Rights

Gbear

This could probably go in the philosophy forum but I like you guys and what we do here.

Any time we get into a debate about freedom of speech or expression or freedom in general the same problem pops up:
You get an argument between people who disagree on which right trumps which.

So, if I'm arguing that Mohammed cartoons are okeydokey I'm arguing that freedom of expression trumps freedom not to be offended.

My question is a general one of why does one freedom trump another?
What makes your right to life trump my right to stab you in the face? :pac:


I'm perfectly convinced that your right to life is paramount so don't all rush off to get stab-proof vests, but I don't know why I'm convinced of that or the more general notion of one right trumping another.

What decides what hierarchy rights have? Right to life trumping right to stab in face is intuitive but it isn't always as obvious - hence my need for some sort of logic to sort them out so that when I can't decide using my intuition, I can have a go at working it out from first principles.

Peregrinus

There’s no one-size-fits-all solution here, I’m afraid.

The problem here is that “rights” are not an empirically demonstrable reality; they are a philosophical construct, a way of speaking that we have developed in the last two or three hundred years to talk about how we think we ought to behave towards one another. Thus you can never prove that anyone has any right to do anything at all; you can merely assert that they do and hope to find people who agree with you.

You can hope to build that kind of shared agreement by appealing to other values or beliefs that may be shared. For example, if you and I agree that the primary role of the state is to maximise individual freedom of action, that will tend to create a wider space in which we can discern rights that we both agree must be respected. (Whereas if we think the role of the state is to preserve public order, or to foster optimal conditions for creating wealth, we will agree on a somewhat different and possibly narrower set of rights.) But, again, this depends on a shared agreement about what the proper role of the state is and this, too, is not something that can be proven or empirically demonstrated.

Ultimate this is a question of values. The rights we recognise and affirm reflect the values that we hold, and in the event of a conflict which right trumps which depends on which underlying value you accord a greater weight to. Knowing which value you accord a greater weight to can be difficult enough, but knowing why you accord a greater weight to it is even more difficult, since there is no objective empirical reason why anyone should accord any weight to any value.

eyescreamcone

Why do we have a right to freedom of speech, but prosecute those who tweet horrible things about that poor girl in Wales.
Is it freedom of speech...but. ???

Peregrinus

eyescreamcone wrote: »

Why do we have a right to freedom of speech, but prosecute those who tweet horrible things about that poor girl in Wales.
Is it freedom of speech...but. ???

That's exactly the point that Gbear is making. To the extent that I get prosecuted for tweeting something, then I don't have a right to freedom of speech.

And I don't know anyone who asserts an absolute and unqualified right of freedom of speech. My right to free speech doesn't extend to me telling pejorative lies about you, for example, because you have a right to your good name and reputation. My right to free speech doesn't allow me to sell state secrets for profit. It doesn't allow me, as a lawyer or a doctor or a banker, to tell the world about my client's private affairs. It doesn't allow me to make false claims in advertising. It doesn't allow me to advertise, say, cigarettes in certain media. It doesn't allow me to sing your song in a public performance without paying you a royalty. It doesn't allow me to shout "fire!" in a crowded theatre when there is no fire. It doesn't allow me to put up a public notice indicating that you will sell sexual favours at a modest rate, and inviting custom. And we could go on and on.

The point is, if you recognise more than one right, then rights are inevitably going to come into conflict, and the more rights you recognise - the more our discourse about public policy is conducted in the language of rights - the more this will happen. The absolutist language of high-flown principal that we tend to use in relation to rights isn't an accurate reflection of the highly conditional, highly nuanced reality.

Or, in other words, my "right to free speech" is in no sense a guarantee that I can always speak freely without repercussions or restraints. At most, it's an acknowledgement of the fact that repercussions or restraints on my speech need some definite justification. But it gives us little help as to what that justification might be.

Dades

^^ Great post.

mikhail

Peregrinus wrote: »

That's exactly the point that Gbear is making. To the extent that I get prosecuted for tweeting something, then I don't have a right to freedom of speech.

And I don't know anyone who asserts an absolute and unqualified right of freedom of speech. My right to free speech doesn't extend to me telling pejorative lies about you, for example, because you have a right to your good name and reputation. My right to free speech doesn't allow me to sell state secrets for profit. It doesn't allow me, as a lawyer or a doctor or a banker, to tell the world about my client's private affairs. It doesn't allow me to make false claims in advertising. It doesn't allow me to advertise, say, cigarettes in certain media. It doesn't allow me to sing your song in a public performance without paying you a royalty. It doesn't allow me to shout "fire!" in a crowded theatre when there is no fire. It doesn't allow me to put up a public notice indicating that you will sell sexual favours at a modest rate, and inviting custom. And we could go on and on.

The point is, if you recognise more than one right, then rights are inevitably going to come into conflict, and the more rights you recognise - the more our discourse about public policy is conducted in the language of rights - the more this will happen. The absolutist language of high-flown principal that we tend to use in relation to rights isn't an accurate reflection of the highly conditional, highly nuanced reality.

Or, in other words, my "right to free speech" is in no sense a guarantee that I can always speak freely without repercussions or restraints. At most, it's an acknowledgement of the fact that repercussions or restraints on my speech need some definite justification. But it gives us little help as to what that justification might be.

You clearly have no idea what freedom of speech means. Freedom of speech means that you are free to say something someone else finds disagreeable. It does not mean that you are free to say something that causes harm.

A tasteless joke about a missing child is clearly in the former category, and the prosecution of a 20 year old guy in England for a joke made on his own facebook wall is an unjustifiable breech of his rights in response to an emotion reaction that the law should be above.

Gbear

I think there might be some sensible boundary to be set between things that are "real" and things that are "man-made". I don't have any better words to describe them so bear with me.


"Real" things would be people. People have integrity and rights because we know (as much as we can know anything) that people exist.
Something more abstract - human sensibility perhaps, or "the greater good" might come in to the "man-made" category.

So making it a right to bodily integrity, life and that sort of thing makes sense in that regard.
However, any attempt to legislate for what are essentially the rights of abstract concepts - outlawing homosexuality because it goes against a kind of morality or outlawing drugs because they go against the "greater good" wouldn't make sense.


I think that personal freedom creates a better society in practice but also, I don't have any reverential notions towards society or culture in and of themselves.
I have no reason to want to defend them and, indeed, I'd happily attack these institutions if it means improving individuals' lives.

This fundamental problem arises when I'm debating with, for example, some religious people.
In some Muslim countries (like Saudi Arabia) they have decency police that go around the place protecting their notion of decency. It's so bloody hard to debate with someone in favour of this because you both value different things ("the individual" vs. "the greater good") so you just talk past each other.

Is there a fundamental line of argument that really sets out why valuing the individual is best?

Peregrinus wrote: »

For example, if you and I agree that the primary role of the state is to maximise individual freedom of action, that will tend to create a wider space in which we can discern rights that we both agree must be respected.

So perhaps a notion along the lines that individuals are the "lowest common denominator" of all societies and they all have their own inherent value means that it's more important to value their freedoms first and foremost?

Peregrinus

mikhail wrote: »

You clearly have no idea what freedom of speech means. Freedom of speech means that you are free to say something someone else finds disagreeable. It does not mean that you are free to say something that causes harm.

