Potential targets for the Luftwaffe in Eire, 1940-41

museologist

The Blitz is considered to have had three phases: the First lasted from September – November 1940 and targeted mainly London; the Second lasted from November 1940 – February 1941 and targeted many other industrial cities; the Third, from February – May 1941 was waged in response to Hitler's Directive 23, giving priority to attacks on ports and naval facilities to contribute to the Kriegsmarine’s efforts in the Battle of Atlantic.

If Eire had declared war on Germany after the fall of France in May 1940, there is little doubt that the country would have been a priority target during this final phase. But which ports would have been targeted and is there any evidence that Eire offered other potential targets during the earlier phases?

tac foley

Quote - 'Ireland was neutral in the war and one of the few countries that sent condolences to Germany on the news of Hitler's suicide. Perhaps they might have reconsidered sending this message of sympathy if they had known the Luftwaffe had taken numerous pictures of Ireland. This one[Dublin] is marked with the barracks as the primary target.'

This is from http://www.hitlersukpictures.co.uk/index.php?page=default-extensions

Dublin may have ended up looking like Rotterdam.

So might Cork.

In both instances, the vital land/sea facilities would have been spared for use by the Kriegsmarine, in particular the submarine flotte.

tac

museologist

tac foley wrote: »

Quote - 'Ireland was neutral in the war and one of the few countries that sent condolences to Germany on the news of Hitler's suicide. Perhaps they might have reconsidered sending this message of sympathy if they had known the Luftwaffe had taken numerous pictures of Ireland. This one[Dublin] is marked with the barracks as the primary target.'

This is from http://www.hitlersukpictures.co.uk/index.php?page=default-extensions

Dublin may have ended up looking like Rotterdam.

So might Cork.

In both instances, the vital land/sea facilities would have been spared for use by the Kriegsmarine, in particular the submarine flotte.

tac

Great stuff, thanks for the link! This is the kind of thing I'm looking for.

In appears that by the end of 1940, Nazi High Command had decided that an invasion of Ireland was not feasible:

'On 3rd December 1940, at a meeting in Berlin where an invasion of Ireland was dicussed, Hitler stated that 'a landing in Ireland' could 'only be attempted if Ireland requests help'...Raeder considered that, even if Ireland requested help, British naval supremacy in the waters surrounding Ireland meant that no transport operation of troops to Ireland could succeed' (Kennedy, Michael (2010), 'Guarding Neutral Ireland', p 178)

Thus it seems that Luftwaffe would not have had the burden of attempting to preserve certain facilities for the Kriegsmarine.

tac foley

The invasion of Ireland was always going to be problematical, to state the obvious. Any air-war would have had to have been conducted from bases in Norway or in the western part of France, to give the Luftwaffe any chance at all of carrying a load of bombs to the east and south east coast ports with any hope of a successful return journey. In short, they would have needed to have flown over a beaten UK to get to Ireland, or to use a beaten UK's airfields to enable them to reach the west coast and places like the only really usable anchorage there - Galway city.

True, the Luftwaffe had the longest-ranging aircraft of WW2 until the arrival of the B29 in the FW Condor, but although they had an enormous range, and were very useful as LRMR and convoy bombing, their bomb-load was reduced in favour of fuel. No Heinkel or other two-engined aircraft of the time could reach Galway AND return to base in either Norway or France.

IMO the entire venture depended on a successful invasion of mainland UK having been achieved. The reason for then building on the success and being able to form up massive wolfpacks of submarines then disappeared. With no UK to succour, there would have been no convoys heading in that direction. Any eventual convoy system required to support Soviet Russia could have been dealt with by a much-inflated number of aircraft flying from the by-then totally occupied Europe.

However, all is conjecture and fun to think about. The man that you should really have gotten to speak to was the late Kurt Kyke, who was the r/o in the very first Condor to crash in the Free State. He never went back to Germany after the war, and lived out the rest of his long life in Ireland after his internment was over. He was a good friend of a close friend of mine who lives in Drogheda and who will be coming over to stay with us next month [and visit the IWM at Duxford]. If you care to listen to stuff second-hand, you might PM me and I'll put you in touch with him.

tac

jamesdiver

Are we talking blitzing, or precision bombing? I doubt there was any point in blitzing any of the cities, seeing as we didnt have troops anywhere to affect their morale. My discussion below is more to do with precision bombing, so maybe im a little bit off topic.

Its a really interesting discussion. Had Hitler any notion of bombing Ireland, he would have possibly first knocked out the treaty ports, and removed them from Britains hands. Although you can see how they would want to safeguard them for their own use. Actually, Ireland was always on its toes for a possible British invasion force taking back the treaty ports. Churchill used to swear blind that we wouldnt offer them back for wartime use.

Secondly, the small amount of AA protection Ireland had, would probably have been a target. Then lastly, perhaps some of the coastal look out posts, and their communication lines might have been hit.

There was meant to be a radar outpost built at Malin Head towards the end of the war; which was to be manned by Irish, but covertly funded and trained by British engineers over the border. I'm not sure if it was a detection system, or a navigation aid to the transatlantic war plane deliveries. The end of the war meant this never happened, but things like this would have been targets.

tac foley

jamesdiver wrote: »

Are we talking blitzing, or precision bombing?

The only aircraft capable of 'precision bombing' at that time was the Junkers JU87B - STUKA. They were pushing it to cross the English Channel from France to southern England and deliver their single bomb, let alone fly from NW France or Norway/Denmark to Ireland. IAC, the term precision bombing did not enter the arena until the development of the Norden bombsight, which permitted American aircraft at 20,000 feet to drop their payload within a half-mile RADIUS circle.

tac

jamesdiver

Fair point, but maybe I should reword. Are we talking about the mass blitzing, where the 'target' is a large populated area, and the outcome is a blow to morale, or are we talking about strategic bombing, where the 'target' may be a military instalment, and the outcome is to remove it as a threat.

Either way, my reply post was more about strategic bombing (should'nt have said precision, as you pointed out).

Wibbs

jamesdiver wrote: »

Either way, my reply post was more about strategic bombing (should'nt have said precision, as you pointed out).

The thing is the German military weren't really set up for strategic bombing anyway. They were pretty much all about medium range tactical bombing in support of their army. You could argue The Blitz wasn't a designed tactic, but evolved in response to the tides of war. They'd have to reinvent the wheel to take on a target like Ireland. Nothing to do with our abilities to respond, purely logistical. Plus they'd have to have defeated the UK, or most of it to even think of an Irish invasion running to their script. With the UK still fighting, hitting Ireland would be akin to trying to hit a small bloke standing behind Hulk Hogan.

tac foley wrote: »

The only aircraft capable of 'precision bombing' at that time was the Junkers JU87B - STUKA. They were pushing it to cross the English Channel from France to southern England and deliver their single bomb, let alone fly from NW France or Norway/Denmark to Ireland.

