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The Soviets could have beaten the Germans without help

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  • Closed Accounts Posts: 2,126 ✭✭✭Reekwind


    realweirdo wrote: »
    The German divisions in Russia peaked at 195 in February 1943, and on other fronts it amounted to 86. These 86 were largely facing threats, potential or real from the Western Allies.
    No, they were garrison troops. There was no real possibility of invasion in, say, August 1941 but it still took 40 divisions to maintain Nazi occupational rule in Western Europe. Similarly, the use of 15 divisions in the SE by 1943, and its later increase, was directly tied to the activity of Tito's Partisans and not the threat of any invasion.
    Gradually from that point on, German divisions on the Eastern Front began to decline and began to rise on other fronts, again to counter the Western allies.
    No one denies that by 1943 the forces in the West began to rise. What has been repeatedly pointed out is that by this point the Germans had already been defeated at Moscow and Stalingrad and thus had lost any hopes of a quick victory. By mid-1943 there was no way for the Nazis to win the war; anything that happens after this point is only hindering or accelerating a Soviet victory.
    By January 1945, they were down to 145 divisions on the Eastern Front but shot up again the next month no doubt in preparation of a new Russian advance. The whole of 1944, German divisions on the Eastern front were at a relatively low number compared to the rest of the war, which hardly points to the Germans struggling in 1944 on the Eastern Front.
    Read that again. Your picture "hardly points to the Germans struggling in 1944 on the Eastern Front"... in the exact period where the Germans were on the defensive and losing vast swathes of territory in punishing engagements. The reduction of forces in the East was largely due to their destruction at the hands of the Soviets. For example, the drop in Eastern divisions from May-July 1944 was largely due to Bagration, losses from which dwarfed any transfers West.
    113 divisions was hardly insubstantial.
    Except that many of those 113 divisions were garrison or militia units that had been hastily called up and were unsuited to combat. It's either that or the Wehrmacht was actually more capable in December 1944 than it was in December 1942.
    This is of course ignoring lend lease which many people unfortunately do, but which in my opinion was significant during the course of the war. I don't want to go through the stats of lend lease again, as they are available elsewhere, but here is an exerpt from a wiki article.
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend-Lease
    Lend Lease has been dealt with earlier in the thread. It accelerated Soviet victory but was not fundamental to it.


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 20,297 ✭✭✭✭Jawgap


    Tony EH wrote: »
    I agree. But my issue is that the Kriegsmarine units wouldn't have been the help that was needed to secure victory in the east in the German's best window of opportunity.

    The Ubootwaffe (which essentially is the Kriegsmarine) would have been pretty much redundant in the east. Sure there would have been targets of opportunity in the gulf of Finland and down in the Black Sea, but it's certain that their contribution would have been minimal to say the least.

    The army units too would have been help, as I said to Realweirdo, in terms of manpower (the vast majority of materiel was in the east) and would have offset the million+ that the Germans lost in Barbarossa, but she was so far off of a victory by the time winter had set in that the difference would simply not have tipped the balance.

    In my opinion, Germany has one chance of success in the east. That is an attack in early 1941, with substantially greater forces than were historically employed, fully mechanised and not reliant on horses, a much better strategic focus than was utilised at the time and a more practical political approach taken in the occupied areas behind the front lines, with a real effort on winning "hearts and minds" (if you'll forgive that awful phrase).

    ...and even then, I find it doubtful that a complete success is on the cards.

    I think you're missing the point about the Kriegsmarine. In a straight Germany / USSR conflict there's no need for the Kriegsmarine, which means the Germans would have been spared the opportunity cost of building, maintaining and operating a reasonably significant navy, and used the men, steel etc for something else.

    Their merchant fleet would have been free to source and supply them from their traditional sources, for example if the Med never happened then that, on it's own, would have freed up a modest 300,000 tonnes of merchant shipping, much of it ocean-going.

    Again, I'm saying the USSR could have been defeated, only that it a straight conflict a bloody stalemate would have been the outcome.

    And while the USSR had impressive manpower resources, technologically, logistically and operationally they were behind the US, and the British.

    Informationally, in terms of intelligence, they were heavily dependent on the Western Allies for their strategic intel.


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 974 ✭✭✭realweirdo


    Tony EH wrote: »
    I agree. But my issue is that the Kriegsmarine units wouldn't have been the help that was needed to secure victory in the east in the German's best window of opportunity.

    The Ubootwaffe (which essentially is the Kriegsmarine) would have been pretty much redundant in the east. Sure there would have been targets of opportunity in the gulf of Finland and down in the Black Sea, but it's certain that their contribution would have been minimal to say the least.

    The army units too would have been help, as I said to Realweirdo, in terms of manpower (the vast majority of materiel was in the east) and would have offset the million+ that the Germans lost in Barbarossa, but she was so far off of a victory by the time winter had set in that the difference would simply not have tipped the balance.

    In my opinion, Germany has one chance of success in the east. That is an attack in early 1941, with substantially greater forces than were historically employed, fully mechanised and not reliant on horses, a much better strategic focus than was utilised at the time and a more practical political approach taken in the occupied areas behind the front lines, with a real effort on winning "hearts and minds" (if you'll forgive that awful phrase).

    ...and even then, I find it doubtful that a complete success is on the cards.

    Sorry Tony, your argument is nowhere near convincing, despite your personal conviction that you are right, which counts for little.

    You imply again that American assistance did not play a huge part in the Russians advance, despite the fact the Americans sent hundreds of thousands of trucks to Russia, the best trucks of either side on the eastern front. You all too easily whitewash facts like this.

    You ignore that the Russians hadn't a single heavy bomber. You ignore that large parts of the lufftwaffe were tied down on the western front in 1944 and 1945 and largely annihalated on that front. Transferred to the eastern front, those lufftwaffe units could have been used with great effect and would in time have destroyed the Russian airforce, a Russian airforce remember that had no material assistance from the allies. In total lendlease accounted for 60% of Soviet aviation fuel as one example, something of course you will discount and minimise as you always do. Lendlease gave a massive boost to the Russian airforce. And you can have tens of thousands of planes, many of them poor quality, but if you have no aviation fuel, you are in trouble, as the Germans discovered towards the end of the war.

    Without air cover, the Russians would be in serious trouble. Again like I said, you aren't really offering a convincing argument.

    Here's more stats on lendlease by the way.

    http://orbat.com/site/sturmvogel/SovLendLease.html


  • Registered Users Posts: 18,822 ✭✭✭✭Tony EH


    So what?

