Ethiopian Airlines Crash/ B737MAX grounding

Mebuntu · 18-03-2019 5:39pm

Irish Steve wrote: »

What's not yet clear is why 2 AOA sensors have failed, we don't yet know if it's an instrument (sensor) electronic or mechanical failure, or if damage to the sensor (for example a bird strike, or mechanical damage on the ground from ramp equipment) has caused the AOA sensor to give wrong information to the aircraft systems.

That Seattle Times article states:

The black box data provided in the preliminary investigation report shows that readings from the two sensors differed by some 20 degrees not only throughout the flight but also while the airplane taxied on the ground before takeoff.

Regardless of how the failure occurred it seems to me that something as critical as that should set off a loud warning horn as the aircraft is taxying to the runway - as part of the takeoff configuration.

L1011 · 18-03-2019 6:06pm

55, not 45. As hideous as the idea that 2009 is ten years ago is, time marches on!

cnocbui · 18-03-2019 9:10pm

Black box data from doomed Ethiopian Airlines jet show 'clear similarities' between both Boeing 737 Max crashes

French accident investigator BEA has downloaded data from the doomed Ethiopian Airlines plane's black boxes.
The flight data recorder showed "clear similarities" between the Ethiopia crash and another Boeing 737 Max that went down in October.

Investigators who verified the data from the doomed Ethiopian Airlines jet's flight data recorder found similarities between the Lion Air and Ethiopia crashes, "which will be the subject of further study during the investigation," French accident authority BEA said in a statement Monday. That echoed statements from Ethiopian Transport Minister Dagmawit Moges a day earlier.

Data from the other black box — the cockpit voice recorder — has also been extracted and has been handed over to Ethiopia's accident investigator, BEA said. The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, which is participating in the investigation of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, also verified the data, BEA added.

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/18/french-investigator-clear-similarities-between-boeing-737-max-crashes.html

I wonder do the FAA and Boeing still think it's safe to fly? The world in general is going to question any assurances these two give for the next decade or more.

Inquitus · 18-03-2019 9:24pm

cnocbui wrote: »

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/18/french-investigator-clear-similarities-between-boeing-737-max-crashes.html

I wonder do the FAA and Boeing still think it's safe to fly? The world in general is going to question any assurances these two give for the next decade or more.

It's criminal negligence, they deliberately rated the system lower down the scale so redundant inputs were not required, despite the fact it is an incredibly powerful auto trimming system, they also increased the amount of nose down trim it could apply at slower speeds by a significant factor during the test flight phase.

This Seattle Times article gives a good insight into the oversight failures

Nijmegen · 18-03-2019 9:55pm

Alas, we have seen time and again in various industries that money trumps safety. Usually nobody sets out to create something dangerous, but small managerial decisions here and there add up. The preponderance of evidence so far seems to be pointing to a similar outcome here. We have also seen in the past corporations that deny, obfuscate and shift blame by innuendo and outright falsehoods onto others - and Boeing has form here. And we have seen regulatory capture in various industries as well. The last bit is what ought to worry the public - corporations will always err towards revenue growth and profits, but what if the people paid by taxpayers won’t or can’t do their jobs.

Hopefully this will be a wake up and change some future practices.

Jeff2 · 18-03-2019 10:10pm

So to me it seems the max was made longer and different engines which are bigger.

To accommodate this the engine was moved forward and higher a little.

This is the whole reason that it needed the MCAS system that other 737s didn't have.

plodder · 18-03-2019 10:18pm

Damien360 wrote: »

I won't requote that but how much of that ex-lufthansa pilot speech is conjecture and tin foil hat stuff. If he had left out the pharma and automotive industry dig at the end, it would have stood on its own.

It lost me at the TWA 600 shot down by a missile, bit. There could be some possibility for discussion of that theory, but the way he states it as (criminally concealed) fact, makes me question everything that sounded plausible up to that point, and it goes down hill from there.

Also, I wonder how appropriate it was for the BEA to be releasing information about the similarity of the data to the Lion air crash. I'd have thought it was the job of the Ethiopian accident authority to do that.

