Imperialism during WWII and USSR's aims in the wars aftermath

Manic Moran

jonsnow wrote: »

Ireland just did what every other small nation attempted to do in Europe during World War Two and remain neutral.I think it was something like twenty eight countries tried this approach but must were eventually embroiled in the maelstrom.We were lucky and skillful enough to avoid the war and should make no apologies for it.If superpowers like the United States wanted to avoid the conflict then we could hardly be blamed when our intervention wouldn,t make much difference to the outcome but our nation could have suffered terribly.

Which, I think, should indicate the futility of the approach. The war can come to you whether you want it to or not, and you should plan accordingly. Even if you're one of the largest, most industrialised and geographically isolated (and theoretically safest) nations on Earth. Relying on 'luck' as a national strategy is not something I would encourage.

I take your point about the archives, but I've never seen any real evidence that Russia intended to expand into Western Europe after WWII.

The Red Army was always viewed as an instrument of implementing revolution in the world, from its very beginning in the attempts to spread the revolutionary ideal by military force in Poland in the 1920s. That was the first indication that purely revolutionary armies were militarily fairly incompetent (i.e. the Poles won), so in the late 20s/early 30s the Red Army was kept busy by being used to forcefully implement revolution in the USSR whilst the higher echelons tried to figure out how to combine a competent military force with revolutionary ideals. The history of the Red Army in the interwar period was far more complicated than the perception of "There was a competent military until Stalin shot the officers." There was no reason not to believe that the only reason that the USSR had stopped attempting to conquer their way to world communism as one method was simply the realisation earned by experience that the military was not up to scratch to do so yet. By the time the war had ended in 1945, the Red Army had fixed itself and it again had become a viable option. I do note that to my knowledge there is no hard evidence to indicate that the Russians did intend to continue the conflict to the West in the mid-late '40s, but that does not eliminate the issue that such a move would be in keeping with the historical ideals of the USSR and the Red Army to that point.

Because of this he claims they were unprepared when the Germans launched Barbarossa and the Germans quickly got behind them (hence their rapid gains and envelopments), whereas if they'd have been in a defensive posture they would have been arrayed in depth. No idea whether its horse**** or not, but its an interesting theory

There is a kernel of truth behind the statement, but I think he draws the wrong conclusion. There was a schism at the highest levels of the grand strategy pundits, between those like General Svechin who believed that the best way for the USSR to win a war against the European powers was a defensive war of attrition, and those such as General Shaposhnikov who believed that the political value and impact of an offensive war of annihiliation was the better course. The problem is that Svechin was a 'traditional' officer, apolitical, whilst Shaposhnikov saw the military and politcs as intertwined: In his opinion, by its very nature as a revolutionary force the Red Army was required to use its offensive elan. Of course, the more politically 'attuned' people tended to curry more favour with Leadership, so the 'offense is the best form of defense' school of thought ended up being predominant for a while, with the troop deployments made accordingly. That is distinct from the pre-emptive strike idea, however, and was simply a preparation for an immediate counter-offensive in the event that the Germans struck first. The only proposal I'm aware of for a pre-emptive strike into Germany was made by General Vasilevsky, Zhukov's deputy, but it was not endorsed by either Zhukov or Timoshenko: The Red Army simply needed more time to amass equipment.

Interesting theory indeed but I would think that Stalin's decimation of the officer class in the army would have not have been part of this plan

Not really. The officer purge was started by a German double-agent named Skoblin, who put it to the NKVD that Tukhachevsky (who generally fell in with Svechin) and his associates were planning a coup. The purge tended to nail the senior officers who advocated the space-for-time strategy, not the offensive strategy so if a pre-emptive start was being considered, the purge would not have actually removed many of its advocates.

NTM

brianthebard

Manic Moran wrote: »

The Red Army was always viewed as an instrument of implementing revolution in the world, from its very beginning in the attempts to spread the revolutionary ideal by military force in Poland in the 1920s. That was the first indication that purely revolutionary armies were militarily fairly incompetent (i.e. the Poles won), so in the late 20s/early 30s the Red Army was kept busy by being used to forcefully implement revolution in the USSR whilst the higher echelons tried to figure out how to combine a competent military force with revolutionary ideals. The history of the Red Army in the interwar period was far more complicated than the perception of "There was a competent military until Stalin shot the officers." There was no reason not to believe that the only reason that the USSR had stopped attempting to conquer their way to world communism as one method was simply the realisation earned by experience that the military was not up to scratch to do so yet. By the time the war had ended in 1945, the Red Army had fixed itself and it again had become a viable option. I do note that to my knowledge there is no hard evidence to indicate that the Russians did intend to continue the conflict to the West in the mid-late '40s, but that does not eliminate the issue that such a move would be in keeping with the historical ideals of the USSR and the Red Army to that point.

