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Garda Ombudsman "under high-tech surveillance"
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knird evol wrote: »One of the suspicious things about all this is how gsoc avoid making any allegation themselves. they don't have to take responibility for or stand over any individual piece of the jigsaw. Yet conveniently each piece appearing in perfect choreography in the public domain. Great plausable deniability.
As plausable as Shatter`s claim that nothing happened based on the Rits "peer" review?0 -
Is this not what it is all about. Fear of speaking out to be fingered and dealt with.knird evol wrote: »One of the suspicious things about all this is how gsoc avoid making any allegation themselves. they don't have to take responibility for or stand over any individual piece of the jigsaw. Yet conveniently each piece appearing in perfect choreography in the public domain. Great plausable deniability.
Yes, the media are the only source that can be told the full story. Only problem with that is that they are only interested in headlines and then they forget about it and the status quo prevails0 -
The statement to the Dail Committee is clearer than anything else on this issue.
Well that's a matter of opinion, nobody and in particular O'Brien or anybody else in GSOC has stated it, people are going on what a journalist said. Kenny is now treating the dossier with the utmost importance, pity his office didn't when it received the report from the whistleblower.Mad Men's Don Draper : What you call love was invented by guys like me, to sell nylons.
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We cannot even state that the GSOC was bugged. That is the problem with statements like that.
We can say that the chairman believes they probably were, we can say that another commissioner told Prime Time that the chances of one anomaly being coincidental were next to zero, we can't say anything definitively but we can certainly form opinions based on that. You've formed yours, and I've formed mine.Imagine you had an enemy, someone who had done you great harm in the past. Say you own a shotgun. Say that person is now missing. Would it be reasonable for someone to say that we cannot state whether you have murdered that person and we cannot state whether you have not. Those people are making a connection between a missing person and a motive for you murdering that person to a veiled accusation of murder.
If I'd had a very recent altercation with the deceased and if my shotgun was the kind of gun that fires the kind of bullets found in the deceased? I'd certainly expect to be considered a "person of interest". If I was a friend of the deceased and I learned that the Gardai had not considered such an enemy a person of interest, I'd be absolutely livid and regard it as negligence.In fact, some people on this thread would use the logic of GSOC to accuse you of murder.
Accuse? No. Suspect? Absolutely. I'd see no problem with that. I'd expect to be hauled in for questioning about it, and I'd expect to see checks being done on my background, where I was that night, etc. And I wouldn't object to any of that.If that person was murdered (rather than disappearing by themself) then it is entirely reasonable to place you at the top of the list of potential suspects based on means and motive.
Exactly. So this hinges on whether or not you believe GSOC was put under surveillance or not.You see you have to have a crime to have a potential suspect.
Your entire argument hinges on Verrimus and GSOC's chairman being wrong about them being under surveillance. You and I disagree there, that's the key point in our argument with eachother - anything beyond that, we're certain not to agree on.If we had a crime and if posters were treating Gardai as a potential suspect, then you might have a reasonable point. But instead there is no crime, posters are openly saying the Gardai must have been behind it and that Callinan and Shatter must resign. All based on nothing.
Again I don't agree. I think GSOC was probably under surveillance based on what GSOC's commissioners have said in public statements over the last week, and it is in that context that I further speculate as to who was responsible. If of course you don't believe they were under surveillance at all, then obviously you will find my stance irrelevant.It is possible that a crime has been committed and it is possible that rogue elements of the Gardai are behind it, even possible it was an authorised dark ops (thought we are getting to very low percentage chances here) but there is no evidence for any of the above that anyone here has seen.
Except that the chairman has publicly stated that he believes they were under surveillance and that Verrimus rated the possibility of a benign explanation for one of their findings as remote to zero, to quote another commissioner.The hysterical calls for resignations and casting of blame at the gardai is rather silly.
Actually my own calls for Shatter's resignation have nothing to do with whether or not GSOC was under surveillance, if it transpires that they have never been under any form of surveillance whatsoever I would still be calling for his resignation - it's his response to the allegations which I'm concerned with, the fact that he has very firmly nailed his trousers to the Garda commissioner and treated GSOC as villain instead of victim. I have a serious problem with that as it shows that Shatter is far too cozy with the commissioner, this is wildly unhealthy in a democracy, and in the context of this, his behavior with regard to the whistleblower and his behavior with regard to Mick Wallace, yes, I do believe he is an absolute disgrace and I'm rapidly losing all respect for this government continuing to tolerate his presence in the DOJ.
