Imperialism during WWII and USSR's aims in the wars aftermath

Fratton Fred

MarchDub wrote: »

You said it! The only "moral" aspect of WWII was in the propaganda that spun and spun - especially afterwords. The documents now coming out of the archives of the Soviet Union, Poland and other "Iron Curtain" countries tell a very different story.

The "Allies" sold out Poland for one - the very reason given for the war, to "save" Poland got shelved and put aside. Poland, who fought alongside the allies, lost thousands in the war, were not even allowed to march in the victory parade in London in 1946. The Poles are rightfully very angry about this and how the "Allies" sold Poland at the end of the war. Churchill gave away large tracks of Polish land to the Soviets. Something that was hardly mentioned for fifty years. The massacre at Katyn is another event that got shoved under the carpet by the "Allies."

Morality? You can call WWII many things but a moral war it was not.

In hindsight it is very easy to judge. non of us can imagine what it was like to endure six years of total war. Yes, the Poles were sold out to an extent, but after six years at war with Nazi Germany, a war with Russia would have caused even more bloodshed and potentially could have had the unthinkable outcome of Russia controlling all of europe.

in terms of morals, I suggest we be a bit less judgemental.

brianthebard

Fratton Fred wrote: »

In hindsight it is very easy to judge. non of us can imagine what it was like to endure six years of total war. Yes, the Poles were sold out to an extent, but after six years at war with Nazi Germany, a war with Russia would have caused even more bloodshed and potentially could have had the unthinkable outcome of Russia controlling all of europe.

in terms of morals, I suggest we be a bit less judgemental.

So the price to be paid in liberating millions is to allow other millions to be subjugated? Yes it is easy to judge, and to an extent that's what history is about. We can't just sit back and reserve criticism because we weren't there and didn't know what it was like (maaaan). Historians must be critical in order to learn from the past.

Fratton Fred

brianthebard wrote: »

So the price to be paid in liberating millions is to allow other millions to be subjugated? Yes it is easy to judge, and to an extent that's what history is about. We can't just sit back and reserve criticism because we weren't there and didn't know what it was like (maaaan). Historians must be critical in order to learn from the past.

Surely context must come into it though.

WWIII breaking out right after WWII?

The Americans would have buggered off straight away and there would have been nothing to stop the Russians reaching the Atlantic in a matter of weeks. In that case, i doubt very much if irish neutrality would have been much of an issue.

What's the old saying, red or dead?

Fratton Fred

how in god's name did the allies create Stalin? he was in power long before WWII and the ground gained by the Soviets was down purely to the Russian war with Germany. If the west were not involved, eastern europe would still have ended up under Soviet control, or worse, Nazi.

there was no way that after WWII Britan, France and the US were going to go to war with Russia. The US was the only country with anything like the ability but they had no interest in european affairs and to an extent, why should they?

IIMII

Fratton Fred wrote: »

In hindsight it is very easy to judge. non of us can imagine what it was like to endure six years of total war. Yes, the Poles were sold out to an extent, but after six years at war with Nazi Germany, a war with Russia would have caused even more bloodshed and potentially could have had the unthinkable outcome of Russia controlling all of europe.

in terms of morals, I suggest we be a bit less judgemental.

I agree. The reality was that the Soviets held the ground in Poland at that time. What could the British have done, invaded? This whole idea of countries 'liberating' other counties is a misnomer.

Countries 'liberate' other countries in the interests of power. The Aliies liberated France, Holland etc to defeat Germany. Similarly when the French, Spanish and even the Pope tried to liberate Ireland from the English / British - these armys were promoting their own states, not on expeditions of liberation. More recently, the first Gulf war was about power (oil control), not about liberating Kuwait.

Any liberation of Poland was always going to be dependent on political nessessity. The only surprise is that people are surprised by that

Capt'n Midnight

Fratton Fred wrote:

The US was the only country with anything like the ability but they had no interest in european affairs and to an extent, why should they?

The only option would have been to nuke Moscow

IIRC at one stage half the Russian population was in German control, the death toll and military losses were staggering but there was no chance of Peace and Bread style settlement like handing over the Ukraine as happened in WWI.

The 1945 August Storm campaign by the Red Army in China / Korea would have given anyone pause for thought.

Japan forces
1,217,000 men,
5,360 artillery,
1,155 tanks,
1,800 aircraft,
1,215 vehicles
And in Manchukuo
another 200,000 men

While not first rate troops with the best equipment they got steamrollered, the Russian advance was so fast that they had to fly in fuel for the tanks. Logistical problems not suprising given there was a 3,000 mile front , and a US landing at Inchion prevented them taking the whole of Korea.

MarchDub

IIMII wrote: »

This whole idea of countries 'liberating' other counties is a misnomer.

Countries 'liberate' other countries in the interests of power. The Aliies liberated France, Holland etc to defeat Germany. Similarly when the French, Spanish and even the Pope tried to liberate Ireland from the English / British - these armys were promoting their own states, not on expeditions of liberation. More recently, the first Gulf war was about power (oil control), not about liberating Kuwait.

Any liberation of Poland was always going to be dependent on political nessessity. The only surprise is that people are surprised by that

That is precisely the point I am making. The whole basis for the war - the "liberation" of Poland from Germany was a lie and soon put aside at the end of the war. It was an imperial war fought for the benefit of each nation that participated and not a "good" war fought for pure morality.
Just like our more recent WMD war - the reasons for war are more often changed when the original "reason" or "justification" proves to be false.

As for context - we find much of that when we study the archival material. The cover up of Katyn by the Allies - hey, don't want that getting out. Within the context of the time they knew precisely why it had to be covered up and we ought certainly to judge their actions. The reluctance of any of the allies to help the Warsaw uprising - if Stalin doesn't like it then we don't move attitude. Within the context of the time there is overwhelming evidence that the allies time and time again overlooked Stalin's atrocities. Would have dinted the "good"image of the war.

As for Churchill and the carving up of Poland - within the context of the time that was his perennial solution to many issues and for the sake of world peace ought not to be overlooked and never repeated. Churchill remember gave us Pakistan, Iraq - and was involved in the carving up of Ireland [not to mention his great idea of the Black and Tans]. Thanks but I think there are lessons to be learned from history - and ignoring those lessons is beyond stupid, it is periolious.

brianthebard

Fratton Fred wrote: »

Surely context must come into it though.

WWIII breaking out right after WWII?