+1 The JU 87 B the model they had at that stage had a range of around 2-300 miles depending on bombload. The southern UK was just about within range of their forward bases in France, but like you say no way would they have made a run to Ireland unless they were in bases in a defeated UK. Even the later long range R model wouldn't have made it. It was a perfect example of their thinking, a tactical bomber in close support of the army*.

Forget Ireland for a second, they had no real concrete plan to invade the UK because of their tactical script written for land battles. That narrow English CHannel had them by the nuts and all the posturing of their top brass looking through binoculars at the Cliffs of Dover was mostly flim flam. They had little in the way of beach assualt craft or any of that. Relying on barges in the event they were going to go for southern England. Even their aircraft weren't rated for over water flights and they had to hastily come up with plans for life vests and rafts in their single engined aircraft. Previous to the Battle of Britain Luftwaffe pilots of single engined aircraft were banned from crossing more than 8 miles of open water.








*A role it was incredibly effective in(contrary to much post war dismissal of them). Considering that there were rarely more than 400 Stuka's in service at any one time(and they only built a total of around 4000) their tally was very impressive. The German troops on the ground loved them. They were about the first army that could call in precision airstrikes on enemy positions.

jamesdiver

You make alot of good points, and I agree completely; but my suggestions where a purely theoretical reply to the original post as to what germany may have marked as a potential target.

Wibbs

I'd say the Curragh camp, Casement aerodrome, the Dail buildings, Dublin, Cobh and Dún Laoghaire ports, that sort of thing.

Jawgap

museologist wrote: »

The Blitz is considered to have had three phases: the First lasted from September – November 1940 and targeted mainly London; the Second lasted from November 1940 – February 1941 and targeted many other industrial cities; the Third, from February – May 1941 was waged in response to Hitler's Directive 23, giving priority to attacks on ports and naval facilities to contribute to the Kriegsmarine’s efforts in the Battle of Atlantic.

If Eire had declared war on Germany after the fall of France in May 1940, there is little doubt that the country would have been a priority target during this final phase. But which ports would have been targeted and is there any evidence that Eire offered other potential targets during the earlier phases?

I'd say there's every doubt Ireland would have been a priority target.

First, there was no way to get to Ireland in daylight without getting at the very least harassed by 10 Group's fighter squadrons. Any raid say departing for Brest and heading for Cork would have been detected by the Trevescan Chain Home station (CH17) unless they flew fairly far out to sea and didn't take a direct routing - this would also have moved them beyond fighter cover. Long flights over the sea, unescorted by fighters were tried once and only once during the Battle of Britain and they failed miserably.

A Brest-Cork raid faced a round trip of at least 1000km assuming a direct routing was used. Castletownbere was about 1200km and Foynes about 1300km. He111 and Do17s could have hit Cork, but really only the Do17 could have gone beyond that, and once you go north of Galway that's beyond the range of anything except a Condor. Any raid coming up the East Coast would be within range of fighters based in 10 Group (in Wales) and 13 Group (NW England and Northern Ireland).

Also the He111 and Do17s lacked accuracy bombing as they did from medium level, even in daylight. The only aircraft to attain any kind of precision was the Bf110 as operated by Erpro 110, but even they suffered fairly high casualties to achieve that success.

The Yanks with their Norden sight and bombing in daylight (albeit from high level) could only bomb with about 1000-1500ft accuracy and the Germans didn't start to equip their bombers with gyroscopically stabilised sights until Jan / Feb 1941.

All of which means they'd have been reduced to attacking at night - which means you can talk about Dublin or Cork being targeted, but they'd have no way to target and hit with any degree of precision a building or a docks without saturating an area.

....and if you are going to invest in saturation bombing, there were more profitable targets to strike closer to the German bases within the range of fighter protection, although probably more heavily defended, which would suggest Ireland would not have been a priority for reasons of practicality.

Stovepipe

Stukas made the 90 mile run from Cherbourg to Cornwall with five bombs, not one. They also bombed RAF Detling, up on the North kent coast, on one raid, which was another long-range raid for their type. the germans also pasted belfast from France, more than once.

regards
Stovepipe

Snickers Man

tac foley wrote: »

Quote - 'Ireland was neutral in the war and one of the few countries that sent condolences to Germany on the news of Hitler's suicide. Perhaps they might have reconsidered sending this message of sympathy if they had known the Luftwaffe had taken numerous pictures of Ireland. This one[Dublin] is marked with the barracks as the primary target.'

This is from http://www.hitlersukpictures.co.uk/index.php?page=default-extensions

Fascinating.

Now tell me. What sort of intelligence and pre-arranged plans did Britain have for the invasion and re-occupation of Ireland at the time? Probably far more detailed--and indeed realistic--given their prior knowledge of the country.

You know how armies work: they make basic plans for all sorts of operations which may become necessary in the future. Most of them never eventuate.

I bet the British High Command had (and probably still has) oodles of plans for military action against the likes of Spain (you think they don't have something up their sleeve wrt Gibraltar?), Belgium, even France.

And I'm sure they have contingencies for reoccupying their truculent western neighbour too.

The plans don't prove intent; they just prove the necessity of keeping staff officers busy during times of military inactivity. And giving politicians a covering for their arses when something unexpected happens and the great public says "How come you hadn't foreseen this and planned for it?"

Tony EH

Most nations militaries have contingency plans for use during a possible wartime situation. They would be foolish not to and Germany was no exception.

It makes perfect sense that a country, especially in a time of war would cover all the angles, doubly so in modern times (post WWI), where war has ceased to be contained to a small scale battlefield and has expanded into a truly global affair.

I'm basically agreeing with Snickers Man.

Also, Hitler prefered neutral countries to remain neutral, except when they were "in the way" of course, a la Belgium, Holland and Denmark. There is no real scenario that I can see where Ireland and Germany get intangled during the war. It would have been pointless for Ireland and a massive pain in the arse for Germany, who already had the irritation of having to try and deal with Britain, in a war they didn't want to bother with in the first place. It just would have been another detour for Hitler's real goal concerning Russia...

...and on top of it all, Germany jsut didn't have the equipment for such operations.

Jawgap

Stovepipe wrote: »

Stukas made the 90 mile run from Cherbourg to Cornwall with five bombs, not one. They also bombed RAF Detling, up on the North kent coast, on one raid, which was another long-range raid for their type. the germans also pasted belfast from France, more than once.

regards
Stovepipe

The Stuka was obsolescent by the time the BoB rolled around. Sure it had it successes and there was no doubting it's [relative] accuracy, but as the Germans (and the other air forces) found out, dive bombers are very vulnerable in contested air space.

