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Dawkins vs Sartre/ existentialism vs biological determinism
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12-09-2019 1:58am#1I'd like to clarify from the outset that I don't subscribe to Dawkins' hard-line views of genetic determinism. I'm just using him as an appropriately extreme example of biological deterministic scientists - in reality, probably the vast majority of biologists in academia.
On the other hand, I have for years been attracted to Sartre's writing on existentialism and freedom - especially emotional freedom/ emotion as strategy in Bad Faith.
The more Sartre's Theory of Emotion was ridiculed, the more. I convinced myself that this was a predictable response from people clinging to myths about themselves and their unwillingness to accept personal responsibility.
Lately, however, Sartre's Sketch on emotions seems incapable of withstanding the scientific criticism that is implied by biological determinism ("BD"). Whilst both existentialism and BD express doubts, or reject, the idea of "consciousness", BD has convincingly rubbished very idea of Free Will, a basic and necessary element of existentialism which has been consigned to the dustbin of superstition.
The idea is - and it is difficult to reject - that human beings are, in fact, prisoners of our biology or (per Dawkins), our genes. Free will is a myth we tell ourselves, it is belief our ability to act with freedom that lacks any scientific or reasonable basis.
Am I wrong? I'd hate to think that I finally persevered through BEING AND NOTHINGNESS for no good reason. How can this conclusion be avoided?0
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It seems to me that the quick-and-dirty objection to absolute biological determinism is this: it doesn't correspond with our observations or experiences. We observe and experience ourselves to be making choices all the time.
"Ah", you may say, "but this may be illusory."
Indeed it may. But one of the fundamental axioms of the scientific method is that our empirical observations are not illusory; they are not are not delusions; there is an objective external reality and our observations and experiences meaningfully correspond to it. If this is not so, then we can never learn anything objectively true by observation or experimentation.
Of course, we can't prove that this is so, since any attempted proof that this is so must rely on observations and experiments whose validity, as a mathod of proof, depends on it being so. Thus, circular reasoning. So, instead, the meanignfulness and significance of our observations and experiences is one of the axioms on which the scientific method depends. And arguing that our experience of choice is, in reality, delusional and does not correspond to exertnal reality is a direct attack on that axiom and, therefore, on the whole of the scentific method.0 -
What is freedom and free will? Is it a feeling, a belief that’s defined by how we act? (Algorithms that can predict our behavior?!) Surely every decision made by people can be traced back to some sort of learned behavior, experience or bias? Probably influenced greatly by culture and communities. But if you have, for example 3 different possibilities and you choose one, surely that’s free will if you choice is informed and won’t necessarily always be the same (can be cultivated through growth and I suppose manipulation).
People who isolate themselves - depression = prison , Solitude - freedom and choosing to be free
People who conform to the norms without questioning anything - willing prisoners? Free will to be ignorant?
People who challange conformity - free if they genuinely don’t get upset with ignorance or pushback - prison if they allow society to undermine their own efforts to objectively challange norms
Is freedom not a mindset or a feeling? As somebody who suffers from depression and anxiety I certainly know what I consider “freedom” and to a degree “free will”. People in horrible situations (nazi camp) that managed to survive or retain hope, freedom of the mind?
Personally when I feel like anything is possible in my life but I am content with just believing this , being content with my life and not actually feeling like the need to act on it, I feel free. Kind of a gratitude of sorts because there is no desire for anything other then the now which is absolute freedom. Choosing to accept this truth at that moment is free will in my opinion because there are so many alternate competing options, just choosing the now is freedom from bondage. Im rejecting my instincts (anxiety/depression) in favour of freedom that often alludes me.
Edit: thinking of Buddhism and meditation, isn’t freedom just being able to accept that life just is, it doesn’t really matter what it’s about or freedom or free will. Just accepting life as is, is freedom.
Incidentally I do find philosophy very interesting subject but I find the way people talk in this forum a barrier to discussions. I don’t have an education in this area and perhaps it’s because many of you do and you don’t want to engage people who you feel might not be serious about it. I’m not looking to offend, Maybe I’m not clever enough to take up this subject but I’d rather be honest about how I feel when writing here then to pretend I understand everything.0 -
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You introduce several complex and interesting discussion points Miltiades. Given my limitations at the moment, I will attempt to touch upon one or two, and return later when time permits.A Tyrant Named Miltiades! wrote: »Lately, however, Sartre's Sketch on emotions seems incapable of withstanding the scientific criticism that is implied by biological determinism ("BD").
This position of biological determinism appears to be solidly on the Nature side of the Nature vs nurture argument. Some may question if nurture was biologically determined too?A Tyrant Named Miltiades! wrote: »Whilst... BD express doubts, or reject, the idea of "consciousness", BD has convincingly rubbished very idea of Free Will.
The philosophical origins of "consciousness," and alternatively unconsciousness, have been confounded. Some have claimed that St Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274) suggested that unconscious processing occurred in his theory of mind way before Friedrich Schelling, Sigmund Freud, Carl Gustav Jung, or more poetically Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Obviously the works of Freud and Jung greatly popularized these concepts, but unfortunately both of these psychiatrists based their researches on prescientific case study analyses, and as in the case of Freud committed an ecological fallacy by leaping from individual level cases to social populations in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930).
Behaviorists like BF Skinner in his Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971), or in his more scientifically based Cumulative Record (1961), would also suggest that free will was myth, and that humans were a product of their Nature and environment. Unlike hard line biological determinists, behaviourists tended to include both Nature and nurture in their models; but nurture with considerable limitations in definition, content, and context.A Tyrant Named Miltiades! wrote: »The idea is - and it is difficult to reject - that human beings are, in fact, prisoners of our biology or (per Dawkins), our genes. Free will is a myth we tell ourselves, it is belief our ability to act with freedom that lacks any scientific or reasonable basis.0 -
It has? In the relevant sciences, neurology and genetics being two, there is still back and forth discussions on whether Free Will exists and to what extent. I don't think it has been convincingly rubbished in any sense.A Tyrant Named Miltiades! wrote: »BD has convincingly rubbished very idea of Free Will0 -
A Tyrant Named Miltiades! wrote: »
The idea is - and it is difficult to reject - that human beings are, in fact, prisoners of our biology or (per Dawkins), our genes. Free will is a myth we tell ourselves, it is belief our ability to act with freedom that lacks any scientific or reasonable basis.
Am I wrong? I'd hate to think that I finally persevered through BEING AND NOTHINGNESS for no good reason. How can this conclusion be avoided?
I’m not sure what you’re saying here, in the final chapter of The Selfish Gene, Dawkins argues that we are not slaves to our genes.0 -
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An example of Bad Faith? Or what?A Tyrant Named Miltiades! wrote: »The more Sartre's Theory of Emotion was ridiculed, the more. I convinced myself that this was a predictable response from people clinging to myths about themselves and their unwillingness to accept personal responsibility.
For Jean-Paul Sartre consciousness allows the world to be perceived. Challenges Immanuel Kant's phenomena and noumena dualism. Where Kant contended that there were things that existed yet to be perceived, in any case they still existed. Satre countered that only those things that were consciously perceived existed. But new things could be added should they appear. Makes me wonder about this subtle distinction between Satre and Kant, or how similar and different it might be? Where Kant was more an objective materialist that some biological determinists may identify with, Satre's consciousness seemed to differentiate humans from Richard Dawkins' biologically driven animals that exhibited no consciousness.A Tyrant Named Miltiades! wrote: »Sartre's Sketch ... the idea of "consciousness" ... idea of Free Will, a basic and necessary element of existentialism0 -
Can you name any biologists who believe in the concept of free will?It has? In the relevant sciences, neurology and genetics being two, there is still back and forth discussions on whether Free Will exists and to what extent. I don't think it has been convincingly rubbished in any sense.
Stanford Professor Robert Sapolsky is seen as a moderate, and even he is unequivocal on the non-existence of free will. Scientists can accept that which is observable or can be inferred -- where is this free will? Describe it?Black Swan wrote: »You introduce several complex and interesting discussion points Miltiades. Given my limitations at the moment, I will attempt to touch upon one or two, and return later when time permits.
This position of biological determinism appears to be solidly on the Nature side of the Nature vs nurture argument. Some may question if nurture was biologically determined too?
I don't know of any biologist who rejects the idea of nurture (let's say environment, instead) -- but they add (to the genetic theory) a biochemical dimension -- now I'm a slave to my coffee withdrawal and my genes. They believe in the interaction of genetics and the physiocal/ biochemical world as being in control of who we are and what we do.Unlike hard line biological determinists, behaviourists tended to include both Nature and nurture in their models; but nurture with considerable limitations in definition, content, and context.
Of course, maybe we're not slaves to our genes, in the sense that our genes give us some latitude -- I can sit inside for lunch or I can choose to go for a walk. I can choose my words in replying to you -- or can I? How much of what I am writing is interdependent on my biology, my metabolism, all the combined physical structures of my body?I’m not sure what you’re saying here, in the final chapter of The Selfish Gene, Dawkins argues that we are not slaves to our genes.
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/Many scientists say that the American physiologist Benjamin Libet demonstrated in the 1980s that we have no free will. It was already known that electrical activity builds up in a person’s brain before she, for example, moves her hand; Libet showed that this buildup occurs before the person consciously makes a decision to move. The conscious experience of deciding to act, which we usually associate with free will, appears to be an add-on, a post hoc reconstruction of events that occurs after the brain has already set the act in motion.0 -
First note Neuronal determinism does not imply a negation of Free Will (Compatibilism).A Tyrant Named Miltiades! wrote: »Can you name any biologists who believe in the concept of free will?
Anyway Adina Roskies is an example of a biologist. However in general I don't like to cite proponents of ideas for scientific issues. People can not believe in an issue and yet contribute papers that cast doubt on what they believe.
Libet's original studies that started the "No Free Will" in a big way in neurology are being criticised in the last few years as not showing what Libet claimed. This lack of conclusivity to experiments is much more important than what people believe.
Humans don't seem to be predictable in many scenarios. That's an observable fact. To claim that this unpredictability can be removed by detailed knowledge of neuronal tissue is itself a conjecture that is not observed or inferrable from what is currently known.A Tyrant Named Miltiades! wrote: »Scientists can accept that which is observable or can be inferred -- where is this free will? Describe it?
There's no onus on one side in particular here. Demonstrating Free Will involves showing the unpredictability cannot be removed, showing it false requires showing it can.
We know the most fundamental levels of reality are autonomous/free, so it wouldn't be completely unprecedented in science for something to be "Free".0 -
By referring to Libet's "claims" being since "criticised" you almost make it sound as if this research has become less credible over time.Libet's original studies that started the "No Free Will" in a big way in neurology are being criticised in the last few years as not showing what Libet claimed. This lack of conclusivity to experiments is much more important than what people believe.
In fact, it's the other way around. Libet's research was originally far more controversial than it is today. The basic thrust of his observations -- that ostensibly free choices are in fact determined by neural activity before the subject is conscious of having made a 'choice' -- has been reproduced in subsequent research. The concept of scientific/ biological determinism has never been less controversial.
As an aside, I find it very interesting that much of the criticism of LIbet's work, and criticism of biological determinism itself, seems almost to dwell on why BD should not be true, or mustn't be true, because of the moral consequences for human society. Obviously, there's more intelligent criticism than that out there, but it is surprising that so many commentators seem to posit that 'this mustn't be true because that would be terrible'.
Even if they don't state their opposition in such brute language, it's difficult to avoid the conclusion that some people are in opposition to the concept of biological determinism because, well, they'd rather it weren't real.
What do you mean by the sentence "We know the most fundamental levels of reality are autonomous/free"? Can you expand on that?Humans don't seem to be predictable in many scenarios. That's an observable fact. To claim that this unpredictability can be removed by detailed knowledge of neuronal tissue is itself a conjecture that is not observed or inferrable from what is currently known.
There's no onus on one side in particular here. Demonstrating Free Will involves showing the unpredictability cannot be removed, showing it false requires showing it can.
We know the most fundamental levels of reality are autonomous/free, so it wouldn't be completely unprecedented in science for something to be "Free".
Because it reads to me like you might actually be referring there to randomness. We know that biology can be random -- random gene mutation is the obvious example. It may very well be that our choices are governed by random processes as well as biological onces -- but random phenomena are equally as incompatible with freedom as determinism is.
You also say "there is no onus on one side here". It reminds me of something Adina Roskies wrote, that neuroscientists haven't managed to prove that there isn't a free will. That's an amazing statement, which I would think is akin to saying "well biologists haven't proven that there isn't a soul, or an omniscient God, so I'm going to retain my belief in one"
There is no scientific evidence in favour of autonomous human freedom -- certainly not of the type proposed by Sartre, which is the specific type of freedom I'm referring to here. It seems increasingly necessary to view that kind of libertarianism as a myth or a superstition.0 -
That's not my reading of the neurological literature. Libet's work was originally criticised and then became accepted more during the 1990s. Since the mid-2000s further studies have been done that have left the state of the whole area more complex and confusing with no clear conclusions.By referring to Libet's "claims" being since "criticised" you almost make it sound as if this research has become less credible over time.
In fact, it's the other way around. Libet's research was originally far more controversial than it is today. The basic thrust of his observations -- that ostensibly free choices are in fact determined by neural activity before the subject is conscious of having made a 'choice' -- has been reproduced in subsequent research. The concept of scientific/ biological determinism has never been less controversial.
Those might be the criticisms outside neurology but not within. The criticisms within neurology have mostly been about what the timings are correlated with, other studies showing the ambiguity of sensory processing, how you extract correlations from a temporal series and other technical issues.As an aside, I find it very interesting that much of the criticism of LIbet's work, and criticism of biological determinism itself, seems almost to dwell on why BD should not be true, or mustn't be true, because of the moral consequences for human society
Humans having Free Will is just as in line with the evidence as the alternative. Human predictability is quite low in many circumstances. I don't want to get too technical here, but some of our choices break what are known as the CHSH inequalities, which are very hard to explain with determinism. There have been experiments attempting to track us in basic tasks where the probability distributions don't tighten even after repeated sampling. Just currently the evidence is not clearly in favour of either direction. There are things that support both views to some degree. Wiki says it well enough:You also say "there is no onus on one side here". It reminds me of something Adina Roskies...
There is no scientific evidence in favour of autonomous human freedomThe field remains highly controversial. The significance of findings, their meaning, and what conclusions may be drawn from them is a matter of intense debate. The precise role of consciousness in decision making and how that role may differ across types of decisions remains unclear
It's just an open issue with no clear conclusion yet. I don't think it's like arguing for God or spirits, there are things in line with it.
Subatomic systems' behaviour is not controlled by other physical facts. Thus what they do seems autonomous from other physical systems. This is not the same as the popular conception of randomness.What do you mean by the sentence "We know the most fundamental levels of reality are autonomous/free"? Can you expand on that?
Because it reads to me like you might actually be referring there to randomness0 -
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As the boundaries of knowledge in neuroscience are pushed further out, it is entirely to be expected for the landscape of knowledge should grow more complex, like a blind man regaining his sight. When in the process of scientific discovery doesn't that happen? I don't see how growing complexity can be used to refute the studies that have reproduced Libet's work.That's not my reading of the neurological literature. Libet's work was originally criticised and then became accepted more during the 1990s. Since the mid-2000s further studies have been done that have left the state of the whole area more complex and confusing with no clear conclusions.
There are valid criticisms of Libet and subsequent related research, their methodologies and how they drew conclusions, of course.
So lets ignore Libet for a moment and return to basic human reasoning involving a real life case-study.
We know that neurochemical and anatomical changes in the brain cause massive changes in our behaviour. Charles Whitman is a classic example. Whitman led a normal, humdrum life -- until one day he killed 16 people including members of his own family, whom he loved. Whitman asked for his brain to be examined after his suicide, and eventually a panel of medical experts affirmed that Whitman's behaviour was due to a tumour disrupting neural processes in his amygdala, which is widely cited as a reason for his extraordinary, violent behaviour.
This is nothing new; for well over a century, the legal system has recognised how neurological disorders can cause a killer to be not guilty for their crime.
A person suffering with clinical depression who is prescribed the correct type and dosage of an SSRI/ SNRI will usually have their systems relieved, to the point where their personality may change altogether.
If I go out tonight and consume MDMA, I'll be more friendly and empathetic.
The materialistic/ deterministic concept of human behaviour is visible to all of us, every day. If you don't have enough glucose in your blood, you're likely to be lethargic and unable to focus. If you have elevated testosterone, you're more likely to get in a fight.
Knowing this, then even if Libet et al. had never conducted their research into brain activity and conscious decision-making, we should still be extremely skeptical about some invisible, quasi mystical 'driving force' within our brains (souls?), when we know that we are constantly doing strange things because of our biochemistry and neuroanatomy which, in retrospect, can cause us surprise or alarm that we behaved in those ways.
No, it isn't. There is literally no scientific evidence for the existence of free will.Humans having Free Will is just as in line with the evidence as the alternative. Human predictability is quite low in many circumstances.
In fact, the trend in neuroscience over the past 100 years or so, has been to increasingly demonstrate biological reasons for human behaviour.
It is only in the past 70 years or so we've even known about ADHD, the biochemistry of depression, schizophrenia, and even epilepsy. 30 years ago we didn't even know about various personality disorders, now we know they have a genetic component, as does alcoholism. The march of biology is moving in a very clear direction, and it isn't favouring the omnipotent humunculus.
Why would quantum indeterminacy be relevant here? It shows unpredictability, for sure, but that's not necessarily at odds with biological determinism. The fact that we cannot predict (or understand) aspects of our brain doesn't cause us to resort to "Oh well it must be my mystical free will instead"Subatomic systems' behaviour is not controlled by other physical facts. Thus what they do seems autonomous from other physical systems. This is not the same as the popular conception of randomness.
