Questions about induction and God

jjn2

These questions are for anyone who thinks that a belief in the existence of God is irrational, stupid or can't be reconciled with science.

Firstly, do you think there is a conclusive answer to the problem of induction? If so, what do you think it is?

Secondly, if you do think there is a real problem with induction, what makes believing in God different from believing in induction? What separates belief in induction, from belief in counter-induction, or from belief in a slightly modified version of induction, where, for example, induction holds whenever it isn't in contradiction with Christian theology?


I'm not claiming that this is in any way an argument for the existence of God, and I'm not trying to catch anyone out. I've just been curious about these questions for a while, and since I didn't study philosophy, I don't really know where to look for their answers.

Turtwig

It's quite simple really. What reason does anyone give as to why we should assume a deity exists in the first place? Usually this reason is full of waffle, keruffle and relies heavily on appeals of ignorance to subjective notions such as complexity. It doesn't matter how logical your argument is if this initial assumption is utter tripe, which in my view, it pretty much always is. God may exist, but to assume so because, well, because, is just silly.

robindch

I'm not quite sure what you mean here. Induction, so far as I understand it, applies to domains like maths and logic and not to the physical world which is mapped to maths only by convention. That's assuming you're not applying the term "induction" to "solve" irresolvable conjectures/assumptions like the universality of physical law.

I have no idea at all how you're applying either of those two meaning of "induction" to resolve the existence or non-existence of one or more deity figures.

Perhaps you could clarify?

jjn2

Jernal wrote: »

It's quite simple really. What reason does anyone give as to why we should assume a deity exists in the first place? Usually this reason is full of waffle, keruffle and relies heavily on appeals of ignorance to subjective notions such as complexity. It doesn't matter how logical your argument is if this initial assumption is utter tripe, which in my view, it pretty much always is. God may exist, but to assume so because, well, because, is just silly.

I accept that this isn't an argument for the existence of God, nor is it an argument for the assumption of the existence of God. My question (and point) was that since there doesn't seem to be any argument for the validity of induction (certainly this is the case if you don't believe that the problem of induction has been well solved), what makes an unfounded belief in God different from an unfounded belief in induction?

wylo

Jernal wrote: »

It's quite simple really. What reason does anyone give as to why we should assume a deity exists in the first place? Usually this reason is full of waffle, keruffle and relies heavily on appeals of ignorance to subjective notions such as complexity. It doesn't matter how logical your argument is if this initial assumption is utter tripe, which in my view, it pretty much always is. God may exist, but to assume so because, well, because, is just silly.

How many humans have ever lived , 90 - 100 billion? Lets be very conservative here and say 30 billion of them have created a very strong belief in some element of "something more than what they see in front of them". Some people have even had "God" experiences. Throughout different cultures, throughout the millenia, humans have channeled this through their own religion/ceremonys/sacred areas/ interpretations. Some of the greatest scientists in the world were deep in faith.

Now, yes, most of that is as a result of being told it by someone else, and the beleif engrained in their brain from a young age.


But Im of the view, while people shouldnt assume God exists, it would be just as foolish, ignorant and unscientific to assume that 30 billion peoples behaviours is based on nothing more than ignorance and stupidity. And thats why the question should be addressed.

I dont believe in God, but I really really dont beleive in assuming that people who have had experiences are just "wrong". Agnostic really

You mean vampires are real???

jjn2

robindch wrote: »

I'm not quite sure what you mean here. Induction, so far as I understand it, applies to domains like maths and logic and not to the physical world which is mapped to maths only by convention. That's assuming you're not applying the term "induction" to "solve" irresolvable conjectures/assumptions like the universality of physical law.

I have no idea at all how you're applying either of those two meaning of "induction" to resolve the existence or non-existence of one or more deity figures.

Perhaps you could clarify?

Sorry, I probably should have been clearer, but I thought if I made my first post too long, people mightn't bother reading/replying to it!

My question is related to the problem of induction from philosophy: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_induction

Inductive reasoning is the approach used to draw conclusions about general principles from limited observations. For example, because the sun has risen every day so far, we expect it to rise tomorrow. Does this clarify what I mean?

wylo

whats your view jjn?

jjn2

wylo wrote: »

whats your view jjn?

