Brexit discussion thread III

J Mysterio · 25-03-2018 10:49PM

Capt'n Midnight wrote: »

David Davis has sick bucket on hand during BBC interview

Probably thought he would have to answer some tough questions...

Memnoch · 26-03-2018 01:18AM

Econ_ wrote: »

It’s not that the BBC are pro Brexit, it’s more accurate to say they have let themselves be intimidated by the Tory hard right. The second they report/comment something that reflects badly in Brexit, you will have Iain Duncan Smith, Reed-Mogg, Boris Johnson et all shout ‘TYPICAL BBC BIAS’

The BBC reporters would also fear being hung out as an ‘enemy of the people’ in the right wing press.

The BBC, Pro EU MPs, Businesses etc. have essentially been subordinated by the British hard right. I believe it’ll be described as a fascist-like coup in the history books.

It's interesting that you say this. David Cameron's government was quite successful in subjugating the BBC. The BBC's license fee was up for renewal and George Osborne threw out all kinds of threats, heaping a huge amount of pressure on the organisation. There was talk that a lot of the BBC's services such as recipes, food sites etc as well as their range of programming would be severely curtailed, all, ostensibly, in service of greater competition in UK tv and media.

The result was that Tories were appointed to key positions such as politics editor, etc, and the BBC was allowed to survive, but with their news and politics arms towing strong pro-government lines thereafter.

The kind of intimidation, I believe, you are speaking about is a relatively newish phenomena. I would say this really started the night of the debate in the run up to the latest election which 'Strong and Stable' Theresa refused to participate in, sending Ambur Rudd in her stead.

May's absence was the butt of countless jokes, with the, largely balanced audience laughing out loud on several occasions. The next morning Boris Johnson launched a scathing attack on the 'bias' of question time / debate audiences. This was the most biased audience ever, etc etc. Now, I don't know if this was direct intimidation or simply political cover for those already emplaced, but the balance of BBC QT and debate audiences shifted noticeably and decisively to much more right leaning from then on and has continued ever since.

Cronyism, intimidation, corruption? Take your pick. I'd say a mix of all three.

Peregrinus · 26-03-2018 02:18AM

Bit cynical wrote: »

But the impact over the whole of the EU will be spread out. The political fallout will be minimal and such fallout as there is will be will not be directed towards the EU, who will be seen as arguing in good faith, but towards Ireland for exercising or threatening to exercise its veto.

No no no no no. If the EU want a trade agreement to fail, they don't want that to be seen as attributable to the Irish veto. The veto mechanism is part of the EU's decision-making process. If any member state exercises a veto, that's a decision by the whole EU.

The EU doesn't want blame for a failure to secure a workable trade deal to be laid at Ireland's door; that just comes back to them. They want it to be laid at the UK's door.

If you're talking about political fallout from the UK, Brexiters have been positioning themselves prettty much since June 2016 to blame the EU for what they know will be a very painful Brexit. Hence all the guff about the EU "bullying" the UK. That won't stop them from blaming Ireland as well - Brexiters will blame everyone but themselves, and you can certainly expect them to offer entirely inconsistent arguments for why different parties are to blame. But it's not as though the EU greatly cares who the Brexiters blame, or as if they could do much to influence it if they could.

If we end up with no trade deal, that will be because May plucked out of the air a set of arbitrary and inconsistent red lines and pretended that they had been on the ballot paper in the referendum and therefore could not be critically evaluated by the British government, and the red lines she has selected were such as to preclude a viable free trade deal. That will be entirely the fault of the British, and everyone will know this. The only difference will be between those who are honest about it, and those who attempt to deflect the blame. The EU is not in the game of deflecting the blame; it is not in their interests to do so.

Peregrinus · 26-03-2018 02:27AM

Capt'n Midnight wrote: »

David Davis today showing how the UK are still fudging things.

In the space of about three hours
The Brexit Secretary David Davis has said the UK will agree to a 'backstop' text for the Irish border, but not the one proposed by the EU.

David Davis says a deal with EU is 'incredibly probable'

David Davis has sick bucket on hand during BBC interview

Signficantly, in the course of this interview Davis rules out cameras at the border.

