Hitlers role in WWII eastern Europe

jonniebgood1

I will keep this OP short as I would like to get some others opinions before I express my own. My query is in relation to Hitlers role as Commander of the German forces in Russia. His role is often complimented for the early stages, and also he is blamed for the losses that followed. I refer specifically to the war in the East as I see it as being the most decisive battlefield in determining the war but if people wish to disagree with this then work away.

So...
Was he an innovative leader who's unpredictablility lead Germany to the brink of victory in the east, or,
Was he a poor tactician without the requisite knowledge of military affairs that was required in identifying acheivable objectives for his armies.

Examples would help to show where opinions are formed from.

Stovepipe

hi there,
His insistence on refusing local commanders tactical freehand, especially to retreat or break out of encirclement. His insistence on committing huge resources to Stalingrad, which stopped the advance to the Caspian oil.

regards
Stovepipe

HamletOrHecuba

Hitler could have easily taken out the UK, but choose not too because he wanted to keep the British Empire together forgetting the blood lust and immense injustice of those who rule Britain both in being one of the primary causes of WWI, during it and after. Britain unlike in fairness Stalin's Russia was never interested in peaceful co-existence.

Nodin

HamletOrHecuba wrote: »

Hitler could have easily taken out the UK, but choose not too because he wanted to keep the British Empire together.

....how? A sourced answer, please.

indioblack

HamletOrHecuba wrote: »

Hitler could have easily taken out the UK, but choose not too because he wanted to keep the British Empire together forgetting the blood lust and immense injustice of those who rule Britain both in being one of the primary causes of WWI, during it and after. Britain unlike in fairness Stalin's Russia was never interested in peaceful co-existence.

Ah, there's nothing like a bit of blood lust to keep the old empire going - shame Stalin never killed anybody.

jonniebgood1

Stovepipe wrote: »

hi there,
His insistence on refusing local commanders tactical freehand, especially to retreat or break out of encirclement. His insistence on committing huge resources to Stalingrad, which stopped the advance to the Caspian oil.

regards
Stovepipe

Refusing local commanders tactical freehand could be seen as a proper move in alot of cases. In 1941 it was this that kept the German army intact against the Russian winter offensives and left them in a better position for 1942 than would have happened had retreat been allowed in those conditions. This followed the successes of the German advance in 1941.

Border-Rat

Negative

The sheer mass and technological advancement of the USSR made victory nigh on impossible. Hitler should have taken his Generals' advice and used chemical weapons. I would have, the whole point of Barbarossa was to pre-empt a Bolshevik invasion of Europe.

jonniebgood1

OK then the poll is one sided.
This is German control in 1942.


Things may have been changing at this stage but it seems to me that people give credit to the Wehrmacht for the German success in WWII and then they blame Hitler for German failings. ???

Tzar Chasm

I don't think any of the WW2 leadership were up to the task of. Military command
Hitler was responsible for a lot of retarded decisions where vsnity wasted hundreds of thousands of lives
Stain just threw bodied at the problem he was just lucky to have more of them
Mussolini, do I even have to finish that sentence
Churchill may have been a great motivator but he did orchestrate some disastrous campaigns
Rosevelt interred all japanese and german citizens of the US, and condemned eastern europe to soviet occupation

Border-Rat

Negative

jonniebgood1 wrote: »

OK then the poll is one sided.
This is German control in 1942.


Things may have been changing at this stage but it seems to me that people give credit to the Wehrmacht for the German success in WWII and then they blame Hitler for German failings. ???

The early successes can attributed to catching the Soviets on a forward posture. This is down to their intention to attack Europe. Hitler himself described Barbarossa as pre-emptive;

Today something like 160 Russian divisions are standing at our frontier. For weeks there have been constant violations of this frontier, not only affecting us but also in the far north [against Finland], as well as Romania. Russian airmen consider it sport nonchalantly to overlook these frontiers, presumably to prove to us that they already feel themselves masters of these territories. During the night of June 17 to 18 Russian patrols again penetrated into Reich territory, and could only be driven back after prolonged exchange of fire.