Also, the question is not so much what did they hit, or how accurate they were, but what effect did they achieve, and the answer is very little principally because the Germans knew how to bomb, but not what to target - targeting policy and directives shifted continually. So did the Allies but at least they began to focus in on what was important.

Stuka raids had limited effects especially when compared to the strikes carried out by Me109 and Fw190 'Jabos' - unlike the Stuka attacks, the RAF found these incredibly difficult to deal with and they only stopped when the Luftwaffe transferred the squadrons to the Med.

Unlike Stuka and medium bomber raids they also tied up a significant number of men, guns and aircraft especially when compared to the number of aircraft involved. Again, intelligence and targetting was the Germans' achilles heel - they could hit things with the Jabos, but they didn't know what to hit, and they didn't realise the impact they were having.

True, the Luftwaffe hit Belfast very hard in two series of raids originating in France and Holland, but these were not precision raids, nor where they intended to be, and they were conducted at night, which goes back to my orginal point that the only thing the Luftwaffe could have targetted in Ireland was cities.

Snickers Man wrote: »

Fascinating.

Now tell me. What sort of intelligence and pre-arranged plans did Britain have for the invasion and re-occupation of Ireland at the time? Probably far more detailed--and indeed realistic--given their prior knowledge of the country.

You know how armies work: they make basic plans for all sorts of operations which may become necessary in the future. Most of them never eventuate.

I bet the British High Command had (and probably still has) oodles of plans for military action against the likes of Spain (you think they don't have something up their sleeve wrt Gibraltar?), Belgium, even France.

And I'm sure they have contingencies for reoccupying their truculent western neighbour too.

The plans don't prove intent; they just prove the necessity of keeping staff officers busy during times of military inactivity. And giving politicians a covering for their arses when something unexpected happens and the great public says "How come you hadn't foreseen this and planned for it?"

Britain had very advanced plans to 'invade' south of the border and planning had advanced to the point where there was active liaison between the militaries.

Essentially, the agreed plan was that in the event of an invasion force being detected light bombers and fighters based in Northern Ireland would launch an immediate attack on the force.

Once a landing had taken place, the Irish Government would wait at least 48 hours before asking the British to help - this would make it seem less like an invasion and more like what it was - assistance. That period would also have given the British time to bring their ground forces to the border and for the designated Irish Army escort / liaison forces to move north to meet them.

The working assumption was that the SE or S coast, with a potential airborne landing around Kilkenny, would be the target. The British and Irish forces were planned to move south to engage and forces ashore with the Irish only dealing with any 'indigenous' resistance towards the Brits.

Fighter Command also had plans to, once invited in, set up a Group covering the whole island.

Stovepipe

Hi Jawgap,
I think the German targeting (selection of targets) was a bit more accurate than you suggest. They were well able to make pinpoint attacks on aircraft factories, such as the repeated raids on the Supermarine factories. They knew perfectly well how critical they were to the UK war effort and were able to target them because of prewar information. The late UK aviation writer, John Isaacs, was an employee of the Spitfire factory and survived a precise Me110 attack on the plant (one of the EGr 210 unit's attacks?). One of the surviving Ju88 pilots of that summer, Peter Stahl, also wrote in his book that they were routinely tasked to bomb factory roofs and not housing. Apart from that, having conquered a huge chunk of continental Europe, don't you think that they would have figured out what to hit by the time they got to the French coast? They had units dedicated to scouring the captured industrial spaces of France and Holland for usable equipment so I doubt if they'd suddenly break with a national tradition of precision and accuracy and just allow pilots to bomb at random.
With regard to the Stuka, they knew perfectly well it was vulnerable but it was the best delivery system until the Jabo matured. The British persisted with the Blenheim, long after better American bombers were available and as a result, aircrews continued to die like flies in them.

regards
Stovepipe

Jawgap

@stovepipe.....

While I agree they were able to hit factories, again I'd question whether they achieved any meaningful effect. In early July 1940, Fighter Command had about 870 aircraft in its operational squadrons of which about 650 were available for immediate operations.

By the end of the BoB they had over 1000 in the squadrons and 720 available for immediate ops.

In early July 1940, there were 156 Spitfires (and 362 Hurricanes) in storage of which 119 were Class 1 - ready for immediate action. By the end of the BoB they still had 120 Spits in storage.

Spitfire production in June 1940 amounted to 103 aircraft; July - 160; August - 163; September 156; and October - 148.

Which I'd suggest indicates the Luftwaffe didn't generate a desired effect.

You've hinted at the challenge faced by the Luftwaffe and only figured out by the Americans after 18 months of bombing, namely it is relatively easy to blow the roof off a factory or even demolish it, but unless you damage or destroy the machine tools (particularly for something like aircraft production) any effect on production will only be temporary.

Also I think the Luftwaffe were a bit like the Yanks in that they preached precision and tried to practice it, but the limitations of the technology meant it was effectively a form of area bombing.

Jawgap

Some docs relating to the planning for providing assistance to 'Eire'...

BostonB

Stovepipe wrote: »

Hi Jawgap,
I think the German targeting (selection of targets) was a bit more accurate than you suggest. ..

Certainly everyone thought they were being accurate but the reality was they weren't unless they bombed at low level, or from diving bombing. TBH this was still a problem in Vietnam and to a certain degree in the Falklands.

I don't get your comment about the Blenheim. I was of the impression that they were withdrawn (from bombing in Europe) as B25s, Havocs, and Mosquito came into service. Sure theres some overlap especially in other theatres.

Tony EH

Jawgap wrote: »

The Stuka was obsolescent by the time the BoB rolled around.

Actually, the Stuka wasn't really "obsolete" at all, this is kind of a general mis-conception. It was still a worthy design for her purpose and could carry out its mission with greater accuracy than a lot of her contemporaries. It was always a slow machine, even in the 30's and was never meant for operations too far from the ground units she was to support. The problem with using the Stuka during the BoB, was that she simply was never designed for such a scenario, especially the very early unescorted sorties. In fact, none of the Luftwaffe's aircraft were designed for the likes of the BoB, which is why the Germans were forced to withdraw.

Jawgap wrote: »

Sure it had it successes and there was no doubting it's [relative] accuracy, but as the Germans (and the other air forces) found out, dive bombers are very vulnerable in contested air space.

The Gerries had always known about its vulnerability to fighter attack. There was no "finding out". Her low speed and manoeuvrability made her a juicy target for any fighter of the period, just like any dive bomber of the era. This was certainly not lost on the Germans. But again, she wasn't designed to be flown against fighter opposition. Her raison d'etre was to fly to a short range target and place a bomb load within a few metres of it, and this she did with great aplomb for her entire career. In fact, one could argue that she was the most successful in her class.

