The Soviets could have beaten the Germans without help

Jawgap · 10-05-2014 7:23am

A few points about the Italian campaign.......

This is North Apennines in winter.......and Riva Ridge in particular.....

10th Mountain attacked and took this ridge........in the winter......and at night. And then had to keep on going - as you can see there's even higher ground beyond.

Also, if you have a look at any photos from that time taken by the Allies you noticed several things - one being the number of mules in use because of the terrain. The most heavily mechanised force in history was thrown back to using a means of transport from antiquity.....

Through December and January 1944/45, the Allied artillery were rationed to 25 rounds per gun per day - I don't think there is an example of another Allied theatre having to employ ammunition rationing that late in the war?

The casualty rates were 'impressive' - Division diaries record very heavy casualties among officers - and not just the junior officers, there's a couple of instances where over 70% of a battalion's officers were killed or injured in an action. The Kiwis suffered casualties in 1944 that equated to twice their ration strength and during the winter of 44/45 non-combat losses exceed combat losses in the Eighth Army.

....and if you were wounded during the winter mountain fighting you had two choices - get up (if you could) and stagger off down the mountain to the aid post, which could be extra problematic if it was night-time and you had to navigate down mountain tracks over territory just seized and still littered with mines and booby-traps - or you could wait until your mates could afford the eight men it needed to carry one wounded down the mountains or you could wait until the eight stretcher bearers found you.

It's not for nothing one of the campaign histories is called "a hard way to make war."

Just a final point on numbers - checking the sources it seems Allied divisions in the battle zone outnumbered Germans up until the fall of Rome, thereafter the Germans outnumber the Allies, as divisions were stripped out for the ANVIL/DRAGOON landings, the occupation of Greece and to fulfil the wish of the Canadian government that all their forces serve together.

The Germans also had substantially more divisions in the whole country as their rear security requirements were greater - in December 1944, for instance they had 27 divisions in the country (20 of which were engaged in the battle zone) whereas the Allies had 20 divisions (19 of which were engaged in the battle zone).

Tony EH · 10-05-2014 5:17pm

realweirdo wrote: »

And the code breaking by the British which was passed to the soviets in the build up the battle of Kursk? Negligible too?

The Soviets were well aware of the German plans for Zitadelle, with or without Western information. The reason being the quite obvious bulge in the Soviet line. One didn't have to be a strategic genius to see that particular thorn in the German's side. The Russians had taken measures for the offensive before any intel from the west came their way.

In addition, it was the Lucy Spy Ring, headed by a German, that first offered information about a German offensive plan against the salient.

This was further verified with their soviet spy John Cairncross, at Bletchley.

As for your "negligible" remark, I don't believe anyone, except you, has said such a word.

realweirdo wrote: »

As for the battles on the eastern front, in the early days, guys who actually fought on the ground reported one rifle for several men. I'm going to accept their word against yours.

If your going to get your "history" from movies like 'Enemy at the Gates', then you'll be drawing the shortest straw every time.

There were plenty of arms to go around for Soviet soldiers, even during the "early days".

The 1 rifle for 2 is actually from the First World War, when Russia logistics had broken down.

Perhaps there were local cases of last ditch, desperate, attempts at defence were there wasn't enough arms for encircled Russian defenders, but it certainly was not a widespread issue across the Red Army, at any stage of the war.

realweirdo wrote: »

As for the latter stages of the conflict, you've pretty much argued the case for lend lease - 90% of the trucks at wars end in the soviet army were american made. You simply can't have it both ways. The fact is the Americans helped turn the Soviet army into a modern army that moved men, supplies and ammunition by trucks. Not to mention the thousands of fighter planes as well as virtually all the aviation fuel. As well as the 2000 train engines donated by the Americans (The soviets had 90 at the outbreak of war).

The key point here of course is "...at wars end". You'll find, however that the Soviet vehicle park did not contain that amount of Fords, Dodges and Studebakers during the years previous to 1945. It was MUCH lower for 1943 and early 44, by which time the Russians had already won their most important strategic victories, at Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk.

There isn't any "both ways", just the one.

Lend lease did not have an real impact until late 1943.

For the major battles of 1944 and 45, like Bagration, LL was helpful. Nobody has said otherwise. But before that, the Russians won their most important victories largely with their own equipment and their own blood.

After Kursk, there was only one way for the German Army to go. Lend lease helped speed up that inevitability, but it was going to happen anyhow.

realweirdo wrote: »

To say American and British help was negligible is simply farcical in the extreme.

Again, nobody had said the word "negligible", except you.

realweirdo · 11-05-2014 3:28pm

Tony EH wrote: »

Again, nobody had said the word "negligible", except you.

What are you talking about? Implicit in your whole argument is your opinion that the Soviets would have won sooner or later without outside help, which is of course nonsense. The American and British war effort was massive, not some slight distraction to the main eastern front where you argue the war was truely won. It wasn't won by the Russians, and it's unlikely they would have won it before 1950 without the help of the western allies.

And saying the Russians would have won "sooner or later" without outside help misses the entire point. Had the war continued on until the late '40s or even reached stalemate, there is a probabiliity the Germans would have developed nuclear capability by that stage and certainly have far more advanced weapons and in greater numbers. Increased numbers of ballistic missiles with greater accuracy, cruise weapons, jet fighters and bombers and so on. That's not to mention the 4 or 5 million Germany soldiers and allies tied down fighting the western allies on other fronts.

Beating the Germans at Stalingrad and drawing with them at Kursk did not end the war. The Russians still had to turn the tide against a German Army that had to continually dilute its effort on the eastern front to fight in the west. And it wasn't just a slight dilution, something like 75% of their airforce and their best pilots were sent west.

Tony EH · 12-05-2014 12:11am

realweirdo wrote: »

What are you talking about? Implicit in your whole argument is your opinion that the Soviets would have won sooner or later without outside help, which is of course nonsense.

Wrong.

It's obvious to any serious student of the war that the Soviets had gained the upper hand in mid 1943 and that the Germans had lost the ability to mount any real effort at a large scale assault of the kind seen in the two previous years and with the subsequent battering that the Germans took and continued to take all across the front, it's also obvious that a successful conclusion to the war in the east was lost too.

Germany threw her three dice in 1941 and with the failure of Barbarossa, she wouldn't be able to throw those three dice again and instead would have to make do with one. When Blau failed at Stalingrad, her remaining dice was thrown at Kursk and once that was done, she was finished as a major attacker in the east.

The very best Germany could have hoped for would have been a stalemate of some kind.

realweirdo wrote: »

The American and British war effort was massive, not some slight distraction to the main eastern front where you argue the war was truely won. It wasn't won by the Russians, and it's unlikely they would have won it before 1950 without the help of the western allies.

Wrong again.

realweirdo wrote: »

And saying the Russians would have won "sooner or later" without outside help misses the entire point. Had the war continued on until the late '40s or even reached stalemate, there is a probabiliity the Germans would have developed nuclear capability by that stage and certainly have far more advanced weapons and in greater numbers. Increased numbers of ballistic missiles with greater accuracy, cruise weapons, jet fighters and bombers and so on. That's not to mention the 4 or 5 million Germany soldiers and allies tied down fighting the western allies on other fronts.

Again wrong.

Germany was at the very least 10 years away from developing a viable atomic weapon. Hitler never really had that much of an interest in it, as he considered it "Jewish" science. The Germans were just nowhere near to developing a successful weapon.

In addition, they had LOST the initiative on the eastern front in mid-1943, NEVER to regain it and she would continue to lose the attrition war into the bargain. There is simply no success for Germany in the eastern front, after the Soviets gained the upper hand in 1943. None.

Her retreat to her own borders was inexorable and inevitable. There is just no way around that fact, no matter what fantasy you wish to indulge in.

I agree with David Glantz's opinion on this matter, that at most, the war would have dragged on for another year, or 18 months.

That the Germans actually managed to hold out for another one and half years after 1943 in reality, is nothing short of a miracle, given the weight of the tide that faced them. There is nothing but retreat for the Germans after 1943. There's a reason why a posting to the Russian Front struck fear into the heart of the average Landser.

realweirdo wrote: »

Beating the Germans at Stalingrad and drawing with them at Kursk did not end the war. The Russians still had to turn the tide against a German Army that had to continually dilute its effort on the eastern front to fight in the west. And it wasn't just a slight dilution, something like 75% of their airforce and their best pilots were sent west.

The Germans LOST at Kursk, you need to get your facts straight, if you want to be taken seriously. After Kursk, the Russians continued to smash German divisions all across the front for the rest of the year. The Germans retreated for miles. They took another pounding at the Dnieper a month later. It was through Herculean efforts and the Russians running out of steam for the Germans to eventually stabilised their front.

As for their airforce, large amounts of the Jagdwaffe were sent back and forth from east to west. It wasn't a one way system. But, in any case, the war in the east was not going to be won in the air. No war is. Wars are won on the ground and in that respect, the Soviets had the greater advantage.

Plus, by 1943, the Germans had already engaged in loosing their training programs and had to do so to a much higher degree by the time 1944 came around, while at the same time, the VVS were training their pilots better.

Without a doubt, the extra units employed elsewhere would have come in handy for the Germans, but it just would not have been enough to turn the tide.

Ping Chow Chi · 16-05-2014 3:59pm

I am no expert, but wasn't there engagements between Britian and Germany (and its allies) before Kursk?

Tony EH · 16-05-2014 4:24pm

Of course. The war had been ongoing from September 1939, with the first major engagements between British and German forces in France in 1940.

