Russia - threadbanned users in OP

The first question would be which part of Russia we're talking about. While Russia has dispersed its nuclear weapons throughout the country, its sheer size would mean that there are likely several provinces or republics without any nuclear weapons on their territory. Beyond that, I would imagine that there are likely no land-based nuclear weapons systems too close to the borders, or in the Caucasian republics either, for reasons of security. That leaves the region surrounding the Urals, the Russian Far East with the naval bases around Vladivostok & Petropavlovsk, as well as European Russia and the Kola Peninsula as areas of "concern".

Then, there's the status of the nukes in question. From all that I've read, we should expect the ballistic missile submarines of the Northern and Pacific Fleets to be in the same state of readiness as their western counterparts. They regularly received funding even in the dark years and have been the recipients of a bulk of funds allocated to the navy, to a degree that even the ever-present corruption has likely not led to major issues. This would in turn mean that commanders might be less inclined to throw in with any potential "warlords" for lack of a better term, while the comparatively better funding would allow missile boats to slip their lines with relative ease if things start getting dicey. For the purposes of this thought exercise, we should take those submarines out of the picture. The same goes for most of the navy's tactical nuclear weapons, as they will for the most part be mounted on torpedoes or as depth charges, with only a few ones able to be mounted on cruise missiles. These will be of little to no use in a civil war which will be mostly fought on land.

That leaves land-based ballistic missiles and air-dropped weapons, whether gravity bombs or cruise missiles. For most ballistic missiles, it will be a question of who can get their hands on the command posts of those missile units. The silo-based missiles themselves will likely be useless to anyone who captures the actual silo, as the launch command will come from one of these command posts. I'm not sure about Russia's road-mobile ICBMs, but I would imagine that they too will need some sort of go-code before they can actually launch. Also, ICBMs of all types have a minimum range as well as a maximum range, which means that these weapons might be of no use if the target is too close.

The main concern here will be air-dropped weapons and those meant for use on SRBMs, and here, maintenance comes into play. While Russia has always held their nukes in higher regard than western nations, much of the focus has been on ICBMs and SLBMs, with short-range or "tactical" weapons of secondary concern. As such, there is a genuine question as to how many of these short-ranged weapons are actually operational or can be made operational in relatively short order. I'd say that there are no more than a few hundred of these weapons within the Russian arsenal, and how many of those would be captured by any warlord prior to them being sabotaged is questionable.

Finally, there's the question of mindset. While the stereotypical wild-eyed general makes for great storytelling in Hollywood, most of those who are likely to rise to power in a second Russian Civil War will likely have a very well-developed sense of self-preservation. Even Putin is not completely balls-to-the-wall crazy, even though he clearly has issues. They will know that a use of nukes might get them a LOT of unwanted attention and as such, they will likely keep any nuclear weapons in their back pocket. In effect, these weapons will likely be most useful as a deterrent and/or a bargaining chip, just as they already are on an international scale.

I agree fully with you on this.

The Russians finance all of the world's malcontents and cranks. Regardless of what they represent, as long as they oppose the local stability, the Russian KGB will be in the background with their dirty money and kompromat and they will always find willing takers and useful idiots.

To a nation like Russia a victory does not necessarily have to be a victory for them. A victory is seeing a better and more propserous country suffer due to Russian interference.

I can picture UKr ‘losing ground ‘in certain places with a view to the Ru rushing in to occupy it and because the Ru would not have time to set up defence lines to secure it and they are in a confined area the UKr open up and the place becomes a Turkey shoot for the Ukr. .

I would imagine that Ukr is not too worried about losing some land as long as it is very successful in eliminating a lot of Ru armoury and personnel

is it not the case that the defender loses less than the attacker , in general