Jawgap wrote: »

Stuka raids had limited effects especially when compared to the strikes carried out by Me109 and Fw190 'Jabos' - unlike the Stuka attacks, the RAF found these incredibly difficult to deal with and they only stopped when the Luftwaffe transferred the squadrons to the Med.

The primary reason for the Stukas failure over Britain was a.) unfocused mission planning and b.) unsuitability for the campaign. The attacks on Britain were an unwanted detour to the Fuhrer's main goal, Russia. The Luftwaffe, as a whole was simply never designed to carry out a campaign against the likes of Britain and it was never really factored into her creation. Thus, the early missions were extremely muddled and more of a feeler type, that a well planned out strategic assault.

The Jabos may have been more successful at getting away, but their accuracy was minimal. Jabo's were suited to nuisance raids during the BoB, but they did little else and the BF109 was never suited to the role in the first place, due to the vulnerability to ground attack that her radiator suffered from. The FW190 would prove to be a much better aircraft for the Jabo role, largely because of her air cooled radial engine and she had a fair amount of success in Russia. But accuracy still left a lot to be desired.

BostonB

I thought that the pre WWII thinking was bombers (in general) could defend themselves. The scenario where they'd need escorting wasn't really in the general mindset. Also they thought they'd sweep the skies of fighter opposition.

Stovepipe

Hi all,
The Blenheim was in production until 1944, in various forms, well after it should have been replaced because it was slow, badly armed, had a miserable bombload and consumed metals and materials best kept for better aircraft. All of the American bombers surpassed it in every way.
I'd argue that the Jabo succeeded because it ultimately supplanted or replaced the pure dive bomber, in all air forces. In terms of accuracy, look at the fate of HMS Fiji, sunk by two 109s. In terms of utility to the Luftwaffe, it was unbeatable, because it was hard to detect, hard to catch, consumed a huge amount of defensive resources and used little in terms of strategic resources to enact.They may not have had pinpoint accuracy but they annoyed the British no end and when you think about it, Ramrods and Circuses were bigger versions of the same things.

regards
Stovepipe

The Pheasant

Hydro-electric dam at Ardnacrusha? largest hydro-electric dam in the world at the time AFAIR, would have had a pretty big effect on the state of electricity in Ireland at the time

EDIT: Hoover dam was bigger in 1930

Tony EH

BostonB wrote: »

I thought that the pre WWII thinking was bombers (in general) could defend themselves. The scenario where they'd need escorting wasn't really in the general mindset. Also they thought they'd sweep the skies of fighter opposition.

There were some (mainly among politicians) who believed that bombers would (or should, more to the point) be able to defend themselves, but more level headed people (mainly among those in the military) always knew that escort would be needed, especially on longer ranges.

The Germans understood this from the creation of the Luftwaffe in the 30's, which is why the development of the BF110 was even considered. Unfortunately, the BF110 wasn't a match for modern single engined fighters of the time and had to fall back on its secondary role as a fighter-bomber, which it was successful in, especially in Russia and as a night-fighter in the West, in which it excelled.

Stanley Baldwin famously said that "The bomber would always get through" (although he was echoing Duhet), however, what he actually meant was that when employed in large enough numbers, enough bomber aircraft would be able to get through to their target, not that fighter interception would be easily tackled by the bomber.

BostonB

When I said they'd sweep the skies of fighter opposition I didn't mean the bomber. I meant it was assumed air superiority would by created by their fighters. I didn't write what I had in my head, sorry.

Now I've never really thought about it before, or done any research, so this is off the top of my head. But other than the BF110 were there any aircraft designed with a escort role in mind. Sure lots of aircraft ended up in the role. But were any designed from scratch in that role? Before the war? Which suggests the idea of escorting bombers wasn't planned at all (as a sweeping generalization). Also most of the early bombing raids were not escorted. Which again suggests the planner and tacticians didn't really consider it. The Heavy Fighter, bomber interceptor wasn't designed to be an escort. Though they were used for that. Another factor was prewar bombers had relatively high speed in relation to fighters. This advantage suddenly disappear with new fighters that appeared just before the war. Most of these fighters had short range, which again suggests. escort role wasn't considered as requirement for fighters.

BostonB

Stovepipe wrote: »

Hi all,
The Blenheim was in production until 1944, in various forms, well after it should have been replaced because it was slow, badly armed, had a miserable bombload and consumed metals and materials best kept for better aircraft. All of the American bombers surpassed it in every way....

In production doesn't mean it was used as a bomber against heavy defenses. It was moved to other roles and theaters.I also think you are underestimating the time it takes to switch over to another aircraft, or the running costs in resources.

BostonB

Wibbs wrote: »

T....hitting Ireland would be akin to trying to hit a small bloke standing behind Hulk Hogan....

Couldn't agree more. It would make no sense to bomb Ireland. More important targets closer in the UK.

Wibbs

Tony EH wrote: »

Actually, the Stuka wasn't really "obsolete" at all, this is kind of a general mis-conception. It was still a worthy design for her purpose and could carry out its mission with greater accuracy than a lot of her contemporaries. It was always a slow machine, even in the 30's and was never meant for operations too far from the ground units she was to support. The problem with using the Stuka during the BoB, was that she simply was never designed for such a scenario, especially the very early unescorted sorties. In fact, none of the Luftwaffe's aircraft were designed for the likes of the BoB, which is why the Germans were forced to withdraw.



The Gerries had always known about its vulnerability to fighter attack. There was no "finding out". Her low speed and manoeuvrability made her a juicy target for any fighter of the period, just like any dive bomber of the era. This was certainly not lost on the Germans. But again, she wasn't designed to be flown against fighter opposition. Her raison d'etre was to fly to a short range target and place a bomb load within a few metres of it, and this she did with great aplomb for her entire career. In fact, one could argue that she was the most successful in her class.

+1. Considering how few were in service at any one time their tally of destruction is unbeatable in it's category. You name it they blew it up. From tanks to pillboxes to battleships. Hell some even got lucky with fighter planes the odd time. The first fighter shot down in the invasion of Poland was shot down by a Stuka. By the pilot too, not the rear gunner. This idea of "oh well they were boned without fighter escort, so this means they were crap" has more than a hint of wartime propaganda to it. Until fighter bombers like the Mosquito came along all bombers were vulnerable to enemy fighters. It was the nature of bombers at the time. Even so I'd rather be in a Stuka than say a Heinkel in contested airspace. You were more likely to get home. Plus even in the BoB they had successes. They essentially closed down the channel to British shipping for a start.

BostonB

Dive bombing in general was quite successful.

