Simulated reality and *ism

fergalr

One possible way of organising beliefs, on a spectrum:

1) Definite theism (e.g. certain belief in interventionist catholic God)
2) Uncertain, broad theism (belief in general categories of possibly interventionist Gods)
3) Deism (belief in non-interventionist God)
4) Agnosticism (uncertainty about existence of any God)
5) Strong Agnosticism (belief no certainty is possible)
6) Weak atheism (belief there's probably no God)
7) Strong Atheism (certain belief there's no God)


Anyway, my question:
If you accept the argument that:

- One individual objective possible universe is likely to contain many simulated universes
- Therefore its more likely we are in a simulated universe than in a real one
- Therefore our simulation was likely setup by someone

(henceforth 'simulation programmer argument')

Then wouldn't it be more rational to believe somewhere around 3, or 4 above, (or even 2) rather than 5, 6, or certainly 7?

I would be particularly interested in hearing from anyone who accepts the simulation programmer argument, or its general plausibility, but is in 6 or 7.

Or if anyone knows coherent writing on this topic, I'd also be interested.

I'm familiar with the simulation argument as set out by e.g. Bostrom.
I find the simulation argument plausible, and think that even accepting its plausibility moves you away from 5,6,7 above.

I'm curious if this sort of argument impacts how people class themselves.

Obliq

fergalr wrote: »

Anyway, my question:
If you accept the argument that:

- One individual objective possible universe is likely to contain many simulated universes
- Therefore its more likely we are in a simulated universe than in a real one
- Therefore our simulation was likely setup by someone
.

I don't accept this argument as I can see no proof of same. I am at your No.4/5 though, so my opinion would stand to reason (in my world :pac: )

BTW, in this argument, how does a) lead to b)? Why would one universe be more 'real' than another?

fergalr

Let me take this part first:

Obliq wrote: »

Why would one universe be more 'real' than another?

This is a good question. So, maybe any universe is equally real, to the people in it.

But lets say we want to argue about the possibility or presence of a supreme being, or creator. Being in a universe running on a big computer certainly admits the possibility of a creator.

By contrast, lets consider a strong atheist who believes that the universe just came into being without any design; just the result of a fluke of physics. With no creator. (A reasonable position, imo.)


The two positions make different predictions, in extremis.

Specifically, in the case of an intervention by the programmer/creator, if a message in the sky shows up one day, the strong atheist will be very more surprised than the person who admits the possibility they are running in a simulation.

Now, absent such extreme cases, where an intervention occurs, we don't have a testable difference between the two universes. (Probably; maybe its possible to detect whether we are running in a simulation through some other means; timing attack etc! but lets neglect that.)


But even if we dont have a way of testing which we are in currently, I think its clear there is a meaningful distinction to be made between the two models, as they give different levels of surprise in response to a future possible intervention.

So it is a real difference of model we are talking about, not just some semantic issue. I hope that makes sense?

Obliq wrote: »

BTW, in this argument, how does a) lead to b)? Why would one universe be more 'real' than another?

I assume that you are referring to these two parts:

Lets label them A & B:

a) - One individual objective possible universe is likely to contain many simulated universes
b) - Therefore its more likely we are in a simulated universe than in a real one

I accept that B doesn't follow directly from A, here.

For counter-example, maybe even though some 'real' (i.e. objective, baseline, non-simulated) universes can contain many simulated universes, perhaps most 'real' universes can't. And that as a result, we are in fact most likely to live in a non-simulated universe.

Its very hard to reason about other possible universes - or equivalently about the probability space of the universes we could be in. We have very little information to go on.

But I do think its possible to make some logical arguments about these things - weak ones, along similar lines to how arguments like the Drake equation work. Weak arguments, but there's little empirical evidence in all these matters; you work with what you have.

I think that we shouldn't really neglect these arguments, from deciding where on the *ism spectrum we might be.


To come at this from another tack:

I believe that, in this universe (the one universe I have any access to), we will probably soon have the ability, as humans, to simulate universes which appear real to the sentient beings that live within them.