Unless they back-pedal on this, that should (but probably won't) stop Brexiters waving the Karlsson Report in the air and claiming that it's the solution to the Irish border problem. And it may signal a tactical decision on the part of the UK to stop promoting Pption B, unicorn technology, as the way to have an open border and to start focussing on Option A, the super-duper trade deal. (The "overwhelmingly likely option", according to Davis.)

Bit cynical · 26-03-2018 03:01AM

Peregrinus wrote: »

No no no no no. If the EU want a trade agreement to fail, they don't want that to be seen as attributable to the Irish veto. The veto mechanism is part of the EU's decision-making process. If any member state exercises a veto, that's a decision by the whole EU.

The EU doesn't want blame for a failure to secure a workable trade deal to be laid at Ireland's door; that just comes back to them. They want it to be laid at the UK's door.

In a technical sense it would be a decision by the whole EU, yes, but in an another sense, it would be seen as Ireland vetoing a deal that the EU institutions were reasonably happy with.

Why would they do this?: to show that the UK brought the whole thing on themselves without being seen themselves as architects of the situation.

If you're talking about political fallout from the UK, Brexiters have been positioning themselves prettty much since June 2016 to blame the EU for what they know will be a very painful Brexit. Hence all the guff about the EU "bullying" the UK. That won't stop them from blaming Ireland as well - Brexiters will blame everyone but themselves, and you can certainly expect them to offer entirely inconsistent arguments for why different parties are to blame. But it's not as though the EU greatly cares who the Brexiters blame, or as if they could do much to influence it if they could.

Of course, but there is a wider perspective: how the world views the EU when faced with a country leaving. The ideal scenario for the EU institutions is that they are seen to be negotiating in good faith while setting up traps for the UK.

The trap here is the border issue. In my view the Irish government has not really been acting in Ireland's interests but rather in the interests of the political centre of the EU. By making the border the issue that must be agreed early on, we have unwittingly made a hard border more rather than less likely. In reality, the border can only really be determined after trade and other issues have been sorted out. If there's failure to agree on these then a hard border is the result regardless of what is agreed now.

We are now pursuing a very risky strategy with full enthusiastic support of the Brussels negotiators, yet the risk is almost entirely being borne by Ireland. If there's no deal, Ireland suffers economically to roughly the same extent as the UK, plus we get the hardest of hard borders.

Barnier and his team may not actually want the deal to fail but if it does, at least they will be seen - even if not true - to have been dealing fairly with the Brits. The hardship therefore of the UK (and by extension Ireland) is the fault of the UK not the EU institutions.

Peregrinus · 26-03-2018 03:29AM

Bit cynical wrote: »

In a technical sense it would be a decision by the whole EU, yes, but in an another sense, it would be seen as Ireland vetoing a deal that the EU institutions were reasonably happy with.

Why would they do this?: to show that the UK brought the whole thing on themselves without being seen themselves as architects of the situation.

That doesn’t make sense, Bit cynical. The EU letting Ireland be blamed wouldn’t “show that the UK brought the whole thing on themselves”; it would tend to have the opposite effect. If the EU institutions are being strategic about this, they want the deal they are happy with to be one the UK will reject, not one the Irish will veto.

The EU would wish the UK to be responsible for their being no deal, not Ireland.

Bit cynical wrote: »

Of course, but there is a wider perspective: how the world views the EU when faced with a country leaving. The ideal scenario for the EU institutions is that they are seen to be negotiating in good faith while setting up traps for the UK.

No. The ideal scenario for the EU institutions is that they are seen to be negotiating in good faith because they are actually negotiating in good faith. They don’t need to be laying traps which will sabotage a deal; if a deal is to be sabotaged, they want it to be sabotaged by the positions the UK has taken.

Bit cynical wrote: »

The trap here is the border issue. In my view the Irish government has not really been acting in Ireland's interests but rather in the interests of the political centre of the EU. By making the border the issue that must be agreed early on, we have unwittingly made a hard border more rather than less likely. In reality, the border can only really be determined after trade and other issues have been sorted out. If there's failure to agree on these then a hard border is the result regardless of what is agreed now.

I completely disagree with this analysis.

