Hitlers role in WWII eastern Europe

Jim S

The 750,000 horses only serves to show how unprepared the Germans were for a campaign which would make demands like those brought on by Barbarossa, Hitler refused to believe that the Red Army could field the number of troops his intell. had furnished him with.
If Hitler was misled he misled himself.

cloud493

Well his disbelief was certainly inflated by his victories. I mean, the victories in the first two years or so of the war were against poorly trained, poorly equipped armies, the Polish, the French, the Greeks, etc. The nazi hierarchy was full of this, Goering\s claims for example, that he could destroy the RAF in six weeks was it?

HavingCrack

cloud493 wrote: »

Well his disbelief was certainly inflated by his victories. I mean, the victories in the first two years or so of the war were against poorly trained, poorly equipped armies, the Polish, the French, the Greeks, etc. The nazi hierarchy was full of this, Goering\s claims for example, that he could destroy the RAF in six weeks was it?

While the Polish and Greek armies were poorly equipped the French army actually had superior armaments to the Germans, just poorer tactics.

cloud493

HavingCrack wrote: »

While the Polish and Greek armies were poorly equipped the French army actually had superior armaments to the Germans, just poorer tactics.

Superior equipment in tanks/ other stuff. Poorer aircraft, poorer infantry weapons, and what's the phrase, concentration of force at the decisive point.

BostonB

Then you have the widespread use of radios and better communications.

cloud493

BostonB wrote: »

Then you have the widespread use of radios and better communications.

Yeah, case in point, Gamelin's headquarters had no telephone, or radio, and messages were dispatched to and from it hourly by motorbike messenger, hence why it was called 'a submarine without a periscope'

The Master of Disaster

I think Hitler's role in the military failure of the Eastern War is somewhat overstated. The view that Germany might have won had he just let his generals 'get on with it' is too simple and IMO, for the most part wrong. Certainly his refusal more often than not to countenance a withdrawal in favour of a counter attack and a war of manoeuvre was detrimental to the war effort but that became more of an issue after 1942 when the war was already lost. In addition as another poster mentioned if he is to be blamed for the defeats he must get credit for the successes as well. His boldness and initiative when OKW and OKH were more hesitant sometimes led to astonishing victories, notably in France in 1940. At times his intuition actually proved correct in predicting where a major Soviet offensive might occur not that it made all that much a difference.

If I had to choose a side to fall down I'd say his role was more negative than positive but like I said only for the most part when it didn't really matter. Certainly in 1941 most of OKH were all too confident in Barbarossa; they knew that they couldn't win a protracted war but appear to have genuinely believed they would defeat the SU within a matter of weeks due to inaccurate intelligence, underestimation of SU ability and determination, and downright belief in their own ability. They lost that war as early as December 1941 by failing to take Moscow and destroying the Red Army definitively there and then. Hitler's industrialists told him even then that they couldn't outproduce the SU and they never again were able to fully replenish the troop levels of the start of the campaign.

Some would argue that there was still a chance of victory in 1942 and here Hitler can be blamed for forcing the army to carry out too many objectives rather than concentrating his forces on one task at hand. But again I repeat I think the war was already lost at this stage and some people don't comprehend that because it went on for another 3/4 years. It was really a testament to the Wehrmacht's soldiers and commanders that they were able to fight and delay the Red Army until 1945 despite the huge manpower and equipment deficits they possessed. But Hitler or not they were never going to win that war after the failure of the summer offensive in 1941.

BostonB

I think your overstating the credit due. But I think even Hitler knew he was in trouble if the allies east and west didn't, come to the table which I think, he expected them to do.

gaelicred

He fought the war on too many fronts and who can say that his generals would have done any better

Jim S

Stalingrad a contrast to Papa H's. withdrawal from Kharkov and Manstien's recovery in he South in 1943.

Hitler's interference in Barbarossa, changing direction from Moscow to Kiev, his inflexible love of static lines, his interference with Donitz's intention to put greater numbers of boats into Drumbeat in 1942.

Hitler's desire to control all projects and to change and alter as he saw fit , also the waste of resources changing priorities, and investing in projects which took to long to develop, lack of clarity.

Hitler's refusal to bring home troops from Baltic regions and when they were cut off leaving the there to "tie up Russian forces.

I think his generals would have done better , the loss of 6th Army would not have happened, Blue had all Hitler's finger prints on it , the same mistakes he made again and again.

Dannyboy83

It looks in his favour until the Stalingrad airlift.
Hindsight or no, it was a gamble which he must have known would not succeed and the goering facade was well exposed by this stage.
So he gambled to lose here.

Seems there were two hitlers.
The rational gambler pre-stalingrad.
The irrational reactionist post-stalingrad.

I wonder how much Dr.Morrell was to blame for this. It was around this time Hitler went full junkie and simultaneously lost his famous intuition.

I don't fully understand why Hitler, uniquely, held his hand against Goering.

Canvasser

Up until summer 1942, Hitler got more right than wrong militarily (not including geo-political decisions like decalring war on the USSR and USA)

Jim S

I wonder about his getting it right. ...
He had embarked on a supporting role in North Africa , never intending to go to Egypt but having lent a hand to the Italians he had ventured into a situation which made greater demands on him , one which actually offerred greater results than Russia did and more easily achieved.
He was increasingly in 941 drawn into the Med. , Crete, the movement of naval forces and never in sufficient strength to force the issue when it could have been done.
Long term problems developed.

The Atlantic was never resolved, Russia hugely complicated the use of his scant resources and even by August 41 Barbarossa was running out of steam the three "goals" had not been reached with Hitler was changing his priorities and making huge alterations in troop movements.
Kiev was on paper a huge victory but within the time he had it was a phyric victory which in December 41 counted for nothing.

1941 saw the need to develop a home defence system against the RAF, and although the year started well for the Axis Barbarossa changed everything and from then on Hitler was reaching out at too many prizes and achieving none of them.