To return to the OP and the topic at hand, at the very least, developments in neuroscience and biology should cause people to question a lot of things about our species, but most relevantly for the purposes of this discussion, it raises serious doubts about a lot of the writing of Sartre and other existentialists, but especially Sartre.0 -
I never said the complexity itself was refutation. It was that there were no clear conclusions from the current state of the field. That's not a refutation either. The point is that there is no reasonably solid refutation of either position. If you read monographs on the subject that is essentially what they say, that the results are inconclusive. At no point is simply the complexity invoked as a refutation.As the boundaries of knowledge in neuroscience are pushed further out, it is entirely to be expected for the landscape of knowledge should grow more complex, like a blind man regaining his sight. When in the process of scientific discovery doesn't that happen? I don't see how growing complexity can be used to refute the studies that have reproduced Libet's work.
Experts say it is not conclusive:and eventually a panel of medical experts affirmed that Whitman's behaviour was due to a tumour
Again something inconclusive.Wiki wrote:During the autopsy, Chenar discovered a "pecan-sized" brain tumor,[58] which he labeled an astrocytoma and which exhibited a small amount of necrosis. Chenar concluded that the tumor had no effect on Whitman's actions. These findings were later revised by the Connally Commission: "It is the opinion of the task force that the relationship between the brain tumor and Charles J. Whitman's actions on the last day of his life cannot be established with clarity."
This is a false dichotomy. The options are not between total biochemical determinism or a supernatural soul/magic force. Nobody would argue that biochemistry affects our behaviour and that our control over our actions can be diminished in various circumstances. It is a leap though to go from this to total biochemical determinism.Knowing this, then even if Libet et al. had never conducted their research into brain activity and conscious decision-making, we should still be extremely skeptical about some invisible, quasi mystical 'driving force' within our brains (souls?), when we know that we are constantly doing strange things because of our biochemistry and neuroanatomy which, in retrospect, can cause us surprise or alarm that we behaved in those ways.
There is scientific evidence both for the fact that our actions are not predictable in advance and evidence against. You cannot just declare the case closed in contradiction to the academic views on the subject. I gave an example of humans breaking statistical inequalities hard to square with determinism.No, it isn't. There is literally no scientific evidence for the existence of free will.
Can you provide a scientific reference that states clearly that Free Will has been refuted in the opinion of the neurological community?
Again these don't demonstrate an absence of Free Will. Of course neurology has found biological reasons for human behaviour. You are again contrasting total biochemical dependence with magic souls. Nobody is advocating magic souls. There are several other concepts such as top-down causation or emergence. Completely physical/naturalist explanations that permit Free Will.In fact, the trend in neuroscience over the past 100 years or so, has been to increasingly demonstrate biological reasons for human behaviour.
It is only in the past 70 years or so we've even known about ADHD, the biochemistry of depression, schizophrenia, and even epilepsy. 30 years ago we didn't even know about various personality disorders, now we know they have a genetic component, as does alcoholism. The march of biology is moving in a very clear direction, and it isn't favouring the omnipotent humunculus.
I never said it was. I gave it as an example in science where freedom/autonomy exists with no reference to magic or supernatural events.Why would quantum indeterminacy be relevant here? It shows unpredictability, for sure, but that's not necessarily at odds with biological determinism.
However note some people do think it is relevant. Can you explain why it's not at odds with biological determinism? It's not an easy argument to make in my experience involving subtle effects like decoherence.
Again this is strawmanning. Nobody is talking about "mystical" stuff. I also never said we have to resort to saying there is Free Will.The fact that we cannot predict (or understand) aspects of our brain doesn't cause us to resort to "Oh well it must be my mystical free will instead"
What I am saying is that the field is currently inconclusive. Not that there is Free Will. And certainly not that if there were it would be a "mystical" force0 -
Not refutation perhaps, but you appear to be suggesting that growing complexity (again, to be expected) is contributing to discrediting Libet et al.I never said the complexity itself was refutation.
I don't take issue with people criticising methodology or specific conclusions -- Libet did that himself, as I'm sure you're aware. I'm a bit puzzled as to how the growing complexity can be a problem -- it's not as if the added complexity is pointing instead towards a little humunculus.
Said. In 1966. Back then, the amydala was vaguely linked to fear, but scientists weren't at all sure of what the amygdala did. To my knowledge, it wasn't until the last 30-35 years that we've known about its relationship with aggression.Experts say it is not conclusive:
You're referencing a quote from people who believed in the efficacy of (and were probably performing) lobotomies. I'm talking about contemporary observations of Whitman's tumour.
It's a bigger leap to go to the mystical concept of Free Will.
This is a false dichotomy. The options are not between total biochemical determinism or a supernatural soul/magic force. Nobody would argue that biochemistry affects our behaviour and that our control over our actions can be diminished in various circumstances. It is a leap though to go from this to total biochemical determinism.A Tyrant Named Miltiades! wrote:Knowing this, then even if Libet et al. had never conducted their research into brain activity and conscious decision-making, we should still be extremely skeptical about some invisible, quasi mystical 'driving force' within our brains (souls?), when we know that we are constantly doing strange things because of our biochemistry and neuroanatomy which, in retrospect, can cause us surprise or alarm that we behaved in those ways.
All opinions are not equal. I'm not attempting to establish a false dichotomy, I'm simply suggesting that even ignoring Libet et al, ignoring Dawkins (yes, please lets), even a layman's knowledge of science should cause them to be skeptical about the idea of a Free Will compared to a biological explanation for human behaviours.
First we learned about the frontal lobe, then we found out about schizophrenia, then we discovered dyslexia, and autism, and ADHD, and personality disorders -- and suddenly what do we have? A growing picture where our behaviours are increasingly demonstrated to be biological and/or genetically heritable.
That's the point. I'm not saying it's proof, I'm asking that you consider the direction of the evidence.
No. I don't have the resources to do a survey on this. I just haven't ever come across a biologist who believes in a metaphysical kind of free will, of the kind that Sartre believed to be true (which was, after all, the point of this thread)Can you provide a scientific reference that states clearly that Free Will has been refuted in the opinion of the neurological community?
Well the obvious answer to that is that you cannot rule out some unknown deterministic processes underlying quantum mechanics. All we can talk about for sure is unpredictability -- and even a hard determinist would agree that human behaviour, although obeying material laws, is unpredictable.However note some people do think it is relevant. Can you explain why it's not at odds with biological determinism? It's not an easy argument to make in my experience involving subtle effects like decoherence.0 -
No as I said it is the lack of a consensus or clear conclusions. I'm not even really sure what complexity contributing to discrediting would mean. Regardless it's not the complexity.Not refutation perhaps, but you appear to be suggesting that growing complexity (again, to be expected) is contributing to discrediting Libet et al.
No they still aren't conclusive:Said. In 1966...
https://www.dailytexanonline.com/2016/07/30/experts-still-disagree-on-role-of-tower-shooters-brain-tumor
Once again nobody is claiming a mystical version of Free Will.It's a bigger leap to go to the mystical concept of Free Will
"Be skeptical about" is fine and I'm not arguing that. Conclude it's false though is not supported by neuroscience.cause them to be skeptical about the idea of a Free Will
The current evidence in totality has no clear direction, that's the problem. There is evidence in both directions. In both cases however the relevant studies are performed on low sample groups with poor control often leading to poor p-values, which themselves only manifest after certain priors are assumed. I've dug into one of the major "no free will" papers before. I could explain how weak its statistics actually are if you want. This also applies to pro-Free Will papers.That's the point. I'm not saying it's proof, I'm asking that you consider the direction of the evidence
This can be a function of reading things at the popular science level. There are many neurologists and scientists with ideas including top down causation and emergence that are compatible with what Sartre spoke about. It's just all the writing is at a very technical level and requires an understanding of emergence and complex systems. There's plenty of debates in science that unfortunately don't filter down to general books.No. I don't have the resources to do a survey on this. I just haven't ever come across a biologist who believes in a metaphysical kind of free will, of the kind that Sartre believed to be true (which was, after all, the point of this thread)
That has been ruled out. Conclusively.Well the obvious answer to that is that you cannot rule out some unknown deterministic processes underlying quantum mechanics0 -
You're the one who raised the issue of increasing complexity. You said "further studies have been done that have left the state of the whole area more complex and confusing" -- what, then did you mean by that?No as I said it is the lack of a consensus or clear conclusions. I'm not even really sure what complexity contributing to discrediting would mean. Regardless it's not the complexity.
You cannot have meant that the question has become more confused/ complex because of discoveries in favour of some invisible, unobserved Free Will which lacks any scientific explanation, so what then?
Have you read the article you cite?No they still aren't conclusive:
https://www.dailytexanonline.com/201...rs-brain-tumor
One of the people who doubted the relevance of Whitman's tumour doubted that the tumour even existed -- this is patent nonsense, it was grossly identifiable. To believe that, you'd have to posit that the medical experts were unable to distinguish a tumour from brain tissue. The other (far more reasonable) criticism was that Whitman's behaviour was exacerbated by his traumatic early childhood -- which is totally compatible with a deterministic view.
It can't be though, can it, in principle. Asking you to disprove "Bohmian mechanics", however ridiculous, is like asking a scientist to prove that free will doesn't exist.Fourier wrote:
That has been ruled out. Conclusively.A Tyrant Named Miltiades wrote:Well the obvious answer to that is that you cannot rule out some unknown deterministic processes underlying quantum mechanics0 -
That the field has not converged toward a consensus.A Tyrant Named Miltiades! wrote: »You're the one who raised the issue of increasing complexity. You said "further studies have been done that have left the state of the whole area more complex and confusing" -- what, then did you mean by that?
There have been facts found that are more easily explained via lack of determinism. I have already stated that most researchers who suggest Free Will do so via naturalistic explanations like top down causation, emergence, ontological structural realist theories and so on. Constantly characterising it as mystic/magical with no scientific explanation is just not correct.You cannot have meant that the question has become more confused/ complex because of discoveries in favour of some invisible, unobserved Free Will which lacks any scientific explanation, so what then?
Yes.Have you read the article you cite?
It shows doubt about the tumour being the cause. That's all I was contending. I'm not saying it proves Free Will or something. Of course there are explanations compatible with determinism. However it's not a shutcase either as "childhood" is much more nebulous than a direct physical cause like a tumour.
It has. Bohmian mechanics cannot replicate relativistic particle decays. It has particle number as a conserved quantity.It can't be though, can it, in principle. Asking you to disprove "Bohmian mechanics", however ridiculous, is like asking a scientist to prove that free will doesn't exist.0 -
Peregrinus wrote: »It seems to me that the quick-and-dirty objection to absolute biological determinism is this: it doesn't correspond with our observations or experiences. We observe and experience ourselves to be making choices all the time.
"Ah", you may say, "but this may be illusory."
Indeed it may. But one of the fundamental axioms of the scientific method is that our empirical observations are not illusory; they are not are not delusions; there is an objective external reality and our observations and experiences meaningfully correspond to it. If this is not so, then we can never learn anything objectively true by observation or experimentation.
Of course, we can't prove that this is so, since any attempted proof that this is so must rely on observations and experiments whose validity, as a mathod of proof, depends on it being so. Thus, circular reasoning. So, instead, the meanignfulness and significance of our observations and experiences is one of the axioms on which the scientific method depends. And arguing that our experience of choice is, in reality, delusional and does not correspond to exertnal reality is a direct attack on that axiom and, therefore, on the whole of the scentific method.
A different perspective of our experience can be arrived at through the practice of meditation, which is essentially the practice of examining ones experience. We can see how little control we actually exhibit over our internal processes.0 -
Just on the issue of the Libet experiments. This is a tweet from Sam Harris on the topic:
https://twitter.com/SamHarrisOrg/status/1172175513671987200?s=190 -
I've recently rekindled my interest in the question of Free Will, so it's great to see a thread on the topic here.
From my recent egnagement on the subject I have come to the conclusion (perhaps erroneously) that for free will to be real it must be, as Miltiades posits, mysytical in nature. It seems to necessitate either Idealism* or some form of cartesian dualism. I just can't see how it can possibly fit into any sort of materialist paradigm.
Compatibilism
Amongst philosophers, the dominant argument in favour of free will appears to be something called "compatibilism". Apparently this is the position favoured by a majority of philosophers. Notable proponents of compatibilism include Daniel Dennett and Eddy Nahmias. Compatibilism is the attempt to reconcile [a] notion of free will with the scientific paradigm of determinisim. On the other side of that argument are people like Sam Harris and Jerry Coyne, who are deemed incompatibilists bcos, for obvious reasons, they say that free will is not compatible with determinism. I would consider myself an incompatibilist because I cannot see how free will is possibly compatible with determinism within the materialist paradigm.
Determinism, as I'm sure goes without saying, is the idea that all states of the universe are caused by antecedant (or prior) states. If this is true, then it implies that everything in the universe has a prior cause and is part of an overall chain of causality - analogous to a train of dominoes. If we imagine that "our will" or our "choice" is one such domino which causes us to act in a given manner, then we can see that our "will" itself has a prior cause. If we follow this chain of causality it will extend beyond "me", that is, "my will" will be caused by something other than me. This is not difficult to imagine in a real sense, when we consider that we don't choose our genes, we don't choose our parents, we don't choose the environment in which we grow up, etc. etc. yet all of these things determine our values, our beliefs, and our general outlook on life, all of which dictate the choices we make. Knowing all of thise we still ffeel as though we have free will or ultimate control over our choices, but imcompatibilists will say that this is illusory.
It is easy to overcomplicate the argument by following this feeling that we have, when all we need to do is return to the idea of determinism. Determinism tells us that everything has a prior cause, this includes our will. Therefore, our will cannot be free, unless we invoke some entity that doesn't fit into this chain of causality. To do this we would need to invoke something outside the paradigm of materialism. Compatibilists such as Dennett attempt to dance around this and try to redefine what free will is, however, they only succeed in positing that we have a will. They don't restore the critical freedom [of that will] which determinism removes.
Indeterminism
Quantum Indeterminism appears to be even less compatible with free will than determinism. Firstly, it is probably worth noting that the ability to predict the choices of a person has absolutely no bearing on whether or not their will is free. A deterministic sysytem can be sufficiently complex that it can be unpredictable, as in chaos theory.
We have to think about where our will comes into quantum indeterminacy. If our actions/choices are the result of quantum randomness then this is just another form of determinism over which we have no control and our will, therefore, is not free.
If the quantum event is the caused by our willing it to happen which then gives rise to our choices or our behaviour then we are dealing with the much maligned notion of "the observer effect" which is the idea that a conscious observer is necessary to "collapse the [quantum] wave function". This is something that doesn't appear to have much truck in the field of physics and it also appears to invoke some form of either idealism or cartesian dualism because indetermin because, as Fourier mentioned, "subatomic systems' behaviour is not controlled by other physical facts."
It's hard to see where free will can squeeze into the materialist paradigm. Any arguments that attempt to rescue it from determinsim appear to do so at the cost of the critical characteristic of freedom, while indeterminism seems to strip it of either freedom, will, or both.0 -
That has been ruled out. Conclusively.Miltiades wrote:Well the obvious answer to that is that you cannot rule out some unknown deterministic processes underlying quantum mechanics.
There are a few prominent physicists who would disagree with that, aren't there? Lee Smolin being the most prominent.
The notion of Superdeterminism hasn't been (or perhaps can't be) ruled out, has it? It seems like a big objection to it tends to be that it involves some form of "conspiracy" but that argument allegedly involves a presupposition of free will. It is, however, just the natural conclusion of determinism i.e. all chains of causality have their origins at the big bang.
It's difficult to see how we can have an indeterminate universe without, again, invoking some form of dualism.
@Fourier, you've mentioned that "subatomic systems' behaviour is not controlled by other physical facts". This appears to be a statement about indeterminism which naturally refutes determinism. If we apply this notion to the double slit experiment, where we have a flash of light registering on the screen. This would imply that nothing physical precedes the particle registering on the screen. We might then ask, at the moment immediately prior to the particle registering on the screen, what physical state was it in? If it wasn't in some kind of physical state then what kind of state was it in? If it wasn't in some physical state immediately prior to registering on the screen, then how was it able to interact with the screen?0 -
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Firstly Smolin does not advocate determinism for QM. I'm not about to give a course in his views on Quantum Gravity, but it's not about determinism. It's about focusing more on an aspect of QM called relationism.There are a few prominent physicists who would disagree with that, aren't there? Lee Smolin being the most prominent.
And no I wouldn't say many prominent physicists argue for determinism in QM. The view of the overwhelming majority in light of the evidence is that determinism is invalidated. Not only is there no working deterministic theory, but we know none can exist without several kinds of fine tuning which makes them unnatural.
Superdeterministic theories require fine-tuning. The issue with them has nothing to do with Free Will, but in their deficiencies as predictive physical theories.The notion of Superdeterminism hasn't been (or perhaps can't be) ruled out, has it?
"Physical state" is an ambiguous phrase. QM gives it a quantum state, which is a description of the probabilities for outcomes of subsequent measurements. If you're asking what it's like independent of anybody measuring it, QM doesn't speak about that.@Fourier, you've mentioned that "subatomic systems' behaviour is not controlled by other physical facts". This appears to be a statement about indeterminism which naturally refutes determinism. If we apply this notion to the double slit experiment, where we have a flash of light registering on the screen. This would imply that nothing physical precedes the particle registering on the screen. We might then ask, at the moment immediately prior to the particle registering on the screen, what physical state was it in?
In QM one makes a preparation. That is you set up some kind of physical system like a hot cathode ray or a laser. Then you pick how to measure this system, e.g. do you use a photo-detection screen or do you use a homodyne detector. What happens at the measurement equipment is not determined completely by any other physical fact, that's the random part of QM. Also whether there is a particle there or not depends on the measurement choice. If I use a photo-detection screen then I can talk about the laser being composed of photons, if I use a homodyne detector I can't. So the composition of objects is context dependent.If it wasn't in some kind of physical state then what kind of state was it in? If it wasn't in some physical state immediately prior to registering on the screen, then how was it able to interact with the screen?