The Irish government were right to make the border a central issue early on. It’s clear beyond doubt that, if the UK had been allowed to long-finger it, they would have put off thinking about it or addressing it until much later, and the contradictions between the UK’s aspiration to an open border and their aspirations to regulatory, customs, etc autonomy would not have been confronted until the extent of the the UK’s regulatory, customs, etc autonomy had already been locked in.

There’s no reason why “the border can only really be determined after trade and other issues have been sorted out”. That effectively amounts to a decision that objectives in relation to the border must be subordinated to objectives relating to trade and other issues. Why should it not be the other way around? Decide what kind of border you want, and accept that that will constrain what you can do with respect to trade, etc. Or - which is what is actually happening - try to work out an agreement which takes account of all objectives, with any tension between the objectives being recognised, addressed and worked out as part of the process. Kicking the border issue to the boundary is effectively a decision to treat the border issue as less important, and one whose solution must give way to greater priorities.

I don’t accept that addressing all the objectives together makes a hard border more rather than less likely. The strategy you recommend - work out a deal that prioritises objectives other than an open border and then see what can be done about the border in light of that deal - makes a hard border virtually certain.

Bit cynical wrote: »

We are now pursuing a very risky strategy with full enthusiastic support of the Brussels negotiators, yet the risk is almost entirely being borne by Ireland. If there's no deal, Ireland suffers economically to roughly the same extent as the UK, plus we get the hardest of hard borders.

That is a risk. But we avoid an even worse situation - that there is a deal, and a hard border.

Hard border is the default that results from Brexit, and certainly from the no-single-market no-customs-union Brexit that May has read in the entrails of the referendum result. There will be a hard border, unless effective steps are taken to avoid one. Long-fingering the question, while “more important” issues are settled, is highly like to result in a Brexit deal that is compatible only with a hard border.

And that would be a disaster, because a hard border resulting from an EU/UK Brexit deal would be permanent. A crash-out Brexit is, I agree, very bad for Ireland. But it’s also very bad for the UK; they will have a continuing need to make some post-Brexit deal with the EU, and this provides an opportunity for leverage to get the UK to honour the commitments they have already made in relation to the border.

Bit cynical wrote: »

Barnier and his team may not actually want the deal to fail but if it does, at least they will be seen - even if not true - to have been dealing fairly with the Brits. The hardship therefore of the UK (and by extension Ireland) is the fault of the UK not the EU institutions.

Why would it be untrue? Avoiding a hard border is a stated objective of both the UK and the EU; why is it “unfair” to address this in the negotiations between the EU and the UK? True, the UK’s objective of avoiding a hard border is seen by the EU as one which it will be hard to reconcile with some of the other objectives of the UK, but the EU have been quite upfront about pointing that out. They haven’t covertly snuck the border question into the discussions because it’s a hidden hazard that will suddenly blow up when no-one expects it to. They have insisted on its being addressed precisely because the tension between it and other objectives is an obvious problem that must be solved, and that won’t be solved if not addressed. How is that in any way “unfair”?

Peregrinus · 26-03-2018 07:33AM

Interesting article here from politico.eu.

They report that the UK is about to bring forward its own suggestion for how the Option C backstop could work. Briefly, instead of part of the UK remaining wholly aligned with single market rules , the suggestion is that the whole of the UK would remain partly aligned. But the part they remain aligned to would be the part relevant to the kind of trade that crosses the border in Ireland, and this should facilitate an open border.

Presumably, whatever degree of alignment is requires will be fine with the DUP as along as it applies to the whole of the UK.

As far as this goes, I don't think the EU would have a fundamental problem - if, and this is a very big if, there can be agreement on which part of the single market regulatory regime is the part that would be relevant to cross-border trade.

But, even parking that issue, this only addresses the problems that result from the UK's withdrawal from the single market. The UK will also be withdrawing from the customs union (or, at least, that is current Tory policy) and that also gives rise to a need for border controls. On that, according to the politico argument, the UK are not saying anything radically new. They are still suggesting either the "customs partnership" or the "highly streamlined customs arrangement", neither of which the UK has regarded as particularly realistic or attractive.

judeboy101 · 26-03-2018 08:09AM

Peregrinus wrote: »

Interesting article here from politico.eu.

