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Questions about induction and God

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  • #122
    Mark Hamill
    Registered Users, Registered Users 2 Posts: 7,834 ✭✭✭Mark Hamill


    jjn2 wrote: »
    I have explained why I (and many important philosophers) think inductive reasoning is unjustified. This doesn't in any way mean that I think we should abandon science though! You can either read the link

    http://ls.poly.edu/~jbain/philsci/philscilectures/08.Induction.pdf

    to see why the success of inductive reasoning isn't a justification for inductive reasoning.

    Yeah, I think that whole argument, and your points, are based on a simple misunderstanding of what the word "justified" means. Inductive reasoning is justified by its success. The simple fact that it works so well and so often for us does justify our continued reliance on it. This does not make it infallible (it can still be flawed and there may still be situations were it doesn't apply or we can't get it to work) or falsifiable (it is an unprovable assumption), but that doesn't mean we can't approach each and every new situation using it as our first tool to make hypotheses with, we just need to be able to set it aside if and when a better alternative comes along. Of course, you need to propose a better alternative to justify putting aside something which offers so much success.


  • #123
    jjn2
    Registered Users, Registered Users 2 Posts: 74 ✭✭jjn2


    Knasher wrote: »
    Superfluous to what exactly. I'm happy to accept that the assumptions of science are superfluous to reality, as reality will exist or not exist independent of our understanding of it. If you mean they are superfluous to science, by which we derive an understanding of reality, then you are clearly wrong and I don't see how I can spell that out further. But lets be honest, the assumptions of science are as truisms in every arena beyond science, science is just pedantic enough to spell them out as they really are, unverifiable assumptions. I accept these assumptions, not because I am making a leap of faith that they are true, but simply because science, so far, has been the only reliable way for us to learn anything.

    We learn something, but the value of learning something is contingent on whether or not it is true. Science teaches us a lot, if inductive reasoning actually works. The assumption that pink unicorns exist teaches us that pink unicorns exist, this is useful if they exist, and useless if they don't exist. With no prior way of knowing how probable our assumption is of actually being true, I don't see how the (possible) knowledge obtained from an assumption is vindicates our making it.
    I would be interested to know how you derived your more general understanding of coin tossing (in this example) without relying on science or the assumptions underlying it. I would also like to know how you would differentiate between the necessity for further explanation for the phenomenon and your current understating. In my view you are simply tossing a coin in the air and offering no explanation for anything you are observing, hardly the simplest explanation that Occam's razor endorses.

    The more general understanding I referred to was under the assumption of science working. What I meant to show was that as I understand Occam's razor, if at any point we need to assume that a phenomenon has occurred before we have any reason to think it has occurred, we are better off not making that assumption to start with. Whether that be, the possible pattern in the the coin tossing experiment, under the initial normal scientific assumptions, or the possible uniformity of nature, under no initial assumptions.

    In any event, I have to admit defeat to some extent, I can't see the specific flaw(s) in my argument, but I can't see that it's particularly convincing. At this stage, with regard to the claim that Occam's razor would get rid of our assumption of uniformity of nature, while I am not convinced that it wouldn't, I also can't say that I'm convinced that it would. If the former is the case, it would obviously mean that while our assumption of uniformity of nature is no more justified than any other assumption, it is more vindicated.
    I'm not going to expand on this simply because I can't read your mind so I can't say what your definition of a moderate christian is or what beliefs they should hold. For example, the belief that god is omnipotence is a logically impossible position, omniscience is incompatible with free will and omnibenevolence is incompatible with both (at least without misconstruing the meaning of words), all of these are mainstream beliefs, but are internally contradictory, but I obviously can't say if you would accept them as moderate christian beliefs or not. So without knowing what your beliefs exactly are, I really can't say if they are in conflict with science or not.

    I would have taken omnipotence to mean the capacity to do anything that is possible. I also would have taken omniscience to mean knowing all that is knowable, and hence that free will and omniscience aren't necessarily contradictory. The problem with this is presumably that the omniscience described in the Bible is possibly taken to have a broader meaning than the one I've described, I don't know, since I know next to nothing about theology. In any event, it wouldn't be my belief that it's possible for God to do something impossible.
    Naz_st wrote: »
    I've only skimmed through the thread, so apologies if this has already been said, but isn't this whole line of argument ultimately pointless? I mean, it seems to me to be trying to argue against an axiom.