Now I accept that this is not a widely held belief.
But I'm a pretty strong and, I would say informed, believer in the future potential of better software technology, and AI. (I dont have a lot of certainty, of course, but I think its rational to believe theres a reasonable probability that, extrapolating forward our development several hundred years, we'll get there. There's a huge variance on that estimate, of course, but for me, the probability is reasonable - maybe 70%?, assuming no cataclysms).


So, if I believe that in the one universe I have access to, it'll probably be possible to simulate many other 'universes', then that is a pretty compelling argument, to me, that the probability space of universes in general is one in which each real universe contains many simulations.
Hence I am more likely to be living in a simulation.


And so maybe when I think bad thoughts, maybe I should worry that there is some programmer person who is going to penalise me in future for thinking those thoughts. (I dont actually think that, but it illustrates the line of argument.)

Turtwig

Atheists don't take any position on the creation of the universe, or universes. They only take a position on the existence of deities. Whether these deities abilities comprise of being able to a blow out candle or create universes is irrelevant.

fergalr

Jernal wrote: »

Atheists don't take any position on the creation of the universe, or universes. They only take a position on the existence of deities. Whether these deities abilities comprise of being able to a blow out candle or create universes is irrelevant.

I don't really understand the point you are making there, or perhaps why its relevant here.

I am also not sure I agree with your assertion:

Jernal wrote: »

Atheists don't take any position on the creation of the universe, or universes.

Most religions, as I understand it, and most religious people, believe that one or more of their deities created the universe. This is a widespread belief. Atheists reject this belief, thus firmly taking a contrary position on the creation of the universe, surely?

Would you say that belief in the existence of an all powerful sentient creator of the universe, optionally with the capacity for arbitrary intervention, is compatible with an atheist belief structure? I would say it is not.

magicbastarder

fergalr wrote: »

I am also not sure I agree with your assertion:

i assume he means in the sense that atheism only goes as far as to state 'i do not believe god created the universe'. it says nothing about how the universe came into being; merely that it was not an omnipotent sky-being.

fergalr

magicbastarder wrote: »

i assume he means in the sense that atheism only goes as far as to state 'i do not believe god created the universe'. it says nothing about how the universe came into being; merely that it was not an omnipotent sky-being.

That question, of whether a 'god' created the universe, is at the heart of what my post is about, though.

In this context, I don't see any meaningful or useful distinction between an 'omnipotent sky-being' and a 'programmer that created and exerts arbitrary control over the simulation of our universe'. (Maybe Im missing something?)


As such, an argument that we are likely to be living in such a created simulation universe is very relevant to the core of atheist belief.

Pherekydes

fergalr wrote: »

As such, an argument that we are likely to be living in such a created simulation universe is very relevant to the core of atheist belief.

What core of atheist belief? Atheism is, generally speaking, about lack of beliefs.

GCU Flexible Demeanour

magicbastarder wrote: »

i assume he means in the sense that atheism only goes as far as to state 'i do not believe god created the universe'. it says nothing about how the universe came into being; merely that it was not an omnipotent sky-being.

Although I'd say a little more could be said. Religions aren't necessarily built around creator gods.

So we have to detach questions of how the universe was created from the question of believe in gods. It would strike me that a valid atheist position would be that the universe wasn't created, it was always here. (I'm not saying that is or isn't correct - just that it's a possible position that someone might advocate.)

I'd say atheism is simply the assertion that there are no gods. Now, clearly that must entail rejection of any theist creation myths. But it won't necessarily be the main point of difference.

fergalr

Pherekydes wrote: »

What core of atheist belief? Atheism is, generally speaking, about lack of beliefs.

Was what I meant by 'core of atheist belief' really unclear, in the context, in a way that made my meaning hard to understand?

Personally, I don't see a meaningful difference between "belief there is no god" vs "lack of belief in a god", in the context of this thread.


But to be super-clear, I have tried to update what I wrote to be compatible with your chosen semantics:

As such, an argument that we are likely to be living in such a created simulation universe is very relevant to the core of atheism, i.e. that atheists do not believe in a creator/god.

fergalr

GCU Flexible Demeanour wrote: »

Although I'd say a little more could be said. Religions aren't necessarily built around creator gods.

True, but creator gods are certainly a pretty strong part of several major religions Im familiar with.

