Potential targets for the Luftwaffe in Eire, 1940-41

Dr Strange

Here's an interesting scientific article about the remains of a plane and pilot recovered in 2007 in Austria. The interesting part is the involvement of American bomber formations, the Mustang escorts and the Luftwaffe FW190 Sturmjaeger interceptors that were sent out.

The take down of one of the Sturmjaeger by a Mustang is described through witnesses on the ground and the analysis of bone fragments is also described.

Link: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12024-012-9390-6

(The problem is that you will have to have access through a university library or similar or else you'll have to pay for the article as it is in a scientific journal rather than a popular magazine).

Here's a letter to the editor with some additional details regarding the article (I think this one is freely available from the journal):

Link: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12024-012-9399-x

I think that the day of this particular fight is actually listed in official Luftwaffe and Allied records.

Stovepipe

The British were able to phase out the Hampden, Whitley, Manchester and Defiant in fairly short order and instigate mass production of their replacements. The Blenheim was kept in service despite the availability of better aircraft, such as the Havoc, Ventura, Baltimore and B-25. It should have joined it's fellows in second-line duties and not be kept on the various fronts, as it was vulnerable to even second-rate fighters. Once the British got the thumb out with aircraft production, by end 1940,they were able to deal with new builds and upgrades as they needed it. They could have expended the metals wasted on Blenheims by building B-25s, a much better bomber. In reality, service on Blenheims was regarded as a death sentence. There was a very good DVD out a few years back, about them and the loss rate of men and machines was prodigious. They were past it by 1941, at the latest.

regards
Stovepipe

BostonB

Where are you getting your information that the Blenheim was used when better types were available and operational?

On my brief search it seems as soon as other types became operational the Blenheim was moved to other tasks. Obviously ETO got the replacements first then the other theaters. I'm sure it took time to get the replacement aircraft in service. You can't really compare the use of something like the Manchester, Hampden and the Blenheim for other duties. The Blenheim might have been more versatile, more reliable and economical on fuel and other such things.

Tony EH

BostonB wrote: »

I read a good book about the P38 (such a cool aircraft) in the ETO and PTO and I don't think it mentioned escort role at all, other than it falling into it. A much misunderstood aircraft though. The P38 some early glitches with engines and compressibility dive issues. But once sorted,and flown with a well trained pilot it was superb.

Aye, the P38 was a smashing old plane. Such a crazy design. Maybe I'm wrong, but I do recall escort being a factor mentioned along the line.

By the time the J appeared, she was a great aircraft. No match for a single engined fighter in Europe really, but a well flown P38 could hold its own.

Qualitymark

Jawgap wrote: »

<snip>
Once a landing had taken place, the Irish Government would wait at least 48 hours before asking the British to help - this would make it seem less like an invasion and more like what it was - assistance. That period would also have given the British time to bring their ground forces to the border and for the designated Irish Army escort / liaison forces to move north to meet them.

The working assumption was that the SE or S coast, with a potential airborne landing around Kilkenny, would be the target. The British and Irish forces were planned to move south to engage and forces ashore with the Irish only dealing with any 'indigenous' resistance towards the Brits.

Fighter Command also had plans to, once invited in, set up a Group covering the whole island.

Citation?

Jawgap

Tony EH wrote: »

Actually, the Stuka wasn't really "obsolete" at all, this is kind of a general mis-conception. It was still a worthy design for her purpose and could carry out its mission with greater accuracy than a lot of her contemporaries. It was always a slow machine, even in the 30's and was never meant for operations too far from the ground units she was to support. The problem with using the Stuka during the BoB, was that she simply was never designed for such a scenario, especially the very early unescorted sorties. In fact, none of the Luftwaffe's aircraft were designed for the likes of the BoB, which is why the Germans were forced to withdraw.

Point of order Mr Chairman.......I never said the Stuka was obsolete, I said it was obsolescent, especially in the West.

The Luftwaffe's twin engined bombers were designed as bombers and that's what they did. Through the Blitz they dropped over 18,000 tons of bombs on Britain in six months - a rate comparable to the early stages of Bomber Command's offensive through 1941 and 1942.

The problem for the Germans was targeting - they were trying to generate a political effect - force Britain out of the war through a negotiated peace. To do that, they needed to present a credible invasion threat - to do that they need air superiority over the Channel to protect the invasion fleet and negate the Royal Navy.

To achieve air superiority meant knocking out Fighter Command - Galland himself estimated that to knock out Fighter Command and preserve a sufficient fighter force for the support of the invasion the Germans would need to sustain a 5:1 victory ratio over Fighter Command - they only came close to that on maybe 2 or 3 days over the BoB.

The Germans knew they needed to draw Fighter Command (not just 11 Group) up in large numbers if they were going to knock them down in large numbers.

They tried to figure out what they needed to target to get that response, hence the constant shifts in targeting. There main problem was that Dowding's strategy was based on preservation and he wasn't minded to fall for the bait.

The bomber groups of the Luftwaffe were there the same in 1940 as the 8th US Air Force bombers in 1944 - to act as 'fighter bait.' The Stuka was not so much bait, as free food for the fighters and that led to its withdrawal in the West.

Tony EH wrote: »

......

The Jabos may have been more successful at getting away, but their accuracy was minimal. Jabo's were suited to nuisance raids during the BoB, but they did little else and the BF109 was never suited to the role in the first place, due to the vulnerability to ground attack that her radiator suffered from. The FW190 would prove to be a much better aircraft for the Jabo role, largely because of her air cooled radial engine and she had a fair amount of success in Russia. But accuracy still left a lot to be desired.

Militarily, tip and run raids were not even a nuisance, they were the equivalent of pinpricks on an elephant, but politically they had a huge impact. In some sense the irony of the BoB and the Blitz was that it had a unifying effect on the British - tip and run caused huge political infighting.

It led to significant breakdowns in relations between politicians and between the political and military leadership, and caused friction between the Air Ministry, Air Council and the RAF - and within the RAF itself.

