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Rights
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It really depends on the extent to which a person's gender identity is a choice, as opposed to a biological imperative.0
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That why I said "the extent to which.."0
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My take on this is fairly simple: "rights" are about preventing "negative" action, but they are not an obligation on anyone to undertake a "positive" action.
For example, the UN Declaration of Human Rights has articles that cover things such as housing e.g. "everyone has the right to housing". My interpretation of this is that no-one has the right to take away your housing (a "negative" action). But it does not impose an obligation on anyone else to provide you with housing (a "positive" action).
So I have no problem respecting the rights of others - starting with (IMHO) the most fundamental right, the right to be left in peace if that's what you wish.From out there on the moon, international politics look so petty. You want to grab a politician by the scruff of the neck and drag him a quarter of a million miles out and say, ‘Look at that, you son of a bitch’.
— Edgar Mitchell, Apollo 14 Astronaut
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I see where you’re coming from. But I think there are problems with that approach.My take on this is fairly simple: "rights" are about preventing "negative" action, but they are not an obligation on anyone to undertake a "positive" action.
For example, the UN Declaration of Human Rights has articles that cover things such as housing e.g. "everyone has the right to housing". My interpretation of this is that no-one has the right to take away your housing (a "negative" action). But it does not impose an obligation on anyone else to provide you with housing (a "positive" action).
First problem - on the individual level. Suppose I’m walking along, minding my own business, looking down and admiring my blue suede shoes. I hear a cry, and I see a toddler, drowning in a duckpond. It’s a shallow pond; I could easily wade in and rescue the toddler with no risk to myself. But it’s muddy and slimy and scummy and ducks have been doing in it what ducks do in duckponds and I don’t wade in because, you know, suede. The toddler drowns.
Have I violated the rights of the toddler?
If the toddler has any kind of a claim to my care and protection then it seems to me that yes, I have. Or, if you want to construct an argument that the toddler’s claim on me is not usefully characterized as a “right”, then the corollary of your argument is that a recognition of “rights” is an incomplete account of the obligations we owe to one another, and the claims we can make on one another.
Second problem - on the collective level. When it comes to politics and/or public policy - and this is mainly the area in which we employ the language of rights - the moral issues we face are rarely of the form “what should I do?” They are nearly always of the form “what should we do?”
Suppose we recognize a right to personal liberty. At a minimum, this means that the state, as agent of the community, must refrain from locking you up arbitrarily. There must be a legal basis for locking you up, there must be a procedure, there must be a justification, there must be people with authority to lock you up, and other people with authority to determine whether you are rightly locked up, and so forth.
Suppose the state behaves in accordance with these rules, and does not imprison arbitrarily, or unlawfully, or without demonstrated justification. Is that enough to ensure that your right of personal liberty is respected?
No, it isn’t. If you’re kidnapped, you expect the community (through the state) to endeavour to find you, and release you, and detect and punish those responsible, and indeed to prevent or deter kidnappings in the first place. If the state’s response to your plight is to say, in effect “not our problem - we didn’t lock you up”, you will not feel that you live in a society in which your right of personal liberty is respected, defended or vindicated.
So I suggest that your right of personal liberty means more to me than simply that I, personally, must not lock you up. It also means that we, the community of which I am a part, must act positively to protect and defend your personal liberty.
Thus I think it’s wrong to say that right are not an obligation on anyone to undertake a positive action. They mostly do require positive action in some contexts, and in the context in which rights language is mainly employed, that of law and public policy, they will nearly always require positive action.0 -
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I've never thought that "rights" were a complete "account of the obligations we owe to one another" in the first place, so I don't have a problem with that interpretation. If anything, my argument is that "rights" do not naturally (automatically) translate in to obligations at all - see the example I used (housing). As for "the claims we can make on one another", my interpretation of "rights" excludes those altogether, anyway, though I don't know exactly what you mean by that.Peregrinus wrote: »If the toddler has any kind of a claim to my care and protection then it seems to me that yes, I have. Or, if you want to construct an argument that the toddler’s claim on me is not usefully characterized as a “right”, then the corollary of your argument is that a recognition of “rights” is an incomplete account of the obligations we owe to one another, and the claims we can make on one another.
In your example, the toddler had a "right" to life, and you did nothing to take that "right" away. If you feel yourself to have an obligation to save him or her, that's a separate issue: why do you feel that? Because of the possible consequences of inaction e.g. feelings of guilt, your reputation, and so on. But I would not confuse that with "rights".
It sounds harsh, I know, but we are talking in abstract philosophical terms here, and bringing emotion in to this only muddies the arguments.
Correct, but you're lumping "respected, defended or vindicated" together.Peregrinus wrote: »Suppose the state behaves in accordance with these rules, and does not imprison arbitrarily, or unlawfully, or without demonstrated justification. Is that enough to ensure that your right of personal liberty is respected?
No, it isn’t. If you’re kidnapped, you expect the community (through the state) to endeavour to find you, and release you, and detect and punish those responsible, and indeed to prevent or deter kidnappings in the first place. If the state’s response to your plight is to say, in effect “not our problem - we didn’t lock you up”, you will not feel that you live in a society in which your right of personal liberty is respected, defended or vindicated.