This post makes the very large assumption that there was no difference between Leninism, Trotskyism and Stalinism, which is clearly not the case. The first two were most likely to pursue a perpetual revolution, the latter was not. There is no evidence to suggest that the USSR intended to conquer western europe.

Manic Moran

This post makes the very large assumption that there was no difference between Leninism, Trotskyism and Stalinism, which is clearly not the case. The first two were most likely to pursue a perpetual revolution, the latter was not.

Granted, but I'm not sure that from the military point of view the difference isn't all that academic. (I tend to focus a lot more on military than political things) To quote the Stalin-leaning Frunze: "Between our proletarian state and the rest of the bourgeois world there can be only one condition - that of a long, persistent, depserate war to the death" and all military thinking was directed towards the eventual resumption of the Struggle by force of arms. I think Stalin's shift towards the concept of "collective security" after the failed attempt to destabilise Germany politically in the early 1930s was really just a reflection of the realisation of the limitations of the military as demonstrated during the attempted use of the Army to force collectivisation in 1929-1930: The military simply could not be depended on to do its jobs.

I think in both Leninism and Stalinism there was a belief that it would eventually have to boil down to a military fight, which, pragmatically, would be best for the USSR to happen when it was most ready. There was no doubting that Stalin realised that the Red Army simply could not take on the Western forces until after the mass industrialisation was completed. Quoting him in 1931: " We are 50-100 years behind the leading countries. We must make up this distance in ten years. Either we do that or they will suppress us." (Fortunately, they got their ten years). From the military perspective, it seems that the difference between the two schools of thought was that under one doctrine, the military could be used as a catalyst to create and support the revolution of the proletariat in another country, and in the other it was a mindset of 'whether we can create a revolution or not, we will have to militarily destroy the opposition else they will destroy us." Perhaps a difference in intent, but for practical purposes, does the difference matter?

NTM

brianthebard

I agreed with you up to this;

From the military perspective, it seems that the difference between the two schools of thought was that under one doctrine, the military could be used as a catalyst to create and support the revolution of the proletariat in another country, and in the other it was a mindset of 'whether we can create a revolution or not, we will have to militarily destroy the opposition else they will destroy us." Perhaps a difference in intent, but for practical purposes, does the difference matter?

Even within your own statement its clear there is a difference between aggressive and defensive posturing. Stalin's very first policy was for the USSR to exist-that is what the five year plans were about, that's what his attempted destruction of Germany was about. Its not entirely clear when or if he ever intended to expand the revolution out of the USSR afaik. I certainly believe that the supposed threat to Western Europe from the USSR was not real.

Manic Moran

Even within your own statement its clear there is a difference between aggressive and defensive posturing.

Posturing, intent and capability are all functionally independent. The most important of those three are intent and capabilty as they have nothing to do with posturing. (Indeed, this was driven into Stalin in 1941 when Germany failed to manufacture the expected casus belli and simply drove into the USSR, to hell with appearances). Until the end of the War, the capability did not exist, regardless of intent, making even intent irrelevant, be it publicised by posturing or not.

Stalin's very first policy was for the USSR to exist-that is what the five year plans were about, that's what his attempted destruction of Germany was about.

Agreed.

Its not entirely clear when or if he ever intended to expand the revolution out of the USSR afaik.

Fair enough, I'll acceed to this for the sake of the argument.

I certainly believe that the supposed threat to Western Europe from the USSR was not real.

This belief does not necessarily follow from the first two. If we accept that Stalin believed the outside powers to be an existential threat to the USSR, and if we accept that Stalin believed that it would eventually come down to an armed struggle even if he personally wished to avoid one*, then it is not beyond the realms of possibility to conclude that the inevitability of a war would result in a desire that the war for the existance of the USSR should be fought on Soviet terms, not terms of the other powers. Especially so when the 'annihilation by offense' military doctrine was the dominant one in the Soviet military/political circles, not Svechin's defensive doctrine which was purely militarily based.

*Those evil Capitalist regimes, you see, would start one regardless of Russia's peace-loving nature.

NTM

brianthebard

I've cut posts on the topic of the USSR and Imperialism from the other WWII thread-the number of posts moved tells me I should've done this a lot earlier. If anyone feels their post is better suited to the old thread(or vice versa) please let me know. Mod.