    If you want to think about, or interact with, reality in any meaningful way it requires of you to accept certain axioms (e.g. I'm not a brain in a jar, I'm not in the matrix, etc). None of these axioms can ever be proved (that's the nature of an axiom) so any debates about them are pointless. Induction is simply one of those. You have to work under the assumption that the physical laws of the universe aren't going to randomly change tomorrow, otherwise nothing will ever make sense.

    As to what Induction has to do with God, I'm not clear. One is something which has to be taken as an axiom for the universe to make sense, the other isn't (the universe makes sense, more sense really, without the assumption of God's existence).

    There were really two points I was trying to make, firstly, that induction is an axiom (in the sense of being an unprovable assumption we make), this is widely accepted, and I didn't expect it to be controversial, but maybe because I phrased it badly, some people disagreed.

    Secondly, that there is no inherent reason to choose this "axiom of induction" (I avoided using the word axiom, because the axiom of induction has a different, and more well known meaning in mathematics). If we first accept induction and science, we might in dealing with some problems choose to employ hyperbolic geometry. This is perfectly valid, but the motivation for choosing our initial axioms is non-existent. The universe makes as much sense without assuming anything to do with induction, it is just a possibly very disordered universe about which we know nothing.
    King Mob wrote: »
    If all ideas in science are not subject to revision, why then has Newtonian physics given way to Quantum and Einsteinian physics? Why are people working on theories that modify, correct or overturn even these ideas?

    It's because science only assumes induction conditionally.

    I don't think there is much to be said, since as far as I can tell, you are simply ignoring the current state of philosophy of science. Kuhn's scientific revolutions for example make it very that science undergoes huge revisions at times, and smaller revisions constantly, but also that science can't work without inductive reasoning allowing us to use positive results to draw general conclusions, and to identify what exactly might have gone wrong when our experiment falsifies our prediction.
    Again, I never ignored statistics, I just stated that it is a practical convenience of science but you are arguing about the philosophical level of science.

    Because science uses both deductive and inductive reasoning, the "problem" of induction simply is not a problem.

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EYPapE-3FRw

    Statistics aren't a convenience of science, the explicit use alone is hugely important, but the implicit use of statistical inference is at the heart of the philosophy of science. That video is very good, but there is a flaw in it, widely recognized today in the philosophy of science, that we have know way of knowing what exactly we have falsified, unless we use inductive reasoning to analyze our experimental outcomes.

    For somebody who has accused me of not reading your posts, it's remarkable to me that you could have interpreted anything I have said as implying that the LHC is inherently a waste of our efforts (of course a cost-benefit analysis might suggest that it actually is a waste of money)


  • #124
    [Deleted User]
    Posts: 0 ✭ [Deleted User]


    jjn2 wrote: »
    I don't think there is much to be said, since as far as I can tell, you are simply ignoring the current state of philosophy of science. Kuhn's scientific revolutions for example make it very that science undergoes huge revisions at times, and smaller revisions constantly, but also that science can't work without inductive reasoning allowing us to use positive results to draw general conclusions, and to identify what exactly might have gone wrong when our experiment falsifies our prediction.
    I'm not ignoring anything, I'm trying to get you to actually address what I'm typing, which is the basic mechanism of science.

    For example, the constant revision and refining of science, which is only possible because all the things we know are only accepted conditionally depending on the evidence.
    If this is not the case, how do you think that science can be revised if we accept things as absolutes?
    jjn2 wrote: »
    Statistics aren't a convenience of science, the explicit use alone is hugely important, but the implicit use of statistical inference is at the heart of the philosophy of science. That video is very good, but there is a flaw in it, widely recognized today in the philosophy of science, that we have know way of knowing what exactly we have falsified, unless we use inductive reasoning to analyze our experimental outcomes.
    Then please explain to me, on the philosophical level were precisely statistics comes into the results of the example I outlined?
    Lets take the example of the Higgs-boson.
    The hypothesis gained from inductive reasoning about the standard model of particle physics is that at certain energy we will observe a particle with certain behaviour.
    The experiment produces the conditions needed for that particle to exist.
    It is a negative result if, no particle is observed, or a particle with a different behaviour is produced.
    It is a positive result if the particle is observed and exhibits the predicted behaviour.

