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Simulated reality and *ism

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  • Registered Users Posts: 1,462 ✭✭✭Peanut


    I love Richard Feynman's position articulated here (apologies if it's been posted before):



    IMHO far more intellectually honest compared to Dawkins, Hawking et al.


  • Registered Users Posts: 1,922 ✭✭✭fergalr


    Peanut wrote: »
    I love Richard Feynman's position articulated here (apologies if it's been posted before):



    IMHO far more intellectually honest compared to Dawkins, Hawking et al.

    I really love that video - its one of my favourite Feynman things.
    Was almost going to post it earlier in the thread, in response to the Russell quote.


  • Registered Users Posts: 3,038 ✭✭✭sponsoredwalk


    nagirrac wrote: »
    Krauss is basing his theory on QFT which is the quantum field. QFT suggests that any physical reality is possible, anything from "nothing" to what we observe as our objective universe.

    To quote one of the links you musn't have read:
    "Putting [general relativity and quantum mechanics] together, one can imagine that the universe started in the total empty geometry – absolute nothingness – and then made a quantum tunneling transition to a nonempty state"
    http://debunkingwlc.wordpress.com/2010/08/11/alexander-vilenkins-model-of-cosmic-origins/
    Quantum field theory is a kind of special-relativistic version of quantum mechanics that does not incorporate general relativity, so it's not surprising to see them invoking the extraneous concept of general relativity to justify their claims - if you really think a person is basing his claims off of X - in our case QFT - & you see some obvious flaw in their assumptions - namely that the QTF vacuum isn't empty in the sense Krauss implied - then you really ought to afford the person you're criticizing a bit more respect and ensure they're not making trivially obvious errors - in this case the error being that Krauss wasn't referring to the QFT vacuum in the first place which could only be because he's invoking more than QFT - so let this be a lesson...
    nagirrac wrote: »
    When Krauss says "there's no quantum" he is not being truly honest,

    In your rush to slander Krauss as dishonest you missed a section from one of my links that could have stopped you from slandering someone behind their backs:
    As Vilenkin’s colleague Alan Guth explains,

    Putting [general relativity and quantum mechanics] together, one can imagine that the universe started in the total empty geometry – absolute nothingness – and then made a quantum tunneling transition to a nonempty state. Calculations show that a universe created this way would typically be subatomic in size, but that is no problem . . . Vilenkin was able to invoke inflation to enlarge the universe to its current size.
    The Inflationary Universe (1997), Page 275

    http://debunkingwlc.wordpress.com/2010/08/11/alexander-vilenkins-model-of-cosmic-origins/
    Here you have the pre-youtube incarnation of Krauss making more or less the same arguments Krauss does, saying that a universe begins in a totally empty geometry [incorporating general relativity "before" quantum mechanics it seems] & only then once it is inside this empty geometry it makes a quantum transition to a non-empty state.
    nagirrac wrote: »
    as quantum is the most fundamental theory we know of, and is the basis of his own theory.

    I just quote the sentence "Putting [general relativity and quantum mechanics] together" & your claim goes out the window, he simply can't be basing his theories off QFT alone if they're invoking general relativity as a justification for what they're saying:
    There is currently no complete quantum theory of the remaining fundamental force, gravity. Many of the proposed theories to describe gravity as a QFT postulate the existence of a graviton particle that mediates the gravitational force. Presumably, the as yet unknown correct quantum field-theoretic treatment of the gravitational field will behave like Einstein's general theory of relativity in the low-energy limit.
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_field_theory
    But to re-iterate the point I've made, Guth has made, Vilenkin has made & Krauss has made - they are incorporating the extraneous idea of gravity to arrive at their theories, even on Q&A which I randomly threw on this morning motivated by this discussion:



    from 28:30 on for about a minute you have Krauss explaining how it is with the addition of gravity that he can make his claims. So no, quantum theory is not the basis of his theory, I'd be willing to bet money he's made that clear in his book as well, something (giving you the benefit of the doubt, something you clearly won't afford to Krauss) I assume you missed due to confusing Tryon's model with Vilenkins...
    nagirrac wrote: »
    Everything that is possible in our universe stems from quantum theory,

    You know this isn't true, nobody knows if the orbits of the planets is explainable in terms of quantum theory...
    nagirrac wrote: »
    you cannot state "there's no quantum", except to a non scientific audience.

    Again I'll quote one of my links:
    In a nutshell, Vilenkin’s model is a variation on Edward Tryon’s “vacuum fluctuation” model, but instead of the universe appearing within a background of space, the universe appears from an empty geometry (i.e. “nothing”). As Vilenkin’s colleague Alan Guth explains,

    Putting [general relativity and quantum mechanics] together, one can imagine that the universe started in the total empty geometry – absolute nothingness – and then made a quantum tunneling transition to a nonempty state. Calculations show that a universe created this way would typically be subatomic in size, but that is no problem . . . Vilenkin was able to invoke inflation to enlarge the universe to its current size.
    The Inflationary Universe (1997), Page 275

    http://debunkingwlc.wordpress.com/2010/08/11/alexander-vilenkins-model-of-cosmic-origins/
    Here are other physicists explaining how there is "no quantum", it begins in an "empty geometry" & after this the dreaded quantum (:eek:) kicks in - It's completely irrelevant what they mean by an empty geometry, & it doesn't even matter if the claim makes sense, the important thing for us is that the universe exists in what they mean by nothing & once inside this nothing it makes a quantum transition - this isn't the fields of energy vacuum you referred to earlier in the thread (the only reason I posted). In other words, the claim "no quantum" is accurate.
    nagirrac wrote: »
    Open your mind and start asking the tough questions.

    Unfortunately it takes a closed mind to spot how the justification offered by someone extremely quick to slander fails based on the one weak link in their entire argument - you've just called him dishonest for neglecting "the theory of everything that is possible in our universe" when in fact it's precisely because of the fact that his theory merges "the theory of everything that is possible in our universe" with the one exception [you fail to mention] to "the theory of everything that is possible in our universe" (gravity, currently not adequately explained in the context of quantum mechanics) that he can make his claims. In case that was all too much, I literally have Guth saying point blank that it is because they are "Putting [general relativity and quantum mechanics] together" that "one can imagine that the universe started in the total empty geometry". Again, there is none of the quantum vacuum or fields of energy you were referring to, by incorporating extraneous ideas they end up with something new. Even if it's complete nonsense that's irrelevant, the simple point is that this is what they were saying, there's no need to go off pulling out claims of dishonesty...
    nagirrac wrote: »
    Why is it that in every interview Krauss claims there is no need for a creator due to his theory. Why does he reference Dawkins so much? Why did Dawkins wax so lyrically in the preface to his book, claiming this was the final nail in the theist coffin? Why are Dawkins and Krauss on a world tour arguing against theism?

    EvilAtheistConspiracy.jpg

    Hopefully your suspicions of Krauss will dissipate somewhat of their own accord now that you see he was making proper arguments all along and in fact it was you who was misinterpreting things. I'll be on the lookout for your arguments against Dawkins ;)
    nagirrac wrote: »
    Should they not be doing science, which is what they are good at?

    Why "should" they? Who are we to tell people what they "should" be doing? I wonder do you invoke such authoritarian judgement upon yourself, for instance - "should" you be posting slander against someone before properly reading the links claiming to refute you? Should you be posting on the internet when you could be juggling 10 miniature polar bears, 5 to each hand (1 to each finger) after sufficient practice that you should have begun in utero? Freedom my man, freedom ;)


  • Registered Users Posts: 3,063 ✭✭✭Kiwi in IE


    I don't believe the probability of this theory being correct is lower than that of any existing religion.

    If this is what you truly believe you could start a new religion. With the amounts of people that believe in existing religions, you may be onto a winner.

    It may sound as if I am being facetious, but I am actually not. It is certainly not less believable than Christianity. Maybe even more so.

    I'd be at 5/6 on the OP scale I reckon, so I don't believe the theory, as there is no proof, but there are plenty of people who don't require proof in order to believe.


  • Registered Users Posts: 1,922 ✭✭✭fergalr


    Kiwi in IE wrote: »
    I don't believe the probability of this theory being correct is lower than that of any existing religion.


    If this is what you truly believe you could start a new religion.

    Why do I have to truly believe it?

    We could start out by honing the story, under the pretext of a set of science fiction novels, and see how we get on from there.
    Kiwi in IE wrote: »
    With the amounts of people that believe in existing religions, you may be onto a winner.

    It may sound as if I am being facetious, but I am actually not. It is certainly not less believable than Christianity. Maybe even more so.

    If you hadn't directly said that, it would sound like you are being just a little facetious; but now all my doubts are gone. Far be it from me to ever question the word of a person on the Internet.

    Tell you what, why don't I flesh out the details a little, while you get cracking on the kickstarter video?


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  • Registered Users Posts: 3,063 ✭✭✭Kiwi in IE


    Well it worked for L Ron Hubbard!


  • Registered Users Posts: 1,462 ✭✭✭Peanut


    fergalr wrote: »
    But there are a whole lot of provisios there. You can build a system outside the logical system of interest, that reasons about the truth or falseness of the logical system. You can do this many times. Eventually, yes, the 'outermost' system still suffers the incompleteness problem. But is that really a problem? Why do you think that such a system wouldnt be powerful enough to simulate a universe, in which it was possible to reason about P(A), the probability of the existence of god? That's a massive assumption.