All of that holds true even if GSOC has never been under surveillance by anyone. Shatter is still a disgrace, as is Callinan for (a) sharing confidential info about a political opponent with Shatter, and (b) his reaction to whistleblowers.0 -
On the one side of a continuum there is extrapolation of known facts which is a logical scientific exercise and on the other there is conspiracy theory.
Your point is much closer to CT territory than logic.
You're nearly there, except you came to the wrong conclusion.
I am an IT professional with 20+ years experience. Along the way I picked up the qualification "MCSA-Messaging Specialist". I have installed, managed and troubleshooted email systems. Two years ago I was the lead engineer tasked with recovering the Exchange infrastructure for one of the main banks following a catastrophic SAN failure. I know what email system GSOC have and I even know what archiving and backup software they use.
You can try to dismiss what I am saying as conspiracy theory, but it doesn't change the fact that I know what I am talking about, and I can tell you that if GSOC were surveilled with the suggested technology, then hacking their email would have been well within the capabilities of the perpetrators.0 -
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You're nearly there, except you came to the wrong conclusion.
I am an IT professional with 20+ years experience. Along the way I picked up the qualification "MCSA-Messaging Specialist". I have installed, managed and troubleshooted email systems. Two years ago I was the lead engineer tasked with recovering the Exchange infrastructure for one of the main banks following a catastrophic SAN failure. I know what email system GSOC have and I even know what archiving and backup software they use.
You can try to dismiss what I am saying as conspiracy theory, but it doesn't change the fact that I know what I am talking about, and I can tell you that if GSOC were surveilled with the suggested technology, then hacking their email would have been well within the capabilities of the perpetrators.
:) Now THAT is some comeback . 0 -
You say you have knowledge of this area, but you haven't explained how the perpetrators might have gained access to their email.You're nearly there, except you came to the wrong conclusion.
I am an IT professional with 20+ years experience. Along the way I picked up the qualification "MCSA-Messaging Specialist". I have installed, managed and troubleshooted email systems. Two years ago I was the lead engineer tasked with recovering the Exchange infrastructure for one of the main banks following a catastrophic SAN failure. I know what email system GSOC have and I even know what archiving and backup software they use.
You can try to dismiss what I am saying as conspiracy theory, but it doesn't change the fact that I know what I am talking about, and I can tell you that if GSOC were surveilled with the suggested technology, then hacking their email would have been well within the capabilities of the perpetrators.
Let's look at the vulnerabilities that were exposed.
1. The WiFi device: This wasn't connected to any of GSOCs systems (and they don't have WLAN), so this couldn't have been used to get to their email.
2. The Phone: I can't see any feasible way to connect to an email server from this (unless if was connected to a VOIP system that was on the network or some other elaborate explanation that we haven't been told about).
3. The GSM vunerability: We know that GSOC don't have a wireless network that a compromised phone could have been connected to, so that's out. So unless GSOC were using some kind of service like Exchange Online, I'm just not seeing it.
Look - in order for the email to have been compromised there must have been some other vulnerability that we haven't been told about.
The Sunday Times piece said that they compromised GSOC's WiFi network to steal emails. To my knowledge, that was the only source of any idea that emails were compromised, and that has been shown to be nonsense (because we've since been told that GSOC do not have a WiFi network).
So really this whole email thing is just empty speculation - we may as well be speculating that the attackers had the ability to pick the locks on the GSOC offices and have a root around in the paper files.0 -
You say you have knowledge of this area, but you haven't explained how the perpetrators might have gained access to their email.
Let's look at the vulnerabilities that were exposed.
1. The WiFi device: This wasn't connected to any of GSOCs systems (and they don't have WLAN), so this couldn't have been used to get to their email.
2. The Phone: I can't see any feasible way to connect to an email server from this (unless if was connected to a VOIP system that was on the network or some other elaborate explanation that we haven't been told about).