A tasteless joke about a missing child is clearly in the former category, and the prosecution of a 20 year old guy in England for a joke made on his own facebook wall is an unjustifiable breech of his rights in response to an emotion reaction that the law should be above.

Mate, first of all you are saying that "freedom of speech" actually means "freedom of harmless speech", i.e. speech which does not cause harm. Already that's a sigfnificant qualification on the notion of freedom of speech. And furthermore you are abitrarly taking a particular kind of harm and labelling it as not-harm.

This is incoherent. You don't believe in freedom of speech any more than anyone else; you're just in denial about it.

MrPudding

mikhail wrote: »

You clearly have no idea what freedom of speech means. Freedom of speech means that you are free to say something someone else finds disagreeable. It does not mean that you are free to say something that causes harm.

A tasteless joke about a missing child is clearly in the former category, and the prosecution of a 20 year old guy in England for a joke made on his own facebook wall is an unjustifiable breech of his rights in response to an emotion reaction that the law should be above.

Whilst I tend not to agree with very much Peregrinus says, I think he has a very good idea of what freedom of speech is, possible a better idea than you have.

Freedom of speech is, as Peregrinus points out, as qualified right. There is no absolute right to freedom of speech. His example of shouting fire in a crowed theatre is probably the most famous example, and it comes from a case in the US which arguably has some of the strongest right to freedom of speech.

Your freedom of speech is restricted. In very simplistic terms, you are free to say whatever you want, so long as what you say does not break any laws. So then we have you example of the guy what made the April "joke." Unfortunately for him he has arguable breached s127 of the Communications Act 2003, in that he has sent a message that is grossly offensive. Of course, it will be up to the CPS to prove that message / joke was grossly offensive though it test is something along the lines of, "would it cause grossly offensive to the persons it relates to, who may not be the recipients."

So no, we do not have an unfettered right to be offensive any more than we have an unfettered right to freedom of speech. You may agree with that or not, but that is how it is.

MrP

Peregrinus

Gbear wrote: »

I think there might be some sensible boundary to be set between things that are "real" and things that are "man-made". I don't have any better words to describe them so bear with me.


"Real" things would be people. People have integrity and rights because we know (as much as we can know anything) that people exist.
Something more abstract - human sensibility perhaps, or "the greater good" might come in to the "man-made" category.

So making it a right to bodily integrity, life and that sort of thing makes sense in that regard.
However, any attempt to legislate for what are essentially the rights of abstract concepts - outlawing homosexuality because it goes against a kind of morality or outlawing drugs because they go against the "greater good" wouldn't make sense.

This isn't going to work, Gbear. I don't know anyone who advocates outlawing drugs because "they go against the greater good"; do you? All the advocacy I've seen on this point comes down to arguments that drugs cause harm in very concrete ways. Whether they do or not is an empirical question, and clearly the answer may be different for different drugs, but this is certainly not an "unreal" argument.

And, on the wider scale, I'm not attracted by your "real" versus "man-made" distinction. A concept like integrity is quite plainly man-made, as are artefacts like money. Indeed, the notion of freedom is a human construct, as indeed is the notion of "rights". If we argue that we need respect only real things and not man-made things, then we need not respect personal rights, which I think is kind of self-defeating.

Gbear wrote: »

I think that personal freedom creates a better society in practice but also, I don't have any reverential notions towards society or culture in and of themselves.
I have no reason to want to defend them and, indeed, I'd happily attack these institutions if it means improving individuals' lives.

This fundamental problem arises when I'm debating with, for example, some religious people.
In some Muslim countries (like Saudi Arabia) they have decency police that go around the place protecting their notion of decency. It's so bloody hard to debate with someone in favour of this because you both value different things ("the individual" vs. "the greater good") so you just talk past each other.

We have decency police here too, as you'll discover if you walk down O'Connell Street in the nip, or try to have sex in a public place. Our standards of what is decent or indecent differ from those of the Saudis, but I can;t see any argument that ours have some objective validity while theirs are just a subjective preference.

Gbear wrote: »

Is there a fundamental line of argument that really sets out why valuing the individual is best?

So perhaps a notion along the lines that individuals are the "lowest common denominator" of all societies and they all have their own inherent value means that it's more important to value their freedoms first and foremost?

Possibly. But if you find someone who doesn't agree with this, can you advance any argument as to why he should?

And, even if you do, you won't go too far before you find that you and your friend have different understandings of which freedoms matter. Classical liberalism (which is really where we get rights language from) has traditionally stressed the freedom to pursue economic/material advantage and the American right, say, are very strong on this. Others might argue that we are not truly free unless we enjoy the opportunities given to us by education and health, and providing us with education and healthcare is therefore a good reason to curtail our economic freedoms (by taxing us to pay for these things). Both sides in this debate are arguing for the freedom of the individual, but they prioritise different kinds of freedom in different ways (and in fact in western society this is probably the most common source of disagreement over rights).

mikhail

Peregrinus wrote: »

Mate, first of all you are saying that "freedom of speech" actually means "freedom of harmless speech", i.e. speech which does not cause harm. Already that's a sigfnificant qualification on the notion of freedom of speech. And furthermore you are abitrarly taking a particular kind of harm and labelling it as not-harm.

This is incoherent. You don't believe in freedom of speech any more than anyone else; you're just in denial about it.

I believe that when a nation makes offending someone a crime, then there is no rational basis whatsoever for claiming that nation has freedom of speech.

Daftendirekt

When building a 'hierarchy of rights' it's important to look at the real world consequences of prioritising certain rights over others. We value freedom of speech over freedom from offence because the silencing of dissenting voices can cause more tangible and substantial problems for a greater number of individuals.

What would happen in an organisation where criticism of management and co-workers is forbidden? Bad habits and working practices would become entrenched and people would have less opportunity to refine their skills or grow in their jobs. Such an organisation could expect stagnation at best, and decline at worst.

On the other hand, in an organisation where constructive criticism is encouraged, employees could expect to improve continuously, bad practices could be weeded out more easily and the organisation as a whole would be more likely to flourish.

I don't agree that it's a case of the individual good versus the greater good. IMO, the greater good is a very utilitarian concept - the greatest benefit for the greatest number of individuals over a longer time frame than we'd usually deal with.

SeanW

I'm with Pat Condell on this one:

"You have rights. Your beliefs do not."

robindch

mikhail wrote: »

I believe that when a nation makes offending someone a crime, then there is no rational basis whatsoever for claiming that nation has freedom of speech.

Up to a point, I agree with you, but it's only a very limited point. I haven't heard what this guy said, nor will I google it, probably because -- as the dad of a desperately similar five-year old girl -- I expect I'd want to locate this idiot and permanently rearrange his head.

In this, I'm sticking to A+A's general guidelines -- be as rude as you want about whatever ideas you want, but don't insult people, or at least, not without a cracking good reason. Because I believe that if the honor or memory of a private person is unreasonably insulted, then it's legitimate for that person or their successors to demand a public and apologetic retraction, or have the state sanction the person who made the insult.

There's an assumption of innocence within most legal systems, and assuming the honor of a state's citizens is a corollary of that assumption.

robindch

robindch wrote: »

In this, I'm sticking to A+A's general guidelines -- be as rude as you want about whatever ideas you want, but don't insult people, or at least, not without a cracking good reason. Because I believe that if the honor or memory of a private person is unreasonably insulted, then it's legitimate for that person or their successors to demand a public and apologetic retraction, or have the state sanction the person who made the insult.