Hermione*

Manic Moran wrote: »

Which, I think, should indicate the futility of the approach. The war can come to you whether you want it to or not, and you should plan accordingly. Even if you're one of the largest, most industrialised and geographically isolated (and theoretically safest) nations on Earth. Relying on 'luck' as a national strategy is not something I would encourage.

While I do think one should apply a greater strategic thinking than luck to national defense, neutrality seems to have remarkably successful for the Swiss. Also, when the war came to Ireland and the North Strand was bombed, Germany apologised.

Manic Moran wrote: »

The Red Army was always viewed as an instrument of implementing revolution in the world, from its very beginning in the attempts to spread the revolutionary ideal by military force in Poland in the 1920s. That was the first indication that purely revolutionary armies were militarily fairly incompetent.

I would draw your attention to the success of the "purely revolutionary" French First Republic in the late 18th/ early 19th century. From 1792 - 1801, the French Republic was attacked by a number of European kingdoms and withstood them all. So competent was this revolutionary army that they could spare men to send to Ireland in support of Wolfe Tone's revolution in 1798.

brianthebard wrote: »

Manic Moran wrote: »

The Red Army was always viewed as an instrument of implementing revolution in the world, from its very beginning in the attempts to spread the revolutionary ideal by military force in Poland in the 1920s. That was the first indication that purely revolutionary armies were militarily fairly incompetent (i.e. the Poles won), so in the late 20s/early 30s the Red Army was kept busy by being used to forcefully implement revolution in the USSR whilst the higher echelons tried to figure out how to combine a competent military force with revolutionary ideals. The history of the Red Army in the interwar period was far more complicated than the perception of "There was a competent military until Stalin shot the officers." There was no reason not to believe that the only reason that the USSR had stopped attempting to conquer their way to world communism as one method was simply the realisation earned by experience that the military was not up to scratch to do so yet. By the time the war had ended in 1945, the Red Army had fixed itself and it again had become a viable option. I do note that to my knowledge there is no hard evidence to indicate that the Russians did intend to continue the conflict to the West in the mid-late '40s, but that does not eliminate the issue that such a move would be in keeping with the historical ideals of the USSR and the Red Army to that point.

This post makes the very large assumption that there was no difference between Leninism, Trotskyism and Stalinism, which is clearly not the case. The first two were most likely to pursue a perpetual revolution, the latter was not. There is no evidence to suggest that the USSR intended to conquer western europe.

The very point I was going to make. While Communism was feared by Western governments in the 1920s and 1930s, that was more to do with the fact that most of them had active Communist parties in their country. It was not a fear of the Red Army, which was only feared after its exploits in World War II. Stalinism was not concerned with a perpetual revolution. Bear in mind that a very large part of Poland was governed by Russia between 1795-1917 (Poland did not exist during this period but was divided between three Empires). Russia exercised a strong policy of Russification in its Polish territories during this time to further diminish Polish claims of statehoodp. It is likely that Russians of the 1920s and 1930s did not see Poland as an independent state, but rather land which should be part of Russia.

brianthebard

Manic Moran wrote: »

Posturing, intent and capability are all functionally independent. The most important of those three are intent and capabilty as they have nothing to do with posturing. (Indeed, this was driven into Stalin in 1941 when Germany failed to manufacture the expected casus belli and simply drove into the USSR, to hell with appearances). Until the end of the War, the capability did not exist, regardless of intent, making even intent irrelevant, be it publicised by posturing or not.

I see your point. I used the word posturing because even though Lenin perhaps wanted to spread revolution, it was clearly beyond the USSR's capacity at that time.

Agreed.



Fair enough, I'll acceed to this for the sake of the argument.



This belief does not necessarily follow from the first two. If we accept that Stalin believed the outside powers to be an existential threat to the USSR, and if we accept that Stalin believed that it would eventually come down to an armed struggle even if he personally wished to avoid one*, then it is not beyond the realms of possibility to conclude that the inevitability of a war would result in a desire that the war for the existance of the USSR should be fought on Soviet terms, not terms of the other powers. Especially so when the 'annihilation by offense' military doctrine was the dominant one in the Soviet military/political circles, not Svechin's defensive doctrine which was purely militarily based.

*Those evil Capitalist regimes, you see, would start one regardless of Russia's peace-loving nature.

