A Tyrant Named Miltiades! wrote: » Lately, however, Sartre's Sketch on emotions seems incapable of withstanding the scientific criticism that is implied by biological determinism ("BD").
A Tyrant Named Miltiades! wrote: » Whilst... BD express doubts, or reject, the idea of "consciousness", BD has convincingly rubbished very idea of Free Will.
A Tyrant Named Miltiades! wrote: » The idea is - and it is difficult to reject - that human beings are, in fact, prisoners of our biology or (per Dawkins), our genes. Free will is a myth we tell ourselves, it is belief our ability to act with freedom that lacks any scientific or reasonable basis.
A Tyrant Named Miltiades! wrote: » BD has convincingly rubbished very idea of Free Will
A Tyrant Named Miltiades! wrote: » The idea is - and it is difficult to reject - that human beings are, in fact, prisoners of our biology or (per Dawkins), our genes. Free will is a myth we tell ourselves, it is belief our ability to act with freedom that lacks any scientific or reasonable basis. Am I wrong? I'd hate to think that I finally persevered through BEING AND NOTHINGNESS for no good reason. How can this conclusion be avoided?
A Tyrant Named Miltiades! wrote: » The more Sartre's Theory of Emotion was ridiculed, the more. I convinced myself that this was a predictable response from people clinging to myths about themselves and their unwillingness to accept personal responsibility.
A Tyrant Named Miltiades! wrote: » Sartre's Sketch ... the idea of "consciousness" ... idea of Free Will, a basic and necessary element of existentialism
Fourier wrote: » It has? In the relevant sciences, neurology and genetics being two, there is still back and forth discussions on whether Free Will exists and to what extent. I don't think it has been convincingly rubbished in any sense.
Black Swan wrote: » You introduce several complex and interesting discussion points Miltiades. Given my limitations at the moment, I will attempt to touch upon one or two, and return later when time permits. This position of biological determinism appears to be solidly on the Nature side of the Nature vs nurture argument. Some may question if nurture was biologically determined too?
Unlike hard line biological determinists, behaviourists tended to include both Nature and nurture in their models; but nurture with considerable limitations in definition, content, and context.
5uspect wrote: » I’m not sure what you’re saying here, in the final chapter of The Selfish Gene, Dawkins argues that we are not slaves to our genes.
A Tyrant Named Miltiades! wrote: » Can you name any biologists who believe in the concept of free will?
A Tyrant Named Miltiades! wrote: » Scientists can accept that which is observable or can be inferred -- where is this free will? Describe it?
Fourier wrote: » Libet's original studies that started the "No Free Will" in a big way in neurology are being criticised in the last few years as not showing what Libet claimed. This lack of conclusivity to experiments is much more important than what people believe.
Humans don't seem to be predictable in many scenarios. That's an observable fact. To claim that this unpredictability can be removed by detailed knowledge of neuronal tissue is itself a conjecture that is not observed or inferrable from what is currently known. There's no onus on one side in particular here. Demonstrating Free Will involves showing the unpredictability cannot be removed, showing it false requires showing it can. We know the most fundamental levels of reality are autonomous/free, so it wouldn't be completely unprecedented in science for something to be "Free".
By referring to Libet's "claims" being since "criticised" you almost make it sound as if this research has become less credible over time. In fact, it's the other way around. Libet's research was originally far more controversial than it is today. The basic thrust of his observations -- that ostensibly free choices are in fact determined by neural activity before the subject is conscious of having made a 'choice' -- has been reproduced in subsequent research. The concept of scientific/ biological determinism has never been less controversial.
As an aside, I find it very interesting that much of the criticism of LIbet's work, and criticism of biological determinism itself, seems almost to dwell on why BD should not be true, or mustn't be true, because of the moral consequences for human society
You also say "there is no onus on one side here". It reminds me of something Adina Roskies... There is no scientific evidence in favour of autonomous human freedom
The field remains highly controversial. The significance of findings, their meaning, and what conclusions may be drawn from them is a matter of intense debate. The precise role of consciousness in decision making and how that role may differ across types of decisions remains unclear
What do you mean by the sentence "We know the most fundamental levels of reality are autonomous/free"? Can you expand on that? Because it reads to me like you might actually be referring there to randomness
Fourier wrote: » That's not my reading of the neurological literature. Libet's work was originally criticised and then became accepted more during the 1990s. Since the mid-2000s further studies have been done that have left the state of the whole area more complex and confusing with no clear conclusions.