    You are defining discrete boundaries between systems - that is, in effect, part of the definition of "simulation" or a system within a system.

    But once you create these boundaries, they also necessarily limit the flow of information from an outer system to an inner system. If there was transfer of information between systems, there wouldn't really be a boundary as such, and the entirety could be viewed as a single system.
    fergalr wrote: »
    Its another huge assumption that rules of formal logic are even necessary to simulate a universe.
    I would suggest that it's not so much an assumption as a way of trying to ground the question in terms that have at least some chance of rationalisation.

    People might think that undecidability in a logical system is abstract and divorced from physical reality, but these become very physical limitations when you put them into practice.

    Your argument is that these don't necessarily apply to your scenario.

    My argument is that since you're using simulation as part of your original proposition, you are obliged to make an attempt at defining it in rational terms.

    It's not really good enough to say - let's just deal with the definition on an ad-hoc basis - it doesn't tell me anything about what you're trying to do.

    How do you suggest defining a simulation that has access to information outside of itself, and still be classed as a simulation with discrete boundaries?

    The discrete boundary idea is really critical to your initial argument about probabilities. If there are no discrete boundaries, I'm not sure you can say that there is any increased probability of being in a simulation.


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 2,257 ✭✭✭GCU Flexible Demeanour


    Peanut wrote: »
    I love Richard Feynman's position articulated here (apologies if it's been posted before):



    IMHO far more intellectually honest compared to Dawkins, Hawking et al.
    I hadn't seen that before, but I agree he says plainly what Dawkins et al avoid. There are tremendous problems in how some atheists engage in discussion, which I think could be summed up by Feynman's comments about the pitfall of enquiring into the unknown with some preconception of what you want the answer to confirm.

    But I'd suggest the issue isn't just that (for the sake of argument) no theory of the original of the universe can ever be tested. The issue is (to borrow a little of Feynman's language) more local and provincial than that. Feynman can assert that he's not afraid of the unknown, and that's valid as a position on scientific enquiry. Unfortunately, its not workable as a basis for social organisation.

    I just caught a bit of the earlier video, showing the Atheism vs Islam debate. I doubt that the arguments will be unfamiliar to many here, but I was struck at how the person arguing the Islamic side had identified the gap into which religion fits. In particular, he mentioned the social implications of seeing altruism as an evolutionary self-defence mechanism, which is an issue that (IMHO) folk can be complacent about. IIRC, in his essay on the anniversary edition of the Selfish Gene, Dawkins even comments that part of his outlook in publishing the book was to point out that decent values were not going to be magicked up out of evolution. They'd have to be consciously developed.

    Feynman's comment are good and apt, but the social issue doesn't stop there. Decisions need to be taken, in situations where we don't know everything. The difficult problem is agreeing on what basis those decisions can be made. And the situation is so lacking in obvious truths, that you can find someone beheading an 0ff-duty soldier in London, apparently under the impression that we're all at war.


  • Moderators, Society & Culture Moderators Posts: 24,404 Mod ✭✭✭✭robindch


    Peanut wrote: »
    I love Richard Feynman's position articulated here [...] IMHO far more intellectually honest compared to Dawkins, Hawking et al.
    How are Dawkins, Hawking etc dishonest?


  • Registered Users Posts: 1,922 ✭✭✭fergalr


    Peanut wrote: »
    You are defining discrete boundaries between systems - that is, in effect, part of the definition of "simulation" or a system within a system.

    But once you create these boundaries, they also necessarily limit the flow of information from an outer system to an inner system. If there was transfer of information between systems, there wouldn't really be a boundary as such, and the entirety could be viewed as a single system.

    Godels theorem doesn't deal in terms of information crossing simulation boundaries. It doesnt apply to worlds or simulations of universes; but instead to formal systems - systems of mathematical logic, which are concerned with theorems which may be either true or false, and with the deduction of which theorems are true, and which are false.

    It tells us that if we have such a formal system, of a certain expressiveness, that it is possible to construct certain statements that we can be sure are true within the system, but which we cannot prove within the system. (assuming we want consistency.)

    Why does that apply here? Where is the formal system that we are applying Godels theorem to?
    Peanut wrote: »
    I would suggest that it's not so much an assumption as a way of trying to ground the question in terms that have at least some chance of rationalisation.

    It is laudable to try and ground questions that are in fuzzy terms by expressing them in ways we can try and reason rationally about.

    But just because you seek to do that, doesnt mean that you can then say that we can't attempt to reason about a particular claim, simply on the basis that 1) we are trying to be express things logically and 2) Godels theorem.

    Dont you see, that could be used as an attack on reasoning about anything!


    If someone tells you there is a monkey in a box, you could say:
    "Well, lets try and express this in formal terms, in order to be rational. Oh, and, btw, Godels theorem! Therefore I now claim it is pointless to reason about whether there is a monkey in this box!"


    Thats a really bad argument as to why you cant reason about a particular theorem (e.g. whether there is a monkey in the box), unless you have some really clear evidence that it is one of the theorems that Godels theorem precludes from being found.


    And again, we aren't even trying to do theorems, that have truth or false values which is the domain to which Godels theorem applies.
    Peanut wrote: »
    People might think that undecidability in a logical system is abstract and divorced from physical reality, but these become very physical limitations when you put them into practice.

    Sure, yeah, if you try and build a theorem prover, that is physically manifest in some artefact (e.g. computer) then you are going to have physical limitations as to the theorems which it can prove, some of which will be as a result of the truth of Godels theorem which is proven to apply to a relevant mathematical model of the physical system.
    Peanut wrote: »
    Your argument is that these don't necessarily apply to your scenario.

    My argument is that since you're using simulation as part of your original proposition, you are obliged to make an attempt at defining it in rational terms.

    It's not really good enough to say - let's just deal with the definition on an ad-hoc basis - it doesn't tell me anything about what you're trying to do.

    How do you suggest defining a simulation that has access to information outside of itself, and still be classed as a simulation with discrete boundaries?

    The discrete boundary idea is really critical to your initial argument about probabilities. If there are no discrete boundaries, I'm not sure you can say that there is any increased probability of being in a simulation.


    Why is it good to think of an inner simulation as a formal system of logic, within which [this is in a simulation] might be a theorem at the level of the fabric of the simulation?

    Even granting that, we dont even want to go theorem proving. We're trying to reason about the probability of that statement, not about proving it true. So, Godels theorem isnt relevant, because we arent trying to do theorem proving.


    Even if we were trying to do theorem proving, theres no evidence that the particular theorem we would care about - [this is a simulation] - would be one of the theorems that is true in the system, but which is not provable from within the system.


    Thus I dont see how Godels theorem should at all preclude us from trying to reason about the probability that [we are in a simulation].


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  • Closed Accounts Posts: 2,019 ✭✭✭nagirrac


    Quantum field theory is a kind of special-relativistic version of quantum mechanics that does not incorporate general relativity, so it's not surprising to see them invoking the extraneous concept of general relativity to justify their claims - if you really think a person is basing his claims off of X - in our case QFT - & you see some obvious flaw in their assumptions - namely that the QTF vacuum isn't empty in the sense Krauss implied - then you really ought to afford the person you're criticizing a bit more respect and ensure they're not making trivially obvious errors - in this case the error being that Krauss wasn't referring to the QFT vacuum in the first place which could only be because he's invoking more than QFT - so let this be a lesson...


    Here are other physicists explaining how there is "no quantum", it begins in an "empty geometry" & after this the dreaded quantum (:eek:) kicks in - It's completely irrelevant what they mean by an empty geometry, & it doesn't even matter if the claim makes sense, the important thing for us is that the universe exists in what they mean by nothing & once inside this nothing it makes a quantum transition - this isn't the fields of energy vacuum you referred to earlier in the thread (the only reason I posted). In other words, the claim "no quantum" is accurate.

    My criticism of Krauss is not with the science, it is his philosophy or rather his ideology. I don't believe I am slandering him as my disagreement is with the ideological conclusions he draws from very speculative science.In my opinion Kraus is a good scientist but a poor philosopher.

    In defense of my earlier remarks, the vast majority of Krauss' book relates to how our observed physical universe emerged from empty space or the quantum vacuum, which I think we agree is anything but "nothing", it consists of fields of energy with virtual particles popping in and out of physical existance. Krauss does a very good job outlining this, he is a good science writer, although personally I prefer Brian Greene, but that is just personal opinion. I would say that aspect of the science is reasonably well established at this point.

    Vilenkin's "vacuum fluctuation" model is highly speculative and does not seem to have gained much traction in the scientific community since first proposed in the 1980s. Krauss actually does not spend a lot of time on this model in his book. Yes, the model is based on unifying general relativity and QM , but I think the following quote from Vilenkin himself, is the key one that distinguishes for me the "quantum" versus "no quantum" argument. I don't accept, based on my reading of Vilenkin, that you can make the conclusion that quantum "kicked in" after the quantum tunneling event from an "empty geometry".

