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The Soviets could have beaten the Germans without help
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Be some humdinger of a air battle if the Germans had there un divided attention on the Russians.
If the Jadgwaffe had all its forces on the eastern front it would have slaughtered the red airforce. Even when heavily outnumbered the german aces racked up enormous tallies, if the numbers had been equal or in the germans favour then the red airforce wouldn't have stood a chance. The german bomber and ground attack forces would have had free reign to smash soviet attacks and the soviets would have been denied air support to blunt the Heer and Waffen SS advances.0 -
Unfortunately airforces alone don't win wars. They're won on the ground and in that regard, the Russians had the advantage.
Besides, the Germans only left a couple of Geschwader in the west when they launched Barbarossa. Simply not enough to turn the tide in their favour.
Hitler's gamble of "kick(ing) the door in" and hoping that the "whole rotten edifice" crumbled relied on destroying the Russians in a quick war. He knew that a long protracted war was not in Germany's best interest.
Once the Russians had retreated within their country and regrouped their manufacturing base, the war was in their favour. They always had the upper hand in the long grind.
As for the alte hassen racking up large scores, that is an inevitability of operating in a target rich area. The Jadgwaffe were always outnumbered in Russia from day one, so the odds for getting high scores was on their side. They also flew in small formations for the majority of the conflict. Rotte was the order of the day and they flew their machines in a manner that suited the best abilities.
The trouble was the Russians could absorb the losses. AFAIR, they actually scaled back aircraft production in 1944, while still managing to produce over 40.000 combat aircraft. The Russians managed that with relative ease, while the Germans had to jump through incredible hoops to achieve the same result. In fact it's a miracle they managed it at all. It was a last throw of the dice for them however.0 -
I wonder how many people in other countries and countries would have joined the Germans in a battle just against Russia and communism. Maybe they'd have got further with atomic programme and other advanced weapons. They wouldn't have needed all those resources put into uboats etc. Maybe what if but .....0
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Just a couple of observations.....
First, Russia was too big to defeat. That's just a simple fact of geography and demographics. There is an idea that if Germany had driven all out for Moscow on a narrow front, seized and held it then that would have represented a political defeat for the USSR (which it probably would) and the end of Stalin (again, it probably would) but it would not have represented the defeat of the USSR, and no doubt they would have regarded any accommodation they might have reached as simply buying time to strike back.
To quote Quintus form 'Galdiator' "People should know when they are conquered" - and the occupation of Moscow would not have represented victory over the USSR - nor would it have meant the end of the war.
The country was simply unconquerable.
On the other hand, without the broad assistance of the Western Allies, the final and complete defeat of the Third Reich could not have been achieved by the USSR acting on its own for many reasons.
Yes, you can cite all the production figures you want and denigrate Lend Lease and the other programmes the USSR benefited from, but the fact remains that building or assembling equipment carries with it a huge opportunity cost - if you are using your steel for tanks, what are you having to sacrifice- locomotives, rail tracks, ships etc. Every decision is a trade off and the USSR (unlike for example the US) didn't have the luxury of being able to produce practically unlimited equipment, food, fuel and other materiel.
Without the Western Allies, the USSR would have to have built (and crewed) both a strategic air force and an ocean going navy OR accepted that German industry could concentrate instead of being compelled to disperse and that it could continue to obtain its fuel from its traditional pre-WW2 sources (Venezuela and the US), instead of Ploesti. It would also have to have accepted that there would be no dislocation between the German economy and the military effort.
Also just as the further the Germans moved East the more it played into the Soviets hands, so the opposite is true. A denser road-net consisting of paved roads, and a denser railway network benefits the Germans (as does better airfields) - especially as there was a difference in gauge between German and Soviet tracks. Meaning the Soviets would either need to move stuff from train to train at trans-shipping depots (which they would have to set up) or do as the Germans did and rip track up and re-lay it (something which severely disrupted their logistics effort during Barbarossa).
Moreover, the Germans had 7 or 8 major east-west rail lines which they would have been falling back on closer to their depots and factories while all the while the Red Army would be pulling away from them - it's over 3,000 km from Chelyabinsk to the Vistula - that's a long way to transport a tank. The alternative being to set-up factories further east, but again that uses materials that could otherwise be used for weapons or other types of production.