QM also has a deeper form of indeterminism. Which is that nothing controls the choice of measurement equipment/context. It's not even random like the measurement outcomes, it's outside the theory.0 -
The point was that determinism has been conclusively ruled out, when I don't believe that this is the case. The many worlds interpretation, along the lines of Everett, is a deterministic interpretation of QM which hasn't conclusively been ruled out, therefore the notion of determinism itself hasn't been ruled out.And no I wouldn't say many prominent physicists argue for determinism in QM. The view of the overwhelming majority in light of the evidence is that determinism is invalidated. Not only is there no working deterministic theory, but we know none can exist without several kinds of fine tuning which makes them unnatural.
With regard to Smolin's position
I'm not sure if you mean that he doesn't advocate determinism for QM as it is currently formulated bcos I think that is technically correct, but he is an advocate of the position that QM is [in his words] "wrong". What he means by "wrong" is what most people might [in his words again] "politely" mean when they say it is incomplete.Firstly Smolin does not advocate determinism for QM. I'm not about to give a course in his views on Quantum Gravity, but it's not about determinism. It's about focusing more on an aspect of QM called relationism.
https://www.americanscientist.org/article/a-realist-vision-of-the-quantum-worldthe theory Smolin seeks...must be deterministic, meaning that the future state of a system is completely determined by the laws of physics acting on the present state.
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-01101-0Graham Farmelo - nature wrote:Like Einstein, Smolin is a philosophical ‘realist’ — someone who thinks that the real world exists independently of our minds and can be described by deterministic laws.
He might not advocate for determinism as we generally tend to understand it, instead a kind of non-local determinism.
https://www.space.com/einsteins-unfinished-revolution-lee-smolin-interview.htmlLee Smolin - Space.com wrote:The most important thing I'm doing in my new work is taking seriously the role of nonlocality. [Nonlocality refers to the ability of objects to influence the actions of other objects that are very far apart in space and time.] If you want to give a realistic, complete description of what's going on when you have two particles or more that have interacted and are what we call "entangled," then how you choose to manipulate one of the particles can influence the others, even if they're very far apart. And this means that you have to take seriously that influences aren't constrained by the idea that things only affect what is near to them.
There are those who argue against superdeterminism bcos they feel that it invalidates the whole practice of scientific inquiry. They argue that we must be free to choose what experiments to do, otherwise the universe is engaged in some giant conspiracy to make us conduct experiments that make the universe appear indeterminate, when it is actually [super]deterministic.Superdeterministic theories require fine-tuning. The issue with them has nothing to do with Free Will, but in their deficiencies as predictive physical theories.
I'm not sure about the fine tuning argument and how it makes it seem "unnatural", I think the anthropic argument speaks to that, doesn't it? Either way, superdeterminism is simply determinisim taken to its natural conclusion, and that would mean that the universe is deterministic.
Is a quantum state something other than physical? This is what I meant by indeterminism seeming to imply some form of dualism - the indeterminism of certain interpreations of QM that is."Physical state" is an ambiguous phrase. QM gives it a quantum state, which is a description of the probabilities for outcomes of subsequent measurements. If you're asking what it's like independent of anybody measuring it, QM doesn't speak about that.
The idea that QM doesn't speak about what the system is like independent of anybody measuring it is where the charge of incompleteness comes from, isn't it; that was, essentially, the basis of the EPR paper. Bell's theorem then demonstrated that we need to give up either locality, realism, local realism, or free will. Bell actually suggested that superdeterminism could address the issue, didn't he, but he seemed to dismiss it? I must read up on his reasons for that again.
If we stick with the idea that QM doesn't speak about the state of a system independent of being measured; we can still ask the question, what is the state of the system immediately prior to measuring it?
If QM doesn't speak about this, then does QM fail to give a complete description of the physical world?
If it is in a quantum state, does this mean that quantum states are not physical and therefore the universe is dualistic?
Is it a photo-detection screen that is used in the double-slit experiment (or at elast in the version that is commonly described)? It might be easiest to stick with one and explore the consequences.In QM one makes a preparation. That is you set up some kind of physical system like a hot cathode ray or a laser. Then you pick how to measure this system, e.g. do you use a photo-detection screen or do you use a homodyne detector. What happens at the measurement equipment is not determined completely by any other physical fact, that's the random part of QM. Also whether there is a particle there or not depends on the measurement choice. If I use a photo-detection screen then I can talk about the laser being composed of photons, if I use a homodyne detector I can't. So the composition of objects is context dependent.
If we take the photon arriving at the photo-detection screen (this presumably means that the electron collides with some other particle and a photon is emitted which then arrives at the screen). We can ask what causes the flash of light on the photo-detection screen, where does it come from?
If we don't have a deterministic answer then I struggle to see how we have a complete answer, or one that doesn't invoke some form of dualism.
There is that word "choice". There are those who argue that free will is a foundational assumption of QM (or science in general). Is this the kind of free will that the Conway-Kochen-Specher paper talks about?QM also has a deeper form of indeterminism. Which is that nothing controls the choice of measurement equipment/context. It's not even random like the measurement outcomes, it's outside the theory.
Even taking all of the above into consideration, there doesn't appear to be any room for free will in any of the paradigms of scienctific inquiry.0 -
If we adopt this notion of "not ruled out", then it hasn't been ruled out if there is a civilization living inside the sun or if small pandas live inside our cells. Virtually nothing would be ruled out under this definition.The point was that determinism has been conclusively ruled out, when I don't believe that this is the case. The many worlds interpretation, along the lines of Everett, is a deterministic interpretation of QM which hasn't conclusively been ruled out, therefore the notion of determinism itself hasn't been ruled out.
However in terms of actual scientific research yes they have been ruled out. Quantum Field Theory doesn't have the tensor product decompositions necessary to support Many Worlds and similar issues hold for other deterministic interpretational positions. They all have the potential to replicate only non-relativistic quantum theory in non-thermal states once they have been fine-tuned. And even that hasn't been fully proved.
I'm not going to argue about Smolin's position, he doesn't advocate determinism. Simple as that. If you disagree quote the relevant equations in his papers, not pop science articles.
What I mentioned above has nothing to do with the anthropic principle. Superdeterministic theories are ruled out on the basis of empirical evidence, only a set of measure zero in their parameter space replicates current observations. Thus by Bayesian reasoning they are ruled out.I'm not sure about the fine tuning argument and how it makes it seem "unnatural", I think the anthropic argument speaks to that, doesn't it? Either way, superdeterminism is simply determinisim taken to its natural conclusion, and that would mean that the universe is deterministic.
It appears in a physical theory so it is physical. That's what I would mean by a physical state, but I'm not sure it is what you mean. Similarly the macrostate in statistical mechanics doesn't describe what an object is like exactly, but it is still a state in a physical theory.Is a quantum state something other than physical?
You can give it a state prior to measurement. The quantum state, which describes the probabilities of possible future measurements.If we stick with the idea that QM doesn't speak about the state of a system independent of being measured; we can still ask the question, what is the state of the system immediately prior to measuring it?
The quantum state is physical because it appears in a physical theory. QM doesn't give a complete description of the physical world, because QM itself says no such description exists. The best one can do is QM.If QM doesn't speak about this, then does QM fail to give a complete description of the physical world?
If it is in a quantum state, does this mean that quantum states are not physical and therefore the universe is dualistic?
No. In QM you cannot ask that. Furthermore QM and its resulting no-go theorems tell you that you will not get the answer for that. Furthermore as I mentioned above you can't even talk about a "photon" unless you use the appropriate apparatus. If you had used a Homodyne detector the results wouldn't have been comprehensible in terms of photons. "Photons" are just a type of mark in certain devices.If we take the photon arriving at the photo-detection screen (this presumably means that the electron collides with some other particle and a photon is emitted which then arrives at the screen). We can ask what causes the flash of light on the photo-detection screen, where does it come from?
I don't know what you mean by dualism, but what I've described is what QM says. It tells you the probability of the outcomes of various measurements and those probabilities have been verified in real life experiments.If we don't have a deterministic answer then I struggle to see how we have a complete answer, or one that doesn't invoke some form of dualism.
Yes.There is that word "choice". There are those who argue that free will is a foundational assumption of QM (or science in general). Is this the kind of free will that the Conway-Kochen-Specher paper talks about?
That QM requires choice leaves no room for choice? Could you explain that. I would say there is clearly room for it in QM, since QM requires it.Even taking all of the above into consideration, there doesn't appear to be any room for free will in any of the paradigms of scienctific inquiry.0 -
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I struggle with the free will concept. It's been discussed here in various ways; but has it been conceptually defined? Quantum randomness? To what extent would indeterministic dynamics allow for a very small attribution to free will? Free will (in addition to other variables) as a label that refers to something that alters the probability distribution over allowed outcomes. I ponder to what extent research design may exhibit some small measure of free will? For example the Free Will Theorem of Conway and Kochen suggests: "It is usually tacitly assumed that experimenters have sufficient free will to choose the settings of their apparatus in a way that is not determined by past history."If our actions/choices are the result of quantum randomness then this is just another form of determinism over which we have no control and our will, therefore, is not free.0 -
There are two general arguments going here. One can generally be categorised as whether or not there are physicists who would disagree that determinism has been been conclusively ruled out. The other argument is more of a philosophical exploration of foundational questions in Quantum Theory, taking in the implications of free will, determinism, and indeterminism.
Determinism ruled out?
This first part of the post seeks to address the "ruled out" issue by referencing well established physicists who advocate for either MWI or realism, both of which are deterministic - the implication being that these well established physicists disagree that determinism has been ruled out, by way of necessity.If we adopt this notion of "not ruled out", then it hasn't been ruled out if there is a civilization living inside the sun or if small pandas live inside our cells. Virtually nothing would be ruled out under this definition.
However in terms of actual scientific research yes they have been ruled out. Quantum Field Theory doesn't have the tensor product decompositions necessary to support Many Worlds and similar issues hold for other deterministic interpretational positions. They all have the potential to replicate only non-relativistic quantum theory in non-thermal states once they have been fine-tuned. And even that hasn't been fully proved.
I'm not familiar with the work of many (or indeed any) tenured physicists releasing books and/or actively advocating that there is a civilization living inside the sun or small pandas living inside our cells, whereas there are a number of prominent physicists who do actively promote the many worlds interpretation i.e. they don't consider it to be ruled out. There are also prominent pyhsicists who advocate a realist interpretation. Are you familiar with any of the work by Sean Carroll?
I might defer to Smolin himself on this one.I'm not going to argue about Smolin's position, he doesn't advocate determinism. Simple as that. If you disagree quote the relevant equations in his papers, not pop science articles.
This might be where Graham Farmelo and Helge Kragh came to the conclusion that "the theory Smolin seeks...must be deterministic, meaning that the future state of a system is completely determined by the laws of physics acting on the present state" and "like Einstein, Smolin is a philosophical ‘realist’ — someone who thinks that the real world exists independently of our minds and can be described by deterministic laws."Thus, if you are a realist and a physicist, there is one overriding imperative, which is to go beyond quantum mechanics to discover those missing features and use that knowledge to construct a true theory of the atoms. This was Einstein’s unfinished mission, and it is mine.
The power of physics comes from its laws, which dictate how nature changes in time. They do this by transforming the state of the world as it is now to the state at any future time. A law of physics functions in some ways like a computer program: it reads in input and puts out output. The input is the state at a given time; the output is the state at some future time.*
Along with the computation comes an explanation of how the world changes in time. The law acting on the present state causes the future states. A successful prediction of the future state is taken as a validation of that explanation. The prediction is deterministic, in that a precise input leads to a precise output. This confirms a belief that the information that went into describing the state is in fact a complete description of the world at one moment of time.
This concept of a law is basic to a realist conception of nature and, as such, transcends any one theory.
Is there a paper that you could point to on this. Genuinely, I am always on the lookout for more information.What I mentioned above has nothing to do with the anthropic principle. Superdeterministic theories are ruled out on the basis of empirical evidence, only a set of measure zero in their parameter space replicates current observations. Thus by Bayesian reasoning they are ruled out.
It is probably worth mentioning again that determinism taken to its natural conclusion gives us superdeterminism. I understand that you disagree on the viability of determinism, but we can explore the implications of indeterminism below and see how viable that remains.
Foundational Questions
I'm not sure if you're aware of how you are aware of how you are evading the question, but if we look at our exchange again. We're talking about how QM rules out determinism. Broadly speaking, I'm asking questions in the direction of realism, while you are, broadly speaking, defending a radical anti-realist position similar that of Bohr, commonly known as the Copenhagen interpretation - this is distinct from other anti-realist approaches such as quantum epistemology or operationalism (or the shut-up-and-calculate position).
This is your statement about indeterminism i.e. a statement against determinism.Fourier wrote:What happens at the measurement equipment is not determined completely by any other physical fact
Here, I'm asking a question in the direction of realism. Note, this is a question about the state of the system prior to measurement.roosh wrote:at the moment immediately prior to the particle registering on the screen, what physical state was it in?
You say that it is a "quantum state" which gives the probabilities for the outcomes of subsequent measurements. The issue is, I'm asking about the state of the system prior to measurement, while you are answering a question about the likelihood of a measurement occurring at a given location on the screen.Fourier wrote:QM gives it a quantum state, which is a description of the probabilities for outcomes of subsequent measurements. If you're asking what it's like independent of anybody measuring it, QM doesn't speak about that.
You say that QM doesn't speak about the state of the system prior to measuring it. Here, we have two conclusions. Either QM is:
1) incomplete, or
2) radically anti-realist
The Copenhagen interpretation as espoused by Bohr is a radically anti-realist interpretation of QM. We can explore the logical consequences of that.
Note, I'm asking a question here again about the state of the sytstem prior to measurement i.e. a question in the direction of realism.roosh wrote:QM doesn't speak about the state of a system independent of being measured; we can still ask the question, what is the state of the system immediately prior to measuring it?
Here, the question is evaded again. You talk about the probability of the particle being measured at a specific location on the screen, when the question was about the state of the system prior to being measured.Fourier wrote:You can give it a state prior to measurement. The quantum state, which describes the probabilities of possible future measurements.
But, if we go back to your original statement about determinism
We can interpret this to mean that the measurement of the system is not determined by the prior physical state (or "fact") of the system (this is simply a statement about determinism).Fourier wrote:What happens at the measurement equipment is not determined completely by any other physical fact
Do we take this to mean that the system was not in a physical state prior to being measured? I think the literature talks about "beables" as opposed to observables. If it was in a physical state, then we have determinism. If it wasn't then we have either dualism (of the Cartesian variety) or spontaneous manifestation out of nothing, that we can somehow predict probabilistically.
There is a difference between "in QM you cannot ask that" and "you cannot ask that". Clearly, we can ask that and it is a reasonable question. The no-go theorems tells us we won't get an answer, but that doesn't mean that there isn't an answer. This is where the argument that QM is incomplete comes from.Fourier wrote:No. In QM you cannot ask that. Furthermore QM and its resulting no-go theorems tell you that you will not get the answer for that.
It may very well mean that there is a limit to our ability to express the fundamental nature of the universe in mathematical or linguistic terms, but that is a limitation of humanity as opposed to a statement about the fundamental nature of the universe. Our reasoning can allow us to draw further conclusions, even if it is only to say that there must be a more fundamental "level" of the universe which we are precluded from describing, given our limitations.
It still makes sense to ask what was it that interacted with the device to manifest as a photon? Something had to interact with it, otherwise there would have been no photon. If we can't ever describe that, then fair enough, but that doesn't mean that the mark on the device wasn't in a physical state prior to being detected. There may have been no physical "facts" about it because "facts" seems to imply known observables, but again, I think the term "beables" is used to describe the physical state of the system prior to being measured - which would make the system deterministic.Fourier wrote:Furthermore as I mentioned above you can't even talk about a "photon" unless you use the appropriate apparatus. If you had used a Homodyne detector the results wouldn't have been comprehensible in terms of photons. "Photons" are just a type of mark in certain devices.
Yes, but it doesn't tell us the state of the system prior to being measured. In fact, the anti-realist position tells us that there is no physical state of the system prior to it interacting with the measuring device. This just begs the question, how does nothing interact with a measuring device to manifest as something?Fourier wrote:I don't know what you mean by dualism, but what I've described is what QM says. It tells you the probability of the outcomes of various measurements and those probabilities have been verified in real life experiments.
Firstly, can I ask if you agree that free will is a foundational assumption of QM?Fourier wrote:Yes.
That QM requires choice leaves no room for choice? Could you explain that. I would say there is clearly room for it in QM, since QM requires it.
We have to be careful here when we talk about the "free will" in QM. If we take the freedom to mean the freedom offered by indeterminism i.e. that the future is open, then it isn't necessarily free will that is in question because it isn't our choice that causes the wave function collapse, it isn't our choice that determines where the photon will appear on the screen. That is, it gives us but no will - unless again, we invoke cartesian dualism (and the much maligned "observer effect").
Similarly, if some quantum indeterminate occurrence dictates our choice, then it can neither be said to be free, nor our will. Indeed, it is just another form of determinism.0 -
Of course there aren't people advocating these things, it was just for emphasis. I am familiar with Carroll's work. The point is that they think they can make a deterministic theory. They've been saying this for nearly 70 years at this point. Not one person has managed to progress any such theory beyond non-thermal finite system non-relativistic QM, i.e. they can only replicate a tiny fraction of modern Quantum Theory and even there there are significant gaps in their attempts. Theorems unproven that mean even this tiny fragment isn't secured. And we know that even if they do secure this fragment they'll only do so after fine tuning.I'm not familiar with the work of many (or indeed any) tenured physicists releasing books and/or actively advocating that there is a civilization living inside the sun or small pandas living inside our cells, whereas there are a number of prominent physicists who do actively promote the many worlds interpretation i.e. they don't consider it to be ruled out. There are also prominent pyhsicists who advocate a realist interpretation. Are you familiar with any of the work by Sean Carroll?