The Americans would have buggered off straight away and there would have been nothing to stop the Russians reaching the Atlantic in a matter of weeks. In that case, i doubt very much if irish neutrality would have been much of an issue.

What's the old saying, red or dead?

I'm not aware of any evidence that the USSR intended to take control of the whole of Europe, can you provide some?

Also to say the US were not interested in European affairs is clearly false, they were involved in the war, there was the marshall plan, and the cold war, all intimately linked to European affairs.

Fratton Fred

MarchDub wrote: »

That is precisely the point I am making. The whole basis for the war - the "liberation" of Poland from Germany was a lie and soon put aside at the end of the war. It was an imperial war fought for the benefit of each nation that participated and not a "good" war fought for pure morality.

how was it an imperial war? what exactly did Britain and France get out of it? both countries bent over backwards to avoid it. "Peace in our Time", remember?

Admittedly neither really cared too much about poland, they were more interested in preventing Hitler from taking over more and more territory unhindered and posing a potential threat to them, but there was nothing that Hitler was after that directly affected them, with the possible exception of Alsace lorraine.

MarchDub wrote: »

As for context - we find much of that when we study the archival material. The cover up of Katyn by the Allies - hey, don't want that getting out. Within the context of the time they knew precisely why it had to be covered up and we ought certainly to judge their actions. The reluctance of any of the allies to help the Warsaw uprising - if Stalin doesn't like it then we don't move attitude. Within the context of the time there is overwhelming evidence that the allies time and time again overlooked Stalin's atrocities. Would have dinted the "good"image of the war.

in fairness, there was a much bigger issue at the time, ie defeating Nazi germany.

MarchDub wrote: »

As for Churchill and the carving up of Poland - within the context of the time that was his perennial solution to many issues and for the sake of world peace ought not to be overlooked and never repeated. Churchill remember gave us Pakistan, Iraq - and was involved in the carving up of Ireland [not to mention his great idea of the Black and Tans]. Thanks but I think there are lessons to be learned from history - and ignoring those lessons is beyond stupid, it is periolious.

Poland wasn't carved up, Churchill had little or no control over what happened to it and i believe that Clement Atlee should take the "Blame for Pakistan rather than Churchill.

Fratton Fred

brianthebard wrote: »

I'm not aware of any evidence that the USSR intended to take control of the whole of Europe, can you provide some?

Also to say the US were not interested in European affairs is clearly false, they were involved in the war, there was the marshall plan, and the cold war, all intimately linked to European affairs.

The Soviets had the clear intention of spreading their influence. A war with the West would have meant Russian forces invading those areas. North Korea springs to mind. The US only adopted the marshall plan to prevent the spread of communism in europe, which was their biggest fear. They were initially reluctant to keep troops in europe until it became evident that Russia was a threat, they then adopted a plan to keep any Russian expansion within europe. it was a line of defence for them, no more.

MarchDub

Fratton Fred wrote: »

how was it an imperial war? what exactly did Britain and France get out of it? both countries bent over backwards to avoid it. "Peace in our Time", remember?

The biggest imperialist of them all was Churchill and he was literally gunning for war and wanted nothing to do with peace. I haven't got the document in front of me right now but there is a letter written by one of the cabinet wives -recently released - where Churchill is described as clicking his heels in delight at the declaration of war. War was an aphrodisiac for him and he was also furious at the idea of a powerful Germany - Nazi or no. Churchill was the supreme British imperialist who ironically did most to damage the British empire. You are right - the French and the Brits were stupid to get involved. They lost all that they had.

Fratton Fred wrote: »

Poland wasn't carved up, Churchill had little or no control over what happened to it and i believe that Clement Atlee should take the "Blame for Pakistan rather than Churchill.

Check your history - Churchill changed the Polish borders most significantly. He was the one who originally suggested this at the beginning of the war and it was his Polish border configuration which was adopted at the end. Poland lost a large chunk of her land to the Russians.

The following is from the PBS site on "Behind Closed Doors" -

"At the Potsdam conference in the summer of 1945, Great Britain, the United States, and the USSR agreed to new postwar borders for Poland as outlined by Churchill. The Polish people had no say in the matter. After the war, the borders of Poland were reshaped to the specifications set out at Potsdam, leading to a population shift on an enormous scale. While Stalin took Poland’s eastern territories, Poland itself was given “Regained Lands” in the west along the Baltic Coast and in Upper Silesia. In the end, Poland became twenty percent smaller."

http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/in-depth/struggle-poland.html

brianthebard

Fratton Fred wrote: »

The Soviets had the clear intention of spreading their influence.
A war with the West would have meant Russian forces invading those areas.

I'm sorry but that's an opinion, not evidence. I've never seen any concrete evidence that the Soviets intended to take over the whole of Europe, and unless you can provide some I don't think you're position is very strong.
If you can then great-if you can't then there's no basis for what you're saying.

North Korea springs to mind. The US only adopted the marshall plan to prevent the spread of communism in europe, which was their biggest fear. They were initially reluctant to keep troops in europe until it became evident that Russia was a threat, they then adopted a plan to keep any Russian expansion within europe. it was a line of defence for them, no more.

Reluctant, but already involved in Europe for several years at that stage. I'm not concerned with their goal, only in proving that you were incorrect to say they had no interest in European affairs, which I think it is clear at this stage that they had.

Manic Moran

Yes I did and also heard about the Stalin’s Gulags, the killing fields of Cambodia, etc. Were we supposed to declare war on the USSR and the Kymer Rouge also ??

There was no small school of thought in 1945 that, yes, it might well be in the best interests to keep going to Moscow (Especially once they had the A-Bomb). Of course, after six years of war in Europe, it was not a particularly appealing prospect, but what should be done, and what the voters want to be done are not necessarily going to be the same thing. The West's inaction in 1956 was not something soon forgotten by either side, for example.

NTM

Manic Moran

Surely the whole point of the bomb was to fight wars without having to risk thousands of lives in battle? If as you contend, any hundred lives saved by Ireland's participation is to be valued, why would thousands of lives be risked when America had a weapon like the Atomic bomb?

America didn't actually have many bombs (In 1945 they had built three, and two were used on Japan), so there wouldn't have been much choice but to go on a conventional level. Hence one very good reason for a pause. There would be no particular reason they couldn't drop more bombs on Russia to put them out of the picture in, say, 1946.

