Capt'n Midnight wrote: » David Davis has sick bucket on hand during BBC interview
Econ_ wrote: » It’s not that the BBC are pro Brexit, it’s more accurate to say they have let themselves be intimidated by the Tory hard right. The second they report/comment something that reflects badly in Brexit, you will have Iain Duncan Smith, Reed-Mogg, Boris Johnson et all shout ‘TYPICAL BBC BIAS’ The BBC reporters would also fear being hung out as an ‘enemy of the people’ in the right wing press. The BBC, Pro EU MPs, Businesses etc. have essentially been subordinated by the British hard right. I believe it’ll be described as a fascist-like coup in the history books.
Bit cynical wrote: » But the impact over the whole of the EU will be spread out. The political fallout will be minimal and such fallout as there is will be will not be directed towards the EU, who will be seen as arguing in good faith, but towards Ireland for exercising or threatening to exercise its veto.
Capt'n Midnight wrote: » David Davis today showing how the UK are still fudging things. In the space of about three hoursThe Brexit Secretary David Davis has said the UK will agree to a 'backstop' text for the Irish border, but not the one proposed by the EU.David Davis says a deal with EU is 'incredibly probable'David Davis has sick bucket on hand during BBC interview
Peregrinus wrote: » No no no no no. If the EU want a trade agreement to fail, they don't want that to be seen as attributable to the Irish veto. The veto mechanism is part of the EU's decision-making process. If any member state exercises a veto, that's a decision by the whole EU. The EU doesn't want blame for a failure to secure a workable trade deal to be laid at Ireland's door; that just comes back to them. They want it to be laid at the UK's door. In a technical sense it would be a decision by the whole EU, yes, but in an another sense, it would be seen as Ireland vetoing a deal that the EU institutions were reasonably happy with. Why would they do this?: to show that the UK brought the whole thing on themselves without being seen themselves as architects of the situation. If you're talking about political fallout from the UK, Brexiters have been positioning themselves prettty much since June 2016 to blame the EU for what they know will be a very painful Brexit. Hence all the guff about the EU "bullying" the UK. That won't stop them from blaming Ireland as well - Brexiters will blame everyone but themselves, and you can certainly expect them to offer entirely inconsistent arguments for why different parties are to blame. But it's not as though the EU greatly cares who the Brexiters blame, or as if they could do much to influence it if they could. Of course, but there is a wider perspective: how the world views the EU when faced with a country leaving. The ideal scenario for the EU institutions is that they are seen to be negotiating in good faith while setting up traps for the UK. The trap here is the border issue. In my view the Irish government has not really been acting in Ireland's interests but rather in the interests of the political centre of the EU. By making the border the issue that must be agreed early on, we have unwittingly made a hard border more rather than less likely. In reality, the border can only really be determined after trade and other issues have been sorted out. If there's failure to agree on these then a hard border is the result regardless of what is agreed now. We are now pursuing a very risky strategy with full enthusiastic support of the Brussels negotiators, yet the risk is almost entirely being borne by Ireland. If there's no deal, Ireland suffers economically to roughly the same extent as the UK, plus we get the hardest of hard borders. Barnier and his team may not actually want the deal to fail but if it does, at least they will be seen - even if not true - to have been dealing fairly with the Brits. The hardship therefore of the UK (and by extension Ireland) is the fault of the UK not the EU institutions.
In a technical sense it would be a decision by the whole EU, yes, but in an another sense, it would be seen as Ireland vetoing a deal that the EU institutions were reasonably happy with. Why would they do this?: to show that the UK brought the whole thing on themselves without being seen themselves as architects of the situation. If you're talking about political fallout from the UK, Brexiters have been positioning themselves prettty much since June 2016 to blame the EU for what they know will be a very painful Brexit. Hence all the guff about the EU "bullying" the UK. That won't stop them from blaming Ireland as well - Brexiters will blame everyone but themselves, and you can certainly expect them to offer entirely inconsistent arguments for why different parties are to blame. But it's not as though the EU greatly cares who the Brexiters blame, or as if they could do much to influence it if they could. Of course, but there is a wider perspective: how the world views the EU when faced with a country leaving. The ideal scenario for the EU institutions is that they are seen to be negotiating in good faith while setting up traps for the UK. The trap here is the border issue. In my view the Irish government has not really been acting in Ireland's interests but rather in the interests of the political centre of the EU. By making the border the issue that must be agreed early on, we have unwittingly made a hard border more rather than less likely. In reality, the border can only really be determined after trade and other issues have been sorted out. If there's failure to agree on these then a hard border is the result regardless of what is agreed now. We are now pursuing a very risky strategy with full enthusiastic support of the Brussels negotiators, yet the risk is almost entirely being borne by Ireland. If there's no deal, Ireland suffers economically to roughly the same extent as the UK, plus we get the hardest of hard borders. Barnier and his team may not actually want the deal to fail but if it does, at least they will be seen - even if not true - to have been dealing fairly with the Brits. The hardship therefore of the UK (and by extension Ireland) is the fault of the UK not the EU institutions.