Humans having Free Will is just as in line with the evidence as the alternative. Human predictability is quite low in many circumstances.
Subatomic systems' behaviour is not controlled by other physical facts. Thus what they do seems autonomous from other physical systems. This is not the same as the popular conception of randomness.
As the boundaries of knowledge in neuroscience are pushed further out, it is entirely to be expected for the landscape of knowledge should grow more complex, like a blind man regaining his sight. When in the process of scientific discovery doesn't that happen? I don't see how growing complexity can be used to refute the studies that have reproduced Libet's work.
and eventually a panel of medical experts affirmed that Whitman's behaviour was due to a tumour
Wiki wrote: During the autopsy, Chenar discovered a "pecan-sized" brain tumor,[58] which he labeled an astrocytoma and which exhibited a small amount of necrosis. Chenar concluded that the tumor had no effect on Whitman's actions. These findings were later revised by the Connally Commission: "It is the opinion of the task force that the relationship between the brain tumor and Charles J. Whitman's actions on the last day of his life cannot be established with clarity."
Knowing this, then even if Libet et al. had never conducted their research into brain activity and conscious decision-making, we should still be extremely skeptical about some invisible, quasi mystical 'driving force' within our brains (souls?), when we know that we are constantly doing strange things because of our biochemistry and neuroanatomy which, in retrospect, can cause us surprise or alarm that we behaved in those ways.
No, it isn't. There is literally no scientific evidence for the existence of free will.
In fact, the trend in neuroscience over the past 100 years or so, has been to increasingly demonstrate biological reasons for human behaviour. It is only in the past 70 years or so we've even known about ADHD, the biochemistry of depression, schizophrenia, and even epilepsy. 30 years ago we didn't even know about various personality disorders, now we know they have a genetic component, as does alcoholism. The march of biology is moving in a very clear direction, and it isn't favouring the omnipotent humunculus.
Why would quantum indeterminacy be relevant here? It shows unpredictability, for sure, but that's not necessarily at odds with biological determinism.
The fact that we cannot predict (or understand) aspects of our brain doesn't cause us to resort to "Oh well it must be my mystical free will instead"
Fourier wrote: » I never said the complexity itself was refutation.
Experts say it is not conclusive:
A Tyrant Named Miltiades! wrote: Knowing this, then even if Libet et al. had never conducted their research into brain activity and conscious decision-making, we should still be extremely skeptical about some invisible, quasi mystical 'driving force' within our brains (souls?), when we know that we are constantly doing strange things because of our biochemistry and neuroanatomy which, in retrospect, can cause us surprise or alarm that we behaved in those ways. This is a false dichotomy. The options are not between total biochemical determinism or a supernatural soul/magic force. Nobody would argue that biochemistry affects our behaviour and that our control over our actions can be diminished in various circumstances. It is a leap though to go from this to total biochemical determinism.
A Tyrant Named Miltiades! wrote: Knowing this, then even if Libet et al. had never conducted their research into brain activity and conscious decision-making, we should still be extremely skeptical about some invisible, quasi mystical 'driving force' within our brains (souls?), when we know that we are constantly doing strange things because of our biochemistry and neuroanatomy which, in retrospect, can cause us surprise or alarm that we behaved in those ways.
Can you provide a scientific reference that states clearly that Free Will has been refuted in the opinion of the neurological community?
However note some people do think it is relevant. Can you explain why it's not at odds with biological determinism? It's not an easy argument to make in my experience involving subtle effects like decoherence.
Not refutation perhaps, but you appear to be suggesting that growing complexity (again, to be expected) is contributing to discrediting Libet et al.
Said. In 1966...
It's a bigger leap to go to the mystical concept of Free Will
cause them to be skeptical about the idea of a Free Will
That's the point. I'm not saying it's proof, I'm asking that you consider the direction of the evidence
No. I don't have the resources to do a survey on this. I just haven't ever come across a biologist who believes in a metaphysical kind of free will, of the kind that Sartre believed to be true (which was, after all, the point of this thread)
Well the obvious answer to that is that you cannot rule out some unknown deterministic processes underlying quantum mechanics
Fourier wrote: » No as I said it is the lack of a consensus or clear conclusions. I'm not even really sure what complexity contributing to discrediting would mean. Regardless it's not the complexity.