In any other area of science we would call this "ruled out". A minuscule fraction of people with nothing to show after 70 years with impossibility proofs preventing natural versions of what they advocate. It's ruled out.
I asked for Smolin's papers, not pop science material. If you look at his papers it is relational.I might defer to Smolin himself on this one.
https://arxiv.org/abs/1208.4119Is there a paper that you could point to on this. Genuinely, I am always on the lookout for more information.
I'm not evading questions. I'm just describing quantum theory. That's the way it is, not my fault. Copenhagen isn't anti-realist, though that is a common phrasing in popular science books. It's non-representational. What is "Quantum Epistemology"?I'm not sure if you're aware of how you are aware of how you are evading the question, but if we look at our exchange again. We're talking about how QM rules out determinism. Broadly speaking, I'm asking questions in the direction of realism, while you are, broadly speaking, defending a radical anti-realist position similar that of Bohr, commonly known as the Copenhagen interpretation - this is distinct from other anti-realist approaches such as quantum epistemology or operationalism (or the shut-up-and-calculate position).
You have to be clear about what you mean by "state". The reason you think I am evading questions is because you're not familiar with physics terminology as I have mentioned to you before. State has a specific meaning in physics. You want to know the metaphysical nature of the system prior to measurement (a separate notion to "state"). QM does not tell you that.The issue is, I'm asking about the state of the system prior to measurement
I'm not evading the question, you're using the wrong terminology. It does give the system a state as defined in physics. If you're asking does it give a metaphysically representational state. The answer to that is no, as I have already explained. I've answered your question before, not evaded it.Here, the question is evaded again. You talk about the probability of the particle being measured at a specific location on the screen, when the question was about the state of the system prior to being measured.
You'll need to use correct terminology. QM gives a state, but not a metaphysically representational one. I don't really understand why the absence of a metaphysically representational state implies Cartesian dualism. There are several other options. For example the underlying ontology could be a non-mathematical monist one. There are several options here, I don't see how your two options are the only ones. See the work of Bernard d'Espagnat "On Physics and Philosophy" for a more complete list of possibilities.Do we take this to mean that the system was not in a physical state prior to being measured? I think the literature talks about "beables" as opposed to observables. If it was in a physical state, then we have determinism. If it wasn't then we have either dualism (of the Cartesian variety) or spontaneous manifestation out of nothing, that we can somehow predict probabilistically.
Again you need to be more precise. You mean to say "that doesn't mean there wasn't a metaphysical state of affairs". If a physical theory cannot describe something then that does mean there is no physical state, since "physical state" refers to a description of a system in a physical theory.If we can't ever describe that, then fair enough, but that doesn't mean that the mark on the device wasn't in a physical state prior to being detected
Again you see this is the problem of reading high-level physics without the appropriate background knowledge. "No physical state" is not the same as "nothing" or "no metaphysical state of affairs".This just begs the question, how does nothing interact with a measuring device to manifest as something?
Yes, in the specific sense meant in QM. That the choice of observable is free. Note you go on to speak about indeterminism, this isn't what the term "Free Will" in QM refers to. It's that nothing, not even quantum probabilities, dictate the choice of observable. Quantum probability dictates the chances of the outcomes associated to a given observable once one is chosen. It does not dictate the choice of observable itself. Nothing physical does according to the theory.Firstly, can I ask if you agree that free will is a foundational assumption of QM?0 -
It is a generally ill-defined term but it is still possible to discuss it using a place holder and see what conclusions can be drawn.I struggle with the free will concept. It's been discussed here in various ways; but has it been conceptually defined?
The notion of a deterministic universe was seen as the death knell for free will. Compatibilists then tried to rescue it from determinism but they failed to restore the freedom that determinism destroyed.
If we think about where our will can fit in a non-deterministic world with quantum randomness. Does our will cause the collapse of the wave function which results in a specific measurement outcome, or is our will caused by quantum randomness?Quantum randomness? To what extent would indeterministic dynamics allow for a very small attribution to free will? Free will (in addition to other variables) as a label that refers to something that alters the probability distribution over allowed outcomes.
If our will is caused by quantum randomness then it is only free in the sense that quantum randomness means that our will could be anything [within the given parameters]. If our choices are simply the manifestation of quantum randomness manifesting in a specific outcome i.e. the collapse of the wave function then it isn't something that we control i.e. we are not free to choose because we have absolutely no control over the outcome. In this case we have no will, not to mind free will.
Alternatively, if there is a thing called "our will", and our choices are determined by some random quantum event, then this is just another form of determinism which removes the freedom from our will.
If "our will" is free but is not part of the causal chain in a deterministic universe, or in some way causes the random quantum event to manifest as a measurement, then we have cartesian dualism.
Conway Kochen assumed free will in their paper in order to demonstrate that, if we have free will, then so too do particles.I ponder to what extent research design may exhibit some small measure of free will? For example the Free Will Theorem of Conway and Kochen suggests: "It is usually tacitly assumed that experimenters have sufficient free will to choose the settings of their apparatus in a way that is not determined by past history."
There are those who suggest that free will is a foundational assumption of QM while others argue that it is indeterminism that is the foundational assumption - think of a truly random number generator, we wouldn't necessarily ascribe free will to it.0 -
I was just using your examples for emphasis as well.Of course there aren't people advocating these things, it was just for emphasis. I am familiar with Carroll's work. The point is that they think they can make a deterministic theory. They've been saying this for nearly 70 years at this point. Not one person has managed to progress any such theory beyond non-thermal finite system non-relativistic QM, i.e. they can only replicate a tiny fraction of modern Quantum Theory and even there there are significant gaps in their attempts. Theorems unproven that mean even this tiny fragment isn't secured. And we know that even if they do secure this fragment they'll only do so after fine tuning.
In any other area of science we would call this "ruled out". A minuscule fraction of people with nothing to show after 70 years with impossibility proofs preventing natural versions of what they advocate. It's ruled out.
The reason they haven't ruled it out is bcos they find the interpretation you are advocating deeply unsatisfying. In some cases, they don't believe that QFT is the fundamental theory bcos it fails to talk about the state of the system prior to measurement. As you have said yourself.
So, Smolin's own characterisation of his position isn't sufficient?I asked for Smolin's papers, not pop science material. If you look at his papers it is relational.
Thanks, I'll give this a look over. Anything from a journal?
Quantum epistemologists argue that QM doesn't deal with what is real in the world but rather only ever talks about our knowledge of the world.I'm not evading questions. I'm just describing quantum theory. That's the way it is, not my fault. Copenhagen isn't anti-realist, though that is a common phrasing in popular science books. It's non-representational. What is "Quantum Epistemology"?
The term anti-realist is used for a very good reason, namely that when proponents of Copenhagen have freely expressed their interpretation of it, it falls squarely in the anti-realist camp. Indeed, as we drill down here we seem to find that either Copenahgen is incomplete or it is anti-relaist.
Hopefully though dialogue I can outline my position more clearly. I will strive for the correct terminology but if you feel like you have an idea of the point I am trying to make hopefully you can point me in the right direction - as you have done here.You have to be clear about what you mean by "state". The reason you think I am evading questions is because you're not familiar with physics terminology as I have mentioned to you before. State has a specific meaning in physics. You want to know the metaphysical nature of the system prior to measurement (a separate notion to "state"). QM does not tell you that.
I'm not certain that "metaphysical nature" is the precise term, but we can go with it for now. Does the term "beable" refer to the metaphysical nature of a system?
Am I correct in saying that the field of science in general works on the assumption that the metaphysical nature of all things in the universe is physical? As opposed to there being some other kind of substance that could be classed as non-physical giving rise to dualism akin to cartesian dualism?
Is the failure of QM to tell us the metaphysical nature of a system prior to measurement the reason behind the argument that it is incomplete?
Your answer was that it does give the state of the system prior to measurement. You said that this is a quantum state. But you also said that the quantum state gives the probability of future measurement outcomes. So, it doesn't then give the state of the system prior to measurement, it gives the probability of a measurement outcome.I'm not evading the question, you're using the wrong terminology. It does give the system a state as defined in physics. If you're asking does it give a metaphysically representational state. The answer to that is no, as I have already explained. I've answered your question before, not evaded it.
Does it say anything about the metaphysical nature/state at the time of measurement? Is that physical?
The absence of a metaphysically representational state doesn't necessarily imply Cartesian dualism, it implies incompleteness. It's when we ask the question about how a physical measurement can manifest from something non-physical - as it must, if the measurement isn't determined by prior physical "facts" (or is "beables" the better term here) - that we arrive at some form of Cartesian Dualism.You'll need to use correct terminology. QM gives a state, but not a metaphysically representational one. I don't really understand why the absence of a metaphysically representational state implies Cartesian dualism. There are several other options. For example the underlying ontology could be a non-mathematical monist one. There are several options here, I don't see how your two options are the only ones. See the work of Bernard d'Espagnat "On Physics and Philosophy" for a more complete list of possibilities.
Aye, there's the rub. This exposes the semantic nature of the argument. This says that there is no "physical state" because the theory is incapable of describing it.Again you need to be more precise. You mean to say "that doesn't mean there wasn't a metaphysical state of affairs". If a physical theory cannot describe something then that does mean there is no physical state, since "physical state" refers to a description of a system in a physical theory.
The counter argument is that there is a "physical state" to be described but the current theory cannot describe it, therefore it is incomplete.
Alternatively, there is a metaphysical state which is not a "physical state", hence dualism.
We can drop the word "state" here and simply use the word "physical" (given that anything in a "physical state" is "physical"). The implication of what you are saying is that describing something in a physical theory makes it physical as opposed to there being a physical world that we discover and attempt to describe.
Looked at another way:
We have a description of the system at the moment of measurement. This is a "physical state". You are saying that this physical state is not determined by prior physical "facts". This leads us to question how this "physical state" manifests as a physical interaction at the screen.
This seems to beg a number of questions: yes the observable that is chosen is open, it is free, it is not predetermined but where does the "will" come into it? Who or what "wills" the choice of observable; how are observables chosen; by what process are choices made; what constitutes a "choice"?Yes, in the specific sense meant in QM. That the choice of observable is free. Note you go on to speak about indeterminism, this isn't what the term "Free Will" in QM refers to. It's that nothing, not even quantum probabilities, dictate the choice of observable. Quantum probability dictates the chances of the outcomes associated to a given observable once one is chosen. It does not dictate the choice of observable itself. Nothing physical does according to the theory.
There appears to be freedom but no will or at least no physical will. Perhaps a non-physical will?0 -
I know all this, I have read most of their technical articles. What I'm describing is what QM itself says. They aren't satisfied with that, but there is no evidence at all for their positions and theorems proving they're not able to replicate parts of QFT.The reason they haven't ruled it out is bcos they find the interpretation you are advocating deeply unsatisfying.
That's not a characterisation of his own position. See this paper:So, Smolin's own characterisation of his position isn't sufficient?
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.12468.pdf
Section 3.1
Did you look at the link? That is from a journal. Namely: New J. Phys. 17, 033002 (2015)Thanks, I'll give this a look over. Anything from a journal?
Do you mean Quantum Bayesians or QBism? There isn't an interpretational position called Quantum Epistemology.Quantum epistemologists argue that QM doesn't deal with what is real in the world but rather only ever talks about our knowledge of the world.
A lot of this back and forth is due to your misuse of the word "state" and "physical". Physical means as described by a physical theory or can be described by a physical theory. "Physical State" is then the description of an object in a theory. For example in Newtonian gravity a gas cloud has a physical state. This state only describes the cloud's mass distribution so it isn't a exhaustive description of the cloud. It is still a physical state though as it is a description of the cloud in a physical theory.Your answer was that it does give the state of the system prior to measurement. You said that this is a quantum state. But you also said that the quantum state gives the probability of future measurement outcomes. So, it doesn't then give the state of the system prior to measurement, it gives the probability of a measurement outcome.
Metaphysical and physical are not the same. Metaphysical is as such "how things truly are", physical is "the description given by a physical theory". The latter might not inform you of everything about the former and in fact in many theories, not just QM, it is quite different from it. For example the macrostate in Statistical Mechanics.
We don't arrive at Cartesian dualism then. As I said Bernard d'Espagnat goes through several possible ontologies of which Cartesian dualism is simply one. It's a fact that this doesn't arrive at Cartesian dualism. As I said we might arrive at a non-mathematical monism.It's when we ask the question about how a physical measurement can manifest from something non-physical - as it must, if the measurement isn't determined by prior physical "facts" (or is "beables" the better term here) - that we arrive at some form of Cartesian Dualism.
QM doesn't tell you. And since the idea of a theory underneath QM is so strongly prohibited and shown to require fine tuning to an unnatural degree, it is virtually certain that you cannot know how an observable is chosen.This seems to beg a number of questions: yes the observable that is chosen is open, it is free, it is not predetermined but where does the "will" come into it? Who or what "wills" the choice of observable; how are observables chosen; by what process are choices made0 -
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Thank you. That looks like an interesting paper and has relevance for my own philosophical position that time is neither fundamental no emergent. It'll take me a while to parse all of it, but I will concede that point about Smolin advocating for a deterministic theory, although he does classify himself as a realist.I know all this, I have read most of their technical articles. What I'm describing is what QM itself says. They aren't satisfied with that, but there is no evidence at all for their positions and theorems proving they're not able to replicate parts of QFT.
That's not a characterisation of his own position. See this paper:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.12468.pdf
Section 3.1
I know that there are well respected physicists out there, such as Sean Carroll, who wouldn't agree that determinism has been ruled out and I'm willing to make the leap that he is familiar with the arguments that you raise here and himself remains unconvinced.
We can still explore the second question on the philosophical implications of QM, as we are doing below.
I'm not sure, Smolin uses the term in Einstein's Unfinished revolution to mean those who say that QM is not about the fundamental nature of reality, but about our knoweldge of it.Do you mean Quantum Bayesians or QBism? There isn't an interpretational position called Quantum Epistemology.
Scientific inquiry has many different applications. One of those applications is informing the deepest philosophical questions, such as the question of "how things truly are". When we talk about free will and whether the universe itself (as opposed to a theory of it) is deterministic or indeterministic we are talking about "how things truly are".A lot of this back and forth is due to your misuse of the word "state" and "physical". Physical means as described by a physical theory or can be described by a physical theory. "Physical State" is then the description of an object in a theory. For example in Newtonian gravity a gas cloud has a physical state. This state only describes the cloud's mass distribution so it isn't a exhaustive description of the cloud. It is still a physical state though as it is a description of the cloud in a physical theory.
Metaphysical and physical are not the same. Metaphysical is as such "how things truly are", physical is "the description given by a physical theory". The latter might not inform you of everything about the former and in fact in many theories, not just QM, it is quite different from it. For example the macrostate in Statistical Mechanics.
We don't arrive at Cartesian dualism then. As I said Bernard d'Espagnat goes through several possible ontologies of which Cartesian dualism is simply one. It's a fact that this doesn't arrive at Cartesian dualism. As I said we might arrive at a non-mathematical monism.
You say that "physical means as described by a physical theory or can be described by a physical theory. "Physical State" is then the description of an object in a theory". What we are interested in is whether or not the description of the object is a complete description of that object. If the description of an object in a physical theory is incomplete then we can ask what the complete physical state of the object is. We're not interested in whether or not that theory (or any other theory) can provide a more complete description. We are interested in "how things truly are". If a theory cannot describe how things truly are then that is a limitation of the theory and that theory cannot be said to offer a complete description of the universe.
It would seem that you are arguing that QM cannot give such a complete description.
In the context of determinism, it is whether or not something is determined by a prior state that is important. The application of a conceptual label in this case "physical" is not absolutely necessary; especially if what we mean by "physical" is "what has been measured". If "state" is too confusing then we can use the term "beable".
If the flash of light at a detector screeen is caused by a "beable" colliding with the screen to manifest as a "photon" then we still have determinism. Given that we cannot use the term "physical" to describe a "beable" we should call it "unphysical". If the "beable" is of a different substance then we have substance or cartesian dualism, if it is of the same substance we have a form of monism. Either way, both scenarios are deterministic.
So where does "my will" come into play, where does "your will" come in to play? I can see where there is freedom of outcome, but not freedom of will.QM doesn't tell you. And since the idea of a theory underneath QM is so strongly prohibited and shown to require fine tuning to an unnatural degree, it is virtually certain that you cannot know how an observable is chosen.0 -
Carroll thinks he can get Many Worlds to work despite 60 years of it not working. His first attempt to do so was in 2014, which was later shown to be invalid by Adrian Kent. Since then he hasn't published anything on it aside from an essay in 2018 whose contents are invalid because they contradict theorems in QFT.I know that there are well respected physicists out there, such as Sean Carroll, who wouldn't agree that determinism has been ruled out and I'm willing to make the leap that he is familiar with the arguments that you raise here and himself remains unconvinced.
He might be unconvinced, but the question is are his objections reasonable? Considering some of them have been disproven and others contradict properties of QFT on curved spacetime, like most I would say no they are not. Further they show a lack of understanding in the Foundations of QM. No surprise since he isn't an expert in the field.
Copenhagen falls under that heading as well.I'm not sure, Smolin uses the term in Einstein's Unfinished revolution to mean those who say that QM is not about the fundamental nature of reality, but about our knoweldge of it.
This analysis leaves out several positions like "substance monism-epistemic dualism" explored by many philosophers and physicists. The possibilities aren't only the simple ones you give here. I'd read d'Espagnat's book.If the flash of light at a detector screeen is caused by a "beable" colliding with the screen to manifest as a "photon" then we still have determinism. Given that we cannot use the term "physical" to describe a "beable" we should call it "unphysical". If the "beable" is of a different substance then we have substance or cartesian dualism, if it is of the same substance we have a form of monism. Either way, both scenarios are deterministic.