It also led to the RAF flying (pun intended:)) in the face of logic and dispersing air defence and anti-aircraft guns in an attempt to defend the 1300km coastline deemed vulnerable to tip and run. Finally, it forced them to do the one thing they had managed to avoid to that point - maintain standing patrols.......not bad considering at most there were only 48 aircraft committed to these missions at any one time.

Tony EH wrote: »

There were some (mainly among politicians) who believed that bombers would (or should, more to the point) be able to defend themselves, but more level headed people (mainly among those in the military) always knew that escort would be needed, especially on longer ranges.

The Germans understood this from the creation of the Luftwaffe in the 30's, which is why the development of the BF110 was even considered. Unfortunately, the BF110 wasn't a match for modern single engined fighters of the time and had to fall back on its secondary role as a fighter-bomber, which it was successful in, especially in Russia and as a night-fighter in the West, in which it excelled.

Stanley Baldwin famously said that "The bomber would always get through" (although he was echoing Duhet), however, what he actually meant was that when employed in large enough numbers, enough bomber aircraft would be able to get through to their target, not that fighter interception would be easily tackled by the bomber.

The Bf110 was a dog and its design and adoption was driven by Goering. One theory is that Milch who was largely responsible for establishing and equipping the new Luftwaffe, only let the design progress to production so he could use it to undermine Messerschmitt.

It could still outrun a Hurricane a sea level.

The idea that 'the bomber will always get through' was based not on the idea that mass would overcome any defence, but that the impossibility of defence against air attack was driven by the vastness of a country's airspace.

The rest of Baldwin's quote is 'the bomber will always get through, and it is very easy to understand that, if you realise the area of space.' He was using it as part of a debate to justify maintaining and expanding the bomber forces on the basis that 'the only defence is in offence, which means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves.'

Also his thinking and view was more driven by Trenchard (who was influenced to a degree by Douhet) and his ideas of morale bombing and bombing centres of gravity - this became dogma in RAF from the 1920s onwards and was largely driven by Trenchard's erroneous conclusion that the collapse in German morale in 1918 that led to the mutinies and civil resistance were significantly influenced by bombing, even though research done at the time showed it was not.

The shift in British defence planning and spending in the late 1930s was driven by an emerging realisation that bombers could be found, and their positions fixed using RDF. Dowding also knew he needed fast fighters to catch them - this led to the cantilever monoplane fighters - and he needed enough punch to knock them down (eight guns - although cannons proved more effective). Then he just integrated the lot.

It was driven or supported by a shift in assumptions - namely that a bomber force didn't need to be defeated in one one engagement - the strike just needed to be parried rather than blunted.

Jawgap

Qualitymark wrote: »

Citation?

I posted up the some of the docs showing the plans Fighter Command had.

The contingency planning took place between the militaries detailed in in DO 130 in the National Archives in Kew - "Dominions Office and successors: United Kingdom Representative to Eire, and Embassy, Republic of Ireland: Archives, Correspondence"

Specifically the cables from the British Military Attache and his contacts with Colonel Liam Archer Director of G2.

If you can't make it to Kew - pg 67 here has a useful summary

The KV series of files (Records of the Security Service) also go into plenty of detail on the cooperation between G2 and MI5 to counter German espionage efforts.

Tony EH

Jawgap wrote: »

The idea that 'the bomber will always get through' was based not on the idea that mass would overcome any defence, but that the impossibility of defence against air attack was driven by the vastness of a country's airspace.

The rest of Baldwin's quote is 'the bomber will always get through, and it is very easy to understand that, if you realise the area of space.' He was using it as part of a debate to justify maintaining and expanding the bomber forces on the basis that 'the only defence is in offence, which means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves.'

Here's a fuller quote from wiki:

I think it is well also for the man in the street to realise that there is no power on earth that can protect him from being bombed. Whatever people may tell him, the bomber will always get through, The only defence is in offence, which means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves...If the conscience of the young men should ever come to feel, with regard to this one instrument [bombing] that it is evil and should go, the thing will be done; but if they do not feel like that – well, as I say, the future is in their hands. But when the next war comes, and European civilisation is wiped out, as it will be, and by no force more than that force, then do not let them lay blame on the old men. Let them remember that they, principally, or they alone, are responsible for the terrors that have fallen upon the earth.

The opening paragraph of the wiki article states:

The bomber will always get through was a phrase used by Stanley Baldwin in 1932, in the speech "A Fear for the Future" to the British Parliament. He and others believed that, regardless of air defences, sufficient bomber aircraft will survive to destroy cities.

Which is accordance to the way I and others have always taken his meaning.

Jawgap wrote: »

Point of order Mr Chairman.......I never said the Stuka was obsolete, I said it was obsolescent, especially in the West.

And it's still wrong though, Jawgap. The Stuka went on for years after 1940 and continued to do stirling work in the job she was designed to do. Richthofen's stukas were essential over Stalingrad, for example. Over two years after their withdrawl from the Channel.

"The West" was essentially Britain for the better part of the war and as said, the Stuka was wholly unsuited to operations in that area.

Sure, she was an easy target for determined fighter opposition. But no more so than any of her class. A Dauntless wouldn't have faired much better, but I yet to hear anyone claim that the SBD was obsolete...or obsolescent.

Jawgap

Tony EH wrote: »

Here's a fuller quote from wiki:

I think it is well also for the man in the street to realise that there is no power on earth that can protect him from being bombed. Whatever people may tell him, the bomber will always get through, The only defence is in offence, which means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves...If the conscience of the young men should ever come to feel, with regard to this one instrument [bombing] that it is evil and should go, the thing will be done; but if they do not feel like that – well, as I say, the future is in their hands. But when the next war comes, and European civilisation is wiped out, as it will be, and by no force more than that force, then do not let them lay blame on the old men. Let them remember that they, principally, or they alone, are responsible for the terrors that have fallen upon the earth.