Jawgap · 16-05-2014 6:08pm

.....not forgetting Khalkin Gol where the Soviets first engaged the Japanese but I think this predated the Tripartite Pact so perhaps doesn't 'count' as an action against the Axis, as such.

realweirdo · 21-05-2014 5:10pm

Tony EH wrote: »

Without a doubt, the extra units employed elsewhere would have come in handy for the Germans, but it just would not have been enough to turn the tide.

This is fairly typical of how you underplay facts that don't fit your argument.

You call the 4-5 million men tied up on fronts other than the eastern front towards the end of the war as merely "other units".

Given that a division at the time was 10-20,000 men, this would equate to at least 200 divisions minimum, or to take an average of 15,000 per division, 300 divisions. Including several panzer divisions, as well at the 75% of the Lufftwaffe engaged on other fronts, artillery and so on.

It's frankly laughable you would relegate these to being mere "extra units".

When something suits your argument you overplay and exaggerate it to the maximum. When it doesn't suit, you completely underplay it.

There is absolutely no question that the fact the Germans had to divide their forces between not just 1 or 2, but 3 and more fronts (including the Atlantic War) had a huge bearing on their defeat in the end. They were completely overstretched and overambitious.

Tony EH · 21-05-2014 6:26pm

realweirdo wrote: »

This is fairly typical of how you underplay facts that don't fit your argument.

You call the 4-5 million men tied up on fronts other than the eastern front towards the end of the war as merely "other units".

...and this is a prime example of your lack of knowledge on the subject.

By 1945, the Wehrmacht was a completely spent army. Their training levels had plummeted and they were forced to enlist old men and boys to fill out their depleted ranks. In fact, standards had been dropping steadily since the beginning of 1943.

These units would have been steamrollered with little difficulty by the Red Army.

By the end of the war the Wehrmacht was a shadow of itself. "Stomach battalions", rear echelon barely trained troops, Volksstrum, 60 year old men and 15 year old boys. They would have been slaughtered.

realweirdo wrote: »

It's frankly laughable you would relegate these to being mere "extra units".

When something suits your argument you overplay and exaggerate it to the maximum. When it doesn't suit, you completely underplay it.

What you may or may not find laughable is immaterial.

I certainly don't overplay anything or exaggerate anything. There's nothing in that for me to gain.

I have no stake in the war. I am ONLY interested in fact.

realweirdo wrote: »

There is absolutely no question that the fact the Germans had to divide their forces between not just 1 or 2, but 3 and more fronts (including the Atlantic War) had a huge bearing on their defeat in the end. They were completely overstretched and overambitious.

The Units employed in the Atlantic war would have been of little use to the German struggle in the east. That war was going to be won on land.

In addition, the ONLY chance Germany had for a victory over Russia was if they had completely destroyed the Red Army in 1941, and even then it would still mean a long and difficult war against the Russian people itself.

Once Russia had consolidated her men and material, moved her industry back to the Urals, the war became a waiting game in Russia's favour.

The units that Germany left in the west was a mere skeleton crew and certainly not enough to turn the tide in their only real opportunity in 1941.

After that the attrition war was well within the Soviets hands.

It is true that the German defeat was compounded and accelerated by her having to necessitate a multi-front war. You won't find anyone who would disagree with that.

However, her defeat would have come eventually, in any case.

Reekwind · 21-05-2014 7:09pm

realweirdo wrote: »

You call the 4-5 million men tied up on fronts other than the eastern front towards the end of the war as merely "other units".

Given that a division at the time was 10-20,000 men, this would equate to at least 200 divisions minimum, or to take an average of 15,000 per division, 300 divisions

Where are you pulling these fantasy numbers from? Because if you add 200 divisions ("minimum" :eek:) to the Eastern Front in 1943 then you more than double the number of German divisions on that front. And I'd hope that no one here is stupid enough to think that over half the Nazi divisions were loitering around Europe when the Army Groups were getting chewed up in Russia.

Jawgap · 21-05-2014 7:44pm

Tony EH wrote: »

..

.......

The units that Germany left in the west was a mere skeleton crew and certainly not enough to turn the tide in their only real opportunity in 1941.

........

I think your otherwise well written and argued posts are slightly let down by statements such as this - some of the panzer / panzer grenadier, fallschirmjaeger, gebirgsjäger and Luftwaffe field divisions were hardly 'mere skeleton crew' - likewise, some of the more capable German commanders fought in the West.

The USSR mounted the most important land campaign without a doubt, but the rest of the Allies weren't exactly fighting old men and boys until very much later in the War.

Likewise, the USSR didn't mount any major jungle warfare operations against the Japanese, any major mountain warfare offensives, nor did they mount any significant amphibious operations - or any genuinely combined operation during the war - and by 'combined' I mean land, air and sea.

realweirdo · 21-05-2014 8:06pm

Reekwind wrote: »

Where are you pulling these fantasy numbers from? Because if you add 200 divisions ("minimum" :eek:) to the Eastern Front in 1943 then you more than double the number of German divisions on that front. And I'd hope that no one here is stupid enough to think that over half the Nazi divisions were loitering around Europe when the Army Groups were getting chewed up in Russia.

I didn't have time to research this during work hours for obvious reasons.

Here is a more accurate portrait though.

http://www.axishistory.com/books/134-campaigns-a-operations/campaigns-a-operations/2085-number-of-german-divisions-by-front-in-world-war-ii

The German divisions in Russia peaked at 195 in February 1943, and on other fronts it amounted to 86. These 86 were largely facing threats, potential or real from the Western Allies.

Gradually from that point on, German divisions on the Eastern Front began to decline and began to rise on other fronts, again to counter the Western allies.

By January 1945, they were down to 145 divisions on the Eastern Front but shot up again the next month no doubt in preparation of a new Russian advance. The whole of 1944, German divisions on the Eastern front were at a relatively low number compared to the rest of the war, which hardly points to the Germans struggling in 1944 on the Eastern Front.

Meanwhile on all other fronts, from 86 divisions on the Eastern front in February 1943, it slowly began to rise until it was at 113 divisions at wars end as opposed to 163 divisions on the eastern front. 113 divisions was hardly insubstantial.

This is of course ignoring lend lease which many people unfortunately do, but which in my opinion was significant during the course of the war. I don't want to go through the stats of lend lease again, as they are available elsewhere, but here is an exerpt from a wiki article.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend-Lease

Much of the aid can be better understood when considering the economic distortions caused by the war. Most belligerent powers cut back severely on production of non-essentials, concentrating on producing weapons. This inevitably produced shortages of related products needed by the military or as part of the military-industrial complex.

The USSR was highly dependent on rail transportation, but the war practically shut down rail equipment production: only about 92 locomotives were produced. 2,000 locomotives and 11,000 railcars were supplied under Lend-Lease. Likewise, the Soviet air force received 18,700 aircraft, which amounted to about 14% of Soviet aircraft production (19% for military aircraft).[19]

Although most Red Army tank units were equipped with Soviet-built tanks, their logistical support was provided by hundreds of thousands of U.S.-made trucks. Indeed by 1945 nearly two-thirds of the truck strength of the Red Army was U.S.-built. Trucks such as the Dodge 3/4 ton and Studebaker 2½ ton were easily the best trucks available in their class on either side on the Eastern Front. American shipments of telephone cable, aluminum, canned rations, and clothing were also critical.[20]
Quotations

Roosevelt, eager to ensure public consent for this controversial plan, explained to the public and the press that his plan was comparable to one neighbor's lending another a garden hose to put out a fire in his home. "What do I do in such a crisis?" the president asked at a press conference. "I don't say... 'Neighbor, my garden hose cost me $15; you have to pay me $15 for it' …I don't want $15 — I want my garden hose back after the fire is over."[21] To which Robert Alphonso Taft, Republican Senator from Ohio, responded: "Lending war equipment is a good deal like lending chewing gum. You don't want it back." In practice, very little was returned except for a few ships.

Joseph Stalin, during the Tehran Conference in 1943, acknowledged publicly the importance of American efforts during a dinner at the conference: "Without American production the United Nations [the Allies] could never have won the war."[22]

Stalin of all people would be loathe to acknowledge the role played by a capitalist country.

It must be remembered by the way, that most of the Soviet factories were moved East in the early years of the war. Getting ammo, spare parts and the like a thousand miles west demanded a lot of train locomotives and thousands of first rate trucks - something the Russians didn't have prior to lend lease.

Tony EH · 21-05-2014 10:12pm

Jawgap wrote: »

I think your otherwise well written and argued posts are slightly let down by statements such as this - some of the panzer / panzer grenadier, fallschirmjaeger, gebirgsjäger and Luftwaffe field divisions were hardly 'mere skeleton crew' - likewise, some of the more capable German commanders fought in the West...

I am talking 1941.

Germany's best hope for any kind of a victory over Russia.

Germany left a paltry defence force in the west, in comparison to what was thrown at the Russians.

Jawgap · 21-05-2014 10:51pm

Tony EH wrote: »

I am talking 1941.

Germany's best hope for any kind of a victory over Russia.

Germany left a paltry defence force in the west, in comparison to what was thrown at the Russians.

Well, again I'd hesitate to describe an entire Army Group comprising of the 1st, 7th and 15th Armies (along with AOK Norway and AOK 12 in Greece) as 'paltry' even in comparison to the forces committed to BARBAROSSA.

It was, of course, less but in terms of land forces it was about one third of the Heer's strength - so hardly 'paltry.' And while the bulk of the Luftwaffe headed east, nearly all the Kriegsmarine (including, obviously enough the U-boats) stayed in the West.