As d'Espagnat mentions in one example the underlying ontology could be monist and physical/matter is just a human characterisation of certain sections of the world. Thus everything could be one substance and yet not everything be physical, i.e. somethings are physical and others unphysical but without substance dualism.
Determinisitc/random are properties of mathematical models of phenomena. According to QM the underlying metaphysics behind the detector flashes is not modellable, thus isn't deterministic or random in a strict sense. Rather it is unmodellable.
Did you read what I wrote? See here:So where does "my will" come into play, where does "your will" come in to play? I can see where there is freedom of outcome, but not freedom of will.
As I said I am not taking about the outcomes of an observable, to which QM assigns probabilities, but the choice of observable, which QM does not model. Thus your choice of observable is not physically modeled either deterministically or probabilitistically.Quantum probability dictates the chances of the outcomes associated to a given observable once one is chosen. It does not dictate the choice of observable itself. Nothing physical does according to the theory.
Your choice of which observable to investigate (not the outcome of same) is "free".0 -
That's fair enough. I guess I have a habit of assuming that everyone who is more knowledgeable than me on the topic are all on a level playing field. I appreciate your patience in taking the time to explain that. I seriously dislike MWI as well, so this is very useful information.Carroll thinks he can get Many Worlds to work despite 60 years of it not working. His first attempt to do so was in 2014, which was later shown to be invalid by Adrian Kent. Since then he hasn't published anything on it aside from an essay in 2018 whose contents are invalid because they contradict theorems in QFT.
He might be unconvinced, but the question is are his objections reasonable? Considering some of them have been disproven and others contradict properties of QFT on curved spacetime, like most I would say no they are not. Further they show a lack of understanding in the Foundations of QM. No surprise since he isn't an expert in the field.
Would it not be fair to say that Copenhagen can fall under this heading? It's just that it appears that, when Copenhagen is probed, it necessitates anti-realism or one of the other interpretations you allude to.Copenhagen falls under that heading as well.
I will! Thanks for the recommendation.This analysis leaves out several positions like "substance monism-epistemic dualism" explored by many philosophers and physicists. The possibilities aren't only the simple ones you give here. I'd read d'Espagnat's book.
If the underlying ontology is monist then it can only be either physical or unphysical, with human characterisation not being representative of that underlying ontology.As d'Espagnat mentions in one example the underlying ontology could be monist and physical/matter is just a human characterisation of certain sections of the world. Thus everything could be one substance and yet not everything be physical, i.e. somethings are physical and others unphysical but without substance dualism.
It does appear that the term "physical" seems to be interpreted differently by different people. Without necessarily dissecting it, it almost appears as though people used the word "physical" to describe the world around them and to talk about the fundamental nature of the universe, then as physics explored the world around us the question of what we mean by "physical" evolved to mean "our measurement/description" of the world around us. Then QM found that, actually, there's a level of nature which we cannot measure without affecting it, therefore there's an aspect of reality that we can't describe in conventional scientific measurements. Given that the meaning of the word "physical" had evolved, it seems we can no longer refer to that level of ontology as "physical".
But, I think the word "physical" as it is commonly used can be contrasted with the notion of "magical", when people think about ghosts, or souls.
But, if it is unmodellable, that would mean that our models of the universe can never be complete, including QM/QFT. This was, essentially, what we mean by the charge the QM is incomplete and is not the fundamental theory. Granted, it might not be possible to develop a more fundamental theory, but that is a comment on the limitations of scientific inquiry as opposed to a statement about the ontology of the universe.Determinisitc/random are properties of mathematical models of phenomena. According to QM the underlying metaphysics behind the detector flashes is not modellable, thus isn't deterministic or random in a strict sense. Rather it is unmodellable.
So, there is an underlying metaphysics which gives rise to the detector flash. This means that it is determined by a prior state, even if it is to be argued that we cannot apply the conceptual label "physical" to that state. If we can't use the word state then we can say it is determined by the metaphysical nature of the system. It's still deterministic. It might not be how the word "deterministic" is used in a mathematical sense, but it is deterministic in the more general sense of being caused by the prior nature of the system.
I did see what you wrote, but perhaps I didn't fully understand it. I am questioning why you have put free in inverted commas there. When we do this, we usually mean that it is not really what it purports to be. Was that your intention to imply that we call it "free will" but it isn't really free?Did you read what I wrote? See here:
As I said I am not taking about the outcomes of an observable, to which QM assigns probabilities, but the choice of observable, which QM does not model. Thus your choice of observable is not physically modeled either deterministically or probabilitistically.
Your choice of which observable to investigate (not the outcome of same) is "free".
Something occurred to me earlier, as my mind was processing all of the information from our discussion, the thought arose in my mind that when we talk about Free Will and the choice of observable, we are talking about an intrinsically first-person experience. Perhaps these no-go theorem's for QM are representative of the limitations of scientific empiricism and the need to embrace first-person empiricism and theory - namely meditation and Buddhist philosophy. I usually refer to it as spiritual empiricism because Buddhist philosophy and practice are "spiritual" practices grounded in first-person empiricism.
If we're talking about free will and our choice of experiment, then there is no escaping the first-person perspective. When one pays close enough attention to the mind it is possible to question the degree to which our will is actually free. Indeed, it is possible to question the nature of "the self" to whom the will is supposed to belong, in the first place.
Through careful reflection, empirical observation, we can see that we are beholden to a form of psychological determinism. Our choice of experiment or observable isn't free, it isn't controlled by ourselves. Indeed, the very notion of "self" proves to be very elusive when subjected to scrutiny.0 -
I just read Smolin's book in order to explain this. Note that the terminology he uses is not really standard. Roughly speaking though Copenhagen is (using his terms) anti-realist, epistmologist and operationalist. It's more that for example Bohr cared more about the first part, Heisenberg cared more about the latter. "Care" in the sense of wrote more about. However both do acknowledge and mention the other points.Would it not be fair to say that Copenhagen can fall under this heading? It's just that it appears that, when Copenhagen is probed, it necessitates anti-realism or one of the other interpretations you allude to.
No those are not the only possibilities, because as the last 100 years have shown us, you have to be very careful about the terminology. I think you are using "physical" in its everyday sense, as contrasted with "magical" as you said. Both of these categories (everyday) physical/magical are too vague and unspecified to discuss QM properly. Thus it is best to just drop them.If the underlying ontology is monist then it can only be either physical or unphysical, with human characterisation not being representative of that underlying ontology.
The underlying ontology might be monist with physical parts and unphysical parts without contradicting substance monism as physical/unphysical are epistemological categories not ontic ones.
It's best to just come away from the everyday notions and learn the proper terminology from d'Espagnat's book.
Yes.But, if it is unmodellable, that would mean that our models of the universe can never be complete
It can be both. There is something about the ontology of the world that limits scientific inquiry.but that is a comment on the limitations of scientific inquiry as opposed to a statement about the ontology of the universe.
This is applying Boolean logic to the underlying metaphysics. Which we already know cannot be true. I know this is hard to understand but QM actually prevents the logic (literally the way you are combining facts) involved in your argument. This is because QM has a non-Boolean structure, which is the feature behind all the no-go theorems like Bell and Kochen-Secker and PBR.So, there is an underlying metaphysics which gives rise to the detector flash. This means that it is determined by a prior state, even if it is to be argued that we cannot apply the conceptual label "physical" to that state. If we can't use the word state then we can say it is determined by the metaphysical nature of the system. It's still deterministic. It might not be how the word "deterministic" is used in a mathematical sense, but it is deterministic in the more general sense of being caused by the prior nature of the system.
Human language has Boolean inference built into it, thus without learning QM it is very difficult to reason about quantum systems.
It means it's shorthand because I can't give a course in Non-Boolean probability theory. It's a technical notion being approximated by its closest term in everyday language.I did see what you wrote, but perhaps I didn't fully understand it. I am questioning why you have put free in inverted commas there. When we do this, we usually mean that it is not really what it purports to be. Was that your intention to imply that we call it "free will" but it isn't really free?
I would say that although that introspection shows a degree of constraint, I don't think it implies no choice. Such an absence of choice would contradict QM which is, in the ladder of science, supposed to bedrock other empirical theories.If we're talking about free will and our choice of experiment, then there is no escaping the first-person perspective. When one pays close enough attention to the mind it is possible to question the degree to which our will is actually free. Indeed, it is possible to question the nature of "the self" to whom the will is supposed to belong, in the first place.
Through careful reflective, empirical observation, we can see that we are beholden to a form of psychological determinism. Our choice of experiment or observable isn't free, it isn't controlled by ourselves. Indeed, the very notion of "self" proves to be very elusive when subjected to scrutiny.
For if we say that our choices are dictated by our neurons, and our neurons are dictated by biochemistry, biochemistry is dictated by quantum physics and we then find quantum physics requires those choices at the start of the chain we can't close the loop. We can't terminate in a fundamental cause.
QM presents this freedom as an unanalysable primitive in the theory. You can't use other empirical facts to contradict it if you accept QM as the basis of physics. Since if QM is the fundamental theory, then ultimately all other theories will refer back to this freedom in their chains of inference. Which leads into your next point.
You will find it no surprise that many of the founders of QM (Bohr, Pauli, Oppenheimer) had many positive things to say about Eastern Philosophy for the reasons you mention here.Something occurred to me earlier, as my mind was processing all of the information from our discussion, the thought arose in my mind that when we talk about Free Will and the choice of observable, we are talking about an intrinsically first-person experience. Perhaps these no-go theorem's for QM are representative of the limitations of scientific empiricism and the need to embrace first-person empiricism and theory - namely meditation and Buddhist philosophy. I usually refer to it as spiritual empiricism because Buddhist philosophy and practice are "spiritual" practices grounded in first-person empiricism.
There is the strong implication that QM is very "first person". The only real disagreement within Copenhagen has always been how far to take this. With Bohr on one conservative end and QBists on the other more radical end. Bohr would have said that although the choice of observable is up to us, the resultant outcome is always a "global fact" accessible to all/a "shareable" experience. QBists however say exactly what you have said:
and that the outcome being shareable need not always be true.we are talking about an intrinsically first-person experience
So QM says:- We are free to "prod" the world as we wish. Nothing determines that choice.
- The world will then react back in some manner.
- You can use quantum theory to compute the various chances of reacting back. These probabilities will depend on your previous knowledge and "proddings". The theory doesn't give fixed universal probabilities. Imagine a system of ten particles. Two people who have measured particles 1,2 and 3,4 respectively will have different probabilities for what particle 5 will do.
Note that points 1 and 3 are explicitly first-person/subjective. The only disagreement would be on whether point 2 is first person. Bohr would say the reaction back can be shown to all others or shared. QBists would say not necessarily.
Personally I side with Bohr, but this could be simple reticence on my part to fully dive into what the theory implies. The last five or so years have made the QBist position more plausible I would say.
I have to say I applaud the incisiveness of your observation here. I really do recommend getting a hold of d'Espagnat's book and "QBism" by Hans von Bayers. Also if possible "Atom and Void" by Robert Oppenheimer, especially the second last chapter.0 -
I am not sure you describing Dawkins as a genetic determinist is correct I certainly don't think when he describes his views that he is one.
He seems to think freedom of choice determines your future along with your circumstance.
He is quoted as sayingDAWKINS: It's an important point to realize that the genetic programming of our lives is not fully deterministic. It is statistical -- it is in any animal merely statistical -- not deterministicDAWKINS: The phrase "the selfish gene" only means that genes are selfish. It doesn't mean that individual organisms are.
The selfish gene is giving a genetic law a layman's term. Its not about individual humans or the human species. Its the fact that each gene is out for itself. Not that there is a selfish gene. Or one gene that makes people more selfish.
I think you are confusing genotype with phenotype. Your genotype is all the genes you carry. Some of the genes you carry are not things your phenotype expresses. Your phenotype are all the observable characteristics you have ...brown eyes etc.
Your phenotype is influenced both by your genes AND your environment.
Very few scientists would subscribe to biological determinism because of the observable differences in phenotype based on environment both for animals of diff species and humans.
For example, temperature affects coat color in Siamese cats. ... Height in humans is a complex phenotype influenced by many genes, but it is also influenced by nutrition.
While the sequence of DNA (genotype) may not be affected by your environment, the way genes work called gene expression (phenotype)can.
Environmental factors such as food, drugs, or exposure to toxins can cause epigenetic changes by altering the way molecules bind to DNA or changing the structure of proteins that DNA wraps around.
Experiences your mother goes through can actually affect you years later in the womb.
The we look ...as humans is often as a result of our reaction to our environment over thousands of yrs.
If you plant flowers of the SAME species in different parts of the garden often one plant will be one colour and the other another color because of their reactions to different sunlight.
If you have the genotype for height ....and you eat a poor diet and don't exercise ...then you will probably be a lot shorter than you had the potential to be.
Its called phenotype Plasticity.
Dawkins would have been and must still be well aware of this fact. So its unlikely given what he has said and what he knows that he subscribes to genetic determinism.
Also some people have wanted to label him as that for their own purposes.0 -
I understand that it might be a bit difficult to jump back into this discussion from cold but I'll post a reply and see if we can go from there.
Ah, I appreciate you going to that trouble.I just read Smolin's book in order to explain this. Note that the terminology he uses is not really standard. Roughly speaking though Copenhagen is (using his terms) anti-realist, epistmologist and operationalist. It's more that for example Bohr cared more about the first part, Heisenberg cared more about the latter. "Care" in the sense of wrote more about. However both do acknowledge and mention the other points.
I wasn't able to get a copy of On Physics and Philosophy in ebook format bcos, unfortunately, it appears as though it isn't available in that format. I have been reading Veiled Reality as well as a few papers form d'Espagnat and I must say, thank you very much for the recommendation! His writing is very insightful, cogent, and direct. I'm certain I haven't fully grasped everything thus far, but hopefully enough to gain a more thorough understanding through discussing it.
No those are not the only possibilities, because as the last 100 years have shown us, you have to be very careful about the terminology. I think you are using "physical" in its everyday sense, as contrasted with "magical" as you said. Both of these categories (everyday) physical/magical are too vague and unspecified to discuss QM properly. Thus it is best to just drop them.If the underlying ontology is monist then it can only be either physical or unphysical, with human characterisation not being representative of that underlying ontology.
The underlying ontology might be monist with physical parts and unphysical parts without contradicting substance monism as physical/unphysical are epistemological categories not ontic ones.
It's best to just come away from the everyday notions and learn the proper terminology from d'Espagnat's book.
I have heard d'Espagnat's position characterised as "monistic idealism" but, if my understanding is correct, the use of terms like "realism" and "idealism" can be misleading, as they can be interpreted in different ways. Realism often tends to be interpreted in the context of the inter-subjective agreement we have about the phenomena we observe, things like our desks, computers, trees, etc. In this context realism tells us that we arrive at this agreement because the objects themselves exist independently of us i.e. the phenomena are representative of the "things in themselves". On the other hand, idealism says either that the former is false or that we simply cannot determine it to be true. An issue that gets raised in relation to this notion of idealism is the question of how we can arrive at inter-subjective agreement in this case.
On the subject of inter-subjective agreement, quantum mechanics seems to tell us that that the common sense notion of realism doesn't apply at the quantum level; particles cannot be said to have definite positions, yet inter-subjective agreement is still reached.
Am I correct in thinking that his "monistic idealism" is almost a hybrid of realism and idealism? The idea that there is an independent reality but we are restricted to our observations of it; that what we observe is not the "things in themselves" but shadows of them, to borrow from the Platonic interpretation. Essentially that there is a real, independent reality but we can only ever probe it through the veil of our sense perceptions. Would that be an any way accurate representation?
Would you happen to have any suggestions for introductory resources to non-boolean logic?
This is applying Boolean logic to the underlying metaphysics. Which we already know cannot be true. I know this is hard to understand but QM actually prevents the logic (literally the way you are combining facts) involved in your argument. This is because QM has a non-Boolean structure, which is the feature behind all the no-go theorems like Bell and Kochen-Secker and PBR.So, there is an underlying metaphysics which gives rise to the detector flash. This means that it is determined by a prior state, even if it is to be argued that we cannot apply the conceptual label "physical" to that state. If we can't use the word state then we can say it is determined by the metaphysical nature of the system. It's still deterministic. It might not be how the word "deterministic" is used in a mathematical sense, but it is deterministic in the more general sense of being caused by the prior nature of the system.
Human language has Boolean inference built into it, thus without learning QM it is very difficult to reason about quantum systems.
It means it's shorthand because I can't give a course in Non-Boolean probability theory. It's a technical notion being approximated by its closest term in everyday language.
I'm thinking that it should be possible, in the context of this discussion at least, to start from the ground up and define our terms as we go. I don't think we would need to get too intricate to get to the point that I am trying to make. Literally,
Utilising a Cartesian type deconstruction we can establish that, by virtue of our discussion here, there is such thing as language, which we use to try and communicate about our experience. Our experience itself establishes the fact that there is existence. We can use the term "thing" to refer to whatever can be said to exist. We don't need to define the criteria for existence or even identify what does exist. We can reason that, by virtue of our experience some "thing" exists. We also don't need to specify the nature of this "thing" that must exist. In this way, we can avoid using terms such as "physical" and "non-physical".
Developing our system of language, we can use the term Universe to refer to the totality of existence. That is, all of the things that can be said to exist are (or is) together labelled "the Universe". A consequence of this is that the Universe is only made of those things that exist and everywhere the Universe is, there must be some "thing" there.