The opening paragraph of the wiki article states:

The bomber will always get through was a phrase used by Stanley Baldwin in 1932, in the speech "A Fear for the Future" to the British Parliament. He and others believed that, regardless of air defences, sufficient bomber aircraft will survive to destroy cities.

Which is accordance to the way I and others have always taken his meaning.




And it's still wrong though, Jawgap. The Stuka went on for years after 1940 and continued to do stirling work in the job she was designed to do. Richthofen's stukas were essential over Stalingrad, for example. Over two years after their withdrawl from the Channel.

"The West" was essentially Britain for the better part of the war and as said, the Stuka was wholly unsuited to operations in that area.

Sure, she was an easy target for determined fighter opposition. But no more so than any of her class. A Dauntless wouldn't have faired much better, but I yet to hear anyone claim that the SBD was obsolete...or obsolescent.

Seriously, Wikipedia is your rebuttal

Can I suggest you read the Hansard transcript of the debate rather than rely on Wikipedia. Baldwin was speaking in a disarmament debate when he said this - he was arguing in favour of maintaining a strong bomber force as a deterrent to attack - like an early version of Mutually Assured Destruction.

In fact his opening sentence, after the formalities of the speech's introduction is "Disarmament in my view will not stop war."

Considering this speech was made in 1932 when there was no real concept of air defence they couldn't debate overwhelming air defences by weight of numbers because none existed- this only changed and developed in 1937 with the adoption of the Inskip Doctrine and the idea of replacing fear of the bomber with fear of the fighter

Also just because the Stuka continued in service doesn't mean it wasn't obsolescent - my father-in-law's restore Morris Minor is perfectly serviceable, but you wouldn't say it meets modern day motoring needs.

After the BoB the Stuka continued - it was used in secondary theaters like the Aegean and Mediterranean with good results, but even in the desert the serviceability rate of St.G 3 rarely exceeded 50% which is pretty poor considering the Luftwaffe planned operations on the basis of 80% serviceability.

BostonB

Doesn't obsolescent mean that something is no longer useful? Rather than simply outdated.

It was known that Stuka was too slow when it when into production never mind during the war. Hard to argue it wasn't useful though.

BostonB

Jawgap wrote: »

...The problem for the Germans was targeting - they were trying to generate a political effect - force Britain out of the war through a negotiated peace. To do that, they needed to present a credible invasion threat - to do that they need air superiority over the Channel to protect the invasion fleet and negate the Royal Navy.

To achieve air superiority meant knocking out Fighter Command - Galland himself estimated that to knock out Fighter Command and preserve a sufficient fighter force for the support of the invasion the Germans would need to sustain a 5:1 victory ratio over Fighter Command - they only came close to that on maybe 2 or 3 days over the BoB....

Another problem for the Germans was the UK had a great system in place for the repair of aircraft. Shooting aircraft down wasn't enough to put them out of the fight. Whereas the Germans in France didn't have that. Also pilots shot down over the UK could be recovered. Again not so with German Pilots.

Stovepipe

@BostonB, the Blenheim was used for raids on France into 1942, under fighter cover (Ramrods/Circuses) and was widely used in the Middle East and Far East during the same period. During 1941, the RAF diverted Havocs from day bombing to the useless Turbinlite project, which meant that the Blenheim had to keep going.It was fitted with the same 950 hp engines or equivalent and was as slow as glacial drift.Also, the Germans did not have a good aircraft repair system at the start of the war, but they learned fast.They used a percentage damage assessment system and anything fit for repair was shipped back to regional depots (equivalent to RAF MUs) or the main factory.The Daimler Benz in the 109 was routinely shipped home for repair, as field repair was deliberately limited to whatever squadrons could cope with. The British and Americans tended to have a more practical attitude to their field maintenance, ie, the men at the front were expected to do as much as humanly possible before they needed to send items to a depot.Both sides used factory field service techs to deal with unusual problems or to service specialised equipment.
@jawgap, the 110 was well regarded by all who flew it and was very versatile. It might have been a dog as a pure fighter but plenty of other nations built aircraft to the same concept, such as the Dutch Fokker twinboom fighter, the many varieties of Potez 63 and the Japanese Dinah.

regards
Stovepipe

BostonB

Stovepipe wrote: »

...Also, the Germans did not have a good aircraft repair system at the start of the war, but they learned fast....

My comment was only in relation to the BOB.

Stovepipe wrote: »

@BostonB, the Blenheim was used for raids on France into 1942, under fighter cover (Ramrods/Circuses) and was widely used in the Middle East and Far East during the same period. During 1941, the RAF diverted Havocs from day bombing to the useless Turbinlite project, ...

I can't really comment. You've not posted any links to where you are getting this information from or the relative numbers of available operation aircraft in the various theaters to compare like with like.

Off the top of my head perhaps in 1941 defending against bombing took more of a priority and the Blenheim didn't have the performance needed to carry use the Turbinlite.

Tony EH

Jawgap wrote: »

Seriously, Wikipedia is your rebuttal

In as far as explaining my reading of Baldwins quote yes. I don't see what your problem is here. You seem like you're determined to have an argument over nothing?

Jawgap wrote: »

Also just because the Stuka continued in service doesn't mean it wasn't obsolescent - my father-in-law's restore Morris Minor is perfectly serviceable, but you wouldn't say it meets modern day motoring needs.

If something is in general service, it isn't obsolescent. The Stuka continued to be an integral part of the German 1st line for years after 1940. It was essential to CAS in the war's most important theatre, Russia. Certainly, production was winding down in 1944. But, so was every German bomber, as production turned to fighters for the last years of the war.

Your Morris Minor analogy doesn't apply.

Jawgap wrote: »

After the BoB the Stuka continued - it was used in secondary theaters like the Aegean and Mediterranean with good results, but even in the desert the serviceability rate of St.G 3 rarely exceeded 50% which is pretty poor considering the Luftwaffe planned operations on the basis of 80% serviceability.