Tony EH · 21-05-2014 11:07pm

realweirdo wrote: »

It must be remembered by the way, that most of the Soviet factories were moved East in the early years of the war. Getting ammo, spare parts and the like a thousand miles west demanded a lot of train locomotives and thousands of first rate trucks - something the Russians didn't have prior to lend lease.

Russia had a tremendous amount of locomotives and roiling stock before the war. From memory, she had close to 30,000 locos alone.

Stalin's five year plans were facilitated by Russia's large collection of rail vehicles. In fact the last five year plan, albeit interrupted in 1941, had strove to update and modernise her extensive rail network and was completed to a large degree.

Russia had so many locomotives she only had to build less than 100 during the war,. offset by 2000 sent from the west.

Again, from memory, not a single locomotive arrived in Russia from the west until the latter half of 1944. Long after Russia had secured victories over Germany in her most crucial battles.

The main reason Russia ordered locos from the west was because of the narrower gauge used in Poland and Germany. Ordering shipments in 1944, with a view to gaining ground in western Europe proper, was a quicker and easier solution than retooling existing locos with a narrower under carriage.

You see, this is generally the problem with the "rah rah" approach to lend lease. Those who want to overrate it and exaggerate its importance, do so, with the laboured belief that Russia couldn't produce what was sent by the west.

She could, by and large.

But, and this is what the minimisers of lend lease miss tend to miss, shipments from the west allowed her to focus on building overwhelming numbers of other equipment.

After 1945 there was a concerted effort to shrink the contribution that Russia made to defeating the Germans in the Second World War to a mere side show, because after their usefulness they were relegated back to the pre-war position of untrusted potential enemy and the cold war politics of the day prevailed largely in the west and especially in America. Since the 90's this minimisation has been replaced by the lend lease myth, whereby, while it can no longer be hidden that Russia did the lion's share of fighting against Germany, she would have "gone under", without western (i.e. American) goods.

Neither is correct, has ever been correct, nor ever will be.

realweirdo · 21-05-2014 11:17pm

Tony EH wrote: »

I am talking 1941.

Germany's best hope for any kind of a victory over Russia.

Germany left a paltry defence force in the west, in comparison to what was thrown at the Russians.

But when it came to the battle of the bulge, the Germans were able to throw in first rate forces against the allies.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Bulge

Four armies were selected for the operation. First was the Sixth Panzer Army, under SS General Sepp Dietrich—newly created on 26 October 1944, it incorporated the most senior and the most experienced formation of the Waffen-SS: the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler as well as the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend. The 6th Panzer Army was designated the northernmost attack force, having its northernmost point on the pre-attack battlefront nearest the German town of Monschau. It was entrusted with the offensive's primary objective—capturing Antwerp.

The Fifth Panzer Army under General Hasso von Manteuffel was assigned to the middle attack route with the objective of capturing Brussels.

Not to mention that Kesselring was leading the fight in Italy with many experienced and first rate divisions, and the man in charge of the German forces on D Day was Rommel.

It doesn't stack up that the Germans had inferior commanders or soldiers on the Western front.

Tony EH · 21-05-2014 11:20pm

Jawgap wrote: »

Well, again I'd hesitate to describe an entire Army Group comprising of the 1st, 7th and 15th Armies (along with AOK Norway and AOK 12 in Greece) as 'paltry' even in comparison to the forces committed to BARBAROSSA.

It was, of course, less but in terms of land forces it was about one third of the Heer's strength - so hardly 'paltry.' And while the bulk of the Luftwaffe headed east, nearly all the Kriegsmarine (including, obviously enough the U-boats) stayed in the West.

The troops left behind guarding the back door, were built largely of occupation troops and units were often understrength, especially in armour. The cream of Germany's front line fighting men went east.

The Luftwaffe's minimal rear guard is obvious and yes the bulk of the Kriegsmarine stayed where she was trained to fight. But, as already said, Russia was a land war. The Germany navy would have been largely redundant. There simply wouldn't have been the target opportunities presented to them as there were in the Atlantic routes.

Perhaps the men of the Kriegsmarine could have been press-ganged into land units, as did happen in 1944/45. But the result would have been pretty much the same, they would have been wholly unsuited to land fighting as they were historically.

In every case...it simply isn't enough.

One final note, we all need to be extremely careful about Germany's theoretical division strength and her actual division strength, which rarely matched, even in the early war years.

Tony EH · 21-05-2014 11:38pm

Tony EH wrote: »

I am talking 1941.

Germany's best hope for any kind of a victory over Russia.

Germany left a paltry defence force in the west, in comparison to what was thrown at the Russians.

realweirdo wrote: »

But when it came to the battle of the bulge, the Germans were able to throw in first rate forces against the allies.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Bulge

You do know that the Wacht am Rhein was in late 1944, don't you. Not 1941.

Also, those forces WERE FAR FROM FIRST RATE. The Germans literally had to scrape the bottom of the barrel in order to build up a decent strength, in yet another wartime miracle.

In addition, their attack failed and failed terribly.

Tony EH wrote: »

Not to mention that Kesselring was leading the fight in Italy with many experienced and first rate divisions, and the man in charge of the German forces on D Day was Rommel.

It doesn't stack up that the Germans had inferior commanders or soldiers on the Western front.

Smiling Al was a great divisional commander, but so what?

Rommel was a proven Corps commander, but there's doubt to his ability at higher levels.

And although Kesselring was in charge of Luftflotte 2 for a short period in 1941 neither of them were tested in a combined ops commander role on the eastern front. So, the point whether they could have made a deciding difference is moot.

Lastly, I never said that Germans had "inferior commanders or soldiers on the Western front".

Jawgap · 22-05-2014 4:26am

My point in referencing the Kriegsmarine was to demonstrate that considerable & significant resources (and 'steel') were left in the West during the "time of iron"........including the elite U-boat force.

Despite the Soviet outlook, the War was more than just a series land and tactical air campaigns.

Tony EH · 22-05-2014 8:08am

I agree. But my issue is that the Kriegsmarine units wouldn't have been the help that was needed to secure victory in the east in the German's best window of opportunity.

The Ubootwaffe (which essentially is the Kriegsmarine) would have been pretty much redundant in the east. Sure there would have been targets of opportunity in the gulf of Finland and down in the Black Sea, but it's certain that their contribution would have been minimal to say the least.

The army units too would have been help, as I said to Realweirdo, in terms of manpower (the vast majority of materiel was in the east) and would have offset the million+ that the Germans lost in Barbarossa, but she was so far off of a victory by the time winter had set in that the difference would simply not have tipped the balance.

In my opinion, Germany has one chance of success in the east. That is an attack in early 1941, with substantially greater forces than were historically employed, fully mechanised and not reliant on horses, a much better strategic focus than was utilised at the time and a more practical political approach taken in the occupied areas behind the front lines, with a real effort on winning "hearts and minds" (if you'll forgive that awful phrase).

...and even then, I find it doubtful that a complete success is on the cards.

Reekwind · 22-05-2014 8:24am

realweirdo wrote: »

The German divisions in Russia peaked at 195 in February 1943, and on other fronts it amounted to 86. These 86 were largely facing threats, potential or real from the Western Allies.

No, they were garrison troops. There was no real possibility of invasion in, say, August 1941 but it still took 40 divisions to maintain Nazi occupational rule in Western Europe. Similarly, the use of 15 divisions in the SE by 1943, and its later increase, was directly tied to the activity of Tito's Partisans and not the threat of any invasion.

Gradually from that point on, German divisions on the Eastern Front began to decline and began to rise on other fronts, again to counter the Western allies.

No one denies that by 1943 the forces in the West began to rise. What has been repeatedly pointed out is that by this point the Germans had already been defeated at Moscow and Stalingrad and thus had lost any hopes of a quick victory. By mid-1943 there was no way for the Nazis to win the war; anything that happens after this point is only hindering or accelerating a Soviet victory.

By January 1945, they were down to 145 divisions on the Eastern Front but shot up again the next month no doubt in preparation of a new Russian advance. The whole of 1944, German divisions on the Eastern front were at a relatively low number compared to the rest of the war, which hardly points to the Germans struggling in 1944 on the Eastern Front.

Read that again. Your picture "hardly points to the Germans struggling in 1944 on the Eastern Front"... in the exact period where the Germans were on the defensive and losing vast swathes of territory in punishing engagements. The reduction of forces in the East was largely due to their destruction at the hands of the Soviets. For example, the drop in Eastern divisions from May-July 1944 was largely due to Bagration, losses from which dwarfed any transfers West.

113 divisions was hardly insubstantial.

Except that many of those 113 divisions were garrison or militia units that had been hastily called up and were unsuited to combat. It's either that or the Wehrmacht was actually more capable in December 1944 than it was in December 1942.

This is of course ignoring lend lease which many people unfortunately do, but which in my opinion was significant during the course of the war. I don't want to go through the stats of lend lease again, as they are available elsewhere, but here is an exerpt from a wiki article.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend-Lease

Lend Lease has been dealt with earlier in the thread. It accelerated Soviet victory but was not fundamental to it.

Jawgap · 22-05-2014 8:40pm

Tony EH wrote: »

I agree. But my issue is that the Kriegsmarine units wouldn't have been the help that was needed to secure victory in the east in the German's best window of opportunity.

The Ubootwaffe (which essentially is the Kriegsmarine) would have been pretty much redundant in the east. Sure there would have been targets of opportunity in the gulf of Finland and down in the Black Sea, but it's certain that their contribution would have been minimal to say the least.