Already in 1940 it became increasingly clear from month to month that the plans of the men in the Kremlin were aimed at the domination, and thus the destruction, of all of Europe. I have already told the nation of the build-up of Soviet Russian military power in the East during a period when Germany had only a few divisions in the provinces bordering Soviet Russia. Only a blind person could fail to see that a military build-up of unique world-historical dimensions was being carried out. And this was not in order to protect something that was being threatened, but rather only to attack that which seemed incapable of defense ... "When I became aware of the possibility of a threat to the east of the Reich in 1940 through [secret] reports from the British House of Commons and by observations of Soviet Russian troop movements on our frontiers, I immediately ordered the formation of many new armored, motorized and infantry divisions ...
"We realized very clearly that under no circumstances could we allow the enemy the opportunity to strike first into our rear. Nevertheless, the decision in this case was a very difficult one ...
"A truly impressive amount of authentic material is now available that confirms that a Soviet Russian attack was intended. We are also sure about when this attack was to take place. In view of this danger, the extent of which we are perhaps only now truly aware, I can only thank the Lord God that He enlightened me in time, and has given me the strength to do what must be done. Millions of German soldiers may thank Him for their lives, and all of Europe for its existence.
"I may say this today: If the wave of more than 20,000 tanks, hundreds of divisions, tens of thousands of artillery pieces, along with more than 10,000 airplanes, had not been kept from being set into motion against the Reich, Europe would have been lost ..."

The USSR, in moving into an aggressive posture, exposed itself to extreme danger. E.g. their airfields were moved to within 2km along some areas of the border. Not only does that prove mendacious intention but it exposes them to German aerial attack - well within range. Other proving factors are their conversion of their railcars to meet European gauge, the moving of mountain division so far forward into areas where there are no mountains, massing of more amphibious tanks (An offensive weapon) than the entire armor of French tanks etc.


An aggressive strategy for such a planned invasion by the USSR comes with the hindrance of extreme vulnerability. Stalin was informed of this and chose to ignore it. A similar example is an abandoned plan by Iraq to thwart US Forces in Kuwait at the turn of 2003. The point is that an inferior army can make herculean headway into enemy territory at an opportune time.


In the end I doubt the Axis could've stopped the Red Army. D-Day, throwing it all at Moscow etc... probably moot arguments. The fact is that the capability, numerical strength and technological advancements, not least to mention intentions, of the Red Army, have all been brushed under the carpet. The accounts of German fighter-bombers in for June 1941 alone are extremely disturbing. They speak of bombing so many tanks in forward positions that the enemy had more AFV's than they had actual ammunition per plane. A Turkey shoot that went on for weeks ceaselessly.

HamletOrHecuba

Nodin wrote: »

....how? A sourced answer, please.

An Irish Republican swallowing the myths of British Imperialists?

Are you forgetting that the scrawny soldiers of Plutocratic Britain crumbled and fled before the healthy and strong German soldiers, having to scramble back across the channel from Dunkirk in whatever type of boats could be found?

You should check out this book.

http://www.amazon.com/Churchill-Hitler-The-Unnecessary-War/dp/030740515X

HamletOrHecuba

Eire's Devalera deserves so much praise for doing his best to prevent the blood bath of WWII happening in the first and when he failed keeping his country out of it.

@ BorderRat; By the period we are talking about the USSR was governed by Great Russian nationalists and not by Internationalist Communists (Stalin had been them all purged), also it is hard to get around the fact that the USSR was unprepared for the war, a fact that both Trotskyists and liberals use to berate it. Hitler deserves a large share of the blame for the blood shed and destruction though he was far from the only guilty party.

cloud493

Well its easy enough to remember, Some German generals displayed fear about the attack on the soviet union, before it happened, the argument being that Britain was still unbeaten in the west. When the Soviet armies suffered the shocking losses of 1941-1943, this is what gave Hitler a sense of 'being right' so to speak. But once he started loosing, then the generals turned on hitler and claimed he was leading Germany to defeat, there are few examples of opposition to Hitler in the military before that.

