88 year old Nazi soldier charged over 1944 massacre.

Tony EH

boomchicawawa wrote: »

Here's where you are saying that there was an 'innocent' explanation for the Blow torch btln tag....which is used as a defence by some when the other version is told...ie the blow torch was on the vehicles as a badge of honour to signify that they torched Russian houses

Yeh, I know.

That's the version that makes the most sense, frankly.

Peiper's battalion wouldn't have been alone in such methods. It was a common thing to do, not just in the StuG battalions, but in the Panzer battalions and for the Jadgwaffe too.

That doesn't mean that it may not have been bastardised into something else at another time.

Jawgap

Tony EH wrote: »

You're missing the point.

All of your above issues are tactical situations. They don't apply to occupying a country.



.

They are tactical situations but they illustrate clearly the German 'way of war' and within that their concept of the 'elastic defence' - that was the German army way and it was only when Hitler began to impose linear defences on them that they were forced to stand on fixed lines and defend territory they would have otherwise yielded.

Standing and holding territory for territory's sake was very much neither the German nor the modern way of war.

Tony EH

Again though, you are completely missing the point.

A tactical situation on the battlefield is by its very nature a fluid situation.

But major areas of ground secured in a strategic situation, such as an entire country, aren't yielded to the enemy on a whim.

Jawgap

Tony EH wrote: »

Again though, you are completely missing the point.

A tactical situation on the battlefield is by its very nature a fluid situation.

But major areas of ground secured in a strategic situation, such as an entire country, aren't yielded to the enemy on a whim.

Really?

Why did the Germans withdraw from Greece - there was no major ground combat? Yet given the potential for being cut off it was probably the correct decision.

Tony EH

By 1944, holding Greece was untenable. The Germans knew that there was a British landing on the cards and the Soviets were advancing as well.

...and you've already addressed the salient point, there was a danger of being cut off and the troops lost. If anything warrants a withdrawal from a land mass, it's that.

Greece was lost because the Axis were effectively beaten there. They simply wouldn't have been able to hold off any attack and the resources were needed for better use elsewhere.

It's the same reason why the Crimea had to be abandoned.

The Germans weren't beaten in Italy in 1944 however, and a withdrawal from there would have been stupid in the extreme. A defence of Italy was essential to holding off an allied invasion of Southern Europe.

Jawgap

Tony EH wrote: »

By 1944, holding Greece was untenable. The Germans knew that there was a British landing on the cards and the Soviets were advancing as well.

...and you've already addressed the salient point, there was a danger of being cut off and the troops lost. If anything warrants a withdrawal from a land mass, it's that.

Greece was lost because the Axis were effectively beaten there. They simply wouldn't have been able to hold off any attack and the resources were needed for better use elsewhere.

It's the same reason why the Crimea had to be abandoned.

The Germans weren't beaten in Italy in 1944 however, and a withdrawal from there would have been stupid in the extreme. A defence of Italy was essential to holding off an allied invasion of Southern Europe.

I'm detecting a certain lack of consistency between the above and your earlier post on this matter

Tony EH wrote: »

.........



That's only the efforts to take the ground. once you've taken it you hold it.

That's basic warfare...even for the Germans.

......

And the Germans knew there was no chance of a landing Greece because their own reconnaissance confirmed the lack of landing craft in the Adriatic through 1943 into late 1944.

Their main pre-occupation was an Allied invasion through NE Italy and Istria - hence the move to pivot the defences onto the Ventian plain.

What scared the bejaysus out of Kesselring was further amphibious landings up the west coast of Italy - even though the threat was not real, he did not know that and said himself he got a sore neck from looking over his shoulder - by your logic he should have withdrawn, which he did, but only after he was compelled to do so and not under his own terms.

Also, the idea of a strategic re-positioning from the South to the North of Italy (on the Pisa - Rimini Line) was Rommel's - hard to believe a soldier of his standing could be advocating something 'stupid in the extreme.'

Kesselring's logic for fighting as far south as possible stemmed from the idea of keeping the air forces as far away from the southern borders of the Reich as possible, but when the Foggia airfields complex fell in October 1943 and 15th USAAF started operations from there, the strategic rationale for staying so far south was pretty much gone.

In fact, one of Rommel's points was that a re-positioning would free up a number of divisions for employment elsewhere in Europe or the East. If they remained so far south he reasoned they would be pinned, broken and then forced to retreat while being prursued - which is precisely what happened. Once the Allies broke the last bit of the Caesar line the Germans were chased all the way up the Tiber plain to the Arno.

.......and even if that wasn't enough. They still had the Alps. Alexander's own assessment was that the Germans could hold the Alpine passes and the Lubjana Gap with about 8 divisions (about a third of the force they had in Italy) while it would require in the region of 36 Allied Divisions to force the Lubjana Gap on its own just to get to Vienna.

So not only was there no need for the German's to defend so far south, there was no reason not for them to re-position, which comes back to my original point that the SS were in Rome on the day of via Rasella bombing for reasons that nothing to do with military necessity.

Tony EH

Jawgap wrote: »

I'm detecting a certain lack of consistency between the above and your earlier post on this matter

This is getting a bit silly now.

I think you are aware of exactly what I am talking about on this matter.

Once you have taken an area, you hold onto that area until you either no longer need it or it becomes undefendable and a detriment to your war effort.

This is really simple.

Jawgap

Tony EH wrote: »

This is getting a bit silly now.