3. The GSM vunerability: We know that GSOC don't have a wireless network that a compromised phone could have been connected to, so that's out. So unless GSOC were using some kind of service like Exchange Online, I'm just not seeing it.
Look - in order for the email to have been compromised there must have been some other vulnerability that we haven't been told about.
The Sunday Times piece said that they compromised GSOC's WiFi network to steal emails. To my knowledge, that was the only source of any idea that emails were compromised, and that has been shown to be nonsense (because we've since been told that GSOC do not have a WiFi network).
So really this whole email thing is just empty speculation - we may as well be speculating that the attackers had the ability to pick the locks on the GSOC offices and have a root around in the paper files.
You're focusing on the three anomalies as if they are the only possible vectors of penetration. They are the only anomalies that were detected. If GSOC were surveilled, it is highly likely that there were other areas that were breached that were not detected, and which would never be detected. If they were breached, it wouldn't have been a bunch of script kiddies, it would have been people who most certainly would have had the ability pick their network apart from a distance. The also would probably have had the ability (or had colleagues who could pick the locks and have a root around in the paper files. But they might not risk that as there would be a chance that they would get caught. But they would certainly be able to intercept both incoming and outgoing mail safe in the knowledge that they were undetectable.0 -
2. The Phone: I can't see any feasible way to connect to an email server from this (unless if was connected to a VOIP system that was on the network or some other elaborate explanation that we haven't been told about).
I'm open to correction on this, but since the internet is delivered over a phone line, does it not stand to reason that if the voice line was bugged they could have also been monitoring email traffic? Would depend on what type of encryption etc was being used, in that case. I don't know, I'm just saying that seems like a legitimate possibility, in this day and age to compromise a phone line is also to compromise an internet connection and vice versa.3. The GSM vunerability: We know that GSOC don't have a wireless network that a compromised phone could have been connected to, so that's out. So unless GSOC were using some kind of service like Exchange Online, I'm just not seeing it.
Do you have a Smartphone? My iPhone downloads my emails from an external server into its internal "Mail" app. If somebody gets access either to my phone or to what it's transmitting (and if it's true that gsoc had no internal wifi system then anyone using this facility would have been getting their emails from 3G sync) they can read my emails, Facebook messages, etc etc etc. Any online service my phone is synced to in real time, in fact.0 -
hatrickpatrick wrote: »I'm open to correction on this, but since the internet is delivered over a phone line, does it not stand to reason that if the voice line was bugged they could have also been monitoring email traffic? Would depend on what type of encryption etc was being used, in that case. I don't know, I'm just saying that seems like a legitimate possibility, in this day and age to compromise a phone line is also to compromise an internet connection and vice versa.
Do you have a Smartphone? My iPhone downloads my emails from an external server into its internal "Mail" app. If somebody gets access either to my phone or to what it's transmitting (and if it's true that gsoc had no internal wifi system then anyone using this facility would have been getting their emails from 3G sync) they can read my emails, Facebook messages, etc etc etc. Any online service my phone is synced to in real time, in fact.
see the recent snowden leaks0 -
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You're focusing on the three anomalies as if they are the only possible vectors of penetration. They are the only anomalies that were detected. If GSOC were surveilled, it is highly likely that there were other areas that were breached that were not detected, and which would never be detected. If they were breached, it wouldn't have been a bunch of script kiddies, it would have been people who most certainly would have had the ability pick their network apart from a distance. The also would probably have had the ability (or had colleagues who could pick the locks and have a root around in the paper files. But they might not risk that as there would be a chance that they would get caught. But they would certainly be able to intercept both incoming and outgoing mail safe in the knowledge that they were undetectable.
OK bajer, I'm on your side of this debate. But having raised your expertise - and it's great to have someone with that level of expertise in the thread - you've got to take on the three points Phoebas made.
To me (not a techie), what you've said above reads like Phoebas is right about the three things. Is he?
...oh, and if it's possible to give it in terms that the likes of me can understand, that'd be great!0 -
None of us speculating here know exactly what happened from a technical point of view or what the potential vectors of attack on their network or telephone infrastructure might have been.