    None of that requires statistics or induction, the particle is either observed or it is not.
    jjn2 wrote: »
    For somebody who has accused me of not reading your posts, it's remarkable to me that you could have interpreted anything I have said as implying that the LHC is inherently a waste of our efforts (of course a cost-benefit analysis might suggest that it actually is a waste of money)
    And this is a prime example of you either not reading or misunderstanding what I typed.

    It was a rhetorical point. I was illustrating the fact that even though the Higgs-boson is inferred from the standard model using maths and inductive logic it is not accepted as a fact, nor will it even have a chance to be until they are able to observe it. And this is why they are spending billions on experiments. If you have another explanation for why scientists are so keen to spend this much money, I'd love to hear it.

    And this point was to again point out that the problem of induction is made redundant because science does not deal in absolutes gained from inductive logic. It only holds conditional positions back up by empirical observation until it is replaced by better evidence.
    Something that Richard Feynman details quite well in that video.


  • #125
    robindch
    Moderators, Society & Culture Moderators Posts: 24,458 Mod ✭✭✭✭robindch


    Naz_st wrote: »
    it seems to me to be trying to argue against an axiom.
    Yes, that's what jjn2 is doing.
    Naz_st wrote: »
    I've only skimmed through the thread, so apologies if this has already been said, but isn't this whole line of argument ultimately pointless?
    Yes. The argument also applies to the Flying Spaghetti Monster (praise be his holy name).
    Naz_st wrote: »
    As to what Induction has to do with God, I'm not clear.
    jjn2's ultimate aim appears to be to argue that the conditional acceptance of an axiomatic assumption concerning the universality of physical law constitutes "faith", and that since religion is also "faith", that believing the christian deity exists is no less unreasonable, in structural terms, than believing that the sun will rise tomorrow.

    It's not a convincing argument.


  • #126
    jjn2
    Registered Users, Registered Users 2 Posts: 74 ✭✭jjn2


    King Mob wrote: »
    I'm not ignoring anything, I'm trying to get you to actually address what I'm typing, which is the basic mechanism of science.

    For example, the constant revision and refining of science, which is only possible because all the things we know are only accepted conditionally depending on the evidence.
    If this is not the case, how do you think that science can be revised if we accept things as absolutes?

    What you're typing isn't the basic mechanism of science, I believe it is your misunderstanding of the basic mechanism of science! Using inductive reasoning to analyze our experimental results doesn't (and couldn't) give absolute results, it allows us to attach degrees of confidence to our conclusions and generalize our results.
    Then please explain to me, on the philosophical level were precisely statistics comes into the results of the example I outlined?

    Lets take the example of the Higgs-boson.
    The hypothesis gained from inductive reasoning about the standard model of particle physics is that at certain energy we will observe a particle with certain behaviour.
    The experiment produces the conditions needed for that particle to exist.
    It is a negative result if, no particle is observed, or a particle with a different behaviour is produced.
    It is a positive result if the particle is observed and exhibits the predicted behaviour.

    None of that requires statistics or induction, the particle is either observed or it is not.

    Absent induction, if the particle is observed, you don't know if the general theory that Higgs-bosons exist is true, or if you simply observed a one off unrepresentative particle, which might never again be observed. In this case, you really are in the same position as if you'd never done the experiment (note, only absent induction).

    If the particle isn't observed, you don't know if the prediction was wrong, or perhaps if some simple principle on which your prediction was based was wrong. You just know that something went wrong. In order to pinpoint the final prediction as the mistake, you would need to have a degree of confidence (implicitly statistically based), in all the underlying theories, and not just the theory which you are currently testing. How do you know that the LHC is constructed correctly? Without induction, the earlier absence of falsifications in basic testing provides you no reason to trust that the LHC actually does what it's meant to do.
    And this point was to again point out that the problem of induction is made redundant because science does not deal in absolutes gained from inductive logic.

    This sentence sums up your misunderstanding of the problem of induction. The problem of induction isn't that we can't get absolute certainty from our application of inductive reasoning, but that we have absolutely no reason to believe that our inductive reasoning will yield correct conclusions.


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  • #127
    Knasher
    Registered Users, Registered Users 2 Posts: 2,370 ✭✭✭Knasher


    jjn2 wrote: »
    The more general understanding I referred to was under the assumption of science working.