The Stuka was used primarilly in the MOST important theatre of the entire war. The Russian front outweighed ANYTHING that happened in the West, or the sideshows like the Med, and the aircraft was essential to German Eastern advances from 1941 to 1943. Even in 44, she was still doing what she did best.

When something is about to become obsolete, it means it's no longer capable of carrying out its function to its fullest degree, but the Stuka was still able to do the duty she was designed for and that was to fly a short distance and put a bomb right on top of a target.

She wasn't meant to do anything else.

If we can find common ground on this, perhaps we can agree that the entire concept of dive bombing was to become outmoded, due to the changing of manner aircraft and air combat in the jet age, post 1945?

Stovepipe

Hi there,
The information about Blenheim bombing raids and other duties has been extensively covered in the UK aviation history magazines such as Flypast and Aeroplane Monthly. It's very common knowledge, really. As for night-fighting, as in the turbinlite project and even conventional night interception, the Blenheim was not really up to the task and the Beaufighter was much better as a dedicated AI platform.
Tony,
I think pure vertical dive-bombing was effectively done away with by the demise of the Stuka/Dauntless/Vengeance generation of aircraft and even before the end of WW 2, dive bombing was confining itself to dive angles of 45 degrees or less and being conducted by fighter-bombers like the A-36 and a lot of the time, dive angles were shallow (30 degrees or less) to deliver rockets, napalm, cluster bombs and so on, as well as conventional iron bombs. I think by the Korean War, the concept of very steep dive bombing was pretty much over, unless a pilot was prepared to take the risk in the face of intense flak or dangerously low cloud cover.

regards
Stovepipe

BostonB

These are fairly sweeping and dissimilar generalizations when a whole range of factors are relevant like number of available air frames (bombers of different types and fighters) at specific dates are needed to put everything into perspective. Seems to me (on casual observation) they had a load of Blenheims and a shortage of better types for that period of 41~42.

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/weapons_bristol_blenheim_combat.html

I think conventional bombing fell out of favor in general, from the 50's to Vietnam. It was all missiles and radar. The limitations of this only became apparent in Vietnam. Which lead back to Dive Bombing with F105's etc.

Wibbs

Tony EH wrote: »

The Stuka was used primarilly in the MOST important theatre of the entire war. The Russian front outweighed ANYTHING that happened in the West, or the sideshows like the Med, and the aircraft was essential to German Eastern advances from 1941 to 1943. Even in 44, she was still doing what she did best.

When something is about to become obsolete, it means it's no longer capable of carrying out its function to its fullest degree, but the Stuka was still able to do the duty she was designed for and that was to fly a short distance and put a bomb right on top of a target.

She wasn't meant to do anything else.

+1. That said the JU 87 was an obsolete old fashioned design even by the start of the war. It was very much a 1930's aircraft and on that score the "obsolete" tag sits well enough. However, this says nothing about it's effectiveness. In pure results, it was one of the more effective airframes of the war on any side. As airborne artillery in close support of guys on the ground it was pretty unmatched. It was also damned good at attacks on shipping. The Germans were constantly looking for ways to replace the aging design and coming up short. Pilots like Rudel and others spoke of this and in particular spoke of the all encompassing obsession with speed in designers and planners and they reckoned this was a mistake when applied to a close support aircraft. Rudel noted that when he transferred to FW190's, a far superior aircraft on paper their ability to loiter in an area and ability to aim effectively was much reduced compared to their Stukas. The latter could also take far more punishment and keep flying, plus were more robust with regard to rough field operations(unusually for German WW2 aircraft it had very good brakes so could stop in a shorter distance*). It also extended it's original pure dive bomber mission brief, becoming a very effective tankbuster and night harrasment bomber.




*When the end was nigh Rudel hatched a plan to get Hitler out of Berlin by air and he insisted on using a Stuka rather than a Storch to do it.

Tony EH

Sure, the design was old fashioned, employing fixed gear etc. But, with the appearance of jet aircraft, every prop aircraft design was put in that category, especially where fighters were concerned.

I'd say the Stuka was a unique design, but yes, very 30's. However, a strong one for its intended role, nonetheless.

Her adaptation as a tank-buster led to a nightmare for Russian tank crews, you're correct. By all accounts she was devastating at Kursk, although, to be honest, Idread to think what it was like to fly with those big 37mm cannons under the wings.

Stovepipe

The Germans held a conference about ground attack in 1943, I think, to which input from the attack units and the manufacturers was included. One pertinent comment was the loss rate of the Stuka, which, at the time of the Kursk battle was in the order of 100% on one front, along with the consequent drain of qualified manpower. This prompted the greater use of the 190 as a "Schlact" aircraft, because it was tough, well-armed, fast and had a good bombload.

regards
Stovepipe

Wibbs

Tony EH wrote: »

I'd say the Stuka was a unique design, but yes, very 30's. However, a strong one for its intended role, nonetheless.

Very much so.

Her adaptation as a tank-buster led to a nightmare for Russian tank crews, you're correct. By all accounts she was devastating at Kursk

In the tank busting role throughout the eastern campaign they were hated by the Soviet forces, when the G version came out it really put the wind up.

although, to be honest, Idread to think what it was like to fly with those big 37mm cannons under the wings.

Apparently a real dog alright and only the best pilots could handle it. they reduced airspeed, range, increased take off length and stall speed and really reduced any aerobatic shenanigans but were a real pain for the tank crews on the ground. Reports of whole Soviet crews jumping out of their tanks at the sight of them were common.

Stovepipe wrote: »

The Germans held a conference about ground attack in 1943, I think, to which input from the attack units and the manufacturers was included. One pertinent comment was the loss rate of the Stuka, which, at the time of the Kursk battle was in the order of 100% on one front, along with the consequent drain of qualified manpower. This prompted the greater use of the 190 as a "Schlact" aircraft, because it was tough, well-armed, fast and had a good bombload.