Tony EH

BostonB wrote: »

When I said they'd sweep the skies of fighter opposition I didn't mean the bomber. I meant it was assumed air superiority would by created by their fighters. I didn't write what I had in my head, sorry.

Aye, that was clear, no worries. My point was that there was a number in political circles that erroneously believed that bombers would be able to fend off the fighters. The Germans too, despite the development of the BF110, laboured under false impressions about bomber aircraft. Even though their political institutions listened to their military recomendations, they still had misconceptions in their minds about the so called schnell-bomber. It was believed that the Ju88 would be so fast that she wouldn't need escort and while she was actually a fast aircraft when first designed, that edge was very quickly lost. The earlier Do17 was also developed along those lines and actually set a number of speed records. The theoretical concept held some merit, especially within the "flying artilery" tactical design of the Luftwaffe, but in practice the theory fell apart.

BostonB wrote: »

Now I've never really thought about it before, or done any research, so this is off the top of my head. But other than the BF110 were there any aircraft designed with a escort role in mind. Sure lots of aircraft ended up in the role. But were any designed from scratch in that role? Before the war? Which suggests the idea of escorting bombers wasn't planned at all (as a sweeping generalization). Also most of the early bombing raids were not escorted. Which again suggests the planner and tacticians didn't really consider it. The Heavy Fighter, bomber interceptor wasn't designed to be an escort. Though they were used for that. Another factor was prewar bombers had relatively high speed in relation to fighters. This advantage suddenly disappear with new fighters that appeared just before the war. Most of these fighters had short range, which again suggests. escort role wasn't considered as requirement for fighters.

No, by and large, it wasn't planned, but that's because the political heads of the countries who had the design capabilities to produce modern aircraft weren't listening to the military minds advocating it. But the idea of escort was certainly around among more serious thinkers during the 30's. During the Spanish Civil War, it was shown very clearly that the concept of a schnellbomber, or a non-escorted bomber was a falsehood and the voices who were on the side of escort fighters were somewhat vindicated. As I said though, the only nation who's leaders took it seriously enough to actually design an aircraft for that purpose was Germany.

The only aircraft I can think of, IICRC, other than the BF110, that was designed with some escort duty in mind, was the P38. But it wasn't central to the design, by any means.

BostonB

I read a good book about the P38 (such a cool aircraft) in the ETO and PTO and I don't think it mentioned escort role at all, other than it falling into it. A much misunderstood aircraft though. The P38 some early glitches with engines and compressibility dive issues. But once sorted,and flown with a well trained pilot it was superb.

In the ETO, P-38s made 130,000 sorties with a loss of 1.3% overall, comparing favorably with ETO P-51s which posted a 1.1% loss, considering that the P-38s were vastly outnumbered and suffered from poorly thought-out tactics.

Dr Strange

Here's an interesting scientific article about the remains of a plane and pilot recovered in 2007 in Austria. The interesting part is the involvement of American bomber formations, the Mustang escorts and the Luftwaffe FW190 Sturmjaeger interceptors that were sent out.

The take down of one of the Sturmjaeger by a Mustang is described through witnesses on the ground and the analysis of bone fragments is also described.

Link: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12024-012-9390-6

(The problem is that you will have to have access through a university library or similar or else you'll have to pay for the article as it is in a scientific journal rather than a popular magazine).

Here's a letter to the editor with some additional details regarding the article (I think this one is freely available from the journal):

Link: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12024-012-9399-x

I think that the day of this particular fight is actually listed in official Luftwaffe and Allied records.

Stovepipe

The British were able to phase out the Hampden, Whitley, Manchester and Defiant in fairly short order and instigate mass production of their replacements. The Blenheim was kept in service despite the availability of better aircraft, such as the Havoc, Ventura, Baltimore and B-25. It should have joined it's fellows in second-line duties and not be kept on the various fronts, as it was vulnerable to even second-rate fighters. Once the British got the thumb out with aircraft production, by end 1940,they were able to deal with new builds and upgrades as they needed it. They could have expended the metals wasted on Blenheims by building B-25s, a much better bomber. In reality, service on Blenheims was regarded as a death sentence. There was a very good DVD out a few years back, about them and the loss rate of men and machines was prodigious. They were past it by 1941, at the latest.

regards
Stovepipe

BostonB

Where are you getting your information that the Blenheim was used when better types were available and operational?

On my brief search it seems as soon as other types became operational the Blenheim was moved to other tasks. Obviously ETO got the replacements first then the other theaters. I'm sure it took time to get the replacement aircraft in service. You can't really compare the use of something like the Manchester, Hampden and the Blenheim for other duties. The Blenheim might have been more versatile, more reliable and economical on fuel and other such things.

Tony EH

BostonB wrote: »

I read a good book about the P38 (such a cool aircraft) in the ETO and PTO and I don't think it mentioned escort role at all, other than it falling into it. A much misunderstood aircraft though. The P38 some early glitches with engines and compressibility dive issues. But once sorted,and flown with a well trained pilot it was superb.

Aye, the P38 was a smashing old plane. Such a crazy design. Maybe I'm wrong, but I do recall escort being a factor mentioned along the line.

By the time the J appeared, she was a great aircraft. No match for a single engined fighter in Europe really, but a well flown P38 could hold its own.

Qualitymark

Jawgap wrote: »

<snip>
Once a landing had taken place, the Irish Government would wait at least 48 hours before asking the British to help - this would make it seem less like an invasion and more like what it was - assistance. That period would also have given the British time to bring their ground forces to the border and for the designated Irish Army escort / liaison forces to move north to meet them.

The working assumption was that the SE or S coast, with a potential airborne landing around Kilkenny, would be the target. The British and Irish forces were planned to move south to engage and forces ashore with the Irish only dealing with any 'indigenous' resistance towards the Brits.

Fighter Command also had plans to, once invited in, set up a Group covering the whole island.

Citation?

Jawgap

Tony EH wrote: »

Actually, the Stuka wasn't really "obsolete" at all, this is kind of a general mis-conception. It was still a worthy design for her purpose and could carry out its mission with greater accuracy than a lot of her contemporaries. It was always a slow machine, even in the 30's and was never meant for operations too far from the ground units she was to support. The problem with using the Stuka during the BoB, was that she simply was never designed for such a scenario, especially the very early unescorted sorties. In fact, none of the Luftwaffe's aircraft were designed for the likes of the BoB, which is why the Germans were forced to withdraw.

Point of order Mr Chairman.......I never said the Stuka was obsolete, I said it was obsolescent, especially in the West.

The Luftwaffe's twin engined bombers were designed as bombers and that's what they did. Through the Blitz they dropped over 18,000 tons of bombs on Britain in six months - a rate comparable to the early stages of Bomber Command's offensive through 1941 and 1942.