Regardless, creator gods are incompatible with atheism, 5&6 on my spectrum there, which is the relevant issue here.

Pherekydes

fergalr wrote: »

Personally, I don't see a meaningful difference between "belief there is no god" vs "lack of belief in a god", in the context of this thread.

Well, you should!

One is about a belief, the other is about a lack of belief. A not unsubtle difference, and not just a matter of semantics.

fergalr

Pherekydes wrote: »

Well, you should!

One is about a belief, the other is about a lack of belief. A not unsubtle difference, and not just a matter of semantics.

To address that tangent:

To avoid semantic confusion, let me state some of the principles of my reasoning on this. These are not the only possible principles, but I believe they are suitable here. Let me know if you disagree with any of them.

There either is or is not a god.
There can not both 'be a god' and 'be no god'.
The 'there is a god' and 'there is no god' possibility spaces are exclusive, and provide a complete cover of the space of possibilities.
Lets call 'there is a god' A, and 'there is no god' B.

If we measure the subjective degree of belief in A as probability P(A), then the subjective degree of belief in B, P(B), is (1 - P(A)).


At any point in time, you should theoretically be able to answer what your P(A) is, and that will also reveal your P(B). Lack of belief in P(A) implies an increased belief in P(B) and vicea versa.


Do you think there's anything wrong with what Im doing here?

Pherekydes

fergalr wrote: »

To address that tangent:

To avoid semantic confusion, let me state some of the principles of my reasoning on this. These are not the only possible principles, but I believe they are suitable here. Let me know if you disagree with any of them.

There either is or is not a god.
There can not both 'be a god' and 'be no god'.
The 'there is a god' and 'there is no god' possibility spaces are exclusive, and provide a complete cover of the space of possibilities.
Lets call 'there is a god' A, and 'there is no god' B.

If we measure the subjective degree of belief in A as probability P(A), then the subjective degree of belief in B, P(B), is (1 - P(A)).


At any point in time, you should theoretically be able to answer what your P(A) is, and that will also reveal your P(B). Lack of belief in P(A) implies an increased belief in P(B) and vicea versa.


Do you think there's anything wrong with what Im doing here?

Your probability space covers the 'god' question, but not the 'belief' question. Many people believe in god(s) to a greater or lesser extent, but this in no way covers the entire populace. Many are non-believers. That is, they don't fall into either of your groups.

fergalr

Pherekydes wrote: »

Your probability space covers the 'god' question, but not the 'belief' question. Many people believe in god(s) to a greater or lesser extent, but this in no way covers the entire populace. Many are non-believers.

That doesn't make sense.

P(A) is the subjective degree of belief in there being a god.

A 'non-believer', in this model, is someone who has a P(A) of, or arguably close to, zero.

Pherekydes wrote: »

That is, they don't fall into either of your groups.

You are mistaken: I did not define two groups of people.


I defined two possibilities, which cover the possibility space.

In the model, individuals can have a subjective degree of belief in P(A) that varies between 0 and 1. It is not the case that an individual must have a P(A) of either zero or one. There are no groups of individuals in my model.

However, there would probably be clusters in the space (groups) due to the nature of the world, but thats irrelevant here.

fergalr

Are you trying to say that some individuals would have very low confidence in their value of P(A)? Of course that varies per individual; but individuals still have a P(A). And thats not relevant to the original statement I made which you objected to.

Or perhaps you might say that its difficult to get individuals to reveal their actual beliefs of P(A), or perhaps you might even go so far as to argue that some people don't even have a value for P(A).

I would argue that non-believers most certainly do have a value for P(A), and that it is near 0, by definition of what it means to be a 'non believer'.

I would argue that everyone else has a value of P(A), either explicitly in their heads, or at least implicitly; although it might be hard to reveal, it is there. It would have to be, in order for us to make judgements about how to act, incultured as we are in the presence of so many religions telling us 'god is watching you', 'you will be judged later' etc.

18AD

You've just pushed the problem back. God still exists in wherever the "real" people are, the programmers.

How exactly does this sidestep the idea of God?

fergalr

18AD wrote: »

You've just pushed the problem back. God still exists in wherever the "real" people are, the programmers.