    In any event, I have to admit defeat to some extent, I can't see the specific flaw(s) in my argument, but I can't see that it's particularly convincing.
    As I see it you are trying to use science to say that the assumptions underlying science are unnecessary (under Occam's razor). The flaw is that science is a necessary part of your argument, so your conclusion, if held, invalidates your argument. You are also trying to provide an exemption from Occam's razor in order to avoid that flaw, which could be considered special pleading. At least those are the main reasons your argument failed to convince me.


  • #128
    robindch
    Moderators, Society & Culture Moderators Posts: 24,458 Mod ✭✭✭✭robindch


    jjn2 wrote: »
    [...] we have absolutely no reason to believe that our inductive reasoning will yield correct conclusions.
    Would you be happy to jump from the top of a tall building?


  • #129
    [Deleted User]
    Posts: 0 ✭ [Deleted User]


    jjn2 wrote: »
    What you're typing isn't the basic mechanism of science, I believe it is your misunderstanding of the basic mechanism of science! Using inductive reasoning to analyze our experimental results doesn't (and couldn't) give absolute results, it allows us to attach degrees of confidence to our conclusions and generalize our results.
    And that's what scientists do practically for convenience but it doesn't show that science is dependant on inductive logic.
    jjn2 wrote: »
    Absent induction, if the particle is observed, you don't know if the general theory that Higgs-bosons exist is true, or if you simply observed a one off unrepresentative particle, which might never again be observed. In this case, you really are in the same position as if you'd never done the experiment (note, only absent induction).
    But that wasn't the premise of the experiment I stated.
    The theory predicts that a particle with certain characteristics will/can exist in certain conditions.
    Observing a particle with those exact same characteristics, even if it only ever exists that one time ever, confirms the theory. No statistics, no induction, just empirical observation.
    jjn2 wrote: »
    If the particle isn't observed, you don't know if the prediction was wrong, or perhaps if some simple principle on which your prediction was based was wrong. You just know that something went wrong. In order to pinpoint the final prediction as the mistake, you would need to have a degree of confidence (implicitly statistically based), in all the underlying theories, and not just the theory which you are currently testing.
    If the particle isn't observed then they theory is not confirmed. You can go back and try to figure out what went wrong with induction, but this is not much different to coming up with the theory via induction in the first place, which I've already stated involves induction.
    jjn2 wrote: »
    How do you know that the LHC is constructed correctly? Without induction, the earlier absence of falsifications in basic testing provides you no reason to trust that the LHC actually does what it's meant to do.
    And these are practical problems, not philosophical ones as I stipulated.
    jjn2 wrote: »
    This sentence sums up your misunderstanding of the problem of induction. The problem of induction isn't that we can't get absolute certainty from our application of inductive reasoning, but that we have absolutely no reason to believe that our inductive reasoning will yield correct conclusions.
    1) I'm not agruing that the problem is due to the fact that you can't get absolute certainty. I'm saying (and have repeated several times) that the problem is only a problem for claims of absolutes, which science does not make.
    2) And I agree that inductive reasoning will not always yield correct conclusions. Science accounts for this by doing experiments and observations. It's the answer to the question about the LHC you've dodged twice.
    The history of science is a long list of incorrect conclusions made by inductive reasoning, and even the theories of today might possibly join them if new evidence is found.

    So again, because science does not claim absolutes or relies on inductive logic, the problem of induction does not apply.


  • #130
    Zombrex
    Closed Accounts Posts: 25,848 ✭✭✭✭Zombrex


    jjn2 wrote: »
    This sentence sums up your misunderstanding of the problem of induction. The problem of induction isn't that we can't get absolute certainty from our application of inductive reasoning, but that we have absolutely no reason to believe that our inductive reasoning will yield correct conclusions.

    That isn't the problem of induction. There are lots of reasons to believe that induction will yield correct conclusions (as Robin says, consider throwing yourself off a building and see the power of inductive reasoning)

    The problem of induction is that we cannot philosophically justify our beliefs formed based on induction as they work on assumptions that are themselves discovered through induction (eg induction is valid because the universe will continue to act as it has been as demonstrated by the fact that it has acted that way up to now)

    The lesson to take from Hume is to be skeptical of conclusions reached through induction, not to abandon it. Hume himself argued that we have to rely on induction simply out of necessity.

    I think you are over stating the conclusions that arise from the problem of induction.


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