There's an assumption of innocence within most legal systems, and assuming the honor of a state's citizens is a corollary of that assumption.

(I started a thread a while back in Humanities on this very issue, and I posted in it today about Matthew Woods — the 20 year old man who has been imprisoned for 12 weeks for his controversial and distasteful "jokes" on Facebook about April Jones and Madeleine McCann.)

I can completely sympathise with the position you hold on this — it's the position most people seem to hold. I have a fundamental disagreement with it, though. I cannot agree that it should be the state's duty to protect individuals from being offended, nor should the state, as a consequence of this protection, prosecute and imprison those who it deems to have caused "great" offence or moral outrage. I cannot reconcile offence with criminalisation, however great the offence caused is deemed to be. To use an over-used term, the state should not be a "nanny state" which concerns itself with offence being caused, or those who cause offence. The "right" not to be offended is not an intrinsic right, in my opinion. People have a right to their good name, which is why libel laws are important, but this doesn't extend to protection from offence.

robindch

gvn wrote: »

The "right" not to be offended is not an intrinsic right, in my opinion.

I'm not referring to a "right" not to be offended, but to an assumption, backed by the sate, of the decency and honor of its citizens; in much the same way as the state assumes the innocence of people before it for trial. And that people who deny that assumption of decency should be called to demonstrate publicly that their contention is true, or as above, publicly and apologetically retract what they said, or suffer some sanction if they don't. Similarly, the right of free speech should be balanced, to the greatest extent possible, by the responsibility to use it fairly and decently.

There's a big difference between saying "atheism is dishonest" and "you are dishonest". The first is ok as far as I'm concerned; but for the second, the state should stand in, if the insultee wants, and require that the insulter proves the contention it in court or publicly retract it -- that's what libel laws are for.

Mr Woods appears to have failed to retract what I've no doubt are grossly offensive comments about a recently murdered child, so I'm happy -- indeed, I'm thrilled -- he's going to spend several months facing at a concrete wall and considering what I hope and trust will be a bleak immediate future. Next time, perhaps Mr Woods might think twice before publicly insulting the memory of a murdered child for no reason other than his own inability to make people laugh.

robindch

robindch wrote: »

I'm not referring to a "right" not to be offended, but to an assumption, backed by the sate, of the decency and honor of its citizens; in much the same way as the state assumes the innocence of people before it for trial. And that people who deny that assumption of decency should be called to demonstrate publicly that their contention is true, or as above, publicly and apologetically retract what they said, or suffer some sanction if they don't. Similarly, the right of free speech should be balanced, to the greatest extent possible, by the responsibility to use it fairly and decently.

I don't exactly agree with the above, but I appreciate the point and the (admirable) intention behind it. I have a fundamental disagreement with the state concerning itself with matters of decency — I simply believe that it's none of its business. Prosecution and imprisonment aren't the best responses to offensive material or indecency: criticism is.

In any case, Matthew Woods wasn't prosecuted for making factually incorrect statements about April; he was prosecuted for "sending by means of a public electronic communications network a message or other matter that is grossly offensive." This is markedly different to what you outline above: what you outline is closer to a libel lawsuit than a prosecution on the basis that gross offence was caused.

There's a big difference between saying "atheism is dishonest" and "you are dishonest". The first is ok as far as I'm concerned; but for the second, the state should stand in, if the insultee wants, and require that the insulter proves the contention it in court or publicly retract it -- that's what libel laws are for.

I cannot agree that an insultee should be able to bring an insulter to court — in all cases, at least. If I call you, say, a gobshite (which you're not ), and my doing so deeply offends you, I should not have the prospect of a prison sentence looming over my head. There's a distinct difference between an individual being offended by some action or remark of another, and an individual expressing a libellous remark about another. If I libel you, yes, you should be able to bring me to court; if you're offended by a (distasteful) joke I make, then no, you should not be able to bring me to court. There's a certain overlap between the two, but the two are not equivalent. I'd contend that Matthew Woods is guilty of the latter — of causing offence, which is what he was prosecuted for — and not the former — of being guilty of libel against April Jones (who is, in any case, upsettingly, dead, so libel doesn't apply).

Mr Woods appears to have failed to retract what I've no doubt are grossly offensive comments about a recently murdered child, so I'm happy -- indeed, I'm thrilled -- he's going to spend several months facing at a concrete wall and considering what I hope and trust will be a bleak immediate future. Next time, perhaps Mr Woods might think twice before publicly insulting the memory of a murdered child for no reason other than his own inability to make people laugh.

If you read the HuffPost article (linked to in the thread in Humanities) it states that Woods is remorseful and regretful over what he has done. That's beside the point, though.

He was prosecuted for "sending by means of a public electronic communications network a message or other matter that is grossly offensive." Not for libel, nor for something tantamount or equivalent to libel, but for sending an offensive message.

I suspect we might not disagree as much as it seems. If libel was to be clearly defined, and expressing an offensive remark defined, and a distinction drawn between the two, then we might agree more. It's important not to conflate libel with the expression of offensive remarks or messages — this would be very easy to do.

P.S. I do agree that his remarks were horrible. But for that I believe he should be criticised, not imprisoned.

P.P.S. I'm sorry to drag this thread (slightly) off-topic. If this is more suited to the thread in Humanities then, by all means, reply to me there. If you're happy with it being left here then that's good, too.

decimatio

robindch wrote: »

Mr Woods appears to have failed to retract what I've no doubt are grossly offensive comments about a recently murdered child, so I'm happy -- indeed, I'm thrilled -- he's going to spend several months facing at a concrete wall and considering what I hope and trust will be a bleak immediate future. Next time, perhaps Mr Woods might think twice before publicly insulting the memory of a murdered child for no reason other than his own inability to make people laugh.

I'm not a father, yet, but I do have a wonderful niece a little older than this girl so I can go a little way towards knowing how someone might feel in this situation.

So I can sympatheise but at the same time I absolutely disagree.

The problem is that when you start down this road of denying anyone the right to say anything then where does it lead? Who do you trust to decide what can or can't be heard?

How far do you think "offensive language used against a murdered 5 year old" is away from "offensive language against my prophet?" or "offensive language against my beliefs".

Robin, you said that you didn't google what he said but you trust that it was offensive. It's your right to choose to not listen to it but it's of paramount importance that we have that choice.

And that's not even opening the book on what different people find offensive. For example if someone said "God bless her, she's in a better place now" that would offend me, it really makes me angry actually. But do you think for a second that society these days would label it as offensive?

In France and other countries it's illegal, actually illegal, to deny the holocaust. Now I don't for a second deny it nor have I any desire to hear a holocaust denier speak on the subject but that's a completely different question from whether or not he has the right to speak and I have the right to listen if I so choose.

I live in a country where its not only illegal to state something false about someone but its also illegal to state something true about them if what I said is damaging to their character or reputation. Can you wrap your head around that?

Now that's not to say that anyone can say or do anything anywhere. People should be allowed to shout "fire" in a theatre without legal repercussions but that doesn't mean that the theatre has to allow that individual to remain there or admit them next time. A theatre is a private location where you agree to abide by their rules.

