Do you believe a 'you' exists?

philologos

Axle_of_Elvis wrote: »

The causal chain model is still good here. Earlier events in the chain have an influence on later events; the later events cannot change the earlier events. You can call this phenomenon "experience" but there is no need to postulate a persisting object like "identity" or "self": a chain of causally connected events is all that's required.

A causal chain model still requires a unifying something that is behind the causation. I.E What caused what. There has to be a unifying event that can determine when one event happens and another begins. Even David Hume when he said that the mind simply unifies many different successions in order into a unity still required a mind to observe this. For example, if I have a table and it is comprised of smooth pine if I run my hand over the top of it I know it is smooth only because there is a union of similar perceptions following one after the other. To determine when one event begins and one ends we still need a mind. Just as when my hand falls off the table or reaches a new object which produces a different sensation my mind says to itself "that's different". One cannot say that anything is causually related unless there is something by which to determine that it is causually related.

Now, when I turn my attention to my own mind, all I perceive is a flow of thoughts, one after another. Some thoughts are memories, others are reflections on current experience, others are considerations about the future. But only one thought exists at a time; and each thought, existing for a while, then ends (although it has a conditioning influence on the thoughts which follow). I call this stream of thoughts "my mind", but actually there is no persisting thing which I can empirically observe: just a stream of individual thoughts, and occasionally the thought "this is my mind".

Axle_of_Elvis wrote: »

Admittedly, I can have an experience. And, after an interval of time (and a stream of unrelated thoughts), I can have a memory of that experience. Without some kind of persisting mental "container" in which the memory is "stored" (i.e., a "self") until it is recalled to mind, how do we connect the experienced event with the later memory of the event?

You're trying a David Hume argument here while ignoring how he actually does it. There is still a single I by which all these perceptions are stored.

Axle_of_Elvis wrote: »

One way is to suggest that the experience sets in motion a chain of thoughts about the event, most of which are "latent", that is to say, do not appear in the stream of thoughts of which I am conscious. But every once in a while one of these thoughts about the event does emerge in the stream of thoughts of which I am conscious, and we call this "remembering".

You cannot resort to the I in this argument. Even if you are doing it out of semantics you have just disregarded the I. You cannot fall back on it now. You must either reject the I and the self in fullness or accept it in fullness. There is no limbo in between here.

The I is simply produced when one reflects reflexively on oneself. Like René Descartes I think therefore I am.

Axle_of_Elvis wrote: »

It might seem a bit laborious to have to postulate an unconscious chain of causally-related "latent" thoughts, but consider digestion: it's a process, not a thing, and most of the time you're completely unconscious of it, although it certainly has an effect on the rest of the bundle of causally-related elements which we call "the person". So memory is a process of events, a causal chain, most of whose elements occur outside the realm of awareness. It does not have to be a concrete thing which persists through time.

It's not laborious at all, it is just impossible. You yourself have failed to do so by invoking the I in your argument.

The best option you have to reject the I is simply to say that we all partake in a unified conscience as Avicenna argued in the Middle Ages.

wylo

wylo: can you tell me what is mistaken about my empiricist style take to the question a few posts ago?

Sorry just saw your post now

philologos wrote: »

Treating this on a philosophical level only simply put yes, I do believe that an I exists. Each individual is consistent in that there is a set of experiences that are instinctively theirs and that instinctively changed their lives and their thinking.

It changed the life and the thinking of that body, but where is the ownership over this? Where is the extra entity/controller that says "these are my experiences and my memories". Thats the part that doesnt exist, only as a thought. The difference is , what I believe is that the thought has been amplified and something new and untrue has been created out of it cause of our use of language, "I", "me" , "yours", "his", these words are necessary and practical, but they only serve to create a sense of identity when hammered home on a daily basis from a young age.
My experience/realization is that there is no extra you that owns your body, its just body experiencing reality, and that people have a sense of "Im me" in the brain that is unnecessary.

I am not the same person as the person I was when I was 12 although there has been considerable development I still am the same I even if the collection of experiences I had then were lesser. Put it this way, the experiences I had up until I was 12 are a subset of the experiences that I have had up until now.
The only difference is that I have had many more since. So in a sense I'm an empiricist in respect to identity. In addition to the I that I think that we have through experience, I think much of our I is derived from our origins from what we believe about how we got here, to our families, culture and general surroundings. All have a profound impact on us.