NTM

Again I see your point but I don't necessarily agree here, what was to stop a cold war scenario occurring, where the USSR and the rest of Europe would uneasily co-exist side by side? both would probably prepare for invasion and counter invasion, without necessarily ever committing to it. The USSR gave aid in the same way the USA did after the war, its possible Stalin hoped to transform Europes politics through wealth and technology, just as the USA wished to stabilise politics through the same.

pwd

Morality and mortality, in WW2:
Hitler killed about 20 million people, outside of combat I think.
Stalin killed beween 3 million and 60 people in executions and gulags.
Truman killed about quarter of a million people by ordering the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
The Japanese killed about 3 million Chinese civilians.
The British and Americans killed tens of thausands of civilians in the bombing of Dresden. They also destroyed a major cultural centre.

This list could probably continue quite a long way.

France and the British Commonwealth nations were the members of the Allies that declared war on the Axis nations before being directly attacked by them. The USA did not honour its alliance and stayed neutral. The Soviet Union actually wanted to ally with Germany, before the Germans launched a surprise attack on them. Maybe the second strongest potential German ally to be made an enemy.

Einstein

Hermione*

brianthebard wrote: »

I've cut posts on the topic of the USSR and Imperialism from the other WWII thread-the number of posts moved tells me I should've done this a lot earlier. If anyone feels their post is better suited to the old thread(or vice versa) please let me know. Mod.

I wondered what happened; I hit reply to one thread and replied in a different one! Thanks though - I was beginning to worry about off-topic posting.

Manic Moran wrote: »

I think in both Leninism and Stalinism there was a belief that it would eventually have to boil down to a military fight, which, pragmatically, would be best for the USSR to happen when it was most ready. There was no doubting that Stalin realised that the Red Army simply could not take on the Western forces until after the mass industrialisation was completed. Quoting him in 1931: " We are 50-100 years behind the leading countries. We must make up this distance in ten years. Either we do that or they will suppress us." (Fortunately, they got their ten years). From the military perspective, it seems that the difference between the two schools of thought was that under one doctrine, the military could be used as a catalyst to create and support the revolution of the proletariat in another country, and in the other it was a mindset of 'whether we can create a revolution or not, we will have to militarily destroy the opposition else they will destroy us." Perhaps a difference in intent, but for practical purposes, does the difference matter?

One of the main tenets of Stalinism was Socialism in One Country. Socialism in One Country (as the name suggests)was based on the theory that it was better to cement Communism within Russia and ignore external revolutions (there were a number of small revolutions in Europe between 1919 and 1921; they all failed). Trotsky was opposed to Socialism in One Country. He believed in the theory of permament revolution as the best method of securing Communism within Russia. Stalinism and Trotskyism are opposed to each other, as Stalin and Trotsky themselves were opposed to each other.

Manic Moran

I would draw your attention to the success of the "purely revolutionary" French First Republic in the late 18th/ early 19th century. From 1792 - 1801, the French Republic was attacked by a number of European kingdoms and withstood them all. So competent was this revolutionary army that they could spare men to send to Ireland in support of Wolfe Tone's revolution in 1798

I would counter that by looking at the first experiences into battle by the French revolutionary army in 1792, when they attempted to hop into the Austrian Netherlands. The results were, to put it mildly, disappointing. French military capability and successes in the subsequent years were due to no small measure simply due to the large size of the conscript army subsequently raised, and technically excellent equipment such as artillery. Now, granted, the technology available is nothing to do with revolutions, but it wasn't available to the Russians in the early 20th century.

The Red Army of a century later relied initially not on conscription but volunteerism. Whilst they did in common undertake basically a purge of the old officers who may have been politically unacceptable but did know their jobs, the French after their initial disasters decided to re-implement a proper command structure. The Russians were not quite so ammenable to the concept. After a failed experiment with 'komitetschina' (Decision-making by comittee) and the abolishment of ranks, they did attempt to reintegrate professionals as 'voenspetsy', "military specialists", but for fear of political unreliability never gave them the autonomy required for the military. The Bolsheviks learned their lesson from the French revolution of the 18th Century: Their revolution would not fail like the French one did, they would have a 'proper' revolutionary military of the (conscripted) people under a dual command structure including political commisars. The dual command system also is arguably the cause of the Russian defeat at Warsaw in 1920, given that Stalin, the political commisar of the excellent First Cavalry Division, wanted to capture Lvov for political reasons instead of supporting the attack at Warsaw as per Tukhachevsky's instructions. In the subsequent analysis (give this to the Russians, they've never been afraid to do an AAR), the voenspetsy dared to suggest that 'revolutionary elan is no substitute for a proper understanding of military science or the effective application of miliary art.'