STB. · 18-03-2019 10:51pm

Nijmegen wrote: »

Alas, we have seen time and again in various industries that money trumps safety. Usually nobody sets out to create something dangerous, but small managerial decisions here and there add up. The preponderance of evidence so far seems to be pointing to a similar outcome here. We have also seen in the past corporations that deny, obfuscate and shift blame by innuendo and outright falsehoods onto others - and Boeing has form here. And we have seen regulatory capture in various industries as well. The last bit is what ought to worry the public - corporations will always err towards revenue growth and profits, but what if the people paid by taxpayers won’t or can’t do their jobs.

Hopefully this will be a wake up and change some future practices.

How long have they been getting away with this ? It was never a good idea to give self certification to the manufacturer.

If the information in this documentary below is accurate, then its only a matter of time before the NGs start falling from the sky. It is truly shocking. There are stress parts on NGs out there and the FAA know. The problem is apparently too big to solve.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vWxxtzBTxGU

Irish Steve · 18-03-2019 11:52pm

STB. wrote: »

How long have they been getting away with this ? It was never a good idea to give self certification to the manufacturer.

If the information in this documentary below is accurate, then its only a matter of time before the NGs start falling from the sky. It is truly shocking. There are stress parts on NGs out there and the FAA know. The problem is apparently too big to solve.

If, and it's a big IF given the number of ambulance chasing lawyers in the States, this is a true and valid account of what's been going on at Boeing, there can be no doubt that at some stage, a very big house of cards is going to come tumbling down very hard, and very damagingly.

I hope that this is a story that's been very much dressed up to get additional publicity, but I also fear that it may well be true, and if that is the case, there will be problems going forward for Boeing,

Maybe now we know a possible reason why some of the low cost high volume operators of the 737's are moving them on after relatively short usage periods, they are very likely going to be more aware than most operators of the underlying issues that are affecting the NG airframes, due to the high utilisation and significant number of cycles they are putting on the airframes, and if there are corrosion and stress issues with them, the costs of rectification may make it cheaper to move them on, possibly for parting out, rather than repair them.

I don't know the actual numbers of NG airframes affected, or how many have been parted out, and I suspect that it will be hard to get an answer to this very loaded question.

Thought provoking indeed

STB. · 19-03-2019 12:17am

Irish Steve wrote: »

I hope that this is a story that's been very much dressed up to get additional publicity, but I also fear that it may well be true, and if that is the case, there will be problems going forward for Boeing,

The program aired in 2011, long before the Max went into production, and concerned the manufacture of the NG series. It might be said that it supports claims that not much seems to have changed in terms of safety and oversight. It was carried out by investigative journalist and author, Tim Tate.

https://twitter.com/TimTateBooks/status/1105899245356371971

https://www.sbs.com.au/news/sites/sbs.com.au.news/files/transcripts/381701_dateline_awingandaprayer_transcript.html

Irish Steve · 19-03-2019 12:32am

STB. wrote: »

The program aired in 2011, long before the Max went into production, and concerned the manufacture of the NG series. It might be said that it supports claims that not much seems to have changed in terms of safety and oversight. It was carried out by investigative journalist and author, Tim Tate.

https://twitter.com/TimTateBooks/status/1105899245356371971

https://www.sbs.com.au/news/sites/sbs.com.au.news/files/transcripts/381701_dateline_awingandaprayer_transcript.html

Thanks, worrying doesn't even come close if that's the case, in that it does indeed expose an underlying culture within both Boeing and the FAA that has the potential to undermine much of what was considered a sacred trust, given how critical safety is to the aviation industry.

If the FAA are not correctly managing their responsibilities, and Boeing are ignoring valid concerns that they are made aware of, I'd like to hope that at some stage, "the system" will ensure that they pay the price for their arrogance. If that eventually means goodbye Boeing, then that may well be the price that has to be paid to ensure continuing aviation safety.

Hotblack Desiato · 19-03-2019 1:40am

murphaph wrote: »

Boeing simply gambled that they would get the patch for the MCAS out before they lost another one.

Perhaps.

The Ford Pinto car is an example of a corporate decision that it was cheaper to let occupants burn rather than spend a few dollars per car to fix the known fire risk issue.

The book Unsafe At Any Speed by Ralph Nader spells out several other examples. When you can save a dollar per car spread over millions of cars per year, morality goes out the window.

Jeff2 · 19-03-2019 2:05am

The people that run a company on the stock exchange has a priority to make money for share holders.