All we know are things gleaned from press reports and a few vague statements.
I wouldn't rule the WiFi thing out or in with the level of info we have.
If a major security company with specialist skills in the area of espionage detection thought it was a problem, I would tend to think it was a problem.0 -
Yet another great article from Mick Clifford.THROUGH the fog of confusion, a ‘fall guy’ has emerged to take the rap. The sacking yesterday of the man who held the office of garda confidential recipient is another example of an attempt to bury a scandal as far as possible from the door of Justice Minister Alan Shatter. And he’s not alone, for Enda Kenny was also veering dangerously close to being drawn in himself.
The man in question, Oliver J Connolly, has been treated harshly by his erstwhile buddy, Shatter. He wasn’t even given the opportunity to resign with some grace from an office that is reaching the end of its days. More to the point, the sacking infers that Connolly did something wrong. There is absolutely no evidence of any wrongdoing on his part. If anything, all we know about how he functioned in his office suggests that he carried out his duties largely in a correct manner.
The role of the confidential recipient is to receive allegations of malpractice from serving gardaí and pass it on to the Department of Justice, which refers the matter to the Garda Commissioner. The office was set up in the wake of the Morris tribunal, and was designed to root out corruption. Or so we were told.
Connolly was the second holder of the office, appointed in June 2011. He is, or certainly was, a political supporter of Shatter’s, having contributed €1,000 to a previous election campaign. His predecessor in the office was a senior civil servant, Brian McCarthy.
Connolly’s appointment signalled a downgrading of the independence of the office.
How could a supporter of the justice minister be wholly independent in a process that involved the minister’s department and the gardaí, for whom the minister bears ultimate responsibility?
On February 9, 2012, Connolly met Sergeant Maurice McCabe, the garda who has made a number of complaints about serious malpractice in the force. McCabe had lodged a complaint about Garda Commissioner Martin Callinan’s intention to promote a senior officer, whose handling of a number of criminal cases was unresolved.
Sources close to McCabe said yesterday that he found Connolly to be “a gentleman, an honest man, 100%”. Notwithstanding that evaluation, McCabe taped his conversation with Connolly. By January 2012, McCabe had run into a series of brick walls in his attempts to highlight the malpractice. His experience led him to withdraw trust from the whole process, and he felt obliged to tape the conversation for his own protection.
The transcript has emerged in recent months, and in the last two weeks, sections have been read into the record of the Dáil. The tenor of the sections is best summed up by a line delivered by Micheál Martin last week, alleged to have been spoken by Connolly.
“I’ll tell you something, Maurice — and this is just personal advice to you — if Shatter thinks you’re screwing him, you’re finished.” It is the emergence of a transcript that has ultimately led to Shatter firing Connolly.
However, a number of serious issues arise, all of which Shatter and Enda Kenny seem eager to bury. When the transcript was read into the Dáil last week, Kenny said he would launch an investigation. Yet Kenny had been well aware of the tenor of these comments for the last eight months.
On May 27 last year, McCabe emailed the Taoiseach about the penalty points issue, and complained of how he was being portrayed by the justice minister.
“Mr Shatter is in the public spotlight at the moment, and unlike him, I do not intend to play the man and not the ball,” McCabe wrote.
“It is suffice to say that my figures are correct, my allegations are correct, and despite receiving information that Mr Shatter would ‘go after me’ if I brought the matter further, I am standing firm.”
He received an anodyne response with no interest in the suggestions that Shatter would go after him. Like much else in this matter, the Taoiseach opted to turn a blind eye to anything that might lead towards further hassle.
A reading of the full transcript of the conversation between McCabe and Connolly doesn’t reflect badly on Connolly. He was acting, as his office was designed, as a confidant of a whistleblower. He advised McCabe not to go to the media, to avoid scandal at all costs. Events of recent days in relation to handling of the GSOC bugging controversy suggest this was astute advice. The imperative in avoiding scandal has been a hallmark of all the recent controversies involving An Garda Síochána.
In the conversation, Connolly was outlining to McCabe the political realities of the situation. Is it reasonable to assume that in appointing a supporter, this is precisely what Shatter would have wanted him to do?