I would not classify the role of the State in this as any sort of natural defender of "rights". If it does play a role in that area, it's because we have decided that it should do so, got laws passed to that effect by our representatives, and are willing to pay the price. The Garda (or any other state actor) are not superheroes acting out of concern for "rights", they have a job to do which is defined by law and paid for by your taxes. They would come to your aid, if you are kidnapped, because that is what they are set up to do. They would not fix your car if it broke down, because that is not what they are set up to do. You could call that a "utilitarian" position if you like.
It's a bit like religion (A&A content): the Catholic Church sees itself as a State actor in Ireland for historical reasons. It used to have a much wider influence than it does now because there was a vacuum to be filled, not because that is somehow "ordained". That's why e.g. so many hospitals have names starting with "St." - because they were necessary, and the Church had the resources to make it happen. These days, though we understand the need for secular government that does what we want it to do (or not), and don't accept that the Church has to be involved just because it was in the past. We should get what we pay for.From out there on the moon, international politics look so petty. You want to grab a politician by the scruff of the neck and drag him a quarter of a million miles out and say, ‘Look at that, you son of a bitch’.
— Edgar Mitchell, Apollo 14 Astronaut
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In this case the kidnapper has contravened the victim's right to liberty. The State, as a guardian of rights, intervenes to restore liberty and punish the offender. The police (not the entire community) do this because we pay them to intervene. Its not because we have a "right" to expect other people to drop what they are doing, and come looking for us.Peregrinus wrote: »If you’re kidnapped, you expect the community (through the state) to endeavour to find you0 -
I think you are overstating your own case a bit there. Earlier on you said that my right translates into your negative obligation - if I have a right to liberty, you have an obligation not to imprison me. So at the very least, my right gives me this claim on you; that you should refrain from imprisoning me.I've never thought that "rights" were a complete "account of the obligations we owe to one another" in the first place, so I don't have a problem with that interpretation. If anything, my argument is that "rights" do not naturally (automatically) translate in to obligations at all - see the example I used (housing). As for "the claims we can make on one another", my interpretation of "rights" excludes those altogether, anyway, though I don't know exactly what you mean by that.
So - forgive me if I misunderstand you - what you seem to be saying is this: If I can demand of you that you should refrain from certain actions, my power to make that demand can properly be called a “right”. But if I can go on to demand that you should positively engage in certain actions, that cannot be properly called a “right”.
To which I say:
(a) It’s not obvious why this should be so.
(b) Arguments about the definitions of words are pretty pointless. You can define and use the word “right” however you want, but I don’t think that this is how the word is generally used or defined in moral/political discourse in our society.
I don’t think it’s just a matter of how I feel. A third party who could observe what was going on but not intervene would, I think, make a negative moral judgment of my decision to prioritise the cleanliness of my shoes over the life of the toddler. He would see me as a less virtuous person. He would assert, I am fairly confident, that I did have a moral obligation in the circumstances to save the child, even at the cost of my shoes.In your example, the toddler had a "right" to life, and you did nothing to take that "right" away. If you feel yourself to have an obligation to save him or her, that's a separate issue: why do you feel that? Because of the possible consequences of inaction e.g. feelings of guilt, your reputation, and so on. But I would not confuse that with "rights".
It sounds harsh, I know, but we are talking in abstract philosophical terms here, and bringing emotion in to this only muddies the arguments.
Consider a few alternative scenarios:
1. I throw the toddler into the pond, knowing and intending that he will drown.
2. I throw the toddler into the pond, knowing that he will drown but motivated by a desire to startle a duck.
3. I throw the toddler into the pond, knowing that he may drown, and indifferent as to whether he does or not. In the event, he does.
4. I steal the fence which keeps toddlers out of the pond, because I want the timber. I know there is a risk that a toddler may drown as a result, and in the event he does.
5. I see the toddler about to fall into the pond, and I know that if he does he will drown. This will amuse me. I do not intervene. The toddler falls in and drowns.
6. I encourage the toddler to cross the pond on a log which I know to be unsafe. I do this because it amuses me. I know that if he falls in he will likely drown, and this is indeed what happens.
7. I see the toddler about to fall into the pond and I know what will happen if he does, but if I stop to help him I will miss my bus and I will get home late for the start of “Fair City”. I pass by. The toddler falls in and drowns.
8. The same, except the toddler is already in the pond when I see him.
In all of these scenarios, the toddler has a strong interest in continuing to live. We accept, I think, that that interest can have moral implications for how I ought to behave, if only because in scenario 1 above most people will agree that I acted immorally.
I also suggest that most people would agree that in every case outlined above I acted immorally. In each case I ought to have acted or intervened in a way which meant that the toddler did not die.
You seem to be saying that if what is required of me is purely negative - in scenario 1, not to throw the toddler in the pond - then the toddler’s interest in continuing to live can be characterized as a “right”. But if the action morally required of me is something positive - to fish the toddler out of the pond, or prevent him from falling in in the first place - then the toddler’s interesting in living cannot be called a “right”. But:
(a) This seems to be arbitrary; I don’t see why it should be so.