I'm Catholic, and my view is that the problem of induction has not been solved, but I don't have a fully fixed opinion on how this affects my second set of questions in my first post.

robindch

jjn2 wrote: »

Inductive reasoning is the approach used to draw conclusions about general principles from limited observations. For example, because the sun has risen every day so far, we expect it to rise tomorrow. Does this clarify what I mean?

Yes, that's broadly what I meant above by the "universality of physical law" - does the physics we observe now apply in all places and all times? Without observing all places and times, this conjecture is undecidable, but it's a conjecture which is assumed true and referred to (inaccurately, in my view) as "induction".

But what does that have to do with deciding whether it's more or less likely that one more particular deities exist, or whether it's reasonable to "believe in" it or them?

I see no immediate connection.

jjn2

robindch wrote: »

Yes, that's broadly what I meant above by the "universality of physical law" - does the physics we observe now apply in all places and all times? Without observing all places and times, this conjecture is undecidable, but it's a conjecture which is assumed true and referred to (inaccurately, in my view) as "induction".

But what does that have to do with deciding whether it's more or less likely that one more particular deities exist, or whether it's reasonable to "believe in" it or them?

I see no immediate connection.

There isn't an immediate connection to the question of whether it's reasonable to believe in God. The question is, if there is no justification for the validity of induction, why is belief in induction reasonable? What makes belief in induction superior to belief in counter induction (which would lead us to conclude that because the sun has risen every day so far, we expect that it will not rise tomorrow), or belief in a modified principle of induction, which holds in all cases where it doesn't contradict Christianity.

Note that I'm not claiming that counter induction or the above "modified" induction have any justification, but asking what should make us choose induction over those two (or any other) principles.

Turtwig

wylo wrote: »

How many humans have ever lived , 90 - 100 billion? Lets be very conservative here and say 30 billion of them have created a very strong belief in some element of "something more than what they see in front of them". Some people have even had "God" experiences. Throughout different cultures, throughout the millenia, humans have channeled this through their own religion/ceremonys/sacred areas/ interpretations. Some of the greatest scientists in the world were deep in faith.

Now, yes, most of that is as a result of being told it by someone else, and the beleif engrained in their brain from a young age.


But Im of the view, while people shouldnt assume God exists, it would be just as foolish, ignorant and unscientific to assume that 30 billion peoples behaviours is based on nothing more than ignorance and stupidity. And thats why the question should be addressed.

I dont believe in God, but I really really dont beleive in assuming that people who have had experiences are just "wrong". Agnostic really

People have supernatural beliefs. The predominant idea that spread was that of a God. Probably because any other competing ideas were likely wiped out by violence and the like. You like to think that 30 billion people couldn't be wrong. All you have to do is look at human history, at yourself and others today. Some of the greatest scientists in the world. We're wrong more often than we are right. It's unscientific to assume anything other than humans are wrong. And yes I am saying that humans as whole, myself included, are woefully ignorant. I for one choose to embrace that fact.

Also if the vast majority of those 30 billion had developed a meme* whereby they would all commit mass suicide via jumping off cliffs every fifty years would you still suggest that because of the long history of culture and tradition of cliff jumping that these people can't possibly be ignorant? If such logic isn't flawed here, please explain why it can't be applied to your own reasoning.

*For want of a better term.

Turtwig

jjn2 wrote: »

Sorry, I probably should have been clearer, but I thought if I made my first post too long, people mightn't bother reading/replying to it!

My question is related to the problem of induction from philosophy: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_induction

Inductive reasoning is the approach used to draw conclusions about general principles from limited observations. For example, because the sun has risen every day so far, we expect it to rise tomorrow. Does this clarify what I mean?

Ahh I get your question now.

Personally this is just an interesting philosophical problem. I'm fully aware that one day the universe I might know might be totally different to the universe I currently reside. Personally I love this explanation.:)

Douglas Adams wrote:

There is a theory which states that if ever anyone discovers exactly what the Universe is for and why it is here, it will instantly disappear and be replaced by something even more bizarre and inexplicable.
There is another theory which states that this has already happened.

