Nigel Farage MEP

GCU Flexible Demeanour

micosoft wrote: »

Interesting that you say here that the issue is EU EEA regulations (which is seriously challengeable) when in another thread you are quite convinced the problem is the Euro. Which is it?

I think what I actually said was the regulatory regime was inadequate in the context of a single currency. I don't think many people disagree. For what its worth, Scofflaw seems to agree.

Scofflaw wrote: »

That confuses certain minimum standards with the full scope of regulation. That Irish regulation was specifically and nationally inadequate has been the subject of several detailed reports into the crisis. I would suggest Honohan at a minimum, but Regling-Watson as well - both reports are available here: http://www.socialjustice.ie/content/honohan-report-irelands-banking-crisis

Clearly, no-one can say that regulation was effective. However, I think you are underestimating the degree of convergence that had taken place. If you Google "Lamfalussy process", you find material on the network of committee through which European regulators harmonised rulebooks with the overall legislative framework.

Scofflaw wrote: »

There was no single EU/EEA bank regulation regime, and currently still isn't.

Again, I'm not going to get hung up on individual words. The key point is this: Do you appreciate that, for Member States to agree to mutual recognition of banking licences, the "minimum standards" agreed would have to be pretty robust? If they failed to be robust, wouldn't that suggest that the mutual recognition was a bit premature?

Scofflaw wrote: »

Certain minimum standards, yes, and I would agree that they were clearly inadequate - but that's like claiming that all sausages are the same because they fit the same basic description.

I don't get the sausage analogy, but can I invite you to consider the significance of our agreement that EU rules (or minimum standards or whatever term you are happy to use to refer to the considerable body of EU Directives, Regulations and secondary legislation that set out a common framework for financial service legislation) were inadequate.

My point throughout this thread has simply been to point out that it cannot be assumed that participating in joint action by States is automatically a good thing, just because that community of States is bigger and theoretically better able to regulate international capital.

That framework, that we agree was inadequate, was what the EU agreed as enough to enable EEA financial institutions to operate across borders. Can you appreciate that this (surely, FFS) illuminates that joint action cannot be assumed to be better - the compromises you have to make to get joint agreement may mean that the outcome is not an improvement, and possibly worse, than retaining full domestic control.

We've a single currency and, as you say, an inadequate regulatory regime in the financial sector. That's far from an ideal picture of big, strong European institutions taming the market, isn't it?

Scofflaw

GCU Flexible Demeanour wrote: »

I think what I actually said was the regulatory regime was inadequate in the context of a single currency. I don't think many people disagree. For what its worth, Scofflaw seems to agree.

I largely do, although I can't see the relevance of the single currency - the Icesave example you've used involves two non-euro countries, and that hardly worked out well.

GCU Flexible Demeanour wrote: »

Clearly, no-one can say that regulation was effective. However, I think you are underestimating the degree of convergence that had taken place. If you Google "Lamfalussy process", you find material on the network of committee through which European regulators harmonised rulebooks with the overall legislative framework.

Actually, this again confuses the existence of a joint process with the application of it in depth or breadth. I don't think anyone argues that where the Member States have agreed to convergence, there is a convergence process, and that's all that the Lamfalussy process actually shows.

GCU Flexible Demeanour wrote: »

Again, I'm not going to get hung up on individual words. The key point is this: Do you appreciate that, for Member States to agree to mutual recognition of banking licences, the "minimum standards" agreed would have to be pretty robust? If they failed to be robust, wouldn't that suggest that the mutual recognition was a bit premature?

I would say that that is the case, personally, but clearly the views of the national governments and supervisory authorities were different.

GCU Flexible Demeanour wrote: »

I don't get the sausage analogy, but can I invite you to consider the significance of our agreement that EU rules (or minimum standards or whatever term you are happy to use to refer to the considerable body of EU Directives, Regulations and secondary legislation that set out a common framework for financial service legislation) were inadequate.

My point throughout this thread has simply been to point out that it cannot be assumed that participating in joint action by States is automatically a good thing, just because that community of States is bigger and theoretically better able to regulate international capital.

