Scientific Proof and Memory

FISMA

I remember reading an article once about how our brains edit visual information.

They used the analogy of streaks that appear on television when a camera pans which we do not see when our eyes pan. They noted that we do not see such streaks, because our brain "edits" the information.

I forget the exact amount of time, but over the course of a day, our brains edited out something on the order of tens of minutes.

That set me thinking about the trust we have in our brains.

In discussions of God I am often asked for scientific proof or evidence. Such information will presumably come from my past memories. But, if we are going to hold God to scientific standards, shouldn't the tools we are going to use be held to the same scientific standards?

So I ask: what is your scientific test to demonstrate that your memory is working properly?

Sarky

Generally my memory of past events follows the same timeline as everyone else. There are disagreements, because brains are shocking for filling in gaps, but as long as there are no serious discrepancies with the memories of anyone else (or, say, video or audio evidence), then I'm happy my memory is working well enough. Call it a back-of-the-envelope statistics test, it's not too far off.

legspin

FISMA wrote: »

I remember reading an article once about how our brains edit visual information.

They used the analogy of streaks that appear on television when a camera pans which we do not see when our eyes pan. They noted that we do not see such streaks, because our brain "edits" the information.

I forget the exact amount of time, but over the course of a day, our brains edited out something on the order of tens of minutes.

That set me thinking about the trust we have in our brains.

In discussions of God I am often asked for scientific proof or evidence. Such information will presumably come from my past memories. But, if we are going to hold God to scientific standards, shouldn't the tools we are going to use be held to the same scientific standards?

So I ask: what is your scientific test to demonstrate that your memory is working properly?

That I have my keys, wallet and phone in my pockets before I open the front door. The amount of times I have failed in this would lead me to conclude it doesn't work properly.

Zillah

My memory is massively defective and I tend to avoid trusting it whenever possible.

As a media person I will say that what you said about camera streaks makes no sense though.

sbsquarepants

FISMA wrote: »

IThey used the analogy of streaks that appear on television when a camera pans which we do not see when our eyes pan. They noted that we do not see such streaks, because our brain "edits" the information.


So I ask: what is your scientific test to demonstrate that your memory is working properly?

I think you're talking about persistence of vision - but it happens more so with our eyes and less so with cameras. It's actually what enables our eyes to view video rather than just a series of stills. I'm not sure what it would have to do with memory though.
I don't really need a scientific test to tell me my memory doesn't work very well - my missus reminds me every anniversary, birthday etc!
I don't really see how anything you say applies to science any more than it does to magic though?

Doctor DooM

I don't think you're going to get what you want from this thread, I would guess we're all painfully aware of how crappy the human memory is and its tendency to fill gaps with made up stuff.

This is why the scientific method is important, tbh, not the other way around.

HHobo

FISMA wrote: »

In discussions of God I am often asked for scientific proof or evidence. Such information will presumably come from my past memories. But, if we are going to hold God to scientific standards, shouldn't the tools we are going to use be held to the same scientific standards?

So I ask: what is your scientific test to demonstrate that your memory is working properly?

Scientific evidence doesn't come from past memories. Your reporting of scientific evidence might, the evidence itself doesn't. You don't get scientific submissions to peer reviewed publications in the form...

"I think it was a tuesday. I was wearing a lab coat. It was a frosty morning and we had just run a series of experiments in the high temperature vessel. It was around...ooh I'd say about 700 degree C, give or take......."

It is accepted in science that our memories are very unreliable. This is why eye-witness testimony is considered one of the worst forms of evidence (in science).

So, I cannot demonstrate what isn't true!

Hotblack Desiato

FISMA wrote: »

I remember reading an article once about how our brains edit visual information.

They used the analogy of streaks that appear on television when a camera pans which we do not see when our eyes pan. They noted that we do not see such streaks, because our brain "edits" the information.

you don't see them because your eyes don't use image orthicon tubes

I forget the exact amount of time, but over the course of a day, our brains edited out something on the order of tens of minutes.

'god of the gaps' argument coming up...

In discussions of God I am often asked for scientific proof or evidence. Such information will presumably come from my past memories.

Nope, it'll come* from peer-reviewed, reproducible, studies using a well-documented methodology. That's what scientific evidence is.


* don't hold your breath

FISMA

Perhaps, I did not make the intention of my post clear, my mistake, I will try again.

The purpose of this post is to determine a scientific test to demonstrate that my memory is working properly.

Concisely, as a scientist, one who makes a nice living off of the scientific method, I state that there is no scientific test to demonstrate that your memory is working properly.

If you disagree, that is, you believe that there is a scientific test that demonstrates your memory is working properly, please post.

Doctor DooM wrote: »

I would guess we're all painfully aware of how crappy the human memory is and its tendency to fill gaps with made up stuff.

Thanks for the reply, however, I am not trying to question our forgetfulness, absentmindedness, or things along those lines. Rather, I am questioning the fundamental mechanism that we refer to as memory.