The problem for the Germans was targeting - they were trying to generate a political effect - force Britain out of the war through a negotiated peace. To do that, they needed to present a credible invasion threat - to do that they need air superiority over the Channel to protect the invasion fleet and negate the Royal Navy.

To achieve air superiority meant knocking out Fighter Command - Galland himself estimated that to knock out Fighter Command and preserve a sufficient fighter force for the support of the invasion the Germans would need to sustain a 5:1 victory ratio over Fighter Command - they only came close to that on maybe 2 or 3 days over the BoB.

The Germans knew they needed to draw Fighter Command (not just 11 Group) up in large numbers if they were going to knock them down in large numbers.

They tried to figure out what they needed to target to get that response, hence the constant shifts in targeting. There main problem was that Dowding's strategy was based on preservation and he wasn't minded to fall for the bait.

The bomber groups of the Luftwaffe were there the same in 1940 as the 8th US Air Force bombers in 1944 - to act as 'fighter bait.' The Stuka was not so much bait, as free food for the fighters and that led to its withdrawal in the West.

Tony EH wrote: »

......

The Jabos may have been more successful at getting away, but their accuracy was minimal. Jabo's were suited to nuisance raids during the BoB, but they did little else and the BF109 was never suited to the role in the first place, due to the vulnerability to ground attack that her radiator suffered from. The FW190 would prove to be a much better aircraft for the Jabo role, largely because of her air cooled radial engine and she had a fair amount of success in Russia. But accuracy still left a lot to be desired.

Militarily, tip and run raids were not even a nuisance, they were the equivalent of pinpricks on an elephant, but politically they had a huge impact. In some sense the irony of the BoB and the Blitz was that it had a unifying effect on the British - tip and run caused huge political infighting.

It led to significant breakdowns in relations between politicians and between the political and military leadership, and caused friction between the Air Ministry, Air Council and the RAF - and within the RAF itself.

It also led to the RAF flying (pun intended:)) in the face of logic and dispersing air defence and anti-aircraft guns in an attempt to defend the 1300km coastline deemed vulnerable to tip and run. Finally, it forced them to do the one thing they had managed to avoid to that point - maintain standing patrols.......not bad considering at most there were only 48 aircraft committed to these missions at any one time.

Tony EH wrote: »

There were some (mainly among politicians) who believed that bombers would (or should, more to the point) be able to defend themselves, but more level headed people (mainly among those in the military) always knew that escort would be needed, especially on longer ranges.

The Germans understood this from the creation of the Luftwaffe in the 30's, which is why the development of the BF110 was even considered. Unfortunately, the BF110 wasn't a match for modern single engined fighters of the time and had to fall back on its secondary role as a fighter-bomber, which it was successful in, especially in Russia and as a night-fighter in the West, in which it excelled.

Stanley Baldwin famously said that "The bomber would always get through" (although he was echoing Duhet), however, what he actually meant was that when employed in large enough numbers, enough bomber aircraft would be able to get through to their target, not that fighter interception would be easily tackled by the bomber.

The Bf110 was a dog and its design and adoption was driven by Goering. One theory is that Milch who was largely responsible for establishing and equipping the new Luftwaffe, only let the design progress to production so he could use it to undermine Messerschmitt.

It could still outrun a Hurricane a sea level.

The idea that 'the bomber will always get through' was based not on the idea that mass would overcome any defence, but that the impossibility of defence against air attack was driven by the vastness of a country's airspace.

The rest of Baldwin's quote is 'the bomber will always get through, and it is very easy to understand that, if you realise the area of space.' He was using it as part of a debate to justify maintaining and expanding the bomber forces on the basis that 'the only defence is in offence, which means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves.'

Also his thinking and view was more driven by Trenchard (who was influenced to a degree by Douhet) and his ideas of morale bombing and bombing centres of gravity - this became dogma in RAF from the 1920s onwards and was largely driven by Trenchard's erroneous conclusion that the collapse in German morale in 1918 that led to the mutinies and civil resistance were significantly influenced by bombing, even though research done at the time showed it was not.

The shift in British defence planning and spending in the late 1930s was driven by an emerging realisation that bombers could be found, and their positions fixed using RDF. Dowding also knew he needed fast fighters to catch them - this led to the cantilever monoplane fighters - and he needed enough punch to knock them down (eight guns - although cannons proved more effective). Then he just integrated the lot.

It was driven or supported by a shift in assumptions - namely that a bomber force didn't need to be defeated in one one engagement - the strike just needed to be parried rather than blunted.

Jawgap

Qualitymark wrote: »

Citation?

I posted up the some of the docs showing the plans Fighter Command had.

The contingency planning took place between the militaries detailed in in DO 130 in the National Archives in Kew - "Dominions Office and successors: United Kingdom Representative to Eire, and Embassy, Republic of Ireland: Archives, Correspondence"

Specifically the cables from the British Military Attache and his contacts with Colonel Liam Archer Director of G2.

If you can't make it to Kew - pg 67 here has a useful summary

The KV series of files (Records of the Security Service) also go into plenty of detail on the cooperation between G2 and MI5 to counter German espionage efforts.

Tony EH

Jawgap wrote: »

The idea that 'the bomber will always get through' was based not on the idea that mass would overcome any defence, but that the impossibility of defence against air attack was driven by the vastness of a country's airspace.

The rest of Baldwin's quote is 'the bomber will always get through, and it is very easy to understand that, if you realise the area of space.' He was using it as part of a debate to justify maintaining and expanding the bomber forces on the basis that 'the only defence is in offence, which means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves.'

Here's a fuller quote from wiki:

I think it is well also for the man in the street to realise that there is no power on earth that can protect him from being bombed. Whatever people may tell him, the bomber will always get through, The only defence is in offence, which means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves...If the conscience of the young men should ever come to feel, with regard to this one instrument [bombing] that it is evil and should go, the thing will be done; but if they do not feel like that – well, as I say, the future is in their hands. But when the next war comes, and European civilisation is wiped out, as it will be, and by no force more than that force, then do not let them lay blame on the old men. Let them remember that they, principally, or they alone, are responsible for the terrors that have fallen upon the earth.

The opening paragraph of the wiki article states:

The bomber will always get through was a phrase used by Stanley Baldwin in 1932, in the speech "A Fear for the Future" to the British Parliament. He and others believed that, regardless of air defences, sufficient bomber aircraft will survive to destroy cities.

Which is accordance to the way I and others have always taken his meaning.

Jawgap wrote: »

Point of order Mr Chairman.......I never said the Stuka was obsolete, I said it was obsolescent, especially in the West.

And it's still wrong though, Jawgap. The Stuka went on for years after 1940 and continued to do stirling work in the job she was designed to do. Richthofen's stukas were essential over Stalingrad, for example. Over two years after their withdrawl from the Channel.