    It's not like the Russians had no trucks, or couldn't build them.

    They produced over a million ZiS 5's alone.

    You see, the problem with your POV, is that it requires a belief that the Russians couldn't produce the goods, if lend lease didn't exist.

    This is, of course, nonsense.

    With the lend lease programs, the Russians could order items that America and Britain could produce easily and allow Russia to ease back on the same items and focus on other areas in extreme and overwhelming numbers. The Russians used prudence and chose, in certain cases, the superior US vehicle over the Russian one, where applicable. But, if they weren't forthcoming, they would have had to continue producing their own domestic vehicle.

    It made perfect sense for Russia to utilise foreign, better designed, trucks and focus their attention on other production, in order to produce overwhelming numbers.

    However, there is nothing, absolutely nothing, to suggest that the Russians would have folded without Lend lease help. It's an absurd point of view and one that is held only by ideologues and those without sufficient knowledge of the period.

    In addition, the Russians didn't need a "single heavy bomber". The war in Russia wasn't that type of war. Both sides in the conflict used tactical airforces. So, this point is completely moot. The war was going to be won on the ground.

    As for your "aviation fuel" point, your % is meaningless without knowing the type of aviation fuel. A large percentage of that fuel was shipped to fuel the lend lease vehicles. For instance, in Murmansk, Hurricanes sat idle, because Soviet grade aviation fuel, which suited their aircraft, was extremely rough on Merlin engines. The VVS had to ask Britain to ship the 100 octane fuel that the RAF used, because the Hurricanes they were using were seizing up, due to the unsuitability of Soviet fuel which was of a lower octane value.

    Context is everything. Simple numbers or percentages are misleading.

    Also, I imply NOTHING. I only state what I know to be fact. I don't believe in "implying" anything. If I want to say something, I'll say it. Implications are an imperfect medium.

    Lastly, I don't "ignore" anything. The simple fact is, is that you are wrong. You don't have the knowledge required and frankly, your stance smacks of a political and ideological air that colours your perception.

    You keep returning to 1944/45 in your posts, while remaining completely ignorant of the fact that the crucial victories in the eastern campaign were won in 1941, 42 and 43, before lend lease made its presence felt in any kind of significance. With the failure of Barbarossa in 1941, the Germans had blown their chance of a "victory" in Russia. She had exhaused her ability to attack on a broad front. There is simply no victory for Germany here, no matter what fantasy you wish to employ.


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 20,297 ✭✭✭✭Jawgap


    Tony EH wrote: »
    So what?

    It's not like the Russians had no trucks, or couldn't build them.

    They produced over a million ZiS 5's alone.

    That would be about 5 times more than all Studebaker US6s produced for the entire war...........and yet, as Khrushchev pointed out in his autobiography, the word 'Studebaker' and derivations of it became the word for 'truck' and slang for 'quality' in Russia. He was somewhat irritated that this remained the case for a long time after the war.
    Tony EH wrote: »

    .......
    However, there is nothing, absolutely nothing, to suggest that the Russians would have folded without Lend lease help. It's an absurd point of view and one that is held only by ideologues and those without sufficient knowledge of the period.

    The Russians would have ejected the Germans from the East, eventually, without Lend / Lease - but without the Western Allies to to do run a strategic air and naval campaign, they wouldn't have got to Berlin.
    Tony EH wrote: »
    In addition, the Russians didn't need a "single heavy bomber". The war in Russia wasn't that type of war. Both sides in the conflict used tactical airforces. So, this point is completely moot. The war was going to be won on the ground.

    No, it became that type of war because they lacked heavy bombers. And both sides lacked heavy bombers because they lacked the technology to build them in the case of the Soviets (despite their early work in this area in the 20s) and the vision to build them in the case of the Germans.

    It also helped the Soviets that so many potential German fighter-bombers and dual use 88s were off trying to bring down US and British heavy bombers instead of setting their sights on Soviet armour.
    Tony EH wrote: »
    As for your "aviation fuel" point, your % is meaningless without knowing the type of aviation fuel. A large percentage of that fuel was shipped to fuel the lend lease vehicles. For instance, in Murmansk, Hurricanes sat idle, because Soviet grade aviation fuel, which suited their aircraft, was extremely rough on Merlin engines. The VVS had to ask Britain to ship the 100 octane fuel that the RAF used, because the Hurricanes they were using were seizing up, due to the unsuitability of Soviet fuel which was of a lower octane value.

    I referenced this in post #18
    During the Winter War for example, the USSR was sold (admittedly not given) over 1,500 million litres of aviation fuel - the good stuff too at 99/100 octane.

    The example of the Hurricanes does illustrate an important point though of how the Soviets lacked certain key technologies - in this instance the ability to refine high octane avgas in sufficient quantities and get it to where it's needed.
    Tony EH wrote: »
    ......
    You keep returning to 1944/45 in your posts, while remaining completely ignorant of the fact that the crucial victories in the eastern campaign were won in 1941, 42 and 43, before lend lease made its presence felt in any kind of significance. With the failure of Barbarossa in 1941, the Germans had blown their chance of a "victory" in Russia. She had exhaused her ability to attack on a broad front. There is simply no victory for Germany here, no matter what fantasy you wish to employ.

    The Germans could never have defeated the USSR, no matter what military defeats they secured. So discussions about broad / narrow fronts are almost moot - one offered the opportunity of failure in a less spectacular fashion than the other.

    .......and aid to the USSR extended far beyond the materiel supplied through Lend / Lease.


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  • Closed Accounts Posts: 20,297 ✭✭✭✭Jawgap


    From "A HIGH-OCTANE WEAPON FOR VICTORY" (Alexander Matveichuk, Ph. D. (History), Member, Russian Academy of Natural Sciences).......

    In 1940, a total of 29,414 million tons of oil was processed at domestic refineries, producing only 883,600 tons of aviation gasoline, 3.477 million tons of automotive gasoline, 5.6 million tons of kerosene, 1.274 million tons of ligroin, 1.459 million tons of diesel fuel, 413,000 tons of naval oil, 9.8 million tons of fuel oil, and 1.469 million tons of various lubricants.

    Of the 883,600 tons of aviation gasoline produced domestically in 1940, an overwhelming proportion was avgas with low octane numbers of 70 to 74. This was almost good enough for obsolete domestically-produced aircraft, but only 4% of the demand for B-78 aviation gasoline, the best of those produced in the Soviet Union and the one needed by the new generation of warplanes, was satisfied across the country.

