Ethiopian Airlines Crash/ B737MAX grounding

Padraig Mor wrote: »

Maybe I'm reading things wrong, and obviously we have no definitive answers to either crash yet, but - to me - it seems like there isn't really a specific problem with MCAS per se (other than lack of pilot training re it), but rather its implementation - specifically that it *appears* that MCAS was triggered by faulty data sent by a single AOA sensor. If the AOA data had been set up properly, is it not likely that there would not have been crashes?

The One Doctor wrote: »

Chilling mistake by Boeing, but they're not the only ones to have had software problems. How this didn't crop up in flight testing is beyond me.

In hindsight, the simple remedy would be to flip the Stab Cutout switches, but who's going to think of that if you're hauling back on the control column with both hands?

I imagine that the FAA won't accept a software fix for this issue. Could even lead to the Max having to be recertified without MCAS.

Hotblack Desiato wrote: »

Two chances of that happening. The FAA didn't consider it unsafe to keep the MAX flying until ET302 went down - or rather until lots of other CAAs started grounding it...

If it wasn't for the shutdown, would ET302 have had the fix in place? Maybe, maybe not.

Calina wrote: »

Some reading.

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/

jon1981 wrote: »

The more i read into this the more i can't understand how corproate manslaughter charges are not being discussed?

Boeing knowingly ( with some FAA backing ) allowed a flawed system to enter into service. How is this not criminal?

[Deleted User] wrote: »

Someone somewhere is feeling very bad about how they coded that.. It's so obvious as a programmer myself that a system that adds instead of sets needs safeguards. That no one realised the system could be run multiple times in a faulty situation is mind-boggling.

A German ex Lufthansa pilot, who wrote about the situation: https://www.epochtimes.de/meinung/gastkommentar/ex-pilot-haisenko-ueber-b-737-max-endlich-muss-der-schrott-aus-seattle-am-boden-bleiben-a2823933.html I put it in google translation for you (I did not control the results) :
Ex-pilot Haisenko on B 737 MAX: Seattle scrap finally has to stay on the ground

The B 737 MAX is a miss construction from the beginning. Anyone who knows anything about aerodynamics will recognize it immediately when they only look at the plane.

Boeing 737 Max 8.Photo: Joe Raedle / Getty Images

Taking the example of the Boeing 737 and especially the latest development stage MAX 8/9, it becomes apparent how fatal it is when not more engineers make the decisions, but rather merchants. No engineer on his mind would have built the 737 MAX that way, had it not been forced by profit-hungry managers. The nearly 400 deaths in two crashes go to the account of Boeings Group Board, as well as the impending bankruptcy of the entire group.

The Boeing B 737 was a crutch from the start. When Boeing planned the B 737-100 in the early 1960s, a 2/3 seat configuration was planned, as was the case with the DC 9. However, Lufthansa, the largest launch customer for the "City Jet", wanted a 3/3 version As with the B 727 and the B 707. But the construction was already advanced and so began tinkering to save costs. Boeing has simply left the already planned cockpit as narrow as it was and so the pilots have to force today in all varieties of the 737 in a cockpit, for which one actually needs a shoehorn to get on. But this mini-cockpit is obviously lighter than an ergonomically reasonable one and so the merchants are happy. But that was not the only cost-saving (lazy) compromise.
To save costs, Boeing has constructed flying crutches

The bow and main landing gears were not designed from the start for the now larger hull. So our flight engineers told me that during their study of aeronautical engineering as early as the 1960s, the nose gear of the 737 was presented to them as a negative example of how not to do it. Nevertheless, the B 737-100 was a successful model, but this was mainly due to lack of competing models. In the 1970s, the B 737 was modernized for the first time with the model B 737-200. The more powerful engines JT-8 were still small in size and fit under the low wings. Boeing responded to the current requirements for bad weather with an autopilot design that was a crutch right from the beginning but is still used in all B 737 models to this day.

This led, for example, to the crash of the "Fly Dubai" in Rostov in April 2016. What can be done with this crash and the autopilot, you can read here: https://www.anderweltonline.com/wissenschaft-und-technik/ aviation-2016 / fly-dubai-accident-in-rostov-sets-a-chain-of-system errors-open /

Boeing introduced the model 737-300 in the mid-1980s. It had a "glass cockpit" like the Airbus A 310 (with screens instead of a "clock shop") and contemporary engines with a large front rotor. Even here, Boeing would have to redesign, because the engines no longer fit under the low wings. To save the cost of a redesign and especially the elaborate approvals for it, came the next crutch. The engine was set a little higher and farther forward and the engine inlet was flattened below so it would not be too close to the ground, sucking up any rock from the ground, which would have destroyed the engine.