"The West" was essentially Britain for the better part of the war and as said, the Stuka was wholly unsuited to operations in that area.

Sure, she was an easy target for determined fighter opposition. But no more so than any of her class. A Dauntless wouldn't have faired much better, but I yet to hear anyone claim that the SBD was obsolete...or obsolescent.

Jawgap

Tony EH wrote: »

Here's a fuller quote from wiki:

I think it is well also for the man in the street to realise that there is no power on earth that can protect him from being bombed. Whatever people may tell him, the bomber will always get through, The only defence is in offence, which means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves...If the conscience of the young men should ever come to feel, with regard to this one instrument [bombing] that it is evil and should go, the thing will be done; but if they do not feel like that – well, as I say, the future is in their hands. But when the next war comes, and European civilisation is wiped out, as it will be, and by no force more than that force, then do not let them lay blame on the old men. Let them remember that they, principally, or they alone, are responsible for the terrors that have fallen upon the earth.

The opening paragraph of the wiki article states:

The bomber will always get through was a phrase used by Stanley Baldwin in 1932, in the speech "A Fear for the Future" to the British Parliament. He and others believed that, regardless of air defences, sufficient bomber aircraft will survive to destroy cities.

Which is accordance to the way I and others have always taken his meaning.




And it's still wrong though, Jawgap. The Stuka went on for years after 1940 and continued to do stirling work in the job she was designed to do. Richthofen's stukas were essential over Stalingrad, for example. Over two years after their withdrawl from the Channel.

"The West" was essentially Britain for the better part of the war and as said, the Stuka was wholly unsuited to operations in that area.

Sure, she was an easy target for determined fighter opposition. But no more so than any of her class. A Dauntless wouldn't have faired much better, but I yet to hear anyone claim that the SBD was obsolete...or obsolescent.

Seriously, Wikipedia is your rebuttal

Can I suggest you read the Hansard transcript of the debate rather than rely on Wikipedia. Baldwin was speaking in a disarmament debate when he said this - he was arguing in favour of maintaining a strong bomber force as a deterrent to attack - like an early version of Mutually Assured Destruction.

In fact his opening sentence, after the formalities of the speech's introduction is "Disarmament in my view will not stop war."

Considering this speech was made in 1932 when there was no real concept of air defence they couldn't debate overwhelming air defences by weight of numbers because none existed- this only changed and developed in 1937 with the adoption of the Inskip Doctrine and the idea of replacing fear of the bomber with fear of the fighter

Also just because the Stuka continued in service doesn't mean it wasn't obsolescent - my father-in-law's restore Morris Minor is perfectly serviceable, but you wouldn't say it meets modern day motoring needs.

After the BoB the Stuka continued - it was used in secondary theaters like the Aegean and Mediterranean with good results, but even in the desert the serviceability rate of St.G 3 rarely exceeded 50% which is pretty poor considering the Luftwaffe planned operations on the basis of 80% serviceability.

BostonB

Doesn't obsolescent mean that something is no longer useful? Rather than simply outdated.

It was known that Stuka was too slow when it when into production never mind during the war. Hard to argue it wasn't useful though.

BostonB

Jawgap wrote: »

...The problem for the Germans was targeting - they were trying to generate a political effect - force Britain out of the war through a negotiated peace. To do that, they needed to present a credible invasion threat - to do that they need air superiority over the Channel to protect the invasion fleet and negate the Royal Navy.

To achieve air superiority meant knocking out Fighter Command - Galland himself estimated that to knock out Fighter Command and preserve a sufficient fighter force for the support of the invasion the Germans would need to sustain a 5:1 victory ratio over Fighter Command - they only came close to that on maybe 2 or 3 days over the BoB....

Another problem for the Germans was the UK had a great system in place for the repair of aircraft. Shooting aircraft down wasn't enough to put them out of the fight. Whereas the Germans in France didn't have that. Also pilots shot down over the UK could be recovered. Again not so with German Pilots.

Stovepipe

@BostonB, the Blenheim was used for raids on France into 1942, under fighter cover (Ramrods/Circuses) and was widely used in the Middle East and Far East during the same period. During 1941, the RAF diverted Havocs from day bombing to the useless Turbinlite project, which meant that the Blenheim had to keep going.It was fitted with the same 950 hp engines or equivalent and was as slow as glacial drift.Also, the Germans did not have a good aircraft repair system at the start of the war, but they learned fast.They used a percentage damage assessment system and anything fit for repair was shipped back to regional depots (equivalent to RAF MUs) or the main factory.The Daimler Benz in the 109 was routinely shipped home for repair, as field repair was deliberately limited to whatever squadrons could cope with. The British and Americans tended to have a more practical attitude to their field maintenance, ie, the men at the front were expected to do as much as humanly possible before they needed to send items to a depot.Both sides used factory field service techs to deal with unusual problems or to service specialised equipment.
@jawgap, the 110 was well regarded by all who flew it and was very versatile. It might have been a dog as a pure fighter but plenty of other nations built aircraft to the same concept, such as the Dutch Fokker twinboom fighter, the many varieties of Potez 63 and the Japanese Dinah.

regards
Stovepipe

BostonB

Stovepipe wrote: »

...Also, the Germans did not have a good aircraft repair system at the start of the war, but they learned fast....

My comment was only in relation to the BOB.

Stovepipe wrote: »

@BostonB, the Blenheim was used for raids on France into 1942, under fighter cover (Ramrods/Circuses) and was widely used in the Middle East and Far East during the same period. During 1941, the RAF diverted Havocs from day bombing to the useless Turbinlite project, ...

I can't really comment. You've not posted any links to where you are getting this information from or the relative numbers of available operation aircraft in the various theaters to compare like with like.

Off the top of my head perhaps in 1941 defending against bombing took more of a priority and the Blenheim didn't have the performance needed to carry use the Turbinlite.

Tony EH

Jawgap wrote: »

Seriously, Wikipedia is your rebuttal

In as far as explaining my reading of Baldwins quote yes. I don't see what your problem is here. You seem like you're determined to have an argument over nothing?

Jawgap wrote: »

Also just because the Stuka continued in service doesn't mean it wasn't obsolescent - my father-in-law's restore Morris Minor is perfectly serviceable, but you wouldn't say it meets modern day motoring needs.

If something is in general service, it isn't obsolescent. The Stuka continued to be an integral part of the German 1st line for years after 1940. It was essential to CAS in the war's most important theatre, Russia. Certainly, production was winding down in 1944. But, so was every German bomber, as production turned to fighters for the last years of the war.

Your Morris Minor analogy doesn't apply.