NTM

Hermione*

Manic Moran wrote: »

America didn't actually have many bombs (In 1945 they had built three, and two were used on Japan), so there wouldn't have been much choice but to go on a conventional level. Hence one very good reason for a pause. There would be no particular reason they couldn't drop more bombs on Russia to put them out of the picture in, say, 1946.

NTM

Indeed. This (the number of bombs) I was aware of, as I have studied the Manhattan Project, but thank you. Yet if you are quoting a school of thought which contends the Allies should have continued onto Moscow after WWII, obviously this would be occurring in 1945 - if not 1946, as we know the Russian winter is not kind to favouring armies and VE day was in May. VJ was not until September, and it is likely (at least arguable) that any attacks on Russia would not be until after the conclusion of the war in the Pacific. So, say in 1946, why would there be a need to go on a conventional level if "There would be no particular reason they couldn't drop more bombs on Russia to put them out of the picture in, say, 1946." This merely reinforces my previous point - that I think this school of thought must have been quite small. IMO, America would not have attacked Russia either on land or from the air after WWII.

Fratton Fred

brianthebard wrote: »

I'm sorry but that's an opinion, not evidence. I've never seen any concrete evidence that the Soviets intended to take over the whole of Europe, and unless you can provide some I don't think you're position is very strong.
If you can then great-if you can't then there's no basis for what you're saying.

the fact they never left any country they "Liberated" is surely proof enough? if the allies had declared war on Russia and lost, would Stalin have just decided that "fair enough, they fought, they lost" or would he have taken the opportunity to increase Soviet influence across the whole of europe. They certainly tried in Spain.

brianthebard wrote: »

Reluctant, but already involved in Europe for several years at that stage. I'm not concerned with their goal, only in proving that you were incorrect to say they had no interest in European affairs, which I think it is clear at this stage that they had.

The US wanted out of europe after the war, this was always their aim. when it became apparant that Russia was indeed a big threat they reluctantly stayed. OK, they had aninterest, but it was a reluctant one and self serving.

Fratton Fred

MarchDub wrote: »

The biggest imperialist of them all was Churchill and he was literally gunning for war and wanted nothing to do with peace. I haven't got the document in front of me right now but there is a letter written by one of the cabinet wives -recently released - where Churchill is described as clicking his heels in delight at the declaration of war. War was an aphrodisiac for him and he was also furious at the idea of a powerful Germany - Nazi or no. Churchill was the supreme British imperialist who ironically did most to damage the British empire. You are right - the French and the Brits were stupid to get involved. They lost all that they had.

that still doesn't explain how it was an imperialist war. also, if youcheck your history, the Anglo-Polish alliance was signed by Chamberlain and it was Chamberlain who declared war on Germany.

MarchDub wrote: »

Check your history - Churchill changed the Polish borders most significantly. He was the one who originally suggested this at the beginning of the war and it was his Polish border configuration which was adopted at the end. Poland lost a large chunk of her land to the Russians.

The following is from the PBS site on "Behind Closed Doors" -

"At the Potsdam conference in the summer of 1945, Great Britain, the United States, and the USSR agreed to new postwar borders for Poland as outlined by Churchill. The Polish people had no say in the matter. After the war, the borders of Poland were reshaped to the specifications set out at Potsdam, leading to a population shift on an enormous scale. While Stalin took Poland’s eastern territories, Poland itself was given “Regained Lands” in the west along the Baltic Coast and in Upper Silesia. In the end, Poland became twenty percent smaller."

http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/in-depth/struggle-poland.html

interesting debate on the same thing here


From the above

-Churchill alone pushed for free elections in Poland. The British leader pointed out that UK "could never be content with any solution that did not leave Poland a free and independent state". Stalin pledged to permit free elections in Poland, but eventually never honored his promise

your points would have credibility if you didn't have an obvious agenda.

MarchDub

Fratton Fred wrote: »

that still doesn't explain how it was an imperialist war. also, if youcheck your history, the Anglo-Polish alliance was signed by Chamberlain and it was Chamberlain who declared war on Germany.

I never suggested that Churchill actually signed the declaration of war - but it was widely known at the time that his was the voice most vocal in calling for it. He had been calling for greater British armament since 1933 - which is why on the actual declaration of war he was immediately put into the cabinet and soon after become the obvious choice for PM.

As for Poland and elections - the minutes of the meetings with the soviets [released in the 1990s] reveal that there was a naive assumption by both the Americans and the British that elections would be held - but when that became a non event they had to let it pass. Were they stupid or naive? One thing is certain they had as one of the “Allies” a guy as treacherous as Hitler and they didn’t want their own people to know this. Would have been bad for the narrative of the good war - and the continued support for it at home.

Churchill's rhetoric to the Polish Government in exile - and he was excellent at rhetoric - about standing by Poland and never allowing them to be overrun and being free and all the other palaver that you can find anytime you look up Churchill - came to absolutely nothing. Just empty words. But their important purpose was to keep the Poles with him in the British armed forces. But the Poles got ditched in the end. And that is my point – the “good” war came to a “bad” end. Wars frequently do – but the job of the “winners” is to spin it all out afterwards so they look like they held the moral high ground. Churchill himself said that this was what he would do - and he did. He wrote his memoirs with the expressed intention of making the allies effort look all good - with no blemishes - or only those few that he chose to reveal.

There is nothing new in how all this pans out – the history of Ireland is chock full of the fight over the Irish narrative. Time and time again, the English, later the British, wrote the history of events in Ireland to support their presence – and more importantly their continued occupation - on this island. It began with Giraldus Cambrensis and never stopped. Those who control the written record know that they control minds and out of that - the events.

Fratton Fred

MarchDub wrote: »

There is nothing new in how all this pans out – the history of Ireland is chock full of the fight over the Irish narrative. Time and time again, the English, later the British, wrote the history of events in Ireland to support their presence – and more importantly their continued occupation - on this island. It began with Giraldus Cambrensis and never stopped. Those who control the written record know that they control minds and out of that - the events.

This ^ is what I meant when I wrote this V

Fratton Fred wrote: »

your points would have credibility if you didn't have an obvious agenda.

How have you managed to turn a thread about Irish participation in WWII into a rant about Churchill?

MarchDub

Fratton Fred wrote: »

This ^ is what I meant when I wrote this V



How have you managed to turn a thread about Irish participation in WWII into a rant about Churchill?