If we apply this to our quantum system, where a particle/flash of light registers on a detector screen, we know that it must correspond to some "thing" because it is part of the Universe. It cannot correspond to no "thing" because the universe is only made up of "things" which exist. We can also know that, immediately prior to the "thing" hitting the screen, it must have been located elsewhere in the Universe. If it wasn't located elsewhere in the Universe, then it didn't exist. If it didn't exist, then it couldn't have interacted with the screen to give the flash of light. The flash of light must have been caused by some "thing" colliding with the screen. We would apply the term "determinism" to this sequence of events.
I'm not entirely sure if this might appear as though its applying boolean logic, but I would argue that it doesn't require logic at all. It is simply a matter of applying conceptual labels to our experience.
To what extent does QM require, let's call it, human free will, as opposed to libertarian free will. Does it require a "will" that makes decisions or does it just require degrees of freedom when it comes to decision making? Compatibilists like Daniel Dennett argue in favour of a conceptualisaiton of free will based on degrees of freedom in decision making i.e. the outcome of a decision is open.I would say that although that introspection shows a degree of constraint, I don't think it implies no choice. Such an absence of choice would contradict QM which is, in the ladder of science, supposed to bedrock other empirical theories.
For if we say that our choices are dictated by our neurons, and our neurons are dictated by biochemistry, biochemistry is dictated by quantum physics and we then find quantum physics requires those choices at the start of the chain we can't close the loop. We can't terminate in a fundamental cause.
QM presents this freedom as an unanalysable primitive in the theory. You can't use other empirical facts to contradict it if you accept QM as the basis of physics. Since if QM is the fundamental theory, then ultimately all other theories will refer back to this freedom in their chains of inference. Which leads into your next point.
This notion of "free will" isn't really free will though because the decision is part of a deterministic causal chain. The outcome is however open - although it is hard to see where the degrees of freedom come in, in a deterministic chain, other than in terms of our ability to predict the outcome i.e. perceived degrees of freedom.
The indeterminism of QM would offer true degrees of freedom with regard to the outcome of decisions because they would not be part of a deterministic chain of causality. This would not, however, be free will because "the will" doesn't choose the random quantum event.
Unless....and I'm literally thinking out loud here....free will (whatever it might be made of) is fundamental and the choice of which measurement to make manifests itself as a seemingly-random, quantum event which appears as biochemistry at a certain level of inspection, appears as neuronal activity at another, which manifests as our actions at the macro level?
Would it be correct to say that Bohr would have suggested that there would always be inter-subjective agreement on the outcome?You will find it no surprise that many of the founders of QM (Bohr, Pauli, Oppenheimer) had many positive things to say about Eastern Philosophy for the reasons you mention here.
There is the strong implication that QM is very "first person". The only real disagreement within Copenhagen has always been how far to take this. With Bohr on one conservative end and QBists on the other more radical end. Bohr would have said that although the choice of observable is up to us, the resultant outcome is always a "global fact" accessible to all/a "shareable" experience. QBists however say exactly what you have said:
and that the outcome being shareable need not always be true.
Without knowing the QBist position and basing it solely on what you've said here, would the QBist position be dangerously close to solipsism?
I have thought before that scientific investigation, or investigation of any kind, could just be the exploration of our own minds.
At what point do the predictions of QM start to become accurate, if they don't predict the outcomes of individual experiments?So QM says:- We are free to "prod" the world as we wish. Nothing determines that choice.
- The world will then react back in some manner.
- You can use quantum theory to compute the various chances of reacting back. These probabilities will depend on your previous knowledge and "proddings". The theory doesn't give fixed universal probabilities. Imagine a system of ten particles. Two people who have measured particles 1,2 and 3,4 respectively will have different probabilities for what particle 5 will do.
I can see how the two people would calculate different probabilities (I think) but the probability of what particle 5 will do would be close to meaningless would it not?
I'm still inclined to think that, although QM is indeterministic, the Universe itself is, at a fundamental level, deterministic because a particle which hits a detector screen cannot come from nothing. Some "thing" must collide with the detector screen i.e. it must be caused by an antecedent thing, whatever its ontological nature.Note that points 1 and 3 are explicitly first-person/subjective. The only disagreement would be on whether point 2 is first person. Bohr would say the reaction back can be shown to all others or shared. QBists would say not necessarily.
Personally I side with Bohr, but this could be simple reticence on my part to fully dive into what the theory implies. The last five or so years have made the QBist position more plausible I would say.
I have to say I applaud the incisiveness of your observation here. I really do recommend getting a hold of d'Espagnat's book and "QBism" by Hans von Bayers. Also if possible "Atom and Void" by Robert Oppenheimer, especially the second last chapter.
I must check out that book on QBism. Thanks for the recommendations!!0 -
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Particles don't have positions, not even indefinite ones. The effect a particle has on a measuring device has a position. That's the insight from the Kochen-Specker theorem.On the subject of inter-subjective agreement, quantum mechanics seems to tell us that that the common sense notion of realism doesn't apply at the quantum level; particles cannot be said to have definite positions, yet inter-subjective agreement is still reached.
Correct basically.Am I correct in thinking that his "monistic idealism" is almost a hybrid of realism and idealism? The idea that there is an independent reality but we are restricted to our observations of it; that what we observe is not the "things in themselves" but shadows of them, to borrow from the Platonic interpretation. Essentially that there is a real, independent reality but we can only ever probe it through the veil of our sense perceptions. Would that be an any way accurate representation?
Introductory I don't think so. The basic text is Svozil, K.'s Quantum Logic, but it requires a good bit of mathematical knowledge.Would you happen to have any suggestions for introductory resources to non-boolean logic?
Well it's an event, if you count that as a thing. The detection plate changed. Is a change in the detection plate a thing. Usually we say there are things, properties and events. I would say there was an event here where a property (the colour) of a thing (part of the detection plate) changed. I don't know if I'd refer to that event as a thing, no more than I'd refer to a car slowing down as a thing. The car is a thing, but I wouldn't say the slowing down was a thing.If we apply this to our quantum system, where a particle/flash of light registers on a detector screen, we know that it must correspond to some "thing"
We don't know that as it is refuted by the Kochen-Specker theorem. Assuming there was some "thing" that previously had a location prior to hitting the screen leads to a contradiction with predictions in several experiments. You're assuming spatio-temporal location to be a fundamental physical property. It would seem it is not. We have various events in our devices. Trying to tie those events together into a "thing" is barred by Kochen-Specker.We can also know that, immediately prior to the "thing" hitting the screen, it must have been located elsewhere in the Universe
You're misunderstanding.The indeterminism of QM would offer true degrees of freedom with regard to the outcome of decisions because they would not be part of a deterministic chain of causality. This would not, however, be free will because "the will" doesn't choose the random quantum event.
QM has two types of indeterminism.
The first type is the outcome of an experiment. So an experiment sets up the possibility of some type of event, some reaction in the device. There will be several possibilities. One will occur. Which one can only estimated probabilistically.
The second type is the choice of experiment, i.e. which type of device capable of what events. This isn't even probabilistic in QM, it's apparently not even analysable. It's outside the theory.
You're speaking as if the choice of experiment is the first type, i.e. a random quantum event.
Yes barring obvious things like the outcome being poorly recorded/the machine being damaged.Would it be correct to say that Bohr would have suggested that there would always be inter-subjective agreement on the outcome?
It's not. Although that requires a proper knowledge of the mathematics to see.Without knowing the QBist position and basing it solely on what you've said here, would the QBist position be dangerously close to solipsism?
Running an experiment several times to verify the frequencies is one method.At what point do the predictions of QM start to become accurate, if they don't predict the outcomes of individual experiments?
It's very meaningful as it can be checked statistically.I can see how the two people would calculate different probabilities (I think) but the probability of what particle 5 will do would be close to meaningless would it not?
Then you are believing that in contradiction not only from QM and experiment, but also no-go theorems invalidating it logically in the face of basic experiments. I think it's more likely that QM describes reality but it just doesn't conform to gut intuitive categories of thought you hold.I'm still inclined to think that, although QM is indeterministic, the Universe itself is, at a fundamental level, deterministic because a particle which hits a detector screen cannot come from nothing.0 -
I understand that particles don't have positions and that the effect a particle has on a measuring device has a position. The part I'm trying to get at is what happens prior the particle registering on the device. It seems that QM doesn't give us a complete picture of this and indeed, the no go theorems imply that no theory can give us this complete description. I don't think this means that we cannot deduce anything further however.Particles don't have positions, not even indefinite ones. The effect a particle has on a measuring device has a position. That's the insight from the Kochen-Specker theorem.
Cheers. I'll see if I can get through some of it anyway. Sometimes books like that have even just a few sentences that offer a small insight for the non-mathematically inclined. Never sufficient for a full understanding of course, but helpful nonetheless.Introductory I don't think so. The basic text is Svozil, K.'s Quantum Logic, but it requires a good bit of mathematical knowledge.
OK, so, if we take the idea here that an event occurs and that event is the change in colour of a "thing" (part of the detection plate). We can question what causes this event occur i.e. what causes the change in colour. For the sake of simplicity, I would say that there are two possible causes:Well it's an event, if you count that as a thing. The detection plate changed. Is a change in the detection plate a thing. Usually we say there are things, properties and events. I would say there was an event here where a property (the colour) of a thing (part of the detection plate) changed. I don't know if I'd refer to that event as a thing, no more than I'd refer to a car slowing down as a thing. The car is a thing, but I wouldn't say the slowing down was a thing.- The "thing" (detection plate) changes colour spontaneously, without being caused by any other "thing"
- Some secondary "thing" collides with the detection plate
Could we proceed with that?
Working on the two possible scenarios above we would either conclude that the detection plate spontaneously changes colour or that something collides with the detection plate causing it to change colour. In the former, the event occurs due to the internal dynamics of the detection plate.We don't know that as it is refuted by the Kochen-Specker theorem. Assuming there was some "thing" that previously had a location prior to hitting the screen leads to a contradiction with predictions in several experiments. You're assuming spatio-temporal location to be a fundamental physical property. It would seem it is not. We have various events in our devices. Trying to tie those events together into a "thing" is barred by Kochen-Specker.
Working on the second scenario:- We know that there is existence.
- Anything which can be said to exist we call a "thing".
- The Universe is the name given to the collection of all "things".
- Everywhere the Universe is, there must be some "thing" there.
- IF the Universe is spatially extended, then we can refer to different parts of
the Universe with the label "location" - IF the change in colour of the detector plate doesn't spontaneously occur
due to its own internal dynamics, then it must be caused by a secondary
"thing" colliding with it. - Immediately prior to colliding with the detector plate that secondary "thing"
must have been somewhere in the Universe i.e. it must have had a
location - well defined or otherwise. - The event at the detector plate would therefore have an antecedent cause.
Ah, I see. I was applying the experimental indeterminism to that of free will.You're misunderstanding.
QM has two types of indeterminism.
The first type is the outcome of an experiment. So an experiment sets up the possibility of some type of event, some reaction in the device. There will be several possibilities. One will occur. Which one can only estimated probabilistically.
The second type is the choice of experiment, i.e. which type of device capable of what events. This isn't even probabilistic in QM, it's apparently not even analysable. It's outside the theory.
You're speaking as if the choice of experiment is the first type, i.e. a random quantum event.
Is the experimental indeterminism dependent upon the freedom in the choice of experiment? Does superdeterminism negate the apparent indeterminacy of QM and remove the reliance on the notion of a free will which lies outside the the theory?John Bell wrote:There is a way to escape the inference of superluminal speeds and spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will. Suppose the world is super-deterministic, with not just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clockwork, but with our behavior, including our belief that we are free to choose to do one experiment rather than another, absolutely predetermined, including the "decision" by the experimenter to carry out one set of measurements rather than another, the difficulty disappears. There is no need for a faster than light signal to tell particle A what measurement has been carried out on particle B, because the universe, including particle A, already "knows" what that measurement, and its outcome, will be.
Ah, OK. I was just speculating. I'll have to see if I can get a better understanding of it.It's not. Although that requires a proper knowledge of the mathematics to see.
But is there a minimum number of experiments that have to be run before they become significant. For example, if we calculate the probability distribution (is that the correct terminology) for a given set-up but we only "send" one particle to the screen, then our probabilistic prediction doesn't tell us much. How many particles would we have to "send" before the predictions being to correspond to observations?Running an experiment several times to verify the frequencies is one method.
That's probably a very garbled way of saying it, but hopefully you have an idea what I am asking.
Following on from the question above:It's very meaningful as it can be checked statistically.
If you observe particles 1 and 2 and I observe 3 and 4, and we both calculate a different probability for particle 5, where I say there's a 20% probability the particle will land at position X on the screen, while you say there's a 40% probability. If the particle registers at X then which of our predictions is more accurate?
Apologies, I can't remember if you've said something on this before but is superdeterminism a possibility?Then you are believing that in contradiction not only from QM and experiment, but also no-go theorems invalidating it logically in the face of basic experiments. I think it's more likely that QM describes reality but it just doesn't conform to gut intuitive categories of thought you hold.0 -
I understand that particles don't have positions and that the effect a particle has on a measuring device has a position.I would say that there are two possible causes:
- The "thing" (detection plate) changes colour spontaneously, without being caused by any other "thing"
- Some secondary "thing" collides with the detection plate
You say you understand they don't have positions and yet engage in dealing with them as if they do immediately after. "Collide" is spatiotemporal terminology where the particle moves through locations to the location where the device is.- IF the Universe is spatially extended, then we can refer to different parts of
the Universe with the label "location"
They don't have positions so they don't collide. There are element of existence that don't have locations.
They are related. One can prove that given freedom of choice you have the indeterminacy.Is the experimental indeterminism dependent upon the freedom in the choice of experiment?
In the same sense that Lamarkian theories negate Darwinian selection, i.e. if they were correct the other would be incorrect. They aren't correct so this isn't real worth wasting thought on.Does superdeterminism negate the apparent indeterminacy of QM and remove the reliance on the notion of a free will which lies outside the the theory?
Superdeterminism doesn't just involve negating free will but also requires the universe to essentially be designed to fool us. Superdeterminism is basically the statement that a bunch of accidental errors in equipment were built into the Big Bang which means that for instance our equipment makes us think quantum mechanics is true or general relativity is true. But superdeterminism doesn't just apply in physics it applies to all of science.
For example maybe bacteria aren't what make people sick, it just so happens that every time somebody used a microscope to look at the blood of somebody ill the microscope itself happened to be dirty with bacteria that systematically match symptoms by coincidence.
To me it's a silly desperate move to evade the conclusions of QM.
If superdeterminism were true the only rational conclusion to me would be the existence of a trickster demiurge. But this is silly nonsense we don't engage with in other sciences so I don't see a reason to bother with it in QM. It can be evoked for any scientific theory.
I do, but that's basically the science of statistics. How many experiments you need to run etc is part of detailed modelling.But is there a minimum number of experiments that have to be run before they become significant. For example, if we calculate the probability distribution (is that the correct terminology) for a given set-up but we only "send" one particle to the screen, then our probabilistic prediction doesn't tell us much. How many particles would we have to "send" before the predictions being to correspond to observations?
That's probably a very garbled way of saying it, but hopefully you have an idea what I am asking.
It depends. Usually we'd have to run more tests and Bayesian update our probabilities which will begin to converge. Again though this really leading into a course in statistics.Following on from the question above:
If you observe particles 1 and 2 and I observe 3 and 4, and we both calculate a different probability for particle 5, where I say there's a 20% probability the particle will land at position X on the screen, while you say there's a 40% probability. If the particle registers at X then which of our predictions is more accurate?
Abstractly anything is a possibility. But in reality no, it's ruled out.Apologies, I can't remember if you've said something on this before but is superdeterminism a possibility?0 -
It might be more accurate to say that I understand that QM says they don't have positions.You say you understand they don't have positions and yet engage in dealing with them as if they do immediately after. "Collide" is spatiotemporal terminology where the particle moves through locations to the location where the device is.
The alternative to a particle moving through locations to collide/interact with the device at its location, giving rise to a change of colour on the detector, is that the change of colour event occurs spontaneously and is part of the inner dynamics of the detector screen, with no need to talk of particles at all - unless particles are exclusively those spontaneous events which cause detectors to change colour without interacting with anything else.
We can try to avoid the use of the term "particle" and use the very crude term "thing". If we can't use the word "location" then we can talk about a "place" within the universe.
Using this terminology we can say, immediately prior to interacting with the detector the "thing" must have been in some "place" within the universe. It must have moved from this "place" to the "place" where the detector screen was and interacted with it, to cause the detector screen to change colour. In this way, the change of colour on the detector is caused by an antecedent "thing".
If it didn't, then the change of colour was a spontaneous event within the detector screen which has no relation to the particle that we prepared as part of the experimental set-up.
So, without this freedom of choice, there is no indeterminism?They are related. One can prove that given freedom of choice you have the indeterminacy.
A first point on this, that I think sometimes gets overlooked, is the fact that superdeterminism is really just normal determinism taken to its logical conclusion.In the same sense that Lamarkian theories negate Darwinian selection, i.e. if they were correct the other would be incorrect. They aren't correct so this isn't real worth wasting thought on.
Superdeterminism doesn't just involve negating free will but also requires the universe to essentially be designed to fool us. Superdeterminism is basically the statement that a bunch of accidental errors in equipment were built into the Big Bang which means that for instance our equipment makes us think quantum mechanics is true or general relativity is true. But superdeterminism doesn't just apply in physics it applies to all of science.
For example maybe bacteria aren't what make people sick, it just so happens that every time somebody used a microscope to look at the blood of somebody ill the microscope itself happened to be dirty with bacteria that systematically match symptoms by coincidence.
To me it's a silly desperate move to evade the conclusions of QM.
If superdeterminism were true the only rational conclusion to me would be the existence of a trickster demiurge. But this is silly nonsense we don't engage with in other sciences so I don't see a reason to bother with it in QM. It can be evoked for any scientific theory.