In any event, any suggestion that Shatter would go after McCabe proved to be prophetic. At every turn over the last 18 months, the justice minister acted to stymie the garda whistleblower.
At first, Shatter rubbished allegations McCabe and his former colleague John Wilson made about malpractice in deleting penalty points. When the internal Garda report into the matter — now largely discredited — was published, Shatter called into question the bone fides of the whistleblowers.
Last October, the minister told the Dáil that the whistleblowers “didn’t co-operate with the internal Garda inquiry”. This was completely erroneous. Neither man was even approached to be interviewed in the inquiry.
When McCabe brought his complaints to the Public Accounts Committee, Shatter attempted to ensure he didn’t give evidence by very belatedly referring the whole affair to the Garda Ombudsman. Not once did he as much as lift a finger to protect the whistleblowers, preferring instead to back the Garda Commissioner at every turn.
Last month, Commissioner Callinan said he found the whistleblowers’ complaints to be “disgusting”.
Back in June 2011, on Connolly’s appointment, Shatter issued the following high-minded statement: “Any member or civilian employee of An Garda Síochána who wishes to report in confidence about corruption and malpractice can be assured that any such report will be taken seriously and extensive protections will be given to him or her.”
How hollow those words ring now that we know what we know.
The other thing that did it for Connolly is the shift in perception of the whistleblower, McCabe. As with other whistleblowers, he has been subjected to a whispering campaign designed to assassinate his character. (I, for one, have been privy to rumours that are little short of disgusting.)
Yet, a series of public figures have lately come out to vouch for McCabe’s character. Leo Varadkar last year described him as “credible”; Micheál Michael, who met McCabe last week, described him as “credible” in the Dáil yesterday. Pat Rabbitte told RTÉ News at One yesterday that he knew McCabe, and spoke of his character in glowing terms. Former Garda Ombudsman Conor Brady did likewise last month.
Members of the Public Account Committee also expressed themselves impressed with his evidence.
McCabe can no longer be painted as a malcontent with an agenda designed to damage the gardaí.
Who therefore is to blame for the manner in which he has been treated since he first came forward? Surely not the justice minister, that great protectorate of whistleblowers? Surely not the Garda Commissioner, charged with upholding the highest standards in the force?
No, it’s all down to the confidential recipient, Connolly. A fall guy has emerged. All other parties will simply brush themselves down and move on. That, at least, must be their most fervent wish.
http://www.irishexaminer.com/analysis/shatter-struggles-to-find-a-fall-guy-259318.html0 -
Well you're right that normal email is notoriously difficult to encrypt - the email body can be encrypted, but the SMTP protocol afaik doesn't have a facility to encrypt the headers (because all of the mail routers along the way need to see that information), so yeah, email isn't very secure.hatrickpatrick wrote: »I'm open to correction on this, but since the internet is delivered over a phone line, does it not stand to reason that if the voice line was bugged they could have also been monitoring email traffic? Would depend on what type of encryption etc was being used, in that case. I don't know, I'm just saying that seems like a legitimate possibility, in this day and age to compromise a phone line is also to compromise an internet connection and vice versa.
Do you have a Smartphone? My iPhone downloads my emails from an external server into its internal "Mail" app. If somebody gets access either to my phone or to what it's transmitting (and if it's true that gsoc had no internal wifi system then anyone using this facility would have been getting their emails from 3G sync) they can read my emails, Facebook messages, etc etc etc. Any online service my phone is synced to in real time, in fact.
I did mention the possibility that GSOC would be using some kind of webmail service - but I'd be very doubtful.
So sure, somebody could be sniffing GSOCs email - that's not in doubt. But we have zero evidence that they were, and the assertion from the Sunday Times about how they said they were doing it was shown to be false.0 -
What have verrimus to gain by coming to their conclusions ,you must think that ags arent capable of this sort of carry on0
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Love nor Money wrote: »OK bajer, I'm on your side of this debate. But having raised your expertise - and it's great to have someone with that level of expertise in the thread - you've got to take on the three points Phoebas made.
To me (not a techie), what you've said above reads like Phoebas is right about the three things. Is he?
...oh, and if it's possible to give it in terms that the likes of me can understand, that'd be great!