No they still aren't conclusive:https://www.dailytexanonline.com/201...rs-brain-tumor
Fourier wrote: A Tyrant Named Miltiades wrote: Well the obvious answer to that is that you cannot rule out some unknown deterministic processes underlying quantum mechanics That has been ruled out. Conclusively.
A Tyrant Named Miltiades wrote: Well the obvious answer to that is that you cannot rule out some unknown deterministic processes underlying quantum mechanics
A Tyrant Named Miltiades! wrote: » You're the one who raised the issue of increasing complexity. You said "further studies have been done that have left the state of the whole area more complex and confusing" -- what, then did you mean by that?
You cannot have meant that the question has become more confused/ complex because of discoveries in favour of some invisible, unobserved Free Will which lacks any scientific explanation, so what then?
Have you read the article you cite?
It can't be though, can it, in principle. Asking you to disprove "Bohmian mechanics", however ridiculous, is like asking a scientist to prove that free will doesn't exist.
Peregrinus wrote: » It seems to me that the quick-and-dirty objection to absolute biological determinism is this: it doesn't correspond with our observations or experiences. We observe and experience ourselves to be making choices all the time. "Ah", you may say, "but this may be illusory." Indeed it may. But one of the fundamental axioms of the scientific method is that our empirical observations are not illusory; they are not are not delusions; there is an objective external reality and our observations and experiences meaningfully correspond to it. If this is not so, then we can never learn anything objectively true by observation or experimentation. Of course, we can't prove that this is so, since any attempted proof that this is so must rely on observations and experiments whose validity, as a mathod of proof, depends on it being so. Thus, circular reasoning. So, instead, the meanignfulness and significance of our observations and experiences is one of the axioms on which the scientific method depends. And arguing that our experience of choice is, in reality, delusional and does not correspond to exertnal reality is a direct attack on that axiom and, therefore, on the whole of the scentific method.
Fourier wrote: » Miltiades wrote: Well the obvious answer to that is that you cannot rule out some unknown deterministic processes underlying quantum mechanics. That has been ruled out. Conclusively.
Miltiades wrote: Well the obvious answer to that is that you cannot rule out some unknown deterministic processes underlying quantum mechanics.
roosh wrote: » There are a few prominent physicists who would disagree with that, aren't there? Lee Smolin being the most prominent.
The notion of Superdeterminism hasn't been (or perhaps can't be) ruled out, has it?
@Fourier, you've mentioned that "subatomic systems' behaviour is not controlled by other physical facts". This appears to be a statement about indeterminism which naturally refutes determinism. If we apply this notion to the double slit experiment, where we have a flash of light registering on the screen. This would imply that nothing physical precedes the particle registering on the screen. We might then ask, at the moment immediately prior to the particle registering on the screen, what physical state was it in?
If it wasn't in some kind of physical state then what kind of state was it in? If it wasn't in some physical state immediately prior to registering on the screen, then how was it able to interact with the screen?
Fourier wrote: » And no I wouldn't say many prominent physicists argue for determinism in QM. The view of the overwhelming majority in light of the evidence is that determinism is invalidated. Not only is there no working deterministic theory, but we know none can exist without several kinds of fine tuning which makes them unnatural.
Fourier wrote: » Firstly Smolin does not advocate determinism for QM. I'm not about to give a course in his views on Quantum Gravity, but it's not about determinism. It's about focusing more on an aspect of QM called relationism.
Helge Krach - Amercian Scientist" wrote: the theory Smolin seeks...must be deterministic, meaning that the future state of a system is completely determined by the laws of physics acting on the present state.
Graham Farmelo - nature wrote: Like Einstein, Smolin is a philosophical ‘realist’ — someone who thinks that the real world exists independently of our minds and can be described by deterministic laws.
Lee Smolin - Space.com wrote: The most important thing I'm doing in my new work is taking seriously the role of nonlocality. [Nonlocality refers to the ability of objects to influence the actions of other objects that are very far apart in space and time.] If you want to give a realistic, complete description of what's going on when you have two particles or more that have interacted and are what we call "entangled," then how you choose to manipulate one of the particles can influence the others, even if they're very far apart. And this means that you have to take seriously that influences aren't constrained by the idea that things only affect what is near to them.
Fourier wrote: » Superdeterministic theories require fine-tuning. The issue with them has nothing to do with Free Will, but in their deficiencies as predictive physical theories.