Nodin

HamletOrHecuba wrote: »

An Irish Republican swallowing the myths of British Imperialists?

Are you forgetting that the scrawny soldiers of Plutocratic Britain crumbled and fled before the healthy and strong German soldiers, having to scramble back across the channel from Dunkirk in whatever type of boats could be found?

You should check out this book.

http://www.amazon.com/Churchill-Hitler-The-Unnecessary-War/dp/030740515X

I'm sorry, but the extracts from that book available on the web fail to explain how "Hitler could have easily taken out the UK, but choose not too because he wanted to keep the British Empire together.". Nor would the book itself, by the looks of things.

Would you care to explain your statement, please.

cloud493

I'd say the more interesting question is 'how could hitler have forced the british government in a negotiating position' rather than 'how Hitler could have taken over the United Kingdom mainland' If you consider had Hitler say, been able to convince Franco to allow German troop movements through spain to attack gibraltar, eliminated Malta, Crete and Alexandria as British bases in 1941 by a dispatch of a larger force to the desert, and intensified the bombings of the UK mainland, while also perhaps planning with the Japanese for the attacks on the British far east.

I mean mostly everyone agrees with the commonly held facts, as long the RAF maintained a presence, if not control, of the southern england skies along with the forces of the royal navy, direct assault would have failed.

indioblack

HamletOrHecuba wrote: »

An Irish Republican swallowing the myths of British Imperialists?

Are you forgetting that the scrawny soldiers of Plutocratic Britain crumbled and fled before the healthy and strong German soldiers, having to scramble back across the channel from Dunkirk in whatever type of boats could be found?

The German army in WW2 had much to be admired for - except the cause they served.
The BEF and the French Army were outmanoeuvered in France and Belgium.
I would say that the BEF's scramble across the Channel was an orderly one - contradictory as that may seem - check out Operation Dynamo.
None of it was perfect - but it was understandable - as was the French feeling of betrayal with the haste with which the British left.
By the way, what did de Valera do to avert "the bloodbath of WW"?

HavingCrack

HamletOrHecuba wrote: »

Eire's Devalera deserves so much praise for doing his best to prevent the blood bath of WWII happening in the first and when he failed keeping his country out of it.

.

What exactly did De Valera do to trying to prevent WWII?

BostonB

In fairness Dev was great in Die Hard.

Reekwind

jonniebgood1 wrote: »

Things may have been changing at this stage but it seems to me that people give credit to the Wehrmacht for the German success in WWII and then they blame Hitler for German failings. ???

Pretty much. You have to remember that most of Western histories on the war, during the Cold War period at least, were heavily influenced by the memoirs of Wehrmacht generals. Which is not unreasonable given their abundance and the corresponding lack of Soviet material. Nonetheless these generals, often enjoying feted post-war NATO careers, had an obvious interest in making themselves look good and pinning all that went wrong on external factors. Hitler and the discredited Nazis formed the most obvious scapegoat

Now this is certainly warranted in places but it is pretty one sided and tends to ignore a) Hitler's beneficial influence in the early stages, b) the acceptance of the generals of these decisions and c) just how impossible the overall 'big picture' was by the end of 1942 (or even '41)

If you're going to blame Hitler for later defeats then he must also be given credit for 'successes' such as the Battle of France or Barbarossa. Without Hitler the Wehrmacht would have still been slogging it out in northern France in '42. Assuming there had been a war of course

BostonB

Were not most of the plans that worked not Hitlers? like the Manstein Plan. Barbarossa was a failure. It didn't achieve its objectives. Pretty much lost the war. Which is exactly what Hitler was told at the start.

At the start of the war he let his staff and military for the most part do their jobs. As the tide turned he interfered and micromanaged to the point where he no one could do their job, even to the point where no one else would make decisions or act when it was required.

You can certainly credit him with all of that.