"I am the same I", that bodys experience through life creates thoughts that flow through the mind, so there is no doubt that that body has seperate memories, personality, thoughts to another body. Thats not what im getting at.
But again, I am talking about that sense that there is a you who owns all that. That sense is simply a thought, do you agree ? I think you even mentioned in another post there that there is a thought "this is my mind" or something like that. The point is, that sense isnt founded on anything true, there is no controller or entity or even soul that runs things in the body, the body does it by itself. we need language to seperate this body from that body, thats fair enough, but I think thats where the confusion comes from.
The result is an illusion or belief that there is a you. This illusion, like many other illusions (e.g. going back to my fear of spiders example) are simply a 'malfunction' for want of a better word. There is no need for it and the belief can be removed.

Perhaps a modified version of John Locke's thinking on the tabular rasa and our lives constantly being added to. If you look at it in a sculpture type way the tabular rasa could be the block and the experiences are the chippings made by the scalpel into the block. Each chipping shapes us a little bit more until the sculpture is completely different from the original block.

Well, I think Axle of Elvis argued this point well.

Its worth noting that this isnt to be confused with the simple acknowledgement that this bodys thoughts are seperate from another bodies thoughts, and when you look in the mirror you see the body that contains those thoughts, but that is not the 'me' im referring to, that 'me' is just an acknowledgement. Where the word 'me' is simply used as a handier way of saying "This body", but its the use of that word that has created that extra belief.

philologos

wylo: It appears that we're having a problem defining what exactly what the I you are rejecting is. For all intents and purposes I would consider it the self-reflexive consciousness.

The problem with Axle of Elvis is a gaping contradiction in that he invokes the I that he is trying to reject to make his point. If he wants to argue his point he has to throw the I in the bin for this discussion. Only those defending the idea of the "I" the self, the ego whatever you want to call it are permitted to use it logically.

wylo

philologos wrote: »

wylo: It appears that we're having a problem defining what exactly what the I you are rejecting is. For all intents and purposes I would consider it the self-reflexive consciousness.

The problem with Axle of Elvis is a gaping contradiction in that he invokes the I that he is trying to reject to make his point. If he wants to argue his point he has to throw the I in the bin for this discussion. Only those defending the idea of the "I" the self, the ego whatever you want to call it are permitted to use it logically.

ok I hadnt read this yet, but I edited the last bit of my post to add in that acknowledgment.


I can use the word I instead of "this body", thats why I use the word. Language is a practical tool, what I see now though is that it has contributed other beliefs in the mean time.

I THINK thats why it happened but I dont know, it just makes sense to me because I used to have a a mild interest in affirmations and what they used do for people, and this is a bloody BIG one.

philologos

We still need to know what is the I you are rejecting. The I that you choose to use now means the body, but what is the I that you are saying is non-existent? We need these to be set to continue discussing.

coffee_cake

Ātman is an essence of things that does not depend on others; it is an intrinsic nature.

I think the idea is that the I, the ego, is some intrinsic personality which is there when you take away all the habits, mental formations, etc.

wylo

philologos wrote: »

We still need to know what is the I you are rejecting. The I that you choose to use now means the body, but what is the I that you are saying is non-existent? We need these to be set to continue discussing.

The "I" im rejecting is the belief of ownership over your body, the soul, the controller, the extra entity. Many will acknowledge at least in theory that what im saying makes sense , but the difference they still experience the belief.
I knew for years that this "I" didnt exist, I always acknowledged, "yea this is just a body and a brain , just a more complex version than a small bug thats all", the difference is I was still experiencing the "I", the sense of self.

I am not even able to imagine now. It creates an uncomfortable feeling when I try and experience that 'ownership' again.

philologos

bluewolf wrote: »

I think the idea is that the I, the ego, is some intrinsic personality which is there when you take away all the habits, mental formations, etc.

I don't even think that Descartes in earnest would have really believed that you can actually fully separate the mind from the body. Yes he did subscribe to mind body dualism but that there is some necessity for the body to exist in terms of the mind and vice versa.

Mind and body go together, much as the I and the body go together for me to be able to take substantive being as philologos.