    "The state of "nothing" cannot be identified with absolute nothingness. The tunnelling is described by the laws of quantum mechanics, and thus "nothing" should be subject to these laws. The laws of physics must have existed, even though there was no universe". Vilenkin from his book "Many Worlds in One". Here Vilenkin is clearly making the point that "nothing" is not absolute nothing.

    So, back to my original question; Where did the laws of physics, including the laws of QM, come from? They had to be there for this proposed quantum tunnelling event to happen.

    The charge of slander is a serious one and one you might consider withdrawing. The scientist whose work Krauss draws on does not make the conclusion that Krauss is arriving at, as in my opinion unlike Kraus he does not have an ideological ax to grind. Vilenkin clearly states in his own book that "nothing" as described in his model, is not absolute nothing.


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 2,257 ✭✭✭GCU Flexible Demeanour


    robindch wrote: »
    How are Dawkins, Hawking etc dishonest?
    For my own part, I'd say 'dishonest' might be a word that would generate as much heat as light (and, yes, I know you didn't introduce the term). I think Dawkins is probably naïve more than anything else. I think the Selfish Gene is a terrific book, one that I felt I really learned from. I'm just not sure that he knows that he's not offering anything in the God Delusion that will appeal to anyone without an arse in their trousers.

    I think what Feynman is adding in that short interview is the clear statement that scientific investigation may ultimately lead nowhere. No model for the origin of the universe can ever be tested. The thought occurred, while watching some of that atheism vs islam video, that Krauss was confidently stating that time would not exist in a situation of nothingness. That seems logical. But we've absolutely no idea if that corresponds to any situation that actually existed (to the extent that nothingness can exist.)

    What I take from Feynman is an acceptance that he has no answer if an eighteen year old school-leaver says "what should I do if I want to avoid an unhappy life." I'm not sure Dawkins is even aware there's such a question. He just sees that religions are willing to purport to have an answer, and then attacks them on grounds that have little to do with why people follow a religion. I doubt many people convert to this or that religion because they're yearning for a comprehensive explanation of the origins of the Universe.


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 25,848 ✭✭✭✭Zombrex


    fergalr wrote: »
    I still have a difficulty with that bit.

    I can accept the idea that the universe spontaneously arose.
    I dont really understand those things, my physics knowledge doesnt go that far; but I trust the physicists to some extent, and if the physicists can provide an argument that is a little bit like 'things spontaneously arise - look at those particles' and 'look, here are singularities which violate your normal ideas of casuality, thats evidence that your normal ideas of causality dont always apply' then Im prepared to accept that the universe might not need any cause.

    But, if I'm living in this universe, and its 200 years in the future, and humans are simulating other (less complex?) universes, then I think I'm going to consider it more likely that an intelligence is simulating our universe, than at least some of 'the other millions of things I could imagine might have caused the universe'. E.g. imagining that a non-intelligent optimising system has created the universe.

    You don't have enough information to say it is "more likely", only that it is possible. But sure when we are talking about rules outside the universe there are a whole host of things that are possible, things we can't even imagine.

    It is foolish to think that the range of possibile causes for the universe are restricted to what we can imagine them to be. The fact that human culture has come up with the notion of simulations of virtual worlds really has little if anything to do with what will eventually be the answer to the question "What is the universe"?

    If you actually discover evidence that we are in some sort of simulation, that is an entirely different matter. But so far it is just human ponderings, ponderings that will be by definition limited to what we can imagine, which has little if anything to do with how the universe will turn out to be.

    It is the old saying that if you lived all your life in a box you will naturally imagine that outside the box is another bigger box. But that says nothing as to what is actually outside the box.
    fergalr wrote: »
    I'm not sure about that argument.

    I accept your argument that any specific chosen set of theistic beliefs, chosen from a broad space of theistic beliefs, in the absence of any evidence which elevates them above the other possible beliefs, are a priori unlikely to be true.

    But can't a reasonable person describe a statement such as "there exists a creator intelligence"? Absent the framework of any particular existing theistic religion? Then try and reason about the truth or falsity of that statement, or the probability of its truth?

    Sure, once you have defined "creator" in the context divorced from our every day experiences, and once you have defined "intelligence" in a context divorced from our every day experiences, and once you have defined "exists" in a context divorced from our every day experience.

    Otherwise you are just a guy in a box pondering what size the box outside of the box is.

    In all likelihood we do not possess the language or references required to imagine the answer to questions like "What caused the universe". We don't even know if those are the right questions in the first place. The guy in the box might thing the only relevant question is what size is the box outside of his box, when in fact that question is irrelevant.

    Asking was the creator of the universe intelligent or not introduces so many assumptions in the question itself as to make the question meaningless.
    fergalr wrote: »
    In your last question, you are asking me to estimate the probability that X exists, but you are explicitly not telling me anything about X.

    Well, thats not entirely true - you told me its something I dont know, and never imagined. Its not clear whether you mean X is outside the category of things I could have known or imagined, or whether X is just not one of the specific things I knew or imagined; that does make a difference, but I dont think thats the intention of your question.
    I think your question is mean to be "estimate the probability of X, where Im telling you nothing about X - it doesnt even necessarily have to be something you know or could have imagined".

    As Im sure you intend, thats a really hard question. I don't even know where to start.
    We arent even limited to the set of things that could conceivably exist.
    Im not sure I can sensibly reply to that question?[/quote]

    You can't, that is the point. If the guy in the box is actually floating on a river, asking 'What colour is the box ouside of my box' is an irrelevant question, and the guy in the box will have no hope of even coming up with the concept of a river because he has nothing to reference that back to, he has no experience of anything like a river.

    Asking "Does God exist" is basically just asking "Was the cause of the universe something like what we have experienced in this universe".

    Likewise asking Are we in an simulated virtual world is again just asking "Is the universe something like what we experience in this universe"

    The only thing the guy in the box can imagine is outside the box is things that related to his experience in the box. If he found out he was on a river, or at the top of a mountain he would literally be awe struct because he would have nothing to relate that to.

    Pondering what things outside/before/beyond the universe by referencing things inside/currently in the universe to my mind is a rather pointless and limiting exercise.
    fergalr wrote: »
    You have no trouble giving a low probability that any particular theistic god (god_1, god_2 etc) exists, as I understand it? You also seem to have no problem saying that the sum of the probabilities P(god_1 or god_2 ... or god_n) for all the theistic religions that exist is also low?

    If we abstract a certain aspect of the existing religions - the general belief in some intelligent creator - we can define a space of possible theisms that share this aspect.

    Why then cannot we then ask 'what is the reasonable degree of belief that any of the religions in this space could be correct'? We cant we call this P(God), and reason about it?

    Because it is simply one of billions upon billons of things that could be the cause of the universe.

    The guy in the box says "Well my entire universe is made up of this box, so is it not reasonable to conclude that what ever is outside the box is also of some box like form". Which of course it isn't. The box might be floating on a river, a concept that the man has nothing to relate to.

    The idea that all humans have some notion of a creator intelligent means absolutely nothing as to the likelihood of the existence of that creator intelligence.


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 3,232 ✭✭✭Brian Shanahan


    fergalr wrote: »
    The whole point of this thread is to introduce an argument that we might need a different null.

    You cannot have a different null hypothesis on the existence of god spectrum of theories than "I hypothesise that there is no god". Absence of a god will always be the null position, as it posits non-existence to be the reality.

    Your supposition that there is some sort of creator is a positive position, because you posit that there is something out there analogous to god.
    fergalr wrote: »
    Its like if you are walking along a beach, and you just find a computer, running a simulation. You tend to think it was put there by some intelligence.

    Read On the Origin of Species, Darwin disproved Paley's hypothesis 150 years ago in relation to evolution, a much more complex process than any computer.


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 2,019 ✭✭✭nagirrac


    Read On the Origin of Species, Darwin disproved Paley's hypothesis 150 years ago in relation to evolution, a much more complex process than any computer.

    The watchmaker analogy was already addressed by the OP earlier (post #57).

    Evolution is not a complex process, it is a simple process that reproduces things that work and discards things that do not work. The end product may be complex, but according to the current theory of evolution, the complexity arose from billions of years of evolution from simple organisms to complex organisms.

    Paley's mistake was to try and draw an analogy between something complex designed by humans (a watch) to the natural world, something complex that had then and still has unknown origin. As Dawkins points out in The God Delusion, it is also fallacious to compare the "lucky" construction of a watch to evolution, as evolution has nothing to do with luck but is the result of a natural process. I don't believe anyone suggests a watch (let alone a computer running a simulation) would evolve naturally from inorganic matter, if we give the inorganic matter enough time, so in my view the analogy is useless.


  • Registered Users Posts: 1,922 ✭✭✭fergalr


    Zombrex wrote: »
    You don't have enough information to say it is "more likely", only that it is possible.
    I'm trying to argue that we can make statements about relatively likeliness.
    Zombrex wrote: »
    But sure when we are talking about rules outside the universe there are a whole host of things that are possible, things we can't even imagine.
    Agreed.
    Zombrex wrote: »
    It is foolish to think that the range of possibile causes for the universe are restricted to what we can imagine them to be.
    Agreed.
    Zombrex wrote: »
    The fact that human culture has come up with the notion of simulations of virtual worlds really has little if anything to do with what will eventually be the answer to the question "What is the universe"?