You seem to be the one with the problem here – sorry if you don’t like what you are reading here about Churchill and have to – once again - get personal [nothing new for you] but I am sticking to the historic record and I continue to do so…

Ireland's relationship with Britain was at the heart of many political decisions made at the time. The generation of Irish living at the time had harsh memories of how Churchill behaved towards Ireland during the Tan War and during the Treaty negotiations. Churchill embodied the war for Britain – but he did also for Ireland. There was no support in independent Ireland for his imperialist world view.

Churchill attacked Ireland's neutrality in a speech in the most insulting terms at the end of the war – petty thing to do but a marker of how petty the man really was - to the point where de Valera felt it incumbent on himself to answer for the Irish nation. He did so in a radio address to Churchill in 1945 which the generation of Irish living at the time gave overwhelming support to. Copies of de Valera’s speech were made and given out as gifts for years after – even as late as the 1970s you could buy recordings of it in Dublin shops.

That is why – once again with feeling – any discussion about Ireland and WWII involves discussion on the relationship with Churchill and the duplicitous character he was.
Say what you will about Dev - the man had class and showed it when he had to answer Churchill's ungenerous attack on Ireland at the end of the war.

Hear Dev here...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=isNOQ3zQ2F0

brianthebard

Fratton Fred wrote: »

the fact they never left any country they "Liberated" is surely proof enough? if the allies had declared war on Russia and lost, would Stalin have just decided that "fair enough, they fought, they lost" or would he have taken the opportunity to increase Soviet influence across the whole of europe. They certainly tried in Spain.

No I'm afraid that is not proof at all. Please provide a source that shows they had actual plans to continue on past Germany?

The US wanted out of europe after the war, this was always their aim. when it became apparant that Russia was indeed a big threat they reluctantly stayed. OK, they had aninterest, but it was a reluctant one and self serving.

The reason why they had an interest was not of concern to me, only that they had one, which they did.

Hookey

brianthebard wrote: »

No I'm afraid that is not proof at all. Please provide a source that shows they had actual plans to continue on past Germany?

Other than the fact that World Communism was a stated Marxist-Leninist objective, its impossible to know Stalin's plans because the Russians only selectively open the archives. Interestingly, there is a Russian author called Viktor Suvorov who claims the Soviets were gearing up to attack Germany in 1941 when the Germans caught them on the hop. His supposition is based on Russian deployments, which were massed thinly along the border in an "attack" posture in June 1941. Because of this he claims they were unprepared when the Germans launched Barbarossa and the Germans quickly got behind them (hence their rapid gains and envelopments), whereas if they'd have been in a defensive posture they would have been arrayed in depth. No idea whether its horse**** or not, but its an interesting theory.

brianthebard

Hookey wrote: »

Other than the fact that World Communism was a stated Marxist-Leninist objective, its impossible to know Stalin's plans because the Russians only selectively open the archives.

Its not necessarily a Stalinist objective though. I take your point about the archives, but I've never seen any real evidence that Russia intended to expand into Western Europe after WWII.

Interestingly, there is a Russian author called Viktor Suvorov who claims the Soviets were gearing up to attack Germany in 1941 when the Germans caught them on the hop. His supposition is based on Russian deployments, which were massed thinly along the border in an "attack" posture in June 1941. Because of this he claims they were unprepared when the Germans launched Barbarossa and the Germans quickly got behind them (hence their rapid gains and envelopments), whereas if they'd have been in a defensive posture they would have been arrayed in depth. No idea whether its horse**** or not, but its an interesting theory.

Interesting theory indeed but I would think that Stalin's decimation of the officer class in the army would have not have been part of this plan.

Hookey

brianthebard wrote: »

Its not necessarily a Stalinist objective though. I take your point about the archives, but I've never seen any real evidence that Russia intended to expand into Western Europe after WWII.

Not in the Stalin era, they did have more concrete invasion plans in the sixties and these have been confirmed in the archives. Of course I'm sure NATO had similar plans.

brianthebard wrote: »

Interesting theory indeed but I would think that Stalin's decimation of the officer class in the army would have not have been part of this plan.

That action defied logic even if the Soviet position was a purely defensive one. Or rather it defied logic from an outsider's perspective. I'm sure it made perfect sense to Stalin.

Capt'n Midnight

Fratton Fred wrote: »

the fact they never left any country they "Liberated" is surely proof enough?

Did they enter Greece ?

They left China , Iran and Austria.

Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, (and Finland) and much of Poland were Russian a generation previously so French and British keeping their empires would not have as much moral high ground there.

Hookey

The weird thing is that FDR had a blind spot about the Soviets. He couldn't see that the Soviet Union was an empire as well. FDR's view seemed be that if you didn't need a boat to travel around it, it wasn't an empire.

brianthebard

Hookey wrote: »

The weird thing is that FDR had a blind spot about the Soviets. He couldn't see that the Soviet Union was an empire as well. FDR's view seemed be that if you didn't need a boat to travel around it, it wasn't an empire.

Though not as bad as McCarthy and some who followed him, I'm sure FDR wanted to see the dissolution of the USSR? A lot of people wouldn't really consider the USSR in imperical terms until after WWI-well I wouldn't anyways.

MarchDub

brianthebard wrote: »

Though not as bad as McCarthy and some who followed him, I'm sure FDR wanted to see the dissolution of the USSR? A lot of people wouldn't really consider the USSR in imperical terms until after WWI-well I wouldn't anyways.

Yes, FDR would have had a pre WWII world view. He saw imperialism as a colonial land grab issue and the European empires as holding people hostage to their own [British, French, Belgium...] economic interests. His vision was of a world free of the colonial powers with open and free trade and the US playing the dominant role. The emergence of the USSR as a super power was all in the future.

brianthebard

You're right and I hope it didn't seem like I thought he should've been able to see the rise of the USSR as a superpower.

Fratton Fred

I'm not sure if FDR was blind to the USSR or just obsessed with setting up the UN. Initially he agreed to each of the states having their own vote in the UN, so the USSR could originally have had 14 votes, this was later reduced to just 2. FDR's obsession with setting up the UN as his legacy was one of the reasons Stalin ran amok at the Yalta conference..

getz

MarchDub wrote: »

Yes, FDR would have had a pre WWII world view. He saw imperialism as a colonial land grab issue and the European empires as holding people hostage to their own [British, French, Belgium...] economic interests. His vision was of a world free of the colonial powers with open and free trade and the US playing the dominant role. The emergence of the USSR as a super power was all in the future.

up to ww11 the usa still had designs on canada,and could not understand why they flew the union flag. they had tried to invade canada and the canadians had beaten them.people in canada are very proud of that,i know i am off topic

Manic Moran

jonsnow wrote: »

Ireland just did what every other small nation attempted to do in Europe during World War Two and remain neutral.I think it was something like twenty eight countries tried this approach but must were eventually embroiled in the maelstrom.We were lucky and skillful enough to avoid the war and should make no apologies for it.If superpowers like the United States wanted to avoid the conflict then we could hardly be blamed when our intervention wouldn,t make much difference to the outcome but our nation could have suffered terribly.