They report that the UK is about to bring forward its own suggestion for how the Option C backstop could work. Briefly, instead of part of the UK remaining wholly aligned with single market rules , the suggestion is that the whole of the UK would remain partly aligned. But the part they remain aligned to would be the part relevant to the kind of trade that crosses the border in Ireland, and this should facilitate an open border.

Presumably, whatever degree of alignment is requires will be fine with the DUP as along as it applies to the whole of the UK.

As far as this goes, I don't think the EU would have a fundamental problem - if, and this is a very big if, there can be agreement on which part of the single market regulatory regime is the part that would be relevant to cross-border trade.

But, even parking that issue, this only addresses the problems that result from the UK's withdrawal from the single market. The UK will also be withdrawing from the customs union (or, at least, that is current Tory policy) and that also gives rise to a need for border controls. On that, according to the politico argument, the UK are not saying anything radically new. They are still suggesting either the "customs partnership" or the "highly streamlined customs arrangement", neither of which the UK has regarded as particularly realistic or attractive.

"partly aligned" goes into the dictionary next to "a little bit pregnant" and "I nearly died"

Gerry T · 26-03-2018 08:32AM

judeboy101 wrote:

"partly aligned" goes into the dictionary next to "a little bit pregnant" and "I nearly died"

Or "partly aligned" are words for staying in the single market and customs union!

Nody · 26-03-2018 09:26AM

Peregrinus wrote: »

As far as this goes, I don't think the EU would have a fundamental problem - if, and this is a very big if, there can be agreement on which part of the single market regulatory regime is the part that would be relevant to cross-border trade.

Except that it's not going to be an open border because you still need to control every truck coming in from NI because you don't know what's on it (or claimed to be on it). The only thing that "fixes" is that controls on certain items can be streamlined but the need for a hard border with checks don't go away short of 100% alignment.

Peregrinus · 26-03-2018 09:42AM

Nody wrote: »

Except that it's not going to be an open border because you still need to control every truck coming in from NI because you don't know what's on it (or claimed to be on it). The only thing that "fixes" is that controls on certain items can be streamlined but the need for a hard border with checks don't go away short of 100% alignment.

The suggestion is 100% alignment with single market rules in relation to goods. That, if agreed, would seem to obviate the need for compliance checks on trucks carrying goods. If the UK is aligned in relation to all goods, then it doesn't matter what goods are on the truck.

If that was all that was agreed, there would still be need for customs checks to see whether the goods being carried, though compliant from a market regulatlory point of view, still attracted customs duties. So there would need to be a further agreement dealing with customs issues before the border could be fully open.

Nody · 26-03-2018 09:50AM

Peregrinus wrote: »

The suggestion is 100% alignment with single market rules in relation to goods. That, if agreed, would seem to obviate the need for compliance checks on trucks carrying goods. If the UK is aligned in relation to all goods, then it doesn't matter what goods are on the truck.

They want only alignment on goods they claim pass the Irish border today (or in the GFA I'd guess); that is not all the goods because goods not passing the Irish border today would then be redirected to do so (and hence we'd have a case of goods that are aligned and goods not aligned coming over the border) ensuring a hard border is required for anything short of UK being 100% aligned on all goods. Of course there's the whole enforcement question as well (i.e. how will UK be enforcing this when EU has no power over them etc.) on top of it all but the point is 100% of UK needs to be aligned on 100% of the UK goods for the IE/NI border to be open (excluding the check at the ports in NI option).

Peregrinus · 26-03-2018 09:58AM

Nody wrote: »

They want only alignment on goods they claim pass the Irish border today . . .

Nope, all goods, if we are to believe the Politico article:

According to the U.K. officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, the British proposal is for U.K.-wide “full alignment” single market rules and regulations for trade in goods — alongside a new customs arrangement between the U.K. and EU . . . The starting point of the U.K.’s position will be that “full alignment” should apply to goods and a limited number of services sectors, one U.K. official said.

Nody wrote: »

Of course there's the whole enforcement question as well (i.e. how will UK be enforcing this when EU has no power over them etc.) . . .