If you're talking about political fallout from the UK, Brexiters have been positioning themselves prettty much since June 2016 to blame the EU for what they know will be a very painful Brexit. Hence all the guff about the EU "bullying" the UK. That won't stop them from blaming Ireland as well - Brexiters will blame everyone but themselves, and you can certainly expect them to offer entirely inconsistent arguments for why different parties are to blame. But it's not as though the EU greatly cares who the Brexiters blame, or as if they could do much to influence it if they could.
Bit cynical wrote: » In a technical sense it would be a decision by the whole EU, yes, but in an another sense, it would be seen as Ireland vetoing a deal that the EU institutions were reasonably happy with. Why would they do this?: to show that the UK brought the whole thing on themselves without being seen themselves as architects of the situation.
Bit cynical wrote: » Of course, but there is a wider perspective: how the world views the EU when faced with a country leaving. The ideal scenario for the EU institutions is that they are seen to be negotiating in good faith while setting up traps for the UK.
Bit cynical wrote: » The trap here is the border issue. In my view the Irish government has not really been acting in Ireland's interests but rather in the interests of the political centre of the EU. By making the border the issue that must be agreed early on, we have unwittingly made a hard border more rather than less likely. In reality, the border can only really be determined after trade and other issues have been sorted out. If there's failure to agree on these then a hard border is the result regardless of what is agreed now.
Bit cynical wrote: » We are now pursuing a very risky strategy with full enthusiastic support of the Brussels negotiators, yet the risk is almost entirely being borne by Ireland. If there's no deal, Ireland suffers economically to roughly the same extent as the UK, plus we get the hardest of hard borders.
Bit cynical wrote: » Barnier and his team may not actually want the deal to fail but if it does, at least they will be seen - even if not true - to have been dealing fairly with the Brits. The hardship therefore of the UK (and by extension Ireland) is the fault of the UK not the EU institutions.
Peregrinus wrote: » Interesting article here from politico.eu. They report that the UK is about to bring forward its own suggestion for how the Option C backstop could work. Briefly, instead of part of the UK remaining wholly aligned with single market rules , the suggestion is that the whole of the UK would remain partly aligned. But the part they remain aligned to would be the part relevant to the kind of trade that crosses the border in Ireland, and this should facilitate an open border. Presumably, whatever degree of alignment is requires will be fine with the DUP as along as it applies to the whole of the UK. As far as this goes, I don't think the EU would have a fundamental problem - if, and this is a very big if, there can be agreement on which part of the single market regulatory regime is the part that would be relevant to cross-border trade. But, even parking that issue, this only addresses the problems that result from the UK's withdrawal from the single market. The UK will also be withdrawing from the customs union (or, at least, that is current Tory policy) and that also gives rise to a need for border controls. On that, according to the politico argument, the UK are not saying anything radically new. They are still suggesting either the "customs partnership" or the "highly streamlined customs arrangement", neither of which the UK has regarded as particularly realistic or attractive.
judeboy101 wrote: "partly aligned" goes into the dictionary next to "a little bit pregnant" and "I nearly died"
Peregrinus wrote: » As far as this goes, I don't think the EU would have a fundamental problem - if, and this is a very big if, there can be agreement on which part of the single market regulatory regime is the part that would be relevant to cross-border trade.
Nody wrote: » Except that it's not going to be an open border because you still need to control every truck coming in from NI because you don't know what's on it (or claimed to be on it). The only thing that "fixes" is that controls on certain items can be streamlined but the need for a hard border with checks don't go away short of 100% alignment.
Peregrinus wrote: » The suggestion is 100% alignment with single market rules in relation to goods. That, if agreed, would seem to obviate the need for compliance checks on trucks carrying goods. If the UK is aligned in relation to all goods, then it doesn't matter what goods are on the truck.
Nody wrote: » They want only alignment on goods they claim pass the Irish border today . . .
According to the U.K. officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, the British proposal is for U.K.-wide “full alignment” single market rules and regulations for trade in goods — alongside a new customs arrangement between the U.K. and EU . . . The starting point of the U.K.’s position will be that “full alignment” should apply to goods and a limited number of services sectors, one U.K. official said.
Nody wrote: » Of course there's the whole enforcement question as well (i.e. how will UK be enforcing this when EU has no power over them etc.) . . .
Nody wrote: » Peregrinus wrote: » The suggestion is 100% alignment with single market rules in relation to goods. That, if agreed, would seem to obviate the need for compliance checks on trucks carrying goods. If the UK is aligned in relation to all goods, then it doesn't matter what goods are on the truck. They want only alignment on goods they claim pass the Irish border today (or in the GFA I'd guess); that is not all the goods because goods not passing the Irish border today would then be redirected to do so (and hence we'd have a case of goods that are aligned and goods not aligned coming over the border) ensuring a hard border is required for anything short of UK being 100% aligned on all goods. Of course there's the whole enforcement question as well (i.e. how will UK be enforcing this when EU has no power over them etc.) on top of it all but the point is 100% of UK needs to be aligned on 100% of the UK goods for the IE/NI border to be open (excluding the check at the ports in NI option).