In the following years, Boeing has further and further "drilled out" the 737 with models up to -800. Boeing has not changed the basic construction from the 1960s with its deficits. It is simply cost-effective for the production to continue to install already certified building units.

Airbus came with the A 320 in the late 1980s. This was a complete redesign and Airbus set standards in flight guidance systems and design. The A 320 became a direct and successful competitor for the B 737. Boeing came in Zugzwang, but could win because of the low purchase price further customers for his crutch 737. This is also because Airbus could not deliver as many aircraft as the global demand was. Here we are at a basic problem of international aviation: The enormous growth, especially in Asia and Africa. There is a lack of qualified junior pilots and mechanics with sufficient experience. Airbus had anticipated this problem and designed the A 320's flight guidance systems to provide meaningful support even to less experienced pilots. Boeing tries to catch up, but can not get to the from the beginning cleverly designed A 320 ran.
Airbus has set new standards with the A 320-neo.
Now you have to look at the markets for this class of aircraft. They are not only located in areas where other qualities are desired than in Europe. Even in the US, airlines do not have the capacity to land in extremely poor visibility. To date, there are only a few airports in the USA that offer the ground-level conditions for a landing according to "Category III", ie for visibility under 100 meters. These conditions are expensive, on the ground and in the air. In Africa or Southeast Asia, they practically do not exist, simply because the need is not there. This also explains why Boeing has never set out to get his crutch down to a decent level from an autopilot. An estimated 90 percent of customers have no need.

With the high oil prices, the demand for fuel-efficient models has increased. Airbus has set new standards with the A 320-neo and its particularly efficient engines. Boeing was in a forced move. However, the A 320 super motors simply did not fit under the wing of the old B 737. But instead of finally designing a completely new model, the Boeing merchants decided to craft the ultimate crutch beyond all aerodynamic rules. The engines that were too big for the 737 were moved further up and down.

During the first test flights, it turned out that physics can not easily be outwitted. The air flow of the engine now passed directly under the wing, which must have several negative effects. Once this is negatively affected the buoyancy, but the biggest problems were in the extreme slow flight, so shortly before the stall that can lead to a crash.

In this situation, the 737 MAX puts the engine's airflow under the entire lower outer wing, which puts the aircraft in an uncontrollable state. Instead of finally redesigning it, Boeing's managers have chosen the worst crutch: they have had a system installed that takes complete control of the aircraft at this boundary. If a sensor, and only one sensor, detects this limit, the attached computer causes the aircraft to move the tailplane trimming all the way down "nose down." That would not be wrong in principle, but shoots beyond the goal.

As fatal has now been twice proven that this deadly system has no control system, which should not occur as such in aviation. This means that if this single sensor gives an error message, the pilots have little chance of preventing their aircraft from flying into the ground without being pointed. The hole in the soil of Ethiopia speaks a clear language.
Not the engineers, but the managers are responsible

Now you should know that the trimming of the horizontal stabilizer on all smaller Boeing models has always been a failure-prone crutch. It is a motor-spindle unit that tends to "run away" or jump out of a relay error and jam. For this reason, there was a prominently placed emergency switch on B 727, with which you could turn off the trim motor, so could switch off. This was practiced in the simulator. The newer 737 models no longer have this emergency shutdown feature.

So even if the pilots are aware of the fault, they can not turn off the trim motor and save the plane. You would have to turn off the entire power rail to which the trim motor hangs. But they would shut down more elementary systems, and it's a process that can not be done in a fraction of a second. So if the only sensor for the angle of attack sends a wrong signal to the only computer, then this aircraft can not be saved, at least if it flies at low altitude.

The B 737 MAX is a miss construction from the beginning. Anyone who knows anything about aerodynamics will recognize it immediately when they only look at the plane. It is the forefront of a series of crutch constructions that run through the history of B 737 development. It's not the engineers who are responsible for that, but the managers who force the engineers to crutches against better knowledge.

The fact that this is actually getting better knowledge is evidenced by the fact that there is an e-mail from the summer of 2018, ie before the first crash, in which Boeing employees already document the effects of these design errors. The board of Boeing has not reacted and accepted so approvingly that exactly what happened twice within just a few months - with almost 400 deaths.
In addition to the managers of Boeing, of course, the heads of the FAA, the American regulatory authority, to hold to account. They have certified the 737 MAX's airworthiness, although they had to know what kind of crutch this is. So it's not surprising that the FAA was the last one that finally allowed the 737 MAX to fly. It's been a one-off event in aviation history that individual countries around the world have had to make leaps and bounds before the proper authority condescends to do so. However, this was preceded by a unique process.