That framework, that we agree was inadequate, was what the EU agreed as enough to enable EEA financial institutions to operate across borders. Can you appreciate that this (surely, FFS) illuminates that joint action cannot be assumed to be better - the compromises you have to make to get joint agreement may mean that the outcome is not an improvement, and possibly worse, than retaining full domestic control.

We've a single currency and, as you say, an inadequate regulatory regime in the financial sector. That's far from an ideal picture of big, strong European institutions taming the market, isn't it?

I don't think I ever do assume that joint actions will be better just because they're joint actions - there are multiple clear cases where they're not. There are also multiple cases where they are, so I'm not sure what argument you're using apart from a straw man.

That EU regulation has the potential to be superior to national regulation when it comes to 'taming the market' is not only logically forceful, but widely agreed. That the joint financial regulation originally agreed in a period characterised globally by inadequate financial regulation was inadequate is not a counter-argument to that - it is only a counter-argument to maintaining the status quo. But nobody here is arguing for the status quo.

National regulation of a trans-national financial industry continues to suffer from the problems it always had and always will have. That joint regulation can be inadequate does not make national regulation any more adequate than it ever was, and it has been inadequate for many years. More importantly, it's impossible ever to make it adequate, whereas joint regulation can be made adequate.

cordially,
Scofflaw

GCU Flexible Demeanour

Scofflaw wrote: »

I largely do, although I can't see the relevance of the single currency - the Icesave example you've used involves two non-euro countries, and that hardly worked out well.

The relevance of the Icesave example is to underline the depth of the commitment involved in the mutual recognition of banking licences - a couple of billion of your deposits could end up in a country that simply didn't have the financial resources to honour any deposit guarantee. I'm pointing this out, because you seem to be under the impression that the convergence in EU financial services legislation was a casual thing. You even baulk at the use of the word "regime", despite the fact that the European Commission was comfortable with the term

http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/actionplan/index/action_en.pdf

The EU’s supervisory and regulatory regime has provided a sound basis for the emergence of a true single financial market which goes hand in hand with prudential soundness and financial stability.

If you look at that linked document, you'll see the euro is quite clearly set out as the context for financial services reform. You'll also appreciate, the assumption is always that EU Member States will at some stage converge economically and join the euro. Formally, as far as the EU is concerned, the UK isn't in the Eurozone yet.

Scofflaw wrote: »

I'm not sure what argument you're using apart from a straw man.

I don't see where the straw man is involved.

Scofflaw wrote: »

More importantly, it's impossible ever to make it adequate, whereas joint regulation can be made adequate.

In fairness, that the very point that I'd feel is questionable. It reads like a quasi-religious statement. Through our fault, through our most grevious fault, the EU regulatory framework (I'm avoiding the word 'regime' out of deference to your good self) has failed to achieve the required result. However, it is clearly the true path and we should not fall back on our old pagan ways because of our personal error.

Maybe it can't be made much better. Maybe this is as good as it gets. Maybe a single EU regulatory authority will be worse.

Or maybe it will be better. All I'm really saying is folk need to critically assess these things. Trying to bring it back to the (now lost) topic of the thread, I've no opinion on Nigel Farage as an individual. But I recognise there is validity in the position that he represents, and the reason he's able to find a support base is because other political actors try to pretend that any statement that looks vaguely anti-EU must be denonounced as mad or bad.

georgesstreet

Scofflaw wrote: »

More importantly, it's impossible ever to make it adequate, whereas joint regulation can be made adequate.

GCU Flexible Demeanour wrote: »

In fairness, that the very point that I'd feel is questionable. It reads like a quasi-religious statement. Through our fault, through our most grevious fault, the EU regulatory framework (I'm avoiding the word 'regime' out of deference to your good self) has failed to achieve the required result. However, it is clearly the true path and we should not fall back on our old pagan ways because of our personal error.

Maybe it can't be made much better. Maybe this is as good as it gets. Maybe a single EU regulatory authority will be worse.

Or maybe it will be better. All I'm really saying is folk need to critically assess these things. Trying to bring it back to the (now lost) topic of the thread, I've no opinion on Nigel Farage as an individual. But I recognise there is validity in the position that he represents, and the reason he's able to find a support base is because other political actors try to pretend that any statement that looks vaguely anti-EU must be denonounced as mad or bad.