    Monthly deliveries of 20,000 tons of petroleum products for the Soviet air forces (high-octane aviation gasoline, octane-boosting avgas additives, and lubricants and motor oils) were especially stipulated in the First Protocol. Even this, however, was not enough in the first few trying years of the war. Despite the heroic efforts of Soviet oil workers, the extreme conditions of the war led to a drop in Soviet oil production, from 31 million tons in 1940 to 19.3 million tons in 1945, i.e., a reduction of 37.7%. They also aggravated the difficult situation in the oil industry's refining sector, which turned out to be incapable of fully satisfying the growing demand for high-octane aviation gasolines.

    If 1.269 million tons of aviation gasoline had been produced in the Soviet Union in 1941, only 912,000 tons were produced in 1942. It should also be noted that Soviet refineries were producing avgas with low octane numbers. In 1941, an overwhelming amount (75%) of the aviation gasoline produced had octane numbers from 70 to 74, the ones needed by obsolete types of domestically-produced aircraft.
    In response to a request from the Soviet government, the Allies increased deliveries of high-octane aviation gasolines and lubricants. According to the official data for the years of the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War, 2,159,336 short tons of petroleum products were delivered from the United States alone under Lend-Lease and commercial contracts. The amount of high-octane aviation gasoline, converted into the metric system, was 1,197,587 tons, including 558,428 tons with octane numbers above 99. One other important item: in the nomenclature of American oil deliveries, the Soviet Union also received 267,088 tons of automotive gasoline; 16,870 tons of kerosene; 287,262 tons of fuel oil; 111,676 tons of lubricants; 5,769 tons of paraffin; 4,788 tons of chemical additives; and 999 tons of other products.

    It should be emphasized that in addition to petroleum products, the oil component of Lend-Lease included deliveries to the Soviet Union from the United States of equipment for four refinery complexes, along with drilling rigs and other oil industry equipment, pipe casings and compressor/pump piping, portable collapsible pipelines, instruments, tankers, tank trucks, railroad tanker cars, filling station pumps, and much else.

    One of his final conclusions.......
    It should be noted in general that, being part of the overall Lend-Lease program, the deliveries of petroleum products, refining and oilfield equipment, piping, and other materials from the nations of the anti-Hitler coalition to the Soviet Union helped greatly [my emphasis] in keeping the Soviet armed forces supplied with fuel and lubricants throughout the war, thereby bringing the day of the great victory over our common enemy appreciably closer.


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 20,297 ✭✭✭✭Jawgap


    My last point on this......

    From "LEND-LEASE OIL DIMENSION" by Oleg Anatolyev
    Over the years the Lend-Lease program was in effect, the total volume of just the high-octane aviation gasoline supplied by the Allies to the USSR was 1,197,587 tons, of which 558,428 tons had octane numbers higher than 99.

    It is very clear that the Allies' delivery of octane-boosting additives for preparing high-octane aviation gasolines for the Soviet air forces, and for raising the octane number of automotive gasolines, was no less important. A total of 834,427 tons of these were delivered, of which 732,295 tons came from the United States, and 102,132 tons came from the British refinery in Abadan, Iran.

    Finally, he sums up well (for an economist).....
    We cannot, of course, use the same scale to weigh the goods provided under Lend-Lease against the loss of life incurred by Soviet citizens in paving the way to victory over the common enemy. This was, incidentally, emphasized more than once during and after the war years by prominent government figures in the United States, Britain, and other countries.

    "The Russians paid a price that cannot be measured in dollars," said U.S. Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, who, in assessing the role of Lend-Lease, wrote,

    "It is the millions of Nazi soldiers killed or taken prisoner, the Nazi tanks turned into heaps of scrap iron on the battlefield, and the guns and trucks abandoned by the retreating German armies."

    "We never thought that our Lend-Lease aid was the main factor in the Soviet victory over Hitler on the Eastern Front," noted Harry Hopkins. "It was achieved by the heroism and blood of the Russian army." John Hazard, deputy director of the Soviet department of the Lend-Lease Administration from 1941 to1945, wrote in 1990,

    " I believe there is now hardly anyone in the United States who would dare assert that the deliveries of equipment and foodstuffs under Lend-Lease were the main factor ensuring the victory of the Soviet people and the Red Army in that war. Nevertheless, the Americans who were involved in Lend-Lease still feel enormous satisfaction from knowing that the cargoes we delivered helped fill a gap in supplying the Soviet people and their armed forces."

    As we mark the 65th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, there are a great many different stories in the media with regard to the multilateral cooperation among the nations of the anti-Hitler coalition. Contemporary researchers have shown convincingly that Lend-Lease helped greatly in achieving the great victory of 1945 over humanity's common enemy: German fascism.


  • Registered Users Posts: 18,822 ✭✭✭✭Tony EH


    Jawgap wrote: »
    That would be about 5 times more than all Studebaker US6s produced for the entire war...........and yet, as Khrushchev pointed out in his autobiography, the word 'Studebaker' and derivations of it became the word for 'truck' and slang for 'quality' in Russia. He was somewhat irritated that this remained the case for a long time after the war.

    This is correct. "Studebaker" did become slang for truck. American trucks. The Russians called every American truck, regardless whether it was a Ford or a Dodge a "Studebaker", because it was the type they were most familiar with.

    Like calling a vacuum cleaner a hoover.

    It doesn't mean that the Russians couldn't produce trucks, or that lend lease trucks won the war for them.
    Jawgap wrote: »
    The Russians would have ejected the Germans from the East, eventually, without Lend / Lease - but without the Western Allies to to do run a strategic air and naval campaign, they wouldn't have got to Berlin.

    In your opinion. I disagree. Western help made a Russian victory easier and quicker. But it didn't create it.
    Jawgap wrote: »
    No, it became that type of war because they lacked heavy bombers. And both sides lacked heavy bombers because they lacked the technology to build them in the case of the Soviets (despite their early work in this area in the 20s) and the vision to build them in the case of the Germans.

    Again, they didn't need them. The war wasn't that type of war to begin with. Neither side had heavy bombers, so this point is completely moot.
    Jawgap wrote: »
    The example of the Hurricanes does illustrate an important point though of how the Soviets lacked certain key technologies - in this instance the ability to refine high octane avgas in sufficient quantities and get it to where it's needed.

    The problems with specific aviation fuels and aircraft types is only one issue with LL aircraft. In addition to that, aircraft often sat for months unbuilt, because the Russians had no manuals to use and then when they did, the were often in English. This was also compounded by the fact that spare parts were also in very short supply, leading to units that operated LL aircraft very understrength.