Which, I think, should indicate the futility of the approach. The war can come to you whether you want it to or not, and you should plan accordingly. Even if you're one of the largest, most industrialised and geographically isolated (and theoretically safest) nations on Earth. Relying on 'luck' as a national strategy is not something I would encourage.

I take your point about the archives, but I've never seen any real evidence that Russia intended to expand into Western Europe after WWII.

The Red Army was always viewed as an instrument of implementing revolution in the world, from its very beginning in the attempts to spread the revolutionary ideal by military force in Poland in the 1920s. That was the first indication that purely revolutionary armies were militarily fairly incompetent (i.e. the Poles won), so in the late 20s/early 30s the Red Army was kept busy by being used to forcefully implement revolution in the USSR whilst the higher echelons tried to figure out how to combine a competent military force with revolutionary ideals. The history of the Red Army in the interwar period was far more complicated than the perception of "There was a competent military until Stalin shot the officers." There was no reason not to believe that the only reason that the USSR had stopped attempting to conquer their way to world communism as one method was simply the realisation earned by experience that the military was not up to scratch to do so yet. By the time the war had ended in 1945, the Red Army had fixed itself and it again had become a viable option. I do note that to my knowledge there is no hard evidence to indicate that the Russians did intend to continue the conflict to the West in the mid-late '40s, but that does not eliminate the issue that such a move would be in keeping with the historical ideals of the USSR and the Red Army to that point.

Because of this he claims they were unprepared when the Germans launched Barbarossa and the Germans quickly got behind them (hence their rapid gains and envelopments), whereas if they'd have been in a defensive posture they would have been arrayed in depth. No idea whether its horse**** or not, but its an interesting theory

There is a kernel of truth behind the statement, but I think he draws the wrong conclusion. There was a schism at the highest levels of the grand strategy pundits, between those like General Svechin who believed that the best way for the USSR to win a war against the European powers was a defensive war of attrition, and those such as General Shaposhnikov who believed that the political value and impact of an offensive war of annihiliation was the better course. The problem is that Svechin was a 'traditional' officer, apolitical, whilst Shaposhnikov saw the military and politcs as intertwined: In his opinion, by its very nature as a revolutionary force the Red Army was required to use its offensive elan. Of course, the more politically 'attuned' people tended to curry more favour with Leadership, so the 'offense is the best form of defense' school of thought ended up being predominant for a while, with the troop deployments made accordingly. That is distinct from the pre-emptive strike idea, however, and was simply a preparation for an immediate counter-offensive in the event that the Germans struck first. The only proposal I'm aware of for a pre-emptive strike into Germany was made by General Vasilevsky, Zhukov's deputy, but it was not endorsed by either Zhukov or Timoshenko: The Red Army simply needed more time to amass equipment.

Interesting theory indeed but I would think that Stalin's decimation of the officer class in the army would have not have been part of this plan

Not really. The officer purge was started by a German double-agent named Skoblin, who put it to the NKVD that Tukhachevsky (who generally fell in with Svechin) and his associates were planning a coup. The purge tended to nail the senior officers who advocated the space-for-time strategy, not the offensive strategy so if a pre-emptive start was being considered, the purge would not have actually removed many of its advocates.

NTM

brianthebard

Manic Moran wrote: »

The Red Army was always viewed as an instrument of implementing revolution in the world, from its very beginning in the attempts to spread the revolutionary ideal by military force in Poland in the 1920s. That was the first indication that purely revolutionary armies were militarily fairly incompetent (i.e. the Poles won), so in the late 20s/early 30s the Red Army was kept busy by being used to forcefully implement revolution in the USSR whilst the higher echelons tried to figure out how to combine a competent military force with revolutionary ideals. The history of the Red Army in the interwar period was far more complicated than the perception of "There was a competent military until Stalin shot the officers." There was no reason not to believe that the only reason that the USSR had stopped attempting to conquer their way to world communism as one method was simply the realisation earned by experience that the military was not up to scratch to do so yet. By the time the war had ended in 1945, the Red Army had fixed itself and it again had become a viable option. I do note that to my knowledge there is no hard evidence to indicate that the Russians did intend to continue the conflict to the West in the mid-late '40s, but that does not eliminate the issue that such a move would be in keeping with the historical ideals of the USSR and the Red Army to that point.

This post makes the very large assumption that there was no difference between Leninism, Trotskyism and Stalinism, which is clearly not the case. The first two were most likely to pursue a perpetual revolution, the latter was not. There is no evidence to suggest that the USSR intended to conquer western europe.

Manic Moran

This post makes the very large assumption that there was no difference between Leninism, Trotskyism and Stalinism, which is clearly not the case. The first two were most likely to pursue a perpetual revolution, the latter was not.

Granted, but I'm not sure that from the military point of view the difference isn't all that academic. (I tend to focus a lot more on military than political things) To quote the Stalin-leaning Frunze: "Between our proletarian state and the rest of the bourgeois world there can be only one condition - that of a long, persistent, depserate war to the death" and all military thinking was directed towards the eventual resumption of the Struggle by force of arms. I think Stalin's shift towards the concept of "collective security" after the failed attempt to destabilise Germany politically in the early 1930s was really just a reflection of the realisation of the limitations of the military as demonstrated during the attempted use of the Army to force collectivisation in 1929-1930: The military simply could not be depended on to do its jobs.

I think in both Leninism and Stalinism there was a belief that it would eventually have to boil down to a military fight, which, pragmatically, would be best for the USSR to happen when it was most ready. There was no doubting that Stalin realised that the Red Army simply could not take on the Western forces until after the mass industrialisation was completed. Quoting him in 1931: " We are 50-100 years behind the leading countries. We must make up this distance in ten years. Either we do that or they will suppress us." (Fortunately, they got their ten years). From the military perspective, it seems that the difference between the two schools of thought was that under one doctrine, the military could be used as a catalyst to create and support the revolution of the proletariat in another country, and in the other it was a mindset of 'whether we can create a revolution or not, we will have to militarily destroy the opposition else they will destroy us." Perhaps a difference in intent, but for practical purposes, does the difference matter?