It's only 500km from Berlin to the Vistula and 1000km from Nuremberg. All of which would have left the Red Army / Air Force vulnerable to one of the most effective uses of air power - supply interdiction (although the Germans didn't really do that too well, it's possible they may have figured it out, much as the Allies did)
In short, in moving West the Soviets would have faced broadly the same disadvantages the Germans faced as they attacked East.
Finally, the terrain and weather all change the further West you move. West of the Carpathians the terrain and weather (lower cloud, more frequent rain etc) presents different challenges than that presented by the Steppe - and most of it favours the defenders. Soviet 'deep battle' concepts that served them so well on the Steppe are less effective in rolling or mountainous territory where topography dictates direction.
Which leads me back to my point from another post that the whole affair would likely have ended in a very bloody stalemate in poor old Poland - with that country no doubt occupied and with regular skirmishing and occasional hostilities erupting.
In short, no one of the Allies could have beaten Germany on their own - it needed the combined efforts of them all.0 -
Only in a fantasy, I'm afraid.
Barbarossa failed completely and even if Germany had absolutely no commitments in the West, it still would have failed, as the units gained simply wouldn't have been enough. She only left behind a skeleton crew to "watch the backdoor".
Unless Germany could have knocked out the Russians completely in the first go, they had to settle for a long protracted war, in which the Russians would have the upper hand.
But, the facts remain that in 1941, the Germans just didn't have enough resources to do such a thing.
By 1942, it was just too late.
barbarossa was a close-run thing for a while and could have gone both ways.
in a 1on1 engagement, had germany had no other military commitments of any kind, therefore no import restrictions on oil, rubber, nickel and other critical resources, had the reich been able to focus its full military might and human and economic resources on the ussr and to plan and time barbarossa better, had germany had no useless allies and had russia not received any us/uk aid, the ussr would likely have been overrun and smashed in 41/42.
the soviet military machine was numerically absolutely massive even early in the war, yet it was a shambles in the early phase, badly led and organised, many higher-ranking officers had been purged by stalin pre-war, equipment was (mostly) obsolete and often scarce, and morale was super low. whole soviet armies surrendered and went into captivity in 41 and even in 42.
and had russian and ukrainian civilians and pows been treated better by the german invaders, stalin would have had an even harder time getting his people to defend the ussr to the last bullet, and the whole soviet system might have collapsed like a house of cards...as it did just a few decades later...0 -
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Wurzelbert wrote: »barbarossa was a close-run thing for a while and could have gone both ways.
in a 1on1 engagement, had germany had no other military commitments of any kind, therefore no import restrictions on oil, rubber, nickel and other critical resources, had the reich been able to focus its full military might and human and economic resources on the ussr and to plan and time barbarossa better, had germany had no useless allies and had russia not received any us/uk aid, the ussr would likely have been overrun and smashed in 41/42.
the soviet military machine was numerically absolutely massive even early in the war, yet it was a shambles in the early phase, badly led and organised, many higher-ranking officers had been purged by stalin pre-war, equipment was (mostly) obsolete and often scarce, and morale was super low. whole soviet armies surrendered and went into captivity in 41 and even in 42.
and had russian and ukrainian civilians and pows been treated better by the german invaders, stalin would have had an even harder time getting his people to defend the ussr to the last bullet, and the whole soviet system might have collapsed like a house of cards...as it did just a few decades later...
From the frontier of the Reich to Moscow is about 1,700 km - so even if they made it that far and even if they secured their gains and went into a winter bivouac there, come the spring they would have emerged to find that despite having seized the capital (assuming they attacked on a narrow rather than a broad front) - they were still only just over half-way to the Urals - the Germans may have had the opportunity to contribute to the overthrow of Stalin, but even in that scenario they'd still be facing a country that, no doubt, would have seen what had happened as a defeat - but I doubt very much they would have regarded themselves as defeated.0 -
cruasder777 wrote: »Total propaganda myth, resources from the US were minimal.
that’s not true. while stalin never really acknowledged allied aid for propaganda reasons, simply going by the lend-lease numbers on wiki aid to russia was in fact quite substantial...and that does not include technology transfer etc. through sending modern stuff (aircraft etc.) to russia...and let’s not forget the german (navy and air force) effort to sink those convoys which tied up substantial resources, too.
enlighten me if you have more accurate figures, yet the stuff on wiki is pretty much in line with what i have seen, heard and read in the past couple of decades in countless sources...0 -
Just a couple of observations.....
First, Russia was too big to defeat.