The same goes for confidentiality agreements or doctor patient relations etc. By entering such a relationship you have explicity agreed not to exercise your right of free speech on that persons privacy and you have agreed to submit to the repercussions of such actions. This is not a curtailment of free speech.

People claim to be and are offended all the time and they have the right to be offended all they like. But their offense doesn't mean someone else doesnt have the right to speak offensively.

Its the people whom we disagree with the most whose speech should be protected the most.

Peregrinus

I haven’t looked at the Woods case, and have no fixed view as to whether he should, or should not, have been prosecuted.

But the question raised by the OP doesn’t relate specifically to freedom of speech; it’s more general that that. When we acknowledge two (or more) moral rights which we feel the law ought to reflect and uphold, and when those rights come into conflict or into tension, how do we prioritise them? Which must be subordinated to the other?

And the question “how do we prioritise competing rights?” could itself be understood in two ways. It could mean “how ought we to prioritise rights?” Or it could be “how dow we, in practice, prioritise competing rights?”.

I suspect what we do in practice is that we follow a moral instinct. All rights protect values, and we discover which value we hold more dearly by observing which right we want to prioritise. Either for our own satisfaction or in response to someone who challenges us, we may than go on and try to justify our moral instinct by employing “rights” language to explain it, but I don’t think we necessarily have to do that. Nor is that always the best way of explaining our position

Consider robindch’s comment (in post #14) about the Wood case:

robindch wrote: »

. . . I believe that if the honor or memory of a private person is unreasonably insulted, then it's legitimate for that person or their successors to demand a public and apologetic retraction, or have the state sanction the person who made the insult.

There;s nothing about “rights” in there and, while you could reframe the point by using “rights” language if you put your mind to it, I don’t think that would necessarily be a more accurate or clearer way of expressing the point.


And robindch amplifies the point in post #16:

robindch wrote: »

I'm not referring to a "right" not to be offended, but to an assumption, backed by the sate, of the decency and honor of its citizens; in much the same way as the state assumes the innocence of people before it for trial. And that people who deny that assumption of decency should be called to demonstrate publicly that their contention is true, or as above, publicly and apologetically retract what they said, or suffer some sanction if they don't. Similarly, the right of free speech should be balanced, to the greatest extent possible, by the responsibility to use it fairly and decently.

Similar views might be expressed in connection with other controversies, e.g. how to we respond to the Fred Phelps Christian hate group picketing funerals to tell us that "God hates fags"?

I appreciate Gbear’s concern for the individual, but there’s another dimension to the moral question here. A functioning and healthy society requires not just respect for the individual but also a degree of solidarity. We simply have to accord one another at least a basic level of respect, and observe a certain level of decency in our dealings with one another, and if enough people fail to do this seriously enough and consistently enough then social and communal relationships are degraded to a point where we all suffer. A rule of simply not physically or economically injuring my neighbour is not a sufficient basis for a functioning human society; we are social animals, and if we are to be healthy and whole we need both to respect and value others and to be respected and valued by them.

That’s the problem with the actions of Fred Phelps or (from what I superficially gather) this Woods bloke; they manifest such a degree of disdain and contempt for others as to amount to an attack on the glue that holds society together, and we don’t feel that we should let this go unremarked or unsanctioned.

I’m conscious that I’m on dangerous ground here, because a stronger version of this argument is used to justify, e.g., blasphemy laws, and I’ve no particular desire to do that. But the truth, I think, is that none of us do operate out of a paradigm in which the role and actions of the state are entirely confined to upholding individual rights. We’re not just a bunch of individuals; we are also a community, and the health of the community requires certain levels of mutual respect, solidarity, decency, dignity and other things which each of us can only get from others. Intuitively, we know this. Very often, our moral instinct leads us to circumscribe the exercise of individual rights because of this need to protect social relationships, and I think probably we ought to explain our position in that way, rather than to try to frame it in terms of a competing individual right.

ShooterSF

The idea that someone faces jail time for posting something offensive is right up there with the idea that someone could face jail time for drawing Mo imo. Even the argument I meet for outlawing "hate speech" is eerily similar. "Oh but look at how badly the public react" they claim. Well then hold the public responsible if they break the law. Just because it's easier to punish one person for causing 100 to break the law doesn't make the right thing to do. You have a right to be offended by someone, a right to choose not to interact with them any more, a right to tell them what you think of them but not a right to silence them or punish them.

Gbear

I'm using the dark Boards skin so I got rid of your colour change to be able to read the text.

Peregrinus wrote: »

I appreciate Gbear’s concern for the individual, but there’s another dimension to the moral question here. A functioning and healthy society requires not just respect for the individual but also a degree of solidarity. We simply have to accord one another at least a basic level of respect, and observe a certain level of decency in our dealings with one another, and if enough people fail to do this seriously enough and consistently enough then social and communal relationships are degraded to a point where we all suffer. A rule of simply not physically or economically injuring my neighbour is not a sufficient basis for a functioning human society; we are social animals, and if we are to be healthy and whole we need both to respect and value others and to be respected and valued by them.

That’s the problem with the actions of Fred Phelps or (from what I superficially gather) this Woods bloke; they manifest such a degree of disdain and contempt for others as to amount to an attack on the glue that holds society together, and we don’t feel that we should let this go unremarked or unsanctioned.

I absolutely agree that we have to be nice to one another for society to work but to justify legislating that into place is a different matter entirely.

Generally speaking people aren't dicks to each other most of the time. There will be outliers but I don't see how believing and saying that women are subordinate to men based on your religion can be argued as being any less antagonising or offensive than "god hates fags" or, indeed, be seen as being fundamentally different from racist speech or anything else that people seem keen to ban.

Fred Phelps and other insane **** pay the price for being that way. They're basically pariahs.

Indeed, I can't see any reason why any speech whose crime is solely one of giving offence can legitimately be prohibited - people have the capability to be legitimately offended by literally anything and there is no rational basis on which to argue that one form of offense supersedes another (given that the only person capable of gauging the offence is the one experiencing it).
The level of subjectivity in determining offence is extreme in this case and there should be no distinction between words in this sense on a legal level.


The simple fact that people are becoming less ignorant is decreasing many social ills. I don't think it's necessary to legislate for them and I don't think that is any of the state's business.
All I want is from government is to protect our rights and then get the **** out of society's way.

Which brings us back to the argument of which rights trump which. :pac:
The above only works if you believe that the right to offend does not supersede freedom of speech.

And I do not believe that you can hold the opinion that some offensive speech should be outlawed and not all offensive speech.
And unless you can objectively gauge offense (like you can objectively gauge how you broke somebody's arm, with an x-ray) then I don't think it matters either way.

Peregrinus

Couple of thoughts:

First, sorry about the colour problem. I didn’t add any colour to my post, and it’s showing up perfectly normally on my screen. I write my posts in MS Word (boo! hiss!) and then cut-and-paste into the browser (I’m tired of losing stuff when browsers freeze or crash) so perhaps something is going pear-shaped along the way.

