The Soviets could have beaten the Germans without help

realweirdo · 09-05-2014 8:56pm

Tony EH wrote: »

Wrong. The T-34 used a Christie suspension, like many other tanks around the world, but that wouldn't make it a "western design".

Also, I'll repeat this. In total, LL accounted for just 15% of everything used by the Soviets during the war.

It wasn't essential, it wasn't a turning point and didn't win the war for the Russians. LL certainly helped, but most certainly did not win the war for Russia.

In the main, LL didn't really make its presence felt until late 43, by which time the Russians had beaten the Germans at Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk and with their own equipment by and large.

They didn't need a heavy bomber. Their airforce was a tactical one, just like the Germans. In addition, the Allied bombing campaign was largely a waste of time, until it focused on fuel in 1945. German production went UP in 1944 at the height of bombing.

As for the V1 and V2, while they look the part, they were largely useless and the money would have been better spent elsewhere. A huge amount of V weapons fell incredibly short of their targets. While they were great for propaganda, they weren't a war winning weapon, by any stretch of the imagination and they would have been very useful on the eastern front.

I'm sorry, but this is just completely incorrect.

If you think that the battles on the Eastern Front were any less "modern" than they were in the West, then you simply do not have a strong enough grasp of the war in Europe, I'm afraid.

And the code breaking by the British which was passed to the soviets in the build up the battle of Kursk? Negligible too?

As for the battles on the eastern front, in the early days, guys who actually fought on the ground reported one rifle for several men. I'm going to accept their word against yours.

As for the latter stages of the conflict, you've pretty much argued the case for lend lease - 90% of the trucks at wars end in the soviet army were american made. You simply can't have it both ways. The fact is the Americans helped turn the Soviet army into a modern army that moved men, supplies and ammunition by trucks. Not to mention the thousands of fighter planes as well as virtually all the aviation fuel. As well as the 2000 train engines donated by the Americans (The soviets had 90 at the outbreak of war).

To say American and British help was negligible is simply farcical in the extreme.

Wurzelbert · 09-05-2014 9:40pm

realweirdo wrote: »

And the code breaking by the British which was passed to the soviets in the build up the battle of Kursk? Negligible too?
[..]

and not just western code breaking…also basic old-school treason by the likes of the red orchestra and others in germany throughout the war…like at kursk the sovs knew what was coming and had time to prepare, otherwise they would have lost despite their massive numerical advantage, simple as that…and nobody ever won any serious engagement against german front line forces unless they totally outnumbered them – incl. air, resources and all…and the allies - west and east - knew it…

Jawgap · 09-05-2014 9:43pm

Wurzelbert wrote: »

and not just western code breaking…also basic old-school treason by the likes of the red orchestra and others in germany throughout the war…like at kursk the sovs knew what was coming and had time to prepare, otherwise they would have lost despite their massive numerical advantage, simple as that…and nobody ever won any serious engagement against german front line forces unless they totally outnumbered them – incl. air, resources and all…and the allies - west and east - knew it…

Oh, I think there's one or two veterans of the Italian campaign would take serious issue with that statement

cerastes · 09-05-2014 9:57pm

Jawgap wrote: »

Oh, I think there's one or two veterans of the Italian campaign would take serious issue with that statement

The Germans weren't outnumbered in the Italian campaign?
airpower, naval, Id be suprised if they weren't out numbered in manpower too.

Are you saying the Germans outnumbered the Allied forces in Italy and still managed to be beaten?

My understanding was they surrendered at the end of the war having not being completely defeated

Wurzelbert · 09-05-2014 9:59pm

Jawgap wrote: »

Oh, I think there's one or two veterans of the Italian campaign would take serious issue with that statement

of course they would…after all they see themselves as „the greatest generation“, yet they were by and large spared any serious reality checks throughout the war due to their side’s total supremacy in pretty much everything from 43 on…everybody could have won with that…

cerastes · 09-05-2014 10:08pm

Wurzelbert wrote: »

of course they would…after all they see themselves as „the greatest generation“, yet they were by and large spared any serious reality checks throughout the war due to their side’s total supremacy in pretty much everything from 43 on…everybody could have won with that…

Id have to disagree with that and the previous poster,
I knew of two people who were present in Italy, of them one I spoke to about it (I enquired), he was well aware of the grim reality of war having been seriously injured, of the little he spoke of it, looking back on it as an adult, he was telling me of the horror of war, thiongs you might expect to hear, but from a person who had been there made it seem very real, and it didnt sound an easy thing that he had been involved in as an Infantry man and he knew it, never mentioned anything about their sides supremacy.