But as many of the stuka guys on the ground noted it wasn't as tough, nor nearly as accurate in ground attack. The 190's were brought in as a bit of a ground attack stopgap, because they Stuka replacements never materialised. Yes were more likely to get to and back from a target alright*, but hitting the target was the issue. They were also a lot trickier to fly than the Stuka and suffered more accidents. The fact that the majority of high scoring Stuka jockeys when they could stayed with the older aircraft right to the end speaks volumes.





*Losses were not so much because of enemy aircraft fire, but from ground fire. IIRC Rudel was shot down something daft like 20 times, but never by an enemy fighter, always AA.

Jawgap

Tony EH wrote: »

In as far as explaining my reading of Baldwins quote yes. I don't see what your problem is here. You seem like you're determined to have an argument over nothing?

Not really, there's a grave misunderstanding about Baldwin's quote - he was speaking not about defences being overwhelmed, because at the time no defence system existed - it was disarmament debate and the points being made related to the maintenance of a bomber force as a deterrent, because in their view if the enemy's bombers can get through, then so could theirs. If he'd made the speech 7 years later the quote would have sounded absurd because by then a decent, semi-effective integrated air defence had been brought into existence.

Tony EH wrote: »

If something is in general service, it isn't obsolescent. The Stuka continued to be an integral part of the German 1st line for years after 1940. It was essential to CAS in the war's most important theatre, Russia. Certainly, production was winding down in 1944. But, so was every German bomber, as production turned to fighters for the last years of the war.

Your Morris Minor analogy doesn't apply.



The Stuka was used primarilly in the MOST important theatre of the entire war. The Russian front outweighed ANYTHING that happened in the West, or the sideshows like the Med, and the aircraft was essential to German Eastern advances from 1941 to 1943. Even in 44, she was still doing what she did best.

When something is about to become obsolete, it means it's no longer capable of carrying out its function to its fullest degree, but the Stuka was still able to do the duty she was designed for and that was to fly a short distance and put a bomb right on top of a target.

She wasn't meant to do anything else.

If we can find common ground on this, perhaps we can agree that the entire concept of dive bombing was to become outmoded, due to the changing of manner aircraft and air combat in the jet age, post 1945?

The Stuka was originally conceived, designed and specified as a multi-purpose aircraft - not just an aircraft to do one job. Aside from providing close air support at the point of decision, it was supposed to be able to hit strategic targets away from the front and carry out the then equivalent of armed recce. The aircraft that came to be known as the Stuka was the heavy Stuka, there was also supposed to be a light Stuka - which would have been more akin to a fighter-bomber. The heavy Stuka came into service as the Ju87, the light Stuka as the Hs123.

When it was first delivered it had a very limited range and as late as 1937 it was not seen as a primary close air support aircraft - the Hs129 was supposed to fill out that role, but when that turned out to be a disaster, the Ju87 Stuka got a second look and the one thing it could do was hit things on the battlefield, so even though it failed to meet the spec laid out for it in every other regard it did meet the requirements for a close air support weapon.

Something is obsolete if it falls out of use, but it is obsolescent if there is a better alternative available. The Stuka was obsolescent in the technical sense by 1940 (and possibly before the War started) because there were better alternatives available.

Production of the type, like a lot of German airframes, continued because the aircraft manufacturers and the Luftwaffe got locked into a numbers game, and it was easier to keep churning out the same aircraft rather than re-tool to produce successor or wholly new aircraft - one of the reasons they persisted with the likes of Bf109 past the G-2 variant.

The Stuka did one job - close air support - very well. Definitely accurate, and great for the battlefield commander to be able to whistle them up when he required them to deal with an obstacle or fortification, but beyond that they were fairly useless as an instrument of tactical air power. They could roll forward, operate from rough airfields and provide immediate support to the unit commander trying to prevail in a tactical engagement, but on the wider battlefield they were of questionable use.

They couldn't loiter on station for very long - they could do a bit of battlefield interdiction, though not too far beyond the front line. They couldn't do the most important mission of any tactical aircraft - the armed recce.

In the rush to produce aircraft in numbers, it made more sense to the Luftwaffe to take a failed but easy to produce design, re-conceive it as a pure ground attack aircraft and put it into production, rather than explore the potential of a problematic design closer to spec.

The Hs129 was underpowered, over-engineered, difficult to control, difficult to manufacture and was marked down as a programme failure by the Reichsluftfahrtministerium.

The Soviets, too, also had an aircraft that was underpowered, over-engineered, difficult to control, difficult to manufacture when it was delivered, but in contrast to the Germans instead of dumping it, they worked out the problems on what was to become the IL-2 Sturmovik.

I think dive bombing was outmoded long before 1945, even before the War started. Richtofen (Wolfram) thought so and when he was the Luftwaffe's Technical Director he ordered development of dive bombers to cease, it was only when Udet succeeded him did development re-commence. I know he made great use of the Stuka, but I presume in his position you worked with what you were given.

Tony EH

Jawgap wrote: »

Not really, there's a grave misunderstanding about Baldwin's quote - he was speaking not about defences being overwhelmed, because at the time no defence system existed - it was disarmament debate and the points being made related to the maintenance of a bomber force as a deterrent, because in their view if the enemy's bombers can get through, then so could theirs. If he'd made the speech 7 years later the quote would have sounded absurd because by then a decent, semi-effective integrated air defence had been brought into existence.

I am well aware of the time, place and occasion of the Parliamentary debate and also that the particular quote in question has been taken out of context misquoted time and time again. In fact, in my many years of studying the period, I've seen it used as damning quote for Ballwin’s misunderstanding of the situation.

However, I still don't know what we are arguing about here. It seems to me we are on pretty much the same foot here?

Jawgap wrote: »

The Stuka was originally conceived, designed and specified as a multi-purpose aircraft - not just an aircraft to do one job. Aside from providing close air support at the point of decision, it was supposed to be able to hit strategic targets away from the front and carry out the then equivalent of armed recce. The aircraft that came to be known as the Stuka was the heavy Stuka, there was also supposed to be a light Stuka - which would have been more akin to a fighter-bomber. The heavy Stuka came into service as the Ju87, the light Stuka as the Hs123.