Reekwind

BostonB wrote: »

Were not most of the plans that worked not Hitlers? like the Manstein Plan

The 'Manstein Plan' was not the preferred option of OKH and would likely never have been adopted if not for Hitler's backing. Halder had been planning for a short thrust along the Channel coast; something that Hitler recognised would be self-defeating as it would lead to a long war in the West. So he overruled the general staff and insisted on Manstein's plan

Barbarossa was a failure. It didn't achieve its objectives. Pretty much lost the war. Which is exactly what Hitler was told at the start.

What? I'll not disagree that Barbarossa was unwinnable (if perhaps necessary for the long-term survival of the Nazi project) but the idea that it ran contrary to Wehrmacht option is false. The generals were largely enthusiastic about the crusade against Bolshevism (including, contrary to many post-war memoirs, the orders to ignore the rules of war) and happily followed Hitler into the abyss. Any concerns typically lay in the opening of another front while at war with Britain or the order of target priorities*, not the questioning of a rapid military victory in the East. From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia and the World is very good on the "light-headed optimism" that overtook the military planners in the run up to the invasion

The only real note of pessimism came from General Thomas in the Economics Office but his conclusions, which were not uniformly critical, were quickly shunted aside by both political and military leaders

*With Hitler insisting, correctly in light of subsequent events, that the economic assets of the Ukraine be prioritised over the seizure of 'prestige cities'

BostonB

You can't rely on anything post war. People changing their stories to suit the situation they were now in, and so many records being destroyed during the war. But its impossible that all of the military would have been 100% enthusiastic about an operation like Barbarossa based on history and indeed their own history in WWI and simply the scale of the undertaking. Absence of proof isn't proof.

In that context, I would suggest that the Wehrmacht agreed with the plan in the East only so far of a rapid, victory without being drawn too far into Russia, within the capacity of their resources. Hitler persisted well beyond that. You can't credit Hitler with the success of Barbarossa because it wasn't a success.

Likewise you can't credit Hitler with the sole success in the west. Because it wasn't his plan. It didn't originate with him. He didn't discount Halder plan out of hand either. He tried to rework it. So hes far from being some tactical or strategic genius in that regard.

Reekwind

BostonB wrote: »

You can't rely on anything post war. People changing their stories to suit the situation they were now in, and so many records being destroyed during the war. But its impossible that all of the military would have been 100% enthusiastic about an operation like Barbarossa based on history and indeed their own history in WWI and simply the scale of the undertaking. Absence of proof isn't proof

If you are arguing that there was dissension amongst the generals with regards invading Russia then please go ahead and demonstrate this

Were there dissenters? Of course, I've already mentioned some. But by and large the general opinion of the Wehrmacht leadership can be said to be broadly in favour of the operation. They had utmost confidence in their capabilities, with corresponding contempt for those of the Soviets, and shared the fundamental assumptions that military victory in Russia would be swift and desirable

In that context, I would suggest that the Wehrmacht agreed with the plan in the East only so far of a rapid, victory without being drawn too far into Russia, within the capacity of their resources. Hitler persisted well beyond that

What? It was the Wehrmacht (specifically von Brauchitsch) who first asserted that Soviet power would collapse within six weeks, the key assumption that underpinned all Nazi plans regarding Russia. Similarly it was a study under Marcks which first proposed, in the military context, the occupation of vast tracts of European Russia*. The prevailing attitude amongst the military was that it would be a trivial task to defeat the Red Army

This wasn't uniform of course (Thomas' assessment of Soviet industrial strength and potential was much more realistic) but there is nothing to suggest that the Wehrmacht's leadership was reluctant to invade Russia or unhappy with anything more than minor specifics. So I don't know what you're basing this on

*Admittedly, not quite as extensive as the AA line ultimately accepted but even Marck's proposed Arkhangelsk-Rostov line proved far out of the reach of the Wehrmacht in 1941

Likewise you can't credit Hitler with the sole success in the west. Because it wasn't his plan. It didn't originate with him