Yes, this is an issue. But currently the UK polices single market rules in the UK and at UK ports because it's obliged to under the EU treaties. Would it be any different if it were obliged to under a different treaty, the Withdrawal Agreement? Yes, there'd have to be a mechanism for policing this and taking action if it wasn't happening. But they are already talking about such mechanisms in the context of the Withdrawal Agreeement anyway so, if they can agree a mechanism, it can be use for this purpose as well.

First Up · 26-03-2018 10:03AM

Nody wrote: »

Peregrinus wrote: »

The suggestion is 100% alignment with single market rules in relation to goods. That, if agreed, would seem to obviate the need for compliance checks on trucks carrying goods. If the UK is aligned in relation to all goods, then it doesn't matter what goods are on the truck.

They want only alignment on goods they claim pass the Irish border today (or in the GFA I'd guess); that is not all the goods because goods not passing the Irish border today would then be redirected to do so (and hence we'd have a case of goods that are aligned and goods not aligned coming over the border) ensuring a hard border is required for anything short of UK being 100% aligned on all goods. Of course there's the whole enforcement question as well (i.e. how will UK be enforcing this when EU has no power over them etc.) on top of it all but the point is 100% of UK needs to be aligned on 100% of the UK goods for the IE/NI border to be open (excluding the check at the ports in NI option).

The arrangements would also have to cover goods imported into the UK from third countries and that is where the contradictions seem to be irreconcilable.

A major part of the Brexit argument is that it will allow the UK to strike wonderful trade deals elsewhere, which by definition would be different to the terms under which those countries trade with the EU.

Full alignment with EU standards etc. would require the UK to enforce those (EU) standards on the goods it imports.

So instead of "taking back control", they get to negotiate their new trade deals by offering access to a market 10% of the size of the EU on the same terms as the EU.

It is nonsense verging on lunacy but Davis & co keep prattling on about technical solutions.

LeinsterDub · 26-03-2018 10:08AM

Peregrinus wrote: »

The suggestion is 100% alignment with single market rules in relation to goods. That, if agreed, would seem to obviate the need for compliance checks on trucks carrying goods. If the UK is aligned in relation to all goods, then it doesn't matter what goods are on the truck.

Wouldn't this rule out the UK being able to trade deals with other countries so?

trellheim · 26-03-2018 10:08AM

Isnt May making a statement today on this , I expect a can to be confidently kicked down the road

Nody · 26-03-2018 10:11AM

Peregrinus wrote: »

Nope, all goods, if we are to believe the Politico article:

Yes, this is an issue. But currently the UK polices single market rules in the UK and at UK ports because it's obliged to under the EU treaties. Would it be any different if it were obliged to under a different treaty, the Withdrawal Agreement? Yes, there'd have to be a mechanism for policing this and taking action if it wasn't happening. But they are already talking about such mechanisms in the context of the Withdrawal Agreeement anyway so, if they can agree a mechanism, it can be use for this purpose as well.

Well reading through their ideas again and it is already dead and beaten into the ground...

According to the U.K. officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, the British proposal is for U.K.-wide “full alignment” single market rules and regulations for trade in goods — alongside a new customs arrangement between the U.K. and EU.

two distinct economies with “equivalent” regulations for the sake of cross-border trade

Cheery picking much? Full alignment (and access) to the free market for goods but not for people for all of UK with UK implementing their own rules that they promise will have the same effect as EU rules. Sure; that idea will be greeted with open arms by EU to break up its own principles to give UK what it wants.

trellheim · 26-03-2018 10:16AM

two distinct economies with “equivalent” regulations for the sake of cross-border trade

ah but who judges them equivalent ... back to the ECJ overwatch

Remember folks Transition is not yet agreed , thats how far down the road we are brexit in 368 days and not even a transition arrangement yet.

murphaph · 26-03-2018 10:52AM

judeboy101 wrote: »

"partly aligned" goes into the dictionary next to "a little bit pregnant" and "I nearly died"

Indeed. You simply can't be partly aligned because even if you are 95% aligned, 5% of trade won't be and if this includes any goods them you need to have border checks for those non-aligned goods. I actually have no idea anymore where the UK is going with this.

Leroy42 · 26-03-2018 11:30AM

Have I got this thinking right?