Jawgap · 09-05-2014 10:43pm

cerastes wrote: »

The Germans weren't outnumbered in the Italian campaign?
airpower, naval, Id be suprised if they weren't out numbered in manpower too.

Are you saying the Germans outnumbered the Allied forces in Italy and still managed to be beaten?

My understanding was they surrendered at the end of the war having not being completely defeated

In terms of numbers of divisions, both were evenly matched. The Allies had overwhelming numbers BUT they had a generously staffed logistics tail.

In terms of frontline troops vs frontline troops the numbers were very evenly balanced.

The Allies enjoyed total air superiority but again not much good during the autumn and winter campaigns in 1944 through to 1945 when they were grounded for long stretches.

The Germans also had the huge advantage of terrain - mountains, rivers, vineyards, terraces, canals etc all lay across the Allied axis of advance and all were excellent as obstacles or as lines of defence.

Finally, for all the Allies largesse, Italy was stripped of forces to fight elsewhere (NWE, S of France, the Balkans and Greece) and was provided with only a limited supply lift, a significant portion of which was allocated to XV Air Force.

And they still managed to fight ridge to ridge and valley to valley to defeat the German forces there.

Jawgap · 09-05-2014 10:50pm

cerastes wrote: »

Id have to disagree with that and the previous poster,
I knew of two people who were present in Italy, of them one I spoke to about it (I enquired), he was well aware of the grim reality of war having been seriously injured, of the little he spoke of it, looking back on it as an adult, he was telling me of the horror of war, thiongs you might expect to hear, but from a person who had been there made it seem very real, and it didnt sound an easy thing that he had been involved in as an Infantry man and he knew it, never mentioned anything about their sides supremacy.

I've interviewed a few vets from the campaign, and been involved in researching archival material and you hear and read some truly gruesome stories from Italy - especially in the final winter of the War.

Mountain warfare in the winter is about as brutal as it gets, especially if you're the guys trying to maintain the offensive.

audidiesel · 09-05-2014 11:09pm

If the Nazi's didn't have to concentrate any resources on the west and the Soviets did not have the advantage of western supplies, would the prospect of further advanced Nazi weaponry come into play? The war could have stalemated to an extent. Stalemate would have suited the Soviets, due to their numbers.

For example if the war went into 1946, could the Nazi's have created the bomb by this stage? They certainly had the brains to develop it.

Food and material shortages would have become a factor for the Soviets. A massively displaced population with low morale (assuming Moscow, Leningrad etc were conquered). It would have been a damn close run thing.

While the Russians had a spectacular numerical advantage, I think that without external factors, the Nazi's would have won. The German soldiers were better trained and tactically probably the greatest soldiers of their time. Once hitler let his commanders command, they could have done it. If Hitler dictated the battles/tactics, the Soviets would probably have won regardless.

Wurzelbert · 09-05-2014 11:14pm

Jawgap wrote: »

I've interviewed a few vets from the campaign, and been involved in researching archival material and you hear and read some truly gruesome stories from Italy - especially in the final winter of the War.

Mountain warfare in the winter is about as brutal as it gets, especially if you're the guys trying to maintain the offensive.

oh of course, to the individual soldier war is always tough, no question…and americans died like everybody else when shot and they did get cold in winter, too…

Jawgap · 10-05-2014 7:23am

A few points about the Italian campaign.......

This is North Apennines in winter.......and Riva Ridge in particular.....

10th Mountain attacked and took this ridge........in the winter......and at night. And then had to keep on going - as you can see there's even higher ground beyond.

Also, if you have a look at any photos from that time taken by the Allies you noticed several things - one being the number of mules in use because of the terrain. The most heavily mechanised force in history was thrown back to using a means of transport from antiquity.....

Through December and January 1944/45, the Allied artillery were rationed to 25 rounds per gun per day - I don't think there is an example of another Allied theatre having to employ ammunition rationing that late in the war?