    LL aircraft helped plug gaps. But they didn't win the war. For every 1 encounter with a P40, or a P39, there were dozens of encounters with Yaks or LaGGs.

    My point in illustrating these issues to Realweirdo is to show him that while flat statistics and numbers look great, you have to get to the details in order to appreciate the whole picture.
    Jawgap wrote: »
    The Germans could never have defeated the USSR, no matter what military defeats they secured. So discussions about broad / narrow fronts are almost moot - one offered the opportunity of failure in a less spectacular fashion than the other.

    .......and aid to the USSR extended far beyond the materiel supplied through Lend / Lease.

    I know. But to me, a Russian victory over Germany is probable with or without the west being involved. It certainly would have been longer and more costly. But the final result would have been the same.

    Even if they pushed them all the way to Berlin and accepted a truce, Germany, as a national power, would have been finished. Certainly as a National Socialist entity. She would have been completely isolated, terribly weakened and in severe dire straights after a truce, while the Soviet Union would have gained in strength.

    Look, these fantasy scenarios are all fine and dandy for a bit of academic yap, but nothing ever comes of them in the end and I've these "what if" discussions many times over the years. In the end, the only things that we can be absolutely certain of is what actually happened during the course of the war.


  • Registered Users Posts: 18,822 ✭✭✭✭Tony EH


    Jawgap wrote: »
    One of his final conclusions.......
    It should be noted in general that, being part of the overall Lend-Lease program, the deliveries of petroleum products, refining and oilfield equipment, piping, and other materials from the nations of the anti-Hitler coalition to the Soviet Union helped greatly [my emphasis] in keeping the Soviet armed forces supplied with fuel and lubricants throughout the war, thereby bringing the day of the great victory over our common enemy appreciably closer.

    The underlined italics are the important part.

    Lend lease, as a whole DID bring victory closer. But it did not create it.


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 20,297 ✭✭✭✭Jawgap


    Tony EH wrote: »
    Again, they didn't need them. The war wasn't that type of war to begin with. Neither side had heavy bombers, so this point is completely moot.

    Actually, it was. Every major Air Force, including the Soviets, was led by avowed 'Douhetists.'

    The 20s and 30s were all about strategic bombing and until about 1932 the USSR led the way in heavy bomber development.

    The key failing was they did realise that heavy bombers needed to be heavier and they lacked the technology to develop both the aircraft and bombs that eventually would prove successful.

    And I don't think I suggested that Lend Lease "created" the Soviet victory, only that it's contribution was not insignificant - something I think the Soviet official history I quoted earlier shows and what the last two Russian writers suggest.


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  • Registered Users Posts: 18,822 ✭✭✭✭Tony EH


    That's not really the point.

    The issue is that neither side had heavy bombers, so their war (Germany v Russia) wasn't characterised by them either way.
    And I don't think I suggested that Lend Lease "created" the Soviet victory, only that it's contribution was not insignificant - something I think the Soviet official history I quoted earlier shows and what the last two Russian writers suggest.

    I wasn't saying you did.


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 20,297 ✭✭✭✭Jawgap


    Tony EH wrote: »
    That's not really the point.

    The issue is that neither side had heavy bombers, so their war (Germany v Russia) wasn't characterised by them either way.
    .........

    That's an objective view.

    At the time, everyone thought they had heavy bombers.......in the same way everyone thought 100 tons of bombs would be enough to make any city surrender or that 'precision' bombing was possible or that 'heavy' bombing (by the RAF's definition) was 25 tons per square mile.

    No one knew that the pretty crappy Manchester would go on to become the Lancaster or that it would possible to build and operate something like a B-29 or that it would be possible to consistently pour 125 tons into a square mile.

    Subjectively, at the War's outset, most air forces (parts of the RAF excepted) thought they had a war winning theory and what they thought were heavy bombers - time and technology proved their subjective views to be mis-held.


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 20,297 ✭✭✭✭Jawgap


    Tony EH wrote: »



    In your opinion. I disagree. Western help made a Russian victory easier and quicker. But it didn't create it.



    .

    Yes, a reasoned opinion that I argued out earlier in the thread.

    No counter seems to be offered other than the Soviets appear to have had lots of men and lots of materiel (significant quantities of which were serviceable but lesser quality)

    How, for example, in the absence of Allied aid would they have prevented the Germans supplying themselves by sea? How would they have moved supplies, replacements, reinforcements etc as they moved further west and German lines of communication shortened? How would they have dealt with both the changing terrain and changing (milder relative to the Steppes) weather in the west?

    How could they have overcome the increasing disadvantages of moving west to reach Berlin to force an unconditional surrender?

    Quantity may have a quality all of its own but how does tush application defeat a technologically and organisationally superior foe?


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 974 ✭✭✭realweirdo


    Tony EH wrote: »
    So what?

    It's not like the Russians had no trucks, or couldn't build them.

    They produced over a million ZiS 5's alone.

    You see, the problem with your POV, is that it requires a belief that the Russians couldn't produce the goods, if lend lease didn't exist.

    This is, of course, nonsense.

    With the lend lease programs, the Russians could order items that America and Britain could produce easily and allow Russia to ease back on the same items and focus on other areas in extreme and overwhelming numbers. The Russians used prudence and chose, in certain cases, the superior US vehicle over the Russian one, where applicable. But, if they weren't forthcoming, they would have had to continue producing their own domestic vehicle.

    It made perfect sense for Russia to utilise foreign, better designed, trucks and focus their attention on other production, in order to produce overwhelming numbers.

    However, there is nothing, absolutely nothing, to suggest that the Russians would have folded without Lend lease help. It's an absurd point of view and one that is held only by ideologues and those without sufficient knowledge of the period.

    In addition, the Russians didn't need a "single heavy bomber". The war in Russia wasn't that type of war. Both sides in the conflict used tactical airforces. So, this point is completely moot. The war was going to be won on the ground.

    As for your "aviation fuel" point, your % is meaningless without knowing the type of aviation fuel. A large percentage of that fuel was shipped to fuel the lend lease vehicles. For instance, in Murmansk, Hurricanes sat idle, because Soviet grade aviation fuel, which suited their aircraft, was extremely rough on Merlin engines. The VVS had to ask Britain to ship the 100 octane fuel that the RAF used, because the Hurricanes they were using were seizing up, due to the unsuitability of Soviet fuel which was of a lower octane value.

    Context is everything. Simple numbers or percentages are misleading.

    Also, I imply NOTHING. I only state what I know to be fact. I don't believe in "implying" anything. If I want to say something, I'll say it. Implications are an imperfect medium.