Perhaps, a bit of background would help.

In a thermodynamics class as an undergraduate we were discussing entropy and time's arrow, colloquially speaking. The professor got a bit off topic and started talking about t-symmetry. As a young undergrad, this was one of those Sheldon-type moments.

As Physicists, we were all well aware that we have a causative effect on the future, but having one on the past? Interesting. We wondered where these ideas could be applied. Would they be limited to the quantum world or would they manifest themselves in our every day lives?

Anyhow, the professor challenged us to develop a methodology that could demonstrate a causative effect on the past. However futile our efforts were, it was a great mental exercise.

I immediately asked the professor, that suppose we granted a successful experiment, how could we be sure that our brains would handle and process the new information as expected/hoped?

How could we be sure that processing a new timeline was not something that we did regularly, however, due to a necessity of evolution, only the later would be remembered?

I asked, what is the scientific test to demonstrate that our memories are working properly?

He had no answer and after some though, we agreed that there is no scientific test to demonstrate that our memories are working properly. Rather, we test our memories from a colloquial standpoint.

Aside from the whole metaphysics/philosophy questions of that day, the fundamental question on our memory still lingers.

I think it is ironic that the mechanism by which we put all of nature under the scrutiny of scientific fails to be testable itself.

Turtwig

I still don't get your question, so,sorry for answering your question with a question but it might lead to a better understanding.:)

What scientific test is there that robots or humans with perfect working memory could do to demonstrate that a car is working properly?

Peregrinus

FISMA wrote: »

Perhaps, I did not make the intention of my post clear, my mistake, I will try again.

The purpose of this post is to determine a scientific test to demonstrate that my memory is working properly . . . .

I think you'd have to define "working properly" with respect to memory.

If "working properly" means "immediately and reliably recall to mind any sensory perception ever experienced", then most or all of us do not have memories that "work properly", and designing an experiment to verify that is trivial (and has been done many times).

Presumably that's not what you mean, but what do you mean?

endacl

FISMA wrote: »

Concisely, as a scientist, one who makes a nice living off of the scientific method, I state that there is no scientific test to demonstrate that your my memory is working properly.

Reads better now.



Memory is unreliable. This doesn't need a test, scientific or otherwise, to demonstrate. State your hypothesis, and we'll get the committee working on experimental parameters.

If we remember to...

Peregrinus

FISMA wrote: »

I think it is ironic that the mechanism by which we put all of nature under the scrutiny of scientific fails to be testable itself.

Two thoughts:

First, I think you overstate the role of memory in the scientific method.

The scientific method relies on empirical observation, but observation is not the same as memory. You can record your observations so that you don’t have to remember them.

Secondly, you are nevertheless correct that the validity of the scientific method is untestable. The scientific method depends on a number of axioms:

1. The natural universe is real (i.e. not illusory).

2. It is governed by rules (i.e. its behaviour is predictable)

3. Our sensory perceptions accurately reflect the empirical reality of the natural universe (i.e. they are not delusions or dreams)

4. [No doubt we identify more axioms if we put our mind to it.]

None of these axioms are themselves testable by the scientific method. (That’s the reason they are axioms.) Any attempt to verify these axioms by the scientific method is necessarily logically circular, and therefore invalid. If you like, this is ironic, but it’s not a novel point; it has long been recognised. And I think it’s also true of every other epistemological method we might employ. We can’t claim to know anything except in reliance on some axiom or axioms that we assume without proof to be true.

pauldla

Axioms are assumed without proof, yes, but are they assumed without evidence? As an example, why do we assume that the universe is governed by rules? Is there a reason holding this as being axiomatic..?

Peregrinus

pauldla wrote: »

Axioms are assumed without proof, yes, but are they assumed without evidence?

Oh, sure, I’m not criticizing our acceptance of axioms. Ordinary life would be pretty well impossible if we weren’t prepared to accept axioms.

I suppose in the present context my only point is that most of the time it’s probably good to be conscious that you are accepting, and proceeding on, axioms. And it’s usually a good idea to try and identify those axioms.

Do we accept axioms without evidence? Well, it depends on what you mean by “evidence” but, in some contexts certainly, we do. For example, the axioms of Euclidean geometry are unsupported by any empirical evidence.

So why do we accept axioms? I suggest a number of conditions must be satisfied before we accept a proposition as axiomatic:

1. The proposition must be incapable of proof. (If it could be proven, we wouldn’t need to accept it as axiomatic.)

2. The proposition must be rational.

3. The proposition must be consistent with all the axioms that we accept.

4. The proposition must be one we have some need to accept. (For example, it’s probably true that there is an infinite number of prime numbers, but there are epistemological systems in which this proposition is of no particular utility, so it’s not treated as an axiom.)