The Ju-87 was designed as part of the Sturzbomber programm and right from the moment pen hit paper in a serious way in 1933, she was to be a Sturzkampfflugzueg. Her very name was a play on her type. There was nothing about her being developed for any other role, especially anything to do with a "strategic" function. Her role was purely tactical. In fact, the entire Luftwaffe was designed around a tactical doctrine. One of its worst shortcomings and one that would have a significant on Germany's ability to wage war in the coming conflict. I don't know of any stipulation for her to be used in a reconnaissance role either. If, perhaps, that was touted at a very early stage, it was certainly dropped by 1933 and her designer, Hermann Pohlmann, never pencilled in such a requirement.

The Henshel was also designed as part of the same program, but she was designed in part to commit to a reconnaissance role and was to replace an older design. But, as it would turn out, she herself was to be eventually replaced with the Ju-87 (effectively the second stage of the Sturzbomber programm), as numbers became available. From the outset of JU-87 production, the intention was to fully replace the Hs123 design, which is why there was only a few hundred made.

Jawgap wrote: »

When it was first delivered it had a very limited range and as late as 1937 it was not seen as a primary close air support aircraft - the Hs129 was supposed to fill out that role, but when that turned out to be a disaster, the Ju87 Stuka got a second look and the one thing it could do was hit things on the battlefield, so even though it failed to meet the spec laid out for it in every other regard it did meet the requirements for a close air support weapon.

The production Ju-87 was never supposed to have a long range though. She was always supposed to be a ground support dive bomber, designed to operate close to her lines, in support of an advancing army. Again, maybe at the extremely early stages of proposal, range may have been a factor, but by 1933, that wasn't part of the deal, certainly not for the intended production variants and it wouldn't be until the Ju-87R, which saw development during the production of the B series, 5 years after the first Stuka rolled off the line. In addition, the Hs129, wasn't even thought of as a serious proposition until 1938 and she definitely was not to replace the Stuka, which was a different kettle of fish altogether, even if they were both classed as ground attack aircraft. Both aircraft were always to be used as close air support, in their different ways. Also, the Stuka's lifespan wasn't dependant on the relative failure of the Henschel design. She was doing her job just fine, both before and after the Hs129's existence.

Jawgap wrote: »

Something is obsolete if it falls out of use, but it is obsolescent if there is a better alternative available. The Stuka was obsolescent in the technical sense by 1940 (and possibly before the War started) because there were better alternatives available.

But, you see, there wasn't. Not in its class. Although her design was unique and the concept for which she was designed for was wouldn't see a future beyond the end of the war, she carried out her function to the best of her ability for her career. As stated earlier, she was always a slow plane, she was never supposed to operate in contested airspace. But she was supposed to fly to a target and dive bomb it, which she did perfectly. There weren't any better alternatives for her stated purpose.

Jawgap wrote: »

The Stuka did one job - close air support - very well. Definitely accurate, and great for the battlefield commander to be able to whistle them up when he required them to deal with an obstacle or fortification, but beyond that they were fairly useless as an instrument of tactical air power.

But that was the only thing required of her. How you can say the Stuka was "useless", when she continued to perform sterling service in all of Germany's advances, is beyond me. When she was used in the right conditions, the conditions that she was designed for, she was a devastating machine. Sure, she was an easy target in heavily contested airspace, yes she slow, yes she was an older design. But when she was asked to do her trick, she never lost it.

BostonB

The David Beckham of the Luftwaffe.

Jawgap

Tony EH wrote: »

.......



The Ju-87 was designed as part of the Sturzbomber programm and right from the moment pen hit paper in a serious way in 1933, she was to be a Sturzkampfflugzueg. Her very name was a play on her type. There was nothing about her being developed for any other role, especially anything to do with a "strategic" function. Her role was purely tactical. In fact, the entire Luftwaffe was designed around a tactical doctrine. One of its worst shortcomings and one that would have a significant on Germany's ability to wage war in the coming conflict. I don't know of any stipulation for her to be used in a reconnaissance role either. If, perhaps, that was touted at a very early stage, it was certainly dropped by 1933 and her designer, Hermann Pohlmann, never pencilled in such a requirement.

The Henshel was also designed as part of the same program, but she was designed in part to commit to a reconnaissance role and was to replace an older design. But, as it would turn out, she herself was to be eventually replaced with the Ju-87 (effectively the second stage of the Sturzbomber programm), as numbers became available. From the outset of JU-87 production, the intention was to fully replace the Hs123 design, which is why there was only a few hundred made. .

I'm not sure as a student of the period what you're reading, but the generally accepted lineage of the Ju87 pre-dates the establishment of the Luftwaffe. It begins with the testing of the Junkers K47 (also sometimes referred to as the Ju47) in 1928. Following on from these successful tests the Truppenamt Air Staff issued a spec for a light and heavy Stuka in 1930.

The light Stuka was specified to be capable of carrying a 200kg bomb load and operate as a heavy fighter; the heavy Stuka was supposed to be, among other things, a dive bomber capable of carrying 500kg. Following on from this - in 1932 - what became known as the Army Stuka programme produced the He50, and deliveries of that began in 1933.

The re-armament committee which you seem to be referring to, re-prioritised the programme - eventually, in 1934, giving it a top priority. According the airpower historian James Corum (citing the relevant German archives) , "....the rearmament committee gave Stuka development a top priority, envisioning the Stuka as a multi-purpose aircraft with great range. It would be suitable for a variety of missions. including strategic targets."

The limitations of the aircraft subsequently produced, along with emerging Luftwaffe doctrine and the ability to operate from forward airfields, according to Corum, "all combined to turn the Stuka into a CAS weapon."

Tony EH wrote: »

.......