I am not an IT security expert. I have received security training over the years and I can certainly find my way around firewalls and the like, but I can't claim to be an expert in some of the areas that this case goes into. But I'll do my best to answer your question regarding Phoebas points.
1. WiFi: The information that has been released about the WiFi have been ambiguous - to say the least. What I can tell you is that if there was any sort of WiFi network, or a WiFI enabled device connected to the wired network, then you don't need to look any further for a probable point of entry.
2. Landline: I wouldn't even bother looking at this as a point of entry for data. If the landline phone was compromised it was for two reasons only. To listen in to calls and for use a remote listening device.
3. Stingray, ISMI-Catcher: These devices can capture packet data, but it is unlikely that it would have been used as such - unless they had no other way in and they wanted to try to capture usernames and passwords to use in a different exploit.
Other than the WiFi (which as I said, if there was a WLAN, would be the obvious point of entry), there is really no need to focus on the three discovered anomalies. Because, at the level that the alleged infiltrators are operating at, if they wanted to get in, they'd get in. It has been reported by John Mooney who has seem the full Verrimus report that it is suspected that what was detected was just the remnants of a more widespread infiltration. I assume that Verrimus included that conclusion in their report. And that is the point I am trying to make. If this surveillance took place and if that level of tech and know how was used, then it is possible that these three anomalies were the tip of the iceberg.
I'm actually wondering how the MoJ was able to come out and say that the Database wasn't compromised. Unless it's a completely stand-alone system in a clean room. I think I am ok in revealing that the reason I know a bit about GSOC's systems is because I was offered a job with them early last year (which I turned down, thank fúck), and received full details of the job spec. The job spec made no mention of the what DB they used - not really my area anyway. The reason I turned down the job was because the pay was rubbish. So I have my doubts about the quality of their internal security. Pay peanuts and all that.0 -
As for the latest revelations about ags,it seems to be rampant in the force yet people will defend the indefensible.callinan and shatter must go0
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Connecting to 137.191.225.19
220 SMTP ESMTP Relay [1466 ms]
EHLO MXTB-PWS3.mxtoolbox.com
250-doras.gsoc.ie Hello mxtb-pws3.mxtoolbox.com [64.20.227.133], pleased to meet you
250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES
250-PIPELINING
250-8BITMIME
250-SIZE
250-DSN
250-DELIVERBY
250 HELP [827 ms]
MAIL FROM: <supertool@mxtoolbox.com>
250 2.1.0 <supertool@mxtoolbox.com>... Sender ok [936 ms]
RCPT TO: <test@example.com>
550 5.7.1 <test@example.com>... Relaying denied [749 ms]
MXTB-PWS3v2 4930ms0 -
They're hosting that themselves - not exactly the most secure setup.
inetnum: 137.191.225.16 - 137.191.225.23
netname: GSOC-IRELAND
descr: Garda Ombudsman public facing services
country: IE
admin-c: VC2275-RIPE
tech-c: VC2275-RIPE
status: ASSIGNED PA
mnt-by: MNT-IRISHGOVERNMENT
source: RIPE # Filtered
person: Vanessa Colgan
address: Garda Siochana Ombudsman Commission
phone: +35318280370
nic-hdl: VC2275-RIPE
source: RIPE # Filtered0 -
Setup by Fujitsu who probably set it up and then left it to be managed by in house staff. "State level" infiltrators would get into that network with a screwdriver!0
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I'd be quite surprised if GSOC uses a DSL line for Internet access.hatrickpatrick wrote: »I'm open to correction on this, but since the internet is delivered over a phone line...
What would you consider "the most secure setup"? Not an adversarial question; I'm genuinely curious. There are security issues with hosting your own mail server, sure - but there are also some fairly obvious security issues with getting someone else to host it for you.They're hosting that themselves - not exactly the most secure setup.0 -
oscarBravo wrote: »I'd be quite surprised if GSOC uses a DSL line for Internet access.
What would you consider "the most secure setup"? Not an adversarial question; I'm genuinely curious. There are security issues with hosting your own mail server, sure - but there are also some fairly obvious security issues with getting someone else to host it for you.