NTM

brianthebard

I agreed with you up to this;

From the military perspective, it seems that the difference between the two schools of thought was that under one doctrine, the military could be used as a catalyst to create and support the revolution of the proletariat in another country, and in the other it was a mindset of 'whether we can create a revolution or not, we will have to militarily destroy the opposition else they will destroy us." Perhaps a difference in intent, but for practical purposes, does the difference matter?

Even within your own statement its clear there is a difference between aggressive and defensive posturing. Stalin's very first policy was for the USSR to exist-that is what the five year plans were about, that's what his attempted destruction of Germany was about. Its not entirely clear when or if he ever intended to expand the revolution out of the USSR afaik. I certainly believe that the supposed threat to Western Europe from the USSR was not real.

Manic Moran

Even within your own statement its clear there is a difference between aggressive and defensive posturing.

Posturing, intent and capability are all functionally independent. The most important of those three are intent and capabilty as they have nothing to do with posturing. (Indeed, this was driven into Stalin in 1941 when Germany failed to manufacture the expected casus belli and simply drove into the USSR, to hell with appearances). Until the end of the War, the capability did not exist, regardless of intent, making even intent irrelevant, be it publicised by posturing or not.

Stalin's very first policy was for the USSR to exist-that is what the five year plans were about, that's what his attempted destruction of Germany was about.

Agreed.

Its not entirely clear when or if he ever intended to expand the revolution out of the USSR afaik.

Fair enough, I'll acceed to this for the sake of the argument.

I certainly believe that the supposed threat to Western Europe from the USSR was not real.

This belief does not necessarily follow from the first two. If we accept that Stalin believed the outside powers to be an existential threat to the USSR, and if we accept that Stalin believed that it would eventually come down to an armed struggle even if he personally wished to avoid one*, then it is not beyond the realms of possibility to conclude that the inevitability of a war would result in a desire that the war for the existance of the USSR should be fought on Soviet terms, not terms of the other powers. Especially so when the 'annihilation by offense' military doctrine was the dominant one in the Soviet military/political circles, not Svechin's defensive doctrine which was purely militarily based.

*Those evil Capitalist regimes, you see, would start one regardless of Russia's peace-loving nature.

NTM

brianthebard

I've cut posts on the topic of the USSR and Imperialism from the other WWII thread-the number of posts moved tells me I should've done this a lot earlier. If anyone feels their post is better suited to the old thread(or vice versa) please let me know. Mod.

Hermione*

Manic Moran wrote: »

Which, I think, should indicate the futility of the approach. The war can come to you whether you want it to or not, and you should plan accordingly. Even if you're one of the largest, most industrialised and geographically isolated (and theoretically safest) nations on Earth. Relying on 'luck' as a national strategy is not something I would encourage.

While I do think one should apply a greater strategic thinking than luck to national defense, neutrality seems to have remarkably successful for the Swiss. Also, when the war came to Ireland and the North Strand was bombed, Germany apologised.

Manic Moran wrote: »

The Red Army was always viewed as an instrument of implementing revolution in the world, from its very beginning in the attempts to spread the revolutionary ideal by military force in Poland in the 1920s. That was the first indication that purely revolutionary armies were militarily fairly incompetent.

I would draw your attention to the success of the "purely revolutionary" French First Republic in the late 18th/ early 19th century. From 1792 - 1801, the French Republic was attacked by a number of European kingdoms and withstood them all. So competent was this revolutionary army that they could spare men to send to Ireland in support of Wolfe Tone's revolution in 1798.

brianthebard wrote: »

Manic Moran wrote: »

The Red Army was always viewed as an instrument of implementing revolution in the world, from its very beginning in the attempts to spread the revolutionary ideal by military force in Poland in the 1920s. That was the first indication that purely revolutionary armies were militarily fairly incompetent (i.e. the Poles won), so in the late 20s/early 30s the Red Army was kept busy by being used to forcefully implement revolution in the USSR whilst the higher echelons tried to figure out how to combine a competent military force with revolutionary ideals. The history of the Red Army in the interwar period was far more complicated than the perception of "There was a competent military until Stalin shot the officers." There was no reason not to believe that the only reason that the USSR had stopped attempting to conquer their way to world communism as one method was simply the realisation earned by experience that the military was not up to scratch to do so yet. By the time the war had ended in 1945, the Red Army had fixed itself and it again had become a viable option. I do note that to my knowledge there is no hard evidence to indicate that the Russians did intend to continue the conflict to the West in the mid-late '40s, but that does not eliminate the issue that such a move would be in keeping with the historical ideals of the USSR and the Red Army to that point.

This post makes the very large assumption that there was no difference between Leninism, Trotskyism and Stalinism, which is clearly not the case. The first two were most likely to pursue a perpetual revolution, the latter was not. There is no evidence to suggest that the USSR intended to conquer western europe.

The very point I was going to make. While Communism was feared by Western governments in the 1920s and 1930s, that was more to do with the fact that most of them had active Communist parties in their country. It was not a fear of the Red Army, which was only feared after its exploits in World War II. Stalinism was not concerned with a perpetual revolution. Bear in mind that a very large part of Poland was governed by Russia between 1795-1917 (Poland did not exist during this period but was divided between three Empires). Russia exercised a strong policy of Russification in its Polish territories during this time to further diminish Polish claims of statehoodp. It is likely that Russians of the 1920s and 1930s did not see Poland as an independent state, but rather land which should be part of Russia.

brianthebard

Manic Moran wrote: »

Posturing, intent and capability are all functionally independent. The most important of those three are intent and capabilty as they have nothing to do with posturing. (Indeed, this was driven into Stalin in 1941 when Germany failed to manufacture the expected casus belli and simply drove into the USSR, to hell with appearances). Until the end of the War, the capability did not exist, regardless of intent, making even intent irrelevant, be it publicised by posturing or not.

I see your point. I used the word posturing because even though Lenin perhaps wanted to spread revolution, it was clearly beyond the USSR's capacity at that time.

Agreed.



Fair enough, I'll acceed to this for the sake of the argument.