The production Ju-87 was never supposed to have a long range though. She was always supposed to be a ground support dive bomber, designed to operate close to her lines, in support of an advancing army. Again, maybe at the extremely early stages of proposal, range may have been a factor, but by 1933, that wasn't part of the deal, certainly not for the intended production variants and it wouldn't be until the Ju-87R, which saw development during the production of the B series, 5 years after the first Stuka rolled off the line. In addition, the Hs129, wasn't even thought of as a serious proposition until 1938 and she definitely was not to replace the Stuka, which was a different kettle of fish altogether, even if they were both classed as ground attack aircraft. Both aircraft were always to be used as close air support, in their different ways. Also, the Stuka's lifespan wasn't dependant on the relative failure of the Henschel design. She was doing her job just fine, both before and after the Hs129's existence.



But, you see, there wasn't. Not in its class. Although her design was unique and the concept for which she was designed for was wouldn't see a future beyond the end of the war, she carried out her function to the best of her ability for her career. As stated earlier, she was always a slow plane, she was never supposed to operate in contested airspace. But she was supposed to fly to a target and dive bomb it, which she did perfectly. There weren't any better alternatives for her stated purpose.



But that was the only thing required of her. How you can say the Stuka was "useless", when she continued to perform sterling service in all of Germany's advances, is beyond me. When she was used in the right conditions, the conditions that she was designed for, she was a devastating machine. Sure, she was an easy target in heavily contested airspace, yes she slow, yes she was an older design. But when she was asked to do her trick, she never lost it.

Your assertions don't gel with the German archival sources.....and horses continued to do sterling service in the Heer right up to 1945.

As JFK said, the enemy of the truth is not the lie, but the myth and the mythology of the Stuka belies the fact it was a failed design, adapted to do one job well that coincidentally fitted with the norms and expectations of the late 1930s Germany Army - once those norms changed it continued to the job it was co-opted to do, even though that job was becoming less relevant as the Germans moved on to the defensive.

It benefits from what General Dan Bolger calls ‘Wehrmacht penis envy.’ As he sees it this involves a love of Panzers, Stukas, and the 'Sturm und Drang' with "the enthusiasm of a twelve-year old boy who has yet to learn about Kursk, Omaha Beach, or Operation Cobra, let alone Bergen Belsen.”

Finally, the Luftwaffe went to war with an army support doctrine, not a tactical airpower doctrine, or as Richthofen put it - the Luftwaffe was to be the Army's whore. The force had many fine qualities (agility, robustness etc) but doctrinally (for example, a lack of strategic independence) and intellectually it was significantly lacking especially when compared to the RAF, and laterly the USAAF.

BostonB

Jawgap wrote: »

... "....the rearmament committee gave Stuka development a top priority, envisioning the Stuka as a multi-purpose aircraft with great range. It would be suitable for a variety of missions. including strategic targets."...

Great Range? :eek:

Jawgap

BostonB wrote: »

Great Range? :eek:

That's what they asked for, not sure if that's what they got:D

Tony EH

Jawgap wrote: »

I'm not sure as a student of the period what you're reading, but the generally accepted lineage of the Ju87 pre-dates the establishment of the Luftwaffe. It begins with the testing of the Junkers K47 (also sometimes referred to as the Ju47) in 1928. Following on from these successful tests the Truppenamt Air Staff issued a spec for a light and heavy Stuka in 1930.

The light Stuka was specified to be capable of carrying a 200kg bomb load and operate as a heavy fighter; the heavy Stuka was supposed to be, among other things, a dive bomber capable of carrying 500kg. Following on from this - in 1932 - what became known as the Army Stuka programme produced the He50, and deliveries of that began in 1933.

The re-armament committee which you seem to be referring to, re-prioritised the programme - eventually, in 1934, giving it a top priority. According the airpower historian James Corum (citing the relevant German archives) , "....the rearmament committee gave Stuka development a top priority, envisioning the Stuka as a multi-purpose aircraft with great range. It would be suitable for a variety of missions. including strategic targets."

The limitations of the aircraft subsequently produced, along with emerging Luftwaffe doctrine and the ability to operate from forward airfields, according to Corum, "all combined to turn the Stuka into a CAS weapon."

Well, it's the first time that I've heard anything about range or strategic bombing being mentioned at all in conjunction with the production of the Stuka and as I said, perhaps in the very early stages of development, range may have been a factor, but it certainly wasn't deemed to be essential and it certainly wasn't factored in, by the time serious work on development had begun. Also, the Stuka may have "been on the cards" pre-Luftwaffe, but its design, in a serious manner didn't take place until the Sturzbomber programm. I am also aware of Pohlmann's work with the K47. But the K47 was actually designed as a fighter, not a dedicated dive bomber. It was just used in trials. It wasn't the forefather of the Stuka, although I believe Pohlmann nicked some ideas from its basic design.

What exactly does Corum mean by "strategic targets"? Because, frankly, the Stuka is wholly unsuited to strategic bombing and would have been, even on paper. In fact, the entire Luftwaffe wasn't suited to strategic bombing.

Lastly, regardless of what Corum says, the Stuka didn't "turn into" a close support weapon because of the "...limitations of the aircraft subsequently produced", it was designed as such. Dive bombing is a tactical operation. It's not suited to a strategic one.

Jawgap wrote: »

Your assertions don't gel with the German archival sources.....and horses continued to do sterling service in the Heer right up to 1945.

My points gel with what was actually developed.

You analogy about horses is meaningless.

Jawgap wrote: »

Finally, the Luftwaffe went to war with an army support doctrine, not a tactical airpower doctrine....

The Luftwaffe's doctrinal role was as a tactical airforce. That is support of the Army. It was designed around the targeting of items of immediate military value, on the battlefield as it were. It was always meant to act as "flying artilery", it was never meant to be used otherwise, despite its being press-ganged into strategic operations during the war.