    What you wrote there could be taken in several ways.


    Let me first interpret it as if you were saying: 'it doesnt matter what you thought the probability of the coin toss was, it either came up heads or tails, which didnt have anything to do with your notions of its probability'.

    That would be true, of course, taken literally.

    But if someone was trying to tell you that they had seen the last 10 coin tosses, and it came up heads every time, you wouldn't say that to them. Because you'd reasonably accept their experience as evidence that would alter what you thought the coin might do in future. While the belief of the humans wouldn't alter the probability of the coin, the two are now related, from the point of view of making predictions, by the previously observed evidence.


    So, the question really becomes whether our experience in this universe should be considered as evidence that might alter how we reason about other possible universes - or not. So that's what we're talking about.
    I can see strong arguments each way.

    Zombrex wrote: »
    If you actually discover evidence that we are in some sort of simulation, that is an entirely different matter.

    I've said this before - but if we construct simulations, in which we simulate other sentient beings (a huge 'if') - would that count as 'discovering evidence that we are in some sort of simulation'?

    This is the crux - I would argue that yes it would count.

    Very weak evidence, but, put simply, I would argue that it would change our beliefs on the probability(we_in_simulation), due to inductive logic.

    I am sure it would change people's beliefs in practice - if people find out that some guy over there has a universe simulation with sentient beings in it, we are going to start thinking "wait a minute, maybe we're in such a simulation".

    We're not going to automatically believe that - we might still say its really unlikely, but our position on it is going to change.

    I think that's not just a probable reaction, but also a rational one.

    And if the event of us constructing such a simulation changes our rational degree of belief that we are in a simulation, then it counts as evidence that we are in a simulation - albeit weak evidence.

    Zombrex wrote: »
    But so far it is just human ponderings, ponderings that will be by definition limited to what we can imagine, which has little if anything to do with how the universe will turn out to be.

    That's too close to arguing the coin toss logic which I deal with above.

    Zombrex wrote: »
    It is the old saying that if you lived all your life in a box you will naturally imagine that outside the box is another bigger box. But that says nothing as to what is actually outside the box.

    Technically, yes, it says nothing for certain about what is actually outside the box.

    But surely it alters our subjective probability?
    Reasoning inductively?

    As you disagree, do you reject inductive reasoning?

    Or think its misapplied, or unsuitable, here?

    Zombrex wrote: »
    In all likelihood we do not possess the language or references required to imagine the answer to questions like "What caused the universe".

    Given the position you are arguing, I don't think you can say 'in all likelihood ...' there, but anyway.

    Zombrex wrote: »
    We don't even know if those are the right questions in the first place. The guy in the box might thing the only relevant question is what size is the box outside of his box, when in fact that question is irrelevant.

    Asking was the creator of the universe intelligent or not introduces so many assumptions in the question itself as to make the question meaningless.

    I can see the power of that argument.
    But I'm not sure whether I fully agree.

    I think you can use a similar attack against most real-world phenomena that you want to reason about.

    Any time I want to reason inductively about the future, given the past, you can come along and tell me that my past model was only one possible model I chose from an infinitely large space of models. You can tell me that there were an infinitely of models which could also explain the phenomena that I want to describe and predict, that I wouldn't even be capable of conceiving.

    That's all true - but should that really stop me doing induction?

    Whats so special about the question?


    Zombrex wrote: »
    You can't, that is the point. If the guy in the box is actually floating on a river, asking 'What colour is the box ouside of my box' is an irrelevant question, and the guy in the box will have no hope of even coming up with the concept of a river because he has nothing to reference that back to, he has no experience of anything like a river.

    Asking "Does God exist" is basically just asking "Was the cause of the universe something like what we have experienced in this universe".

    Likewise asking Are we in an simulated virtual world is again just asking "Is the universe something like what we experience in this universe"

    Yes - but I'm arguing that's a reasonable thing to give a higher probability to than other possibilities.

    I've said this before, but let me say it again, using your analogy:
    Zombrex wrote: »
    The only thing the guy in the box can imagine is outside the box is things that related to his experience in the box. If he found out he was on a river, or at the top of a mountain he would literally be awe struct because he would have nothing to relate that to.

    Given that you are 'in a box', all that you can imagine is outside, is related to your experience inside.

    So, you tend to imagine the outside is more likely to be a box, than a mountain, or anything else you can or can't conceive.


    Now, I'm not saying that what is outside the box is more likely to be a box than not be a box.

    What I am saying is that it is reasonable to start off by assuming that what is outside is more likely to be similar to what is inside, than it is to be any other single thing.

    That's an inductive argument.

    Maybe its not useful, because the probabilities are so low.



    I think that's the position that I'm coming to overall.
    But I'm not sure.
    And I'm not convinced that the argument is wrong, even if its conclusions aren't very strong or helpful.


    Zombrex wrote: »
    Pondering what things outside/before/beyond the universe by referencing things inside/currently in the universe to my mind is a rather pointless and limiting exercise.

    Because it is simply one of billions upon billons of things that could be the cause of the universe.

    Maybe; Im not sure.

    Zombrex wrote: »
    The guy in the box says "Well my entire universe is made up of this box, so is it not reasonable to conclude that what ever is outside the box is also of some box like form". Which of course it isn't.

    That's a misrepresentation of the argument.
    I'm not saying its reasonable to conclude whatever is outside the box is also some box like form.

    I'm saying that in the absence of other evidence, surely we should think its more likely to be box-like than another, otherwise equally likely possibility?


    The issue, is whether that's a useful statement.
    Without information on the space of possibilities, maybe its still infinitely unlikely to be 'box-like'.
    We don't really know.

    Its all so weak.


    But the original post on the thread was to consider whether if one universe could contain many simulations, that perhaps we are more likely to be in universe with a simulation.

    All very weak, inductive, argument from very weak evidence; but I don't think that means its useless.

    Zombrex wrote: »
    The box might be floating on a river, a concept that the man has nothing to relate to.

    The idea that all humans have some notion of a creator intelligent means absolutely nothing as to the likelihood of the existence of that creator intelligence.

    Again, that's like arguing that the people who have seen the previous cointosses mean absolutely nothing to the likelihood of the coin coming up heads next toss.

    True, in one sense, but also misleading - in the sense that our experience of the history alters our rational probability of the next toss being heads.


  • Registered Users Posts: 1,922 ✭✭✭fergalr


    You cannot have a different null hypothesis on the existence of god spectrum of theories than "I hypothesise that there is no god".

    Thats a really strong statement.
    I don't think its true - but Im not sure exactly what you mean. I cant engage with it seriously unless its explained in a little more detail, though.
    Absence of a god will always be the null position, as it posits non-existence to be the reality.

    Your supposition that there is some sort of creator is a positive position, because you posit that there is something out there analogous to god.

    Read On the Origin of Species, Darwin disproved Paley's hypothesis 150 years ago in relation to evolution, a much more complex process than any computer.

    I have no intention of reading the book; I guess you mean "but what about evolution".

    First off, I used the 'walking along the beach' construct as a joke; it was supposed to be a reference to those debates, to allow us consider by contrast the experience of seeing a computer system, as opposed to a seashell.


    Tell me, if you were walking along a beach, and you literally came across a computer system running a simulation, would you really think it was created directly by evolution?

    I mean, really? Does that not seem just a little bit improbable?


    If you come across a crab, which, like a watch, or a computer, is quite complex, then you can say 'ah, evolution must have caused this - a well understood, simple, naturally occurring process, which can create complex things - a theory we have a lot of evidence for, like the fossil record, or that annoying cluster of nerves that hurts when I fall on my rump'. You can do that because you know that crabs mate and reproduce according to selection pressure and have dna and genes.


    But if you come across a computer system, you dont really have a good explanation for how natural evolution causes that sort of thing, without first inventing intelligent tool builders.


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 25,848 ✭✭✭✭Zombrex


    fergalr wrote: »
    Let me first interpret it as if you were saying: 'it doesnt matter what you thought the probability of the coin toss was, it either came up heads or tails, which didnt have anything to do with your notions of its probability'.

    That would be true, of course, taken literally.

    No, it is more like this.

    You toss a "coin" with n number of sides (could be 2, could be a million). Based on your previous experience with coins you suppose it has two sides, but you don't actually know how many sides it has. Because you suppose it has two sides you conclude that it probably has about a 50/50 chance of landing on side A.

    Based on your experience of two sided coins you think this is a reasonable conclusion. But of course since you don't know how many sides there are you can't say that.

    When judging how likely something we imagine is we compare it to other things we imagine. But this limits the set of considered outcomes far too much.

    You cannot say how likely it is that the universe is a compute simulation because you don't have a clue how large the set of possible outcomes are. You can only say how likely it is based on the other things you imagined it could be. Which is rather irrelevant to how it actually is.
    fergalr wrote: »
    I've said this before - but if we construct simulations, in which we simulate other sentient beings (a huge 'if') - would that count as 'discovering evidence that we are in some sort of simulation'?

    No, no more than discovering a two sided coin is evidence that the n-sided coin is two sided and the odds of any particular side is 50/50.