“Evidence”, I think, sneaks in under condition no. 3 there. If we accept that the empirically-observable universe is real, and if we accept that our observations accurately reflect the universe (and we mostly do accept both of those things) then it follows that anything proposed as an axiom will not be accepted if it is contradicted by empirical evidence. So an axiom must be consistent with the available evidence, even if it’s not established by the available evidence.

pauldla wrote: »

As an example, why do we assume that the universe is governed by rules? Is there a reason holding this as being axiomatic..?

Well, the immediate reason is that without that axiom the scientific method collapses. If my observations of event X (say, a particular occasion on which I drop two unequal weights from the top of the leaning tower of Pisa) can only tell me about event X, I can’t draw any conclusions about what will happen the next time I drop two unequal weights from the top of the leaning tower of Pisa, still less about what will happen if I drop unequal weights from anywhere else. We need to accept this as axiomatic, or else we have to abandon the entire scientific project as meaningless.

The other reason we accept it is that it accords with our experience (which we axiomatically assume to reflect reality). The sun does rise each morning with predictable regularity and, while this could be a series of coincidences which could come to an end at any time or a sequence of independent decisions taken each morning by Ra the Sun God, treating it as a predictable event works fairly well.

HHobo

pauldla wrote: »

Axioms are assumed without proof, yes, but are they assumed without evidence? As an example, why do we assume that the universe is governed by rules? Is there a reason holding this as being axiomatic..?

An axiom is something that is taken to be true without having to be shown to be true. Axioms can sometimes be proven, sometimes not. What is meant by axiom is that something is either self-evident or universally accepted as true so we don't need to convince anyone. An example might be that all aircraft navigators accept as axiomatic that the world is spherical (roughly).

The species of presupposition that the memory question addresses are a subset of axioms that we just accept as true on the understanding that they cannot be shown to be so. Decartes famous tried to see how far he could get reasoning without accepting any unproven presuppositon. He got as far as "cogito ergo sum" and thats probably as far as you can get.

Any evidence that you might appeal to will, of necessity, be based on assumptions that can't be proven themselves.
There are simply some things that we just have to accept utterly free of evidence.

Some of the thought experiments proposed in philosophy over the years have been:

The brain in a vat. The idea here is that you are infact a brain in a vat, matrix style. Your brain is fed electric impulses that simulate sensory input. Sights, sounds, tactile experiences etc. How could you known, given that all sensory perception is just electrical signals passed through your nervous system to your brain that you are not a brain in a vat. It becomes fairly obvious, fairly quickly, that there is no means by which you could ever discover the truth of this situation if it were infact true. You have no choice but to take as axiomatic that you are not.

Another one was the idea that the universe was created five minutes ago but with the appearence of age. This one is very similar to the queston asked by the OP. How can we tell that all our memories, our bodies and the whole rest of the universe wasn't popped into existence just a few minutes ago. The answer, of course, is that we can't tell. We have to accept as axiomatic that the universe is as it appears to be.

These kinds of thought experiments are useful for imparting to people just how much we take for granted. We operate most of the time on very little evidence and a whole lot of assumption.

The scientific method is as sucessful as it is primarily because it was devised with the knowledge that humans make lots and lots of assumptions. Scientists have to be constantly on their guard against making assumptions. There are something that can't be demonstrated to be true. This is a brute fact we just have to accept. Science is the practice of assuming only that which we absolutely must and questioning everything else when determining the nature of reality.

Zombrex

FISMA wrote: »

That set me thinking about the trust we have in our brains.

In discussions of God I am often asked for scientific proof or evidence. Such information will presumably come from my past memories. But, if we are going to hold God to scientific standards, shouldn't the tools we are going to use be held to the same scientific standards?

So I ask: what is your scientific test to demonstrate that your memory is working properly?

Most people here would already know that our brains are not all that reliable, so excusing the some what inaccurate context you put it (what is "properly"), the simple answer is our brains don't work properly.

As to how we have confidence in our memory and how this relates to the scientific method it actually is quite close. An example should highlight this.

I'm in Starbucks and I see a girl that looks familiar, that I think I have met on holiday a year ago. That is the hypothesis. I can quickly turn this into a predictive model. The "girl model" (as in theory, though she was pretty hot) in my head's name is Laura and combined with a more general model that humans have names and respond to names when they are asked them, I can form a predictive test.

I walk up to the girl and say "Hi, Laura isn't it?". Prediction, she will say Yes. How is the model falsified? She says no.

I walk up to the girl and say hi and she says "Hi, yes, do I know you?". Good, we have matched a prediction from our model to an observed outcome of experiment, a prediction that was falsifiable.

But of course science is not build on matching a single prediction of a model to an observation. We need to narrow down the possibilities, make the model more accurate. So I say "I think we met in Florida a year ago?". Again there is a predicted response to this, and we see if the actual response matches prediction.