The casualty rates were 'impressive' - Division diaries record very heavy casualties among officers - and not just the junior officers, there's a couple of instances where over 70% of a battalion's officers were killed or injured in an action. The Kiwis suffered casualties in 1944 that equated to twice their ration strength and during the winter of 44/45 non-combat losses exceed combat losses in the Eighth Army.

....and if you were wounded during the winter mountain fighting you had two choices - get up (if you could) and stagger off down the mountain to the aid post, which could be extra problematic if it was night-time and you had to navigate down mountain tracks over territory just seized and still littered with mines and booby-traps - or you could wait until your mates could afford the eight men it needed to carry one wounded down the mountains or you could wait until the eight stretcher bearers found you.

It's not for nothing one of the campaign histories is called "a hard way to make war."

Just a final point on numbers - checking the sources it seems Allied divisions in the battle zone outnumbered Germans up until the fall of Rome, thereafter the Germans outnumber the Allies, as divisions were stripped out for the ANVIL/DRAGOON landings, the occupation of Greece and to fulfil the wish of the Canadian government that all their forces serve together.

The Germans also had substantially more divisions in the whole country as their rear security requirements were greater - in December 1944, for instance they had 27 divisions in the country (20 of which were engaged in the battle zone) whereas the Allies had 20 divisions (19 of which were engaged in the battle zone).

Tony EH · 10-05-2014 5:17pm

realweirdo wrote: »

And the code breaking by the British which was passed to the soviets in the build up the battle of Kursk? Negligible too?

The Soviets were well aware of the German plans for Zitadelle, with or without Western information. The reason being the quite obvious bulge in the Soviet line. One didn't have to be a strategic genius to see that particular thorn in the German's side. The Russians had taken measures for the offensive before any intel from the west came their way.

In addition, it was the Lucy Spy Ring, headed by a German, that first offered information about a German offensive plan against the salient.

This was further verified with their soviet spy John Cairncross, at Bletchley.

As for your "negligible" remark, I don't believe anyone, except you, has said such a word.

realweirdo wrote: »

As for the battles on the eastern front, in the early days, guys who actually fought on the ground reported one rifle for several men. I'm going to accept their word against yours.

If your going to get your "history" from movies like 'Enemy at the Gates', then you'll be drawing the shortest straw every time.

There were plenty of arms to go around for Soviet soldiers, even during the "early days".

The 1 rifle for 2 is actually from the First World War, when Russia logistics had broken down.

Perhaps there were local cases of last ditch, desperate, attempts at defence were there wasn't enough arms for encircled Russian defenders, but it certainly was not a widespread issue across the Red Army, at any stage of the war.

realweirdo wrote: »

As for the latter stages of the conflict, you've pretty much argued the case for lend lease - 90% of the trucks at wars end in the soviet army were american made. You simply can't have it both ways. The fact is the Americans helped turn the Soviet army into a modern army that moved men, supplies and ammunition by trucks. Not to mention the thousands of fighter planes as well as virtually all the aviation fuel. As well as the 2000 train engines donated by the Americans (The soviets had 90 at the outbreak of war).

The key point here of course is "...at wars end". You'll find, however that the Soviet vehicle park did not contain that amount of Fords, Dodges and Studebakers during the years previous to 1945. It was MUCH lower for 1943 and early 44, by which time the Russians had already won their most important strategic victories, at Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk.

There isn't any "both ways", just the one.

Lend lease did not have an real impact until late 1943.

For the major battles of 1944 and 45, like Bagration, LL was helpful. Nobody has said otherwise. But before that, the Russians won their most important victories largely with their own equipment and their own blood.

After Kursk, there was only one way for the German Army to go. Lend lease helped speed up that inevitability, but it was going to happen anyhow.

realweirdo wrote: »

To say American and British help was negligible is simply farcical in the extreme.

Again, nobody had said the word "negligible", except you.

realweirdo · 11-05-2014 3:28pm

Tony EH wrote: »

Again, nobody had said the word "negligible", except you.

What are you talking about? Implicit in your whole argument is your opinion that the Soviets would have won sooner or later without outside help, which is of course nonsense. The American and British war effort was massive, not some slight distraction to the main eastern front where you argue the war was truely won. It wasn't won by the Russians, and it's unlikely they would have won it before 1950 without the help of the western allies.