The army units too would have been help, as I said to Realweirdo, in terms of manpower (the vast majority of materiel was in the east) and would have offset the million+ that the Germans lost in Barbarossa, but she was so far off of a victory by the time winter had set in that the difference would simply not have tipped the balance.

In my opinion, Germany has one chance of success in the east. That is an attack in early 1941, with substantially greater forces than were historically employed, fully mechanised and not reliant on horses, a much better strategic focus than was utilised at the time and a more practical political approach taken in the occupied areas behind the front lines, with a real effort on winning "hearts and minds" (if you'll forgive that awful phrase).

...and even then, I find it doubtful that a complete success is on the cards.

I think you're missing the point about the Kriegsmarine. In a straight Germany / USSR conflict there's no need for the Kriegsmarine, which means the Germans would have been spared the opportunity cost of building, maintaining and operating a reasonably significant navy, and used the men, steel etc for something else.

Their merchant fleet would have been free to source and supply them from their traditional sources, for example if the Med never happened then that, on it's own, would have freed up a modest 300,000 tonnes of merchant shipping, much of it ocean-going.

Again, I'm saying the USSR could have been defeated, only that it a straight conflict a bloody stalemate would have been the outcome.

And while the USSR had impressive manpower resources, technologically, logistically and operationally they were behind the US, and the British.

Informationally, in terms of intelligence, they were heavily dependent on the Western Allies for their strategic intel.

realweirdo · 23-05-2014 1:00am

Tony EH wrote: »

I agree. But my issue is that the Kriegsmarine units wouldn't have been the help that was needed to secure victory in the east in the German's best window of opportunity.

The Ubootwaffe (which essentially is the Kriegsmarine) would have been pretty much redundant in the east. Sure there would have been targets of opportunity in the gulf of Finland and down in the Black Sea, but it's certain that their contribution would have been minimal to say the least.

The army units too would have been help, as I said to Realweirdo, in terms of manpower (the vast majority of materiel was in the east) and would have offset the million+ that the Germans lost in Barbarossa, but she was so far off of a victory by the time winter had set in that the difference would simply not have tipped the balance.

In my opinion, Germany has one chance of success in the east. That is an attack in early 1941, with substantially greater forces than were historically employed, fully mechanised and not reliant on horses, a much better strategic focus than was utilised at the time and a more practical political approach taken in the occupied areas behind the front lines, with a real effort on winning "hearts and minds" (if you'll forgive that awful phrase).

...and even then, I find it doubtful that a complete success is on the cards.

Sorry Tony, your argument is nowhere near convincing, despite your personal conviction that you are right, which counts for little.

You imply again that American assistance did not play a huge part in the Russians advance, despite the fact the Americans sent hundreds of thousands of trucks to Russia, the best trucks of either side on the eastern front. You all too easily whitewash facts like this.

You ignore that the Russians hadn't a single heavy bomber. You ignore that large parts of the lufftwaffe were tied down on the western front in 1944 and 1945 and largely annihalated on that front. Transferred to the eastern front, those lufftwaffe units could have been used with great effect and would in time have destroyed the Russian airforce, a Russian airforce remember that had no material assistance from the allies. In total lendlease accounted for 60% of Soviet aviation fuel as one example, something of course you will discount and minimise as you always do. Lendlease gave a massive boost to the Russian airforce. And you can have tens of thousands of planes, many of them poor quality, but if you have no aviation fuel, you are in trouble, as the Germans discovered towards the end of the war.

Without air cover, the Russians would be in serious trouble. Again like I said, you aren't really offering a convincing argument.

Here's more stats on lendlease by the way.

http://orbat.com/site/sturmvogel/SovLendLease.html

Tony EH · 23-05-2014 2:41am

So what?

It's not like the Russians had no trucks, or couldn't build them.

They produced over a million ZiS 5's alone.

You see, the problem with your POV, is that it requires a belief that the Russians couldn't produce the goods, if lend lease didn't exist.

This is, of course, nonsense.

With the lend lease programs, the Russians could order items that America and Britain could produce easily and allow Russia to ease back on the same items and focus on other areas in extreme and overwhelming numbers. The Russians used prudence and chose, in certain cases, the superior US vehicle over the Russian one, where applicable. But, if they weren't forthcoming, they would have had to continue producing their own domestic vehicle.

It made perfect sense for Russia to utilise foreign, better designed, trucks and focus their attention on other production, in order to produce overwhelming numbers.

However, there is nothing, absolutely nothing, to suggest that the Russians would have folded without Lend lease help. It's an absurd point of view and one that is held only by ideologues and those without sufficient knowledge of the period.

In addition, the Russians didn't need a "single heavy bomber". The war in Russia wasn't that type of war. Both sides in the conflict used tactical airforces. So, this point is completely moot. The war was going to be won on the ground.

As for your "aviation fuel" point, your % is meaningless without knowing the type of aviation fuel. A large percentage of that fuel was shipped to fuel the lend lease vehicles. For instance, in Murmansk, Hurricanes sat idle, because Soviet grade aviation fuel, which suited their aircraft, was extremely rough on Merlin engines. The VVS had to ask Britain to ship the 100 octane fuel that the RAF used, because the Hurricanes they were using were seizing up, due to the unsuitability of Soviet fuel which was of a lower octane value.

Context is everything. Simple numbers or percentages are misleading.

Also, I imply NOTHING. I only state what I know to be fact. I don't believe in "implying" anything. If I want to say something, I'll say it. Implications are an imperfect medium.

Lastly, I don't "ignore" anything. The simple fact is, is that you are wrong. You don't have the knowledge required and frankly, your stance smacks of a political and ideological air that colours your perception.

You keep returning to 1944/45 in your posts, while remaining completely ignorant of the fact that the crucial victories in the eastern campaign were won in 1941, 42 and 43, before lend lease made its presence felt in any kind of significance. With the failure of Barbarossa in 1941, the Germans had blown their chance of a "victory" in Russia. She had exhaused her ability to attack on a broad front. There is simply no victory for Germany here, no matter what fantasy you wish to employ.

Jawgap · 23-05-2014 6:10am

Tony EH wrote: »

So what?

It's not like the Russians had no trucks, or couldn't build them.

They produced over a million ZiS 5's alone.

That would be about 5 times more than all Studebaker US6s produced for the entire war...........and yet, as Khrushchev pointed out in his autobiography, the word 'Studebaker' and derivations of it became the word for 'truck' and slang for 'quality' in Russia. He was somewhat irritated that this remained the case for a long time after the war.

Tony EH wrote: »

.......
However, there is nothing, absolutely nothing, to suggest that the Russians would have folded without Lend lease help. It's an absurd point of view and one that is held only by ideologues and those without sufficient knowledge of the period.

The Russians would have ejected the Germans from the East, eventually, without Lend / Lease - but without the Western Allies to to do run a strategic air and naval campaign, they wouldn't have got to Berlin.

Tony EH wrote: »

In addition, the Russians didn't need a "single heavy bomber". The war in Russia wasn't that type of war. Both sides in the conflict used tactical airforces. So, this point is completely moot. The war was going to be won on the ground.

No, it became that type of war because they lacked heavy bombers. And both sides lacked heavy bombers because they lacked the technology to build them in the case of the Soviets (despite their early work in this area in the 20s) and the vision to build them in the case of the Germans.

It also helped the Soviets that so many potential German fighter-bombers and dual use 88s were off trying to bring down US and British heavy bombers instead of setting their sights on Soviet armour.

Tony EH wrote: »

As for your "aviation fuel" point, your % is meaningless without knowing the type of aviation fuel. A large percentage of that fuel was shipped to fuel the lend lease vehicles. For instance, in Murmansk, Hurricanes sat idle, because Soviet grade aviation fuel, which suited their aircraft, was extremely rough on Merlin engines. The VVS had to ask Britain to ship the 100 octane fuel that the RAF used, because the Hurricanes they were using were seizing up, due to the unsuitability of Soviet fuel which was of a lower octane value.

I referenced this in post #18

During the Winter War for example, the USSR was sold (admittedly not given) over 1,500 million litres of aviation fuel - the good stuff too at 99/100 octane.

The example of the Hurricanes does illustrate an important point though of how the Soviets lacked certain key technologies - in this instance the ability to refine high octane avgas in sufficient quantities and get it to where it's needed.

Tony EH wrote: »

......
You keep returning to 1944/45 in your posts, while remaining completely ignorant of the fact that the crucial victories in the eastern campaign were won in 1941, 42 and 43, before lend lease made its presence felt in any kind of significance. With the failure of Barbarossa in 1941, the Germans had blown their chance of a "victory" in Russia. She had exhaused her ability to attack on a broad front. There is simply no victory for Germany here, no matter what fantasy you wish to employ.

The Germans could never have defeated the USSR, no matter what military defeats they secured. So discussions about broad / narrow fronts are almost moot - one offered the opportunity of failure in a less spectacular fashion than the other.

.......and aid to the USSR extended far beyond the materiel supplied through Lend / Lease.

Jawgap · 23-05-2014 6:30am

From "A HIGH-OCTANE WEAPON FOR VICTORY" (Alexander Matveichuk, Ph. D. (History), Member, Russian Academy of Natural Sciences).......

In 1940, a total of 29,414 million tons of oil was processed at domestic refineries, producing only 883,600 tons of aviation gasoline, 3.477 million tons of automotive gasoline, 5.6 million tons of kerosene, 1.274 million tons of ligroin, 1.459 million tons of diesel fuel, 413,000 tons of naval oil, 9.8 million tons of fuel oil, and 1.469 million tons of various lubricants.