This time though she says "I'm sorry, I've never been to Flordia?". Ah, fail. Now if we were doing real science we have a couple of options here. We could look at the statistical probability that a girl who looks like a memory of a girl I know called Laura, and who has the same name as here, isn't actually the right girl and decide to either expand the theory into the territory of the possibility she is lying, she herself is mistaken, she is called Laura but she is not the girl I know, etc etc. In science you keep going until you have matched so many different predictions, altering the model as you go, that you are so confident of the model you can say it accurately reflect reality.

Of course this isn't an actual scientific experiment, so doing that in Starbucks would probably just get you arrested.

There is this notion in certain circles, particularly theological ones, that the philosophy of science is irrelevant today to day circumstances. That is really not true. What is true is that science will often highlight how unsure we are about certain beliefs, and this makes people uncomfortable.

For example, theists on the other forum like to say things like "Well science cannot tell you if your wife loves you or not". Which is probably true, but then you can't really know with all that much accurate if your wife does actually love you or not, as demonstrated by the millions of people left heart broken every year when their wives up and leave them. At least you cannot tell you any degree that science would be particularly satisfied with.

If you think about it this is quite logical. Most people would say that they know for certain that their life loves them, but then see how many would be prepared to take personal liability if you set up some insane experiment that if their wife didn't love them an aeroplane full of children and puppies would fall out of the sky.

At that point they would probably say something like "Well I believe it, but I can't prove it". Which simple raises the question Ok, why do you believe it.

That is not to say that you shouldn't believe it. Another misconception on the other forum is that they think that if you cannot demonstrate something to scientific standards you must believe the opposite. Can't scientifically demonstrate your wife loves you? Then you must think she doesn't. Of course you can't scientifically demonstrate she doesn't love you either, so that would be equally illogical.

I think a lot of theists don't get this because they want certainity, and think that since that is what religion proclaims, science must be doing the same. It isn't. Science is not about what is true, what is false, it is about knowing why you believe something and assessing how accurate you can consider that belief to be.

It is, for example, perfectly possible to think, scientifically, that your wife probably loves you, within particular gradients of confidence. From a scientific point of view the important bit is not whether she does or not, but the question why you think she does and you understanding the areas you simply cannot assess, in order to build a particular confidence level for this believe.

And getting back to the original post, this is where theists and the issue of God falls apart, because it is very difficult to form any sort of predictive tests at all for God that can be limited down to God as opposed to anything else.

HHobo

Zombrex wrote: »

Most people here would already know that our brains are not all that reliable, so excusing the some what inaccurate context you put it (what is "properly"), the simple answer is our brains don't work properly.

As to how we have confidence in our memory and how this relates to the scientific method it actually is quite close. An example should highlight this.

I'm in Starbucks and I see a girl that looks familiar, that I think I have met on holiday a year ago. That is the hypothesis. I can quickly turn this into a predictive model. The "girl model" (as in theory, though she was pretty hot) in my head's name is Laura and combined with a more general model that humans have names and respond to names when they are asked them, I can form a predictive test.

I invite FISMA to correct me if I am wrong here, but I think the problem he/she was talking about was much more fundamental than what you deal with here. I took him to mean the same as you have here in my initial response.

The problem FISMA is presenting would be that the instant you end your startbucks conversation and attempt to record your result, how do you know the event occured, or occured as you think it did. What was the word uttered just now? You have to remember to know. In fact, the instant after she says "Yes, I am Laura." or "No, my name isn't Laura and please stop licking my face!" you are reliant on your memory to be aware of the previous moment at all. All comparisions between a static current state and historical data, no matter how recent, relies on memory to one degree or another. There is no avoiding the problem. We simlpy have to accept that our memory's work in principle. Once we accept this, we can carry out experiments much like the one you prepose to discover how reliable our memories are. Even if we had a means of recording events and analysing them completely in zero time, this would be useless to us. It becomes impossible to compare them to any extant reality the moment you allow, well a moment, to pass. How would you know that the observations and analysis are accurate or aren't whole-cloth fabrications? What would you compare them too? Any recording of a previous event, no matter the form it takes is essentially a description of something that is no longer available for comparision. The very idea of a predictive model is based already on the axiomatic assumption that memory is a coherent concept and that it works in reality.

Zombrex

HHobo wrote: »

The problem FISMA is presenting would be that the instant you end your startbucks conversation and attempt to record your result, how do you know the event occured, or occured as you think it did. What was the word uttered just now? You have to remember to know. In fact, the instant after she says "Yes, I am Laura." or "No, my name isn't Laura and please stop licking my face!" you are reliant on your memory to be aware of the previous moment at all. All comparisions between a static current state and historical data, no matter how recent, relies on memory to one degree or another.

True, but then this is again similar to science. Science deals only with the past. The idea that we test things in the present is rather inaccurate. I've had many discussions with Creationists about this where they argue you can't apply the scientific models because they are result of events that have already happened, you can only go on what you "see" in the present, and they then demand to see a dog give birth a cat. But even if you did "see" that you are still talking about the past, the differences are simply in terms of scale.