(b) The toddler’s interest in every case is the same; to continue to live. And the outcome of my choice in every case is the same; he dies. What is the point of saying that in some scenarios the toddler had a right which I infringed and that in others this was not the case?
In short, I think the distinction you propose is meaningless.
I don’t think it’s particularly utilitarian position. As you rightly point out, the guards resist kidnapping and help kidnapping victims because we tell them to, and pay them to. Why do we do that? Because we think that we, as a community, have an obligation to defend - to defend actively - the right to liberty. We recognize that simply not kidnapping you ourselves is not a sufficient response to or recognition of your right to liberty; your right creates a positive obligation on us to outlaw kidnapping and recruit, empower, train and fund a police force to tackle kidnappings, and in societies where this does not happen - Somalia, say - the right of liberty is not recognized or respected as, morally, it ought to be.I would not classify the role of the State in this as any sort of natural defender of "rights". If it does play a role in that area, it's because we have decided that it should do so, got laws passed to that effect by our representatives, and are willing to pay the price. The Garda (or any other state actor) are not superheroes acting out of concern for "rights", they have a job to do which is defined by law and paid for by your taxes. They would come to your aid, if you are kidnapped, because that is what they are set up to do. They would not fix your car if it broke down, because that is not what they are set up to do. You could call that a "utilitarian" position if you like.
Or, in other words, rights do create positive obligations, and not just purely negative ones. And everybody knows this.
The reason the guards don’t fix your car is because we don’t recognize a right to have your car fixed. The reason they will respond to your kidnapping is because we do recognize a right of personal liberty.0 -
We have no right to expect that every single individual will drop what they are doing and come looking for us. But I suggest we do have a right to expect a collective response to our plight; that they community will act to restore our liberty (by, as you point out, organising, paying and mandating a police force to do this).In this case the kidnapper has contravened the victim's right to liberty. The State, as a guardian of rights, intervenes to restore liberty and punish the offender. The police (not the entire community) do this because we pay them to intervene. Its not because we have a "right" to expect other people to drop what they are doing, and come looking for us.
If the community did nothing at all on the basis that it wasn't the community (or anyone acting on its behalf) that had kidnapped me, then I think most of us would agree that that was a society which did not adequately respect the right to personal liberty.
I'm not saying that every recognised human right requires affirmative action on the part of the state. I'm just saying that a human right can require positive, and not merely negative, action, and that the positive action which is most often required is collective, rather than individual, and that the state is often (though not necessarily always) the agency through which this positive action is undertaken.0 -
If we have to have these long discussions about "rights", I think that's symptomatic of an over-emphasis on "rights" in the public sphere. The expectations have been set too high, in my opinion. If you start demanding that "rights" translate in to concrete obligations (the "positive action" I referred to earlier), we see the question becomes one of who is going to carry out those actions.
I was trying to make the point that such "rights" have to paid for. They are not "natural" in the sense that they will "just happen" without positive action by someone, requiring motivation. Using the housing example again, I already explained my position on that, while others see that "right" as an obligation on someone to provide housing. That someone typically being the State, so it was inevitable that the State would pop up in this discussion too.
In summary, I wish people would dial back their expectations of what "rights" are going to do for them. They simply form a baseline expectation of what should not happen, not a "complete account" of the sort described earlier, or an obligation on anyone else to do things for you at no cost.From out there on the moon, international politics look so petty. You want to grab a politician by the scruff of the neck and drag him a quarter of a million miles out and say, ‘Look at that, you son of a bitch’.
— Edgar Mitchell, Apollo 14 Astronaut
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Oh, well, I'm with you there. I made the point back in post #4 http://www.boards.ie/vbulletin/showpost.php?p=81138995&postcount=4I was trying to make the point that such "rights" have to paid for. They are not "natural" in the sense that they will "just happen" without positive action by someone, requiring motivation. Using the housing example again, I already explained my position on that, while others see that "right" as an obligation on someone to provide housing. That someone typically being the State, so it was inevitable that the State would pop up in this discussion too.
that "rights", far from being absolute, are nuanced and conditional, and the more rights you recognise, the truer this becomes. My "right" to healthcare, housing or police protection conflicts with your "right" to retain your earnings and not pay them in taxes. My "right" to free speech conflicts with your "right" not to be bullied or victimised. My "right" to freedom of assocation conflicts with your "right" to equal consideration and fair procedures in employment matters. And so on.0 -
This is true, but you have to realise that the response is organised for somewhat selfish reasons; ie "it could be me next time".Peregrinus wrote: »If the community did nothing at all on the basis that it wasn't the community (or anyone acting on its behalf) that had kidnapped me, then I think most of us would agree that that was a society which did not adequately respect the right to personal liberty.
So there is a selfish benefit as well as a moral obligation involved when we organise a police/ court system to safeguard other people's rights.
We may even feel a moral obligation to personally intervene and help someone, such as your toddler, but the victim has no actual right to make us help.