Of the 883,600 tons of aviation gasoline produced domestically in 1940, an overwhelming proportion was avgas with low octane numbers of 70 to 74. This was almost good enough for obsolete domestically-produced aircraft, but only 4% of the demand for B-78 aviation gasoline, the best of those produced in the Soviet Union and the one needed by the new generation of warplanes, was satisfied across the country.

Monthly deliveries of 20,000 tons of petroleum products for the Soviet air forces (high-octane aviation gasoline, octane-boosting avgas additives, and lubricants and motor oils) were especially stipulated in the First Protocol. Even this, however, was not enough in the first few trying years of the war. Despite the heroic efforts of Soviet oil workers, the extreme conditions of the war led to a drop in Soviet oil production, from 31 million tons in 1940 to 19.3 million tons in 1945, i.e., a reduction of 37.7%. They also aggravated the difficult situation in the oil industry's refining sector, which turned out to be incapable of fully satisfying the growing demand for high-octane aviation gasolines.

If 1.269 million tons of aviation gasoline had been produced in the Soviet Union in 1941, only 912,000 tons were produced in 1942. It should also be noted that Soviet refineries were producing avgas with low octane numbers. In 1941, an overwhelming amount (75%) of the aviation gasoline produced had octane numbers from 70 to 74, the ones needed by obsolete types of domestically-produced aircraft.

In response to a request from the Soviet government, the Allies increased deliveries of high-octane aviation gasolines and lubricants. According to the official data for the years of the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War, 2,159,336 short tons of petroleum products were delivered from the United States alone under Lend-Lease and commercial contracts. The amount of high-octane aviation gasoline, converted into the metric system, was 1,197,587 tons, including 558,428 tons with octane numbers above 99. One other important item: in the nomenclature of American oil deliveries, the Soviet Union also received 267,088 tons of automotive gasoline; 16,870 tons of kerosene; 287,262 tons of fuel oil; 111,676 tons of lubricants; 5,769 tons of paraffin; 4,788 tons of chemical additives; and 999 tons of other products.

It should be emphasized that in addition to petroleum products, the oil component of Lend-Lease included deliveries to the Soviet Union from the United States of equipment for four refinery complexes, along with drilling rigs and other oil industry equipment, pipe casings and compressor/pump piping, portable collapsible pipelines, instruments, tankers, tank trucks, railroad tanker cars, filling station pumps, and much else.

One of his final conclusions.......

It should be noted in general that, being part of the overall Lend-Lease program, the deliveries of petroleum products, refining and oilfield equipment, piping, and other materials from the nations of the anti-Hitler coalition to the Soviet Union helped greatly [my emphasis] in keeping the Soviet armed forces supplied with fuel and lubricants throughout the war, thereby bringing the day of the great victory over our common enemy appreciably closer.

Jawgap · 23-05-2014 6:44am

My last point on this......

From "LEND-LEASE OIL DIMENSION" by Oleg Anatolyev

Over the years the Lend-Lease program was in effect, the total volume of just the high-octane aviation gasoline supplied by the Allies to the USSR was 1,197,587 tons, of which 558,428 tons had octane numbers higher than 99.

It is very clear that the Allies' delivery of octane-boosting additives for preparing high-octane aviation gasolines for the Soviet air forces, and for raising the octane number of automotive gasolines, was no less important. A total of 834,427 tons of these were delivered, of which 732,295 tons came from the United States, and 102,132 tons came from the British refinery in Abadan, Iran.

Finally, he sums up well (for an economist).....

We cannot, of course, use the same scale to weigh the goods provided under Lend-Lease against the loss of life incurred by Soviet citizens in paving the way to victory over the common enemy. This was, incidentally, emphasized more than once during and after the war years by prominent government figures in the United States, Britain, and other countries.

"The Russians paid a price that cannot be measured in dollars," said U.S. Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, who, in assessing the role of Lend-Lease, wrote,

"It is the millions of Nazi soldiers killed or taken prisoner, the Nazi tanks turned into heaps of scrap iron on the battlefield, and the guns and trucks abandoned by the retreating German armies."

"We never thought that our Lend-Lease aid was the main factor in the Soviet victory over Hitler on the Eastern Front," noted Harry Hopkins. "It was achieved by the heroism and blood of the Russian army." John Hazard, deputy director of the Soviet department of the Lend-Lease Administration from 1941 to1945, wrote in 1990,

" I believe there is now hardly anyone in the United States who would dare assert that the deliveries of equipment and foodstuffs under Lend-Lease were the main factor ensuring the victory of the Soviet people and the Red Army in that war. Nevertheless, the Americans who were involved in Lend-Lease still feel enormous satisfaction from knowing that the cargoes we delivered helped fill a gap in supplying the Soviet people and their armed forces."

As we mark the 65th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, there are a great many different stories in the media with regard to the multilateral cooperation among the nations of the anti-Hitler coalition. Contemporary researchers have shown convincingly that Lend-Lease helped greatly in achieving the great victory of 1945 over humanity's common enemy: German fascism.

Tony EH · 23-05-2014 12:47pm

Jawgap wrote: »

That would be about 5 times more than all Studebaker US6s produced for the entire war...........and yet, as Khrushchev pointed out in his autobiography, the word 'Studebaker' and derivations of it became the word for 'truck' and slang for 'quality' in Russia. He was somewhat irritated that this remained the case for a long time after the war.

This is correct. "Studebaker" did become slang for truck. American trucks. The Russians called every American truck, regardless whether it was a Ford or a Dodge a "Studebaker", because it was the type they were most familiar with.

Like calling a vacuum cleaner a hoover.

It doesn't mean that the Russians couldn't produce trucks, or that lend lease trucks won the war for them.

Jawgap wrote: »

The Russians would have ejected the Germans from the East, eventually, without Lend / Lease - but without the Western Allies to to do run a strategic air and naval campaign, they wouldn't have got to Berlin.

In your opinion. I disagree. Western help made a Russian victory easier and quicker. But it didn't create it.

Jawgap wrote: »

No, it became that type of war because they lacked heavy bombers. And both sides lacked heavy bombers because they lacked the technology to build them in the case of the Soviets (despite their early work in this area in the 20s) and the vision to build them in the case of the Germans.

Again, they didn't need them. The war wasn't that type of war to begin with. Neither side had heavy bombers, so this point is completely moot.

Jawgap wrote: »

The example of the Hurricanes does illustrate an important point though of how the Soviets lacked certain key technologies - in this instance the ability to refine high octane avgas in sufficient quantities and get it to where it's needed.

The problems with specific aviation fuels and aircraft types is only one issue with LL aircraft. In addition to that, aircraft often sat for months unbuilt, because the Russians had no manuals to use and then when they did, the were often in English. This was also compounded by the fact that spare parts were also in very short supply, leading to units that operated LL aircraft very understrength.

LL aircraft helped plug gaps. But they didn't win the war. For every 1 encounter with a P40, or a P39, there were dozens of encounters with Yaks or LaGGs.

My point in illustrating these issues to Realweirdo is to show him that while flat statistics and numbers look great, you have to get to the details in order to appreciate the whole picture.

Jawgap wrote: »

The Germans could never have defeated the USSR, no matter what military defeats they secured. So discussions about broad / narrow fronts are almost moot - one offered the opportunity of failure in a less spectacular fashion than the other.

.......and aid to the USSR extended far beyond the materiel supplied through Lend / Lease.

I know. But to me, a Russian victory over Germany is probable with or without the west being involved. It certainly would have been longer and more costly. But the final result would have been the same.

Even if they pushed them all the way to Berlin and accepted a truce, Germany, as a national power, would have been finished. Certainly as a National Socialist entity. She would have been completely isolated, terribly weakened and in severe dire straights after a truce, while the Soviet Union would have gained in strength.

Look, these fantasy scenarios are all fine and dandy for a bit of academic yap, but nothing ever comes of them in the end and I've these "what if" discussions many times over the years. In the end, the only things that we can be absolutely certain of is what actually happened during the course of the war.

Tony EH · 23-05-2014 12:53pm

Jawgap wrote: »

One of his final conclusions.......

It should be noted in general that, being part of the overall Lend-Lease program, the deliveries of petroleum products, refining and oilfield equipment, piping, and other materials from the nations of the anti-Hitler coalition to the Soviet Union helped greatly [my emphasis] in keeping the Soviet armed forces supplied with fuel and lubricants throughout the war, thereby bringing the day of the great victory over our common enemy appreciably closer.

The underlined italics are the important part.

Lend lease, as a whole DID bring victory closer. But it did not create it.

Jawgap · 23-05-2014 6:59pm

Tony EH wrote: »

Again, they didn't need them. The war wasn't that type of war to begin with. Neither side had heavy bombers, so this point is completely moot.

Actually, it was. Every major Air Force, including the Soviets, was led by avowed 'Douhetists.'

The 20s and 30s were all about strategic bombing and until about 1932 the USSR led the way in heavy bomber development.

The key failing was they did realise that heavy bombers needed to be heavier and they lacked the technology to develop both the aircraft and bombs that eventually would prove successful.

And I don't think I suggested that Lend Lease "created" the Soviet victory, only that it's contribution was not insignificant - something I think the Soviet official history I quoted earlier shows and what the last two Russian writers suggest.

Tony EH · 23-05-2014 7:16pm

That's not really the point.

The issue is that neither side had heavy bombers, so their war (Germany v Russia) wasn't characterised by them either way.

And I don't think I suggested that Lend Lease "created" the Soviet victory, only that it's contribution was not insignificant - something I think the Soviet official history I quoted earlier shows and what the last two Russian writers suggest.

I wasn't saying you did.

Jawgap · 24-05-2014 8:30pm

Tony EH wrote: »

That's not really the point.