Basically, the late 18th C French Army was revolutionary in title. But it wasn't really revolutionary in body. They maintained traditional structures and processes (albeit in a much simpler, less refined manner when they realised that attempting to follow complex 1791 doctrine didn't work with their non-professional forces). The Russians really did go for something revolutionary. And it really didn't work well with what they had.

NTM

McArmalite

Fratton Fred wrote: »

i believe that Clement Atlee should take the "Blame for Pakistan rather than Churchill.

Bit off topic, but I say that Mountbatten was more responsible for the partition of India with the creation of Pakistan and the resultant approximately 1 million killed and millions more refugees created.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partition_of_India#Mountbatten_Plan

Hookey

McArmalite wrote: »

Bit off topic, but I say that Mountbatten was more responsible for the partition of India with the creation of Pakistan and the resultant approximately 1 million killed and millions more refugees created.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partition_of_India#Mountbatten_Plan

Easy to blame the (rather thick) Louis Mountbatten, who was little more than a figurehead; Congress voted for it (in the teeth of Gandhi's objections) because they saw partition as the only solution, and the overwhelming majority of Muslims wanted it. The mess that came afterwards was all down to the Indians and Pakistanis.

MarchDub

You have to go back before this post war period to see the seeds of Indian partition being planted. It was actually during the World War II that partition essentially became inevitable. As British PM Churchill was a dedicated imperialist who couldn't think of ever granting India independence – he was also a racist who detested Indians. ("I hate Indians. They are a beastly people with a beastly religion.") He totally lost control of India under his watch.

During WWII Churchill drained India of money. India gave billions of pounds (hundreds of billions in today's figures) to financing the war, and two million Indian soldiers to fight. Churchill totally lacked respect for this contribution and refused to send wheat to alleviate the Bengal Famine of 1943. In fact he had his own “let them eat cake” moment when he sent a message in response for an appeal for help with “If there is no food, how come Gandhi isn’t dead yet”. Eventually the Brits did send food but the seeds of great bitterness were sown as 4 million people died.

What is important is not the what or how or why of this famine but that it happened under British rule and under the premiership of Churchill. It left enormous bitterness behind. Sound familiar?

More significantly [font=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Churchill's policy was to foster Hindu-Muslim antipathy to preserve British rule. [/font]The consequences of this policy would eventually lead to partition.

By the end of the war anti-British feeling was at a height in India, at which point a colonial problem had grown into a full blown call for independence. Those who came after Churchill were left to deal with the problem of division in India over a path forward.

Fratton Fred

MarchDub wrote: »

You have to go back before this post war period to see the seeds of Indian partition being planted. It was actually during the World War II that partition essentially became inevitable. As British PM Churchill was a dedicated imperialist who couldn't think of ever granting India independence – he was also a racist who detested Indians. ("I hate Indians. They are a beastly people with a beastly religion.") He totally lost control of India under his watch.

During WWII Churchill drained India of money. India gave billions of pounds (hundreds of billions in today's figures) to financing the war, and two million Indian soldiers to fight. Churchill totally lacked respect for this contribution and refused to send wheat to alleviate the Bengal Famine of 1943. In fact he had his own “let them eat cake” moment when he sent a message in response for an appeal for help with “If there is no food, how come Gandhi isn’t dead yet”. Eventually the Brits did send food but the seeds of great bitterness were sown as 4 million people died.

What is important is not the what or how or why of this famine but that it happened under British rule and under the premiership of Churchill. It left enormous bitterness behind. Sound familiar?

More significantly [font=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Churchill's policy was to foster Hindu-Muslim antipathy to preserve British rule. [/font]The consequences of this policy would eventually lead to partition.

By the end of the war anti-British feeling was at a height in India, at which point a colonial problem had grown into a full blown call for independence. Those who came after Churchill were left to deal with the problem of division in India over a path forward.

links? quotes?

Churchill is probably the most quoted admired man in British History, therefore, people will take every quote and action of his and create their own view on him. You should read some of the positive books written about him, rather than just the anti Churchill books.

Hookey

Fratton Fred wrote: »

links? quotes?

Churchill is probably the most quoted admired man in British History, therefore, people will take every quote and action of his and create their own view on him. You should read some of the positive books written about him, rather than just the anti Churchill books.