I didn't claim it was his plan or that he was solely responsible for "success in the west". That's a strawman; of course Hitler wasn't personally drawing up operational plans... at any point of the war

What I did say was that it was Hitler's championing of the Manstein Plan that overcame the reluctance of the OKH. Without his acceptance of Manstein's controversial proposal that the main thrust should come from the south, which fitted Hitler's perception that Germany needed to avoid a long war, there is no way that the radical plan would have been accepted. Halder and OKH had outright rejected the proposals and it wasn't until Manstein secured a personal meeting with Hitler in Feb 1940 that strategy was reorientated towards his proposals

(And yes, until then Hitler had insisted on reworking the Halder plan because he had always been dissatisfied with it. For obvious reasons - it would have condemned Germany to a long war which she could not win. Hitler saw this, the general staff didn't. When Manstein presented an alternative, Hitler jumped at it)

This is as much as I would expect the head of state to be involved in military planning. Hitler deserves credit for what was probably the most important German decision of the war. And he got credit: the generals were gushing with praise at the time and were suitably convinced of Hitler's genius that few openly doubted that the USSR would be anything but another easy victory

BostonB

Why I say you, I mean people, as I wasn't quoting you directly.

Invading Russia then staying there and persisting with it, taken as a whole was a mistake and a failure. Not a success. Barbarossa didn't achieve its objective. So not a success.

The question was asked about Hitlers ability as a tactician in the east, then by implication in the west. While obviously Hitler gave the ok, the plan's or idea were not his. So you can't give Hitler credit as a tactician. Which is what was implied by that part of the original question. As a soldier in WWI he wouldn't want to repeat that mindless slogging on a front. To his credit he understood that Halder Plan didn't fit with the doctrine of constant motion and lightnings strike in overwhelming force. But as a tactician he didn't know how to do it. But he knew it when he saw it. You can give him credit for that.

cloud493

The mistake wasn't nesscarily attacking Russia, so to speak though, it was the inability of the Germans to defeat the soviets quickly. Blitzkrieg is obviously, lightening war. A protracted campaign is exactly what the Germans hoped to avoid, and did avoid for almost 2 years of war and the many victories they got.

Jim S

Barbarossa was always a huge risk venture and one which the General Staff did not want to take , it was Hitler's decision , his destiny , his self aggrandizement, him leading vast armies and changing history.
Barbrossa was a departure from what had gone before and on paper the German forces looked good in reality the divisions had been watered down and lacked the bite and concentration which had existed in France and there was only a vague idea of where it was all to end.
Hitler also showed his willingness to change and shift the priorities.
When he turned to Kiev he altered completely the chances of taking Moscow, a pyrrhic victory.
The lesson of 1941 was that by trying to achieve so many goals he failed to capture any of the objectives in 1942 he repeated this failure , and did so again in 1943.
Hitler told his Generals that they knew nothing of economics and waging war with this in mind...... Manstein said that Hitler failed to realise that it was no use in taking regions if you could not exploit them and no use in expending all your forces to achieve a position if you had no reserve to retain it or to from a military view exploit the gain.
Hitler was not in any way a talented military commander at any level.

cloud493

You could potentially make the argument that, if Hitler hadn't had to deal with Britain in the west, he could have deployed the troops in the east to win against the USSR quickly. Or possibly, if Hitler had co-ordinated his invasion, with a simultaneous strike by the Japanese. But then, he didn't. Hitler did have pretty poor judgement, his decision to amend the invasion plans of the west don't make up for his poor judgement later on.

Reekwind

Jim S wrote: »

Barbarossa was always a huge risk venture and one which the General Staff did not want to take , it was Hitler's decision , his destiny , his self aggrandizement, him leading vast armies and changing history

Again, where does this assertion that Hitler's generals were opposed to the campaign come from? From self-serving post-war memoirs perhaps? Certainly not from the evidence from 1941 when most of the Wehrmacht's leadership was almost giddily confident of crushing the Soviets

In 1938 there was real opposition to the military towards Hitler's foreign policy, in 1941 there was nothing comparable

golden lane

the germans, led by hitler spent spent too many years preparing for a war they could not win........utter srtupidity..

they went east for more land....and ended up losing land in the east....utter stupidity..

the german army surrendered with nearly 5 million armed soldiers.....sheer incompetence...