Jawgap

Tony EH wrote: »

Well, it's the first time that I've heard anything about range or strategic bombing being mentioned at all in conjunction with the production of the Stuka and as I said, perhaps in the very early stages of development, range may have been a factor, but it certainly wasn't deemed to be essential and it certainly wasn't factored in, by the time serious work on development had begun. Also, the Stuka may have "been on the cards" pre-Luftwaffe, but its design, in a serious manner didn't take place until the Sturzbomber programm. I am also aware of Pohlmann's work with the K47. But the K47 was actually designed as a fighter, not a dedicated dive bomber. It was just used in trials. It wasn't the forefather of the Stuka, although I believe Pohlmann nicked some ideas from its basic design.

What exactly does Corum mean by "strategic targets"? Because, frankly, the Stuka is wholly unsuited to strategic bombing and would have been, even on paper. In fact, the entire Luftwaffe wasn't suited to strategic bombing.

Lastly, regardless of what Corum says, the Stuka didn't "turn into" a close support weapon because of the "...limitations of the aircraft subsequently produced", it was designed as such. Dive bombing is a tactical operation. It's not suited to a strategic one.
.

I'm going to go out on a limb here and suggest that when a former Lt Col, Oxford educated professor of military history who specialises in air power and the Luftwaffe, writes about the development of an aircraft and cites liberally from the archival sources, that he knows what he's writing about and if this is the first time that you've heard anything about range or strategic bombing being mentioned at all in conjunction with the production of the Stuka, then maybe you need to read from some other sources.

Strategic targets are installations etc vital to a country's war-making capacity - in the BoB, Bentley Priory and the control room at Northolt were arguably two of the most strategic targets overlooked by the Luftwaffe. The Chain Home stations were arguably strategic, but were not subject to the type of sustained attack that would have been needed to put them out of commission - the Stuka had some success against them.

Tony EH wrote: »

My points gel with what was actually developed.

You analogy about horses is meaningless.

.

Yes, all analogies are meaningless if they don't support your position.

Tony EH wrote: »

The Luftwaffe's doctrinal role was as a tactical airforce. That is support of the Army. It was designed around the targeting of items of immediate military value, on the battlefield as it were. It was always meant to act as "flying artilery", it was never meant to be used otherwise, despite its being press-ganged into strategic operations during the war.

Close air support, which is what the Stuka was good at and what the Luftwaffe was geared towards, is not the beginning and end of tactical air support. Yes, it is what the army commander wants, angels on his shoulder, but it is only one aspect of tactical air power / support.

Armed recce, close impromptu support, direct impromptu support, indirect preplanned support, and indirect impromptu support were the components of tactical air power in WW2.

All of those are tactical air power activities, the objectives of which should be to achieve air superiority (a pre-requisite to all other activities), carry out reconnaissance, disrupt communications and logistics, disrupt high level planning and support ground forces.

All armies want the air force to support them directly - something the Luftwaffe was very good at, but moving beyond that their efficiency trailed off.
Post-war analysis shows that while troops on the ground preferred to see the aircraft supporting them and it gave them a psychological boost, it was the armed recce missions that were much more effective - better to find and hit a division when it was forming up rather than knock it out of the way when it deployed - even better, was to prevent the division making to the battlefield.

In contrast, air force officers, while acknowledging the need for close support, recognised the value of indirect support operations. Close air support even if it was called in by flivos tended to dissipate air power, whereas indirect support allows for air power to be concentrated for greater effect.

Tony EH

Jawgap wrote: »

I'm going to go out on a limb here and suggest that when a former Lt Col, Oxford educated professor of military history who specialises in air power and the Luftwaffe, writes about the development of an aircraft and cites liberally from the archival sources, that he knows what he's writing about and if this is the first time that you've heard anything about range or strategic bombing being mentioned at all in conjunction with the production of the Stuka, then maybe you need to read from some other sources.

You can certainly go out onto that limb if you wish and perhaps there was a requirement from the powers that be that suggested that range and strategic bombing be capabilities of the, as yet, unrealised functions of the Ju-87. But like all aircraft, which are subject to sketches, dreams and wish lists at the very first beginnings of life, the realities of development change accordingly and the Stuka was no different. It's an absolute given, that when proper development of the aircraft got going, those "nice-to-haves" from the higher ups were dropped completely and I doubt they survived on the table for very long.

Jawgap wrote: »

Strategic targets are installations etc vital to a country's war-making capacity - in the BoB, Bentley Priory and the control room at Northolt were arguably two of the most strategic targets overlooked by the Luftwaffe. The Chain Home stations were arguably strategic, but were not subject to the type of sustained attack that would have been needed to put them out of commission - the Stuka had some success against them.

Strategic bombing targets are usually those that reside behind the lines, away from the fighting, like factories. Tactical targets are those that are within the immediate are of the battlefield, like pil-boxes, tanks, or enemy personnel, etc. That's the general given concept. The Ju87 was not designed for strategic purposes and she wasn't designed to act alone either. You may wish to label the chain-home radar stations as "strategic" to suit your argument, but the fact still remains that the Stuka wasn't developed to attack ANYTHING in Britain at all. None of the Luftwaffe's aircraft were, even if they were pressganged into such ops. Another point is that the Stuka failed in it's "strategic" operation to destroy the "strategic" radar stations, as the British usually had them repaired in short order, because the damage was too light, demonstrating perfectly well the unsuitability of the Stuka for such a purpose. Yet, when the Stukas were used in conjunction with advancing ground support, they were absolute devastating to the enemy.

Jawgap wrote: »

Yes, all analogies are meaningless if they don't support your position.

Then perhaps you can refrain from posting them then.

Jawgap wrote: »

Close air support, which is what the Stuka was good at and what the Luftwaffe was geared towards, is not the beginning and end of tactical air support.

I never said it was.

Jawgap wrote: »

Armed recce, close impromptu support, direct impromptu support, indirect preplanned support, and indirect impromptu support were the components of tactical air power in WW2.

I never said it wasn't.

BostonB

I've never heard the term Armed recce for WWII air operations before. I always though it was a concept that came later. I've mainly heard of it used in Vietnam.