Agreed. But Hitler's idea was that the Russians were under the heel of Bolshevik oppression and the destruction of that entity would be a welcome thing to the Russian people. His "rotten edifice" would crumble, allowing the Germans to move in as it were. It was never in his mind to engage in a long, drawn out war sweeping through the entire country.- and the occupation of Moscow would not have represented victory over the USSR - nor would it have meant the end of the war.
Agreed again. While the battle of Moscow represented a huge defeat for the Germans and the neutering of Barbarossa, its capture would not have represented the crushing defeat of Russia that some people think. While it's major rail hub and the centre of Russia's political entity, it is not the heart and soul of the nation. Simply put, the Russians, masters of relocation and improvisation that they were, would simply have shifted further east.The country was simply unconquerable.
Agreed yet again! There is just not happy ending for Germany in Russia.On the other hand, without the broad assistance of the Western Allies, the final and complete defeat of the Third Reich could not have been achieved by the USSR acting on its own...
Ah boo!!! You were doing so well.
In terms of win or loss, the lack of a total Russian defeat is still a "loss" for Germany. I still think that in a Germany and Russia only situation, Russia has the upper hand in a victory and the best Germany can hope for is a grinding halt to a stalemate. But the more likely event is slow errosion of Germany held territory either back to her original borders, or all the way to Berlin, but over a greater period of time.
Once Russia's edifice fails to crumble, the war is Russia's favour as it is largely a ground war.
In all probability, Russia still wins at Moscow, they still win at Stalingrad and they still win at Kursk. After that there is only one way for the Germans. All of these major battles are victories for Russia before the Allies get going in earnest. It is possible that the defeat of Army Group Centre isn't as devastating is it was historically, but it's still a defeat in my book and the inevitable long retreat is still on the cards.
The possibility that Germany halts Russian advances certainly exists. But not without massive losses in territory and personnel.
Either way, it's all purely academic. It's impossible to really know how things would have changed and how each nation would have adapted to the situations they faced. as it stands, both nations made incredible changes to their military bodies during the war and adapted to their needs. In the scenario under discussion, there's no reason to believe that they wouldn't do so as well.0 -
Wurzelbert wrote: »barbarossa was a close-run thing for a while and could have gone both ways.
Barbarossa was never a close run thing, despite the great advances that the Germans made. the problem was it was just too big a task for their army groups to achieve. There's no point during Operation Barbarossa where the Germans come near to achieving everything they needed to achieve, in order to consider Barbarossa a victory. Not one. Even with the incredible gains they made, offset against the losses, it's a defeat, no matter how one looks at it. The victory level for Barbarossa is the total defeat of Russia's Bolshevik system and the elimination of Russia as a war making entity and in that respect the Germans couldn't even see the ribbon on the finishing line.
Once Barbarossa fails, it's a slow burn war as Germany has to wait for good weather to get going again. In fact it's yet another miracle that the advanced so much during the Summer of 1942 with Blau.
Either way, it's only a matter of time before Germany runs out of steam. There's just no way around that.0 -
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Ah boo!!! You were doing so well.
In terms of win or loss, the lack of a total Russian defeat is still a "loss" for Germany. I still think that in a Germany and Russia only situation, Russia has the upper hand in a victory and the best Germany can hope for is a grinding halt to a stalemate. But the more likely event is slow errosion of Germany held territory either back to her original borders, or all the way to Berlin, but over a greater period of time.
Once Russia's edifice fails to crumble, the war is Russia's favour as it is largely a ground war.
In all probability, Russia still wins at Moscow, they still win at Stalingrad and they still win at Kursk. After that there is only one way for the Germans. All of these major battles are victories for Russia before the Allies get going in earnest. It is possible that the defeat of Army Group Centre isn't as devastating is it was historically, but it's still a defeat in my book and the inevitable long retreat is still on the cards.
The possibility that Germany halts Russian advances certainly exists. But not without massive losses in territory and personnel.
Either way, it's all purely academic. It's impossible to really know how things would have changed and how each nation would have adapted to the situations they faced. as it stands, both nations made incredible changes to their military bodies during the war and adapted to their needs. In the scenario under discussion, there's no reason to believe that they wouldn't do so as well.
Ah in fairness now, that's what I said - the USSR could, in all probability, on their own have pushed the Germans out of their territory and back to a line on the Vistula, perhaps it would have taken as much as two years longer, and there's plenty of discussion to be had on where the front would have settled, but that doesn't change the fact that the USSR was simply unconquerable.