If that were the case, you would be obliged to sell up all your property and send the money off to the third world to buy food and essential healthcare for people who will undoubtably die otherwise.0 -
Well, the notion of rights is reciprocal, so I suppose we all hope that others will respect our rights, and this does provide a motivation for us to respect theirs. Do unto others, and all that. It's just a particular application of the golden rule.This is true, but you have to realise that the response is organised for somewhat selfish reasons; ie "it could be me next time".
But it doesn't do to be too cynical about this. We have no reason to exclude the possibility that people are motivated also by altruistic or principled consideration. There may well be people who feel their own rights are fairly secure, and yet who recognise an obligation to help protect the rights of others who are less fortunate, and there may also be people whose rights are not at all secure, but who help others without any expectation that this will lead to an improvement in their own situation. Selfishness may be one dimension of human nature, but so is empathy.0 -
Peregrinus, do you believe other people have a right to your assistance, if their life is in peril?0
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Not an absolute and unlimited right in all circumstances. But, yes, in the right circumstances, people could have such a right.
For example, in my "toddler in the duckpond" scenario, I think there'd be a fairly strong moral obligation on me to wade in and fish the little bugger out, suede shoes or no suede shoes. And I suppose you could express the same thought more eloquently by saying that, n the circumstances, he had a right to my assistance.
If I didn't help him, and he drowned, would you say that I had done wrong? Would you say that I had wronged him?0 -
Peregrinus wrote: »Not an absolute and unlimited right in all circumstances. But, yes, in the right circumstances, people could have such a right.
For example, in my "toddler in the duckpond" scenario, I think there'd be a fairly strong moral obligation on me to wade in and fish the little bugger out, suede shoes or no suede shoes. And I suppose you could express the same thought more eloquently by saying that, n the circumstances, he had a right to my assistance.
If I didn't help him, and he drowned, would you say that I had done wrong? Would you say that I had wronged him?
Sorry to butt in, but have to answer, yes, I would say you had wronged him, if you were in a reasonable position to give help but did not do so (Good Samaritan laws). I'd also be interested in looking at why you hadn't helped the toddler. Not helping out of callous amusement would be one thing. But, for example, what if one were to be held legally responsible for the toddler on rescue, or ran the risk of assuming hospital bills?0 -
Then why not sell up everything and donate all your money to the starving people in the third world? Starvation is a dire circumstance.Peregrinus wrote: »But, yes, in the right circumstances, people could have such a right.
Or do you mean it depends on your circumstances (suede shoes).0 -
I've already made the point that other people's rights do not create absolute and unlimited claims on me; I've made that point consistently since the beginning of this thread.
But I notice that you're not answering my questions. In the example I give, do you think the circumstances gave rise to any moral obligation on me?0 -
IMO a moral obligation comes from a person's own perceived values.
Therefore I cannot say whether you would feel a moral obligation to attempt a rescue of the toddler, but I can say that I would.
If you fail to jump in the water though, you are not committing a crime of omission AFAIK. A right is inalienable; it does not depend on the values of the person bestowing it. Even that is not completely objective though because society at large has to decide the extent of rights and who they apply to. But within a secular society (which I'll conveniently define here as one covered by a common legal system) there should be allowed a range of different moral values.
A theocracy which imposes its own moral code, eg Sharia law may not tolerate such a range of personal values, but that's another story.
Interestingly there is a traditional law of the sea among shipwrecked sailors giving them a right to be rescued by any passing ship, even though it may be an inconvenience for the rescuer, but that seems to be more in the way of a professional contract or understanding. It guarantees a level of reciprocity where there is a common danger facing all the participants.0 -
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Is there any connection, then, between rights and moral obligations? You seem to be saying that you might have a right to life, say, but if my values do not require me to respect that right, then I have no moral obligation to do so and (I think it must follow) my violation of your rights is not immoral.IMO a moral obligation comes from a person's own perceived values.
Therefore I cannot say whether you would feel a moral obligation to attempt a rescue of the toddler, but I can say that I would . . .
A right is inalienable; it does not depend on the values of the person bestowing it.
If that's the case, though, what is the signficance of saying that you have a right at all? If it has no moral consequence, it seems to be a statement devoid of meaning.
My position is precisely the opposite of yours; to say that X has a right is to say that everyone else has a corresponding moral obligation. The unresolved question is, what is the extent of that moral obligation? BNT suggests in post #35 that the moral obligations are purely negative; not to interfere actively, but that rights don't give rise to any positive moral obligations to actively do anything in support of the exercise by others of their rights. I find that arbitrary and incoherent, for reasons already outlined, and my "toddler in the duckpond" examples, and my discussion of our communal obligation actively to defend rights are intended to elucidate this.
You seem to be taking an even more limited position than BNT; that rights don't give rise to any moral obligations at all. Have I misunderstood you?0 -
To me, a moral obligation is something you feel obliged to do because of your own conscience.
In contrast a right is defined by society, and you are obliged to respect that, whether you have your own individual conscience or not.