Indeed, a god either exists or does not exist in the baseline reality, whereever that may be.

Thats not so important to my discussion though, which is about whether a god exists in our particular reality.

18AD wrote: »

How exactly does this sidestep the idea of God?

On the contrary, it shows the difficulty of sidestepping the idea of a god - because even if no god exists in the baseline reality, a god (i.e. omnipotent programmer/creator) might in fact be probable in our reality (if we believe certain arguments about the likelihood that we exist in a simulation.)

My point is that this presents a problem for the stronger forms of atheist disbelief.


I should say, that if you are a religious person, that would argue that there is a particular God in the baseline reality, and that we are in that reality, then I don't think there would be much of interest to you in the discussion I started this thread with (although I could be wrong).

I.e., to be clear, I am explicitly not trying to argue "we are more likely to be in a reality created by programmers, therefore there is no need of a god in any reality, including the eventual, ultimate, non-simulated reality".

18AD

fergalr wrote: »

On the contrary, it shows the difficulty of sidestepping the idea of a god - because even if no god exists in the baseline reality, a god (i.e. omnipotent programmer/creator) might in fact be probable in our reality (if we believe certain arguments about the likelihood that we exist in a simulation.)

My point is that this presents a problem for the stronger forms of atheist disbelief.


I should say, that if you are a religious person, that would argue that there is a particular God in the baseline reality, and that we are in that reality, then I don't think there would be much of interest to you in the discussion I started this thread with (although I could be wrong).

I.e., to be clear, I am explicitly not trying to argue "we are more likely to be in a reality created by programmers, therefore there is no need of a god in any reality, including the eventual, ultimate, non-simulated reality".

Surely if a God existed in the ultimate reality he would permeate all other levels of reality too? It's kind of an old Platonist idea that God emanates from the central true existence out into the less existing spaces and realities.

From just the perspecitve of the simulated reality and I think it only impacts on our judgement of probability of God's existence. That is, the simulation has either been programmed to have one, or equally likely, it has not. You have just shifted the odds of there being a God in the simulation based on it being possible for it to have been programmed that way.

Maybe it's no so simple though, because I don't think a simulated God would be considered to be really God. If this is the case, then in both situations (programmed with or without God) it isn't about the real God and the probabilities haven't changed at all and we are back to square one. That is, it all still depends on the real reality.

Pherekydes

fergalr wrote: »

My point is that this presents a problem for the stronger forms of atheist disbelief.

Why is this a problem? What is your interest [in this so-called problem]?

For the record, I don't have any problem. I simply don't believe there is a god(s).

fergalr

18AD wrote: »

Surely if a God existed in the ultimate reality he would permeate all other levels of reality too?

That would make sense to me.

Im more interested in the case where we believe there is no God in the ultimate reality, though, and whether there might still be something in our particular reality - a sort of programmer creator - which might still, from our perspective, have all the characteristics that a God in the ultimate reality would have; and the problems this possibility might cause for atheism.

18AD wrote: »

It's kind of an old Platonist idea that God emanates from the central true existence out into the less existing spaces and realities.

From just the perspecitve of the simulated reality and I think it only impacts on our judgement of probability of God's existence. That is, the simulation has either been programmed to have one, or equally likely, it has not.

Even if the simulation we are in has been programmed to not have a god, my point would be that the programmer being would still have all the characteristics of a god which atheists typically reject.

Pherekydes

fergalr wrote: »

That would make sense to me.

Im more interested in the case where we believe there is no God in the ultimate reality, though, and whether there might still be something in our particular reality - a sort of programmer creator - which might still, from our perspective, have all the characteristics that a God in the ultimate reality would have; and the problems this possibility might cause for atheism.



Even if the simulation we are in has been programmed to not have a god, my point would be that the programmer being would still have all the characteristics of a god which atheists typically reject.

Do you honestly think we are part of some simulated reality?

fergalr

Pherekydes wrote: »

Why is this a problem? What is your interest [in this so-called problem]?

I'm not terribly sure my interest is important to the discussion. Its getting a little close to ad hominem territory.