What I very much doubt the USSR could have done - on it's own with out the assistance of the Western Allies - is secured the unconditional surrender of Germany. Equally, for all the productive capacity of the Western Allies, without the Soviet Union there was no way they could have achieved the unconditional surrender of the Germans either. I very much doubt either the US or UK / Commonwealth could have politically (never mind militarily) sustained the casualties.
Hence my conclusion that "....no one of the Allies could have beaten Germany on their own - it needed the combined efforts of them all."0 -
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Ah in fairness now, that's what I said - the USSR could, in all probability, on their own have pushed the Germans out of their territory and back to a line on the Vistula, perhaps it would have taken as much as two years longer, and there's plenty of discussion to be had on where the front would have settled, but that doesn't change the fact that the USSR was simply unconquerable.
Well, yeah I'm agreeing with that bit.What I very much doubt the USSR could have done - on it's own with out the assistance of the Western Allies - is secured the unconditional surrender of Germany. Equally, for all the productive capacity of the Western Allies, without the Soviet Union there was no way they could have achieved the unconditional surrender of the Germans either. I very much doubt either the US or UK / Commonwealth could have politically (never mind militarily) sustained the casualties.
Hence my conclusion that "....no one of the Allies could have beaten Germany on their own - it needed the combined efforts of them all."
Not necessarily with this.0 -
Well, yeah I'm agreeing with that bit.
Not necessarily with this.
I think the issue may be around 'beat'
Yes, I think the USSR on their own could have forced the Germans back to a line on the Vistula and compelled them to come to terms - although perhaps that would not have been politically acceptable to the Germans, they'd probably agree a cessation of hostilities in order to re-equip etc for a renewal of the conflict. Given they'd have pushed the Germans back practically to their start lines, denied them their objectives and still retained their political identity that would be a strategic victory for the USSR.
What I don't think they could have done was smashed their way through to Berlin and forced the unconditional surrender of the country the way the all Allies actually did.0 -
[...]but that doesn't change the fact that the USSR was simply unconquerable.
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not so sure about “unconquerable”...i mean, you certainly did not have to roll into the kamchatka peninsula and kill every last soviet citizen in order to be able to declare victory...once you’d have destroyed the bulk of the soviet military machine, conquered or destroyed its major cities and industrial areas (pretty much all in the european part) and possibly even managed to foster revolt and topple or at least severely weaken bolshevism – and all that could have been achieved with a relatively small number of realistic “ifs” - you might have reached a point where the russians would have sued for peace...worked before, too...0 -
Not to mention quite a few of the more capable Nazi generals had managed to avoid the eastern front. They would have been forced there had it been the only thing to worry about. This would have increased their odds and the extra men not maintaining the Western/African fronts may have tipped the scales of tight battles.
It also depends on what you mean by no allies to worry about. Stalin signed a pact a with Hitler to gain more time to prepare while Hitler's reasoning was to deal with the west first. Had the Eastern front been opened earlier it also would have hurt the Soviet's chances. As others have said conquering the entire country was never the plan, all that was really needed was the European segment.
Honestly there are probably too many variables to say definitively one way or another. Many decisions by both sides were taken with the knowledge that the allies were fighting. Who knows how much the two respective strategies (for better or worse) would have changed if this wasn't the case. Note that whatever different strategies were taken may not have been optimal, the Nazis may have ended up more over confident or the Soviets more desperate.0 -
Wurzelbert wrote: »not so sure about “unconquerable”...i mean, you certainly did not have to roll into the kamchatka peninsula and kill every last soviet citizen in order to be able to declare victory...once you’d have destroyed the bulk of the soviet military machine, conquered or destroyed its major cities and industrial areas (pretty much all in the european part) and possibly even managed to foster revolt and topple or at least severely weaken bolshevism – and all that could have been achieved with a relatively small number of realistic “ifs” - you might have reached a point where the russians would have sued for peace...worked before, too...
There would be the small matter of the Volga, then the Kama, then the Urals - can't imagine it would be pleasant or even practical to fight through those mountains.
The distance from the Caspian to the north coast is over 3,000km - that's an unconquerable country.......0 -
From the frontier of the Reich to Moscow is about 1,700 km - so even if they made it that far and even if they secured their gains and went into a winter bivouac there, come the spring they would have emerged to find that despite having seized the capital (assuming they attacked on a narrow rather than a broad front) - they were still only just over half-way to the Urals - the Germans may have had the opportunity to contribute to the overthrow of Stalin, but even in that scenario they'd still be facing a country that, no doubt, would have seen what had happened as a defeat - but I doubt very much they would have regarded themselves as defeated.