I have little doubt that Scofflaw and others will disagree that it reads like a quasi religious statement. However, that gets to the nub of UKIP's point, and many of their followers, that they believe for proponents of the ever expanding EU, that any increases in EU regulation are “good”, even if they have disastrous consequences.

It’s obvious from many posts here that many who are pro-Eu simply can’t understand how anyone, like Nigel Farage, thinks, or anyone in UKIP, or anyone across Europe who think criticism is good and valid, and who don’t want to cede more and more power to the centre, and who reject what they see as the "one size fits all" mentality.

No amount of discussion here will alter that difference, It’s simply a difference in view that UKIP and Farage think the EU has too much power, whereas Scofflaw and others here seem to think the course ahead should be to give more and more power to the EU, and simply can’t understand anyone who questions any aspect of that.

McDave

GCU Flexible Demeanour wrote: »

Why would I repeat statements that have not been refuted?

To the contrary. You haven't offered an interpretation of your own of the fact of Irish voter support for the various EU projects put to them, including the EZ in the full knowledge of the financial crisis.

McDave

GCU Flexible Demeanour wrote: »

No-one is suggesting that other players made no mistakes. However, it is rather too much to deny the role of euro in directing resources into places that could make no productive use of them by cloaking the price of money in peripheral economies.

Contrary to your clear misunderstanding, the Euro was not a primary actor in the financial crisis. It was the member states, and indeed those further afield, acting as sovereign entities, and financial institutions acting in those jurisdictions. As has been pointed out to you already, the Euro played practically no role in the generation of our private financial debt. That money was obtained mainly from UK and US retail sources. Furthermore, other countries outside the EZ got into trouble of their own. And many within the EZ didn't get into any significant difficulties at all.

No matter how hard you try, there is no evidence to pin our travails specifically on the Euro. But that we had been more sensible as a country, we could have turned our membership of the EZ into a sustainable economy, rather than making practically every macroeconomic mistake in the book.

McDave

GCU Flexible Demeanour wrote: »

No. no. You're missing the point. The point is that monetary conditions were not necessarily inappropriate for some Member States, but inappropriate for others. There's a whole topic around convergence of member state economies that, I'm afraid, you seem utterly unaware of.

You're completely absolving sovereign countries of responsibility for their economic policies. Ireland pursued blatantly pro-cyclical policies contrary to overwhelming criticism. Spain inflated a massive property bubble. Greece failed on any level to run a modern state, let alone foster a healthy private sector.

The Euro was not designed to politically solve these problems through EZ or EU instruments. But in the event membership of the Euro has forced countries like ourselves and Greece to face up to problems we've created in our own countries so we can carve out some level of convergence with the wealthier economies which have performed quite well throughout the crisis.

The proof in the pudding is that all EZ countries in difficulty are taking steps to rebalance their macroeconomies, and some to improve their private sector economies too. Sensible on their part. And probably something they wouldn't have chosen to do left to their own devices. Leaving a country like Greece, always a tail-end Charlie, to fall even further off the pace, never to converge towards the EZ median.

McDave

GCU Flexible Demeanour wrote: »

I'm not sure of your point. It's simply a fact that the minimum capital requirements of banks in the EU were established by the Second Banking Directive, which applied from the start of 1993. Other Directives defined the rest of the common EU framework for banking and financial sector regulation.

It wasn't an adequate system, particularly given the demands of a single currency. But it was the framework established by EU Directives.

What are you particularly questioning about this?

During the bubble years, we had a financial regulator, a certain Patrick Neary. He was so ineffectual he became a laughing stock playing no role whatsoever in controlling or publicising the behaviour of our banks.

It's hard to believe that anyone paying attention to Ireland's recent economic history could be so ill-informed on this commonly-accepted point.

The Second Banking Directive has little to do with our bubble, which was down to local inaction leaving the field free to private sector gamblers and marketeers. We would have been better served by an active government and regulator preventing the financial bubble from becoming the taxpayers' liability.