While I'm no follower of certain people's "everything the Brits did in the history of the world ever was bad, no exceptions" world view, there's no denying that Churchill didn't have a good word to say about India and Gandhi in particular (who he'd known about since their overlapping stays in South Africa).

On the other hand, I think there needs to be some back up about the UK milking India for funds during WWII, I was under the impression the opposite was the case, and the Bengal famine was at least as much an Indian-created problem as a British-one.

Finally, whether MarchDub likes it or not, it was ultimately the behaviour of Congress that led to partition; they thought Jinnah was a joke and so was the idea of Pakistan, but just like somewhere rather closer to home, they were busy building a sectarian system that failed to accommodate the main minority religion (even their flag was designed to appeal to Hindus, not Muslims) and ended up paying the price. And it their case its not like they hadn't seen salutary lessons from elsewhere in the British Empire (and beyond) by then.

MarchDub

Hookey wrote: »

Finally, whether MarchDub likes it or not, it was ultimately the behaviour of Congress that led to partition; they thought Jinnah was a joke and so was the idea of Pakistan, but just like somewhere rather closer to home, they were busy building a sectarian system that failed to accommodate the main minority religion (even their flag was designed to appeal to Hindus, not Muslims) and ended up paying the price. And it their case its not like they hadn't seen salutary lessons from elsewhere in the British Empire (and beyond) by then.

I actually agree with you - but I was not talking about where the "ultimate" decisions were made but the background that led up to them. The divide and conquer policies of the British Empire [and this was a well established policy throughout the empire] led to many divisions and political partitions- in many of the countries that they eventually were forced to leave.

We are now way off topic!

MarchDub

Fratton Fred wrote: »

links? quotes?

Churchill is probably the most quoted admired man in British History, therefore, people will take every quote and action of his and create their own view on him. You should read some of the positive books written about him, rather than just the anti Churchill books.

I am fully aware of the position that Churchill holds in British history - or I should say "held". I was an undergrad in history dept at a UK university and that was a real education for me knowing the part that he and his nefarious father, Randolph, had played in Irish history [he of the "Ulster will fight and Ulster will be right" chatter]. Talk about causes of partition!

My own work takes me into historical records and then I really got to see the man behind the myth. Churchill was for one thing - the perpetuation of the British Empire. He would go to any lengths to preserve that - and had little to no respect for those peoples who had been "conquered".

But now many British historians are taking a different look at Churchill. British historian Christopher Catherwood is a case in point. I went to a lecture given by him and he casts a very different light on the Churchill myth – blaming his myopic vision on many of today’s Middle East problems. So the “myth” of Churchill [mostly created by himself and his own –admittedly – tremendous power of narrative] is getting chipped away, slowly.

Again - way off topic but I did have to answer.

brianthebard

MarchDub wrote: »

I actually agree with you - but I was not talking about where the "ultimate" decisions were made but the background that led up to them. The divide and conquer policies of the British Empire [and this was a well established policy throughout the empire] led to many divisions and political partitions- in many of the countries that they eventually were forced to leave.

True, the division of Indian ethnic groups by Britain goes back at least as far as the Mutiny in the mid nineteenth century.

We are now way off topic!

It still relates to Imperialism in WWII. Just try and keep it focussed on that period.

Fratton Fred

brianthebard wrote: »

True, the division of Indian ethnic groups by Britain goes back at least as far as the Mutiny in the mid nineteenth century.

That's not strictly true.

The Division of Indian ethnic groups was exploited by the British (Or were the british used by the different ethnic groups?). the divisions were there long before the british came to India.

For example, Muslim Mughals had been executing Sikh's since Sikhism was created.

MarchDub

Hookey wrote: »

On the other hand, I think there needs to be some back up about the UK milking India for funds during WWII, I was under the impression the opposite was the case,

To more fully explain what I meant about money and imperialism. Money was at the heart of imperialism from its earliest roots – this applied to Ireland as it did to other parts of the empire. It was the earliest issue in Ireland very shorty after the initial incursions here in the twelfth century. In fact, the first parliament held in Dublin - at the end of the thirteenth century - was to discuss the wilful lack of tax payments by the Irish to the English treasury.

The British had been milking funds from India for decades and accelerated this after WWI. Taxation was endemic; land tax was enormous and the Salt Tax being one of the ongoing issues for the Independence movement. When Gandhi declared Indian Independence in 1930 he made this salt tax a target – but it continued until 1947. By the time of WWII Indian coffers were so reduced – but the taxes continued, money continued to leave India - that the British were forced to put money in so as to shore up India’s treasury. This was purely an ulterior action. One of the problems for the British was the enormous [British] Indian Army fighting in WWII – so much Indian money was leaving India that they had to be paid out of British funds - but the independence leaders [rightly] saw this financial input as debt, not a gift to India.