Without commitments in the west, the Germans would have been able to win a sufficiently greater victory than they did in the early stages of the war to force the Soviets to accept peace on German terms.
Hitler didnt want to destroy the USSR entirely, indeed early on it was his intention to leave Stalin in power in a reduced USSR to 'continue his interesting socialist experiment'.
Quite possibly such a reduced USSR would have wanted to avenge their defeat, but it is quite unlikely that they would ever risk attacking a victorious Germany on their own with their recent experiance of a disastourous war behind them. (And it should be noted that that first war itself happened when the USSR was itself preparing to attack Germany).
It is more likely infact that the Soviet government would have had more than enough domestic problems to deal with, conditions being quite similer to the end of the Russian involvment in WWI with large numbers of pissed off soldiers returing home. Had the Germans managed to force a peace on their terms, it would have been the second time that Russia lost a major war with Germany, and a massive amount of Russian terrotory to boot in relativly quick succession.0 -
It's easy to overlook the influence of the breaking of the Enigma codes by the British and the information that was passed to the soviets. It was particularly useful prior to the battle of Kursk (and other German offensives on the Eastern Front.)
http://historyrat.wordpress.com/2010/01/23/turning-points-the-battle-of-kursk-the-tank-trap/What Hitler did not know was British intelligence had broken the Enigma code and the British were passing down all the orders from Germany to the Eastern Front. It got so specific that Zhukov knew the day, time, and place that von Manstein would launch the offensive. As a result of knowing every move, Zhukov strategically placed reserves away from Kursk but close enough to call up in a hurry
Knowing what your enemy was planning to do, where and in what numbers was surely crucial to the Soviets. I would imagine it helped the Soviets avoid surprise attacks and massive encirclements which were a feature of the first months of the war on the eastern front. The ability to retreat from these encirclements quickly using motorised trucks would also have helped.
In 1941, much of the soviet army was on foot or horseback and hence quickly encircled. Although having said that, much of the German army was on foot, bicycle and horseback in 1941. The blitzgrieg element largely lay with the tanks and the Luftwaffe.0 -
There would be the small matter of the Volga, then the Kama, then the Urals - can't imagine it would be pleasant or even practical to fight through those mountains.
The distance from the Caspian to the north coast is over 3,000km - that's an unconquerable country.......
Of course one of the great what-ifs of the war is what would have happened if the Germans had taken Moscow. They might have if they had started their invasion a month sooner. Moscow would have provided them with a very strong base of operations along with significant captured millitary assets such as military air fields. I doubt very much there would have been a repeat of what happened with Napolean, an army a long way from home and with no real means to feed and supply it. The Germans on the otherhand had the Luftwaffe which would have been able to at least partially resupply Moscow for a time.0 -
Barbarossa was never a close run thing, despite the great advances that the Germans made. the problem was it was just too big a task for their army groups to achieve. There's no point during Operation Barbarossa where the Germans come near to achieving everything they needed to achieve, in order to consider Barbarossa a victory. Not one. Even with the incredible gains they made, offset against the losses, it's a defeat, no matter how one looks at it. The victory level for Barbarossa is the total defeat of Russia's Bolshevik system and the elimination of Russia as a war making entity and in that respect the Germans couldn't even see the ribbon on the finishing line.
Once Barbarossa fails, it's a slow burn war as Germany has to wait for good weather to get going again. In fact it's yet another miracle that the advanced so much during the Summer of 1942 with Blau.
Either way, it's only a matter of time before Germany runs out of steam. There's just no way around that.
Tony, you are missing a few things, particularly related to lend lease. Much of the sheet metal which was used in the manufacture of the famous T-34, arguably the most influential tank of the war, came from America as part of US assistance. Take away that sheet metal and what are the Soviets left with? Certainly nowhere near the number of tanks. I believe the T-34 was also designed by a westerner but I'm not 100% sure on that one. As others have stated, the Soviets didn't bother to produce one heavy bomber during the war and it was left to the Brits and Americans to undermine German war production. They didn't stop it, but they certainly made things difficult for the Germans. Also, had the full Luftwaffe, V1s and V2s being used on Russia, it could have played a role.