GCU Flexible Demeanour

McDave wrote: »

You haven't offered an interpretation of your own of the fact of Irish voter support for the various EU projects put to them, including the EZ in the full knowledge of the financial crisis.

I think I did. I suggested there was a difference between a vote that takes place at a time when a crisis could be avoided, and one that takes place after a crisis has occurred and is no longer avoidable.

McDave wrote: »

As has been pointed out to you already, the Euro played practically no role in the generation of our private financial debt. That money was obtained mainly from UK and US retail sources.

In fairness, if I deal with every point of detail these posts would be even more long and unreadable. If the bulk of Irish banks funding was denominated in dollars and Sterling, you'd be wondering what the feck they were doing in the Eurozone. Am I right that the ultimate source of your statement is the misunderstanding that much of their funding was obtained through intermediaries in the City of London, but the debt would have been denominated in euro?

McDave wrote: »

You're completely absolving sovereign countries of responsibility for their economic policies.

No, I actually pointed out that our tax policy gave people an incentive to put whatever money they could raise into hopelessly unproductive property investments. However, the more pertinent point is to notice the mismatch between monetary conditions and economic policies. One of the facilitators of those expansionary policies was the availability of cheap euro. In our case, that manifested itself in the rapid accumulation of private sector debt.

McDave wrote: »

During the bubble years, we had a financial regulator, a certain Patrick Neary. He was so ineffectual he became a laughing stock playing no role whatsoever in controlling or publicising the behaviour of our banks.

It's simplistic to lay it all at the door of one man. Yes, there were regulatory failures - very significant ones. That said, the greater failure was within the Central Bank, which is where the systemic risks should have been identified and highlighted through their annual Financial Stability reports.

But, to be honest, it makes no sense to promote a single currency and convergence of interest rates across Europe, and then expect local regulators to effectively reverse the convergence in pricing. The most powerful instrument that could have contained lending was monetary policy - which, under the euro regime, was vested entirely in the ECB.

Equally, its naïve and simplistic not to acknowledge the plain fact the EU has and had a common supervisory and regulatory regime. It was an ineffective regime. But that's what the EU agreed to as sufficient to support a single market in financial services.

Can I also say that, while I can show a certain level of courtesy to folk to allow them time and space to consider facts that they may not have fully appreciated, in any future posts I will use the term 'regime'. If the European Commission felt the term was appropriate for one of their officially sanction Communications, I don't see why I need to shy away from it here.

oscarBravo

GCU Flexible Demeanour wrote: »

The most powerful instrument that could have contained lending was monetary policy - which, under the euro regime, was vested entirely in the ECB.

Two problems with that assertion. One is that if monetary policy was the primary driver of reckless lending and borrowing, it seems strange that not every Eurozone country suffered from it. The other is that, given that our government used all the tools at its disposal to inflate the bubble as hard and fast as it did, it seems unlikely in the extreme that, had it had control over monetary policy, it would have used it to keep lending in check.

Basically, it seems to be rather self-serving to argue that the Euro is to blame because it prevented some member states from doing something they almost certainly wouldn't have done if they could.

dlouth15

oscarBravo wrote: »

Two problems with that assertion. One is that if monetary policy was the primary driver of reckless lending and borrowing, it seems strange that not every Eurozone country suffered from it.

I'm not an economist but I think what economists might say is that the monetary policy needs to be tailored to the individual economy. What is appropriate for one may not be appropriate for another. So a sluggish German economy, for example, might have required a rather low interest rate where as Ireland with the beginnings of an asset bubble would have have required a high one.

The other is that, given that our government used all the tools at its disposal to inflate the bubble as hard and fast as it did, it seems unlikely in the extreme that, had it had control over monetary policy, it would have used it to keep lending in check.

This is true to a certain extent.

georgesstreet

oscarBravo wrote: »

Basically, it seems to be rather self-serving to argue that the Euro is to blame because it prevented some member states from doing something they almost certainly wouldn't have done if they could.

And yet, "It is a failed policy," said Romano Prodi, the former head of the European Commission and the man who launched the euro.

To portray UKIP and Farage as somehow out of step and a problem peculiar to UK, or out of step across the EU, seems to be more and more delusional.