    The most you can say is that it is possible that the universe is a simulation. But then it was always possible the universe was a simulation (in the same way that the existence of a two sided coins makes it possible that the n-sided coin is two sided).
    fergalr wrote: »
    I am sure it would change people's beliefs in practice - if people find out that some guy over there has a universe simulation with sentient beings in it, we are going to start thinking "wait a minute, maybe we're in such a simulation".

    That is unfortunately true, but it has no more significance than people saying their favourite TV programme of all time is the one they last enjoyed.

    The fact that humans just realised the universe could be X is not evidence that the universe is X, any more than discovering the existence of a 2 sided coin is evidence that the n-sided coin has two sides.

    Nor is the fact that we can produce simulations evidence in support of a simulated universe, because we have no grounds to say the rules of this universe effect the rules beyond it it.

    Or to put it another way, even if we couldn't simulate universes in this universe that doesn't mean our universe wouldn't be a simulation.

    The only "significant" thing happening here is that you realised we could be a simulated universe. But that has no relevance to if we are, or how likely that is.

    It is the classic human fallacy of confusing something being significant to you with something being significant in general.
    fergalr wrote: »
    Technically, yes, it says nothing for certain about what is actually outside the box.

    But surely it alters our subjective probability?

    I don't know what you mean by our "subjective probability"?
    fergalr wrote: »
    Given the position you are arguing, I don't think you can say 'in all likelihood ...' there, but anyway.

    I can because I'm arguing the opposite of what you are arguing.

    You are arguing that based on our experience we can narrow down the set of possible causes for the universe. I'm arguing the opposite.

    In all likelihood I'm right :p
    fergalr wrote: »
    Given that you are 'in a box', all that you can imagine is outside, is related to your experience inside.

    So, you tend to imagine the outside is more likely to be a box, than a mountain, or anything else you can or can't conceive.

    Now, I'm not saying that what is outside the box is more likely to be a box than not be a box.

    What I am saying is that it is reasonable to start off by assuming that what is outside is more likely to be similar to what is inside, than it is to be any other single thing.

    That's an inductive argument.

    The issue with this is that you are applying it to a system you have no experience with. As such inductive reasoning fails.

    It is not the inductive reasoning bit that is the issue, it is the applying inductive reasoning to a domain of which you know nothing about the rules of the system.

    Think of it this way, you watch a lot of football, and conclude that you cannot touch the ball with your hands in football unless you are the goal keeper.

    You then imagine what it must be like to play Rugby, a came you have no experience with, and conclude that the same rule should apply because it is all you are familiar with. You might think that is reasonable, after all all you have experienced is football and that rule holds in football.

    Then someone says "Rugby is nothing like football". Given that information is it still sensible to conclude it is likely that Rugby follows the same rule about touching the ball as football?
    fergalr wrote: »
    That's a misrepresentation of the argument.
    I'm not saying its reasonable to conclude whatever is outside the box is also some box like form.

    I'm saying that in the absence of other evidence, surely we should think its more likely to be box-like than another, otherwise equally likely possibility?

    Why? We should think we have no idea, just like we should conclude we have no idea what Rugby is like, rather than assuming it is probably like football because football is all we have experienced.

    We know from experience that this universe appears to follow rules we are familiar with.

    We have zero reason to conclude that anything beyond this universe does.

    We are back to being comfortable with "We don't know"

    fergalr wrote: »
    All very weak, inductive, argument from very weak evidence; but I don't think that means its useless.

    What use does it have?
    fergalr wrote: »
    Again, that's like arguing that the people who have seen the previous cointosses mean absolutely nothing to the likelihood of the coin coming up heads next toss.

    You haven't seen previous universes. You have no experience with the rules of how one creates a universe.

    Induction is only useful in a system that follows rules you are experienced with.

    The issue here is not that you are using inductive reasoning, it is that you are using inductive reasoning applied to a system you have no experience of. And more importantly you know you have no experience of it.


  • Registered Users Posts: 1,922 ✭✭✭fergalr


    I think your issue is with my use of inductive reasoning - or maybe with inductive reasoning in general.
    I'll try respond as best I can - but I've covered this ground in earlier posts.

    I'll reply to you in a different order, to try and keep things simpler.
    Zombrex wrote: »
    I don't know what you mean by our "subjective probability"?

    There's different ways of using and interpreting probability that are useful.
    One is as the 'subjective degree of belief' in a proposition.

    When reasoning about a particular event, that has perhaps already happened, e.g. a coin-toss, it can be the case that the toss has already happened, in which case perhaps some people know that probability(heads) is 1, as they know which way it landed; but other people, who didnt see it land, might also reasonably say the probability(heads) is 0.5. Both of these values can be reasonable, given the different things people know.

    Zombrex wrote: »
    You toss a "coin" with n number of sides (could be 2, could be a million). Based on your previous experience with coins you suppose it has two sides, but you don't actually know how many sides it has. Because you suppose it has two sides you conclude that it probably has about a 50/50 chance of landing on side A.

    Based on your experience of two sided coins you think this is a reasonable conclusion. But of course since you don't know how many sides there are you can't say that.

    "Coins" have a lot of baggage for being solely two sided.

    Lets talk about dice instead.

    Most dice are six sided. But there are plenty of eight sided, twenty sided, etc dice in existence. (Thanks to everyone's favorite servants of evil - the D&D players.)


    If you tell me that I have to roll a 'one' on a dice to win something, I'm probably going to assume its a six sided die, because those are the most popular. I might be wrong. I can't be certain, and shouldn't conclude that my chances are 1 in 6.

    But most dice are 6 sided, so if I had to guess, I would guess my chances of winning are 1 in 6.
    That's reasonable, surely?

    Now, you might have chosen a 20 sided die. If so, then it doesn't matter what most other dice are, as my chance of winning is 1 in 20.

    But, if I don't know this, it is still reasonable for me to believe that my chance of winning is more likely to be 1 in 6 than anything else, because 6 sided dice are the most common. Do you see?
    Zombrex wrote: »
    No, no more than discovering a two sided coin is evidence that the n-sided coin is two sided and the odds of any particular side is 50/50.

    Given the above, every 6 sided dice I see is evidence in favour of my chance of winning being 1 in 6, and every die with a number of sides other than 6 is argument against.

    So, actually, discovering a two sided coin is evidence that the n-sided coin is two sided, and by extension, that the probability(heads) is 0.5

    Zombrex wrote: »
    You cannot say how likely it is that the universe is a compute simulation because you don't have a clue how large the set of possible outcomes are.
    Its true, I cant say anything for definite.
    Zombrex wrote: »
    That is unfortunately true, but it has no more significance than people saying their favourite TV programme of all time is the one they last enjoyed.
    I did next say that I argued they were rational to do so, which is important.
    Zombrex wrote: »
    The fact that humans just realised the universe could be X is not evidence that the universe is X, any more than discovering the existence of a 2 sided coin is evidence that the n-sided coin has two sides.

    I think I have argued that discovering a 2-sided coin is evidence that the n-sided coin has two sides.

    Or more correctly, evidence that we should increase our subjective degree of belief that the value of 'n' on the 'n-sided coin' is likely to be '2'. While still not necessarily believing that it is most likely to be '2', or more likely to be '2' than not be '2'.

    Zombrex wrote: »
    It is the classic human fallacy of confusing something being significant to you with something being significant in general.

    I hope Im arguing at a more sophisticated level than that - but maybe I'm not; not clear exactly what you mean.

    Zombrex wrote: »
    It is not the inductive reasoning bit that is the issue, it is the applying inductive reasoning to a domain of which you know nothing about the rules of the system.
    If we knew the rules of the system, wouldnt we be reasoning deductively, instead? I.e. working from those rules to their implied conclusions?
    Zombrex wrote: »
    Think of it this way, you watch a lot of football, and conclude that you cannot touch the ball with your hands in football unless you are the goal keeper.

    Thats a great example of inductive reasoning.
    Now, I've been told that not being allowed to pick up the ball with my hands is a rule of football. But even if it wasnt, Im sure Id learn it after watching enough games. If I watched 10 of games of soccer, and then in the 11th, someone picked up the ball and ran with it, I'd be very surprised.

    Zombrex wrote: »
    You then imagine what it must be like to play Rugby, a came you have no experience with, and conclude that the same rule should apply because it is all you are familiar with. You might think that is reasonable, after all all you have experienced is football and that rule holds in football.

    That would be very reasonable starting point.

    Of course, there are things I would be wrong about. But I would be right about more things than I would be wrong. It would be very reasonable to assume the same rules, until I was corrected. Which is pretty much what people do.

    Imagine someone shows up to play rugby, and don't know any of the rules, and have only played soccer. But they reason that rugby is different, so they produce a gun, shoot the guy with the ball, and take it from his dead hands.

    Everyone would be appalled.
    Far more carries over, than doesn't.

    But they would also be appalled at the murder's failure to generalise all the existing rules, so obvious that we don't even bother stating them, to rugby.

    Zombrex wrote: »
    Then someone says "Rugby is nothing like football". Given that information is it still sensible to conclude it is likely that Rugby follows the same rule about touching the ball as football?

    Well, that person would be lying. Its very hard to reason about what it is sensible to conclude from a lie.