The scary thing is the Germans weren't even involved in total war in the early years of the Soviet invasion. Imagine if they had been.
The Germans were fighting two different types of wars in 1944 and 45 on the eastern and western front.
On the western front it was a modern conflict and their enemy was the bombers, figher aircraft, and generally modern mechanised warfare of the allies. On the eastern front it was simply sheer weight of numbers. When you face as the Germans did 5-1, 10-1 or even 20-1 odds from their enemy, its impossible to hold out or kill more of them than you. It was possibly weight of numbers more than skill that helped the soviets. That said the Soviets took one hell of a beating from the Germans. 20 million soldiers dead or something like that. There is no doubt the Germans had the better army but were overwhelmed by the numbers.0 -
realweirdo wrote: »Tony, you are missing a few things, particularly related to lend lease. Much of the sheet metal which was used in the manufacture of the famous T-34, arguably the most influential tank of the war, came from America as part of US assistance. Take away that sheet metal and what are the Soviets left with? Certainly nowhere near the number of tanks. I believe the T-34 was also designed by a westerner but I'm not 100% sure on that one. As others have stated, the Soviets didn't bother to produce one heavy bomber during the war and it was left to the Brits and Americans to undermine German war production. They didn't stop it, but they certainly made things difficult for the Germans. Also, had the full Luftwaffe, V1s and V2s being used on Russia, it could have played a role.
The scary thing is the Germans weren't even involved in total war in the early years of the Soviet invasion. Imagine if they had been.
The Germans were fighting two different types of wars in 1944 and 45 on the eastern and western front.
On the western front it was a modern conflict and their enemy was the bombers, figher aircraft, and generally modern mechanised warfare of the allies. On the eastern front it was simply sheer weight of numbers. When you face as the Germans did 5-1, 10-1 or even 20-1 odds from their enemy, its impossible to hold out or kill more of them than you. It was possibly weight of numbers more than skill that helped the soviets. That said the Soviets took one hell of a beating from the Germans. 20 million soldiers dead or something like that. There is no doubt the Germans had the better army but were overwhelmed by the numbers.
I dont think the soviets could have done it without lend lease, boots, radios, tinned food, trucks which are as important as other more obvious things.
The T-34 evolved from previous designs fast tanks (T-26BT I think and possibly others) which were influenced by the Christie tank design which Im sure the inventor sold to the USSR. So it wasn't designed by an American, but influenced by a US design, which I believe the USSR bought with the intent of buying more, I think they bought a few examples and promptly copied it, Either the US govt or maybe more likely the Army wasn't interested in Christie's tank design at the time anyway.
I think the Soviets did have at least one heavy bomber (cant name it off the top of my head, just checked, Il-4) but they did have plenty of attack aircraft Pe-2 and Il-2?.
I dont really think the V weapons were effective uses of resources, it'd have been better spent elsewhere or differently.0 -
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realweirdo wrote: »Tony, you are missing a few things, particularly related to lend lease. Much of the sheet metal which was used in the manufacture of the famous T-34, arguably the most influential tank of the war, came from America as part of US assistance. Take away that sheet metal and what are the Soviets left with? Certainly nowhere near the number of tanks. I believe the T-34 was also designed by a westerner but I'm not 100% sure on that one.
Wrong. The T-34 used a Christie suspension, like many other tanks around the world, but that wouldn't make it a "western design".
Also, I'll repeat this. In total, LL accounted for just 15% of everything used by the Soviets during the war.
It wasn't essential, it wasn't a turning point and didn't win the war for the Russians. LL certainly helped, but most certainly did not win the war for Russia.
In the main, LL didn't really make its presence felt until late 43, by which time the Russians had beaten the Germans at Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk and with their own equipment by and large.realweirdo wrote: »As others have stated, the Soviets didn't bother to produce one heavy bomber during the war and it was left to the Brits and Americans to undermine German war production. They didn't stop it, but they certainly made things difficult for the Germans. Also, had the full Luftwaffe, V1s and V2s being used on Russia, it could have played a role.
They didn't need a heavy bomber. Their airforce was a tactical one, just like the Germans. In addition, the Allied bombing campaign was largely a waste of time, until it focused on fuel in 1945. German production went UP in 1944 at the height of bombing.