The point is that I don't stop once I got the result. I don't go "Well in the present Laura said her name was Laura so I know in this instance that is her name". The event is simply incorporated into the model and future predictions.

The easiest way to illustrate that is to forget about memory and just ask the question "Did I hear her properly". I say "Laura?", she says "No?" and I hear "Hi" or something. That in essence creates a false memory of the event, since as far as I'm aware I said Laura? and she responded in the positive.

In science the model is constantly changing as new information comes along. I might have greater confidence that she is Laura based on this one experiment, but I don't simply stop then and there and say I have "proved" that she is Laura and therefore I can take that fact as a axiom of future interactions.

The model's property "name = Laura" is simply a part of the model that itself is assigned confidence values but must still be assessed on an on going basis. I can grow in confidence about how accurate that particular property of the model, but I can never know it is true.

This is why it is so frustrating dealing with theists who say things like "Well I know God exists because this happened and this wouldn't have happened unless God exists"

They turn around to an atheists like myself and say "Well you are certain her name is Laura, so why can't I be certain God exists", where in fact the whole point is that I'm not certain her name is Lauara. I'm not certain her name isn't Laura. I'm working with a model that is in constant state of flux and assessment, even if I don't even realise I'm doing this. In ten years time I might find out she is a co-artist who's name is Mary and she has douped me. I might find out the entire experiment was the result of taking magic mushrooms an hour before hand.

If that happened I would be surprised, but i wouldn't act like some theists do and proclaim it is impossible! something else must be wrong, I was "certain" she was Laura.

HHobo wrote: »

There is no avoiding the problem. We simlpy have to accept that our memory's work in principle.

No we don't. In fact a lot of people's memories don't work in principle, so there is a good reason not to simply accept that.

We only are forced to accept that if we require certainty. Human like feeling certain about particular things, but when you get down to it there is significant difference between believing you are certain about something and the requirements to function day to day.

I think the difficulty here is the implicate assumption that if you don't assume your memory works in principle you must assume it doesn't work in principle. But that is as equally unsupported. Because I cannot assume that I accurately recorded and memorized the encounter with Laura doesn't mean I'm going to assume I didn't accurately record and memorize the encounter with Laura, not without again matching that model (the "I'm really high right not") model with all the same predictions and tests.

The easiest thing is to not assume anything about your memory and assess the different models as they come up from the point of view of functioning in the world.

HHobo

Zombrex wrote: »

The easiest thing is to not assume anything about your memory and assess the different models as they come up from the point of view of functioning in the world.

In terms of the practical, real world, you are right.

I think you may still be missing the class of enquiry that was being made. It is purely a philosophical question. It has no real world application.

If I asked you to prove to me that the universe exists and isn't just a figment of your imagination, any test you attempt to undertake will never be free of the implication that they might also be imagined by you and therefore can't be trusted.
Burtrand Russel's five minute hypothesis illustrates the idea pretty well where memory is concerned.
It is really just a hyperskeptical postion. Nobody really holds the view that it is true, but it cannot be shown to be false.

It is this kind of fundamental conceptual question I think was being asked. The OP's second post on the topic makes clearer his intent with the question.

Zombrex

HHobo wrote: »

In terms of the practical, real world, you are right.

I think you may still be missing the class of enquiry that was being made. It is purely a philosophical question. It has no real world application.

Not really missing, more dismissing the significance.

People (particular theists) seem to get a bit worked up over these questions.

The issue is can we trust our memory. One propose is that we just have to assume it works, in the same way that someone might say we just have to assume we arne't brains in jars, we just have to assume that the universe works in an ordered fashion, we just have to assume that the entire universe didn't just some how start 5 minutes ago in a state that appears it is a lot older.

My point is that you actually don't need to assume these things at all. You can continue not assuming them and there is no downside. You can assume them, but that to me is an unsupported assumption.

It irks me when theists assume I assume without evidence certain axioms about the universe and then try and use that as justification for their faith in God. They say things like, well you take it on faith that tomorrow is going to continue on with the same physical rules as today and you can't justify that so how is that any different to me assuming God exists.

The point is that I don't assume, on any particularly deep epistemology level, that tomorrow is actually going to be the same as today. People seem to think you have to (how can you plan anything!), but you only have to if the alternative is thinking it won't be. But I don't assume, on any particularly deep epistemology level that it won't be either.

HHobo wrote: »

If I asked you to prove to me that the universe exists and isn't just a figment of your imagination, any test you attempt to undertake will never be free of the implication that they might also be imagined by you and therefore can't be trusted.

Correct. But then there is no reason why I have to assume the universe exists and isn't just a figment of my imagination. To say (not saying you said this) that we must take that as a starting point seems irrelevant to me.

And again it particularly irks me when theists say that their assumption that God exists is no more illogical than an atheist assuming the universe exists. I, as an atheist, don't assume the universe exists, and not doing that poses no disadvantage.