The Dutch Freedom Party is leading the polls with calls to "control our borders, our economy, our currency". The cities of Rotterdam and The Hague have promised openly to breach EU law on social security rights for Balkan migrants.

Over the past few months the eurosceptic floodgates have burst. French support for the EU Project has dropped from 60pc to 41pc since mid-2012, according to the Pew Foundation.

Marine Le Pen's National Front, now leading the polls with calls for a return to the franc and economic self-rule, is pulling votes from Socialist working class bastions. A Polling Vox survey found that 42pc of French voters are willing to consider backing the Front National

The influential Prof Francois Heisbourg, a pro-European, has called for the euro to be broken up to save the European Project. "The dream has become a nightmare. We must face the reality that the EU itself is now threatened by the euro," he said.

Jacques Attali, former head of the EBRD, lashed out at Berlin last week, claiming that contradictory EMU policies imposed by Germany were pushing France over the brink. He explicitly compared the state of French society with Germany in 1933 when the National Socialists took power.

Italy's Five Star Movement is still running at 24pc in the polls, and calling for a referendum on the euro. It is likely to join Britain's UKIP, France's National Front, the Freedom Party and other radical groups from Austria, Scandinavia and the Balkans in sweeping the European Parliament's elections next May.

To claim that Nigel Farage and UKIP are somehow out of step seems to be an increasingly out of date view, with many EU countries now hosting parties with similar ideas, and many polling very respectably.

oscarBravo

georgesstreet wrote: »

And yet, "It is a failed policy," said Romano Prodi, the former head of the European Commission and the man who launched the euro.

To portray UKIP and Farage as somehow out of step and a problem peculiar to UK, or out of step across the EU, seems to be more and more delusional.

The Dutch Freedom Party is leading the polls with calls to "control our borders, our economy, our currency". The cities of Rotterdam and The Hague have promised openly to breach EU law on social security rights for Balkan migrants.

Over the past few months the eurosceptic floodgates have burst. French support for the EU Project has dropped from 60pc to 41pc since mid-2012, according to the Pew Foundation.

Marine Le Pen's National Front, now leading the polls with calls for a return to the franc and economic self-rule, is pulling votes from Socialist working class bastions. A Polling Vox survey found that 42pc of French voters are willing to consider backing the Front National

The influential Prof Francois Heisbourg, a pro-European, has called for the euro to be broken up to save the European Project. "The dream has become a nightmare. We must face the reality that the EU itself is now threatened by the euro," he said.

Jacques Attali, former head of the EBRD, lashed out at Berlin last week, claiming that contradictory EMU policies imposed by Germany were pushing France over the brink. He explicitly compared the state of French society with Germany in 1933 when the National Socialists took power.

Italy's Five Star Movement is still running at 24pc in the polls, and calling for a referendum on the euro. It is likely to join Britain's UKIP, France's National Front, the Freedom Party and other radical groups from Austria, Scandinavia and the Balkans in sweeping the European Parliament's elections next May.

To claim that Nigel Farage and UKIP are somehow out of step seems to be an increasingly out of date view, with many EU countries now hosting parties with similar ideas, and many polling very respectably.

...all of which is (a) argumentum ad populum, and (b) a non-sequitur to the post of mine which you quoted.

GCU Flexible Demeanour

dlouth15 wrote: »

<..> the monetary policy needs to be tailored to the individual economy. What is appropriate for one may not be appropriate for another. So a sluggish German economy, for example, might have required a rather low interest rate where as Ireland with the beginnings of an asset bubble would have have required a high one.

That is precisely the point.

dlouth15 wrote: »

This is true to a certain extent.

A pertinent point I'd mention is that, typically, Central Banks have a degree of independence in controlling interest rates. Plus, there are pressures that you can't hide with an independent currency, even it is pegged to someone else's.

georgesstreet wrote: »

And yet, "It is a failed policy," said Romano Prodi, the former head of the European Commission and the man who launched the euro.

To portray UKIP and Farage as somehow out of step and a problem peculiar to UK, or out of step across the EU, seems to be more and more delusional. <..>

I think you are right on the ball there. For my part, I'm not saying a sustainable case can't be made in favour of the euro. But, for such a case to get my ear, it would need to acknowledge some very obvious realities.