    Lastly, I don't "ignore" anything. The simple fact is, is that you are wrong. You don't have the knowledge required and frankly, your stance smacks of a political and ideological air that colours your perception.

    You keep returning to 1944/45 in your posts, while remaining completely ignorant of the fact that the crucial victories in the eastern campaign were won in 1941, 42 and 43, before lend lease made its presence felt in any kind of significance. With the failure of Barbarossa in 1941, the Germans had blown their chance of a "victory" in Russia. She had exhaused her ability to attack on a broad front. There is simply no victory for Germany here, no matter what fantasy you wish to employ.

    Tony, your posts become increasingly irrational and to be frank immature.

    You have said the impact of Lend Lease had little bearing on the war or at most accelerated the Germans defeat, which of course is also nonsense from you. As has been pointed out by others, Allied assistance came in many forms, Lend Lease being one.

    And for the last time, both Stalin and Zhukov admitted Lend Lease saved their asses. Are you going to put this down to western propaganda too?

    All along I have relied on stats, facts and just as importantly quotes from the Soviet side including soviet historians. And then you claim I have an anti Soviet agenda, one of the reasons I accuse you of being immature. Like I said, just quoting directly from those who did the actual fighting, and who have far more knowledge of this subject than you. I doubt that will stop your immature insults though.

    Now, while you are at it, will you address the point I made earlier in a mature way, back it up with stats if you like - Had the Luftwaffe and the Anti Aircraft brigades not being tied down fighting the allies and fighting Allied HEAVY BOMBERS, where do you think they would have ended up. And do you think the Russian airforce would have survived into 1943 with the full force of the luftwaffe and AA against them?

    Again, the point of the heavy bomber argument is that it tied down thousands of Luftwaffe planes, pilots and AA brigades and hundreds of thousands of German personal. As always, you just simply overlook this point, or write it off as somehow negligible.

    So again I ask Tony, would the Russian airforce have lasted into 1943? Forget the ground war and addres that simple point. A yes/no answer will do, and then we can take it from there on how the rest of the war might have panned out. By the way, when people start using insults or trying to put others down like you do, its a sure sign you are losing the argument.


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 974 ✭✭✭realweirdo


    Jawgap wrote: »
    That's an objective view.

    At the time, everyone thought they had heavy bombers.......in the same way everyone thought 100 tons of bombs would be enough to make any city surrender or that 'precision' bombing was possible or that 'heavy' bombing (by the RAF's definition) was 25 tons per square mile.

    No one knew that the pretty crappy Manchester would go on to become the Lancaster or that it would possible to build and operate something like a B-29 or that it would be possible to consistently pour 125 tons into a square mile.

    Subjectively, at the War's outset, most air forces (parts of the RAF excepted) thought they had a war winning theory and what they thought were heavy bombers - time and technology proved their subjective views to be mis-held.

    There are many points to the Heavy Bomber argument. The main thing is they tied down an awful lot of resources of the Luftwaffe and AA resources which would almost certainly have been used on the Eastern front given that the Russians had not a single bomber to threathen Germany. The bombers also disrupted the V1 campaign, and bombed Pneumende, not destroying the V2 campaign but slowing it down. Of course, Tony will again write all this off as negligible and not being that important.


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 974 ✭✭✭realweirdo


    I know Tony is also going to write this off as not being important, but it was.

    The oil campaign of WW2 involved the bombing of Axis oil production facitilities and resources by Allied bombers. It was hugely successful to the point that in the last year of the war, the Luftwaffe were struggling to put planes in the sky and the Germany Army was struggling to put fuel in its tanks.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defence_of_the_Reich#Impact_on_Axis_oil_production
    Impact on Axis oil production

    The oil campaign was hugely successful. In June 1944, just 56,000 short tons (51,000 t) of oil had been produced against the planned total of 198,000 short tons (180,000 t). Consumption was well above stocks produced since mid-May 1944 so that by the end of June 1944, it had been reduced to a reserve of just 410,000 short tons (370,000 t), a 70% reduction from 30 April 1944.[154] ULTRA intercepts confirmed cutbacks in non-operational flying as a direct consequence. According to Speer, by 21 July 98% of all Axis fuel plants were out of operation. The monthly production fell from 180,000 short tons (160,000 t) in March 1944 to 20,000 short tons (18,000 t) in November; inventory dropped from 575,000 short tons (522,000 t) to 175,000 short tons (159,000 t).[133] The campaign caused huge shortfalls in fuel production and contributed to the impotence of the Luftwaffe in the last 10 months of the war, and the inability of the German Army to conduct counter offensives.[137]

    There were other impacts to the Heavy bombing campaign, but this was one of the big successes which benefitted both the Western allies and the Soviets. The German war machine was more reliant on oil than any other product or raw material and once that resource was degraded, they were in big trouble on all fronts.


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 2,126 ✭✭✭Reekwind


    realweirdo wrote: »
    There are many points to the Heavy Bomber argument. The main thing is they tied down an awful lot of resources of the Luftwaffe and AA resources which would almost certainly have been used on the Eastern front given that the Russians had not a single bomber to threathen Germany.
    And this has been the subject of fierce academic discussion ever since. The bombing campaign was by no means as successful as its advocates like to claim and it's certainly not a foregone conclusion that the programme (which was remarkably expensive) justified its expenditure.

    (Ultimately, the reason that the RAF built up its strategic bombing arm is that there was little else that it could do to influence the course of the war. A 'problem' that the Soviets did not have.)

    As for the resource argument, I find it hard to believe that this was as significant as you make out. Germany produced approx 20k 88 AA guns. Throw in another 5k for other models and assume that every single AA gun was located on the Western Front. That's still just 7% of the 318k guns produced by Germany during the war and does little to close the massive gap that the Soviets (with their 514k guns) enjoyed. I'm not seeing where you're getting this "awful lot of resources" from.

    That's not to say that the bombing campaign was without impact (the impact on infrastructure was particularly important) but it really began to bite late war. By which point Nazi Germany had lost any chance to win and was already being significantly out-produced by the Soviets. All you're talking about is narrowing the gap of the latter slightly.
    The bombers also disrupted the V1 campaign, and bombed Pneumende, not destroying the V2 campaign but slowing it down. Of course, Tony will again write all this off as negligible and not being that important.
    In this case he'd be right. The V1 and V2 programmes were entirely irrelevant to the Eastern Front. They are a classic case of wasting resources on city bombing.