Fourier wrote: » "Physical state" is an ambiguous phrase. QM gives it a quantum state, which is a description of the probabilities for outcomes of subsequent measurements. If you're asking what it's like independent of anybody measuring it, QM doesn't speak about that.
Fourier wrote: » In QM one makes a preparation. That is you set up some kind of physical system like a hot cathode ray or a laser. Then you pick how to measure this system, e.g. do you use a photo-detection screen or do you use a homodyne detector. What happens at the measurement equipment is not determined completely by any other physical fact, that's the random part of QM. Also whether there is a particle there or not depends on the measurement choice. If I use a photo-detection screen then I can talk about the laser being composed of photons, if I use a homodyne detector I can't. So the composition of objects is context dependent.
Fourier wrote: » QM also has a deeper form of indeterminism. Which is that nothing controls the choice of measurement equipment/context. It's not even random like the measurement outcomes, it's outside the theory.
roosh wrote: » The point was that determinism has been conclusively ruled out, when I don't believe that this is the case. The many worlds interpretation, along the lines of Everett, is a deterministic interpretation of QM which hasn't conclusively been ruled out, therefore the notion of determinism itself hasn't been ruled out.
I'm not sure about the fine tuning argument and how it makes it seem "unnatural", I think the anthropic argument speaks to that, doesn't it? Either way, superdeterminism is simply determinisim taken to its natural conclusion, and that would mean that the universe is deterministic.
Is a quantum state something other than physical?
If we stick with the idea that QM doesn't speak about the state of a system independent of being measured; we can still ask the question, what is the state of the system immediately prior to measuring it?
If QM doesn't speak about this, then does QM fail to give a complete description of the physical world? If it is in a quantum state, does this mean that quantum states are not physical and therefore the universe is dualistic?
If we take the photon arriving at the photo-detection screen (this presumably means that the electron collides with some other particle and a photon is emitted which then arrives at the screen). We can ask what causes the flash of light on the photo-detection screen, where does it come from?
If we don't have a deterministic answer then I struggle to see how we have a complete answer, or one that doesn't invoke some form of dualism.
There is that word "choice". There are those who argue that free will is a foundational assumption of QM (or science in general). Is this the kind of free will that the Conway-Kochen-Specher paper talks about?
Even taking all of the above into consideration, there doesn't appear to be any room for free will in any of the paradigms of scienctific inquiry.
roosh wrote: » If our actions/choices are the result of quantum randomness then this is just another form of determinism over which we have no control and our will, therefore, is not free.
Fourier wrote: » If we adopt this notion of "not ruled out", then it hasn't been ruled out if there is a civilization living inside the sun or if small pandas live inside our cells. Virtually nothing would be ruled out under this definition. However in terms of actual scientific research yes they have been ruled out. Quantum Field Theory doesn't have the tensor product decompositions necessary to support Many Worlds and similar issues hold for other deterministic interpretational positions. They all have the potential to replicate only non-relativistic quantum theory in non-thermal states once they have been fine-tuned. And even that hasn't been fully proved.
Fourier wrote: » I'm not going to argue about Smolin's position, he doesn't advocate determinism. Simple as that. If you disagree quote the relevant equations in his papers, not pop science articles.
Lee Smolin - Einstein's Unfinished Revolution wrote: Thus, if you are a realist and a physicist, there is one overriding imperative, which is to go beyond quantum mechanics to discover those missing features and use that knowledge to construct a true theory of the atoms. This was Einstein’s unfinished mission, and it is mine. The power of physics comes from its laws, which dictate how nature changes in time. They do this by transforming the state of the world as it is now to the state at any future time. A law of physics functions in some ways like a computer program: it reads in input and puts out output. The input is the state at a given time; the output is the state at some future time.* Along with the computation comes an explanation of how the world changes in time. The law acting on the present state causes the future states. A successful prediction of the future state is taken as a validation of that explanation. The prediction is deterministic, in that a precise input leads to a precise output. This confirms a belief that the information that went into describing the state is in fact a complete description of the world at one moment of time. This concept of a law is basic to a realist conception of nature and, as such, transcends any one theory.
Fourier wrote: » What I mentioned above has nothing to do with the anthropic principle. Superdeterministic theories are ruled out on the basis of empirical evidence, only a set of measure zero in their parameter space replicates current observations. Thus by Bayesian reasoning they are ruled out.