HHobo wrote: »

It is really just a hyperskeptical postion. Nobody really holds the view that it is true, but it cannot be shown to be false.

My point is best summed up by saying you do not actually need to hold either position. Though I agree entirely with the practice of pointing out that these positions cannot be shown to be false. My objection is the conclusions people draw from those facts, particularly when people start dragging God into it.

This line sums up what I'm objecting to
I think it is ironic that the mechanism by which we put all of nature under the scrutiny of scientific fails to be testable itself.

That should not be "ironic" at all. It is only ironic if you hold certain assumptions that are themselves unscientific, such as assuming you aren't a brain in a jar, or assuming the universe didn't pop into existences 5 minutes ago.

Peregrinus

Is the issue about memory not just a particular instance of a more general point; that, in the scientific method it is axiomatic that our subjective experiences of the world does map onto the objective reality of the world in a meaningful and consistent way?

So, for example, when I see a red apple the redness is an entirely subjective impression generated in my brain in response to certain electrical stimuli from the optic nerve, which in turn is a response to light of a certain wavelength stimulating the optic nerve. I have no guarantee that when you see the apple you have the same subjective impression, even though you give it the same name as I do. And neither of us can be certain that the impressions we experience actually tell us anything objectively true about the apple. But it’s axiomatic that they do.

Memory is just another subjective experience generated within the brain. When I can no longer see the apple but I can still recall the redness, how do I know that I am correctly recalling it? I can’t know that, is the answer. But is reliance on the subjective experience of memory any different from reliance on the subjective experience of seeing red? I don’t see that it is.

Zombrex

Peregrinus wrote: »

Is the issue about memory not just a particular instance of a more general point; that, in the scientific method it is axiomatic that our subjective experiences of the world does map onto the objective reality of the world in a meaningful and consistent way?

So, for example, when I see a red apple the redness is an entirely subjective impression generated in my brain in response to certain electrical stimuli from the optic nerve, which in turn is a response to light of a certain wavelength stimulating the optic nerve. I have no guarantee that when you see the apple you have the same subjective impression, even though you give it the same name as I do. And neither of us can be certain that the impressions we experience actually tell us anything objectively true about the apple. But it’s axiomatic that they do.

Memory is just another subjective experience generated within the brain. When I can no longer see the apple but I can still recall the redness, how do I know that I am correctly recalling it? I can’t know that, is the answer. But is reliance on the subjective experience of memory any different from reliance on the subjective experience of seeing red? I don’t see that it is.

Nor is it necessary to say that I'm just going to assume it is. This is why I don't like the use of axioms (an accepted true starting point), I don't think it is necessary to assume these are axioms.

For example, it might be actually possible some how to work out that the universe did actually start 5 minutes ago in a particular state, who knows. Why assume that the opposite just has to be taken as an axiom.

It comes back to the old point that the universe is under know obligation to us to be a particular way (I guess that would be my only axiom :P)

Peregrinus

Zombrex wrote: »

For example, it might be actually possible some how to work out that the universe did actually start 5 minutes ago in a particular state, who knows. Why assume that the opposite just has to be taken as an axiom.

It comes back to the old point that the universe is under know obligation to us to be a particular way (I guess that would be my only axiom :P)

"The Universe did not start 5 minutes ago" is not actually an axiom upon which the scientific method relies. Rather, it's a conclusion whose reliability depends on other axioms on which the scientific method relies.

But you do have to accept some axioms, because without them you have no basis for saying that we can learn anything at all through the scientific method.

HHobo

Zombrex wrote: »

Not really missing, more dismissing the significance.

People (particular theists) seem to get a bit worked up over these questions.

This kind of argument is just the last gasp of a theist try to convince themselves their belief is rational and failing that, that it is no more irrational than any other. It holds about as much water as a fishing net.

Zombrex wrote: »

The issue is can we trust our memory. One propose is that we just have to assume it works, in the same way that someone might say we just have to assume we arne't brains in jars, we just have to assume that the universe works in an ordered fashion, we just have to assume that the entire universe didn't just some how start 5 minutes ago in a state that appears it is a lot older.

My point is that you actually don't need to assume these things at all. You can continue not assuming them and there is no downside. You can assume them, but that to me is an unsupported assumption.

I don't really agree with this position. You can claim you aren't making these class of assumptions but when you go about your day as if all these are true, I don't see how this isn't assuming them.

Zombrex wrote: »

It irks me when theists assume I assume without evidence certain axioms about the universe and then try and use that as justification for their faith in God. They say things like, well you take it on faith that tomorrow is going to continue on with the same physical rules as today and you can't justify that so how is that any different to me assuming God exists.

The point is that I don't assume, on any particularly deep epistemology level, that tomorrow is actually going to be the same as today. People seem to think you have to (how can you plan anything!), but you only have to if the alternative is thinking it won't be. But I don't assume, on any particularly deep epistemology level that it won't be either.