    Zombrex wrote: »
    Why? We should think we have no idea, just like we should conclude we have no idea what Rugby is like, rather than assuming it is probably like football because football is all we have experienced.

    We'd never get anywhere, unless we reasoned based on our prior experience, that the next thing was mostly like the old thing.

    Even though the ball is shaped funny, it still follows roughly similar trajectories.
    No-one expects that the first time they throw the rugby ball up, it will keep going up.
    We adjust and correct for the things that surprise us - the funny way it bounces - the fact that physical contact is allowed - and we make mistakes and learn as we go. We don't sit down with a full specification of the rules of the game, and work out from there the complete set of things that is and isnt allowed. Inductive reasoning is useful.
    Zombrex wrote: »
    You haven't seen previous universes.
    I have seen one.
    Just one.

    If I had seen a mere 10, I don't think we would be having this discussion.

    Zombrex wrote: »
    The issue here is not that you are using inductive reasoning, it is that you are using inductive reasoning applied to a system you have no experience of. And more importantly you know you have no experience of it.

    Thats when inductive reasoning is useful. Thats the point.


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 13,993 ✭✭✭✭recedite


    Feynman can assert that he's not afraid of the unknown, and that's valid as a position on scientific enquiry. Unfortunately, its not workable as a basis for social organisation. ......... Decisions need to be taken, in situations where we don't know everything. The difficult problem is agreeing on what basis those decisions can be made. And the situation is so lacking in obvious truths, that you can find someone beheading an 0ff-duty soldier in London, apparently under the impression that we're all at war.
    You have just reminded us what can happen when people insert "religion" into the gap that should be filled by "ethics". Ethical behaviour is the basis for social organisation. It is independent of the whole theism/atheism question.


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  • Closed Accounts Posts: 25,848 ✭✭✭✭Zombrex


    fergalr wrote: »
    I think your issue is with my use of inductive reasoning - or maybe with inductive reasoning in general.
    I'll try respond as best I can - but I've covered this ground in earlier posts.

    I'll reply to you in a different order, to try and keep things simpler.



    There's different ways of using and interpreting probability that are useful.
    One is as the 'subjective degree of belief' in a proposition.

    When reasoning about a particular event, that has perhaps already happened, e.g. a coin-toss, it can be the case that the toss has already happened, in which case perhaps some people know that probability(heads) is 1, as they know which way it landed; but other people, who didnt see it land, might also reasonably say the probability(heads) is 0.5. Both of these values can be reasonable, given the different things people know.




    "Coins" have a lot of baggage for being solely two sided.

    Lets talk about dice instead.

    Most dice are six sided. But there are plenty of eight sided, twenty sided, etc dice in existence. (Thanks to everyone's favorite servants of evil - the D&D players.)


    If you tell me that I have to roll a 'one' on a dice to win something, I'm probably going to assume its a six sided die, because those are the most popular. I might be wrong. I can't be certain, and shouldn't conclude that my chances are 1 in 6.

    But most dice are 6 sided, so if I had to guess, I would guess my chances of winning are 1 in 6.
    That's reasonable, surely?

    Now, you might have chosen a 20 sided die. If so, then it doesn't matter what most other dice are, as my chance of winning is 1 in 20.

    But, if I don't know this, it is still reasonable for me to believe that my chance of winning is more likely to be 1 in 6 than anything else, because 6 sided dice are the most common. Do you see?



    Given the above, every 6 sided dice I see is evidence in favour of my chance of winning being 1 in 6, and every die with a number of sides other than 6 is argument against.

    So, actually, discovering a two sided coin is evidence that the n-sided coin is two sided, and by extension, that the probability(heads) is 0.5



    Its true, I cant say anything for definite.


    I did next say that I argued they were rational to do so, which is important.



    I think I have argued that discovering a 2-sided coin is evidence that the n-sided coin has two sides.

    Or more correctly, evidence that we should increase our subjective degree of belief that the value of 'n' on the 'n-sided coin' is likely to be '2'. While still not necessarily believing that it is most likely to be '2', or more likely to be '2' than not be '2'.




    I hope Im arguing at a more sophisticated level than that - but maybe I'm not; not clear exactly what you mean.



    If we knew the rules of the system, wouldnt we be reasoning deductively, instead? I.e. working from those rules to their implied conclusions?



    Thats a great example of inductive reasoning.
    Now, I've been told that not being allowed to pick up the ball with my hands is a rule of football. But even if it wasnt, Im sure Id learn it after watching enough games. If I watched 10 of games of soccer, and then in the 11th, someone picked up the ball and ran with it, I'd be very surprised.




    That would be very reasonable starting point.

    Of course, there are things I would be wrong about. But I would be right about more things than I would be wrong. It would be very reasonable to assume the same rules, until I was corrected. Which is pretty much what people do.

    Imagine someone shows up to play rugby, and don't know any of the rules, and have only played soccer. But they reason that rugby is different, so they produce a gun, shoot the guy with the ball, and take it from his dead hands.

    Everyone would be appalled.
    Far more carries over, than doesn't.

    But they would also be appalled at the murder's failure to generalise all the existing rules, so obvious that we don't even bother stating them, to rugby.




    Well, that person would be lying. Its very hard to reason about what it is sensible to conclude from a lie.




    We'd never get anywhere, unless we reasoned based on our prior experience, that the next thing was mostly like the old thing.

    Even though the ball is shaped funny, it still follows roughly similar trajectories.
    No-one expects that the first time they throw the rugby ball up, it will keep going up.
    We adjust and correct for the things that surprise us - the funny way it bounces - the fact that physical contact is allowed - and we make mistakes and learn as we go. We don't sit down with a full specification of the rules of the game, and work out from there the complete set of things that is and isnt allowed. Inductive reasoning is useful.


    I have seen one.
    Just one.

    If I had seen a mere 10, I don't think we would be having this discussion.




    Thats when inductive reasoning is useful. Thats the point.

    We are kinda getting bogged down in reply roulette.

    My issue isn't with inductive reasoning, which I agree is useful (it is useful to assume the Sun is going to arise tomorrow because it has so far), but with applying inductive reasoning to a system that we have no knowledge about, which I think is profoundly non-useful (un-useful?).

    You mentioned a few times that you believe this is useful. Can you explain what use you think doing that has?

    To me inductive reasoning is only useful at making predictions of the future behaviour of the system your experience with has informed the reasoning in the first place. IE you can make conclusions about football based on watching football, but there is no reason to apply this to Rugby or baseball or hockey because you know the systems are different.


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 2,257 ✭✭✭GCU Flexible Demeanour


    recedite wrote: »
    You have just reminded us what can happen when people insert "religion" into the gap that should be filled by "ethics". Ethical behaviour is the basis for social organisation. It is independent of the whole theism/atheism question.
    I'd basically agree, but say "independent of" is too strong. Clearly, one very popular basis for ethics is religion.

    It's a discussion with a long lineage, which I know we engaged in here a few times (and likely will again, I'd suspect). The issue is always around why people should accept any common, public ethics as personally binding. Similar to the views expressed by some of those smelly soi disant atheists, Hobbes argument for the divine right of kings was simply pragmatic. He just felt an absolute authority needed to exist, and if you gave it religious backing it provided a rationale for that absolute authority.

    I'm sure there's plenty of ways of approaching the issue; but that issue of "what's the basis" has to have a sound foundation. What I'm suggesting is we don't have that solid foundation here in Ireland. The Roman Catholic Church, overwhelmingly, acted as the basis for public ethics. The logic of this State was to provide a space for the creation of a Roman Catholic state. Finding an alternative basis, that actually resonates with people, isn't easy.


  • Registered Users Posts: 308 ✭✭Sycopat


    First up. apologies, I'm a bit busy to give this topic my full attention and the replies are getting long and convoluted so I'll need to cut down a lot anyway:
    fergalr wrote: »
    No, I don't quite follow you there:

    In this specific case, the first 'foo' is the inner universe, and the second 'foo' is the outer universe, yes. But that is all that we have to separate them. Otherwise, we have nothing to tell them apart, and no reason to believe they differ.

    I'm not sure why you think we have no reason to assume they differ. They differ almost by definition. One is a simulation, and not necessarily a simulation of the other. And if it is, it is at best an approximation.

    There is no constraint on the simulation to have it use an identical 'ruleset' (And best use of the tech would probably simulating fundamentally different rulesets. Although that's an 'in-universe' thought.)

    Secondarily, unless the simulation is perfectly identical in every way to the parent universe*, in which case it would be a perfect reproduction and not a simulation, even the small variances would have massive repercussions.

    I really can't think of a system seemingly more sensitive to minor variances in it's initial 'conditions' than a universe like our current understanding of ours.

    You'd end up with the butterfly effect on a literally universal scale.


    *Something inherently leading to an infinite loop. Like your turtles all the way down except even the original universe would be identical to all the rest. Also likely impossible, requiring not only all the information in the universe, but being able to render all that information inside a subset of itself.

    We are talking about two universes.
    They are similar in that they are the same class of thing.

    All that you know is that one is the 'inner' universe, and one is the 'outer' universe.
    Other than that, you've no reason to distinguish between them.

    Perhaps you would say "oh no, they are different classes of thing, because one is the inner universe, and one is the outer universe. Therefore the outer universe has a different quality, in that it is 'real', while the inner one is still simulated."