This belief does not necessarily follow from the first two. If we accept that Stalin believed the outside powers to be an existential threat to the USSR, and if we accept that Stalin believed that it would eventually come down to an armed struggle even if he personally wished to avoid one*, then it is not beyond the realms of possibility to conclude that the inevitability of a war would result in a desire that the war for the existance of the USSR should be fought on Soviet terms, not terms of the other powers. Especially so when the 'annihilation by offense' military doctrine was the dominant one in the Soviet military/political circles, not Svechin's defensive doctrine which was purely militarily based.

*Those evil Capitalist regimes, you see, would start one regardless of Russia's peace-loving nature.

NTM

Again I see your point but I don't necessarily agree here, what was to stop a cold war scenario occurring, where the USSR and the rest of Europe would uneasily co-exist side by side? both would probably prepare for invasion and counter invasion, without necessarily ever committing to it. The USSR gave aid in the same way the USA did after the war, its possible Stalin hoped to transform Europes politics through wealth and technology, just as the USA wished to stabilise politics through the same.

pwd

Morality and mortality, in WW2:
Hitler killed about 20 million people, outside of combat I think.
Stalin killed beween 3 million and 60 people in executions and gulags.
Truman killed about quarter of a million people by ordering the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
The Japanese killed about 3 million Chinese civilians.
The British and Americans killed tens of thausands of civilians in the bombing of Dresden. They also destroyed a major cultural centre.

This list could probably continue quite a long way.

France and the British Commonwealth nations were the members of the Allies that declared war on the Axis nations before being directly attacked by them. The USA did not honour its alliance and stayed neutral. The Soviet Union actually wanted to ally with Germany, before the Germans launched a surprise attack on them. Maybe the second strongest potential German ally to be made an enemy.

Einstein

Hermione*

brianthebard wrote: »

I've cut posts on the topic of the USSR and Imperialism from the other WWII thread-the number of posts moved tells me I should've done this a lot earlier. If anyone feels their post is better suited to the old thread(or vice versa) please let me know. Mod.

I wondered what happened; I hit reply to one thread and replied in a different one! Thanks though - I was beginning to worry about off-topic posting.

Manic Moran wrote: »

I think in both Leninism and Stalinism there was a belief that it would eventually have to boil down to a military fight, which, pragmatically, would be best for the USSR to happen when it was most ready. There was no doubting that Stalin realised that the Red Army simply could not take on the Western forces until after the mass industrialisation was completed. Quoting him in 1931: " We are 50-100 years behind the leading countries. We must make up this distance in ten years. Either we do that or they will suppress us." (Fortunately, they got their ten years). From the military perspective, it seems that the difference between the two schools of thought was that under one doctrine, the military could be used as a catalyst to create and support the revolution of the proletariat in another country, and in the other it was a mindset of 'whether we can create a revolution or not, we will have to militarily destroy the opposition else they will destroy us." Perhaps a difference in intent, but for practical purposes, does the difference matter?

One of the main tenets of Stalinism was Socialism in One Country. Socialism in One Country (as the name suggests)was based on the theory that it was better to cement Communism within Russia and ignore external revolutions (there were a number of small revolutions in Europe between 1919 and 1921; they all failed). Trotsky was opposed to Socialism in One Country. He believed in the theory of permament revolution as the best method of securing Communism within Russia. Stalinism and Trotskyism are opposed to each other, as Stalin and Trotsky themselves were opposed to each other.

Manic Moran

I would draw your attention to the success of the "purely revolutionary" French First Republic in the late 18th/ early 19th century. From 1792 - 1801, the French Republic was attacked by a number of European kingdoms and withstood them all. So competent was this revolutionary army that they could spare men to send to Ireland in support of Wolfe Tone's revolution in 1798

I would counter that by looking at the first experiences into battle by the French revolutionary army in 1792, when they attempted to hop into the Austrian Netherlands. The results were, to put it mildly, disappointing. French military capability and successes in the subsequent years were due to no small measure simply due to the large size of the conscript army subsequently raised, and technically excellent equipment such as artillery. Now, granted, the technology available is nothing to do with revolutions, but it wasn't available to the Russians in the early 20th century.

The Red Army of a century later relied initially not on conscription but volunteerism. Whilst they did in common undertake basically a purge of the old officers who may have been politically unacceptable but did know their jobs, the French after their initial disasters decided to re-implement a proper command structure. The Russians were not quite so ammenable to the concept. After a failed experiment with 'komitetschina' (Decision-making by comittee) and the abolishment of ranks, they did attempt to reintegrate professionals as 'voenspetsy', "military specialists", but for fear of political unreliability never gave them the autonomy required for the military. The Bolsheviks learned their lesson from the French revolution of the 18th Century: Their revolution would not fail like the French one did, they would have a 'proper' revolutionary military of the (conscripted) people under a dual command structure including political commisars. The dual command system also is arguably the cause of the Russian defeat at Warsaw in 1920, given that Stalin, the political commisar of the excellent First Cavalry Division, wanted to capture Lvov for political reasons instead of supporting the attack at Warsaw as per Tukhachevsky's instructions. In the subsequent analysis (give this to the Russians, they've never been afraid to do an AAR), the voenspetsy dared to suggest that 'revolutionary elan is no substitute for a proper understanding of military science or the effective application of miliary art.'

Basically, the late 18th C French Army was revolutionary in title. But it wasn't really revolutionary in body. They maintained traditional structures and processes (albeit in a much simpler, less refined manner when they realised that attempting to follow complex 1791 doctrine didn't work with their non-professional forces). The Russians really did go for something revolutionary. And it really didn't work well with what they had.

NTM

McArmalite

Fratton Fred wrote: »

i believe that Clement Atlee should take the "Blame for Pakistan rather than Churchill.

Bit off topic, but I say that Mountbatten was more responsible for the partition of India with the creation of Pakistan and the resultant approximately 1 million killed and millions more refugees created.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partition_of_India#Mountbatten_Plan

Hookey

McArmalite wrote: »

Bit off topic, but I say that Mountbatten was more responsible for the partition of India with the creation of Pakistan and the resultant approximately 1 million killed and millions more refugees created.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partition_of_India#Mountbatten_Plan

Easy to blame the (rather thick) Louis Mountbatten, who was little more than a figurehead; Congress voted for it (in the teeth of Gandhi's objections) because they saw partition as the only solution, and the overwhelming majority of Muslims wanted it. The mess that came afterwards was all down to the Indians and Pakistanis.

MarchDub

You have to go back before this post war period to see the seeds of Indian partition being planted. It was actually during the World War II that partition essentially became inevitable. As British PM Churchill was a dedicated imperialist who couldn't think of ever granting India independence – he was also a racist who detested Indians. ("I hate Indians. They are a beastly people with a beastly religion.") He totally lost control of India under his watch.