And saying the Russians would have won "sooner or later" without outside help misses the entire point. Had the war continued on until the late '40s or even reached stalemate, there is a probabiliity the Germans would have developed nuclear capability by that stage and certainly have far more advanced weapons and in greater numbers. Increased numbers of ballistic missiles with greater accuracy, cruise weapons, jet fighters and bombers and so on. That's not to mention the 4 or 5 million Germany soldiers and allies tied down fighting the western allies on other fronts.

Beating the Germans at Stalingrad and drawing with them at Kursk did not end the war. The Russians still had to turn the tide against a German Army that had to continually dilute its effort on the eastern front to fight in the west. And it wasn't just a slight dilution, something like 75% of their airforce and their best pilots were sent west.

Tony EH · 12-05-2014 12:11am

realweirdo wrote: »

What are you talking about? Implicit in your whole argument is your opinion that the Soviets would have won sooner or later without outside help, which is of course nonsense.

Wrong.

It's obvious to any serious student of the war that the Soviets had gained the upper hand in mid 1943 and that the Germans had lost the ability to mount any real effort at a large scale assault of the kind seen in the two previous years and with the subsequent battering that the Germans took and continued to take all across the front, it's also obvious that a successful conclusion to the war in the east was lost too.

Germany threw her three dice in 1941 and with the failure of Barbarossa, she wouldn't be able to throw those three dice again and instead would have to make do with one. When Blau failed at Stalingrad, her remaining dice was thrown at Kursk and once that was done, she was finished as a major attacker in the east.

The very best Germany could have hoped for would have been a stalemate of some kind.

realweirdo wrote: »

The American and British war effort was massive, not some slight distraction to the main eastern front where you argue the war was truely won. It wasn't won by the Russians, and it's unlikely they would have won it before 1950 without the help of the western allies.

Wrong again.

realweirdo wrote: »

And saying the Russians would have won "sooner or later" without outside help misses the entire point. Had the war continued on until the late '40s or even reached stalemate, there is a probabiliity the Germans would have developed nuclear capability by that stage and certainly have far more advanced weapons and in greater numbers. Increased numbers of ballistic missiles with greater accuracy, cruise weapons, jet fighters and bombers and so on. That's not to mention the 4 or 5 million Germany soldiers and allies tied down fighting the western allies on other fronts.

Again wrong.

Germany was at the very least 10 years away from developing a viable atomic weapon. Hitler never really had that much of an interest in it, as he considered it "Jewish" science. The Germans were just nowhere near to developing a successful weapon.

In addition, they had LOST the initiative on the eastern front in mid-1943, NEVER to regain it and she would continue to lose the attrition war into the bargain. There is simply no success for Germany in the eastern front, after the Soviets gained the upper hand in 1943. None.

Her retreat to her own borders was inexorable and inevitable. There is just no way around that fact, no matter what fantasy you wish to indulge in.

I agree with David Glantz's opinion on this matter, that at most, the war would have dragged on for another year, or 18 months.

That the Germans actually managed to hold out for another one and half years after 1943 in reality, is nothing short of a miracle, given the weight of the tide that faced them. There is nothing but retreat for the Germans after 1943. There's a reason why a posting to the Russian Front struck fear into the heart of the average Landser.

realweirdo wrote: »

Beating the Germans at Stalingrad and drawing with them at Kursk did not end the war. The Russians still had to turn the tide against a German Army that had to continually dilute its effort on the eastern front to fight in the west. And it wasn't just a slight dilution, something like 75% of their airforce and their best pilots were sent west.

The Germans LOST at Kursk, you need to get your facts straight, if you want to be taken seriously. After Kursk, the Russians continued to smash German divisions all across the front for the rest of the year. The Germans retreated for miles. They took another pounding at the Dnieper a month later. It was through Herculean efforts and the Russians running out of steam for the Germans to eventually stabilised their front.

As for their airforce, large amounts of the Jagdwaffe were sent back and forth from east to west. It wasn't a one way system. But, in any case, the war in the east was not going to be won in the air. No war is. Wars are won on the ground and in that respect, the Soviets had the greater advantage.

Plus, by 1943, the Germans had already engaged in loosing their training programs and had to do so to a much higher degree by the time 1944 came around, while at the same time, the VVS were training their pilots better.

Without a doubt, the extra units employed elsewhere would have come in handy for the Germans, but it just would not have been enough to turn the tide.