I've heard this charge before, that if superdeterminism were true, then the Universe would have to be conspiring against us or fooling us into believing our theories are correct. I would simply see it as the limitations that exist in our exploration of the physical world. The predictions of QM remain accurate but rather than leading us to believe that the Universe is fundamentally indeterminate, our scientific theories tell us that such an indeterminate picture of the Universe is incomplete and that there are limitations to what we can observe. There is no conspiracy, just the consequences of determinism.
Obviously that is on the basis of my current understanding.
Thanks, I kind of have an understanding of that. This point was more of a tangent to the point you made about two observers observing a different pair of particles and thereby calculating a different probability for particle #5. I was just thinking that in such a scenario, the calculated probability for that single test i.e. particle 5 would essentially be meaningless.I do, but that's basically the science of statistics. How many experiments you need to run etc is part of detailed modelling.
It depends. Usually we'd have to run more tests and Bayesian update our probabilities which will begin to converge. Again though this really leading into a course in statistics.0 -
That's not the alternative, it's an alternative and one QM doesn't take. It's not part of the internal dynamics of the detector, nor does the particle collide with it. That's what QM says, it says it is neither of your alternatives.It might be more accurate to say that I understand that QM says they don't have positions.
The alternative to a particle moving through locations to collide/interact with the device at its location, giving rise to a change of colour on the detector, is that the change of colour event occurs spontaneously and is part of the inner dynamics of the detector screen
What's a "place" without a location. Place is just another word for location. So your following paragraph just reads like a rephrasing of the last one.We can try to avoid the use of the term "particle" and use the very crude term "thing". If we can't use the word "location" then we can talk about a "place" within the universe.
In Classical Mechanics one can show that conservation of angular momentum is a consequence of rotational symmetry, so one could say "without rotational symmetry there is no conservation of angular momentum". However this isn't a very interesting statement as Classical Mechanics and all the consequences of conservation of angular momentum seem to be true. It's the same here.So, without this freedom of choice, there is no indeterminism?
It's not. Provably so. Determinism doesn't imply superdeterminism so literally provably this is not the case. One can have deterministic dynamics that don't display superdeterminism (e.g. fluid mechanics) so I don't know where you are getting this from.A first point on this, that I think sometimes gets overlooked, is the fact that superdeterminism is really just normal determinism taken to its logical conclusion.
This is just literally incorrect. I think you don't understand what superdeterminism is considering you think it is similar to determinism. It isn't. Having limitations in our exploration of the physical world has already being explored and it isn't enough to break Bell's and other inequalities. That's not what superdeterminism is.I've heard this charge before, that if superdeterminism were true, then the Universe would have to be conspiring against us or fooling us into believing our theories are correct. I would simply see it as the limitations that exist in our exploration of the physical world. The predictions of QM remain accurate but rather than leading us to believe that the Universe is fundamentally indeterminate, our scientific theories tell us that such an indeterminate picture of the Universe is incomplete and that there are limitations to what we can observe. There is no conspiracy, just the consequences of determinism.
It wouldn't be meaningless, just in many cases of minimal statistical weight.Thanks, I kind of have an understanding of that. This point was more of a tangent to the point you made about two observers observing a different pair of particles and thereby calculating a different probability for particle #5. I was just thinking that in such a scenario, the calculated probability for that single test i.e. particle 5 would essentially be meaningless.0 -
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We know that QM doesn't take that alternative and we know that QM doesn't (and can't) give a complete description of the Universe. The point is to try and see what we can deduce beyond QM, if anything. I know that the no-go theorems suggest that we can't deduce anything further but that doesn't prevent us from trying. There are still questions we can pose.That's not the alternative, it's an alternative and one QM doesn't take. It's not part of the internal dynamics of the detector, nor does the particle collide with it. That's what QM says, it says it is neither of your alternatives.
There seems to issues around the use of specific terminology because of how they are interpreted in scientific theories. I'm trying to avoid these issues by taking a Cartesian approach and starting from the ground up and applying labels to describe what we can hopefully take as brute facts, without relying on boolean logic.What's a "place" without a location. Place is just another word for location. So your following paragraph just reads like a rephrasing of the last one.
I would agree that "place" is pretty much just a synonym for "location" but I am not trying to take QM as a starting point and, if you will alow the expression, reason down to reality, I am trying to start and brute, self-evident facts, apply labels to those facts and demonstrate the consequences.
Those brute facts are:- There is experience.
- There is language.
- We use language to communicate about experience.
- We use the term "existence" to label the brute fact that there is experience.
- Whatever the nature of existence is, whether we can every truly know it or
not, we use the term "reality" to describe it. - Whatever can be said to exist we describe with the label "thing".
- The label "Universe" applies to the totality of "things" [which exist].
- We can describe the different areas of the Universe with the label "place".
- The Universe is made up only of "things" which exist, therefore at every
place in the Universe there must be some "thing" there.
If we take the experiment in QM that we've been discussing, we can try to interpret it according to these brute facts. On the extreme end we can say that the experiments in QM do not represent reality at all, they tell us nothing at all about reality or how the Universe truly is. On the other hand, we can say that they are fully representative of reality. The instruments and particles, etc are the "things in themselves". In between, we can say that the objects in the experiments are our perception of the "things in themselves" and they do reveal something about reality.
According to QM itself, QM does not represent a complete description of reality. Using the above brute facts, we can see if it is possible to paint a fuller picture.
IF we consider the detector plate to be a "thing" which exists, or representative of a "thing" which exists, then we can analyse the event which is the change in colour on the detector and ask what causes this change of colour.
Given that the detector is in the Universe, it must be in a "place" in the Universe. Assuming that it stays in its place there should be no reason for it to change colour, unless there is something about the internal dynamics of the plate that causes this to spontaneously happen. If we rule this out, then we are left with the the alternative, which is that some "thing" must interact with the plate to cause it to change colour.
If some "thing" must interact with the plate to cuase it to change colour then we can talk about the moment when it changes colour and the moment prior to it changing colour. If it requires some "thing" to interact with it to change colour then prior to it changing colour that "thing" must not have been interacting with it and therefore not in the same place.
If this "thing" wasn't in the same place then it must have been in another place prior to interacting with the detector, given that it is somewhere in the Universe.
If it wasn't elsewhere in the Universe, then it didn't exist and if it didn't exist then it couldn't interact with the plate. This would mean that the change in colour must have occurred spontaneously as a result of the internal dynamics of the plate.
A key difference is that freedom of choice is very much open to question.In Classical Mechanics one can show that conservation of angular momentum is a consequence of rotational symmetry, so one could say "without rotational symmetry there is no conservation of angular momentum". However this isn't a very interesting statement as Classical Mechanics and all the consequences of conservation of angular momentum seem to be true. It's the same here.
If the Universe is truly deterministic, then the chain of causality for any event stretches right back to the Big Bang. I might be mistaking that for superdeterminism.It's not. Provably so. Determinism doesn't imply superdeterminism so literally provably this is not the case. One can have deterministic dynamics that don't display superdeterminism (e.g. fluid mechanics) so I don't know where you are getting this from.
I might be making incorrect inferences from what I've heard about superdeterminism including what Bell said about it:This is just literally incorrect. I think you don't understand what superdeterminism is considering you think it is similar to determinism. It isn't. Having limitations in our exploration of the physical world has already being explored and it isn't enough to break Bell's and other inequalities. That's not what superdeterminism is.John Bell wrote:There is a way to escape the inference of superluminal speeds and spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will. Suppose the world is super-deterministic, with not just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clockwork, but with our behavior, including our belief that we are free to choose to do one experiment rather than another, absolutely predetermined, including the "decision" by the experimenter to carry out one set of measurements rather than another, the difficulty disappears.
People talk about superdeterminism implying that the results of experiments are effectively set at the Big Bang. If we take determinism to its logical conclusion then we the chain of causality for any event would stretch back to the Big Bang also.0 -
You have to understand people have being trying this going further stuff for nearly a hundred years. You can try, but you're not going to get anywhere.We know that QM doesn't take that alternative and we know that QM doesn't (and can't) give a complete description of the Universe. The point is to try and see what we can deduce beyond QM, if anything. I know that the no-go theorems suggest that we can't deduce anything further but that doesn't prevent us from trying. There are still questions we can pose.
We can describe the things and events of phenomenal experience with the concept of "place/location". QM shows that there are aspects of reality outside of phenomenal experience to which that does not apply. Hence your analysis of the detector that follows this sentence is not correct. Whatever affected the detector was not in the same place or in a different place. The whole concept of place is just N/A to it.We can describe the different areas of the Universe with the label "place".
Is it though? It's a component of QM and QM matches experiment. I don't really see what's open to question here. It just seems to me that "open to question" really means "I will continue questioning it despite all evidence to the contrary since it seems difficult to conceive of" as is often the case when people discuss QM. Scientifically in QM there is no such open question. The theory has it as part of its structure and the theory is experimentally correct.A key difference is that freedom of choice is very much open to question.
You are. That the chain of causality stretches back to the Big Bang has little to do with superdeterminism. That's true of any deterministic model. For example the motion of a perfect fluid in General Relativity is a deterministic model with causation going back to the Big Bang but it doesn't have superdeterminism.If the Universe is truly deterministic, then the chain of causality for any event stretches right back to the Big Bang. I might be mistaking that for superdeterminism.0 -
We're not starting from a position of phenomenal experience though, in that we are not talking about the content of experience, we are starting from the brute fact of experience itself. From there we build up to using the word "place" to describe areas of the universe. We are distinguishing this from the word "location" which we use to describe our phenomenal experience.We can describe the things and events of phenomenal experience with the concept of "place/location". QM shows that there are aspects of reality outside of phenomenal experience to which that does not apply. Hence your analysis of the detector that follows this sentence is not correct. Whatever affected the detector was not in the same place or in a different place. The whole concept of place is just N/A to it.
The important point is the cause of the event. If the detector plate changes colour then we have a situation where it was dark and then changed to a lighter colour (for the sake of argument). We can ask what caused this change in colour?
Am I right in saying that QM tells us the probability of the detector changing colour, at a given location?
Does it tell us why the detector changes location i.e. what causes this change in colour?
Its a foundation assumption in QM, not based on observation. The theory is experimentally correct, but the theory also tells us that it isn't a complete description of the Universe.Is it though? It's a component of QM and QM matches experiment. I don't really see what's open to question here. It just seems to me that "open to question" really means "I will continue questioning it despite all evidence to the contrary since it seems difficult to conceive of" as is often the case when people discuss QM. Scientifically in QM there is no such open question. The theory has it as part of its structure and the theory is experimentally correct.
This quote from John Bell
seems to suggest that the absence of free will is a distinct possibility and it leads to a different interpretation of QM, namely as a theory based on absolute determinism.There is a way to escape the inference of superluminal speeds and spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will.
The very experience of free will is open to investigation through first person empiricism, by way of practices such as meditation, which involves cultivating awareness of the processes of the body, in particular mental processes. Paying such close attention to the process which gives rise to what appears to be "free will" or freedom of choice can cast serious doubt on how free that will is.
Then the absolute determinism that Bell talks about might be more in line with what I am trying to get at.You are. That the chain of causality stretches back to the Big Bang has little to do with superdeterminism. That's true of any deterministic model. For example the motion of a perfect fluid in General Relativity is a deterministic model with causation going back to the Big Bang but it doesn't have superdeterminism.0 -
I don't really get the distinction. "Place" and "location" are two words for the same thing. The Kochen-Specker theorem shows us electrons don't possess location/position as a property. These are not brute facts for all things in the universe, that's an inescapable aspect of the Kochen-Specker theorem. There are things which don't have a location or a position.We're not starting from a position of phenomenal experience though, in that we are not talking about the content of experience, we are starting from the brute fact of experience itself. From there we build up to using the word "place" to describe areas of the universe. We are distinguishing this from the word "location" which we use to describe our phenomenal experience.
It is due to the particle in some sense. No mechanism is described.The important point is the cause of the event. If the detector plate changes colour then we have a situation where it was dark and then changed to a lighter colour (for the sake of argument). We can ask what caused this change in colour?
Am I right in saying that QM tells us the probability of the detector changing colour, at a given location?
Does it tell us why the detector changes location i.e. what causes this change in colour?
It's not a foundational assumption of QM, it follows from QM's axioms. It's a theorem within QM.Its a foundation assumption in QM, not based on observation. The theory is experimentally correct, but the theory also tells us that it isn't a complete description of the Universe.
The theory not being a complete description of the universe doesn't affect the content of this theorem. In fact they are related. It is the same structure, Non-Booleanity, that gives both the freedom of choice result and the inability to completely describe the world results.
This is the problem with reasoning about a theory you don't know. QM models the world as Non-Boolean. That leads to randomness, freedom of choice and inability to completely describe the world. So the lack of a total description is not something that can negate the free choice theorem since they are both reflections of a deeper experimentally verified structure. Only the refutation of that structure will do and thus far the logic of events seems to be non-Boolean so that is a no-go.
More than this do you not see a common issue in all your threads and discussions of physics. You start with iron certainty about your own philosophical preconceptions. You then find physical theories that refute them. Instead of just going "oh well that was incorrect" you chase increasingly obscure philosophical rabbit holes gleamed from out of context quotes without learning the theory, looking for the barest glimmer of a stalemate that might at least make your intuitions not totally impossible despite no theory matching experimental evidence conforming to them.
I've given you this advice before, but learning about physics from out of context quotes from a debate you don't know the general terms of is not helpful. I mentioned this to you before earlier in this thread and in another thread.This quote from John Bell
seems to suggest that the absence of free will is a distinct possibility and it leads to a different interpretation of QM, namely as a theory based on absolute determinism.
Bell is quoting in summary form an early form of the idea that would later be known as superdeterminism. The idea when fully worked out involves absolute determinism, but that is not all it involves. Superdeterminism is a very very special case of determinism, so it will involve absolute determinism, but there is more to it than that. The extra bits you seem to be unaware of is why it is considered ridiculous.Then the absolute determinism that Bell talks about might be more in line with what I am trying to get at.
Absolute determinism of the style you are conceiving of cannot replicate the predictions of QM, to even have a slim chance you have to go further to superdeterminism.0 -
I'm trying to approach things from a different angle and trying to describe the point as I see it. There seems to be issues with using certain specific terms given how they are interpreted in scientific theories, so I am trying to elucidate my own thinking without tripping over those terms. I'm not so much trying to understand what QM says about the world, as I have a vague understanding of that - obviously far from complete. I am instead trying to elucidate the issue as I see it and why indeterminism seems to be an incomplete description of the world.I don't really get the distinction. "Place" and "location" are two words for the same thing. The Kochen-Specker theorem shows us electrons don't possess location/position as a property. These are not brute facts for all things in the universe, that's an inescapable aspect of the Kochen-Specker theorem. There are things which don't have a location or a position.
If we take the brute fact that there is a Universe which consists only of "things" that exist then, if there is more than one "thing" in the Universe they must be in different places within the Universe. If the Universe is a one single entity, then we can still talk about different "places". This isn't as a result of boolean logic this would be as a result of taking a Descartes like approach to thinking about reality and applying conceptual labels when we talk abstractly about reality.
This is the critical point! In what sense is it due to the particle?It is due to the particle in some sense. No mechanism is described.
If we establish that the change in colour is caused "in some sense" by the particle then we can establish that prior to the change in colour the particle must have been "in some sense" somewhere in the Universe. Not on the basis of applying boolean logic but because of the brute facts that the Universe is made up only of things which exist and if the particle exists in any sense, then it must have been in the Universe and not interacting with the detector. We can legitimately ask, where was it? If the answer is, "nowhere in the Universe", then the particle simply does not exist and cannot interact with detector to cause it to change colour.
This might sound like Boolean logic, but if we imagine ourselves with a "God's-eye view" where we simply apply labels to the things which exist in the Universe, then we would label the particle as a "thing" and we would see it interact with another "thing". This interaction is what manifests as the phenomenon of the colour change. If the one "thing" doesn't interact with the other "thing" then there is no manifestation of the colour change.
In what sense is it "unanalysable" and "outside the theory" then?It's not a foundational assumption of QM, it follows from QM's axioms. It's a theorem within QM.
Are you referring to the Conway-Specher theorem here?The theory not being a complete description of the universe doesn't affect the content of this theorem. In fact they are related. It is the same structure, Non-Booleanity, that gives both the freedom of choice result and the inability to completely describe the world results.
The experience of "free will" doesn't require logic, non-boolean or otherwise, to be investigated. It's experiential and can be investigated through first person empirical practice. When observed closely, the notion that we have of free will turns out to be much less certain than it seems.This is the problem with reasoning about a theory you don't know. QM models the world as Non-Boolean. That leads to randomness, freedom of choice and inability to completely describe the world. So the lack of a total description is not something that can negate the free choice theorem since they are both reflections of a deeper experimentally verified structure. Only the refutation of that structure will do and thus far the logic of events seems to be non-Boolean so that is a no-go.
Now is probably not a great time to mention that I was going to revisit one of those threads.More than this do you not see a common issue in all your threads and discussions of physics. You start with iron certainty about your own philosophical preconceptions. You then find physical theories that refute them. Instead of just going "oh well that was incorrect" you chase increasingly obscure philosophical rabbit holes gleamed from out of context quotes without learning the theory, looking for the barest glimmer of a stalemate that might at least make your intuitions not totally impossible despite no theory matching experimental evidence conforming to them.
What are the extra bits to absolute determinism?I've given you this advice before, but learning about physics from out of context quotes from a debate you don't know the general terms of is not helpful. I mentioned this to you before earlier in this thread and in another thread.
Bell is quoting in summary form an early form of the idea that would later be known as superdeterminism. The idea when fully worked out involves absolute determinism, but that is not all it involves. Superdeterminism is a very very special case of determinism, so it will involve absolute determinism, but there is more to it than that. The extra bits you seem to be unaware of is why it is considered ridiculous.