Most people would experience more moral obligations then, than just the number required to respect the corresponding rights of other people. Hence charity.
In the case of the toddler, he would have a right, or a claim to be rescued if you had previously removed the safety fence, or if you were his parent/guardian/babysitter.
If you were a complete stranger, just innocently passing by, you are not obliged to risk being drowned yourself while attempting the rescue. (Quite a few people die in Ireland every year while trying to rescue drowning swimmers, so this is not just an academic point)
On the other hand, if you felt competent, or the water looked shallow, you might be compelled or obliged by your own conscience to act.
Getting back to the starving people, you haven't said what rights of yours conflict with their supposed "right" to get your money. I suggest it's just your right "not to be hassled by other people" which is fair enough. It gets back to BNT's point about rights being really about freedom from interference, which I agree with. Anything else is charity, and that is not mandatory; its an optional extra.0 -
Yes, but that’s not a complete account.To me, a moral obligation is something you feel obliged to do because of your own conscience.
If I feel a conscientious obligation not to murder you, and ask myself why I feel that, the answer is likely to be something along the lines that I feel you have a right to continue living. Thus “conscience” and “rights” are not mutually exclusive as a source of moral obligation.
The other problem with this conscience-based account of moral obligations is that it’s completely subjective. It doesn’t enable me to make a moral judgment about an action taken by anyone else. Thus I cannot say that, e.g., rounding up Jews and consigning them to gas chambers is morally wrong; only that it would be morally wrong for me to do such a thing. And yet a lot of people are going to be uneasy - to put it no higher - with a moral framework which doesn’t enable us to make an adverse judgment about the Holocaust.
Again, I can’t agree, because Holocaust. If Jews live in society which does not accord them rights of life or liberty, then on this account they have no rights to life or liberty, and there is no reason why their society should alter its attitude and create such a right for them. That’s not very satisfactory.In contrast a right is defined by society, and you are obliged to respect that, whether you have your own individual conscience or not.
You seem to be assuming that charity cannot be a response to, and acknowledgement of, the claims made upon us by the rights of others. Why do you assume that?Most people would experience more moral obligations then, than just the number required to respect the corresponding rights of other people. Hence charity.
Amnesty International, I would have thought, is a fairly obvious example to invalidate the assumption, but in fact there are a wide range of well-known charities whose activities can be understood as (and are often articulated as) a response to the moral claims arising out of the rights of others.
No, you’re cheating there! I specifically stipulated in my hypothetical that the toddler is drowning in a duckpond, and that I could rescue him without danger to myself.In the case of the toddler, he would have a right, or a claim to be rescued if you had previously removed the safety fence, or if you were his parent/guardian/babysitter. If you were a complete stranger, just innocently passing by, you are not obliged to risk being drowned yourself while attempting the rescue. (Quite a few people die in Ireland every year while trying to rescue drowning swimmers, so this is not just an academic point)
Yes. And why would that not be a response to the moral claim put upon my by the toddler’s rights?On the other hand, if you felt competent, or the water looked shallow, you might be compelled or obliged by your own conscience to act.
Except that in most western (and I suspect most non-western) accounts of morality (Ayn Rand excepted) charity is not an “optional extra”; it’s a moral obligation. You’re taking a somewhat fringe position here, and I think there’s some obligation on you to defend and justify it, not merely to assert it.Getting back to the starving people, you haven't said what rights of yours conflict with their supposed "right" to get your money. I suggest it's just your right "not to be hassled by other people" which is fair enough. It gets back to BNT's point about rights being really about freedom from interference, which I agree with. Anything else is charity, and that is not mandatory; its an optional extra.
As for why a starving man’s right to life does not necessarily entitle him to my last penny, there are a couple of accounts. First, he is not the only starving person in the world, and I am not the only person with surplus food. I’ve pointed out already that the moral obligations that arise out of people’s rights are often obligations which are imposed on us collectively, rather than individually. Secondly, he is not the only person in the world with rights, nor the only person whose rights make a claim on me. I may, for example, have a greater obligation to my near dependants than I do to him. Thirdly, I too have rights, and to the extent that my rights may be less pressing than his I have less claim or expectation that others will meet them, and therefore a greater justification for devoting my own resources to them. So the question of what I do for this starving man can’t be addressed in isolation from the questions of what others do for him, what I do for other starving people, what I do for other people whose rights are not being vindicated in different ways, what I do for other people who may have greater claims on me than he does, and what I do for myself. We are not in a situation here when the only possibilities are that I am obliged to do everything for him, or that I am not obliged to do anything for him.0 -
Would you be supportive of the prosecution of a person that allows a toddler to drown in circumstances where they could have saved the toddler with little or no risk to themselves? I am undecided on this, but I think I lean towards they should be prosecuted. My understanding that there are a number of countries that, France for example apparently, where there is such an obligation and a prosecution would follow in your example.Peregrinus wrote: »
My position is precisely the opposite of yours; to say that X has a right is to say that everyone else has a corresponding moral obligation. The unresolved question is, what is the extent of that moral obligation? BNT suggests in post #35 that the moral obligations are purely negative; not to interfere actively, but that rights don't give rise to any positive moral obligations to actively do anything in support of the exercise by others of their rights. I find that arbitrary and incoherent, for reasons already outlined, and my "toddler in the duckpond" examples, and my discussion of our communal obligation actively to defend rights are intended to elucidate this.
