Anglo Tapes

tayto lover wrote: »

Too many political careers at stake.

.... and all the careers at the central bank and dept of finance. An absolute scandal. The very people who are supposed to regulate, lol. Looks to me like regulation should start with the central bank, before it tries to regulate any body else.

Cover up.

Godge wrote: »

It is also possible, given the statement that

(1) Anglo lied
(2) The Central Bank didn't know about it at the time
(3) The Central Bank found out later either through the tapes or the obvious accounts of the bank
(4) While Anglo lied, there was no criminal behaviour on the part of Anglo
(5) While there might be a civil case, that would mean the Government suing itself as it is now the owner of Anglo
(6) The publication of the tapes raises no new issues as all of the above was known to the Central Bank.

Of course, that is a simple explanation, doesn't fit with the criminal conspiracy theory so won't fit the narrative of this thread.

Why was the old Regulator allowed retire with a huge pension and not prosecuted? Who was being protected?

Scofflaw wrote: »

Sure - I think in general people want Anglo to have been dishonest, and I suspect they cannot imagine that the State would have supported Anglo unless Anglo had been dishonest.

For myself, I don't find the idea that the State could have supported Anglo even knowing the full extent of its problems (or at least as well as it knew them itself) at all unlikely. The Irish State, like other states, supports its larger banks.

cordially,
Scofflaw

That's a tricky position - Brian Cowen has gone on record as saying the State didn't have a breeze of what it was doing and simply ignored realistic advice and hoped for a soft landing.

The bank guarantee was a disastrous move - that's well recognised by all analysis, even by Captain Hindsights that are gradually emerging from the Green Jersey Brigade HQ. Its explicable by incompetence, greed and incomprehension only. Presuming the state would do the same knowing exactly how it would turn out presumes the state is more than incompetent - that it is wilfully and consciously malevolent in some way.

Godge wrote: »

Eh, because he had a contractual entitlement to the pension and he had committed no crimes.

Being stupid or incompetent is not a crime.

The so called financial regulator was paid a huge salary to regulate but did nothing of the kind. So he was basically paid to look the other way. :mad:

I am pretty sure that Neary knew what was required of him when he was picked , er, accepted the appointment, that is, do nothing. He was a paid fool and from the evidence of his tenure, a willing one.

The cynic in me is not surprised that people can make vague, unsupported statements about Neary's roles and responsibilities if they are to Neary's benefit (he is entitled to his pension - is he? where does it say he is?) or to his credit (shure he was only following orders - was he? whose orders?) but should someone state anything negative about Neary's entitlements the burden of evidence suddenly shifts to courtroom standards, overseen by the honourable, highly unqualified internet lawyers association with their non-specialists in contract law.

Was the role of the FR created to be non-interventionist? You might argue that was the culture, but there is absolutely nothing in the legislation that says the role of the FR and its CE was to fail to regulate the banks. Quite the opposite. The role of the FR (and actually in many cases the CE of the FR specifically as the chief executive is name checked again and again in the legislation as being responsible) was defined in legislation, essentially taking over the existing role of the CB in financial regulation. Its also worth noting that Neary was not the only Chief Executive - the organisation was created in 2003. Neary was appointed at the start of 2006 (an internal pick - despite the widespread international interest of course the best man for the job is already working for them :rolleyes: ).

Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (IFSRA)

This Bill will: -

establish a new entity – the Irish FinancialServices Regulatory Authority – to manage the supervision of financial institutions in Ireland: this entity will operate within the Central Bank of Ireland’s legal structure, but will have its own Chief Executive, Chairperson and Board with independent functions.(The title of the Central Bank of Ireland will change to reflect the new structure – it will become the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland).The Chief Executive, Chairperson and some board members of IFSRA will also be represented on the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Board;
bring together into a single location the supervision of the major sectors of the financial services industry:in particular, supervision of insurance undertakings will now be carried out by the same institution as the supervision of banks and the funds industry;
place added emphasis within the supervisory structure on the consumer interest: a new position of Consumer Director will be established. The Consumer Director will take on the current powers of the Director of Consumer Affairs in relation to financial institutions.The Consumer Director will also be a full member of the Board of IFSRA, and will monitor the provision of financial services to consumers.This will put consumer issues at the heart of financial services regulation.For the first time in Ireland the two functions of prudential regulation and consumer protection come together as a service to the public;
allow for the continuation of Ireland as an attractive and soundly regulated location for the financial services industry;
allow for the increasingly complex and interrelated sectors of the financial services industry to be regulated in Ireland on a coordinated and integrated basis;
allow for the continued close coordination of financial services regulation and overall monetary and financial stability policies, in the public interest;
ensure theongoing interchange of ideas and personnel between operational, monetary and regulatory functions within the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland
establish a position of Registrar of Credit Unions within the overall structure.The Registrar of Credit Unions will act as the principal regulator of the credit union system (a role currently held by the Registrar of Friendly Societies) subject as appropriate to guidelines from the IFSRA Board.

The Financial Regulator has a two-part mandate
„ a prudential mandate — under which it aims to foster sound, dynamic financial institutions
in Ireland by: disseminating guidance and standards to be followed by financial services
providers; controlling market entry; ongoing supervision of licensed financial services
providers through analysis of periodic returns and selective reviews and inspections of
financial service providers; and enforcement of standards, where necessary.
„ a consumer mandate — under which it aims to help consumers to make informed financial
decisions in a safe and fair market, mainly by: setting business conduct standards and
checking they are adhered to; and publishing information to help consumers choose service
providers and the services appropriate to their particular circumstances

There is nothing in the role that would give the FR "blessing" to conspire with the banks against the public interest to champion Irish banks interests. The CEO has a responsibility to ensure there is proper leadership in an organisation so that organisation can achieve its goals. Arguing that there was a cultural failing in the FR as an excuse for the poor performance of Neary and the FR does not help Neary - it actually condemns him, because he tolerated and encouraged that culture which meant the FR did not achieve its role.

The big failing of the Financial Regulator, and the key issue which the Chief Executive must
address, is the slow speed at which the Financial Regulator operates. It is slow in processing
consultation papers; it is slow in processing applications for authorisation; it is slow in responding
to complaints about advertising; it is slow in implementing sanctions; it is slow in producing its
annual budget.
There seems to be a few reasons for this. They seem indecisive and very minor decisions may have
needed approval from the top and so have to progress through many steps to get approval. They
also seem to operate with undue complexity and formality probably from fear of making a
mistake.

It is easier and less controversial to produce information leaflets and codes of conduct. It is more
difficult to actually enforce those codes when they are transgressed. Everybody is agreed that a
principles-based regulatory regime is appropriate. But the Financial Regulator will need to show
that it has the resolve to enforce those principles. We have seen very little evidence in the year
under review that the Financial Regulator had the resolve to stand up to some institutions and
individuals who were misbehaving. It appears that this lack of resolve is due to the fear of having
its decision challenged in the courts and losing. It seems that when challenged by misbehaving
institutions, the Financial Regulator simply backed down

I should point out the above section is not written with the benefit of hindsight - Its from the Comptroller and Auditor General special report in May 2007. 18 months before the bank guarantee. If there was a legislative requirement on the FR to not regulate, then it appears the CAG didn't get the memo.

@Cody

If we want to know whether Neary is entitled to his pension that's fine, but we don't get to decide that by baying and demanding it is so because we will it.

I have absolutely no idea who you think you are arguing with. Carry on.