The issue is that neither side had heavy bombers, so their war (Germany v Russia) wasn't characterised by them either way.
.........

That's an objective view.

At the time, everyone thought they had heavy bombers.......in the same way everyone thought 100 tons of bombs would be enough to make any city surrender or that 'precision' bombing was possible or that 'heavy' bombing (by the RAF's definition) was 25 tons per square mile.

No one knew that the pretty crappy Manchester would go on to become the Lancaster or that it would possible to build and operate something like a B-29 or that it would be possible to consistently pour 125 tons into a square mile.

Subjectively, at the War's outset, most air forces (parts of the RAF excepted) thought they had a war winning theory and what they thought were heavy bombers - time and technology proved their subjective views to be mis-held.

Jawgap · 24-05-2014 8:44pm

Tony EH wrote: »

In your opinion. I disagree. Western help made a Russian victory easier and quicker. But it didn't create it.

.

Yes, a reasoned opinion that I argued out earlier in the thread.

No counter seems to be offered other than the Soviets appear to have had lots of men and lots of materiel (significant quantities of which were serviceable but lesser quality)

How, for example, in the absence of Allied aid would they have prevented the Germans supplying themselves by sea? How would they have moved supplies, replacements, reinforcements etc as they moved further west and German lines of communication shortened? How would they have dealt with both the changing terrain and changing (milder relative to the Steppes) weather in the west?

How could they have overcome the increasing disadvantages of moving west to reach Berlin to force an unconditional surrender?

Quantity may have a quality all of its own but how does tush application defeat a technologically and organisationally superior foe?

realweirdo · 25-05-2014 1:34am

Tony EH wrote: »

So what?

It's not like the Russians had no trucks, or couldn't build them.

They produced over a million ZiS 5's alone.

You see, the problem with your POV, is that it requires a belief that the Russians couldn't produce the goods, if lend lease didn't exist.

This is, of course, nonsense.

With the lend lease programs, the Russians could order items that America and Britain could produce easily and allow Russia to ease back on the same items and focus on other areas in extreme and overwhelming numbers. The Russians used prudence and chose, in certain cases, the superior US vehicle over the Russian one, where applicable. But, if they weren't forthcoming, they would have had to continue producing their own domestic vehicle.

It made perfect sense for Russia to utilise foreign, better designed, trucks and focus their attention on other production, in order to produce overwhelming numbers.

However, there is nothing, absolutely nothing, to suggest that the Russians would have folded without Lend lease help. It's an absurd point of view and one that is held only by ideologues and those without sufficient knowledge of the period.

In addition, the Russians didn't need a "single heavy bomber". The war in Russia wasn't that type of war. Both sides in the conflict used tactical airforces. So, this point is completely moot. The war was going to be won on the ground.

As for your "aviation fuel" point, your % is meaningless without knowing the type of aviation fuel. A large percentage of that fuel was shipped to fuel the lend lease vehicles. For instance, in Murmansk, Hurricanes sat idle, because Soviet grade aviation fuel, which suited their aircraft, was extremely rough on Merlin engines. The VVS had to ask Britain to ship the 100 octane fuel that the RAF used, because the Hurricanes they were using were seizing up, due to the unsuitability of Soviet fuel which was of a lower octane value.

Context is everything. Simple numbers or percentages are misleading.

Also, I imply NOTHING. I only state what I know to be fact. I don't believe in "implying" anything. If I want to say something, I'll say it. Implications are an imperfect medium.

Lastly, I don't "ignore" anything. The simple fact is, is that you are wrong. You don't have the knowledge required and frankly, your stance smacks of a political and ideological air that colours your perception.

You keep returning to 1944/45 in your posts, while remaining completely ignorant of the fact that the crucial victories in the eastern campaign were won in 1941, 42 and 43, before lend lease made its presence felt in any kind of significance. With the failure of Barbarossa in 1941, the Germans had blown their chance of a "victory" in Russia. She had exhaused her ability to attack on a broad front. There is simply no victory for Germany here, no matter what fantasy you wish to employ.

Tony, your posts become increasingly irrational and to be frank immature.

You have said the impact of Lend Lease had little bearing on the war or at most accelerated the Germans defeat, which of course is also nonsense from you. As has been pointed out by others, Allied assistance came in many forms, Lend Lease being one.

And for the last time, both Stalin and Zhukov admitted Lend Lease saved their asses. Are you going to put this down to western propaganda too?

All along I have relied on stats, facts and just as importantly quotes from the Soviet side including soviet historians. And then you claim I have an anti Soviet agenda, one of the reasons I accuse you of being immature. Like I said, just quoting directly from those who did the actual fighting, and who have far more knowledge of this subject than you. I doubt that will stop your immature insults though.

Now, while you are at it, will you address the point I made earlier in a mature way, back it up with stats if you like - Had the Luftwaffe and the Anti Aircraft brigades not being tied down fighting the allies and fighting Allied HEAVY BOMBERS, where do you think they would have ended up. And do you think the Russian airforce would have survived into 1943 with the full force of the luftwaffe and AA against them?

Again, the point of the heavy bomber argument is that it tied down thousands of Luftwaffe planes, pilots and AA brigades and hundreds of thousands of German personal. As always, you just simply overlook this point, or write it off as somehow negligible.

So again I ask Tony, would the Russian airforce have lasted into 1943? Forget the ground war and addres that simple point. A yes/no answer will do, and then we can take it from there on how the rest of the war might have panned out. By the way, when people start using insults or trying to put others down like you do, its a sure sign you are losing the argument.

realweirdo · 25-05-2014 1:43am

Jawgap wrote: »

That's an objective view.

At the time, everyone thought they had heavy bombers.......in the same way everyone thought 100 tons of bombs would be enough to make any city surrender or that 'precision' bombing was possible or that 'heavy' bombing (by the RAF's definition) was 25 tons per square mile.

No one knew that the pretty crappy Manchester would go on to become the Lancaster or that it would possible to build and operate something like a B-29 or that it would be possible to consistently pour 125 tons into a square mile.

Subjectively, at the War's outset, most air forces (parts of the RAF excepted) thought they had a war winning theory and what they thought were heavy bombers - time and technology proved their subjective views to be mis-held.

There are many points to the Heavy Bomber argument. The main thing is they tied down an awful lot of resources of the Luftwaffe and AA resources which would almost certainly have been used on the Eastern front given that the Russians had not a single bomber to threathen Germany. The bombers also disrupted the V1 campaign, and bombed Pneumende, not destroying the V2 campaign but slowing it down. Of course, Tony will again write all this off as negligible and not being that important.

realweirdo · 25-05-2014 2:14am

I know Tony is also going to write this off as not being important, but it was.

The oil campaign of WW2 involved the bombing of Axis oil production facitilities and resources by Allied bombers. It was hugely successful to the point that in the last year of the war, the Luftwaffe were struggling to put planes in the sky and the Germany Army was struggling to put fuel in its tanks.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defence_of_the_Reich#Impact_on_Axis_oil_production

Impact on Axis oil production

The oil campaign was hugely successful. In June 1944, just 56,000 short tons (51,000 t) of oil had been produced against the planned total of 198,000 short tons (180,000 t). Consumption was well above stocks produced since mid-May 1944 so that by the end of June 1944, it had been reduced to a reserve of just 410,000 short tons (370,000 t), a 70% reduction from 30 April 1944.[154] ULTRA intercepts confirmed cutbacks in non-operational flying as a direct consequence. According to Speer, by 21 July 98% of all Axis fuel plants were out of operation. The monthly production fell from 180,000 short tons (160,000 t) in March 1944 to 20,000 short tons (18,000 t) in November; inventory dropped from 575,000 short tons (522,000 t) to 175,000 short tons (159,000 t).[133] The campaign caused huge shortfalls in fuel production and contributed to the impotence of the Luftwaffe in the last 10 months of the war, and the inability of the German Army to conduct counter offensives.[137]

There were other impacts to the Heavy bombing campaign, but this was one of the big successes which benefitted both the Western allies and the Soviets. The German war machine was more reliant on oil than any other product or raw material and once that resource was degraded, they were in big trouble on all fronts.

Reekwind · 25-05-2014 10:37am

realweirdo wrote: »

There are many points to the Heavy Bomber argument. The main thing is they tied down an awful lot of resources of the Luftwaffe and AA resources which would almost certainly have been used on the Eastern front given that the Russians had not a single bomber to threathen Germany.

And this has been the subject of fierce academic discussion ever since. The bombing campaign was by no means as successful as its advocates like to claim and it's certainly not a foregone conclusion that the programme (which was remarkably expensive) justified its expenditure.

(Ultimately, the reason that the RAF built up its strategic bombing arm is that there was little else that it could do to influence the course of the war. A 'problem' that the Soviets did not have.)

As for the resource argument, I find it hard to believe that this was as significant as you make out. Germany produced approx 20k 88 AA guns. Throw in another 5k for other models and assume that every single AA gun was located on the Western Front. That's still just 7% of the 318k guns produced by Germany during the war and does little to close the massive gap that the Soviets (with their 514k guns) enjoyed. I'm not seeing where you're getting this "awful lot of resources" from.

That's not to say that the bombing campaign was without impact (the impact on infrastructure was particularly important) but it really began to bite late war. By which point Nazi Germany had lost any chance to win and was already being significantly out-produced by the Soviets. All you're talking about is narrowing the gap of the latter slightly.

The bombers also disrupted the V1 campaign, and bombed Pneumende, not destroying the V2 campaign but slowing it down. Of course, Tony will again write all this off as negligible and not being that important.