    But I wouldnt be arguing that the outer universe, from our perspective, would be the ultimately real one. In fact, in order to not contradict my own inductive step, I would have to argue that, if I argue that our universe is likely to be simulated, on the basis that in can contain simulations, thus that the universe containing our universe is also likely to be simulated, and is thus both an inner and and outer universe, in turn.


    Now, as both Hawking and Russell have been mentioned in this thread, its only fair to acknowledge that yes, thats a bit turtles all the way down.
    But we dont have the problem that the turtles do. Obviously, at some point, you reach an ultimate universe. Thats ok, because we are only arguing for the probability of the containing universe also being a simulation - our argument is not sunk if the less probable event eventually happens, as it inevitably will.




    I think yours is not a reasonable mapping of the situation under discussion into a two-valued logic, and that is what has caused the problem.
    Specifically, the bit that is unreasonable, is to describe the the 'outer universe' as 'not-foo'.

    As I have just explained, we know nothing about the outer universe, other than that it is a universe.
    I claim that we can reason inductively that: out of the space of possible universes, it is more likely to be one of the universes that shares characteristics with our universe, than it is to be any specific other universe.

    You don't know the space of possible universes so you cannot reason that deductively.
    Given this universe, there is no reason to think that a simulating universe must have shared characteristics, nor that even given similar or shared characteristics, such a universe would be recognisably similar to this one.
    However, you make a very different, and much stronger claim, by calling it 'not-foo', in your representation, and thus attempting to argue that it is likely to have properties the inverse of the inner universe. Thats a huge thing to do.
    Calling it 'not-foo', just because it is different by virtue of being the 'outer' universe, and then attempting to thus argue that its properties are the 'not' of foo's properties is a big mistake.

    Not inverse. Different, and those differences are unknown. not-foo not negative foo.

    Inverse would be a negative mirror image. -foo = -bar.

    Your argument is a bit like if I said:

    "Here is an 'ASDFG'."
    And I opened it up, and showed you it contained a 'HJKL'.

    And then I said "'Here is another 'ASDFG'. Before I open it up, can you guess what is inside?".
    And then you said "Well, its certainly not a 'HJKL'. I think this because this 'ASDFG' is different than the previous 'ASDFG', because I have seen inside the previous 'ASDFG' and I have not seen inside this one. Therefore this one does not contain a 'HJKL'."


    Whereas I would argue that the best guess would in fact by that the second 'ASDFG' also contains a 'HJKL'.

    You keep restating this analogy or versions of it. I find it inappropriate. we do not both have ASDFG. We have 'ASDFG' and an unknown something else. You are trying to say the unknown something else contains HJKL because ASDFG does. I am saying we can't know the something else is also ASDFG. It may be ASFGH, or another variant. It may contain HJKL, but we have no way of knowing and no way of checking.
    I could flip this around, and ask you why you wouldn't take such claims about tomorrow seriously?
    And you would apply by making an appeal to the power of inductive logic. But they I would ask, why doesnt this same inductive step apply to reasoning about the outer universe?

    No I wouldn't. I would cite the observation of time, and use that to infer tomorrow: A function of time. The outer universe has not been observed. This universe is, by definition, not an observation of the outer universe, and if used as such would, at best, be wildly inaccurate to the point of uselessness due to the magnification of even minor variances by the combined scale of both universes** and also require the additional unfounded assumption that the outer universe is a universe 'like' ours.

    And think about what that even means for a second. That gravity is similar. That light travels at similar speeds. That atomic subparticles have near identical properties. The massive differences possible between universes with constants that approximate, but are not equal to each others. Those are universes conceivably describable as being 'like' ours.

    This is why it's so necessary to either know the space of possible universes for deduction or have directly observed the outer one for induction.
    Well, you can add dimensions indefinitely, each time attempting to quantify the certainty of one of the previous dimensions, but that would quickly get too confusing for me.

    I thought it was necessary to have a Z, in order to discuss certainty about certainty of god. But Im not sure about that model. I think specifically that Zombrex here would say I have misplaced some groups, and I cant say Zombrex would be wrong.

    Oh I don't agree with your group placement, it's just not an issue for me because such graphs are metaphorical representations of your point of view of the different positions held. I have different views, but I don't see how thats important to the discussion.


  • Registered Users Posts: 1,922 ✭✭✭fergalr


    Sycopat wrote: »
    You keep restating this analogy or versions of it. I find it inappropriate. we do not both have ASDFG. We have 'ASDFG' and an unknown something else. You are trying to say the unknown something else contains HJKL because ASDFG does. I am saying we can't know the something else is also ASDFG. It may be ASFGH, or another variant. It may contain HJKL, but we have no way of knowing and no way of checking.

    They are both universes. Thats all I've got on that point; but maybe its not enough.


    I think both Zombrex and Sycopat - and perhaps others - are objecting to the same part of my argument, which is evidence that theres a problem there:
    You are saying its a mistake to try and inductively generalise from our universe to a possible next universe out.

    I am saying that we are talking about two universes, and that the best starting guess we have, if we have to guess, is that the outer one is like the inner one.

    You are saying that I have no basis for this guess, because I have no information that the two are in any way similar; similar things, or even similar categories of thing; and so that its wrong to think that what is in our universe should at all change our guess about whats in a potential outer universe.


    Maybe even if I'm right, I've shown very little, or nothing of use, because, even if I'm right that the best guess is that it's like our universe, that doesn't mean its more likely than not that its like our universe, and as such that doesnt get us anywhere.


    I accept my reasoning might be flawed. I don't think it is; but I'm not sure.

    Anyway, regardless, I think there I have to leave it - I don't think I can make any further progress on this issue; I'm out of analogies or arguments.
    Even if I can't make any further progress, my thanks to everyone who replied - I feel I've learned a lot from the discussion, and I've got a better intuition about the areas I need to learn more about in future.


    Sycopat wrote: »
    Secondarily, unless the simulation is perfectly identical in every way to the parent universe*, in which case it would be a perfect reproduction and not a simulation, even the small variances would have massive repercussions.

    I really can't think of a system seemingly more sensitive to minor variances in it's initial 'conditions' than a universe like our current understanding of ours.

    You'd end up with the butterfly effect on a literally universal scale.

    *Something inherently leading to an infinite loop. Like your turtles all the way down except even the original universe would be identical to all the rest. Also likely impossible, requiring not only all the information in the universe, but being able to render all that information inside a subset of itself.

    Yes - theres a whole load of other challenges there, and fertile ground for objections. From a computational engineering point of view, trying to actually simulate a universe seems like a staggering challenge. Perhaps smarter intellects would find it easier. There might be efficiency hacks; if you want to simulate the universe from our perspective, you dont necessarily have to simulate the quantum vacuum in Andromeda; but still, huge challenges.

    Sycopat wrote: »
    Not inverse. Different, and those differences are unknown. not-foo not negative foo.
    Ok - I misinterpreted you there, my bad; I read 'not-foo' as 'the inverse of foo'.


  • Registered Users Posts: 3,038 ✭✭✭sponsoredwalk


    nagirrac wrote: »
    My criticism of Krauss is not with the science, it is his philosophy or rather his ideology. I don't believe I am slandering him as my disagreement is with the ideological conclusions he draws from very speculative science.In my opinion Kraus is a good scientist but a poor philosopher.

    See now I mentioned the word slander for a specific reason, not because you were disagreeing with his philosophy - you said he wasn't being fully honest because he wasn't admitting that 'the quantum' was the basis of his own theory when in fact I've given you evidence from his own mouth that there's more to it than quantum mechanics & why he simply can't just be using QFT or QM to say what he says. I mean come on, don't misconstrue the situation: to use your rhetoric - be honest about it ;)
    nagirrac wrote: »
    In defense of my earlier remarks, the vast majority of Krauss' book relates to how our observed physical universe emerged from empty space or the quantum vacuum, which I think we agree is anything but "nothing", it consists of fields of energy with virtual particles popping in and out of physical existance.

    Just because Frodo & Sam nearly lose the ring plenty of times on their journey to Mordor doesn't mean they don't eventually get to Mount Doom :confused: How in good conscience could you read 8 chapters of his book with him apparently talking about fields of energy & then come across the following paragraph:
    While inflation demonstrates how empty space endowed with
    energy can effectively create everything we see, along with an
    unbelievably large and flat universe, it would be disingenuous to
    suggest that empty space endowed with energy, which drives
    inflation, is really nothing
    . In this picture one must assume that
    space exists and can store energy, and one uses the laws of
    physics like general relativity to calculate the consequences. So if
    we stopped here , one might be justified in claiming that modern
    science is a long way from really addressing how to get something
    from nothing. This is just the first step, however. As we expand
    our understanding, we will next see that inflation can represent
    simply the tip of a cosmic iceberg of nothingness.
    (Last paragraph of chapter 9)
    then continue reading assuming he was talking about fields of energy? No wonder you think so little of him, if you see him contradicting his whole book with sentences like this (from your pov) then Krauss simply can't be a rational actor, he must be suspect :rolleyes:
    nagirrac wrote: »
    Vilenkin's "vacuum fluctuation" model is highly speculative and does not seem to have gained much traction in the scientific community since first proposed in the 1980s. Krauss actually does not spend a lot of time on this model in his book.