The same as a Lawyer has to try prove a guilty person is innocent.

cnocbui · 19-03-2019 2:12am

No, their priority is to abide by the laws of the land. Making unsafe aircraft is not only illegal, it is also likely to lead to massive costs, not maximum profit.

Jeff2 · 19-03-2019 2:17am

cnocbui wrote: »

No, their priority is to abide by the laws of the land. Making unsafe aircraft is not only illegal, it is also likely to lead to massive costs, not maximum profit.

Which is what they did.

Jeff2 · 19-03-2019 2:20am

The law is make profit for share holders and they fecked up doing so.

Jeff2 · 19-03-2019 2:28am

cnocbui wrote: »

No, their priority is to abide by the laws of the land. Making unsafe aircraft is not only illegal, it is also likely to lead to massive costs, not maximum profit.

That actually leads back to what someone posted that there could be charges for manslaughter by negligence.
Something like that.

Turbulent Bill · 19-03-2019 6:48am

Different industry, but the Federal Communications Commission in the US has (or at least had) a nice safety vs. profit system when it came to their regulations. If a telecoms equipment manufacturer or operator wanted to put a new product on the market (e.g., a network switch), they were free to self-certify to known standards. However, if the equipment carried safety-critical traffic (say 911 calls) and failed, both the operator and manufacturer were subject to enormous fines and basically flogged in public. As a result, it didn't make sense to skimp on any safety-related items.

By comparison, the FAA is far too close to the industry to wield that power.

lfc200 · 19-03-2019 9:36am

http://news.sky.com/story/boeings-737-max-jet-being-investigated-by-us-prosecutors-11669873

Wonder what will come of this if anything from the US side.

Nijmegen · 19-03-2019 10:09am

As I said above, nobody really explicitly sets out to create a deathtrap. Most of the time the decisions that lead to one being created look more malevolent in hindsight fitted into a narrative vs how they appear at the time to the actors involved. But then that's where the company needs to have a culture of internal checks and safety at any cost.

One interesting thing about the US is that their law enforcement agencies do genuinely seem to operate without fear or favour in these matters, and corporate executives do actually go to jail. Maybe not all the time but often. Certainly more often than here - If Boeing were an Irish company there'd be a 15 year tribunal, findings would carry no legal weight and the taxpayer would pick up the bill for everyone's lawyers. If (and it remains an if) there was criminal negligence here, somebody will pay for it.

plodder · 19-03-2019 10:19am

Hotblack Desiato wrote: »

Perhaps.

The Ford Pinto car is an example of a corporate decision that it was cheaper to let occupants burn rather than spend a few dollars per car to fix the known fire risk issue.

The book Unsafe At Any Speed by Ralph Nader spells out several other examples. When you can save a dollar per car spread over millions of cars per year, morality goes out the window.

Leaving morality aside, I don't think that would ever work in the aviation business. I heard one estimate that this is costing Boeing a billion a month until it's resolved. Boeing (and the FAA) have screwed up catastrophically here. They have allowed the bitter competition with Airbus to completely cloud their judgment and cut corners in appalling ways.

I wouldn't assume that this is exclusively an American problem though. The Volkswagen diesel scandal, ironically exposed by US researchers, showed that European (specifically German in that case) regulators can fall asleep at the wheel too or turn a blind eye when it involves their own industrial giants.

STB. · 19-03-2019 11:46am

lfc200 wrote: »

http://news.sky.com/story/boeings-737-max-jet-being-investigated-by-us-prosecutors-11669873

Wonder what will come of this if anything from the US side.

Nothing. The political establishment in the US will hush it up like they have previous whistleblower scandals.

In 2005, the FAA started to loosen regulations over Organization Designation Authorization (ODA), giving the companies more leeway over who was selected to do the safety inspections. While they were technically employees under FAA's authority, the engineers were still managed by the companies.

There was an audit in 2012 by the US Department of Transportation which found that Boeing had created a "negative work environment" for engineers reviewing new designs—to the degree that many interviewed by auditors said that they'd faced retaliation for bringing up concerns.

In 2015 a 10 year old case by whistleblowers who presented overwhelming evidence concerning the poor quality of key components (bearstraps) being supplied and used was basically thrown out on the conclusion that if there was a problem the FAA would have responsibility and would have done something. The FAA director supplied an affidavit stating that everything was ok, despite a litany of SDR's in the FAA database. The affidavit was prepared by Boeing's lawyers.