Ping Chow Chi · 16-05-2014 3:59pm

I am no expert, but wasn't there engagements between Britian and Germany (and its allies) before Kursk?

Tony EH · 16-05-2014 4:24pm

Of course. The war had been ongoing from September 1939, with the first major engagements between British and German forces in France in 1940.

Jawgap · 16-05-2014 6:08pm

.....not forgetting Khalkin Gol where the Soviets first engaged the Japanese but I think this predated the Tripartite Pact so perhaps doesn't 'count' as an action against the Axis, as such.

realweirdo · 21-05-2014 5:10pm

Tony EH wrote: »

Without a doubt, the extra units employed elsewhere would have come in handy for the Germans, but it just would not have been enough to turn the tide.

This is fairly typical of how you underplay facts that don't fit your argument.

You call the 4-5 million men tied up on fronts other than the eastern front towards the end of the war as merely "other units".

Given that a division at the time was 10-20,000 men, this would equate to at least 200 divisions minimum, or to take an average of 15,000 per division, 300 divisions. Including several panzer divisions, as well at the 75% of the Lufftwaffe engaged on other fronts, artillery and so on.

It's frankly laughable you would relegate these to being mere "extra units".

When something suits your argument you overplay and exaggerate it to the maximum. When it doesn't suit, you completely underplay it.

There is absolutely no question that the fact the Germans had to divide their forces between not just 1 or 2, but 3 and more fronts (including the Atlantic War) had a huge bearing on their defeat in the end. They were completely overstretched and overambitious.

Tony EH · 21-05-2014 6:26pm

realweirdo wrote: »

This is fairly typical of how you underplay facts that don't fit your argument.

You call the 4-5 million men tied up on fronts other than the eastern front towards the end of the war as merely "other units".

...and this is a prime example of your lack of knowledge on the subject.

By 1945, the Wehrmacht was a completely spent army. Their training levels had plummeted and they were forced to enlist old men and boys to fill out their depleted ranks. In fact, standards had been dropping steadily since the beginning of 1943.

These units would have been steamrollered with little difficulty by the Red Army.

By the end of the war the Wehrmacht was a shadow of itself. "Stomach battalions", rear echelon barely trained troops, Volksstrum, 60 year old men and 15 year old boys. They would have been slaughtered.

realweirdo wrote: »

It's frankly laughable you would relegate these to being mere "extra units".

When something suits your argument you overplay and exaggerate it to the maximum. When it doesn't suit, you completely underplay it.

What you may or may not find laughable is immaterial.

I certainly don't overplay anything or exaggerate anything. There's nothing in that for me to gain.

I have no stake in the war. I am ONLY interested in fact.

realweirdo wrote: »

There is absolutely no question that the fact the Germans had to divide their forces between not just 1 or 2, but 3 and more fronts (including the Atlantic War) had a huge bearing on their defeat in the end. They were completely overstretched and overambitious.

The Units employed in the Atlantic war would have been of little use to the German struggle in the east. That war was going to be won on land.

In addition, the ONLY chance Germany had for a victory over Russia was if they had completely destroyed the Red Army in 1941, and even then it would still mean a long and difficult war against the Russian people itself.

Once Russia had consolidated her men and material, moved her industry back to the Urals, the war became a waiting game in Russia's favour.

The units that Germany left in the west was a mere skeleton crew and certainly not enough to turn the tide in their only real opportunity in 1941.

After that the attrition war was well within the Soviets hands.

It is true that the German defeat was compounded and accelerated by her having to necessitate a multi-front war. You won't find anyone who would disagree with that.

However, her defeat would have come eventually, in any case.

Reekwind · 21-05-2014 7:09pm

realweirdo wrote: »

You call the 4-5 million men tied up on fronts other than the eastern front towards the end of the war as merely "other units".

Given that a division at the time was 10-20,000 men, this would equate to at least 200 divisions minimum, or to take an average of 15,000 per division, 300 divisions

Where are you pulling these fantasy numbers from? Because if you add 200 divisions ("minimum" :eek:) to the Eastern Front in 1943 then you more than double the number of German divisions on that front. And I'd hope that no one here is stupid enough to think that over half the Nazi divisions were loitering around Europe when the Army Groups were getting chewed up in Russia.