The collection of experiences that we go through are what primarily feed the I. It is not easy to take away these experiences, and these experiences will be a clear point of reference in those times when I reflect in a self-reflexive manner upon myself, who I am, what do I stand for, where have I been, where am I going next? The I seems to be based in a long way on the recollection that we have of what we have already been through as existing beings.

I don't see how one could actually deny this I in the sense that one cannot deny that they have baggage that they bring around everywhere in terms of experience.

coffee_cake

I wasn't talking about separating them as such, I was talking about mental habits &c.

The collection of experiences is just a collection of experiences, it may lead to new habits or reactions but it does not mean there is a core "self" hidden underneath.

philologos

bluewolf wrote: »

The collection of experiences is just a collection of experiences, it may lead to new habits or reactions but it does not mean there is a core "self" hidden underneath.

Largely the I (identity) comes from the collection of experiences. If I reflect on what I am, I am reflecting on where I have come from, where I've been, what I've done and do, and what I generally have come to stand for. These are intangible apart from the fact that they are stored in some way by the brain. The unity that exists between the experiences of the 12 year philologos and the 22 year old philologos are what cause me to conclude that it is the same philologos but that different experiences have arisen in the last 10 years.

Edit: It seems that everyone on thread does believe that a "you" or an "I" exist. The only dispute we are having now is what defines the "I". I suspect that this is a debate that could go on ad-infinitum, but surely the main proposition has been nullified in that we all agree that something is the I. Some defining it as merely the body, and some defining it on the basis of experience.

Axle_of_Elvis

I'm perfectly entitled to use the word "I" when denying the existence of any persisting thing (whether mental or physical) to which that "I" could refer. The "I" is just a causally-related series of discrete events: that doesn't make it illogical to speak of the "I".

For example, it's perfectly logical to write "A history of the Offaly senior hurling team, 1945-1985", even though there is no such thing as a single "Offaly senior hurling team" which persisted from 1945 to 1985. There were just different players who came and went, and undoubtedly each generation of players had an influence on the generations which succeeded them. The individual players feel they are part of a continuing team, with its history and traditions, to which they are loyal. But there is absolutely no need to postulate that there are a set of "experiences" which define the identity of the team that are mysteriously "stored" somewhere (perhaps in a cupboard in the Offaly county GAA board offices?).

I think the self is more like that: a "team" of individual physical and mental constituents, each of brief duration, linked together in a complex bundle of causal chains, of which it is often useful, in daily life, to speak of as if they constitute a continuing "self", even though in reality there is no single ontological factor which persists through time. There is no need to speak of experiences being stored anywhere: the sense of an "I" does not depend on this.

philologos

Axle_of_Elvis wrote: »

I'm perfectly entitled to use the word "I" when denying the existence of any persisting thing (whether mental or physical) to which that "I" could refer. The "I" is just a causally-related series of discrete events: that doesn't make it illogical to speak of the "I".

The question is asking do you believe there is such an 'I' or a 'you' exists. You evidently need to use I or you to answer this question. Thus confirming that in all actuality they must exist in some form.

Axle_of_Elvis wrote: »

For example, it's perfectly logical to write "A history of the Offaly senior hurling team, 1945-1985", even though there is no such thing as a single "Offaly senior hurling team" which persisted from 1945 to 1985. There were just different players who came and went, and undoubtedly each generation of players had an influence on the generations which succeeded them. The individual players feel they are part of a continuing team, with its history and traditions, to which they are loyal. But there is absolutely no need to postulate that there are a set of "experiences" which define the identity of the team that are mysteriously "stored" somewhere (perhaps in a cupboard in the Offaly county GAA board offices?).

The team existed, but the players changed. It's not all that difficult either. Although using a collection of people to explain what happens in the individual isn't a valid comparison to begin with.

18AD

philologos wrote: »

The question is asking do you believe there is such an 'I' or a 'you' exists. You evidently need to use I or you to answer this question. Thus confirming that in all actuality they must exist in some form.

No it doens't. Do unicorns exist? Unicorns don't exist. Just becuase I answer with the term doesn't mean it exists.

The team existed, but the players changed. It's not all that difficult either. Although using a collection of people to explain what happens in the individual isn't a valid comparison to begin with.

A modular theory of mind actually comes pretty close as a comparison.

philologos

18AD wrote: »

No it doens't. Do unicorns exist? Unicorns don't exist. Just becuase I answer with the term doesn't mean it exists.