As for the V1 and V2, while they look the part, they were largely useless and the money would have been better spent elsewhere. A huge amount of V weapons fell incredibly short of their targets. While they were great for propaganda, they weren't a war winning weapon, by any stretch of the imagination and they would have been very useful on the eastern front.realweirdo wrote: »On the western front it was a modern conflict and their enemy was the bombers, figher aircraft, and generally modern mechanised warfare of the allies. On the eastern front it was simply sheer weight of numbers. When you face as the Germans did 5-1, 10-1 or even 20-1 odds from their enemy, its impossible to hold out or kill more of them than you. It was possibly weight of numbers more than skill that helped the soviets. That said the Soviets took one hell of a beating from the Germans. 20 million soldiers dead or something like that. There is no doubt the Germans had the better army but were overwhelmed by the numbers.
I'm sorry, but this is just completely incorrect.
If you think that the battles on the Eastern Front were any less "modern" than they were in the West, then you simply do not have a strong enough grasp of the war in Europe, I'm afraid.0 -
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Also, I'll repeat this. In total, LL accounted for just 15% of everything used by the Soviets during the war.
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can you back that figure up with a reliable (non-soviet) source? the numbers i remember and those on wiki look very different...and of course it also depends on what everything is in your calculation...vodka and red flags included?0 -
They didn't need a heavy bomber. Their airforce was a tactical one, just like the Germans. In addition, the Allied bombing campaign was largely a waste of time, until it focused on fuel in 1945. German production went UP in 1944 at the height of bombing.
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Not really, not when you account for the amount of men and materiel it tied up. As I pointed out earlier, there were nearly 3 times as many heavy AA guns guarding the Italian stretch of the Brenner Pass in November 1944 as there were on the entire Eastern Front.
Indeed, many of the heavy batteries that ended up guarding key points on the Brenner were stripped from the Eastern Front.
That's before you go on to broaden the discussion out to the amount of aircraft, men and guns deployed in the defence of the Reich. If they weren't there trying to bring down or disrupt the bomber streams, they would have been somewhere else - the CBO was more than simple 'statistical destruction.'
For example at the end of June 1944, barely one third of the Luftwaffe's fighter strength was deployed on the Eastern Front - about one quarter was deployed in defence of the Reich, and another third was on the Western Front.
And yes, some production went up in 1944, but in many cases it didn't. Plus there is an argument that the CBO played a role in this production increase by forcing the Germans to streamline their methods and designs. Also production is not a very good measure of the German's effectiveness - reserves, stores and stocks are better and what you see when you look at the 'issues' held by various formations are declining holdings.
In the case of certain aircraft types production increased, but the numbers in the Jagdgeschwader remained static or declined because either replacements weren't getting through or they were being chewed up quicker than they could be replaced. In the period January to July 1943, the German loss rate was 91.3%; in the the six months after that it was 110.4%; and in the first half of 1944 it was 137%! - that's for all a/c.
If you look at fighters on their own, the loss rate in the first half of 1944 was 251% - they lost 4,200 fighters in that period, two-thirds of which were losses in combat. During 'Big Week' they lost 56.4% of their fighters.
Or to look at it another way, Luftflotte Reich had 788 single engine fighters on 1/6/44, of which 472 were operationally ready.
On 1/7/44 they had 388, with 242 operationally ready
And by 27/7/44 they had recovered to 460 fighters, with 273 operationally ready.
Looks like Goering got what he wanted when said "I would rather have a mass of aircraft standing around unable to fly owing to a lack of petrol than not have any at all......"0 -
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Not really, not when you account for the amount of men and materiel it tied up. ....."
All of which we've talked about before.
The salient fact is, though, that by the time the bombing campaigns got going in earnest in the west, the Russians had already defeated the Germans in their largest and most important battles, at Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk.
By 1943,/44, there was no ultimate victory to be had in the East for the German army.
At best, the resources utilised in the west would have slowed an inevitable Russian victory, whether we like it or not.0 -
All of which we've talked about before.
The salient fact is, though, that by the time the bombing campaigns got going in earnest in the west, the Russians had already defeated the Germans in their largest and most important battles, at Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk.
By 1943,/44, there was no ultimate victory to be had in the East for the German army.
At best, the resources utilised in the west would have slowed an inevitable Russian victory, whether we like it or not.
Well, we may have to disagree for reasons I stated in an earlier post
.....and because of what Clausewitz said about defensive warfare...."we must say that the defensive form of warfare is intrinsically stronger than the offensive."0 -
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Of course and we've already agreed to disagree, but that's ok, I'm sure.0
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