Although it is far from a convincing argument. I think, we choose induction over say counter induction because, apart from being biologically predisposed to such thinking, induction leads us to pragmatic results. Now, some would argue that that pragmatism is enough to justify induction. I personally don't think pragmatism should be used to justify or reject any philosophy or theory.

jjn2

Jernal wrote: »

Ahh I get your question now.

Personally this is just an interesting philosophical problem. I'm fully aware that one day the universe I might know might be totally different to the universe I currently reside. Personally I love this explanation.:)

Apart from being an interesting philosophical problem, I think it's important from the point of view of religious discussions. There are many people who believe that you can't really be a good scientist if you're religious, or that belief in God is downright irrational and stupid. This argument doesn't do anything to justify the belief in God, but I think it does show that those anti theist arguments are at least partly wrong.

Jernal wrote: »

Although it is far from a convincing argument. I think, we choose induction over say counter induction because, apart from being biologically predisposed to such thinking, induction leads us to pragmatic results. Now, some would argue that that pragmatism is enough to justify induction. I personally don't think pragmatism should be used to justify or reject any philosophy or theory.

This is precisely the reason I brought up counter induction, a pragmatic justification of counter induction is just as successful. Up until now, counter induction has been a terrible mode of reasoning, therefore by the logic of counter induction, the next time we use counter induction, it should be correct. The same holds true for that modified form of induction I mentioned, it is indistinguishable from normal induction, except in the cases where we assume it to be correct.

Daftendirekt

jjn2 wrote: »

This is precisely the reason I brought up counter induction, a pragmatic justification of counter induction is just as successful. Up until now, counter induction has been a terrible mode of reasoning, therefore by the logic of counter induction, the next time we use counter induction, it should be correct. The same holds true for that modified form of induction I mentioned, it is indistinguishable from normal induction, except in the cases where we assume it to be correct.

The reason we choose induction over counter-induction or alternative forms of induction essentially boils down to the fact that we value the utility of information over it's accuracy. All we can assume about reality outside our own minds is that it exists and it's consistent. We don't necessarily see things as they really are, but model them in a way that's useful to us (this applies to individual human minds as well as scientific theories).

So the value of induction isn't that it gives us truth, but that it gives us usable information.

I know this doesn't answer the problem of induction (which may well be unsolvable), but I'm just trying to explain why the use of inductive reasoning to glean pseudo-knowledge isn't a completely arbitrary choice.

jjn2

Daftendirekt wrote: »

The reason we choose induction over counter-induction or alternative forms of induction essentially boils down to the fact that we value the utility of information over it's accuracy. All we can assume about reality outside our own minds is that it exists and it's consistent. We don't necessarily see things as they really are, but model them in a way that's useful to us (this applies to individual human minds as well as scientific theories).

So the value of induction isn't that it gives us truth, but that it gives us usable information.

I know this doesn't answer the problem of induction (which may well be unsolvable), but I'm just trying to explain why the use of inductive reasoning to glean pseudo-knowledge isn't a completely arbitrary choice.

I agree that it isn't arbitrary (if it was, we really might expect to encounter people who live their (very brief) lives according to the principle of counterinduction), but as you say yourself, it doesn't actually solve the problem of induction. More importantly, there's hardly a difference in the value of information given by induction, or a form of induction modified to preserve certain predefined beliefs?

Michael Nugent

The underlying philosophical problem, if you want to describe it as a problem, arises earlier than induction. It arises once ‘you’ assume that anything exists independently of ‘your’ ‘thoughts’, and that what seems to be reality is not an illusion.

Once ‘you’ make that assumption, induction becomes a reasonable method of devising a model of reality that allows 'you' to function sanely based on that assumption.

Using this model of reality, ideas about gods are different to ideas about induction, both because ideas about gods are not required to explain anything, and also because they often contradict the outcomes of applying reason to the apparent evidence of our senses.

jjn2

jjn2 wrote: »

These questions are for anyone who thinks that a belief in the existence of God is irrational, stupid or can't be reconciled with science.