Lets say US steel (for it is in the news) attracts a hefty tariff from the EU due to Trumps trade war. But, due to the special relationship, Liam Fox manages to get the UK (after Brexit) an exemption.

But there is now an open border between the UK and the EU. So wouldn't the US companies simply ship the steel (tariff free) into the UK and then transport it to mainland Europe?

Of course steel would be easier to control, but even that would give the UK car manufacturers a significant competitive advantage over the EU based plants (leaving aside that there are other sources of steel for simplicity).

The EU couldn't possibly agree to that, could they?

ancapailldorcha · 26-03-2018 12:19PM

This, from LBC is interesting. It would seem that, given the choice, pro-Brexit people would prioritise leaving the EU over keeping Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom:

LBC wrote:

Our poll with YouGov shows that 36% of people think leaving the EU is more of a priority than keeping Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom (29%).

And 71% of people that chose the EU over Northern Ireland voted Brexit.

It makes sense given that the border is such an obstructive issue, along with Ireland's effective veto and the fact that Northern Ireland is effectively a net drain on the UK's public finances.

FrancieBrady · 26-03-2018 12:35PM

ancapailldorcha wrote: »

This, from LBC is interesting. It would seem that, given the choice, pro-Brexit people would prioritise leaving the EU over keeping Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom:

It makes sense given that the border is such an obstructive issue, along with Ireland's effective veto and the fact that Northern Ireland is effectively a net drain on the UK's public finances.

The James O'Brien vid at the bottom is hilarious.

demfad · 26-03-2018 12:41PM

Interesting article with nice county graphic of all-Ireland disposible incomes explaining how vulnerable local economies are to the border.

https://sluggerotoole.com/2018/03/26/is-northern-ireland-dramatically-poorer-than-the-republic/

In term of household income, the poorest region of Ireland is not actually in Northern Ireland, but across the border in County Donegal, where average household incomes are €15,705. In fact, an area being in Northern Ireland is not necessarily an indicator of relative poverty, but proximity to the border is.

With an average household disposable income of €19.9k, the Outer Belfast area is actually one of the wealthiest areas in Ireland outside of Cork, Limerick, Waterford, and the Dublin commuter belt. The poorest areas in Ireland are to be found either side of the border; the Ulster counties of Donegal, Monaghan, Derry, Fermanagh and Tyrone are amongst the poorest in Ireland.

There are likely a number of reasons why these areas are relatively less well off than other regions. Wealth in Ireland flows from proximity to cities; most notably Dublin, where the three counties bordering it are amongst the most affluent in Ireland, but also the cities of Limerick, Cork and Waterford. The rural counties of Kerry, Mayo and Donegal lack nearby major population centres, and are subsequently poorer as a result.

However, there is a strong argument to be made that the frontier nature of the border counties are a strong drag on economic growth. Even given that both sides of the border are currently in the European single market, the differing regulatory environments and different currencies either side of the Irish border are an impediment to trade and commerce and depress economic growth. Were additional impediments to cross border trade to be introduced, the adverse impact on a region which is already the poorest in Ireland would be profound.

Peregrinus · 26-03-2018 01:45PM

Leroy42 wrote: »

Have I got this thinking right?

Lets say US steel (for it is in the news) attracts a hefty tariff from the EU due to Trumps trade war. But, due to the special relationship, Liam Fox manages to get the UK (after Brexit) an exemption.

But there is now an open border between the UK and the EU. So wouldn't the US companies simply ship the steel (tariff free) into the UK and then transport it to mainland Europe?

Of course steel would be easier to control, but even that would give the UK car manufacturers a significant competitive advantage over the EU based plants (leaving aside that there are other sources of steel for simplicity).

The EU couldn't possibly agree to that, could they?

Actually, no, you haven't got it right. At least, not if you're talking about this latest proposal from the UK.

This new proposal only addresses single market issues. Under this proposal, the UK would apply single market regulations to all goods including, relevantly for your example, steel. This would mean that, just as today, 3rd-country steel and steel products could not be imported into, sold in, etc, the UK unless they complied with EU market regulation as regards steel and steel products.