Moral obligations are also something the law recognises as well.To me, a moral obligation is something you feel obliged to do because of your own conscience.
This is pretty much how the law works at the moment. If you have a duty of care, which you would if you were instrumental in the circumstances that caused the risk, or you had a pre-existing obligation towards the child.In the case of the toddler, he would have a right, or a claim to be rescued if you had previously removed the safety fence, or if you were his parent/guardian/babysitter.
If you were a complete stranger, just innocently passing by, you are not obliged to risk being drowned yourself while attempting the rescue. (Quite a few people die in Ireland every year while trying to rescue drowning swimmers, so this is not just an academic point)
On the other hand, if you felt competent, or the water looked shallow, you might be compelled or obliged by your own conscience to act.
I don't think many would advocate a legal obligation to attempt rescue, irrespective of the risk to one's self, but there are many who suggest that where there is little or no risk it would be an offence not to act. This is already the case in a number of countries, and I don't think it is a bad thing. Rather than a legal obligation to risk your life, it would be more like a legal obligation to be inconvenienced. I would presume that Peregrinus chose a duck pond for a reason, they tend to be shallow and whilst it is perfectly conceivable for a child to drown in one it is highly unlikely a adult would. I doubt anyone would suggest a legal obligation for someone to just into the raging torrent of a flooded river, though some people do.
MrP
EDIT: My was written, but not posted, before Peregrinus's last post, apologises for the repeated points.0 -
That raises the question of whether such an action would be, or ought to be, unlawful, which is not the same question of whether it would be immoral.Would you be supportive of the prosecution of a person that allows a toddler to drown in circumstances where they could have saved the toddler with little or no risk to themselves? I am undecided on this, but I think I lean towards they should be prosecuted. My understanding that there are a number of countries that, France for example apparently, where there is such an obligation and a prosecution would follow in your example.
For what it’s worth, I’m in some doubt as to what extent the law should criminalise the bystander who could save a life but doesn’t. A part of me says that if I let you die because it amuses me, that’s unconscionable and we should mark our collective disapproval with a criminal sanction. Another part says, how are we to tell the person who is amused by the sight of someone dying from the person who is paralysed by horror or shock? But I don’t need to decide that it is practicable to criminalise a particular action in order to be able to judge it to be immoral.
Only up to a point. Most people would see, say, cheating on a wife/husband/boyfriend/girlfriend as always or mostly or often immoral, but it doesn’t follow that they want it to be illegal. Similarly, lying is generally considered to be immoral, but is only illegal when some further factors are present - perjury, fraud.Moral obligations are also something the law recognises as well.
Conversely, lots of things which aren’t inherently immoral are nevertheless illegal, e.g. driving on the right-hand side of the road, bringing a Stanley knife with you when you board a plane, failing to display the tax disc on your car.
There’s an obvious overlap between morality and legality, but it’s generally best, when discussing morality, to leave the issue of legality to one side.0 -
Very true, I am not necessarily a fan of the law being used to coercively enforce someone's particular brand of morality, or ideas formed from their comprehensive doctrines, but certain things are considered to be immoral which are also illegal, and in some cases this is OK.Peregrinus wrote: »That raises the question of whether such an action would be, or ought to be, unlawful, which is not the same question of whether it would be immoral.
Murder is both immoral and illegal, and I believe it was considered immoral before it was illegal. Leaving aside the moral or ethical aspect of it, there are clearly non-moralistic reasons for making murder illegal.
As am I, though as I said I think I am leaning towards there being some legal pressure to act in certain circumstances, beyond that which exists right now.Peregrinus wrote: »For what it’s worth, I’m in some doubt as to what extent the law should criminalise the bystander who could save a life but doesn’t.
Very true, but then the courts makes decisions on what a particular person was feeling during a particular course of action all the time; would this really be that different?Peregrinus wrote: »A part of me says that if I let you die because it amuses me, that’s unconscionable and we should mark our collective disapproval with a criminal sanction. Another part says, how are we to tell the person who is amused by the sight of someone dying from the person who is paralysed by horror or shock? But I don’t need to decide that it is practicable to criminalise a particular action in order to be able to judge it to be immoral.
I think I prefer option where if the risk to the bystander is negligible then they would have a duty to intervene. It would then be up to the CPS to decide if there is a public interest to prosecute and if they did the person could then put forward a defence based on their particular circumstances as to why they did not intervene. For example, they almost drowned as a child and had a paralysing fear of open water ever since. This has the advantage of being evidentially simpler than trying to prove how a particular person was feeling as they watched a person drown.