I think you are aware of exactly what I am talking about on this matter.

Once you have taken an area, you hold onto that area until you either no longer need it or it becomes undefendable and a detriment to your war effort.

This is really simple.

I'm aware its simple, but you seem to have moved on from

That's only the efforts to take the ground. once you've taken it you hold it.

That's basic warfare...even for the Germans.

You're confusing a Tactical doctrine with Strategic goals. Once the Schwerpunkt/Blitzkrieg element has achieved it's result, you keep hold of what you've got to deny the enemy.

I don't disagree with what your saying, I'm just pointing to an apparent internal contradiction between that and your idea that the Germans were right to stand so far south in a country criss-crossed by valleys and mountains astride their lines of supply and communications in a situation where they had ceded control of the air to the point where they were denied the freedom to move.

Better to have yielded the ground and re-deploy on their own terms to a stronger position on shorter lines, where they could still hold the Allies off the Alps, kept control of the industrial NW and freed up divisions for use elsewhere. And even from there, there was still the option of falling back on the Adige and ultimately the Alps.

The only reason for standing so far south was the vanity of retaining Rome - and yes they chewed up divisions in the Gustav line, but whatever they achieved there was negated by the eventual breakthrough and pursuit to the Arno, while all the while the Allies fighter bombers made a mess of their supply and communications.

beauf

I don't think Hitler was a) sane and b ) really following any plan at this point. (Other than hold at any cost, regardless of logic.)

So you can't apply normal logic to the situation.

Jawgap

beauf wrote: »

I don't think Hitler was a) sane and b ) really following any plan at this point. (Other than hold at any cost, regardless of logic.)

So you can't apply normal logic to the situation.

True, but Kesselring was all for it too. You could perhaps argue that he was just agreeing with Hitler to get the senior command position, but it seems Hitler was initially inclined to go with Rommel's suggestions until Kesselring intervened and began lobbying for a defence south of Rome.

Again, whether he was being opportunistic in advocating a strategy he know would appeal to Hitler's loathing of giving up ground or whether he believed it was the right thing to do militarily is open to speculation / discussion.

Tony EH

Jawgap wrote: »

I'm aware its simple, but you seem to have moved on from

I haven't moved on from anything. You're just sort of missing the point.

Jawgap wrote: »

I don't disagree with what your saying, I'm just pointing to an apparent internal contradiction between that and your idea that the Germans were right to stand so far south in a country criss-crossed by valleys and mountains astride their lines of supply and communications in a situation where they had ceded control of the air to the point where they were denied the freedom to move.

Better to have yielded the ground and re-deploy on their own terms to a stronger position on shorter lines, where they could still hold the Allies off the Alps, kept control of the industrial NW and freed up divisions for use elsewhere. And even from there, there was still the option of falling back on the Adige and ultimately the Alps.

The only reason for standing so far south was the vanity of retaining Rome - and yes they chewed up divisions in the Gustav line, but whatever they achieved there was negated by the eventual breakthrough and pursuit to the Arno, while all the while the Allies fighter bombers made a mess of their supply and communications.

Hitler's original plan was to defend at the Apennines, but he changed his mind at some point after the allies had landed on the mainland. In the end it was probably better that he did, although the Germans at this point were only holding off the inevitable, as they were on to a loser in any case. But the Axis continued to blunt the noses of the allied advance northwards. If they had chosen just to defend further north, the collapse of the whole Italian mainland probably would have happened quicker and the Anglo-Americans would have had a gateway.

The Allied armies would have broken through in any scenario, as we can see looking back. But at the time it wouldn't have been so clear cut.

Hitler's decision to defend further south actually bought the Germans time, which is why it makes a certain amount of sense as this was Hitlers goal in Italy at that point.

Also, a defence further south was sensible from a political point of view. Hitler need all the help he could get and I think his decision was also informed by his remaining Italian allies.

Hitler, at this point, was all about holding what he could and carry out ordered tactical withdrawals to buy time for an "eventual" split in western and eastern allies and a reversal of fortune in favor of Germany and such desperate hopes were informing his strategy.

I don't believe it had anything to do with "vanity".

beauf

Vanity? Where did that come from? He was delaying hoping for a miracle. A wonder weapon, a super general who knows. The lotto maybe. Regardless, he threw away vast resources on all fronts with this approach. Shortening his lines and the size of the front would (IMO) have given him more time, than trying to hold on where it was impossible.

Anyway this all arose out of some implied military/tactical justification for war crimes. Which is a paper thin argument IMO.

Tony EH

beauf wrote: »

Vanity? Where did that come from?

You're not reading close enough.

beauf wrote: »

Anyway this all arose out of some implied military/tactical justification for war crimes.

No it didn't.

beauf

Otherwise I don't get the point of these circular discussions.

If you are going to rule by terror, don't be surprised when it bites back.

Jawgap

when I used the word 'vanity' - I was effectively referring to Rome.

Hitler prized it for the same reason, basically, that Mark Clark did. It was of no military value but Hitler didn't want to yield it because of what it stood for, rather than what it was.

Clark wanted to be a modern day Bellisarius and wanted the prize of liberating the first Axis capital. What he should have done was driven east (as he was supposed to) - not north, leaving the door open for the German 10th Army to escape.

In fact, but for the grace of Clarke's ego the 10th Army would have paid a high price for the decision to mount a southerly defence.