When that acknowledgement is missing, its no wonder that UKIP gets a following.

McDave

GCU Flexible Demeanour wrote: »

I think I did. I suggested there was a difference between a vote that takes place at a time when a crisis could be avoided, and one that takes place after a crisis has occurred and is no longer avoidable.

By the same token, we might as well propose a vote after the EZ crisis has been fully resolved. Your point is an exercise in whataboutery, and an utter non sequitur.

McDave

GCU Flexible Demeanour wrote: »

In fairness, if I deal with every point of detail these posts would be even more long and unreadable. If the bulk of Irish banks funding was denominated in dollars and Sterling, you'd be wondering what the feck they were doing in the Eurozone.

Irish banks were free to buy their money where they sought fit. International capital transactions are permitted, and were availed of.

McDave

GCU Flexible Demeanour wrote: »

Am I right that the ultimate source of your statement is the misunderstanding that much of their funding was obtained through intermediaries in the City of London, but the debt would have been denominated in euro?

The debt was incurred with those extra-Euro agencies. They could be replaced or rolled over into any other currency once the figures add up. Once they stopped adding up, the ECB stepped in to backstop the loans to those UK and US lenders.

McDave

GCU Flexible Demeanour wrote: »

No, I actually pointed out that our tax policy gave people an incentive to put whatever money they could raise into hopelessly unproductive property investments. However, the more pertinent point is to notice the mismatch between monetary conditions and economic policies. One of the facilitators of those expansionary policies was the availability of cheap euro. In our case, that manifested itself in the rapid accumulation of private sector debt.It's simplistic to lay it all at the door of one man. Yes, there were regulatory failures - very significant ones. That said, the greater failure was within the Central Bank, which is where the systemic risks should have been identified and highlighted through their annual Financial Stability reports.

It was much more than tax policy. It was government overspend, massive public sector recruitment, pro-cyclical incentives, lack of regulation lack of oversight, and general could-care-lessedness.

The facilitators were not the 'cheap' Euro to *any significant extent*. We got our cheap currency primarily outside the EZ. The main facilitator was Irish government policy. FF were the authors of our misfortune. Economic crisis was not pre-programmed by *affordable* Euros. Plenty of EZ countries did not get into significant difficulties.

The Irish Central Bank sure played their role in our downfall. But they can take their place alongside Ahern, McCreevy, Cowen, Lenihan, Neary and our inept policy makers, advisors and bubble-era cheerleaders.

McDave

GCU Flexible Demeanour wrote: »

But, to be honest, it makes no sense to promote a single currency and convergence of interest rates across Europe, and then expect local regulators to effectively reverse the convergence in pricing. The most powerful instrument that could have contained lending was monetary policy - which, under the euro regime, was vested entirely in the ECB.

Equally, its naïve and simplistic not to acknowledge the plain fact the EU has and had a common supervisory and regulatory regime. It was an ineffective regime. But that's what the EU agreed to as sufficient to support a single market in financial services.

There's never a perfect time to do anything, I suppose. But in the case of the Euro it was a long-mooted idea ultimately stimulated into action by historic events. In a way the Euro is probably lucky that it had a decade to prepare before the international crisis. All local regulators were expected to do was stick to the Maastricht criteria. That all couldn't or didn't is unfortunate, but is now a historical detail, as almost all countries have demonstrated the ability and the willingness to meet those criteria after the event.

The fact if the matter also remains that action to date has by definition been for the most part national. There is no common EU or EZ regime. Your reference to the 2nd Banking Directive is meaningless. It's not a centralised regulatory regime. It's taking steps to construct *EU* market mechanisms in private sector activities in member countries, not a regulatory end-point for a *EZ* single currency.

dlouth15

McDave wrote: »

The facilitators were not the 'cheap' Euro to *any significant extent*. We got our cheap currency primarily outside the EZ. The main facilitator was Irish government policy. FF were the authors of our misfortune. Economic crisis was not pre-programmed by *affordable* Euros. Plenty of EZ countries did not get into significant difficulties.