The fear for Indian leaders was that by the end of WWII India would be so far into debt to the British that they would face mountains of taxation that would go on forever. It all gave momentum to the push for independence. Britain itself was so broke as a result of two world wars that continuing to take on Indian resistance became impossible.

Fratton Fred

MarchDub wrote: »

To more fully explain what I meant about money and imperialism. Money was at the heart of imperialism from its earliest roots – this applied to Ireland as it did to other parts of the empire. It was the earliest issue in Ireland very shorty after the initial incursions here in the twelfth century. In fact, the first parliament held in Dublin - at the end of the thirteenth century - was to discuss the wilful lack of tax payments by the Irish to the English treasury.

The British had been milking funds from India for decades and accelerated this after WWI. Taxation was endemic; land tax was enormous and the Salt Tax being one of the ongoing issues for the Independence movement. When Gandhi declared Indian Independence in 1930 he made this salt tax a target – but it continued until 1947. By the time of WWII Indian coffers were so reduced – but the taxes continued, money continued to leave India - that the British were forced to put money in so as to shore up India’s treasury. This was purely an ulterior action. One of the problems for the British was the enormous [British] Indian Army fighting in WWII – so much Indian money was leaving India that they had to be paid out of British funds - but the independence leaders [rightly] saw this financial input as debt, not a gift to India.

The fear for Indian leaders was that by the end of WWII India would be so far into debt to the British that they would face mountains of taxation that would go on forever. It all gave momentum to the push for independence. Britain itself was so broke as a result of two world wars that continuing to take on Indian resistance became impossible.

I was aware of the contributions made by several princes to help out, but not of the rest. again, do you have any further reading?

MarchDub

Fratton Fred wrote: »

I was aware of the contributions made by several princes to help out, but not of the rest. again, do you have any further reading?

Are you asking for reading on India? If so, I would suggest “A History of Modern India 1480-1950" edited by Claude Makovits. It's considered to be an excellent study using contemporary available sources. I have a copy and like it - must confess I haven't read it cover to cover yet, just the parts that I wanted to explore first. Not sure how you will feel about what is said about Churchill...but it explores very well the fears that Indians had in WW II about their vulnerability to British rule and the amount of men and money that India contributed to the war effort.

For another perspective Indivar Kamtekar sees India and Imperialism from a purely class situation and gives some interesting insights. I have some of his papers but when I tried to search did not come up with anything other than sites that offered his work for sale. You could search yourself...

brianthebard

For an ecological perspective that takes in historical and economic analysis of Britain's exploitation of India, try This Fissured Land by Gadhil and Guha.

Fratton Fred

Will do. India is a fascinating country with a fascinating past (and present).

For the record, I am not a massive Churchill fan, but he was, without a doubt, the driving force behind British survival during WWII and beyond that, a vast amount of what he predicted was right. He was, for example, an advocat of home rule for not just Ireland but also Scotland and Wales. He saw this as a natural progression and the best way of keeping the UK together longer term. He also predicted that a hastened British withdrawel from India would result in bloodshed. It is also worth noting, for the record, that a big proportion of the blame for the Bengal famine lay with the people of India, not the British government. It was not the export of food that caused the shortage it was stockpiling by local traders looking to make a profit from a weakening supply chain, caused by the Japanese invasion of Burma.

Most people I have encountered knock Churchill not for his dated views of the Empire, but because when someone is held up on a pedestal like Churchill is, it is easy to try and knock him off.

Will we be hearing of Churchill gassing 20,000 kurds in this thread?

McArmalite

Fratton Fred wrote: »

links? quotes?

Churchill is probably the most quoted admired man in British History, therefore, people will take every quote and action of his and create their own view on him. You should read some of the positive books written about him, rather than just the anti Churchill books.

Yeah, the sort of ' Churchill the man who defaeted Germany and Japan and held Communism back all on his own ' sort of nonsense. Churchill had about as much to do with defeating Germany etc as the dog in the insurance adds.

Fratton Fred

McArmalite wrote: »

Yeah, the sort of ' Churchill the man who defaeted Germany and Japan and held Communism back all on his own ' sort of nonsense. Churchill had about as much to do with defeating Germany etc as the dog in the insurance adds.

links? quotes?