Absolute determinism of the style you are conceiving of cannot replicate the predictions of QM, to even have a slim chance you have to go further to superdeterminism.0 -
No because position and location are not fundamental properties things must possess. It's like saying everything must exist with different flavours or musical themes. Some objects don't carry sound, some things have no flavour. For somethings the concept of position is N/A.If we take the brute fact that there is a Universe which consists only of "things" that exist then, if there is more than one "thing" in the Universe they must be in different places within the Universe.
No, see above. We can't establish this any more than we can say the particle "must have" had a musical background.If we establish that the change in colour is caused "in some sense" by the particle then we can establish that prior to the change in colour the particle must have been "in some sense" somewhere in the Universe.
To be honest I have said several times at this point that particles don't have a position. You keep saying back "they must" despite the fact that this contradicts experiment via the Kochen-Specker theorem.
Boolean logic is ultimately the statement that there is a God's eye view where you can apply labels. That's what's false. You think you are not using Boolean logic, but you are. Deep down it is part of human intuition, part of how we combine truths and mentally frame them. Unfortunately it is not correct for all of reality.This might sound like Boolean logic, but if we imagine ourselves with a "God's-eye view"
The theory provides no mechanism for its occurrence but its existence is a consequence of the axioms.In what sense is it "unanalysable" and "outside the theory" then?
This isn't relevant to the point. It's a consequence of QM. You might feel it is less true when you sit down and meditate, others report the opposite but so what. When I sit and observe the world I don't see Lorentzian geometry, but Lorentzian geometry is true.The experience of "free will" doesn't require logic, non-boolean or otherwise, to be investigated. It's experiential and can be investigated through first person empirical practice. When observed closely, the notion that we have of free will turns out to be much less certain than it seems.
Quantum Theory has freedom of choice as a basic consequence of its Non-Boolean nature. That non-Boolean nature is experimentally verified. I think this is just another form of your "gut" overriding external evidence.
Superdeterminism you mean?What are the extra bits to absolute determinism?0 -
I'm replying to this first bcos I think it underpins much of what we are talking about.Boolean logic is ultimately the statement that there is a God's eye view where you can apply labels. That's what's false. You think you are not using Boolean logic, but you are. Deep down it is part of human intuition, part of how we combine truths and mentally frame them. Unfortunately it is not correct for all of reality.
The God's-eye view might have caused more confusion than clarity bcos it might be give rise to the impression that we can view the Universe at a more fundamental level and see "things in themselves" much like how we perceive the world around us on a phenomenological level, just at a more fundamental level of reality. That wasn't the intention.
I think the Zen Buddhist saying applies here, "the finger pointing to the moon, is not the moon". We can interpret this to mean that the conceptual labels that we apply to the world are not the "things in themselves". Reality is beyond conceptualisation and beyond imagination. We can however use conceptual labels to "point" in the direction of the underlying reality.
As per the brute facts that we started with:
There is experience and there is language. This is self evident. The "experience" is an example of how we apply conceptual labels. Experience itself is not conceptual and no amount of words can ever capture what experience is. But we still apply a conceptual label to this brute fact.
We also apply the label "exist". We can move froward from here and say that there is existence. Not on the basis of boolean logic but bcos we are using language to label brute facts. We can go further and say that whatever it is that exists we can apply the label "thing". We don't need to specify what it is that actually exists, or even define the criteria for existence, we can simply say that whatever it is, we will call it "thing". This allows us to attempt to discuss it further, it allow us to try to use the finger to point to the moon.
The issue is that I am not explaining what I mean clearly enough. There might be an issue with the inadequacy of language in this regard coupled with the pre-existing interpretations. How I am perceiving your use of the the terms "place" and "location" is I think you are using them in the sense of defining position relative to co-ordinate system or relative to objects in phenomenological experience. Am I correct in that?No because position and location are not fundamental properties things must possess. It's like saying everything must exist with different flavours or musical themes. Some objects don't carry sound, some things have no flavour. For somethings the concept of position is N/A.
No, see above. We can't establish this any more than we can say the particle "must have" had a musical background.
To be honest I have said several times at this point that particles don't have a position. You keep saying back "they must" despite the fact that this contradicts experiment via the Kochen-Specker theorem.
That is not how I intend to use it however. I accept that such notions do not apply at a fundamental level. I am trying to use the terms in a much broader way to mean being in the Universe or a part of the Universe. In this sense, if something exists it is located in the Universe or it is part of the Universe.
We might say that propositions such as in don't apply because of how we generally tend to use them, but in the absence of a more specific term, we have to use it to point to what is meant. In this case, something which exists is in the Universe or part of the Universe.
It may be a consequence of the axioms but free will is an experiential phenomenon (or noumenon) and as such, it is open to investigation.The theory provides no mechanism for its occurrence but its existence is a consequence of the axioms.
Free will, if it is true, is open to investigation through first person empirical practice.This isn't relevant to the point. It's a consequence of QM. You might feel it is less true when you sit down and meditate, others report the opposite but so what. When I sit and observe the world I don't see Lorentzian geometry, but Lorentzian geometry is true.
What is the process by which this "free will" is exercised? How does an experimenter freely choosing the settings in an experiment?
Are you familiar with work in the field of psychology pertaining to a phenomenon called priming? Priming is an example of how choices that we believe we freely make are subconsciously affected by the outside environment unbeknownst to us. Metnalists such as Derren Brown and Keith Barry trade on their ability to influence people's seemingly free choices. What appears to be them reading their audiences mind is actually the result of suggestive manipulation to influence the audience member to give the answer they are directing them towards.
Free will is, supposedly something that we all possess and exercise on a regular basis. As such, it is open to investigation.Quantum Theory has freedom of choice as a basic consequence of its Non-Boolean nature. That non-Boolean nature is experimentally verified. I think this is just another form of your "gut" overriding external evidence.
Yes, sorry, what are the extra bits that need to be added to absolute determinism to give us superdeterminism?Superdeterminism you mean?
I want to try to get back to this point because I think it got overlooked when you were challenging my "God's eye view" statement.It is due to the particle in some sense. No mechanism is described.
In what sense is the change in colour due or cause by the particle?0 -
It may be a consequence of the axioms but free will is an experiential phenomenon (or noumenon) and as such, it is open to investigation.Free will, if it is true, is open to investigation through first person empirical practice.Free will is, supposedly something that we all possess and exercise on a regular basis. As such, it is open to investigation.
Of course it is open to these things, that's not in dispute. However like all aspects of QM no solid evidence has come forth to discount the free choice aspect of QM.Are you familiar with work in the field of psychology pertaining to a phenomenon called priming? Priming is an example of how choices that we believe we freely make are subconsciously affected by the outside environment unbeknownst to us. Metnalists such as Derren Brown and Keith Barry trade on their ability to influence people's seemingly free choices. What appears to be them reading their audiences mind is actually the result of suggestive manipulation to influence the audience member to give the answer they are directing them towards.
Also I think you are confusing QM's free choice and Free Will. "Free Choice" is much broader. It's the statement that ultimately no account can be given of how the device settings were chosen. This seems to be correct as nobody has been able to give a mechanistic account of the ultimate origin of device settings.
Just continuously saying "it's open to investigation" is fine. It is and everything we've investigated is compatible with QM.
Similarly the time is open to investigation from an empirical first person perspective and meditative practices have had people proclaim time is non-existent. Turns out they seem to be wrong due to relativity.
I don't see anything worthwhile to this particular line of discussion since it just seems to be about reifying your intuition instead of discussing what an empirically supported theory actually says.
You seem to have a very either/or approach to this and many other things. Of course decisions can be influenced that doesn't contradict free choice.
However more in general psychology is already finding strong evidence that human decisions aren't pre-determined in the manner you seem to be aiming for:
https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.05684
These more advanced studies show human decision making conforming to exactly what QM says it should by breaking contextuality bounds.
This is why I don't place much value in these sort of pseudo-philosophical discussions. Often they're just a jargon coated presentation of intuitions picked up as a child. I place much more value in actually doing experiments. And we see that when human choices are examined closely they break correlation inequalities associated with a deterministic account. You're going to have to explain that instead of just coming up with fancy phrasings of "but it can't be true, a guy on TV made somebody pick a card".
Non-computable fine-tuned correlations without spatial bounds and infinite information storage capacity in any piece of matter.Yes, sorry, what are the extra bits that need to be added to absolute determinism to give us superdeterminism?
There's no evidence for these features.
It wouldn't occur without the particle.I want to try to get back to this point because I think it got overlooked when you were challenging my "God's eye view" statement.
In what sense is the change in colour due or cause by the particle?0 -
As I mentioned above you will have to provide actual evidence against what QM says. Such as showing an example of experimental settings being given ultimately by a deterministic mechanism. Or giving a reason why the paper:
https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.05684
is wrong.
Everything else you've said is just either "we can investigate it" to which the reply is "yes, we have and you seem to be wrong". Or "the following must be true" when it seems in fact it isn't.
You seem to have a massive problem with modern physics despite the wealth of experimental evidence in its favour and even in spite of no-go theorems and specific studies targeting your objections and showing them wrong.
Can I ask what motivates this? Do you not think at some point you'd just accept the world doesn't operate like your intuitions?0 -
I'm moving this from the bottom because I think it is critical to either my point, or my understanding the error in my thinking and I don't want it to get lost among the other points:
OK, so the change in colour on the detector plate would not occur without the particle. How does the particle cause this change in colour on the plate? What does the particle do to cause this change or how do the plate and the particle interact to cause the change in colour?It wouldn't occur without the particle.
Also, we can point to two different moments in our experiment:- The moment the change in colour occurs.
- Any moment prior to when the change in colour occurs.
In the moments prior to the change in colour, does the particle exist in some sense [in the Universe]?
This is the point I was driving at with this questionAlso I think you are confusing QM's free choice and Free Will. "Free Choice" is much broader.To what extent does QM require, let's call it, human free will, as opposed to libertarian free will. Does it require a "will" that makes decisions or does it just require degrees of freedom when it comes to decision making? Compatibilists like Daniel Dennett argue in favour of a conceptualisaiton of free will based on degrees of freedom in decision making i.e. the outcome of a decision is open.
This would just seem to point to an incompleteness in the theory. Ultimately, the choice of device settings is made by the experimenter so we don't need a mechanistic account of their decision making process, we can observe it directly ourselves. Much has been written in Buddhist philosophy relating to this very subject.It's the statement that ultimately no account can be given of how the device settings were chosen. This seems to be correct as nobody has been able to give a mechanistic account of the ultimate origin of device settings.
in our discussion on time you referred to the success of QFT as evidence for the validity of the Einsteinian interpretation of time. Am I correct in saying that this discussion on freedom of choice relates directly to QFT?Similarly the time is open to investigation from an empirical first person perspective and meditative practices have had people proclaim time is non-existent. Turns out they seem to be wrong due to relativity.
As I mentioned, I had been planning to revisit our discussion on time with regard to one particular point. I won't go into it here however.
I do genuinely appreciate your engaging in discussions like this, even if I sometimes forget it myself. Particularly if you don't see anything worthwhile in it. I know that I might come across as a science denier but I wouldn't class myself as such. There are certain conclusions within scientific theories that I would question and challenge on the basis of reason and logic - as far as my own reason and logic will allow - but I don't go around advocating for stuff like homeopathy. These are ultimately philosophical musings.I don't see anything worthwhile to this particular line of discussion since it just seems to be about reifying your intuition instead of discussing what an empirically supported theory actually says.
You seem to have a massive problem with modern physics despite the wealth of experimental evidence in its favour and even in spite of no-go theorems and specific studies targeting your objections and showing them wrong.
Can I ask what motivates this? Do you not think at some point you'd just accept the world doesn't operate like your intuitions?
If we know that choices can be influenced, then we can explore the degree to which decisions are influenced. We can examine the process of decision making. We can do this from a first-person empirical observation.You seem to have a very either/or approach to this and many other things. Of course decisions can be influenced that doesn't contradict free choice.
What would you say is the dynamic of how a decision is influenced? This would probably begin by setting out who/what makes the decision and what that process entails.
I would suggest a potential issue with the paper is something that the authors themselves allude to.However more in general psychology is already finding strong evidence that human decisions aren't pre-determined in the manner you seem to be aiming for:
https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.05684
These more advanced studies show human decision making conforming to exactly what QM says it should by breaking contextuality bounds.
As I mentioned above you will have to provide actual evidence against what QM says. Such as showing an example of experimental settings being given ultimately by a deterministic mechanism. Or giving a reason why the paper:
https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.05684
is wrong.
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.05684.pdfOne might question another aspect of our experimental design: the fact that the respondents were not allowed to contravene their instructions and make incorrect choices (e.g., choose two “high” options or two “low” options in Experiments 1-4). The main reason for this is that in a crowdsourcing experiment, with no additional information about the respondents, it is difficult to understand what could lead a person not to follow the simple instructions
The emboldened bit there is pretty important, I feel. Essentially, it says that without additional information about the respondents it is difficult to understand why they would make the decision not to follow simple instructions. That is, it is difficult to know why they made the choice they did. This can be extended to those participants who did follow the simple instructions. Without such additional information about them, it is difficult to know why they made the decision to follow the instructions.
A further potential issue is that the authors seem to be relying on a particular, limited example of the phenomenon of priming, along the lines described in Daniel Kahneman's Thinking, fast and slow.“What is the first word that comes to your mind when you hear the word DAY?” The researchers tallied the frequency of responses, such as “night,” “sunny,” or “long.” In the 1980s, psychologists discovered that exposure to a word causes immediate and measurable changes in the ease with which many related words can be evoked. If you have recently seen or heard the word EAT, you are temporarily more likely to complete the word fragment SO_P as SOUP than as SOAP. The opposite would happen, of course, if you had just seen WASH. We call this a priming effect and say that the idea of EAT primes
the idea of SOUP, and that WASH primes SOAP
As Kahneman goes onto say:Another major advance in our understanding of memory was the discovery that priming is not restricted to concepts and words. You cannot know this from conscious experience, of course, but you must accept the alien idea that your actions and your emotions can be primed by events of which you are not even aware
From the authors' "Snow Queen" paper that they reference:
[quote=Snow Queen is Evil and Beautiful:
Experimental Evidence for Probabilistic Contextuality in Human Choices]
The design of the experiment is similar to other behavioral imitations of the EPR/BB paradigm:- the choice of an axis is replaced by a choice between two options, the options corresponding to each α-axis being two characters from a story,
- and the options corresponding to each β-axis being two characteristics which characters from the story may possess.
The choices are offered to many people in a crowdsourcing experiment, and the probabilities are estimated by the proportions of people making this or that pair of choices. The expectation is that a respondent who understands the story line would choose a “correct” combination of a character and a characteristic (e.g., either Gerda and Beautiful, or the Troll and unattractive[/quote]
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1711.00418.pdf
It seems to be a bit of a stretch to go from the above to the conclusion that people have freedom of choice - especially given the issue alluded to in the paper you referenced.
From Thinking, fast and slowStudies of priming effects have yielded discoveries that threaten our self-image as conscious and autonomous authors of our judgments and our choices. For instance:- A study of voting patterns in precincts of Arizona in 2000 showed that the support for propositions to increase the funding of schools was significantly greater when the polling station was in a school than when it was
in a nearby location. - A separate experiment showed that exposing people to images of
classrooms and school lockers also increased the tendency of participants to support a school initiative. The effect of the images was larger than the difference between parents and other voters!
The study of priming has come some way from the initial demonstrations that reminding people of old age makes them walk more slowly. We now
know that the effects of priming can reach into every corner of our lives.
Reminders of money produce some troubling effects. Participants in one experiment were shown a list of five words from which they were required to construct a four-word phrase that had a money theme (“high a salary desk paying” became “a high-paying salary”). Other primes were much more subtle, including the presence of an irrelevant money-related object in the background, such as a stack of Monopoly money on a table, or a computer with a screen saver of dollar bills floating in water.- Money-primed people become more independent than they would be without the associative trigger. They persevered almost twice as long in trying to solve a very difficult problem before they asked the experimenter for help, a crisp demonstration of increased self-reliance.
- Money-primed people are also more selfish: they were much less willing to
spend time helping another student who pretended to be confused about an experimental task. When an experimenter clumsily dropped a bunch of pencils on the floor, the participants with money (unconsciously) on their mind picked up fewer pencils. - In another experiment in the series, participants were told that they would shortly have a get acquainted conversation with another person and were asked to set up two chairs while the experimenter left to retrieve that person. Participants primed by money chose to stay much farther apart than their nonprimed peers (118 vs. 80 centimeters).
- Moneyprimed undergraduates also showed a greater preference for being alone.
This ignores all the other influences on our decisions from cultural upbringing and education, to the myriad other stimuli in our environment.
We can try a very simple experiment here if you like. It simply requires you to pay attention to the process by which you make a decision.Everything else you've said is just either "we can investigate it" to which the reply is "yes, we have and you seem to be wrong". Or "the following must be true" when it seems in fact it isn't.
Task: Choose a movie and reply here with the name.
The examples of Brown and Barry were just obvious examples which I referenced along with the effect of psychological priming. The book by Daniel Kahneman references a number of studies on this subject.This is why I don't place much value in these sort of pseudo-philosophical discussions. Often they're just a jargon coated presentation of intuitions picked up as a child. I place much more value in actually doing experiments. And we see that when human choices are examined closely they break correlation inequalities associated with a deterministic account. You're going to have to explain that instead of just coming up with fancy phrasings of "but it can't be true, a guy on TV made somebody pick a card".
That being said, the examples of Borwn and Barry are still examples that require explanation. As does the very notion of freedom of choice. What is it? Who/what has it? How is it exercised? Can we investigate it? Is it falsifiable?
Thank you. This is another piece of information which will help me to do some research. I'll try and put this to a proponent of Superdeterminism and see what response they give.Non-computable fine-tuned correlations without spatial bounds and infinite information storage capacity in any piece of matter.
There's no evidence for these features.0 -
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