I'm not sure I agree with that. Most if not all of the mortgages for housing were issued in Euros and at rates underpinned by the base rate set by the ECB. As far as I know, most developer loans were also denominated in Euros.

GCU Flexible Demeanour

McDave wrote: »

By the same token, we might as well propose a vote after the EZ crisis has been fully resolved.

I don't think you are following the point, at all really. As we know, we've had both yes and no votes in EU-related referenda. Context clearly impacts on how people cast their votes.

McDave wrote: »

The debt was incurred with those extra-Euro agencies.

Well, no. They would be intermediaries. The ultimate funder might have been a French bank, or a Freedonian bank or whatever. The point is that the bulk of their funding would have been denominated in euro - as a Freedonian bank would be happy enough to deal in euro.

The bulk of Irish banks finance would have been raised in euro, as that's what the bulk of their lending was denominated in. The whole point of the euro was to enable people to avoid exchange rate risks. Irish banks would have done considerable (but a minority) of their business in Sterling, and so you'd expect them to raise some funds in that form. But, predominantly, their funding would be euro.

McDave wrote: »

Plenty of EZ countries did not get into significant difficulties.

I don't know why this point is still not comprehended. It has been explained a couple of times that monetary policy was appropriate for some Member States, and not for others. The conditions in the German economy would be different to the conditions in the Greek economy.

McDave wrote: »

There is no common EU or EZ regime.

I've already quoted the European Commission, who used the term "EU’s supervisory and regulatory regime" in something like 1999. Why the reluctance to accept that our regulator was operating as part of a legally binding EU regime, which (14 years ago) the European Commission said "has provided a sound basis for the emergence of a true single financial market which goes hand in hand with prudential soundness and financial stability."

McDave

GCU Flexible Demeanour wrote: »

I'm not sure that it can be dismissed so lightly. The euro currency project is a bit of a fiasco at this stage; if we knew this is where we'd end up, we hardly would have joined it with so little thought and analysis. Would that have been chauvinistic?

This was your original point.

McDave

Originally Posted by McDave
By the same token, we might as well propose a vote after the EZ crisis has been fully resolved.

GCU Flexible Demeanour wrote: »

I don't think you are following the point, at all really. As we know, we've had both yes and no votes in EU-related referenda. Context clearly impacts on how people cast their votes.

You're not even following your own point. You originally offered the opinion that the Euro is a fiasco (a contentious point to say the least). You then proceeded to opine that were the Irish people to accept your (contentious) proposition, they wouldn't have voted for the Euro.

That's far too tendentious and contrived for words. First off, it's simply illogical. Voters couldn't be asked to vote on a subjective (yours) worst case scenario in the future. Second, if voters were to be given a chance to endorse or reject the Euro after seeing it in action, a poll wouldn't be organised by government at the low point of the currency's history.

There are clear deficiencies in your thinking on this point, and a slim grasp of the practicalities.

McDave

GCU Flexible Demeanour wrote: »

Well, no. They would be intermediaries. The ultimate funder might have been a French bank, or a Freedonian bank or whatever. The point is that the bulk of their funding would have been denominated in euro - as a Freedonian bank would be happy enough to deal in euro.

You're offering no facts or evidence here. Merely trite conjecture. Ireland's bank debts were originally acquired through UK and US banks. How they denominated those monies for their own retail customers is an entirely separate matter.

The net point is, Irish banks acquired the bulk of their bubble era funds from outside the Eurozone. Not from within. So the Euro cannot be held responsible for our credit/asset bubble. I have seen no evidence or proof that for the period up to 2007, Irish banks were funded from within the Eurozone in Euro.

Maybe you can provide that evidence, instead of merely speculating.

McDave

GCU Flexible Demeanour wrote: »

I don't know why this point is still not comprehended. It has been explained a couple of times that monetary policy was appropriate for some Member States, and not for others. The conditions in the German economy would be different to the conditions in the Greek economy.

Link please. Comparing Germany and Greece simply doesn't cut it.