Fourier wrote: What happens at the measurement equipment is not determined completely by any other physical fact
roosh wrote: at the moment immediately prior to the particle registering on the screen, what physical state was it in?
Fourier wrote: QM gives it a quantum state, which is a description of the probabilities for outcomes of subsequent measurements. If you're asking what it's like independent of anybody measuring it, QM doesn't speak about that.
roosh wrote: QM doesn't speak about the state of a system independent of being measured; we can still ask the question, what is the state of the system immediately prior to measuring it?
Fourier wrote: You can give it a state prior to measurement. The quantum state, which describes the probabilities of possible future measurements.
Fourier wrote: No. In QM you cannot ask that. Furthermore QM and its resulting no-go theorems tell you that you will not get the answer for that.
Fourier wrote: Furthermore as I mentioned above you can't even talk about a "photon" unless you use the appropriate apparatus. If you had used a Homodyne detector the results wouldn't have been comprehensible in terms of photons. "Photons" are just a type of mark in certain devices.
Fourier wrote: I don't know what you mean by dualism, but what I've described is what QM says. It tells you the probability of the outcomes of various measurements and those probabilities have been verified in real life experiments.
Fourier wrote: Yes. That QM requires choice leaves no room for choice? Could you explain that. I would say there is clearly room for it in QM, since QM requires it.
I'm not familiar with the work of many (or indeed any) tenured physicists releasing books and/or actively advocating that there is a civilization living inside the sun or small pandas living inside our cells, whereas there are a number of prominent physicists who do actively promote the many worlds interpretation i.e. they don't consider it to be ruled out. There are also prominent pyhsicists who advocate a realist interpretation. Are you familiar with any of the work by Sean Carroll?
I might defer to Smolin himself on this one.
Is there a paper that you could point to on this. Genuinely, I am always on the lookout for more information.
I'm not sure if you're aware of how you are aware of how you are evading the question, but if we look at our exchange again. We're talking about how QM rules out determinism. Broadly speaking, I'm asking questions in the direction of realism, while you are, broadly speaking, defending a radical anti-realist position similar that of Bohr, commonly known as the Copenhagen interpretation - this is distinct from other anti-realist approaches such as quantum epistemology or operationalism (or the shut-up-and-calculate position).
The issue is, I'm asking about the state of the system prior to measurement
Here, the question is evaded again. You talk about the probability of the particle being measured at a specific location on the screen, when the question was about the state of the system prior to being measured.
Do we take this to mean that the system was not in a physical state prior to being measured? I think the literature talks about "beables" as opposed to observables. If it was in a physical state, then we have determinism. If it wasn't then we have either dualism (of the Cartesian variety) or spontaneous manifestation out of nothing, that we can somehow predict probabilistically.
If we can't ever describe that, then fair enough, but that doesn't mean that the mark on the device wasn't in a physical state prior to being detected
This just begs the question, how does nothing interact with a measuring device to manifest as something?
Firstly, can I ask if you agree that free will is a foundational assumption of QM?
Fathom wrote: » I struggle with the free will concept. It's been discussed here in various ways; but has it been conceptually defined?
Fathom wrote: » Quantum randomness? To what extent would indeterministic dynamics allow for a very small attribution to free will? Free will (in addition to other variables) as a label that refers to something that alters the probability distribution over allowed outcomes.
Fathom wrote: » I ponder to what extent research design may exhibit some small measure of free will? For example the Free Will Theorem of Conway and Kochen suggests: "It is usually tacitly assumed that experimenters have sufficient free will to choose the settings of their apparatus in a way that is not determined by past history."
Fourier wrote: » Of course there aren't people advocating these things, it was just for emphasis. I am familiar with Carroll's work. The point is that they think they can make a deterministic theory. They've been saying this for nearly 70 years at this point. Not one person has managed to progress any such theory beyond non-thermal finite system non-relativistic QM, i.e. they can only replicate a tiny fraction of modern Quantum Theory and even there there are significant gaps in their attempts. Theorems unproven that mean even this tiny fragment isn't secured. And we know that even if they do secure this fragment they'll only do so after fine tuning. In any other area of science we would call this "ruled out". A minuscule fraction of people with nothing to show after 70 years with impossibility proofs preventing natural versions of what they advocate. It's ruled out.
Fourier wrote: » I asked for Smolin's papers, not pop science material. If you look at his papers it is relational.