  • Registered Users Posts: 18,822 ✭✭✭✭Tony EH


    Jawgap wrote: »
    That's an objective view.

    At the time, everyone thought they had heavy bombers.......in the same way everyone thought 100 tons of bombs would be enough to make any city surrender or that 'precision' bombing was possible or that 'heavy' bombing (by the RAF's definition) was 25 tons per square mile.

    No one knew that the pretty crappy Manchester would go on to become the Lancaster or that it would possible to build and operate something like a B-29 or that it would be possible to consistently pour 125 tons into a square mile.

    Subjectively, at the War's outset, most air forces (parts of the RAF excepted) thought they had a war winning theory and what they thought were heavy bombers - time and technology proved their subjective views to be mis-held.

    Yeh, I full well about the Douhet "bomber will always get through" nonsense. You're saying nothing new to me here.

    But, again, that's not the point.

    Neither Germany or Russia developed a strategic bomber force. It plays no part in their war against each other.

    Both country's developed a tactical airforce.

    So, unless we factor in a fantasy whereby Germany and Russia somehow develop a strategic bomber fleet in the scenario in question, the issue remains, as I've said twice already...moot.


  • Registered Users Posts: 18,822 ✭✭✭✭Tony EH


    Jawgap wrote: »
    Yes, a reasoned opinion that I argued out earlier in the thread.

    No counter seems to be offered other than the Soviets appear to have had lots of men and lots of materiel (significant quantities of which were serviceable but lesser quality)

    When you have overwhelming numbers in your hand, in a war of attrition (which is what the war in the east became) that can be enough.

    But the Russians didn't just have that in their cap.

    There seems to be this impression that the Red Army simply pushed through the victories on mindless brawn alone. This simply isn't the case. The Red Army of 1942 is different to the one of 1941 and it's different further from 1943. In 1942, they adhered to the old Russian tactic to trade land for time. They engaged in tactical retreats in an organised fashion, much like the Germans did, in early/late 43 and for the rest of the war. They learned from their mistakes in 41 and avoided the losses from blitzkrieg pincers in the new year. There are German accounts of seeing the Red Army in constant retreat before they could get to them. This was a genuine worry for the High Command as you can annihilate any enemy army if you cannot reach them. Franz Halder said "The enemy has again found a way to withdraw his forces from under our nose. Using fierce counter attacks and great skill, they're able to escape intact." A huge about face from his previous diary entry that the war was over after two weeks.

    By the end 1942, the Red Army were engaging in huge blitzkrieg-like encirclement maneuvers themselves, which resulted in the destruction of the 6th Army, the effective collapse of Army Group South and the end of Hitler's strategic ambitions in the Caucasus. Probably the most important objective of Hitler's war in the east.

    By 1943, the Red Army were using the same tactics on the Germans that they were the victims of in the previous years. They'd learned to use the tactics of the enemy on the enemy. "They learned from us" as one German general said. What was at one time a disorganised, haphazard, monster became an highly efficient machine.

    It's a mistake to think that the Russians simply had muscle and only that on their side.
    Jawgap wrote: »
    How, for example, in the absence of Allied aid would they have prevented the Germans supplying themselves by sea?

    Der Deutschen Handelsmarine was very small. In fact, the Axis forces in total only had about 3 million tons. The vast, vast majority of German supplies were moved on land. Even so, once Supplies arrive at port they have to be transported on land anyway by and large.
    Jawgap wrote: »
    How would they have moved supplies, replacements, reinforcements etc as they moved further west and German lines of communication shortened? How would they have dealt with both the changing terrain and changing (milder relative to the Steppes) weather in the west?

    Again, this assumes that the Russians had no (or couldn't build) transport other than what was provided by the west. This is a nonsensical view.

    Even without large numbers of trucks, the Red Army would have to have advanced like the Germans did in 1941. On foot and horse.

    The Russian advance through Germany would have been slower, but it wouldn't been non-existent.

    Lend lease transport vehicles sped up the Russian advance to victory. It did not create it.


  • Registered Users Posts: 18,822 ✭✭✭✭Tony EH


    realweirdo wrote: »
    I know Tony is also going to write this off as not being important, but it was.

    You're obviously not reading what I'm writing, if you think that.


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  • Registered Users Posts: 18,822 ✭✭✭✭Tony EH


    Reekwind wrote: »
    That's not to say that the bombing campaign was without impact (the impact on infrastructure was particularly important) but it really began to bite late war. By which point Nazi Germany had lost any chance to win and was already being significantly out-produced by the Soviets. All you're talking about is narrowing the gap of the latter slightly

    I agree. But it's largest impact was when the switch to bombing oil installations was made in 1944/45. Approximately 915.000 tons of bombs were dropped on Germany alone in 1944, of which 126.000 tons were on oil installations of some kind or another, the largest being 36.000 tons in November. This had a huge effect on Germany's ability to move. In 1945, 83.000 tons out of a total of 380.000 tons were dropped.

    The vast majority of the bombing campaign against Germany (especially Bomber Command) was largely useless. I'll maintain that. Bombing cities at night was great for killing women and children, but it did little for the war effort in the long run and American efforts at disrupting production forced the Germans to diversify, but it didn't do much (or enough) to hamper their output.

    Hitting their oil infrastructure, which the allies took a long time to realise for some reason, did more in a relatively small number of raids than the vast majority of sorties throughout the war.

    But, as you say, by that point the war had swung so fully in favour of the Russians that Germany's future was pretty much assured.


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 20,297 ✭✭✭✭Jawgap


    Tony EH wrote: »
    Yeh, I full well about the Douhet "bomber will always get through" nonsense. You're saying nothing new to me here.

    But, again, that's not the point.

    Neither Germany or Russia developed a strategic bomber force. It plays no part in their war against each other.

    Both country's developed a tactical airforce.

    So, unless we factor in a fantasy whereby Germany and Russia somehow develop a strategic bomber fleet in the scenario in question, the issue remains, as I've said twice already...moot.

    Douhet never said that, it was Baldwin. And the person he was referring to was Trenchard, not Douhet. In fact there's any amount of evidence to suggest Douhet never figured in the RAF's thinking on strategic bombardment as he is not referenced in any of the Cranwell staff papers from the period.

    Neither the Soviets nor the Germans had any concept of a 'tactical' Air Force that concept originated with Slessor, was developed by Tedder (and coincidentally by Wann & Woodall) and implemented by Broadhurst. At which point it was picked up by the Yanks.

    Close air support is but one facet of tactical air power (and the least important one at that).