It was not even the FAA or the manufacturer Boeing, who have prohibited the 737 MAX in the US, the flying. It was Donald Trump who pulled the emergency brake with a decree. After that, the FAA and Boeing could not help but understand the step that would have been due by the summer of 2018. Interestingly, the next process, which in turn is unique: Ethiopia has not left the accident investigation the FAA or Boeing.

Contrary to standard procedures, the investigation of the French BEA was transferred and the flight recorder sent to Paris for investigation. This is almost a declaration of war on the American aircraft industry, or at least a demonstration of how little confidence is left in the integrity of American institutions. This is probably also a consequence of the fact that in professional circles a large number of intentionally falsified results is known, the American authorities have delivered to aircraft accidents. It is only reminiscent of the TWA 600, shot down by an American rocket and hidden by all criminal methods from the public and even from us pilots.

The history of the B 737 MAX and all 737 models shows the state of the US and its (aircraft) industry. For even short-term profit, all the rules set aside for decades of dire necessity have been set aside. What role does a couple of hundred people play if profit is to be saved? The FAA itself is obviously also corrupted through and through and here comes the next interesting aspect.

Donald Trump obviously knows that because he wanted to put his personal chief pilot on the FAA's executive chair, but this has met with massive resistance. Here's the next point, why the American establishment hates Trump like that. He obviously wants to dehydrate the swamp on all levels. If he had enforced his will, it is not unlikely that the 737 MAX in this configuration would have received any approval and so 400 people would not have been crushed. A piquant detail is also that from the beginning warnings came from Russia, concerning the airworthiness of the 737 MAX.
Turbo capitalism can not survive in the long run

The catastrophes with the B 737 MAX put the entire aviation industry in dire straits. There will be bottlenecks in Europe in summer 2019, too. But for Boeing itself it can mean the end. After all, there are already a few hundred copies of the 737 MAX delivered and they are likely to be scrapped, because a simple retrofitting with software can not solve the basic problem of the faulty design. Simply resuming the production of the old models of the 737 is also no solution. It's not that easy and who else wanted to have a plane that could not exist alongside the A 320 neo?

The case 737 MAX makes it clear that turbo-capitalism can not survive in the long run. The whole world can not function "sustainably", and aviation certainly can not, if only profit is the determining element. Not only the "diesel scandal" shows that, now drastically Boeing.

So what we need is a radical rethinking. Capital and its managers and profiteers must be deprived of power and returned to reason and common sense. This applies not only to the aircraft and automotive industries, but above all to the pharmaceutical industry, which does not want to heal people at all, but pursues the primary interest in selling more and more drugs to healthy people.

However, in order to be able to improve and prevent thousands of people from losing their lives because of profit-seeking, the entire system has to be completely rebuilt. This has to be radical and must not omit anything that has long had to be questioned.

theguzman wrote: »

Interesting reading here:

So even if the pilots are aware of the fault, they can not turn off the trim motor and save the plane.

You would have to turn off the entire power rail to which the trim motor hangs. But they would shut down more elementary systems, and it's a process that can not be done in a fraction of a second.

Irish Steve wrote: »

First flight of the 737 was April 1967, based on work started in 1964, so that makes it 45 years old, and to be blunt, there have been huge advances in just about every aspect of aviation since that time. Materials, methods, avionics, engines, the list is massive and the reality now with what's happened with the Max is that the latest iteration really does not qualify as a variation of the original design, given the changes Boeing have made to try and make it fly like the original versions.

The fact that their original fix has failed so fundamentally should mean that any new fix has to be comprehensively checked, tested and qualified before the Max is allowed to re enter service, and serious consideration to the validity of flying it on a common type rating needs to be a very public exercise.

The reports from the Seattle investigator, and the latest statement from the BEA are a very clear confirmation that the grounding was very much the right action to take, and it must not be lifted before it has been incontrovertibly demonstrated that the issue is resolved and can never again bring a Max down.

cnocbui wrote: »

How many other commercial airliners have the bottom of the engine nacelles flattened to allow sufficient ground clearance, rather than have an adequately tall landing gear? Probably it's long time passed when Boeing should have come up with a new design, rather than keep tinkering away at a 35 year old design.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TlinocVHpzk