McDave

GCU Flexible Demeanour wrote: »

I've already quoted the European Commission, who used the term "EU's supervisory and regulatory regime" in something like 1999. Why the reluctance to accept that our regulator was operating as part of a legally binding EU regime, which (14 years ago) the European Commission said "has provided a sound basis for the emergence of a true single financial market which goes hand in hand with prudential soundness and financial stability."

Well, there you go. The Commission was talking about the EU and not the EZ. And in the context of a long-standing commitment to a single financial 'market', not a currency which was not yet in force. You're comparing apples with pears.

GCU Flexible Demeanour

McDave wrote: »

This was your original point.

Yes, and you still haven't got it.

McDave wrote: »

I have seen no evidence or proof that for the period up to 2007, Irish banks were funded from within the Eurozone in Euro.

Can I suggest that you look at the annual accounts of any Irish bank for any year pre 2008. That should be enough to demonstrate how this focus on London-based intermediaries is misleading.

McDave wrote: »

Link please. Comparing Germany and Greece simply doesn't cut it.

It does for any balanced reader. Clearly, there's no point in me trying to explain things to a fanatic.

McDave wrote: »

Well, there you go. The Commission was talking about the EU and not the EZ. And in the context of a long-standing commitment to a single financial 'market', not a currency which was not yet in force. You're comparing apples with pears.

I'm afraid your posts are ceasing to make even basic sense. It might help if you simply studied some of the material I've posted, to gain an understanding of the subject in hand.

Exactly as I said, the Commission Communication (issued in May 1999) was anticipating the need for further development of what they termed the "EU's supervisory and regulatory regime". One of the factors they identified as forming the context for that development was "the intensification of links between financial markets because of the euro".

That's all on page 13 of this document:
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/actionplan/index/action_en.pdf

I'm giving the page reference, as I'm not convinced you've the interest to actually read about the topic we're discussing.

Can I also remind you (assuming you knew this already) that the institutions around the single currency have been framed on the assumption that all EU member states will adopt the euro; they just haven't all done it yet.

Can I also suggest that we transfer any further discussion to the thread on Barroso, which is a better vehicle for this discussion.

McDave

GCU Flexible Demeanour wrote: »

Can I suggest that you look at the annual accounts of any Irish bank for any year pre 2008. That should be enough to demonstrate how this focus on London-based intermediaries is misleading.It does for any balanced reader.

Yet again, you're not providing a *scintilla* of evidence, resorting instead to bland generalisations. I can only take it that you're conceding on the merits.

McDave

GCU Flexible Demeanour wrote: »

It does for any balanced reader. Clearly, there's no point in me trying to explain things to a fanatic.

You're explaining nothing, merely resorting to rhetoric and grandstanding.

McDave

GCU Flexible Demeanour wrote: »

I'm afraid your posts are ceasing to make even basic sense. It might help if you simply studied some of the material I've posted, to gain an understanding of the subject in hand.

Exactly as I said, the Commission Communication (issued in May 1999) was anticipating the need for further development of what they termed the "EU's supervisory and regulatory regime". One of the factors they identified as forming the context for that development was "the intensification of links between financial markets because of the euro".

That's all on page 13 of this document:
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/actionplan/index/action_en.pdf

I'm giving the page reference, as I'm not convinced you've the interest to actually read about the topic we're discussing.

Can I also remind you (assuming you knew this already) that the institutions around the single currency have been framed on the assumption that all EU member states will adopt the euro; they just haven't all done it yet.

Can I also suggest that we transfer any further discussion to the thread on Barroso, which is a better vehicle for this discussion.

You're fundamentally confusing:

- the creating of a single financial market based on harmonisation of national legislation for an EU of *all* members

- with the establishment of a single currency for a *subset* of EU members with a distinct institution and distinct treaty provisions.

The fact that the Commission refers forward to a future event *in a very minor fashion* in a 30-page communication document demonstrates, let alone proves, nothing.

On your assumption that *all* member states were to adopt the Euro, you are *fundamentally* wrong. The UK and Denmark negotiated opt-outs from the Euro way back in 1992, seven years *before* the document you cite.

The 1999 Commission communication document refers to a single market, requiring EU member states to harmonise laws. It is not a founding document for the Euro and it's subset of EZ members. It isn't even law. I'm afraid you're running out of road.