Agian, I would be skeptical that you get up everyday, look around you to see if objects are floating or flying apart. Don't misunderstand me, I'm not saying the argument has any force, it doesn't, but I do think that we all make these assumptions.

Zombrex wrote: »

Correct. But then there is no reason why I have to assume the universe exists and isn't just a figment of my imagination. To say (not saying you said this) that we must take that as a starting point seems irrelevant to me.

It just wouldn't be practical to have to start at assumptions that basic. We don't need to. This class of assumption is made instinctively.

Zombrex wrote: »

And again it particularly irks me when theists say that their assumption that God exists is no more illogical than an atheist assuming the universe exists. I, as an atheist, don't assume the universe exists, and not doing that poses no disadvantage.

While this line of theistic argument is awful, I don't understand what you mean when you say you don't assume the universe exists. When you walk down the street or talk to someone, I'm guessing you are not constantly in some state of epistemic doubt about the existence of the street or the people. Denying this assumption seems to me to be almost conceding the point to the theist. That assuming the universe exists is in some way comparable to assuming God.

Zombrex wrote: »

This line sums up what I'm objecting to
I think it is ironic that the mechanism by which we put all of nature under the scrutiny of scientific fails to be testable itself.

That should not be "ironic" at all. It is only ironic if you hold certain assumptions that are themselves unscientific, such as assuming you aren't a brain in a jar, or assuming the universe didn't pop into existences 5 minutes ago.

I make these assumption and would contend that everyone does. It doens't have to be a list of explicit confirmations in someone's mind but if they reach out and pick up a cup, they must be assuming there is something there to grasp. I still don't think it is ironic that we make these assumptions or that science requires them to be true. Science is contingent on the universe existing. It is with this understanding that we proceed.

These questions amount to little more than philosophical navel-gazing. They don't go anywhere and aren't the basis for any serious argument. I consider this kind of argumentation from theists to be a sign of desperation. They know they can't win in a stand-up evidential argument so they resort to this to try to cast doubt on the masses of evidence agaisnt them. I doubt that anyone has ever heard this kind of argument and considered it persuasive. I think theists do far more harm than good to their positions when they raise arguments most people would find ridiculous. The standard reaction I have seen to these kinds of philosopical investigations, outside of any argumentation, is eye-rolling.

Zombrex

HHobo wrote: »

I don't really agree with this position. You can claim you aren't making these class of assumptions but when you go about your day as if all these are true, I don't see how this isn't assuming them.

I would differentiate between functional and true. Or to put it another way, if it seems to work how fundamentally true it is becomes some what irrelevant.

Take the brain in a jar. Someone might say how do I know I'm not just a brain in a jar experiencing a simulation of reality. I don't. But then that has no functional effect on my life either way. I'm either experiencing "reality" or I'm experiencing a simulation of reality that adheres to the same basic rules.

Or take memory. Say I'm a Blade Runner style replicant who rolled off the assembly line 10 days ago but who has had the memories of a 33 year old man implanted in them. Until this has a functional effect (eg. people I think I know don't recognise me) it is actually irrelevant.

HHobo wrote: »

Agian, I would be skeptical that you get up everyday, look around you to see if objects are floating or flying apart. Don't misunderstand me, I'm not saying the argument has any force, it doesn't, but I do think that we all make these assumptions.

This goes back to the point I made about the difference between not assuming something, and assuming the opposite. Not assuming as an axiom that the universe will work the same tomorrow as today is not the same as assuming it won't.

I don't assume that the rules of the universe will work tomorrow as today. When I say that to people they often respond as you did, How do you plan anything?! Do you strap your bed down so you don't float away when gravity changes!? Do you double check the weak nuclear force still holds when you wake up?!

The thing is I would only need to do all those things if I assumed that the rules of the universe wouldn't work the same tomorrow. I don't need to bother doing any of this stuff by merely not assuming they will.

I have a model of how the universe works. Like any model that is merely a representation of how I think the universe is. The universe is under no obligation to actually be that way, and thus I can never assume that the model is how the universe is. There might very well be an as yet undiscovered rule in the universe that says on the 1st Feb 2013 gravity is going to reverse itself. I have no reason to suppose that that isn't going to happen. But I've no reason to suppose it is going to happen either. As such I work on the model I currently have.

HHobo wrote: »

I make these assumption and would contend that everyone does.

Ok, but let me put it this way. What would be the result if you didn't make these assumptions? Imagine you didn't assume we aren't brains in jars. Would anything actually change? Or imagine you didn't assume the universe must work the same tomorrow as today? Would have that have any practical influence, remembering that this is not the same as assuming it will or has a likelihood of changing.

swampgas

From XKCD ...

Zombrex

swampgas wrote: »

From XKCD ...

:P brilliant.

Pat Mustard

FISMA wrote: »

how could we be sure that our brains would handle and process the new information as expected/hoped?