I'd definitely route it through a third party to offload the spam and anti-virus detection and to put an additional layer between your email server and a potential attacker. I hear what you are saying about being concerned about introducing an the risk of a third party having access to your mails. But unless you are very big, the benefits of having that extra layer, which is manned by professionals far outweigh the perceived risk.
The GSOC setup is perfectly normal for an SME. An Exchange server with all the roles running on one box (it is a small org). I haven't done a pen test of their box (no chance that I will - don't want my door kicked in), but Exchange has had a fair few vulnerabilities over the years to be hosting it yourself if you are very concerned about security. Probably doesn't really matter though. If they were penetrate by the people who they suspect, it wouldn't have made a blind bit of difference what they did, and if they were suspicious they probably didn't communicate about the Boylan stuff over email anyway.
But one thing I did learn tonight is that there doesn't seem to have been any real concern about security when their network was set up initially. If you wanted to set up an ultra secure network, Fujitsu wouldn't be top of your list. If you wanted to accept the cheapest quote - then they would be.0 -
With Shatters position looking more and more untenable,as well as Callinan`s from the whistleblowers controversy, can anybody seriously have any faith in this "review" process that he`s written the terms for, if, as should happen, he either resigns or is pushed.0
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With Shatters position looking more and more untenable,as well as Callinan`s from the whistleblowers controversy, can anybody seriously have any faith in this "review" process that he`s written the terms for, if, as should happen, he either resigns or is pushed.
Shatter is gone. That was obvious from today when Enda said he would only make a statement and wouldn't take questions (such as, have you confidence in the MoJ). And if Shatter is gone, Callinan is gone. Bearing in mind the thread we are on - does it matter? Not really. I suspect that due to the underlying issues of the Boylan case, it wouldn't matter a damn who was in either position. The revelations would just be so serious, that they have to be covered up.0 -
Shatter is gone. That was obvious from today when Enda said he would only make a statement and wouldn't take questions (such as, have you confidence in the MoJ). And if Shatter is gone, Callinan is gone. Bearing in mind the thread we are on - does it matter? Not really. I suspect that due to the underlying issues of the Boylan case, it wouldn't matter a damn who was in either position. The revelations would just be so serious, that they have to be covered up.
Good point.
Being naive in hoping that a new minister and commissioner would want to sweep clean, but then there`s the high probability that regardless of all Kenny`s waffle,he knew as much as the other two, and Dear Leader will be protected.
Gonna be a hard sell mind you to cover up this one.0 -
Even if these 2 yahoos resign or are sacked it wont change much in ags .They seem to have forgotten that ags is the peoples ags not callinan and his goons legalised gang.They "top brass in ags" are rotten to the core.sadly their replacements wont be much better0
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Even if these 2 yahoos resign or are sacked it wont change much in ags .They seem to have forgotten that ags is the peoples ags not callinan and his goons legalised gang.They "top brass in ags" are rotten to the core.sadly their replacements wont be much better0
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Even if these 2 yahoos resign or are sacked it wont change much in ags .They seem to have forgotten that ags is the peoples ags not callinan and his goons legalised gang.They "top brass in ags" are rotten to the core.sadly their replacements wont be much better
their replacements won't be much better for ONE simple reason ;
1. The voters are going to wait until April 2016 for general elections.
this in my view only goes to show the corrupt that the people of Ireland are asleep at the wheel and no matter how much corruption is exposed your position is secure.
GAME ON!!0 -
As for the latest revelations about ags,it seems to be rampant in the force yet people will defend the indefensible.callinan and shatter must go
shatter always looks bad when in the public eye due to his personality but the guards come out of this looking far worse and especially the commissioner
our police force has always been shown undue deference in this country , perhaps now people will stop unconditionally lauding them0 -
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Even if these 2 yahoos resign or are sacked it wont change much in ags .They seem to have forgotten that ags is the peoples ags not callinan and his goons legalised gang.They "top brass in ags" are rotten to the core.sadly their replacements wont be much better
It appears that each political party when in power promote their own men to high ranking posts.
This should stop at once.
Politicians should be far removed from the running of the police and independent promotion boards should be put in place.
Even the judges are appointed by politicians.
Madness that that is allowed to continue.0
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