MarchDub

Fratton Fred wrote: »

For the record, I am not a massive Churchill fan, but he was, without a doubt, the driving force behind British survival during WWII and beyond that, a vast amount of what he predicted was right. He was, for example, an advocat of home rule for not just Ireland but also Scotland and Wales. He saw this as a natural progression and the best way of keeping the UK together longer term. He also predicted that a hastened British withdrawel from India would result in bloodshed.

I agree he was the driving force for the British - but that is what made him so reviled in other countries of the empire. He mowed down any attempts at independence of the "possessions" and was ruthless about it. His Black and Tans devastated Ireland.

Fratton Fred wrote: »

It is also worth noting, for the record, that a big proportion of the blame for the Bengal famine lay with the people of India, not the British government. It was not the export of food that caused the shortage it was stockpiling by local traders looking to make a profit from a weakening supply chain, caused by the Japanese invasion of Burma.

The causes of the Bengal famine are far more complex. Like any famine - including our own - there were a number of forces that came into play. The movement of food had been disrupted by the war. And remember the feeling among nationalists in India was this was a war that was "imposed" on India. The British had declared that India was at war - without consulting anyone in India.

There was no deficit in the rice harvest but the means of getting food to the hungry was a major issue. As a direct result of the war the system of transporting rice in the delta of eastern Bengal was disrupted. In fact it was totally eliminated by the British decision to destroy several thousand boats. This is described by an Indian historian as "a scotched earth policy with a view to preventing Japanese invasion". Hoarding was partly done also because of a fear of Japanese invasion and the lack of ability to transport part of the harvest. Prices soared - as they did in the Irish Famine. Common occurrence with a food shortage. Hundreds of thousands flocked toward Calcutta where they died.

The actual causes of famine are always complex but when the government in control does not respond quickly and decisively - it leaves great bitterness behind. The British were regarded in India as failing in this case.

Fratton Fred wrote: »

Most people I have encountered knock Churchill not for his dated views of the Empire, but because when someone is held up on a pedestal like Churchill is, it is easy to try and knock him off.

Not that easy - would that it were. Myths can be dangerous to future stability and used as reasons to perpetuate the myth of heroic military solutions.

mrtaylor1981

McArmalite wrote: »

Yeah, the sort of ' Churchill the man who defaeted Germany and Japan and held Communism back all on his own ' sort of nonsense. Churchill had about as much to do with defeating Germany etc as the dog in the insurance adds.

The Provo bigot trying to be funny and failing as usual. Churchill is a world respected and honoured political leader.

MiniDriver

MarchDub wrote: »

You have to go back before this post war period to see the seeds of Indian partition being planted. It was actually during the World War II that partition essentially became inevitable. As British PM Churchill was a dedicated imperialist who couldn't think of ever granting India independence – he was also a racist who detested Indians. ("I hate Indians. They are a beastly people with a beastly religion.") He totally lost control of India under his watch.

During WWII Churchill drained India of money. India gave billions of pounds (hundreds of billions in today's figures) to financing the war, and two million Indian soldiers to fight. Churchill totally lacked respect for this contribution and refused to send wheat to alleviate the Bengal Famine of 1943. In fact he had his own “let them eat cake” moment when he sent a message in response for an appeal for help with “If there is no food, how come Gandhi isn’t dead yet”. Eventually the Brits did send food but the seeds of great bitterness were sown as 4 million people died.

What is important is not the what or how or why of this famine but that it happened under British rule and under the premiership of Churchill. It left enormous bitterness behind. Sound familiar?

More significantly [font=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Churchill's policy was to foster Hindu-Muslim antipathy to preserve British rule. [/font]The consequences of this policy would eventually lead to partition.

By the end of the war anti-British feeling was at a height in India, at which point a colonial problem had grown into a full blown call for independence. Those who came after Churchill were left to deal with the problem of division in India over a path forward.

Hmmm. Well there's a lot more to the Bengal Famine than just Churchill hating Indians. His influence on it was not obviously good or bad. Leo Amery may be more worthy of scorn, but really the reasons for this particular famine are complex and strange. Like many famines, its cause was less an absence of food than the rumour of an absence (and subsequent hoarding).

If anyone wants to look at this seriously (instead of armchair finger-pointing) then Amartya Sen's "Poverty and Famines" is the definitive work: http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Sociology/Economic/?view=usa&ci=9780198284635

Sen actually lived through the famine and came to some very interesting conclusions. Some of them have been challenged more recently but this book did revolutionise the understanding of how famines occur and how they are often not related to the actual supply of food.