    Out of interest, just picking an example at random, if the Germans didn't have a strategic Air Force why did they bomb Rotterdam and why did the Soviets bomb Helsinki (using American supplied medium bombers, iirc)?

    So maybe I am telling you something new?


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 20,297 ✭✭✭✭Jawgap


    Tony EH wrote: »
    When you have overwhelming numbers in your hand, in a war of attrition (which is what the war in the east became) that can be enough.

    But the Russians didn't just have that in their cap.

    There seems to be this impression that the Red Army simply pushed through the victories on mindless brawn alone. This simply isn't the case. The Red Army of 1942 is different to the one of 1941 and it's different further from 1943. In 1942, they adhered to the old Russian tactic to trade land for time. They engaged in tactical retreats in an organised fashion, much like the Germans did, in early/late 43 and for the rest of the war. They learned from their mistakes in 41 and avoided the losses from blitzkrieg pincers in the new year. There are German accounts of seeing the Red Army in constant retreat before they could get to them. This was a genuine worry for the High Command as you can annihilate any enemy army if you cannot reach them. Franz Halder said "The enemy has again found a way to withdraw his forces from under our nose. Using fierce counter attacks and great skill, they're able to escape intact." A huge about face from his previous diary entry that the war was over after two weeks.

    By the end 1942, the Red Army were engaging in huge blitzkrieg-like encirclement maneuvers themselves, which resulted in the destruction of the 6th Army, the effective collapse of Army Group South and the end of Hitler's strategic ambitions in the Caucasus. Probably the most important objective of Hitler's war in the east.

    By 1943, the Red Army were using the same tactics on the Germans that they were the victims of in the previous years. They'd learned to use the tactics of the enemy on the enemy. "They learned from us" as one German general said. What was at one time a disorganised, haphazard, monster became an highly efficient machine.

    It's a mistake to think that the Russians simply had muscle and only that on their side.



    Der Deutschen Handelsmarine was very small. In fact, the Axis forces in total only had about 3 million tons. The vast, vast majority of German supplies were moved on land. Even so, once Supplies arrive at port they have to be transported on land anyway by and large.



    Again, this assumes that the Russians had no (or couldn't build) transport other than what was provided by the west. This is a nonsensical view.

    Even without large numbers of trucks, the Red Army would have to have advanced like the Germans did in 1941. On foot and horse.

    The Russian advance through Germany would have been slower, but it wouldn't been non-existent.

    Lend lease transport vehicles sped up the Russian advance to victory. It did not create it.

    It's not their capacity to advance I'm questioning, it's their capacity to sustain a force so far away from its bases of supply for a lengthy period - in short, how would they feed and supply the poor sod on the front line? Especially, if they to re-lay rail lines (Soviet and German gauges were different) and / or build the 1000+ locos they would have had if Lend Lease hadn't supplied them?

    How would they then have operated said locos in a situation where they couldn't possibly have complete air superiority along the front? How far back would they have to de-train? Allied air power compelled the Germans to de-train often 150 miles behind the front - what evidence is there to suggest the Soviets could have endured an imposition of that kind?


  • Registered Users Posts: 18,822 ✭✭✭✭Tony EH


    Jawgap wrote: »
    Douhet never said that, it was Baldwin. And the person he was referring to was Trenchard, not Douhet. In fact there's any amount of evidence to suggest Douhet never figured in the RAF's thinking on strategic bombardment as he is not referenced in any of the Cranwell staff papers from the period.

    Neither the Soviets nor the Germans had any concept of a 'tactical' Air Force that concept originated with Slessor, was developed by Tedder (and coincidentally by Wann & Woodall) and implemented by Broadhurst. At which point it was picked up by the Yanks.

    Close air support is but one facet of tactical air power (and the least important one at that).

    Out of interest, just picking an example at random, if the Germans didn't have a strategic Air Force why did they bomb Rotterdam and why did the Soviets bomb Helsinki (using American supplied medium bombers, iirc)?

    So maybe I am telling you something new?

    I'll clarify then. I'm well aware of Douhet and Baldwin and the pre-war positions on bombing.

    No, you're telling me nothing new.

    Both the Germans and the Russians developed airforces, whose concept was tactical support of the land army. In the case of the Germans, especially, the Luftwaffe was to act as flying artillery. It was never envisaged as a strategic weapon and when forced to be employed as such, was an absolute failure, as evidenced during the Battle of Britain.

    For the attack on Rotterdam, the Luftwaffe was to pave the way for the Germany Army waiting outside the city limits. It's main targets were troop concentrations, flak and artillery positions and the port area. The original plan of attack was largely a tactical operation, with strategic elements. That being the attack on the ports.

    However, from its inception the Kampfgeschwader was NEVER designed as anything but a tactical weapon.

    Likewise the VVS was never designed as a strategic weapon, even if it was press-ganged into such ops on occasion, such as bombing Romanian oil production in 1941. It's main use and reason for existence was to directly support the land army on the battlefield.


  • Registered Users Posts: 18,822 ✭✭✭✭Tony EH


    Jawgap wrote: »
    It's not their capacity to advance I'm questioning, it's their capacity to sustain a force so far away from its bases of supply for a lengthy period - in short, how would they feed and supply the poor sod on the front line? Especially, if they to re-lay rail lines (Soviet and German gauges were different) and / or build the 1000+ locos they would have had if Lend Lease hadn't supplied them?

    How would they then have operated said locos in a situation where they couldn't possibly have complete air superiority along the front? How far back would they have to de-train? Allied air power compelled the Germans to de-train often 150 miles behind the front - what evidence is there to suggest the Soviets could have endured an imposition of that kind?

    If the Russians proved one thing in the war historically, it was their ability to adapt to the most extreme conditions. Also, by 1944, the Russians had been outputting more armour than was necessary, enabled by lend lease shipments. So much so that they could afford to equip their reserves with first class front line equipment in many cases. They could have, if forced to, paired back on that production and channeled it into other areas. This wouldn't have been impossible.

    Also, as I've said already. If a mechanised contrubution wasn't available (although it would have been, just not in the same numbers) they would have utilised horse transport, much in the same way that the Germans had to in 1941.

    For locomotive transport, they were already using a large amount of Polish rolling stock by the time they reached the German border in 1944 and no doubt, if forced to retool the under carriages of stock they would have. Or, you relay track, like the Germans had to do in 1941. It took time and a lot of manpower...both of which the Russians had on their side, more so than the Germans did when they invaded.

    It would have taken longer, but it's not as if they would have been completely immobile.