So US steel imported into the UK would be market-compliant, and could be imported into the EU without further inspection (and vice versa, of course).

This doesn't address the customs issue, and something more would be required for that, and the UK acknowledge that it would be required. We can't criticise this proposal for not adressing the customs issue, which it doesn seek to address or pretend to address

On the customs side, the UK has been proposing for some time a "partnership" under which, e.g., steel imported into the UK would be earmarked for the UK market or for onward transmission to the EU. If it was destined for the EU, the UK would collect not UK tariffs at the UK rate, but EU tariffs at the EU rate, and they's send that money on to the EU. (And, again, the EU would be expected to reciprocate.) Obviously there would have to be mechanisms for checking that goods imported were subsequently dealt with as earmarked at the time of import. If this system were in place, there would then be no need for further checks on goods moving between the UK and the EU.

The EU regard this as a bureaucratic and administrative nightmare, to be honest, and I can see why.

Skedaddle · 26-03-2018 02:03PM

The Tories of course realise that those areas will be worse off but they don't particularly care.

Donegal isn't in the same country and they really couldn't care less about it and those areas of Northern Ireland don't vote for the DUP (other than the odd issue with Arlene Foster's constituency actually being border while the rest of the DUP stronghold is in the NE and around Belfast).

Northern unionist politics has never cared much for the border counties or even for the City of Derry. There isn't even a proper road link between Belfast and Derry and the city was denied a university back in the day when Colrane was picked for the new one.

In the normal course of events, Northern Ireland doesn't matter in the UK because they don't vote for Tory / Labour. So the seats are irrelevant. The current situation with the DUP is a bizzare anomalous setup that may never occur again and they're squandering their position, lost in the dogma of tribalism, when they could be securing stability and economic certainty for NI into the future.

Donegal is poor because it's basically cut off from both jurisdictions. One of the things we should be extracting in any deal is significant funding for a high quality road or even motorway into the county to make up for the loss of access across the border.

Key to development up there should be creating a transport link and an economic corridor between Letterkenny and Sligo and Galway. At present that doesn't really exist.

At this stage I would think we're better off developing a strategy for the NW that doesn't involve relying on crazy UK or Northern Irish politics. If there are opportunities to link Derry into Donegal in the future, great ! However, we have to be realistic too. The Republic and the EU needs to support Donegal and get its economic status secured against the instability coming from the UK, not just expose or to more of the same.

To me, Brexit is a sign that the paradigm has shifted and we need to not cut ourselves off from the UK, but to protect ourselves from what is proving to be an extremely unstable trade partner.

It's unfair to just abandon Donegal to the whims of Tory backbenchers who couldn't find it on a map and the DUP who effectively hate it and everything it stands for.

It's by far one or the most stunning parts of this island, and could be a really big asset, if we just made it more accessible!!

J Mysterio · 26-03-2018 03:47PM

The guy tasked with 'the border' in the Department for Exiting the EU has left to become Prince Williams private secretary, leaving the role to his junior.

"David Davis’s Brexit department suffered a blow as the lead civil servant tasked with finding a solution for the Irish border quit after less than a year.

Simon Case is leaving his role to become Prince William’s private secretary. He is to be replaced by his deputy, Brendan Threlfall.

As director general Northern Ireland and Ireland in the Department for Exiting the EU, Case led a team of key officials working on what is arguably the most challenging issuefacing the department.

He was given the director general post in January this year, but had run the Irelandteam since June last year.

Sources said he was leaving for the job in the royal household because it was a “brilliant opportunity”, adding there was no connection between his decision and continuing rows over Ireland’s border".

https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/mar/26/simon-case-brexit-irish-border-prince-william-private-secretary

I mean, that's just really bad optics. Being the private secretary to Prince Will is obviously more important than solving the 'border issue' in old Ireland.

Bit cynical · 26-03-2018 03:50PM

Peregrinus wrote: »

That doesn’t make sense, Bit cynical. The EU letting Ireland be blamed wouldn’t “show that the UK brought the whole thing on themselves”; it would tend to have the opposite effect. If the EU institutions are being strategic about this, they want the deal they are happy with to be one the UK will reject, not one the Irish will veto.

The EU would wish the UK to be responsible for their being no deal, not Ireland.