Secondly, I appreciate that drawing lines to measure offensiveness is extremely difficult. That doesn’t mean, though that there is no distinction between tolerable and intolerable offensiveness, or that drawing the distinction is unimportant. In life we have to draw difficult distinctions all the time; it’s part of the human condition. And, while it presents difficulties when we try to do it in the legal sphere, they are not insurmountable difficulties. We already have to deal with fairly nebulous concepts when the law tries to deal with obscenity, or to draw a distinction between material suitable only for adults and material which can be freely marketed to all, or when courts have to judge - which they do all the time - whether behaviour is “unconscionable” or “unreasonable” or whether harm is “reasonably foreseeable”, or whatever. Questions like these are usually resolved by appealing to community standards. It can be done.

Secondly, I’m unconvinced that the law can take account of physical harm, and of financial harm, but that emotional harm is somehow forever outside the purview of the law, and must be ignored. There’s no obvious reason why this should be so, is there? Emotional harm can be very, very destructive - much more so than financial harm. Look at the suicide rate among gay teens, for example. Look at the consequences of cyberbullying. Look at the kids who suffered emotional, but not physical, abuse while in state care, or in church institutions (or both), and the price they pay, often throughout their lives. You can take the view that free speech is of such paramount importance that all this destruction and death is just a price we have to pay to avoid infringing it but, to put it no higher, that’s not self-evidently true. A case has to be made why my right to belittle and denigrate you, or the community to which you belong, trumps your right to self-esteem and sound mental health. I don’t see anyone making that case in this thread; the sanctity of free speech, so far, has been largely treated as an article of faith.

If you accept that phenomena like cyberbullying or the emotional abuse of children do justify restrictions on freedom of speech, then you do accept that, at least some of the time, the prospect of emotional distress, without any physical or financial injury, is enough to warrant restrictions on free speech, and after that we are only discussing where exactly to draw the line - what kind of distress does, and what does not, justify restrictions on speech. As you point out, it’s a difficult line to draw, and perhaps an even more difficult line to draw rightly. It doesn’t follow, though, that we must abandon the attempt.

decimatio

Christopher Hitchens on Free Speech

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jyoOfRog1EM

Or from a debate.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jw3dDbc1BHE

MrPudding

Whilst the free speech debate is interesting, I personally think some of the other conflicts are more interesting.

Freedom of religion versus freedom not to be discriminated against. This is a very interesting area and the ensuing conflicts raise interesting questions.

MrP

Gbear

Peregrinus wrote: »

Couple of thoughts:

First, sorry about the colour problem. I didn’t add any colour to my post, and it’s showing up perfectly normally on my screen. I write my posts in MS Word (boo! hiss!) an

[...]

al injury, is enough to warrant restrictions on free speech, and after that we are only discussing where exactly to draw the line - what kind of distress does, and what does not, justify restrictions on speech. As you point out, it’s a difficult line to draw, and perhaps an even more difficult line to draw rightly. It doesn’t follow, though, that we must abandon the attempt.

I do want to reply to this at some point but I've been a bit busy lately!:)

recedite

Peregrinus wrote: »

You can take the view that free speech is of such paramount importance that all this destruction and death is just a price we have to pay to avoid infringing it but, to put it no higher, that’s not self-evidently true. A case has to be made why my right to belittle and denigrate you, or the community to which you belong, trumps your right to self-esteem and sound mental health. I don’t see anyone making that case in this thread; the sanctity of free speech, so far, has been largely treated as an article of faith.

To be fair, a few people have said that people have rights, but ideas do not. There is no unanimous feeling here that free speech should be unlimited.
I think you are trying to slip in religion here, as something that needs protection from being offended. (See the bolded bit quoted above)
But religion is only an idea.

BTW I'm not seeing any strange shades or colours in the text of your posts.


On the subject of the jokes made in poor taste by Mr Woods on twitter or whatever; I personally am not offended by them, because I choose not to look them up. Therefore I would not agree with locking him up.

Menchen said;
"I believe there is a limit beyond which free speech cannot go, but it's a limit that's very seldom mentioned. It's the point where free speech begins to collide with the right to privacy. I don't think there are any other conditions to free speech. I've got a right to say and believe anything I please, but I haven't got a right to press it on anybody else. ... Nobody's got a right to be a nuisance to his neighbors."

Peregrinus

recedite wrote: »

To be fair, a few people have said that people have rights, but ideas do not. There is no unanimous feeling here that free speech should be unlimited.
I think you are trying to slip in religion here, as something that needs protection from being offended. (See the bolded bit quoted above)
But religion is only an idea.

I wasn’t, honestly. Cross my heart. What I had in mind when I wrote that bit was the kind of homophobic rhetoric that gets directed at the gay community, and the effect that can have on the self-esteem, and even self-acceptance, of a young person who is beginning to understand themselves as gay, but who doesn’t know any gay people they can talk to or even emulate (or, at any rate, any people they know to be gay). It seems to me that homophobic speech that’s not directed at identifiable individuals is still capable of harming people, and sometimes harming them very seriously. Suicide, self-harm and addiction rates among gay teens are worryingly high, and that doesn’t come from nowhere.

But, since you mention religion (and since MrPudding has brought it up in post #24) . . .

I admit I’m a little impatient with the trope that religion is an idea, and ideas don’t have any rights. It’s fatuous nonsense, even more so than the National Rifle Association slogan that “guns don’t kill people; people do”. Yes, religion is an idea - or, at least, it involves ideas. But so is gender identity. So is nationhood. If I can attack religious people because “religion is just an idea”, then I have the same justification for attacking gays, or Pakistanis.

For that matter freedom of speech is an idea. In fact, freedom of any kind is an idea. If ideas can’t enjoy legal protection, them logically freedom of speech can’t enjoy legal protection, can it?

The reason this trope is stupid is this; it treats “ideas” and “people” as unrelated. In fact we know that they are intimately related. Ideas do not drop from the heavens; they are created and expressed by people. And, conversely, people are profoundly influenced, shaped even, by ideas. The notion that you can attack ideas and not people is completely false, as can be illustrated by historical examples of attacks on, say, Judaism.

recedite wrote: »

On the subject of the jokes made in poor taste by Mr Woods on twitter or whatever; I personally am not offended by them, because I choose not to look them up. Therefore I would not agree with locking him up.

Well, you seem to be suggesting that if something doesn’t offend you, the law should not restrict or sanction it. But - no offence - why should the sensibilities of recedite be the standard here? If it doesn’t offend you, the fact that it offends others is irrelevant?

The test of our commitment to freedom, I think is not whether we defend our own freedoms, but whether we defend someone else’s - even when someone else’s freedom costs us something. The actions of the likes of Fred Phelps, say, are not directed at me; they are directed at other people, chosen as victims precisely because they are vulnerable - they are grieving, or mourning; or they are gay in a society which still seeks to marginalize and denigrate gays. Phelps is looking for someone vulnerable and wounded, and he is aiming to put his hands into the wound and rip it further open; he wants to infect, inflame and irritate it. I, as it happens, am not the wounded person. So if I defend Phelps’ freedom of speech no matter what the cost, I’m actually talking about a cost borne by someone else; someone already wounded; someone who because of his wounded condition might actually have some claim on my sympathy and support. And pretty much the same goes for what Mr Woods has allegedly done.