Jim S

In 1938, the General Staff had the desire to act against Hitler but lacked the momentum and resolve to do so, they didn't want to be dragged into war .
Reekwind, I do certainly take your point on the subject of self serving post war writings, something which was not unique to either side, politicians etc just love to publish more of the same.
On Barbarossa neither Goring nor Raeder wanted to go there, they saw greater rewards and less risk elsewhere, Halder and Bock were not in favour.
By 41 they knew Hitler , protest and rational argument had little place in dialogue with him and whilst many lacked the confidence and will to confront Hitler confidence in the venture was not good.
Staff officers who had seen Red Army strength and tank production at first hand had their views dismissed, the Red Army officers who had visited Germany were amazed that nothing heavier than the Pz.III and IV existed and they expressed the view that "you must be holding something back".
And as with all who saw the extent of early success , they again though , "he has read it better than us" and Halder who thought it was an unwarranted risk saw victory before him in August 41.

BostonB

There was obviously resistance to Hitler in the military. Certainly it was at its weakest in 1940~42

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_resistance#Resistance_in_the_Army_1938.E2.80.9342

Though I do think Hitler was either mislead, or choose to believe his forces were greater than they where. For example Barbarossa used 750,000 horses.

Germany
German Army entered World War II with 514,000 horses,[13] and over the course of the war employed, in total, 2.75 million horses and mules;[16] average number of horses in the Army reached 1.1 million.[26]
....
Most of these horses were employed by foot infantry and horse-drawn artillery troops that formed the bulk of the German Army throughout the war.[1][5][13][37] Of 264 divisions active in November 1944, only 42 were armored or mechanized (November 1943: 52 of 322)

Jim S

The 750,000 horses only serves to show how unprepared the Germans were for a campaign which would make demands like those brought on by Barbarossa, Hitler refused to believe that the Red Army could field the number of troops his intell. had furnished him with.
If Hitler was misled he misled himself.

cloud493

Well his disbelief was certainly inflated by his victories. I mean, the victories in the first two years or so of the war were against poorly trained, poorly equipped armies, the Polish, the French, the Greeks, etc. The nazi hierarchy was full of this, Goering\s claims for example, that he could destroy the RAF in six weeks was it?

HavingCrack

cloud493 wrote: »

Well his disbelief was certainly inflated by his victories. I mean, the victories in the first two years or so of the war were against poorly trained, poorly equipped armies, the Polish, the French, the Greeks, etc. The nazi hierarchy was full of this, Goering\s claims for example, that he could destroy the RAF in six weeks was it?

While the Polish and Greek armies were poorly equipped the French army actually had superior armaments to the Germans, just poorer tactics.

cloud493

HavingCrack wrote: »

While the Polish and Greek armies were poorly equipped the French army actually had superior armaments to the Germans, just poorer tactics.

Superior equipment in tanks/ other stuff. Poorer aircraft, poorer infantry weapons, and what's the phrase, concentration of force at the decisive point.

BostonB

Then you have the widespread use of radios and better communications.

cloud493

BostonB wrote: »

Then you have the widespread use of radios and better communications.

Yeah, case in point, Gamelin's headquarters had no telephone, or radio, and messages were dispatched to and from it hourly by motorbike messenger, hence why it was called 'a submarine without a periscope'

The Master of Disaster

I think Hitler's role in the military failure of the Eastern War is somewhat overstated. The view that Germany might have won had he just let his generals 'get on with it' is too simple and IMO, for the most part wrong. Certainly his refusal more often than not to countenance a withdrawal in favour of a counter attack and a war of manoeuvre was detrimental to the war effort but that became more of an issue after 1942 when the war was already lost. In addition as another poster mentioned if he is to be blamed for the defeats he must get credit for the successes as well. His boldness and initiative when OKW and OKH were more hesitant sometimes led to astonishing victories, notably in France in 1940. At times his intuition actually proved correct in predicting where a major Soviet offensive might occur not that it made all that much a difference.