As you say, if the EU are being strategic then they seek a deal that the EU are happy with but the UK will reject. But the problem with this is that the EU are then seen by some as engineering failure, i.e. not acting in good faith.

However the beauty of the Irish Border issue is that failure is seen the fault of the UK and Ireland. All the EU have to do is "support" Ireland in insisting that the difficult and contentious border issue is settled early on in negotiations even though that is not the logical order in which such things are discussed. Ireland can't really refuse as the border is an emotive issue for the electorate here and people naturally want what they think will bring certainty.

Then if the overall negotiations fail as a result causing Ireland to suffer disproportionately , Ireland can't complain because they are the ones apparently pushing for that strategy. The EU can say "Look you are the ones that exercised the veto. We were merely supporting you. Now you have to live with the consequences." The EU is seen throughout as being an honest broker.

No. The ideal scenario for the EU institutions is that they are seen to be negotiating in good faith because they are actually negotiating in good faith. They don’t need to be laying traps which will sabotage a deal; if a deal is to be sabotaged, they want it to be sabotaged by the positions the UK has taken.

Ideally, yes. But the next best is that the deal is sabotaged by the UK and a small member state.

Personally I don't think the EU are negotiating in good faith. Their PR certainly tries to create that image but their actions speak otherwise. The divorce bill, for example: even if they feel entitled to this money, the way ensure negotiations succeed is to concentrate on less contentious issues. Get things like the future trade relationship sorted out first. Even Ireland, who tries desperately to show solidarity with the EU, said that they would prefer not to get bogged down early on with this.

Also the public nature of the talks early on. These are not how the EU conducted talks with the US or Canada for example.

That is a risk. But we avoid an even worse situation - that there is a deal, and a hard border.

Hard border is the default that results from Brexit, and certainly from the no-single-market no-customs-union Brexit that May has read in the entrails of the referendum result. There will be a hard border, unless effective steps are taken to avoid one. Long-fingering the question, while “more important” issues are settled, is highly like to result in a Brexit deal that is compatible only with a hard border.

And that would be a disaster, because a hard border resulting from an EU/UK Brexit deal would be permanent. A crash-out Brexit is, I agree, very bad for Ireland. But it’s also very bad for the UK; they will have a continuing need to make some post-Brexit deal with the EU, and this provides an opportunity for leverage to get the UK to honour the commitments they have already made in relation to the border.

You acknowledge that it is a risk but I don't think it is appreciated how risky. I doubt very much that the Irish government is pursuing this a a matter of policy. It is a strategy of brinkmanship. I can understand why the EU might be adopting it, because if it fails the consequences are felt most acutely in a small peripheral country that can be "firewalled" if necessary, but it is unlikely that Ireland is pushing it.

Leroy42 · 26-03-2018 03:54PM

In one way it must be super annoying to the voters in Britain that Brexit is potentially being curtailed due to the GFA, signed 20+ years ago and dealing with an issue on a totally separate island.

On the other hand, it is quite useful from the UK governments POv that the NI issue is such a stumbling block as it takes the conversation away from the myriad of other issues that they had equally failed to deal with.

demfad · 26-03-2018 03:58PM

Keir Starmer may be targeting the Commons vote on the proposed Brexit deal with an amendment to the Withdrawal Bill. The amendment wants parliament to decide what to do in the event that the exit deal is defeated. A Canada style deal would bot satisfy Labour and the opposition. Thus it would only take a small number of Tory rebels to bring it down.
Parliament would then decide what to do if the amendment passes. This could be a renegotiation or another referendum. Both would need an A50 extension.
If the Dealw as defeated you'd imagine Theresa May would have to resign so in potentially chaotic scenarios that might arise it makes sense for parliament to have control.

http://politics.co.uk/blogs/2018/03/26/amid-all-the-nonsense-labour-starts-the-right-fight-on-brexi

Econ_ · 26-03-2018 06:12PM

Good article here from James O'Brien on the problem with the media and Brexit

https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/media/2018/03/media-impartiality-problem-when-ignorance-given-same-weight-expertise

Media impartiality is a problem when ignorance is given the same weight as expertise

Brexit discussion thread III

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