In this case he'd be right. The V1 and V2 programmes were entirely irrelevant to the Eastern Front. They are a classic case of wasting resources on city bombing.

Tony EH · 25-05-2014 2:55pm

Jawgap wrote: »

That's an objective view.

At the time, everyone thought they had heavy bombers.......in the same way everyone thought 100 tons of bombs would be enough to make any city surrender or that 'precision' bombing was possible or that 'heavy' bombing (by the RAF's definition) was 25 tons per square mile.

No one knew that the pretty crappy Manchester would go on to become the Lancaster or that it would possible to build and operate something like a B-29 or that it would be possible to consistently pour 125 tons into a square mile.

Subjectively, at the War's outset, most air forces (parts of the RAF excepted) thought they had a war winning theory and what they thought were heavy bombers - time and technology proved their subjective views to be mis-held.

Yeh, I full well about the Douhet "bomber will always get through" nonsense. You're saying nothing new to me here.

But, again, that's not the point.

Neither Germany or Russia developed a strategic bomber force. It plays no part in their war against each other.

Both country's developed a tactical airforce.

So, unless we factor in a fantasy whereby Germany and Russia somehow develop a strategic bomber fleet in the scenario in question, the issue remains, as I've said twice already...moot.

Tony EH · 25-05-2014 3:58pm

Jawgap wrote: »

Yes, a reasoned opinion that I argued out earlier in the thread.

No counter seems to be offered other than the Soviets appear to have had lots of men and lots of materiel (significant quantities of which were serviceable but lesser quality)

When you have overwhelming numbers in your hand, in a war of attrition (which is what the war in the east became) that can be enough.

But the Russians didn't just have that in their cap.

There seems to be this impression that the Red Army simply pushed through the victories on mindless brawn alone. This simply isn't the case. The Red Army of 1942 is different to the one of 1941 and it's different further from 1943. In 1942, they adhered to the old Russian tactic to trade land for time. They engaged in tactical retreats in an organised fashion, much like the Germans did, in early/late 43 and for the rest of the war. They learned from their mistakes in 41 and avoided the losses from blitzkrieg pincers in the new year. There are German accounts of seeing the Red Army in constant retreat before they could get to them. This was a genuine worry for the High Command as you can annihilate any enemy army if you cannot reach them. Franz Halder said "The enemy has again found a way to withdraw his forces from under our nose. Using fierce counter attacks and great skill, they're able to escape intact." A huge about face from his previous diary entry that the war was over after two weeks.

By the end 1942, the Red Army were engaging in huge blitzkrieg-like encirclement maneuvers themselves, which resulted in the destruction of the 6th Army, the effective collapse of Army Group South and the end of Hitler's strategic ambitions in the Caucasus. Probably the most important objective of Hitler's war in the east.

By 1943, the Red Army were using the same tactics on the Germans that they were the victims of in the previous years. They'd learned to use the tactics of the enemy on the enemy. "They learned from us" as one German general said. What was at one time a disorganised, haphazard, monster became an highly efficient machine.

It's a mistake to think that the Russians simply had muscle and only that on their side.

Jawgap wrote: »

How, for example, in the absence of Allied aid would they have prevented the Germans supplying themselves by sea?

Der Deutschen Handelsmarine was very small. In fact, the Axis forces in total only had about 3 million tons. The vast, vast majority of German supplies were moved on land. Even so, once Supplies arrive at port they have to be transported on land anyway by and large.

Jawgap wrote: »

How would they have moved supplies, replacements, reinforcements etc as they moved further west and German lines of communication shortened? How would they have dealt with both the changing terrain and changing (milder relative to the Steppes) weather in the west?

Again, this assumes that the Russians had no (or couldn't build) transport other than what was provided by the west. This is a nonsensical view.

Even without large numbers of trucks, the Red Army would have to have advanced like the Germans did in 1941. On foot and horse.

The Russian advance through Germany would have been slower, but it wouldn't been non-existent.

Lend lease transport vehicles sped up the Russian advance to victory. It did not create it.

Tony EH · 25-05-2014 4:10pm

realweirdo wrote: »

I know Tony is also going to write this off as not being important, but it was.

You're obviously not reading what I'm writing, if you think that.

Tony EH · 25-05-2014 4:30pm

Reekwind wrote: »

That's not to say that the bombing campaign was without impact (the impact on infrastructure was particularly important) but it really began to bite late war. By which point Nazi Germany had lost any chance to win and was already being significantly out-produced by the Soviets. All you're talking about is narrowing the gap of the latter slightly

I agree. But it's largest impact was when the switch to bombing oil installations was made in 1944/45. Approximately 915.000 tons of bombs were dropped on Germany alone in 1944, of which 126.000 tons were on oil installations of some kind or another, the largest being 36.000 tons in November. This had a huge effect on Germany's ability to move. In 1945, 83.000 tons out of a total of 380.000 tons were dropped.

The vast majority of the bombing campaign against Germany (especially Bomber Command) was largely useless. I'll maintain that. Bombing cities at night was great for killing women and children, but it did little for the war effort in the long run and American efforts at disrupting production forced the Germans to diversify, but it didn't do much (or enough) to hamper their output.

Hitting their oil infrastructure, which the allies took a long time to realise for some reason, did more in a relatively small number of raids than the vast majority of sorties throughout the war.

But, as you say, by that point the war had swung so fully in favour of the Russians that Germany's future was pretty much assured.

Jawgap · 25-05-2014 4:31pm

Tony EH wrote: »

Yeh, I full well about the Douhet "bomber will always get through" nonsense. You're saying nothing new to me here.

But, again, that's not the point.

Neither Germany or Russia developed a strategic bomber force. It plays no part in their war against each other.

Both country's developed a tactical airforce.

So, unless we factor in a fantasy whereby Germany and Russia somehow develop a strategic bomber fleet in the scenario in question, the issue remains, as I've said twice already...moot.

Douhet never said that, it was Baldwin. And the person he was referring to was Trenchard, not Douhet. In fact there's any amount of evidence to suggest Douhet never figured in the RAF's thinking on strategic bombardment as he is not referenced in any of the Cranwell staff papers from the period.

Neither the Soviets nor the Germans had any concept of a 'tactical' Air Force that concept originated with Slessor, was developed by Tedder (and coincidentally by Wann & Woodall) and implemented by Broadhurst. At which point it was picked up by the Yanks.

Close air support is but one facet of tactical air power (and the least important one at that).

Out of interest, just picking an example at random, if the Germans didn't have a strategic Air Force why did they bomb Rotterdam and why did the Soviets bomb Helsinki (using American supplied medium bombers, iirc)?

So maybe I am telling you something new?

Jawgap · 25-05-2014 4:44pm

Tony EH wrote: »

When you have overwhelming numbers in your hand, in a war of attrition (which is what the war in the east became) that can be enough.

But the Russians didn't just have that in their cap.

There seems to be this impression that the Red Army simply pushed through the victories on mindless brawn alone. This simply isn't the case. The Red Army of 1942 is different to the one of 1941 and it's different further from 1943. In 1942, they adhered to the old Russian tactic to trade land for time. They engaged in tactical retreats in an organised fashion, much like the Germans did, in early/late 43 and for the rest of the war. They learned from their mistakes in 41 and avoided the losses from blitzkrieg pincers in the new year. There are German accounts of seeing the Red Army in constant retreat before they could get to them. This was a genuine worry for the High Command as you can annihilate any enemy army if you cannot reach them. Franz Halder said "The enemy has again found a way to withdraw his forces from under our nose. Using fierce counter attacks and great skill, they're able to escape intact." A huge about face from his previous diary entry that the war was over after two weeks.

By the end 1942, the Red Army were engaging in huge blitzkrieg-like encirclement maneuvers themselves, which resulted in the destruction of the 6th Army, the effective collapse of Army Group South and the end of Hitler's strategic ambitions in the Caucasus. Probably the most important objective of Hitler's war in the east.

By 1943, the Red Army were using the same tactics on the Germans that they were the victims of in the previous years. They'd learned to use the tactics of the enemy on the enemy. "They learned from us" as one German general said. What was at one time a disorganised, haphazard, monster became an highly efficient machine.

It's a mistake to think that the Russians simply had muscle and only that on their side.

Der Deutschen Handelsmarine was very small. In fact, the Axis forces in total only had about 3 million tons. The vast, vast majority of German supplies were moved on land. Even so, once Supplies arrive at port they have to be transported on land anyway by and large.

Again, this assumes that the Russians had no (or couldn't build) transport other than what was provided by the west. This is a nonsensical view.

Even without large numbers of trucks, the Red Army would have to have advanced like the Germans did in 1941. On foot and horse.

The Russian advance through Germany would have been slower, but it wouldn't been non-existent.

Lend lease transport vehicles sped up the Russian advance to victory. It did not create it.

It's not their capacity to advance I'm questioning, it's their capacity to sustain a force so far away from its bases of supply for a lengthy period - in short, how would they feed and supply the poor sod on the front line? Especially, if they to re-lay rail lines (Soviet and German gauges were different) and / or build the 1000+ locos they would have had if Lend Lease hadn't supplied them?

How would they then have operated said locos in a situation where they couldn't possibly have complete air superiority along the front? How far back would they have to de-train? Allied air power compelled the Germans to de-train often 150 miles behind the front - what evidence is there to suggest the Soviets could have endured an imposition of that kind?

Tony EH · 25-05-2014 5:05pm

Jawgap wrote: »

Douhet never said that, it was Baldwin. And the person he was referring to was Trenchard, not Douhet. In fact there's any amount of evidence to suggest Douhet never figured in the RAF's thinking on strategic bombardment as he is not referenced in any of the Cranwell staff papers from the period.