I’m not saying that it’s an open-and-shut moral case that the likes of Phelps and Woods and such must be silenced; it isn’t. I’m just saying that there is a cost to free speech, and we should acknowledge that cost and consider whether it is right to bear it - or, more pressingly, to require others to bear it. So far the defences of free speech that I’m seeing really don’t take this into account; they seem to be in denial about it, and they rest on unsupported assertions that the law should ignore any harm which is not physical or financial, or on evasive idiocies like “ideas have no rights”. I’m sure a better case can be made for freedom of speech, but we live in a society where it’s so much an article of faith that people are actually not encouraged to make that case.

recedite wrote: »

Menchen said;
"I believe there is a limit beyond which free speech cannot go, but it's a limit that's very seldom mentioned. It's the point where free speech begins to collide with the right to privacy. I don't think there are any other conditions to free speech. I've got a right to say and believe anything I please, but I haven't got a right to press it on anybody else. ... Nobody's got a right to be a nuisance to his neighbors."

I find this incoherent, I must say. Speech is a form of communication. Freedom of speech is meaningless unless it’s the freedom to speak to people. They can choose not to listen, of course, but if the inconvenience and irritation they feel at having to screen me out trumps my right to speak in the first place, then I’m afraid Menken is championing a pretty feeble version of freedom of speech.

recedite

Peregrinus wrote: »

Well, you seem to be suggesting that if something doesn’t offend you, the law should not restrict or sanction it. But - no offence - why should the sensibilities of recedite be the standard here? If it doesn’t offend you, the fact that it offends others is irrelevant?

Not at all, I'm just pointing out that it is within my power to be offended, or not to be offended by this material. I can choose to avoid it.
This also answers your other question re the Menchen quote, and the extent to which freedom of speech should be limited. For example, if the guy was following me around, repeating his offensive jokes, I would feel justified in punching him.
Re homosexuality; I don't accept that this compares with religion as being "just an idea." Unless you believe homosexuality is a lifestyle choice? No, in this case, if you attack the concept, you attack the person.
Its not the same as when a person adopts a political stance, or a religious outlook.

Peregrinus

recedite wrote: »

Re homosexuality; I don't accept that this compares with religion as being "just an idea." Unless you believe homosexuality is a lifestyle choice? No, in this case, if you attack the concept, you attack the person.

I didn't say homosexuality was just an idea; I said gender identity was an idea.

I'm not even sure I know what a "lifestyle choice" is, but I certainly wouldn't call homosexuality a lifestyle choice, any more than heterosexuality or indeed sexuality in general. But gender identity is a social construct; it involves not just the experience of homosexual (or heterosexual) attraction, but a whole set of ideas about how this defines you as a person, and a whole set of conventions about relationships and ways of expressing them. In that regard it's quite similar to religion or nationality. (And, like religion or nationality, it's not something you construct for yourself; it's a social construct.)

recedite

Well then, perhaps gender identity is fair game then.
I admit I sometimes laugh when I see girls who imitate barbie dolls a bit too closely, or macho-men swaggering around like peacocks.
Not to be confused with homophobia though.

Peregrinus

recedite wrote: »

Well then, perhaps gender identity is fair game then.
I admit I sometimes laugh when I see girls who imitate barbie dolls a bit too closely, or macho-men swaggering around like peacocks.
Not to be confused with homophobia though.

Make no mistake; if you attack "gays", you are attacking a gender identity. (For that matter, if you attack"straights", you are attacking gender identity.) Homophobia is largely a matter of discomfort with or hostility to someone else's gender identity.

recedite

It really depends on the extent to which a person's gender identity is a choice, as opposed to a biological imperative.

Peregrinus

recedite wrote: »

It really depends on the extent to which a person's gender identity is a choice, as opposed to a biological imperative.

Why does it have to be one other the other? I don't think it's either of those things.

recedite

That why I said "the extent to which.."

bnt

My take on this is fairly simple: "rights" are about preventing "negative" action, but they are not an obligation on anyone to undertake a "positive" action.

For example, the UN Declaration of Human Rights has articles that cover things such as housing e.g. "everyone has the right to housing". My interpretation of this is that no-one has the right to take away your housing (a "negative" action). But it does not impose an obligation on anyone else to provide you with housing (a "positive" action).

So I have no problem respecting the rights of others - starting with (IMHO) the most fundamental right, the right to be left in peace if that's what you wish.

Peregrinus

bnt wrote: »

My take on this is fairly simple: "rights" are about preventing "negative" action, but they are not an obligation on anyone to undertake a "positive" action.

For example, the UN Declaration of Human Rights has articles that cover things such as housing e.g. "everyone has the right to housing". My interpretation of this is that no-one has the right to take away your housing (a "negative" action). But it does not impose an obligation on anyone else to provide you with housing (a "positive" action).

I see where you’re coming from. But I think there are problems with that approach.

First problem - on the individual level. Suppose I’m walking along, minding my own business, looking down and admiring my blue suede shoes. I hear a cry, and I see a toddler, drowning in a duckpond. It’s a shallow pond; I could easily wade in and rescue the toddler with no risk to myself. But it’s muddy and slimy and scummy and ducks have been doing in it what ducks do in duckponds and I don’t wade in because, you know, suede. The toddler drowns.

Have I violated the rights of the toddler?

If the toddler has any kind of a claim to my care and protection then it seems to me that yes, I have. Or, if you want to construct an argument that the toddler’s claim on me is not usefully characterized as a “right”, then the corollary of your argument is that a recognition of “rights” is an incomplete account of the obligations we owe to one another, and the claims we can make on one another.

Second problem - on the collective level. When it comes to politics and/or public policy - and this is mainly the area in which we employ the language of rights - the moral issues we face are rarely of the form “what should I do?” They are nearly always of the form “what should we do?”

Suppose we recognize a right to personal liberty. At a minimum, this means that the state, as agent of the community, must refrain from locking you up arbitrarily. There must be a legal basis for locking you up, there must be a procedure, there must be a justification, there must be people with authority to lock you up, and other people with authority to determine whether you are rightly locked up, and so forth.

Suppose the state behaves in accordance with these rules, and does not imprison arbitrarily, or unlawfully, or without demonstrated justification. Is that enough to ensure that your right of personal liberty is respected?

No, it isn’t. If you’re kidnapped, you expect the community (through the state) to endeavour to find you, and release you, and detect and punish those responsible, and indeed to prevent or deter kidnappings in the first place. If the state’s response to your plight is to say, in effect “not our problem - we didn’t lock you up”, you will not feel that you live in a society in which your right of personal liberty is respected, defended or vindicated.

So I suggest that your right of personal liberty means more to me than simply that I, personally, must not lock you up. It also means that we, the community of which I am a part, must act positively to protect and defend your personal liberty.

Thus I think it’s wrong to say that right are not an obligation on anyone to undertake a positive action. They mostly do require positive action in some contexts, and in the context in which rights language is mainly employed, that of law and public policy, they will nearly always require positive action.

bnt

Peregrinus wrote: »

If the toddler has any kind of a claim to my care and protection then it seems to me that yes, I have. Or, if you want to construct an argument that the toddler’s claim on me is not usefully characterized as a “right”, then the corollary of your argument is that a recognition of “rights” is an incomplete account of the obligations we owe to one another, and the claims we can make on one another.