Jawgap wrote: »

After the BoB the Stuka continued - it was used in secondary theaters like the Aegean and Mediterranean with good results, but even in the desert the serviceability rate of St.G 3 rarely exceeded 50% which is pretty poor considering the Luftwaffe planned operations on the basis of 80% serviceability.

The Stuka was used primarilly in the MOST important theatre of the entire war. The Russian front outweighed ANYTHING that happened in the West, or the sideshows like the Med, and the aircraft was essential to German Eastern advances from 1941 to 1943. Even in 44, she was still doing what she did best.

When something is about to become obsolete, it means it's no longer capable of carrying out its function to its fullest degree, but the Stuka was still able to do the duty she was designed for and that was to fly a short distance and put a bomb right on top of a target.

She wasn't meant to do anything else.

If we can find common ground on this, perhaps we can agree that the entire concept of dive bombing was to become outmoded, due to the changing of manner aircraft and air combat in the jet age, post 1945?

Stovepipe

Hi there,
The information about Blenheim bombing raids and other duties has been extensively covered in the UK aviation history magazines such as Flypast and Aeroplane Monthly. It's very common knowledge, really. As for night-fighting, as in the turbinlite project and even conventional night interception, the Blenheim was not really up to the task and the Beaufighter was much better as a dedicated AI platform.
Tony,
I think pure vertical dive-bombing was effectively done away with by the demise of the Stuka/Dauntless/Vengeance generation of aircraft and even before the end of WW 2, dive bombing was confining itself to dive angles of 45 degrees or less and being conducted by fighter-bombers like the A-36 and a lot of the time, dive angles were shallow (30 degrees or less) to deliver rockets, napalm, cluster bombs and so on, as well as conventional iron bombs. I think by the Korean War, the concept of very steep dive bombing was pretty much over, unless a pilot was prepared to take the risk in the face of intense flak or dangerously low cloud cover.

regards
Stovepipe

BostonB

These are fairly sweeping and dissimilar generalizations when a whole range of factors are relevant like number of available air frames (bombers of different types and fighters) at specific dates are needed to put everything into perspective. Seems to me (on casual observation) they had a load of Blenheims and a shortage of better types for that period of 41~42.

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/weapons_bristol_blenheim_combat.html

I think conventional bombing fell out of favor in general, from the 50's to Vietnam. It was all missiles and radar. The limitations of this only became apparent in Vietnam. Which lead back to Dive Bombing with F105's etc.

Wibbs

Tony EH wrote: »

The Stuka was used primarilly in the MOST important theatre of the entire war. The Russian front outweighed ANYTHING that happened in the West, or the sideshows like the Med, and the aircraft was essential to German Eastern advances from 1941 to 1943. Even in 44, she was still doing what she did best.

When something is about to become obsolete, it means it's no longer capable of carrying out its function to its fullest degree, but the Stuka was still able to do the duty she was designed for and that was to fly a short distance and put a bomb right on top of a target.

She wasn't meant to do anything else.

+1. That said the JU 87 was an obsolete old fashioned design even by the start of the war. It was very much a 1930's aircraft and on that score the "obsolete" tag sits well enough. However, this says nothing about it's effectiveness. In pure results, it was one of the more effective airframes of the war on any side. As airborne artillery in close support of guys on the ground it was pretty unmatched. It was also damned good at attacks on shipping. The Germans were constantly looking for ways to replace the aging design and coming up short. Pilots like Rudel and others spoke of this and in particular spoke of the all encompassing obsession with speed in designers and planners and they reckoned this was a mistake when applied to a close support aircraft. Rudel noted that when he transferred to FW190's, a far superior aircraft on paper their ability to loiter in an area and ability to aim effectively was much reduced compared to their Stukas. The latter could also take far more punishment and keep flying, plus were more robust with regard to rough field operations(unusually for German WW2 aircraft it had very good brakes so could stop in a shorter distance*). It also extended it's original pure dive bomber mission brief, becoming a very effective tankbuster and night harrasment bomber.




*When the end was nigh Rudel hatched a plan to get Hitler out of Berlin by air and he insisted on using a Stuka rather than a Storch to do it.

Tony EH

Sure, the design was old fashioned, employing fixed gear etc. But, with the appearance of jet aircraft, every prop aircraft design was put in that category, especially where fighters were concerned.

I'd say the Stuka was a unique design, but yes, very 30's. However, a strong one for its intended role, nonetheless.

Her adaptation as a tank-buster led to a nightmare for Russian tank crews, you're correct. By all accounts she was devastating at Kursk, although, to be honest, Idread to think what it was like to fly with those big 37mm cannons under the wings.

Stovepipe

The Germans held a conference about ground attack in 1943, I think, to which input from the attack units and the manufacturers was included. One pertinent comment was the loss rate of the Stuka, which, at the time of the Kursk battle was in the order of 100% on one front, along with the consequent drain of qualified manpower. This prompted the greater use of the 190 as a "Schlact" aircraft, because it was tough, well-armed, fast and had a good bombload.

regards
Stovepipe

Wibbs

Tony EH wrote: »

I'd say the Stuka was a unique design, but yes, very 30's. However, a strong one for its intended role, nonetheless.

Very much so.

Her adaptation as a tank-buster led to a nightmare for Russian tank crews, you're correct. By all accounts she was devastating at Kursk

In the tank busting role throughout the eastern campaign they were hated by the Soviet forces, when the G version came out it really put the wind up.

although, to be honest, Idread to think what it was like to fly with those big 37mm cannons under the wings.

Apparently a real dog alright and only the best pilots could handle it. they reduced airspeed, range, increased take off length and stall speed and really reduced any aerobatic shenanigans but were a real pain for the tank crews on the ground. Reports of whole Soviet crews jumping out of their tanks at the sight of them were common.

Stovepipe wrote: »

The Germans held a conference about ground attack in 1943, I think, to which input from the attack units and the manufacturers was included. One pertinent comment was the loss rate of the Stuka, which, at the time of the Kursk battle was in the order of 100% on one front, along with the consequent drain of qualified manpower. This prompted the greater use of the 190 as a "Schlact" aircraft, because it was tough, well-armed, fast and had a good bombload.

But as many of the stuka guys on the ground noted it wasn't as tough, nor nearly as accurate in ground attack. The 190's were brought in as a bit of a ground attack stopgap, because they Stuka replacements never materialised. Yes were more likely to get to and back from a target alright*, but hitting the target was the issue. They were also a lot trickier to fly than the Stuka and suffered more accidents. The fact that the majority of high scoring Stuka jockeys when they could stayed with the older aircraft right to the end speaks volumes.





*Losses were not so much because of enemy aircraft fire, but from ground fire. IIRC Rudel was shot down something daft like 20 times, but never by an enemy fighter, always AA.