How could we be sure that processing a new timeline was not something that we did regularly, however, due to a necessity of evolution, only the later would be remembered?

I asked, what is the scientific test to demonstrate that our memories are working properly?

Maybe our memories are not reliable at all. Maybe our memories are stories that we tell ourselves are true, stories that adapt with each retelling.

This article discusses research by Karim Nader regarding how memories are changed by the process of recollection itself, or as Nader suggests, reconsolidation. (Abstract at Pubmed)

Nader, now a neuroscientist at McGill University in Montreal, says his memory of the World Trade Center attack has played a few tricks on him. He recalled seeing television footage on September 11 of the first plane hitting the north tower of the World Trade Center. But he was surprised to learn that such footage aired for the first time the following day. Apparently he wasn’t alone: a 2003 study of 569 college students found that 73 percent shared this misperception.

This was something that I had been fairly sure of myself, up until my current doubt after reading the article.

In short, Nader believes that the very act of remembering can change our memories.

Memories surrounding a major event like September 11 might be especially susceptible, he says, because we tend to replay them over and over in our minds and in conversation with others—with each repetition having the potential to alter them.

Nader decided to revisit the concept with an experiment. In the winter of 1999, he taught four rats that a high-pitched beep preceded a mild electric shock. That was easy—rodents learn such pairings after being exposed to them just once. Afterward, the rat freezes in place when it hears the tone. Nader then waited 24 hours, played the tone to reactivate the memory and injected into the rat’s brain a drug that prevents neurons from making new proteins.

If memories are consolidated just once, when they are first created, he reasoned, the drug would have no effect on the rat’s memory of the tone or on the way it would respond to the tone in the future. But if memories have to be at least partially rebuilt every time they are recalled—down to the synthesizing of fresh neuronal proteins—rats given the drug might later respond as if they had never learned to fear the tone and would ignore it. If so, the study would contradict the standard conception of memory. It was, he admits, a long shot...

It worked.

When Nader later tested the rats, they didn’t freeze after hearing the tone: it was as if they’d forgotten all about it.

Daniel Schacter, a psychologist at Harvard University who studies memory, agrees with Nader that distortions can occur when people reactivate memories. The question is whether reconsolidation—which he thinks Nader has demonstrated compellingly in rat experiments—is the reason for the distortions. “The direct evidence isn’t there yet to show that the two things are related,” Schacter says. “It’s an intriguing possibility that people will now have to follow up on.”

Interesting.

FISMA

HHobo wrote: »

I invite FISMA to correct me if I am wrong here, but I think the problem he/she was talking about was much more fundamental than what you deal with here.

Thanks Hhobo, you are correct, your post is pretty much what I was trying to get at.

Surely, there is more information out there of which we are unaware. Could there be information of which we are aware, but unable to retain or otherwise mentally "digest?"

No matter what, it is interesting that there's no scientific method to demonstrate that our memory is working properly.

Thanks for cracking the thread open.

Slan.

Zombrex

FISMA wrote: »

Thanks Hhobo, you are correct, your post is pretty much what I was trying to get at.

Surely, there is more information out there of which we are unaware. Could there be information of which we are aware, but unable to retain or otherwise mentally "digest?"

Depends on how you define "aware"?

Magicians have used suggestion to "implant" (a some what inaccurate term) notions or ideas in our heads that we are not consciously aware of, but certainly they get into our heads.

This is yet another example of how our minds can be tricked into producing a mental model of the world that doesn't accurately reflect reality.

FISMA wrote: »

No matter what, it is interesting that there's no scientific method to demonstrate that our memory is working properly.

That is because our memory doesn't work properly. We know this, scientifically as it were. in fact if our memories worked perfectly we probably wouldn't have invented science in the first place.

FISMA

Thanks to all for the thoughtful responses on this thread.

As a follow-on to the original assertion: "there is no scientific test to demonstrate that your memory is working properly," I have another question on knowledge for the A&A's.

From where does man's knowledge come? With respect to A&A's, am I correct in saying that all of man's knowledge comes via his senses?

By definition, A&A would not accept divine revelation. However, is there any A&A "loop-hole" so to speak that would argue otherwise?

Thanks in advance!

smacl

FISMA wrote: »

From where does man's knowledge come? With respect to A&A's, am I correct in saying that all of man's knowledge comes via his senses?

In my opinion, no. The human mind can conceive in the abstract with no need for observation, or more simply, we have an imagination.

If you look at fields of study such as string theory and brane theory, they're largely abstract rather than observation based. The same is true of much in mathematics, and arguably artistic expression. This doesn't demand any external divinity.

Brian Shanahan

FISMA wrote: »

So I ask: what is your scientific test to demonstrate that your memory is working properly?

Does it agree with the records, and failing that (because I'm not important enough to have my every word written doen), does it agree with what numerous independent recollections from others.

Oh, and pointing out that memory is faulty does nothing to shift the fact that the god hypothesis has no evidence for it.