Jawgap · 21-05-2014 7:44pm

Tony EH wrote: »

..

.......

The units that Germany left in the west was a mere skeleton crew and certainly not enough to turn the tide in their only real opportunity in 1941.

........

I think your otherwise well written and argued posts are slightly let down by statements such as this - some of the panzer / panzer grenadier, fallschirmjaeger, gebirgsjäger and Luftwaffe field divisions were hardly 'mere skeleton crew' - likewise, some of the more capable German commanders fought in the West.

The USSR mounted the most important land campaign without a doubt, but the rest of the Allies weren't exactly fighting old men and boys until very much later in the War.

Likewise, the USSR didn't mount any major jungle warfare operations against the Japanese, any major mountain warfare offensives, nor did they mount any significant amphibious operations - or any genuinely combined operation during the war - and by 'combined' I mean land, air and sea.

realweirdo · 21-05-2014 8:06pm

Reekwind wrote: »

Where are you pulling these fantasy numbers from? Because if you add 200 divisions ("minimum" :eek:) to the Eastern Front in 1943 then you more than double the number of German divisions on that front. And I'd hope that no one here is stupid enough to think that over half the Nazi divisions were loitering around Europe when the Army Groups were getting chewed up in Russia.

I didn't have time to research this during work hours for obvious reasons.

Here is a more accurate portrait though.

http://www.axishistory.com/books/134-campaigns-a-operations/campaigns-a-operations/2085-number-of-german-divisions-by-front-in-world-war-ii

The German divisions in Russia peaked at 195 in February 1943, and on other fronts it amounted to 86. These 86 were largely facing threats, potential or real from the Western Allies.

Gradually from that point on, German divisions on the Eastern Front began to decline and began to rise on other fronts, again to counter the Western allies.

By January 1945, they were down to 145 divisions on the Eastern Front but shot up again the next month no doubt in preparation of a new Russian advance. The whole of 1944, German divisions on the Eastern front were at a relatively low number compared to the rest of the war, which hardly points to the Germans struggling in 1944 on the Eastern Front.

Meanwhile on all other fronts, from 86 divisions on the Eastern front in February 1943, it slowly began to rise until it was at 113 divisions at wars end as opposed to 163 divisions on the eastern front. 113 divisions was hardly insubstantial.

This is of course ignoring lend lease which many people unfortunately do, but which in my opinion was significant during the course of the war. I don't want to go through the stats of lend lease again, as they are available elsewhere, but here is an exerpt from a wiki article.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend-Lease

Much of the aid can be better understood when considering the economic distortions caused by the war. Most belligerent powers cut back severely on production of non-essentials, concentrating on producing weapons. This inevitably produced shortages of related products needed by the military or as part of the military-industrial complex.

The USSR was highly dependent on rail transportation, but the war practically shut down rail equipment production: only about 92 locomotives were produced. 2,000 locomotives and 11,000 railcars were supplied under Lend-Lease. Likewise, the Soviet air force received 18,700 aircraft, which amounted to about 14% of Soviet aircraft production (19% for military aircraft).[19]

Although most Red Army tank units were equipped with Soviet-built tanks, their logistical support was provided by hundreds of thousands of U.S.-made trucks. Indeed by 1945 nearly two-thirds of the truck strength of the Red Army was U.S.-built. Trucks such as the Dodge 3/4 ton and Studebaker 2½ ton were easily the best trucks available in their class on either side on the Eastern Front. American shipments of telephone cable, aluminum, canned rations, and clothing were also critical.[20]
Quotations

Roosevelt, eager to ensure public consent for this controversial plan, explained to the public and the press that his plan was comparable to one neighbor's lending another a garden hose to put out a fire in his home. "What do I do in such a crisis?" the president asked at a press conference. "I don't say... 'Neighbor, my garden hose cost me $15; you have to pay me $15 for it' …I don't want $15 — I want my garden hose back after the fire is over."[21] To which Robert Alphonso Taft, Republican Senator from Ohio, responded: "Lending war equipment is a good deal like lending chewing gum. You don't want it back." In practice, very little was returned except for a few ships.

Joseph Stalin, during the Tehran Conference in 1943, acknowledged publicly the importance of American efforts during a dinner at the conference: "Without American production the United Nations [the Allies] could never have won the war."[22]

Stalin of all people would be loathe to acknowledge the role played by a capitalist country.