I've never thought that "rights" were a complete "account of the obligations we owe to one another" in the first place, so I don't have a problem with that interpretation. If anything, my argument is that "rights" do not naturally (automatically) translate in to obligations at all - see the example I used (housing). As for "the claims we can make on one another", my interpretation of "rights" excludes those altogether, anyway, though I don't know exactly what you mean by that.

In your example, the toddler had a "right" to life, and you did nothing to take that "right" away. If you feel yourself to have an obligation to save him or her, that's a separate issue: why do you feel that? Because of the possible consequences of inaction e.g. feelings of guilt, your reputation, and so on. But I would not confuse that with "rights".

It sounds harsh, I know, but we are talking in abstract philosophical terms here, and bringing emotion in to this only muddies the arguments.

Peregrinus wrote: »

Suppose the state behaves in accordance with these rules, and does not imprison arbitrarily, or unlawfully, or without demonstrated justification. Is that enough to ensure that your right of personal liberty is respected?

No, it isn’t. If you’re kidnapped, you expect the community (through the state) to endeavour to find you, and release you, and detect and punish those responsible, and indeed to prevent or deter kidnappings in the first place. If the state’s response to your plight is to say, in effect “not our problem - we didn’t lock you up”, you will not feel that you live in a society in which your right of personal liberty is respected, defended or vindicated.

Correct, but you're lumping "respected, defended or vindicated" together.

I would not classify the role of the State in this as any sort of natural defender of "rights". If it does play a role in that area, it's because we have decided that it should do so, got laws passed to that effect by our representatives, and are willing to pay the price. The Garda (or any other state actor) are not superheroes acting out of concern for "rights", they have a job to do which is defined by law and paid for by your taxes. They would come to your aid, if you are kidnapped, because that is what they are set up to do. They would not fix your car if it broke down, because that is not what they are set up to do. You could call that a "utilitarian" position if you like.

It's a bit like religion (A&A content): the Catholic Church sees itself as a State actor in Ireland for historical reasons. It used to have a much wider influence than it does now because there was a vacuum to be filled, not because that is somehow "ordained". That's why e.g. so many hospitals have names starting with "St." - because they were necessary, and the Church had the resources to make it happen. These days, though we understand the need for secular government that does what we want it to do (or not), and don't accept that the Church has to be involved just because it was in the past. We should get what we pay for.

recedite

Peregrinus wrote: »

If you’re kidnapped, you expect the community (through the state) to endeavour to find you

In this case the kidnapper has contravened the victim's right to liberty. The State, as a guardian of rights, intervenes to restore liberty and punish the offender. The police (not the entire community) do this because we pay them to intervene. Its not because we have a "right" to expect other people to drop what they are doing, and come looking for us.

Peregrinus

bnt wrote: »

I've never thought that "rights" were a complete "account of the obligations we owe to one another" in the first place, so I don't have a problem with that interpretation. If anything, my argument is that "rights" do not naturally (automatically) translate in to obligations at all - see the example I used (housing). As for "the claims we can make on one another", my interpretation of "rights" excludes those altogether, anyway, though I don't know exactly what you mean by that.

I think you are overstating your own case a bit there. Earlier on you said that my right translates into your negative obligation - if I have a right to liberty, you have an obligation not to imprison me. So at the very least, my right gives me this claim on you; that you should refrain from imprisoning me.

So - forgive me if I misunderstand you - what you seem to be saying is this: If I can demand of you that you should refrain from certain actions, my power to make that demand can properly be called a “right”. But if I can go on to demand that you should positively engage in certain actions, that cannot be properly called a “right”.

To which I say:

(a) It’s not obvious why this should be so.

(b) Arguments about the definitions of words are pretty pointless. You can define and use the word “right” however you want, but I don’t think that this is how the word is generally used or defined in moral/political discourse in our society.

bnt wrote: »

In your example, the toddler had a "right" to life, and you did nothing to take that "right" away. If you feel yourself to have an obligation to save him or her, that's a separate issue: why do you feel that? Because of the possible consequences of inaction e.g. feelings of guilt, your reputation, and so on. But I would not confuse that with "rights".

It sounds harsh, I know, but we are talking in abstract philosophical terms here, and bringing emotion in to this only muddies the arguments.

I don’t think it’s just a matter of how I feel. A third party who could observe what was going on but not intervene would, I think, make a negative moral judgment of my decision to prioritise the cleanliness of my shoes over the life of the toddler. He would see me as a less virtuous person. He would assert, I am fairly confident, that I did have a moral obligation in the circumstances to save the child, even at the cost of my shoes.

Consider a few alternative scenarios:

1. I throw the toddler into the pond, knowing and intending that he will drown.

2. I throw the toddler into the pond, knowing that he will drown but motivated by a desire to startle a duck.

3. I throw the toddler into the pond, knowing that he may drown, and indifferent as to whether he does or not. In the event, he does.

4. I steal the fence which keeps toddlers out of the pond, because I want the timber. I know there is a risk that a toddler may drown as a result, and in the event he does.

5. I see the toddler about to fall into the pond, and I know that if he does he will drown. This will amuse me. I do not intervene. The toddler falls in and drowns.

6. I encourage the toddler to cross the pond on a log which I know to be unsafe. I do this because it amuses me. I know that if he falls in he will likely drown, and this is indeed what happens.

7. I see the toddler about to fall into the pond and I know what will happen if he does, but if I stop to help him I will miss my bus and I will get home late for the start of “Fair City”. I pass by. The toddler falls in and drowns.

8. The same, except the toddler is already in the pond when I see him.

In all of these scenarios, the toddler has a strong interest in continuing to live. We accept, I think, that that interest can have moral implications for how I ought to behave, if only because in scenario 1 above most people will agree that I acted immorally.

I also suggest that most people would agree that in every case outlined above I acted immorally. In each case I ought to have acted or intervened in a way which meant that the toddler did not die.

You seem to be saying that if what is required of me is purely negative - in scenario 1, not to throw the toddler in the pond - then the toddler’s interest in continuing to live can be characterized as a “right”. But if the action morally required of me is something positive - to fish the toddler out of the pond, or prevent him from falling in in the first place - then the toddler’s interesting in living cannot be called a “right”. But:

(a) This seems to be arbitrary; I don’t see why it should be so.

(b) The toddler’s interest in every case is the same; to continue to live. And the outcome of my choice in every case is the same; he dies. What is the point of saying that in some scenarios the toddler had a right which I infringed and that in others this was not the case?

In short, I think the distinction you propose is meaningless.

bnt wrote: »

I would not classify the role of the State in this as any sort of natural defender of "rights". If it does play a role in that area, it's because we have decided that it should do so, got laws passed to that effect by our representatives, and are willing to pay the price. The Garda (or any other state actor) are not superheroes acting out of concern for "rights", they have a job to do which is defined by law and paid for by your taxes. They would come to your aid, if you are kidnapped, because that is what they are set up to do. They would not fix your car if it broke down, because that is not what they are set up to do. You could call that a "utilitarian" position if you like.

I don’t think it’s particularly utilitarian position. As you rightly point out, the guards resist kidnapping and help kidnapping victims because we tell them to, and pay them to. Why do we do that? Because we think that we, as a community, have an obligation to defend - to defend actively - the right to liberty. We recognize that simply not kidnapping you ourselves is not a sufficient response to or recognition of your right to liberty; your right creates a positive obligation on us to outlaw kidnapping and recruit, empower, train and fund a police force to tackle kidnappings, and in societies where this does not happen - Somalia, say - the right of liberty is not recognized or respected as, morally, it ought to be.