If the I was as arbitrary as a unicorn you wouldn't need to use it in any response to this question.

It seems more logical that you do mean something when you say I in response. The I exists at the very least in theory, otherwise you wouldn't need to use it as much. This signifies that there is something about the I which is far less arbitrary than the unicorn.

The more we keep dodging the issue while still invoking the I the further we are from answering the question. "Do you believe that a 'you' exists?". I do because it is reasonable to believe so. As for what exactly it is, that is another question that needs to be established separately. At least the unicorn exists as a concept, the I does as well, but more than likely as something more than a concept due to its prevalence in usage.

18AD

philologos wrote: »

At least the unicorn exists as a concept, the I does as well, but more than likely as something more than a concept due to its prevalence in usage.

I don't think prevelance of use is a strong enough basis to make an existence claim about an "I". Something like the term "God" has widespread use, even among atheists, but I don't think that is grounds to say there must then actually be a God.

philologos

18AD wrote: »

I don't think prevelance of use is a strong enough basis to make an existence claim about an "I". Something like the term "God" has widespread use, even among atheists, but I don't think that is grounds to say there must then actually be a God.

Why do you use it if it doesn't exist? Isn't it just waffling about something intangible then?

The difference between I and God (although God is hugely important to me) is that one cannot form the vast majority of sentences without making reference to I, you, she, he. It is a necessity of language in referring to people in that it is a personal pronoun. It is a necessary grammatical structure in a way that God isn't. No comparison between it and unicorns.

18AD

philologos wrote: »

It is a necessary grammatical structure in a way that God isn't. No comparison between it and unicorns.

Yes, but that it is a grammatical structure does entail it's actually existing.

If I say "we went to the shop" I am not saying that there is a singular existing "we" that went to the shop. Just because the term used, be it "I" or "we", does not mean there exists a singular rigid "I" or "we".

philologos

What do you mean when you say I, you, he, she, if not making reference to a person or identifying a person? They must mean something in some form, and if they mean something they at least exist as theoretical constructs which would mean that we do believe that I, you, he and she exist albeit as mere theoretical constructs rather than something substantive.

18AD

It's fine that people exist and may be identified with personal pronouns.

But I don't think the broader sense of "I" as a self or Cartesian subject exists.

The trouble with language is more apparent with sentences like "I have experiences". There is no "I" having experiences, there are only the experiences. The personal pronoun operates as a simple location designator.

philologos

Why do we say I feel, or I think or use other such verbiage in respect to ourselves? Is that I not thinking, or not feeling? Are thinking and feeling experiences? If so it seems fair to use an empirical model to look at the I just as it is acceptable to use the empirical model in other fields of knowledge.

18AD

Yes, they are experiences. But there is not an "I" having those experiences, there are just the experiences.

The "I" simply points out where those experiences are located, i.e. "I" is right here, for me.

philologos

If the I is describing something, then what the I is describing / pointing to exists. It's just that you think that the I is something other than what people may commonly describe it to be.

It's funny how the I is one of the most rudimentary concepts we know, but it is the most difficult concept to discuss. The more we attempt to simplify it the more we realise we can't.

18AD

philologos wrote: »

If the I is describing something, then what the I is describing / pointing to exists.

Yes. But it exists in a theoretical way only. To steal Dennett's example, it is like center of gravity. There does not exist an actual thing that is a center of gravity. There does not exist a self that you can locate within an individual.

http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/dennett07.htm

philologos

18AD wrote: »

Yes. But it exists in a theoretical way only. To steal Dennett's example, it is like center of gravity. There does not exist an actual thing that is a center of gravity. There does not exist a self that you can locate within an individual.

But the I we use is you as an individual. The you you refer to is someone else as an individual and so on. Therefore the I does exist but it is synonymous with an individual. Or rather what demarcates I from you. What tells us apart as individuals. Some no doubt are bodily factors, others are personality factors?

What does an individual consist of?

18AD

An individual consists of many things. But most importantly it does not have an essence of selfness. The concept of "I" here is one of essence.

If I say that this body is mine I cannot locate within my body anything that can be identified as mineness.