I don't disagree. I did not say that the law recognises all moral obligations, I was merely pointing out that recognition of moral obligations are not new to the law.Peregrinus wrote: »Only up to a point. Most people would see, say, cheating on a wife/husband/boyfriend/girlfriend as always or mostly or often immoral, but it doesn’t follow that they want it to be illegal. Similarly, lying is generally considered to be immoral, but is only illegal when some further factors are present - perjury, fraud.
Not so sure about this... Driving on the right hand side of the road makes you a danger to yourself and others, which is why it is illegal. But, I think it is arguable that you, as a driver, have a moral obligation towards other road users not to put them at risk of injury or death, much like it could be argued that every member of society has a moral obligation to work to the benefit of society and not against it. I expect that with analysis it would be possible for someone to dig a moral reason out of most laws.Peregrinus wrote: »Conversely, lots of things which aren’t inherently immoral are nevertheless illegal, e.g. driving on the right-hand side of the road, bringing a Stanley knife with you when you board a plane, failing to display the tax disc on your car.
This become rather difficult when discussing rights, and particularly what rights have a superior position when two or more rights are in conflict.Peregrinus wrote: »There’s an obvious overlap between morality and legality, but it’s generally best, when discussing morality, to leave the issue of legality to one side.
MrP0 -
Peregrinus wrote: »That raises the question of whether such an action would be, or ought to be, unlawful, which is not the same question of whether it would be immoral . . .
Well, it’s a bit more complicated than that, I think.Very true, I am not necessarily a fan of the law being used to coercively enforce someone's particular brand of morality, or ideas formed from their comprehensive doctrines, but certain things are considered to be immoral which are also illegal, and in some cases this is OK.
All moral questions are variants on one basic question, which is “how ought I (or we) to act?”. It follows that all political questions are also moral questions, since political questions are questions of how we ought to act in relation to public affairs. Politics is therefore a branch of morality. And law is a further sub-branch of that; it asks the question “ought we to prohibit, or to punish, this act?”
In that sense, therefore, all law is the enforcement of someone’s moral view, the “someone” in a democracy being, at least in theory, society, forming a view through some kind of consensus.
But I think the criminal law become “meta-moral”, to coin a phrase, when we decide that it is moral for us to forbid act X because, or partly because, act X is itself immoral. And I think it’s that meta-morality that you are uncomfortable with.
It’s not clear to me, I have to admit. The reasons why we think it’s moral to outlaw murder are pretty much the same as the reasons why we think murder is immoral in the first place, as far as I can see. But I’d be interested to hear your contrary view.Murder is both immoral and illegal, and I believe it was considered immoral before it was illegal. Leaving aside the moral or ethical aspect of it, there are clearly non-moralistic reasons for making murder illegal.
In general, I think it’s often true that the immorality of an act is a substantial part of the case for criminalizing it. It’s not a sufficient case on its own, though. But, if an act is not considered to be immoral, there’s generally some hesitation about criminalizing it.Peregrinus wrote: »Conversely, lots of things which aren’t inherently immoral are nevertheless illegal, e.g. driving on the right-hand side of the road, bringing a Stanley knife with you when you board a plane, failing to display the tax disc on your car.
Possibly I should have added emphasis - it’s not inherently immoral to drive on the right-hand side of the road. A rule banning driving on the left would work just as well to secure public safety. In other words the substantive content of this law has nothing to do with the morality of the act criminalized, but we accept the criminalization of an act which is in itself perfectly moral in order to secure a morally desirable outcome, which is greater road safety. In this case there's no meta-morality at work; the moral act is ours, in working to secure road safety, and to do that we forbid, or enjoin, particular acts without regard to whether they are moral or not.Not so sure about this... Driving on the right hand side of the road makes you a danger to yourself and others, which is why it is illegal. But, I think it is arguable that you, as a driver, have a moral obligation towards other road users not to put them at risk of injury or death, much like it could be argued that every member of society has a moral obligation to work to the benefit of society and not against it.Peregrinus wrote: »There’s an obvious overlap between morality and legality, but it’s generally best, when discussing morality, to leave the issue of legality to one side.
I’m not sure about that. Rights are first and foremost a moral concept. If I assert that rounding Jews up into concentration camps and killing them is a breach of their rights, I’m making a moral point, given that it was legal in the time and place where this was done. It seems to me that we make moral judgments about rights, and then those judgments feed into our political and legal positions. (Rounding people up and killing them on the basis of ethnic, cultural or religious identity is immoral because it infringes their (moral) rights. Therefore it ought to be illegal.) Hence as regards rights we must discuss morality first, and legality second.This become rather difficult when discussing rights, and particularly what rights have a superior position when two or more rights are in conflict.
Otherwise we find our selves in a position where we hold that you have a right to do X because the law allows it, and no right to do Y because the law does not allow it. This leaves us unable to criticize the law on the basis that it fails to reflect rights, which I think is not a good thing.0 -
IMO the Jews did have their rights taken away from them, and later they were restored. It happened in distinct phases;Peregrinus wrote: »Again, I can’t agree, because Holocaust. If Jews live in society which does not accord them rights of life or liberty, then on this account they have no rights to life or liberty, and there is no reason why their society should alter its attitude and create such a right for them. That’s not very satisfactory.