If I had to choose a side to fall down I'd say his role was more negative than positive but like I said only for the most part when it didn't really matter. Certainly in 1941 most of OKH were all too confident in Barbarossa; they knew that they couldn't win a protracted war but appear to have genuinely believed they would defeat the SU within a matter of weeks due to inaccurate intelligence, underestimation of SU ability and determination, and downright belief in their own ability. They lost that war as early as December 1941 by failing to take Moscow and destroying the Red Army definitively there and then. Hitler's industrialists told him even then that they couldn't outproduce the SU and they never again were able to fully replenish the troop levels of the start of the campaign.

Some would argue that there was still a chance of victory in 1942 and here Hitler can be blamed for forcing the army to carry out too many objectives rather than concentrating his forces on one task at hand. But again I repeat I think the war was already lost at this stage and some people don't comprehend that because it went on for another 3/4 years. It was really a testament to the Wehrmacht's soldiers and commanders that they were able to fight and delay the Red Army until 1945 despite the huge manpower and equipment deficits they possessed. But Hitler or not they were never going to win that war after the failure of the summer offensive in 1941.

BostonB

I think your overstating the credit due. But I think even Hitler knew he was in trouble if the allies east and west didn't, come to the table which I think, he expected them to do.

gaelicred

He fought the war on too many fronts and who can say that his generals would have done any better

Jim S

Stalingrad a contrast to Papa H's. withdrawal from Kharkov and Manstien's recovery in he South in 1943.

Hitler's interference in Barbarossa, changing direction from Moscow to Kiev, his inflexible love of static lines, his interference with Donitz's intention to put greater numbers of boats into Drumbeat in 1942.

Hitler's desire to control all projects and to change and alter as he saw fit , also the waste of resources changing priorities, and investing in projects which took to long to develop, lack of clarity.

Hitler's refusal to bring home troops from Baltic regions and when they were cut off leaving the there to "tie up Russian forces.

I think his generals would have done better , the loss of 6th Army would not have happened, Blue had all Hitler's finger prints on it , the same mistakes he made again and again.

Dannyboy83

It looks in his favour until the Stalingrad airlift.
Hindsight or no, it was a gamble which he must have known would not succeed and the goering facade was well exposed by this stage.
So he gambled to lose here.

Seems there were two hitlers.
The rational gambler pre-stalingrad.
The irrational reactionist post-stalingrad.

I wonder how much Dr.Morrell was to blame for this. It was around this time Hitler went full junkie and simultaneously lost his famous intuition.

I don't fully understand why Hitler, uniquely, held his hand against Goering.

Canvasser

Up until summer 1942, Hitler got more right than wrong militarily (not including geo-political decisions like decalring war on the USSR and USA)

Jim S

I wonder about his getting it right. ...
He had embarked on a supporting role in North Africa , never intending to go to Egypt but having lent a hand to the Italians he had ventured into a situation which made greater demands on him , one which actually offerred greater results than Russia did and more easily achieved.
He was increasingly in 941 drawn into the Med. , Crete, the movement of naval forces and never in sufficient strength to force the issue when it could have been done.
Long term problems developed.

The Atlantic was never resolved, Russia hugely complicated the use of his scant resources and even by August 41 Barbarossa was running out of steam the three "goals" had not been reached with Hitler was changing his priorities and making huge alterations in troop movements.
Kiev was on paper a huge victory but within the time he had it was a phyric victory which in December 41 counted for nothing.

1941 saw the need to develop a home defence system against the RAF, and although the year started well for the Axis Barbarossa changed everything and from then on Hitler was reaching out at too many prizes and achieving none of them.