Neither the Soviets nor the Germans had any concept of a 'tactical' Air Force that concept originated with Slessor, was developed by Tedder (and coincidentally by Wann & Woodall) and implemented by Broadhurst. At which point it was picked up by the Yanks.

Close air support is but one facet of tactical air power (and the least important one at that).

Out of interest, just picking an example at random, if the Germans didn't have a strategic Air Force why did they bomb Rotterdam and why did the Soviets bomb Helsinki (using American supplied medium bombers, iirc)?

So maybe I am telling you something new?

I'll clarify then. I'm well aware of Douhet and Baldwin and the pre-war positions on bombing.

No, you're telling me nothing new.

Both the Germans and the Russians developed airforces, whose concept was tactical support of the land army. In the case of the Germans, especially, the Luftwaffe was to act as flying artillery. It was never envisaged as a strategic weapon and when forced to be employed as such, was an absolute failure, as evidenced during the Battle of Britain.

For the attack on Rotterdam, the Luftwaffe was to pave the way for the Germany Army waiting outside the city limits. It's main targets were troop concentrations, flak and artillery positions and the port area. The original plan of attack was largely a tactical operation, with strategic elements. That being the attack on the ports.

However, from its inception the Kampfgeschwader was NEVER designed as anything but a tactical weapon.

Likewise the VVS was never designed as a strategic weapon, even if it was press-ganged into such ops on occasion, such as bombing Romanian oil production in 1941. It's main use and reason for existence was to directly support the land army on the battlefield.

Tony EH · 25-05-2014 5:25pm

Jawgap wrote: »

It's not their capacity to advance I'm questioning, it's their capacity to sustain a force so far away from its bases of supply for a lengthy period - in short, how would they feed and supply the poor sod on the front line? Especially, if they to re-lay rail lines (Soviet and German gauges were different) and / or build the 1000+ locos they would have had if Lend Lease hadn't supplied them?

How would they then have operated said locos in a situation where they couldn't possibly have complete air superiority along the front? How far back would they have to de-train? Allied air power compelled the Germans to de-train often 150 miles behind the front - what evidence is there to suggest the Soviets could have endured an imposition of that kind?

If the Russians proved one thing in the war historically, it was their ability to adapt to the most extreme conditions. Also, by 1944, the Russians had been outputting more armour than was necessary, enabled by lend lease shipments. So much so that they could afford to equip their reserves with first class front line equipment in many cases. They could have, if forced to, paired back on that production and channeled it into other areas. This wouldn't have been impossible.

Also, as I've said already. If a mechanised contrubution wasn't available (although it would have been, just not in the same numbers) they would have utilised horse transport, much in the same way that the Germans had to in 1941.

For locomotive transport, they were already using a large amount of Polish rolling stock by the time they reached the German border in 1944 and no doubt, if forced to retool the under carriages of stock they would have. Or, you relay track, like the Germans had to do in 1941. It took time and a lot of manpower...both of which the Russians had on their side, more so than the Germans did when they invaded.

It would have taken longer, but it's not as if they would have been completely immobile.

Jawgap · 25-05-2014 5:36pm

I think it's time for me to now out of this thread. I think the point have been well aired but the discussion on strategic / tactical bombardment is somewhat limited.

Close air is not tactical air power only a part of it and the confusion around strategic bombardment seems to be driven by references to scholarship that are at least 5 years to a decade out of date - something Overy can be blamed for.

(For anyone referencing his recent book I'd suggest looking at the papers from the original conference on which it is based that he DIDN'T use.)

realweirdo · 25-05-2014 6:42pm

It's certainly and exhausting and complex issue with no easy straight forward answers.
I stick to my belief the Russians couldn't have delivered a knockout blow to the Germans by themselves.

The German army was hugely degraded in the latter stages of the war, and much of that degradation came from the Western Allies. 5 years of the Germany war economy being choked from land, air and sea was beginning to take it's toll.

There are many ways this impacted the Germans ability to fight. To take just one simple example, because of the fuel shortages, new pilots were given less and less hours of training, to the point they were thrown into battle with little training. Would this have been the case had Germany maintained an even amount of fuel production throughout the war, I doubt it. By itself not enough to decide the war, of course not, but an accumalation of hundreds of similar problems took their toll. Germans against Russians in a straight fight with no other distractions, I'm sure the Germans would have held their own. The other factor that cost the Germans big time was Hitler's mistakes. As Tony said, the Russians were willing to retreat to avoid encirclement. Throughout the war, Hitler's favoured approach was "not a single inch of retreat". Though some commanders on the ground went against this order and in the latter stages of the war the Germans had no option but to retreat, although entire armies were indeed encircled and cut off, these foolish and naive orders from the top cost the Germans to lose many of their best soldiers to captivity.

Tony EH · 25-05-2014 7:56pm

realweirdo wrote: »

There are many ways this impacted the Germans ability to fight. To take just one simple example, because of the fuel shortages, new pilots were given less and less hours of training, to the point they were thrown into battle with little training.

This had already been the case in 1943, before the allies had targeted German oil installations. The reason being the rate of attrition was against them. Your scenario simply compounds an issue that was already in effect.

realweirdo wrote: »

Would this have been the case had Germany maintained an even amount of fuel production throughout the war, I doubt it.

Germany's largest source of oil was from Romania. In a situation, as you've outlined, in a straight fight verses Russia, can Hitler use Romanian oil in the way he did historically? I would guess not. Germany has to buy in her oil and it wouldn't be as readily available as it was under the conditions that factually existed, whereby the Germans were effectively getting the lion's share of what Romania produced because of allied agreements.

Fuel, however, was always in short supply, even in 1942. It's always the biggest complaint of any army. But, the shortages weren't just there. Trainers were in severely short supply. A lot of them (especially from blind flying and bomber schools) were actually shipped to Russia to plug the gaps in casualties. Many never returned.

Again, though, the catastrophic impact of hitting German oil installations is not really felt until late 44 and into 45 and this, as has been repeatedly said is in the years after the Soviets have turned the tide irrevocably in their favour.

realweirdo wrote: »

Hitler's favoured approach was "not a single inch of retreat". Though some commanders on the ground went against this order and in the latter stages of the war the Germans had no option but to retreat, although entire armies were indeed encircled and cut off, these foolish and naive orders from the top cost the Germans to lose many of their best soldiers to captivity.

Hitler may have ordered such measures on occasion, Stalin gave the same orders in 1941 too. However, the situation on the ground was very often different to what Hitler had ordered. But, "Stand and fight" orders are sometimes the thing to do, as evidenced at Moscow in 1941. The German retreat there could have been much, much worse if units were simply allowed to collapse. Likewise, at Stalingrad, there is a school of thought that a retreat of the 6th Army before Christmas would have led to the complete capture of units in the Caucasus. The 6th Army did a lot to hold open a corridor allowing German units to escape being cut off and destroyed.

Jawgap · 26-05-2014 9:58am

Tony EH wrote: »

......

Germany's largest source of oil was from Romania. In a situation, as you've outlined, in a straight fight verses Russia, can Hitler use Romanian oil in the way he did historically? I would guess not. Germany has to buy in her oil and it wouldn't be as readily available as it was under the conditions that factually existed, whereby the Germans were effectively getting the lion's share of what Romania produced because of allied agreements.

.....

I know I said I'd stay out of it, but this begs a reply.

If the scenario is a straight German / USSR conflict with the British, the US etc remaining non-aligned, then surely Germany could have maintained its pre-War pattern of imports and continued to.....

Rely on its traditional pre-War sources of POL products - the United States, Venezuela, the Dutch East Indies, and Mexico (as well as the USSR & Romania)
Continued, unhindered, to have expanded their synthetic fuel and hydrogenation plant construction programme

Pre-war US consumption alone was over 1 billion barrels - they could easily have met German demands for more, given that German peace time demands were only 44 million barrels.

BTW, of that 44 million barrels (1938 consumption estimate) - imports from overseas accounted for 28 million barrels (64%) - only 3.8 million barrels (9%) were imported overland from European sources and of that 2.8 million barrels came from Romania (6%) - Romania was not a historically important supplier of POL to Germany and only became so when the British and, latterly, the US navies began their blockade, does that not fall under the category of 'help'?

Royal Dutch Shell was the largest transporter of POL products during the 1930s. At the outset of the War they had a fleet of over 2.3 million tons and in 1938 they transported over 25.5 million tons (not barrels) of POL products - given their location, in a straight Germany / USSR conflict who do you think they'd be more minded to do business with?

Jawgap · 26-05-2014 10:22am

Tony EH wrote: »

For locomotive transport, they were already using a large amount of Polish rolling stock by the time they reached the German border in 1944 and no doubt, if forced to retool the under carriages of stock they would have. Or, you relay track, like the Germans had to do in 1941. It took time and a lot of manpower...both of which the Russians had on their side, more so than the Germans did when they invaded.

It would have taken longer, but it's not as if they would have been completely immobile.

Out of interest, how would they have re-laid track - or more precisely where would they have got the track to relay from?

The Allies delivered 622,100 tonnes of rail line to the USSR - while the Soviets produced less than a 10% of that (48,990) - if they had to build their own railways where would they have got the steel, the sleepers and the ties - Lend Lease provided over 140,000 tonnes of joints and splice bars; 80,000 tonnes of switching gear; and, 30,000 tonnes of ties......it takes more than time and manpower to build and operate a railway.

The Soviets could have beaten the Germans without help

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