It must be remembered by the way, that most of the Soviet factories were moved East in the early years of the war. Getting ammo, spare parts and the like a thousand miles west demanded a lot of train locomotives and thousands of first rate trucks - something the Russians didn't have prior to lend lease.

Tony EH · 21-05-2014 10:12pm

Jawgap wrote: »

I think your otherwise well written and argued posts are slightly let down by statements such as this - some of the panzer / panzer grenadier, fallschirmjaeger, gebirgsjäger and Luftwaffe field divisions were hardly 'mere skeleton crew' - likewise, some of the more capable German commanders fought in the West...

I am talking 1941.

Germany's best hope for any kind of a victory over Russia.

Germany left a paltry defence force in the west, in comparison to what was thrown at the Russians.

Jawgap · 21-05-2014 10:51pm

Tony EH wrote: »

I am talking 1941.

Germany's best hope for any kind of a victory over Russia.

Germany left a paltry defence force in the west, in comparison to what was thrown at the Russians.

Well, again I'd hesitate to describe an entire Army Group comprising of the 1st, 7th and 15th Armies (along with AOK Norway and AOK 12 in Greece) as 'paltry' even in comparison to the forces committed to BARBAROSSA.

It was, of course, less but in terms of land forces it was about one third of the Heer's strength - so hardly 'paltry.' And while the bulk of the Luftwaffe headed east, nearly all the Kriegsmarine (including, obviously enough the U-boats) stayed in the West.

Tony EH · 21-05-2014 11:07pm

realweirdo wrote: »

It must be remembered by the way, that most of the Soviet factories were moved East in the early years of the war. Getting ammo, spare parts and the like a thousand miles west demanded a lot of train locomotives and thousands of first rate trucks - something the Russians didn't have prior to lend lease.

Russia had a tremendous amount of locomotives and roiling stock before the war. From memory, she had close to 30,000 locos alone.

Stalin's five year plans were facilitated by Russia's large collection of rail vehicles. In fact the last five year plan, albeit interrupted in 1941, had strove to update and modernise her extensive rail network and was completed to a large degree.

Russia had so many locomotives she only had to build less than 100 during the war,. offset by 2000 sent from the west.

Again, from memory, not a single locomotive arrived in Russia from the west until the latter half of 1944. Long after Russia had secured victories over Germany in her most crucial battles.

The main reason Russia ordered locos from the west was because of the narrower gauge used in Poland and Germany. Ordering shipments in 1944, with a view to gaining ground in western Europe proper, was a quicker and easier solution than retooling existing locos with a narrower under carriage.

You see, this is generally the problem with the "rah rah" approach to lend lease. Those who want to overrate it and exaggerate its importance, do so, with the laboured belief that Russia couldn't produce what was sent by the west.

She could, by and large.

But, and this is what the minimisers of lend lease miss tend to miss, shipments from the west allowed her to focus on building overwhelming numbers of other equipment.

After 1945 there was a concerted effort to shrink the contribution that Russia made to defeating the Germans in the Second World War to a mere side show, because after their usefulness they were relegated back to the pre-war position of untrusted potential enemy and the cold war politics of the day prevailed largely in the west and especially in America. Since the 90's this minimisation has been replaced by the lend lease myth, whereby, while it can no longer be hidden that Russia did the lion's share of fighting against Germany, she would have "gone under", without western (i.e. American) goods.

Neither is correct, has ever been correct, nor ever will be.

realweirdo · 21-05-2014 11:17pm

Tony EH wrote: »

I am talking 1941.

Germany's best hope for any kind of a victory over Russia.

Germany left a paltry defence force in the west, in comparison to what was thrown at the Russians.

But when it came to the battle of the bulge, the Germans were able to throw in first rate forces against the allies.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Bulge

Four armies were selected for the operation. First was the Sixth Panzer Army, under SS General Sepp Dietrich—newly created on 26 October 1944, it incorporated the most senior and the most experienced formation of the Waffen-SS: the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler as well as the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend. The 6th Panzer Army was designated the northernmost attack force, having its northernmost point on the pre-attack battlefront nearest the German town of Monschau. It was entrusted with the offensive's primary objective—capturing Antwerp.

The Fifth Panzer Army under General Hasso von Manteuffel was assigned to the middle attack route with the objective of capturing Brussels.