Fourier wrote: » https://arxiv.org/abs/1208.4119
Fourier wrote: » I'm not evading questions. I'm just describing quantum theory. That's the way it is, not my fault. Copenhagen isn't anti-realist, though that is a common phrasing in popular science books. It's non-representational. What is "Quantum Epistemology"?
Fourier wrote: » You have to be clear about what you mean by "state". The reason you think I am evading questions is because you're not familiar with physics terminology as I have mentioned to you before. State has a specific meaning in physics. You want to know the metaphysical nature of the system prior to measurement (a separate notion to "state"). QM does not tell you that.
Fourier wrote: » I'm not evading the question, you're using the wrong terminology. It does give the system a state as defined in physics. If you're asking does it give a metaphysically representational state. The answer to that is no, as I have already explained. I've answered your question before, not evaded it.
Fourier wrote: » You'll need to use correct terminology. QM gives a state, but not a metaphysically representational one. I don't really understand why the absence of a metaphysically representational state implies Cartesian dualism. There are several other options. For example the underlying ontology could be a non-mathematical monist one. There are several options here, I don't see how your two options are the only ones. See the work of Bernard d'Espagnat "On Physics and Philosophy" for a more complete list of possibilities.
Fourier wrote: » Again you need to be more precise. You mean to say "that doesn't mean there wasn't a metaphysical state of affairs". If a physical theory cannot describe something then that does mean there is no physical state, since "physical state" refers to a description of a system in a physical theory.
Fourier wrote: » Yes, in the specific sense meant in QM. That the choice of observable is free. Note you go on to speak about indeterminism, this isn't what the term "Free Will" in QM refers to. It's that nothing, not even quantum probabilities, dictate the choice of observable. Quantum probability dictates the chances of the outcomes associated to a given observable once one is chosen. It does not dictate the choice of observable itself. Nothing physical does according to the theory.
roosh wrote: » The reason they haven't ruled it out is bcos they find the interpretation you are advocating deeply unsatisfying.
So, Smolin's own characterisation of his position isn't sufficient?
Thanks, I'll give this a look over. Anything from a journal?
Quantum epistemologists argue that QM doesn't deal with what is real in the world but rather only ever talks about our knowledge of the world.
Your answer was that it does give the state of the system prior to measurement. You said that this is a quantum state. But you also said that the quantum state gives the probability of future measurement outcomes. So, it doesn't then give the state of the system prior to measurement, it gives the probability of a measurement outcome.
It's when we ask the question about how a physical measurement can manifest from something non-physical - as it must, if the measurement isn't determined by prior physical "facts" (or is "beables" the better term here) - that we arrive at some form of Cartesian Dualism.
This seems to beg a number of questions: yes the observable that is chosen is open, it is free, it is not predetermined but where does the "will" come into it? Who or what "wills" the choice of observable; how are observables chosen; by what process are choices made
Fourier wrote: » I know all this, I have read most of their technical articles. What I'm describing is what QM itself says. They aren't satisfied with that, but there is no evidence at all for their positions and theorems proving they're not able to replicate parts of QFT. That's not a characterisation of his own position. See this paper:https://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.12468.pdf Section 3.1
Fourier wrote: » Do you mean Quantum Bayesians or QBism? There isn't an interpretational position called Quantum Epistemology.
Fourier wrote: » A lot of this back and forth is due to your misuse of the word "state" and "physical". Physical means as described by a physical theory or can be described by a physical theory. "Physical State" is then the description of an object in a theory. For example in Newtonian gravity a gas cloud has a physical state. This state only describes the cloud's mass distribution so it isn't a exhaustive description of the cloud. It is still a physical state though as it is a description of the cloud in a physical theory. Metaphysical and physical are not the same. Metaphysical is as such "how things truly are", physical is "the description given by a physical theory". The latter might not inform you of everything about the former and in fact in many theories, not just QM, it is quite different from it. For example the macrostate in Statistical Mechanics. We don't arrive at Cartesian dualism then. As I said Bernard d'Espagnat goes through several possible ontologies of which Cartesian dualism is simply one. It's a fact that this doesn't arrive at Cartesian dualism. As I said we might arrive at a non-mathematical monism.
Fourier wrote: » QM doesn't tell you. And since the idea of a theory underneath QM is so strongly prohibited and shown to require fine tuning to an unnatural degree, it is virtually certain that you cannot know how an observable is chosen.
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