During WWII Churchill drained India of money. India gave billions of pounds (hundreds of billions in today's figures) to financing the war, and two million Indian soldiers to fight. Churchill totally lacked respect for this contribution and refused to send wheat to alleviate the Bengal Famine of 1943. In fact he had his own “let them eat cake” moment when he sent a message in response for an appeal for help with “If there is no food, how come Gandhi isn’t dead yet”. Eventually the Brits did send food but the seeds of great bitterness were sown as 4 million people died.

What is important is not the what or how or why of this famine but that it happened under British rule and under the premiership of Churchill. It left enormous bitterness behind. Sound familiar?

More significantly [font=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Churchill's policy was to foster Hindu-Muslim antipathy to preserve British rule. [/font]The consequences of this policy would eventually lead to partition.

By the end of the war anti-British feeling was at a height in India, at which point a colonial problem had grown into a full blown call for independence. Those who came after Churchill were left to deal with the problem of division in India over a path forward.

Fratton Fred

MarchDub wrote: »

You have to go back before this post war period to see the seeds of Indian partition being planted. It was actually during the World War II that partition essentially became inevitable. As British PM Churchill was a dedicated imperialist who couldn't think of ever granting India independence – he was also a racist who detested Indians. ("I hate Indians. They are a beastly people with a beastly religion.") He totally lost control of India under his watch.

During WWII Churchill drained India of money. India gave billions of pounds (hundreds of billions in today's figures) to financing the war, and two million Indian soldiers to fight. Churchill totally lacked respect for this contribution and refused to send wheat to alleviate the Bengal Famine of 1943. In fact he had his own “let them eat cake” moment when he sent a message in response for an appeal for help with “If there is no food, how come Gandhi isn’t dead yet”. Eventually the Brits did send food but the seeds of great bitterness were sown as 4 million people died.

What is important is not the what or how or why of this famine but that it happened under British rule and under the premiership of Churchill. It left enormous bitterness behind. Sound familiar?

More significantly [font=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Churchill's policy was to foster Hindu-Muslim antipathy to preserve British rule. [/font]The consequences of this policy would eventually lead to partition.

By the end of the war anti-British feeling was at a height in India, at which point a colonial problem had grown into a full blown call for independence. Those who came after Churchill were left to deal with the problem of division in India over a path forward.

links? quotes?

Churchill is probably the most quoted admired man in British History, therefore, people will take every quote and action of his and create their own view on him. You should read some of the positive books written about him, rather than just the anti Churchill books.

Hookey

Fratton Fred wrote: »

links? quotes?

Churchill is probably the most quoted admired man in British History, therefore, people will take every quote and action of his and create their own view on him. You should read some of the positive books written about him, rather than just the anti Churchill books.

While I'm no follower of certain people's "everything the Brits did in the history of the world ever was bad, no exceptions" world view, there's no denying that Churchill didn't have a good word to say about India and Gandhi in particular (who he'd known about since their overlapping stays in South Africa).

On the other hand, I think there needs to be some back up about the UK milking India for funds during WWII, I was under the impression the opposite was the case, and the Bengal famine was at least as much an Indian-created problem as a British-one.

Finally, whether MarchDub likes it or not, it was ultimately the behaviour of Congress that led to partition; they thought Jinnah was a joke and so was the idea of Pakistan, but just like somewhere rather closer to home, they were busy building a sectarian system that failed to accommodate the main minority religion (even their flag was designed to appeal to Hindus, not Muslims) and ended up paying the price. And it their case its not like they hadn't seen salutary lessons from elsewhere in the British Empire (and beyond) by then.

MarchDub

Hookey wrote: »

Finally, whether MarchDub likes it or not, it was ultimately the behaviour of Congress that led to partition; they thought Jinnah was a joke and so was the idea of Pakistan, but just like somewhere rather closer to home, they were busy building a sectarian system that failed to accommodate the main minority religion (even their flag was designed to appeal to Hindus, not Muslims) and ended up paying the price. And it their case its not like they hadn't seen salutary lessons from elsewhere in the British Empire (and beyond) by then.

I actually agree with you - but I was not talking about where the "ultimate" decisions were made but the background that led up to them. The divide and conquer policies of the British Empire [and this was a well established policy throughout the empire] led to many divisions and political partitions- in many of the countries that they eventually were forced to leave.

We are now way off topic!

MarchDub

Fratton Fred wrote: »

links? quotes?

Churchill is probably the most quoted admired man in British History, therefore, people will take every quote and action of his and create their own view on him. You should read some of the positive books written about him, rather than just the anti Churchill books.

I am fully aware of the position that Churchill holds in British history - or I should say "held". I was an undergrad in history dept at a UK university and that was a real education for me knowing the part that he and his nefarious father, Randolph, had played in Irish history [he of the "Ulster will fight and Ulster will be right" chatter]. Talk about causes of partition!

My own work takes me into historical records and then I really got to see the man behind the myth. Churchill was for one thing - the perpetuation of the British Empire. He would go to any lengths to preserve that - and had little to no respect for those peoples who had been "conquered".

But now many British historians are taking a different look at Churchill. British historian Christopher Catherwood is a case in point. I went to a lecture given by him and he casts a very different light on the Churchill myth – blaming his myopic vision on many of today’s Middle East problems. So the “myth” of Churchill [mostly created by himself and his own –admittedly – tremendous power of narrative] is getting chipped away, slowly.

Again - way off topic but I did have to answer.

brianthebard

MarchDub wrote: »

I actually agree with you - but I was not talking about where the "ultimate" decisions were made but the background that led up to them. The divide and conquer policies of the British Empire [and this was a well established policy throughout the empire] led to many divisions and political partitions- in many of the countries that they eventually were forced to leave.

True, the division of Indian ethnic groups by Britain goes back at least as far as the Mutiny in the mid nineteenth century.

We are now way off topic!

It still relates to Imperialism in WWII. Just try and keep it focussed on that period.

Fratton Fred

brianthebard wrote: »

True, the division of Indian ethnic groups by Britain goes back at least as far as the Mutiny in the mid nineteenth century.

That's not strictly true.

The Division of Indian ethnic groups was exploited by the British (Or were the british used by the different ethnic groups?). the divisions were there long before the british came to India.

For example, Muslim Mughals had been executing Sikh's since Sikhism was created.