Peregrinus wrote: » Nope, all goods, if we are to believe the Politico article: Yes, this is an issue. But currently the UK polices single market rules in the UK and at UK ports because it's obliged to under the EU treaties. Would it be any different if it were obliged to under a different treaty, the Withdrawal Agreement? Yes, there'd have to be a mechanism for policing this and taking action if it wasn't happening. But they are already talking about such mechanisms in the context of the Withdrawal Agreeement anyway so, if they can agree a mechanism, it can be use for this purpose as well.
According to the U.K. officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, the British proposal is for U.K.-wide “full alignment” single market rules and regulations for trade in goods — alongside a new customs arrangement between the U.K. and EU. two distinct economies with “equivalent” regulations for the sake of cross-border trade
two distinct economies with “equivalent” regulations for the sake of cross-border trade
judeboy101 wrote: » "partly aligned" goes into the dictionary next to "a little bit pregnant" and "I nearly died"
LBC wrote: Our poll with YouGov shows that 36% of people think leaving the EU is more of a priority than keeping Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom (29%). And 71% of people that chose the EU over Northern Ireland voted Brexit.
ancapailldorcha wrote: » This, from LBC is interesting. It would seem that, given the choice, pro-Brexit people would prioritise leaving the EU over keeping Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom: It makes sense given that the border is such an obstructive issue, along with Ireland's effective veto and the fact that Northern Ireland is effectively a net drain on the UK's public finances.
In term of household income, the poorest region of Ireland is not actually in Northern Ireland, but across the border in County Donegal, where average household incomes are €15,705. In fact, an area being in Northern Ireland is not necessarily an indicator of relative poverty, but proximity to the border is. With an average household disposable income of €19.9k, the Outer Belfast area is actually one of the wealthiest areas in Ireland outside of Cork, Limerick, Waterford, and the Dublin commuter belt. The poorest areas in Ireland are to be found either side of the border; the Ulster counties of Donegal, Monaghan, Derry, Fermanagh and Tyrone are amongst the poorest in Ireland. There are likely a number of reasons why these areas are relatively less well off than other regions. Wealth in Ireland flows from proximity to cities; most notably Dublin, where the three counties bordering it are amongst the most affluent in Ireland, but also the cities of Limerick, Cork and Waterford. The rural counties of Kerry, Mayo and Donegal lack nearby major population centres, and are subsequently poorer as a result. However, there is a strong argument to be made that the frontier nature of the border counties are a strong drag on economic growth. Even given that both sides of the border are currently in the European single market, the differing regulatory environments and different currencies either side of the Irish border are an impediment to trade and commerce and depress economic growth. Were additional impediments to cross border trade to be introduced, the adverse impact on a region which is already the poorest in Ireland would be profound.
Leroy42 wrote: » Have I got this thinking right? Lets say US steel (for it is in the news) attracts a hefty tariff from the EU due to Trumps trade war. But, due to the special relationship, Liam Fox manages to get the UK (after Brexit) an exemption. But there is now an open border between the UK and the EU. So wouldn't the US companies simply ship the steel (tariff free) into the UK and then transport it to mainland Europe? Of course steel would be easier to control, but even that would give the UK car manufacturers a significant competitive advantage over the EU based plants (leaving aside that there are other sources of steel for simplicity). The EU couldn't possibly agree to that, could they?
Peregrinus wrote: » That doesn’t make sense, Bit cynical. The EU letting Ireland be blamed wouldn’t “show that the UK brought the whole thing on themselves”; it would tend to have the opposite effect. If the EU institutions are being strategic about this, they want the deal they are happy with to be one the UK will reject, not one the Irish will veto. The EU would wish the UK to be responsible for their being no deal, not Ireland.
No. The ideal scenario for the EU institutions is that they are seen to be negotiating in good faith because they are actually negotiating in good faith. They don’t need to be laying traps which will sabotage a deal; if a deal is to be sabotaged, they want it to be sabotaged by the positions the UK has taken.
That is a risk. But we avoid an even worse situation - that there is a deal, and a hard border. Hard border is the default that results from Brexit, and certainly from the no-single-market no-customs-union Brexit that May has read in the entrails of the referendum result. There will be a hard border, unless effective steps are taken to avoid one. Long-fingering the question, while “more important” issues are settled, is highly like to result in a Brexit deal that is compatible only with a hard border. And that would be a disaster, because a hard border resulting from an EU/UK Brexit deal would be permanent. A crash-out Brexit is, I agree, very bad for Ireland. But it’s also very bad for the UK; they will have a continuing need to make some post-Brexit deal with the EU, and this provides an opportunity for leverage to get the UK to honour the commitments they have already made in relation to the border.
Media impartiality is a problem when ignorance is given the same weight as expertise