Not to mention that Kesselring was leading the fight in Italy with many experienced and first rate divisions, and the man in charge of the German forces on D Day was Rommel.

It doesn't stack up that the Germans had inferior commanders or soldiers on the Western front.

Tony EH · 21-05-2014 11:20pm

Jawgap wrote: »

Well, again I'd hesitate to describe an entire Army Group comprising of the 1st, 7th and 15th Armies (along with AOK Norway and AOK 12 in Greece) as 'paltry' even in comparison to the forces committed to BARBAROSSA.

It was, of course, less but in terms of land forces it was about one third of the Heer's strength - so hardly 'paltry.' And while the bulk of the Luftwaffe headed east, nearly all the Kriegsmarine (including, obviously enough the U-boats) stayed in the West.

The troops left behind guarding the back door, were built largely of occupation troops and units were often understrength, especially in armour. The cream of Germany's front line fighting men went east.

The Luftwaffe's minimal rear guard is obvious and yes the bulk of the Kriegsmarine stayed where she was trained to fight. But, as already said, Russia was a land war. The Germany navy would have been largely redundant. There simply wouldn't have been the target opportunities presented to them as there were in the Atlantic routes.

Perhaps the men of the Kriegsmarine could have been press-ganged into land units, as did happen in 1944/45. But the result would have been pretty much the same, they would have been wholly unsuited to land fighting as they were historically.

In every case...it simply isn't enough.

One final note, we all need to be extremely careful about Germany's theoretical division strength and her actual division strength, which rarely matched, even in the early war years.

Tony EH · 21-05-2014 11:38pm

Tony EH wrote: »

I am talking 1941.

Germany's best hope for any kind of a victory over Russia.

Germany left a paltry defence force in the west, in comparison to what was thrown at the Russians.

realweirdo wrote: »

But when it came to the battle of the bulge, the Germans were able to throw in first rate forces against the allies.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Bulge

You do know that the Wacht am Rhein was in late 1944, don't you. Not 1941.

Also, those forces WERE FAR FROM FIRST RATE. The Germans literally had to scrape the bottom of the barrel in order to build up a decent strength, in yet another wartime miracle.

In addition, their attack failed and failed terribly.

Tony EH wrote: »

Not to mention that Kesselring was leading the fight in Italy with many experienced and first rate divisions, and the man in charge of the German forces on D Day was Rommel.

It doesn't stack up that the Germans had inferior commanders or soldiers on the Western front.

Smiling Al was a great divisional commander, but so what?

Rommel was a proven Corps commander, but there's doubt to his ability at higher levels.

And although Kesselring was in charge of Luftflotte 2 for a short period in 1941 neither of them were tested in a combined ops commander role on the eastern front. So, the point whether they could have made a deciding difference is moot.

Lastly, I never said that Germans had "inferior commanders or soldiers on the Western front".

Jawgap · 22-05-2014 4:26am

My point in referencing the Kriegsmarine was to demonstrate that considerable & significant resources (and 'steel') were left in the West during the "time of iron"........including the elite U-boat force.

Despite the Soviet outlook, the War was more than just a series land and tactical air campaigns.

Tony EH · 22-05-2014 8:08am

I agree. But my issue is that the Kriegsmarine units wouldn't have been the help that was needed to secure victory in the east in the German's best window of opportunity.

The Ubootwaffe (which essentially is the Kriegsmarine) would have been pretty much redundant in the east. Sure there would have been targets of opportunity in the gulf of Finland and down in the Black Sea, but it's certain that their contribution would have been minimal to say the least.

The army units too would have been help, as I said to Realweirdo, in terms of manpower (the vast majority of materiel was in the east) and would have offset the million+ that the Germans lost in Barbarossa, but she was so far off of a victory by the time winter had set in that the difference would simply not have tipped the balance.

In my opinion, Germany has one chance of success in the east. That is an attack in early 1941, with substantially greater forces than were historically employed, fully mechanised and not reliant on horses, a much better strategic focus than was utilised at the time and a more practical political approach taken in the occupied areas behind the front lines, with a real effort on winning "hearts and minds" (if you'll forgive that awful phrase).

...and even then, I find it doubtful that a complete success is on the cards.

The Soviets could have beaten the Germans without help

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