Or, in other words, rights do create positive obligations, and not just purely negative ones. And everybody knows this.

The reason the guards don’t fix your car is because we don’t recognize a right to have your car fixed. The reason they will respond to your kidnapping is because we do recognize a right of personal liberty.

Peregrinus

recedite wrote: »

In this case the kidnapper has contravened the victim's right to liberty. The State, as a guardian of rights, intervenes to restore liberty and punish the offender. The police (not the entire community) do this because we pay them to intervene. Its not because we have a "right" to expect other people to drop what they are doing, and come looking for us.

We have no right to expect that every single individual will drop what they are doing and come looking for us. But I suggest we do have a right to expect a collective response to our plight; that they community will act to restore our liberty (by, as you point out, organising, paying and mandating a police force to do this).

If the community did nothing at all on the basis that it wasn't the community (or anyone acting on its behalf) that had kidnapped me, then I think most of us would agree that that was a society which did not adequately respect the right to personal liberty.

I'm not saying that every recognised human right requires affirmative action on the part of the state. I'm just saying that a human right can require positive, and not merely negative, action, and that the positive action which is most often required is collective, rather than individual, and that the state is often (though not necessarily always) the agency through which this positive action is undertaken.

bnt

If we have to have these long discussions about "rights", I think that's symptomatic of an over-emphasis on "rights" in the public sphere. The expectations have been set too high, in my opinion. If you start demanding that "rights" translate in to concrete obligations (the "positive action" I referred to earlier), we see the question becomes one of who is going to carry out those actions.

I was trying to make the point that such "rights" have to paid for. They are not "natural" in the sense that they will "just happen" without positive action by someone, requiring motivation. Using the housing example again, I already explained my position on that, while others see that "right" as an obligation on someone to provide housing. That someone typically being the State, so it was inevitable that the State would pop up in this discussion too.

In summary, I wish people would dial back their expectations of what "rights" are going to do for them. They simply form a baseline expectation of what should not happen, not a "complete account" of the sort described earlier, or an obligation on anyone else to do things for you at no cost.

Peregrinus

bnt wrote: »

I was trying to make the point that such "rights" have to paid for. They are not "natural" in the sense that they will "just happen" without positive action by someone, requiring motivation. Using the housing example again, I already explained my position on that, while others see that "right" as an obligation on someone to provide housing. That someone typically being the State, so it was inevitable that the State would pop up in this discussion too.

Oh, well, I'm with you there. I made the point back in post #4 http://www.boards.ie/vbulletin/showpost.php?p=81138995&postcount=4
that "rights", far from being absolute, are nuanced and conditional, and the more rights you recognise, the truer this becomes. My "right" to healthcare, housing or police protection conflicts with your "right" to retain your earnings and not pay them in taxes. My "right" to free speech conflicts with your "right" not to be bullied or victimised. My "right" to freedom of assocation conflicts with your "right" to equal consideration and fair procedures in employment matters. And so on.

recedite

Peregrinus wrote: »

If the community did nothing at all on the basis that it wasn't the community (or anyone acting on its behalf) that had kidnapped me, then I think most of us would agree that that was a society which did not adequately respect the right to personal liberty.

This is true, but you have to realise that the response is organised for somewhat selfish reasons; ie "it could be me next time".
So there is a selfish benefit as well as a moral obligation involved when we organise a police/ court system to safeguard other people's rights.
We may even feel a moral obligation to personally intervene and help someone, such as your toddler, but the victim has no actual right to make us help.
If that were the case, you would be obliged to sell up all your property and send the money off to the third world to buy food and essential healthcare for people who will undoubtably die otherwise.

Peregrinus

recedite wrote: »

This is true, but you have to realise that the response is organised for somewhat selfish reasons; ie "it could be me next time".

Well, the notion of rights is reciprocal, so I suppose we all hope that others will respect our rights, and this does provide a motivation for us to respect theirs. Do unto others, and all that. It's just a particular application of the golden rule.

But it doesn't do to be too cynical about this. We have no reason to exclude the possibility that people are motivated also by altruistic or principled consideration. There may well be people who feel their own rights are fairly secure, and yet who recognise an obligation to help protect the rights of others who are less fortunate, and there may also be people whose rights are not at all secure, but who help others without any expectation that this will lead to an improvement in their own situation. Selfishness may be one dimension of human nature, but so is empathy.

recedite

Peregrinus, do you believe other people have a right to your assistance, if their life is in peril?

Peregrinus

. . .

Peregrinus

Not an absolute and unlimited right in all circumstances. But, yes, in the right circumstances, people could have such a right.

For example, in my "toddler in the duckpond" scenario, I think there'd be a fairly strong moral obligation on me to wade in and fish the little bugger out, suede shoes or no suede shoes. And I suppose you could express the same thought more eloquently by saying that, n the circumstances, he had a right to my assistance.

If I didn't help him, and he drowned, would you say that I had done wrong? Would you say that I had wronged him?

pauldla

Peregrinus wrote: »

Not an absolute and unlimited right in all circumstances. But, yes, in the right circumstances, people could have such a right.

For example, in my "toddler in the duckpond" scenario, I think there'd be a fairly strong moral obligation on me to wade in and fish the little bugger out, suede shoes or no suede shoes. And I suppose you could express the same thought more eloquently by saying that, n the circumstances, he had a right to my assistance.

If I didn't help him, and he drowned, would you say that I had done wrong? Would you say that I had wronged him?

Sorry to butt in, but have to answer, yes, I would say you had wronged him, if you were in a reasonable position to give help but did not do so (Good Samaritan laws). I'd also be interested in looking at why you hadn't helped the toddler. Not helping out of callous amusement would be one thing. But, for example, what if one were to be held legally responsible for the toddler on rescue, or ran the risk of assuming hospital bills?

recedite

Peregrinus wrote: »

But, yes, in the right circumstances, people could have such a right.

Then why not sell up everything and donate all your money to the starving people in the third world? Starvation is a dire circumstance.
Or do you mean it depends on your circumstances (suede shoes).

Peregrinus

I've already made the point that other people's rights do not create absolute and unlimited claims on me; I've made that point consistently since the beginning of this thread.

But I notice that you're not answering my questions. In the example I give, do you think the circumstances gave rise to any moral obligation on me?

recedite

IMO a moral obligation comes from a person's own perceived values.
Therefore I cannot say whether you would feel a moral obligation to attempt a rescue of the toddler, but I can say that I would.

If you fail to jump in the water though, you are not committing a crime of omission AFAIK. A right is inalienable; it does not depend on the values of the person bestowing it. Even that is not completely objective though because society at large has to decide the extent of rights and who they apply to. But within a secular society (which I'll conveniently define here as one covered by a common legal system) there should be allowed a range of different moral values.
A theocracy which imposes its own moral code, eg Sharia law may not tolerate such a range of personal values, but that's another story.

Interestingly there is a traditional law of the sea among shipwrecked sailors giving them a right to be rescued by any passing ship, even though it may be an inconvenience for the rescuer, but that seems to be more in the way of a professional contract or understanding. It guarantees a level of reciprocity where there is a common danger facing all the participants.