But, in the spirit of transparency: I would have probably classed myself as weak atheist, or perhaps agnostic.

I would have thought 'Dont be ridiculous, no-one can possibly hear what you are thinking. Of course you wont be judged when you die.'

However, an argument that we are likely to be in a simulation changes that calculus. Perhaps it is probable that we exist in a simulation, with a creator? (yes, this is a very open question) In which case, perhaps I might be judged after I die?!


This is an interesting thing to think about.

Pherekydes wrote: »

For the record, I don't have any problem. I simply don't believe there is a god(s).

Thats fine, and what you believe is completely up to you.

I am interested in a discussion about what is rational to believe.

If I woke up tomorrow, and there was a giant pulsing message claiming to be from a creator written in the sky, my views on reality, and P(A) would change.

Equally, if someone provides me with a convincing argument for P(A), in my attempt to be rational, my beliefs might change.

So, when I say 'theres a problem', it is in the sense that a compelling argument for P(A) provides a problem for those who believe not P(A).

Its only important to people who want to attempt to be rational about their beliefs, and has no impact on people who just want to maintain a position.

18AD

fergalr wrote: »

Im more interested in the case where we believe there is no God in the ultimate reality, though, and whether there might still be something in our particular reality - a sort of programmer creator - which might still, from our perspective, have all the characteristics that a God in the ultimate reality would have; and the problems this possibility might cause for atheism.

Even if the simulation we are in has been programmed to not have a god, my point would be that the programmer being would still have all the characteristics of a god which atheists typically reject.

OK. But the programmer still doesn't have all the characteristics. I mean, if it's a person, he has only created a universe, or a simulation of one. Let's take the simulation as being real, for us. The creator still lacks omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence. Even if he had all these things and knew everything of this simulated universe, could alter it in any way and somehow permeated it, there would still be somewhere, i.e. another universe, in which he couldn't exercise these powers. Thereby, he still has none of the primary characteristics.

fergalr

Pherekydes wrote: »

Do you honestly think we are part of some simulated reality?

What do you mean? An argument by popular belief? Social consensus? An ad hominem attack?

Said in 1800: Do you honestly believe there's no god?


Genuinely, I honestly believe its a possibility that is worth serious consideration, yes.

Does it impact me hugely on a day to day basis? No. We are discussing very uncertain things here, and abstract things; it doesnt affect my food supply etc.

Worthy of consideration as a possibility? Yes, definitely.


If its 200 years in the future, and a large number of people spend a lot of time in simulated realities, running on hardware they dont control, it won't seem like such an abstract thought.
Do I believe such a future is possible? Yes, even probable. With high confidence? No, the medium term future is v hard to predict, as we know.

Peanut

fergalr wrote: »

..because even if no god exists in the baseline reality, a god (i.e. omnipotent programmer/creator) might in fact be probable in our reality (if we believe certain arguments about the likelihood that we exist in a simulation.)

I don't think it's ever possible to get any meaningful value for this probability, because of Godel's incompleteness etc. when looking at a closed system.

(Some people may argue that logical arithmetic limitations are not relevant to physical reality, however if we're trying to establish a formal or logical argument about existence or non-existence of something, I think it's fair to consider these constraints.)

fergalr

18AD wrote: »

OK. But the programmer still doesn't have all the characteristics. I mean, if it's a person, he has only created a universe, or a simulation of one. Let's take the simulation as being real, for us. The creator still lacks omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence. Even if he had all these things and knew everything of this simulated universe, could alter it in any way and somehow permeated it, there would still be somewhere, i.e. another universe, in which he couldn't exercise these powers. Thereby, he still has none of the primary characteristics.

Well, you are assuming those particular three characteristics are necessary for a god. That might be your personal definition, fair enough. But I would say those characteristics would not be necessary for an atheist. Indeed, I believe there are religions where the gods dont have all those characteristics (although they are present in, e.g. christianity as I understand it).

A creator that can change any aspect of our reality, that has the ability to change our minds, to know any of our thoughts, to pause the simulation, etc I would argue would violate the beliefs a typical atheist has, even if they werent exactly omniscient.

Its true that the creator wouldnt be able to exercise their powers in other universes, but still, the existence of such a creator would make atheism impossible, to my mind.