If I say that someone is an accountant, there is nothing in them that is actually identifiable as accountant in them.That is what I meant by the idea of self being non-rigid. If anything it could be redefined as describing processes that can be altered at any stage. Again, if I say that someone is an accountant this can change at any time. I am not stating an essential fact about that person.

Yet it does exist at the level of description in the same way that unicorns exist as a concept. So if I was to redefine the self as this, then you could say that the self exists but it is now this.

philologos

18AD wrote: »

An individual consists of many things. But most importantly it does not have an essence of selfness. The concept of "I" here is one of essence.

Can we reject the term "self" (myself, and yourself if we are to take your assumption would just be reference points to the individual, they are reflexive pronouns), and just say that the I strictly refers to the individual both body and mind (and its contents which may be intangible)?

18AD wrote: »

If I say that this body is mine I cannot locate within my body anything that can be identified as mineness.]

Is it fair to say that the body, mind and personality are distinctively yours though? Rather than mine? If this isn't true then we must posit a hivemind of some form along the lines of Avicenna.

18AD wrote: »

If I say that someone is an accountant, there is nothinig in them that is actually identifiable as accountant in them.That is what I meant by the idea of self being non-rigid. If anything it could be redefined as describing processes that can be altered at any stage. Again, if I say that someone is an accountant this can change at any time. I am not stating an essential fact about that person.

Why do they recall that they are an accountant? Is it not based on the collective experiences that are stored within the mind of the individual telling them that they actually work that job?

Strictly the data engrained on the database that is the mind.

18AD wrote: »

Yet it does exist at the level of description in the same way that unicorns exist as a concept. So if I was to redefine the self as this, then you could say that the self exists but it is now this.

It seems much more than unicorns. The individual isn't fiction, and if I refers to the individual one could logically say that I <=> you as an individual? That's expressing some form of a reality, even if we don't believe that there is an attribute called I'ness this is in part defined by your experiences stored in the mind, part by your appearance, and part your personality.

Is this fair or am I wrong? It seems that the I is actually a composite?

18AD

philologos wrote: »

It seems much more than unicorns. The individual isn't fiction, and if I refers to the individual one could logically say that I <=> you as an individual? That's expressing some form of a reality, even if we don't believe that there is an attribute called I'ness this is in part defined by your experiences stored in the mind, part by your appearance, and part your personality.

Is this fair or am I wrong? It seems that the I is actually a composite?

The individual isn't fiction. But the sense of self and unity as an "I", the concept of self, functions much in the same way as fiction, within certain limits. One can redefine their whole past life in light of new experiences and can reinterpret who they think they are at any time. Things like memories are not fixed experiences in ones mind but can be remembered in different ways. For instance if you try and remember going to the shop recently, or some other past memory, you tend to imagine yourself from a third person perspective in your own mind. Obviously you didn't experience it like this, but you create this in your mind. So your past definition of who you are is flexible. It's this "I" that we are trying to understand. The "I" that we identify ourselves as being and it is this "I" that is not existing as an existing essence that you can discover empirically.

I am not saying that people don't exist as body-minds, but that their self-conception is not a set essence. To that extent there is no self.

So the accountant may in fact be an accountant at some time, but they are not defined by their self-conception as an accountant. Our concept of self does not define who we are. For example, the accountant does not have to be an accountant because he is an accountant.

philologos

But can we not say that the I is a reference point to the individual in common language such that I = myself as the individual? If so we've established that the I does exist, just perhaps not as people commonly refer to it?

I don't understand why if you think that the I is a reference point to the individual that you can't just declare it as an equivalence.

18AD

philologos wrote: »

But can we not say that the I is a reference point to the individual in common language such that I = myself as the individual? If so we've established that the I does exist, just perhaps not as people commonly refer to it?

I don't understand why if you think that the I is a reference point to the individual that you can't just declare it as an equivalence.

Yeah, I think that's fine. I certainly does refer to existing individual people.

philologos

18AD wrote: »

Yeah, I think that's fine. I certainly does refer to existing individual people.

I'm kind of moving along using the Socratic method which seems to be bringing us a lot of progress so far. If you find it annoying at any point we can just stop. So to recap. Rather than saying that the I is an internal intangible attribute it is actually just me in fullness as an individual.

Just wondering is it OK if I say that in actually determining what the I is now, we are actually asking about what an individual is? Or rather what an individual is comprised of?

What do you think of this actually?