In October of 2017—six months after the 737 MAX was certified Trump signed a law that allows aircraft manufacturers to press the FAA to give them authority over how they certify components considered to be low- or medium-risk items. And if the manufacturers can convince the FAA that something falls into one of those two categories, they could essentially have free rein over how they certify their craft as safe.

Safety and oversight has really taken a backseat to profit and protection of one of the USA's golden companies. It will be left to the consumers to refuse to get on these problem planes, but how many really know the extent of the race for profits over safety ? Most assume the regulatory authorities are doing their jobs whilst the reality seems to be that their credibility is open to question.

Henry Ford III · 19-03-2019 12:42pm

Boeing will not come out of this too well I suspect. I don't believe they would have deliberately done anything to compromise safety but just wanted a seamless and cost effective way to transition airlines and pilots onto the Max. They simply didn't do enough to make that new system safe.

funkey_monkey · 19-03-2019 12:44pm

Hi,
Can someone please provide me with a link to a detailed description of the MCAS software and the update they are making?
I work in Safety critical software and am interested in this system.

Thanks.

MoeJay · 19-03-2019 12:55pm

I don't have access to anything better than this; I also make no claims about how good or accurate this page is!!

http://www.b737.org.uk/mcas.htm

funkey_monkey · 19-03-2019 3:46pm

Deleted User wrote: »

Someone somewhere is feeling very bad about how they coded that.. It's so obvious as a programmer myself that a system that adds instead of sets needs safeguards. That no one realised the system could be run multiple times in a faulty situation is mind-boggling.

Working to DO-178B (or maybe C in this instance) I suspect that this would have been designated as Category A software at worse Category B.

MCAS would have been designed by a number of 'Systems' engineers who should have a greater understanding knowledge of the aircraft operation than the software engineer. Interacting with a number of other disciplines they would have outlined the intended operation of the scheme via a series of requirements which the programmer would have translated into a software design and then implementation.

This would then have gone through a series of testing at software and system level to ensure it was a correct implementation of the scheme. With Cat A software there is a high level of independence for each phase of the process in order to minimise introduction of errors.

I doubt that a software engineer would have implemented such a scheme without requirements from a higher level to do so. I can’t see how it would get through the verification phase unquestioned. Whilst many people may be sweating, whoever signed off on the scheme would be more at peril.

Inquitus · 19-03-2019 5:34pm

funkey_monkey wrote: »

This would then have gone through a series of testing at software and system level to ensure it was a correct implementation of the scheme. With Cat A software there is a high level of independence for each phase of the process in order to minimise introduction of errors.

I doubt that a software engineer would have implemented such a scheme without requirements from a higher level to do so. I can’t see how it would get through the verification phase unquestioned. Whilst many people may be sweating, whoever signed off on the scheme would be more at peril.

From what I have read it was deliberately kept down the scale so it did not require redundant inputs, and it was all self certified by Boeing.

The safety analysis:

Understated the power of the new flight control system, which was designed to swivel the horizontal tail to push the nose of the plane down to avert a stall. When the planes later entered service, MCAS was capable of moving the tail more than four times farther than was stated in the initial safety analysis document.
Failed to account for how the system could reset itself each time a pilot responded, thereby missing the potential impact of the system repeatedly pushing the airplane’s nose downward.
Assessed a failure of the system as one level below “catastrophic.” But even that “hazardous” danger level should have precluded activation of the system based on input from a single sensor — and yet that’s how it was designed.

funkey_monkey · 19-03-2019 5:56pm

Inquitus wrote: »

From what I have read it was deliberately kept down the scale so it did not require redundant inputs, and it was all self certified by Boeing.

Hazardous would still have required redundancy - minimum two inputs that were verified for staleness, validity, range checked and cross checked.
Self-certification is going to come under the microscope intensely now.

murphaph · 19-03-2019 6:05pm

I wonder if and how much of this goes on with Airbus and EASA.

Graham · 19-03-2019 6:10pm

According to the Seattle Times

Assessed a failure of the system as one level below “catastrophic.” But even that “hazardous” danger level should have precluded activation of the system based on input from a single sensor — and yet that’s how it was designed.

Seattle Times: Flawed analysis, failed oversight: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system

Ethiopian Airlines Crash/ B737MAX grounding

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