    At the most pivotal point of chapter 10, the chapter that explains the whole point of the book, he says:
    Alex Vilenkin, who has since become a friend, had actually just
    written a paper that described in exactly this fashion how quantum
    gravity indeed might create an inflating universe directly from nothing.
    I was scooped, but I couldn't be that upset because (a) I frankly didn't
    understand in detail at that point what I was doing, and (b) Alex
    had the boldness to propose something that at the time I didn't.
    Despite the character assassination credibility argument you're trying to employ he seems to pull this traction-less theory up (in a paragraph littered with names like Stephen Hawking, Jim Hartle etc... in the process of developing such ideas, if you want to pull out the credentials ploy) as the main point of his book, even if he doesn't spend a lot of time discussing his model (something I frankly doubt you can be the judge of at this stage).

    nagirrac wrote: »
    Yes, the model is based on unifying general relativity and QM ,

    This is good, finally you're correcting your previous remarks. I wonder what the implications of this will actually be for you though, i.e. will you read Krauss with a bit less bias now that you actually understand where he is coming from?
    nagirrac wrote: »
    but I think the following quote from Vilenkin himself, is the key one that distinguishes for me the "quantum" versus "no quantum" argument. I don't accept, based on my reading of Vilenkin, that you can make the conclusion that quantum "kicked in" after the quantum tunneling event from an "empty geometry".

    Well quite frankly we can't really base any conclusions off your reading since it's been so flawed & biased thus far. You really ought to re-read his book with an open mind & stop to research claim X or Y if you feel strongly enough about the subject.
    nagirrac wrote: »
    So, back to my original question; Where did the laws of physics, including the laws of QM, come from? They had to be there for this proposed quantum tunnelling event to happen.

    Again if you'd read Krauss book with an open mind you'd see even Krauss takes a stab at this question:
    Does this prove that our universe arose from nothing? Of
    course not. But it does take us one rather large step closer to the
    plausibility of such a scenario. And it removes one more of the
    objections that might have been leveled against the argument of
    creation from nothing as described in the previous chapter.

    There, "nothing" meant empty but preexisting space combined
    with fixed and well-known laws of physics. Now the requirement
    of space has been removed.

    But, remarkably, as we shall next discuss , even the laws of
    physics may not be necessary or required
    .
    (Last paragraph of chapter 10)
    I'll leave it to you to re-read his book, hopefully this time with an open mind, so that you can read the chapter beyond this statement to try to get Krauss' answer to your question.
    nagirrac wrote: »
    The charge of slander is a serious one and one you might consider withdrawing.

    I've made the claim based on your own words & justified myself - you went off & grossly mischaracterized what I said, claiming I said it to counteract your disagreement with his philosophy when in fact I mentioned slander because you went off talking about quantum mechanics as the basis of his own theory despite the fact I've more than once given you evidence of Krauss explicitly saying "no quantum", & even went so far as to justify it. You might want to withdraw this request for me to withdraw what I said & maybe fess up to mischaracterizing both me & Krauss at this stage...
    nagirrac wrote: »
    The scientist whose work Krauss draws on does not make the conclusion that Krauss is arriving at, as in my opinion unlike Kraus he does not have an ideological ax to grind. Vilenkin clearly states in his own book that "nothing" as described in his model, is not absolute nothing.

    Who cares if he does have an ideological axe to grind? If you sincerely thought about the implications of that sentence, like went into a field in the sun & stayed there until the moon came up just pondering the implications of approaching 'the other' you suspect of ulterior motives like this then I bet a world of new avenues would open up for you ;)


  • Registered Users Posts: 26,578 ✭✭✭✭Turtwig


    Folks, I realise it's warm outside, but there is a rising sense of condescending and snide tones developing here. This thread has been fantastic so far, so everyone have an ice cream (assuming it's safe for you to eat them.) and try to chill the tones a bit.
    Ta,


  • Registered Users Posts: 3,038 ✭✭✭sponsoredwalk


    Apologies, didn't mean to come off too snide :o I'll take your advice & chill out at a barbeque for a while in the real world & be back with a more laissez-faire attitude :cool:


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 2,019 ✭✭✭nagirrac


    Who cares if he does have an ideological axe to grind? If you sincerely thought about the implications of that sentence, like went into a field in the sun & stayed there until the moon came up just pondering the implications of approaching 'the other' you suspect of ulterior motives like this then I bet a world of new avenues would open up for you ;)

    Sounds like you've read the book since we last spoke. Perhaps you are right and I need to re-read it, its been a while. As I said my main issue is with Krauss' philosophy and not with the (highly speculative) science, and I admit I am a bit harsh on him, due to my bias of disliking scientists who use science to attack religious belief.

    Anyway perhaps we will take this up later, or perhaps not:P, but good luck with the barbeque as if you are in Ireland such occasions are to be treasured;)


  • Closed Accounts Posts: 13,993 ✭✭✭✭recedite


    Hobbes argument for the divine right of kings was simply pragmatic. He just felt an absolute authority needed to exist, and if you gave it religious backing it provided a rationale for that absolute authority.
    .........The Roman Catholic Church, overwhelmingly, acted as the basis for public ethics. The logic of this State was to provide a space for the creation of a Roman Catholic state. Finding an alternative basis, that actually resonates with people, isn't easy.

    People divide into two camps; the authoritarian/ conservative/ religious and then there is the liberal/free thinkers.
    In answer to the Hobbes monarchy, I can give the examples of democracy in ancient Athens, or the Things of of Nordic society in which order was maintained by reaching a consensus. Politicians here still hold hustings "haus thing" which are small local gatherings designed to gather the views of the citizenry. Parliaments in Iceland and Isle of Man are direct the descendants of their original Thing assemblies. So democracy is a workable alternative to divine right.


    On the question of ethics, religion, the state, and the origins of the universe, IMO there are clearly separated issues, but the religious person is not permitted to acknowledge this separation. Religion insists on bundling these issues into one. Take it all, or leave it (but "die you heretic" if you decide to leave it)

    Ethics; yes, there are some in religious texts, such as the Ten Commandments, but these are clearly taken from what was already being used in tribal societies, as worked out by consensus to be mutually beneficial. Other commandments and religious rules have nothing to do with ethics, but are just there to give a sense of cohesion and belonging, or otherwise to propagate the religion in some way.

    Fantasy; this is often overlooked but escapism is important to the human condition. Once we had storytelling; Homers Iliad, the Sagas, Finn Mac Cool, the adventures of The Hebrews and the warrior Mohammad.
    Now we have the modern novel, TV and computer games.

    Human Origins; once we had a range of creation myths. Now we have theories of evolution, Big Bang and others. This thread speculates on the idea that we exist in a simulation, and a bit of fantasy is no harm to fire the imagination. All theories start off in someone's imagination.


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  • Closed Accounts Posts: 2,257 ✭✭✭GCU Flexible Demeanour


    recedite wrote: »
    In answer to the Hobbes monarchy, I can give the examples of democracy in ancient Athens, or the Things of of Nordic society in which order was maintained by reaching a consensus. Politicians here still hold hustings "haus thing" which are small local gatherings designed to gather the views of the citizenry. Parliaments in Iceland and Isle of Man are direct the descendants of their original Thing assemblies. So democracy is a workable alternative to divine right.
    In fairness, I'm not especially saying Hobbes is right, or that he's right in every situation. I'm simply saying he's right in identifying that promoting social co-operation is hard. I'm sure ancient Athens had wonderful democracies. But they didn't survive. Isn't the background to Plato's Republic the practical reality of Athens losing a war to Sparta? Again, I'm not especially defending Plato. I'm just pointing out that (some) advocates of rule by elites are grounding their views in practical experience.

    And, bear in mind, much of political science is devoted to pointing out the difference between formal power structures, and how power is actually exercised. Just to give a for-instance (without particular demonising anyone), it would frequently be observed that doctors have a huge amount of influence over the operation of the health service. Depending on the issue, they'd have more say in what will or won't get done than any Minister for Health, regardless of his democratic mandate.

    You'll appreciate, this is a big topic and there's lots more we can say. The sole point I'm trying to make is that people need a reason to co-operate that seems real to them. Saying to an Irish audience "Let's be like the Spartans in '300', and suddenly have this insanely deep veneration of the law" (or any simply out-of-the-blue assertion) won't magick up the same basis for co-operation that the Church provided.
    recedite wrote: »
    Fantasy; this is often overlooked but escapism is important to the human condition. Once we had storytelling; Homers Iliad, the Sagas, Finn Mac Cool, the adventures of The Hebrews and the warrior Mohammad.
    Now we have the modern novel, TV and computer games.
    And, is it fair to say, many of those novels, shows and games draw their inspiration from the older myths.

    Has anyone done a game yet where you're the Son of God, on a mission to save the world through your own sacrifice? There has to be something in that.

    But, yes, I'd suspect you're right. For myself, I used to love the X Files when it was on. It was that wonderful sense of the limits to reality being shifted. What if there were aliens visiting the Earth? What if there were people with strange abilities hiding in our midst? Great stuff.


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