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 20,297 ✭✭✭✭Jawgap


    I think it's time for me to now out of this thread. I think the point have been well aired but the discussion on strategic / tactical bombardment is somewhat limited.

    Close air is not tactical air power only a part of it and the confusion around strategic bombardment seems to be driven by references to scholarship that are at least 5 years to a decade out of date - something Overy can be blamed for.

    (For anyone referencing his recent book I'd suggest looking at the papers from the original conference on which it is based that he DIDN'T use.)


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 974 ✭✭✭realweirdo


    It's certainly and exhausting and complex issue with no easy straight forward answers.
    I stick to my belief the Russians couldn't have delivered a knockout blow to the Germans by themselves.

    The German army was hugely degraded in the latter stages of the war, and much of that degradation came from the Western Allies. 5 years of the Germany war economy being choked from land, air and sea was beginning to take it's toll.

    There are many ways this impacted the Germans ability to fight. To take just one simple example, because of the fuel shortages, new pilots were given less and less hours of training, to the point they were thrown into battle with little training. Would this have been the case had Germany maintained an even amount of fuel production throughout the war, I doubt it. By itself not enough to decide the war, of course not, but an accumalation of hundreds of similar problems took their toll. Germans against Russians in a straight fight with no other distractions, I'm sure the Germans would have held their own. The other factor that cost the Germans big time was Hitler's mistakes. As Tony said, the Russians were willing to retreat to avoid encirclement. Throughout the war, Hitler's favoured approach was "not a single inch of retreat". Though some commanders on the ground went against this order and in the latter stages of the war the Germans had no option but to retreat, although entire armies were indeed encircled and cut off, these foolish and naive orders from the top cost the Germans to lose many of their best soldiers to captivity.


  • Registered Users Posts: 18,822 ✭✭✭✭Tony EH


    realweirdo wrote: »
    There are many ways this impacted the Germans ability to fight. To take just one simple example, because of the fuel shortages, new pilots were given less and less hours of training, to the point they were thrown into battle with little training.

    This had already been the case in 1943, before the allies had targeted German oil installations. The reason being the rate of attrition was against them. Your scenario simply compounds an issue that was already in effect.
    realweirdo wrote: »
    Would this have been the case had Germany maintained an even amount of fuel production throughout the war, I doubt it.

    Germany's largest source of oil was from Romania. In a situation, as you've outlined, in a straight fight verses Russia, can Hitler use Romanian oil in the way he did historically? I would guess not. Germany has to buy in her oil and it wouldn't be as readily available as it was under the conditions that factually existed, whereby the Germans were effectively getting the lion's share of what Romania produced because of allied agreements.

    Fuel, however, was always in short supply, even in 1942. It's always the biggest complaint of any army. But, the shortages weren't just there. Trainers were in severely short supply. A lot of them (especially from blind flying and bomber schools) were actually shipped to Russia to plug the gaps in casualties. Many never returned.

    Again, though, the catastrophic impact of hitting German oil installations is not really felt until late 44 and into 45 and this, as has been repeatedly said is in the years after the Soviets have turned the tide irrevocably in their favour.
    realweirdo wrote: »
    Hitler's favoured approach was "not a single inch of retreat". Though some commanders on the ground went against this order and in the latter stages of the war the Germans had no option but to retreat, although entire armies were indeed encircled and cut off, these foolish and naive orders from the top cost the Germans to lose many of their best soldiers to captivity.

    Hitler may have ordered such measures on occasion, Stalin gave the same orders in 1941 too. However, the situation on the ground was very often different to what Hitler had ordered. But, "Stand and fight" orders are sometimes the thing to do, as evidenced at Moscow in 1941. The German retreat there could have been much, much worse if units were simply allowed to collapse. Likewise, at Stalingrad, there is a school of thought that a retreat of the 6th Army before Christmas would have led to the complete capture of units in the Caucasus. The 6th Army did a lot to hold open a corridor allowing German units to escape being cut off and destroyed.


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 20,297 ✭✭✭✭Jawgap


    Tony EH wrote: »
    ......



    Germany's largest source of oil was from Romania. In a situation, as you've outlined, in a straight fight verses Russia, can Hitler use Romanian oil in the way he did historically? I would guess not. Germany has to buy in her oil and it wouldn't be as readily available as it was under the conditions that factually existed, whereby the Germans were effectively getting the lion's share of what Romania produced because of allied agreements.

    .....

    I know I said I'd stay out of it, but this begs a reply.

    If the scenario is a straight German / USSR conflict with the British, the US etc remaining non-aligned, then surely Germany could have maintained its pre-War pattern of imports and continued to.....
    1. Rely on its traditional pre-War sources of POL products - the United States, Venezuela, the Dutch East Indies, and Mexico (as well as the USSR & Romania)
    2. Continued, unhindered, to have expanded their synthetic fuel and hydrogenation plant construction programme

    Pre-war US consumption alone was over 1 billion barrels - they could easily have met German demands for more, given that German peace time demands were only 44 million barrels.

    BTW, of that 44 million barrels (1938 consumption estimate) - imports from overseas accounted for 28 million barrels (64%) - only 3.8 million barrels (9%) were imported overland from European sources and of that 2.8 million barrels came from Romania (6%) - Romania was not a historically important supplier of POL to Germany and only became so when the British and, latterly, the US navies began their blockade, does that not fall under the category of 'help'?

    Royal Dutch Shell was the largest transporter of POL products during the 1930s. At the outset of the War they had a fleet of over 2.3 million tons and in 1938 they transported over 25.5 million tons (not barrels) of POL products - given their location, in a straight Germany / USSR conflict who do you think they'd be more minded to do business with?


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  • Closed Accounts Posts: 20,297 ✭✭✭✭Jawgap


    Tony EH wrote: »

    For locomotive transport, they were already using a large amount of Polish rolling stock by the time they reached the German border in 1944 and no doubt, if forced to retool the under carriages of stock they would have. Or, you relay track, like the Germans had to do in 1941. It took time and a lot of manpower...both of which the Russians had on their side, more so than the Germans did when they invaded.

    It would have taken longer, but it's not as if they would have been completely immobile.

    Out of interest, how would they have re-laid track - or more precisely where would they have got the track to relay from?

    The Allies delivered 622,100 tonnes of rail line to the USSR - while the Soviets produced less than a 10% of that (48,990) - if they had to build their own railways where would they have got the steel, the sleepers and the ties - Lend Lease provided over 140,000 tonnes of joints and splice bars; 80,000 tonnes of switching gear; and, 30,000 tonnes of ties......it takes more than time and manpower to build and operate a railway.


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