1. Nazis appeared who felt no moral obligation to treat them well.
2. Nazis gained majority control of the society, with a democratic mandate, and the society then withdrew rights from Jews.
3. Other societies eg Britain and USA were drawn into the situation, and whether through act of charity or by virtue of alliances with others eg Britain/France and Germany/Japan, they intervened to restore the rights of Jews.
IMO there are two distinct questions at play here;
Does group X have rights?
Should group X have rights?
In the past these questions were addressed to groups such as black people, or Jews. In our times animal rights are emerging.
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Society says we must not actively deny or infringe the rights of others unreasonably. However if we choose to actively defend the rights of others, that is a charity. That is a result of us feeling in our own conscience a moral obligation to act.Peregrinus wrote: »You seem to be assuming that charity cannot be a response to, and acknowledgement of, the claims made upon us by the rights of others. Why do you assume that?
Amnesty International.........
If Amnesty International harasses the oppressor, as they do, they are actually impinging on the oppressor's right to be left alone, but this is obviously weighed against the much worse oppression being perpetrated on others.
In regard to the duckpond, if someone refuses to rescue the toddler, even though it was safe to do so, because they find it amusing or whatever, I still don't think they should be formally punished. Obviously there would be some kind of social ostracisation of the person, if it became known. But you have to be careful about criminalizing that which disgusts you. That is how homosexuality came to be criminalized.0 -
Basically, what you are saying here is that the starving person is very far away, and only very distantly related to your selfish genes, and thus you feel only a very weak moral obligation towards him. And you have a right to get on with your own affairs without being hassled by him.Peregrinus wrote: »First, he is not the only starving person in the world, and I am not the only person with surplus food. I’ve pointed out already that the moral obligations that arise out of people’s rights are often obligations which are imposed on us collectively, rather than individually. Secondly, he is not the only person in the world with rights, nor the only person whose rights make a claim on me. I may, for example, have a greater obligation to my near dependants than I do to him. Thirdly, I too have rights, and to the extent that my rights may be less pressing than his I have less claim or expectation that others will meet them, and therefore a greater justification for devoting my own resources to them. So the question of what I do for this starving man can’t be addressed in isolation from the questions of what others do for him, what I do for other starving people, what I do for other people whose rights are not being vindicated in different ways, what I do for other people who may have greater claims on me than he does, and what I do for myself. We are not in a situation here when the only possibilities are that I am obliged to do everything for him, or that I am not obliged to do anything for him.
This backs up my version of rights more than yours. As long as you are not actively interfering with him, he does not have a "right" to claim your active assistance.0 -
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At this point the discussion is becoming a bit semantic. I hold that the Jews did have rights of life, liberty etc and that is why the Nazi government behaved immorally in doing what it did. You agree that the Nazi government behaved immorally, but you also say that, as long as it did behave that way, the Jews did not have any right to life, liberty, etc.IMO the Jews did have their rights taken away from them, and later they were restored. . . .
In other words, there’s a substantial degree of agreement between us; we really disagree about the best way to employ the term “rights”, which is probably a disagreement we can live with if we have to.
But two thoughts do occur to me. First, I think the weight of common usage favours me. When the American colonists declared that “we hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are . . . endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” they weren’t saying that they would have these rights, if only the government would grant them; they were saying that they had these rights, and therefore the government behaved illegitimately in failing to respect them. Similarly, the Declaration of the Rights of Man declared rights to be “natural, inalienable and sacred”. Modern liberals might be uncomfortable with pietistic references to the Creator and the sacred, but they generally still regard human rights as natural and inherent in the human person, not as something granted by the ruler.
Secondly, if the Nazi treatment of the Jews wasn’t immoral as a violation of natural rights, why was it immoral? I suspect it’s not impossible to produce an answer to this question which does not explicitly or implicitly rely on any notion of natural human rights, but I don’t see too many people trying to do that.
Yes, but in most accounts of morality, charity is a moral obligation. So describing active defence of rights as “charity” does nothing to refute the idea that rights create a moral obligation on us to defend them actively. Doing so may well be both charitable and morally obligatory.Society says we must not actively deny or infringe the rights of others unreasonably. However if we choose to actively defend the rights of others, that is a charity.
But the question of whether something is, or ought to be, a crime is different from the question of whether it’s a moral obligation.In regard to the duckpond, if someone refuses to rescue the toddler, even though it was safe to do so, because they find it amusing or whatever, I still don't think they should be formally punished. Obviously there would be some kind of social ostracisation of the person, if it became known. But you have to be careful about criminalizing that which disgusts you. That is how homosexuality came to be criminalized.
Yes, he does. He may not be able to demand my last penny, but it doesn’t follow from that that he has no moral claim on me.Basically, what you are saying here is that the starving person is very far away, and only very distantly related to your selfish genes, and thus you feel only a very weak moral obligation towards him. And you have a right to get on with your own affairs without being hassled by him.
This backs up my version of rights more than yours. As long as you are not actively interfering with him, he does not have a "right" to claim your active assistance.0
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