You could just say 'well, in my book, its still not a god' and leave it at that. I couldn't argue with that position - if such a creator doesn't meet your definition of god, then thats fair enough, and I cant say anything further - my argument would stop there.

Such a creator would meet my definition of god, to all intents and purposes, as I try to answer the question, for me personally, 'is there a god'. But thats very subjective, and I wouldnt seek to convince someone other than they currently think.

fergalr

Peanut wrote: »

I don't think it's ever possible to get any meaningful value for this probability, because of Godel's incompleteness etc. when looking at a closed system.

What? What has Godels theorems got to do with this?

Which of Godels theorems, and how exactly does it apply here? I dont see the relevance.

18AD

fergalr wrote: »

A creator that can change any aspect of our reality, that has the ability to change our minds, to know any of our thoughts, to pause the simulation, etc I would argue would violate the beliefs a typical atheist has, even if they werent exactly omniscient.

Its true that the creator wouldnt be able to exercise their powers in other universes, but still, the existence of such a creator would make atheism impossible, to my mind.

But by the very act of introducing this through the idea of a programmer, you have explained away any Godlike activity as being that of a programmer. For all in tents and porpoises, if we saw this psuedo-omniscient activity we could explain it as the work of the programmer.

You have to consider that any such miraculous activity, under the rubric of there being a programmer, become merely semblances of acts of God. The programmer appears to behave like a God, but we know that it only appears TO US like that. So we know it's not really a God.

There's also the problem that if we can't rule out completely the idea of the traditional God, the one described by religion, then atheism will still exist counter to this, regardless of whether we are in a simulation and there is a programmer.

fergalr

Peanut wrote: »

I don't think it's ever possible to get any meaningful value for this probability, because of Godel's incompleteness etc. when looking at a closed system.

(Some people may argue that logical arithmetic limitations are not relevant to physical reality, however if we're trying to establish a formal or logical argument about existence or non-existence of something, I think it's fair to consider these constraints.)

I dont think you can do that - I'm certainly not accepting that

Its been a while since I read Godel Escher Bach, which had a pretty good intro to Godels theorems, but those are results about formal systems of logic.

I don't see how you can go from Godels incompleteness theorem to a statement that says its impossible to get a meaningful probability for the existence of god.

There are certainly other good obstacles, and you could argue that we'll never be able to make good logical arguments that move P(A) either up or down. But we aren't talking about manipulating rules in a formal system here, right?

You'd be saying that there's some statement that is true that we can't prove is true from within the system (like the diagonal number in the proof) - but then you are trying to say 'oh look, our universe is like a big formal system, and so there are some things that are true that we cant prove'. But thats a very fuzzy last step; I dont how it works, anyway! And further, theres no evidence that P(A) would be one of those things.

I think you are spoofing

fergalr

18AD wrote: »

But by the very act of introducing this through the idea of a programmer, you have explained away any Godlike activity as being that of a programmer. For all in tents and porpoises, if we saw this psuedo-omniscient activity we could explain it as the work of the programmer.

If we could reason about that. If the programmer, staghetti-monster style, didnt just reprogram us! Or if the programmer wasnt an intelligence sufficiently smarter than us to just fool us reliably, with complete control over our universe. But we are getting back to Decartes demon there... its a fair point you make.

18AD wrote: »

You have to consider that any such miraculous activity, under the rubric of there being a programmer, become merely semblances of acts of God. The programmer appears to behave like a God, but we know that it only appears TO US like that. So we know it's not really a God.

You know, we are setting a very high bar of proof, for 'the real god'. All of Jesus' miracles are right out. If the real god ever does show up, we'll just be like 'Oh, you are just our simulation programmer, go away.'

18AD wrote: »

There's also the problem that if we can't rule out completely the idea of the traditional God, the one described by religion, then atheism will still exist counter to this, regardless of whether we are in a simulation and there is a programmer.

Yes, that's a fair point.

I think those are good points; I think they are somewhat different to where I was going with the start, which was really looking for someone to justify atheism, if they believed the simulation argument - they do sort of address that, but I think they are in a slightly different direction - interesting stuff, though...