Firstly, do you think there is a conclusive answer to the problem of induction? If so, what do you think it is?

Secondly, if you do think there is a real problem with induction, what makes believing in God different from believing in induction? What separates belief in induction, from belief in counter-induction, or from belief in a slightly modified version of induction, where, for example, induction holds whenever it isn't in contradiction with Christian theology?

I'm not claiming that this is in any way an argument for the existence of God, and I'm not trying to catch anyone out. I've just been curious about these questions for a while, and since I didn't study philosophy, I don't really know where to look for their answers.

It's not really a problem because all we know (ie. in the scientific sense) is conditional.
In the example they give in the wiki we could "know" that all swans are white, but a black swan might mess that all up.
In science we would say that "all swans so far observed are white" and should a black one show up, then the original statement is corrected to match the observation.
Furthermore, in science we could offer evidence and reasons why we might believe "all swans are white". Such as understanding and explaining how swan plumage gains it's colour or identify the genetics that cause whiteness in swans. Then using these ideas, our confidence in the statement may become stronger or weaker. For instance we could find that swans are genetically incapable of producing black colouring for their feathers and therefore there is a low chance of a swan ever being black.

Similarly because we understand how and why the Earth spins to a high degree of accuracy we know that there is a low chance of it suddenly stopping for no reason (or that the sun wouldn't raise the next morning.)

And eventually the chances of something odd happening diminishes the more the thing is understood till an occurrence is so unlikely that it is practical to assume that it won't happen.

The Earth could very much suddenly stop spinning over night, but there's no reason to
think it would and all the evidence points to the fact it won't, so you may as well assume that you'll have to get up for work in the morning.

As for separating Christian Induction, that's quite easy. Christianity's supernatural claims (and most other supernatural claims) are unverifiable. It would be more akin to saying all swans turning black when no one is looking than making any inductive conclusion.

jjn2

Thanks for the answers!

Michael Nugent wrote: »

The underlying philosophical problem, if you want to describe it as a problem, arises earlier than induction. It arises once ‘you’ assume that anything exists independently of ‘your’ ‘thoughts’, and that what seems to be reality is not an illusion.

Once ‘you’ make that assumption, induction becomes a reasonable method of devising a model of reality that allows 'you' to function sanely based on that assumption.

Using this model of reality, ideas about gods are different to ideas about induction, both because ideas about gods are not required to explain anything, and also because they often contradict the outcomes of applying reason to the apparent evidence of our senses.

I don't want to describe it as a problem, just about every philosopher who's thought about it has described it as a problem! I'm sorry if I'm missing something, but I don't really see how this is anything other than a pragmatic justification of induction. It even seems to be fairly flawed pragmatic argument, since there are many other modes of reasoning that would at the very least also allow us to function somewhat sanely.

Assuming that by saying that the notion of God doesn't explain anything, you are basically using Occam's razor, this also seems flawed. Occam's razor has no inherent value independent of our inductive reasoning. It is an important principle, but I think it would basically be circular reasoning to use it to justify our choice of induction.

King Mob wrote: »

It's not really a problem because all we know (ie. in the scientific sense) is conditional.
In the example they give in the wiki we could "know" that all swans are white, but a black swan might mess that all up.
In science we would say that "all swans so far observed are white" and should a black one show up, then the original statement is corrected to match the observation.
Furthermore, in science we could offer evidence and reasons why we might believe "all swans are white". Such as understanding and explaining how swan plumage gains it's colour or identify the genetics that cause whiteness in swans. Then using these ideas, our confidence in the statement may become stronger or weaker. For instance we could find that swans are genetically incapable of producing black colouring for their feathers and therefore there is a low chance of a swan ever being black.

Similarly because we understand how and why the Earth spins to a high degree of accuracy we know that there is a low chance of it suddenly stopping for no reason (or that the sun wouldn't raise the next morning.)

And eventually the chances of something odd happening diminishes the more the thing is understood till an occurrence is so unlikely that it is practical to assume that it won't happen.

The Earth could very much suddenly stop spinning over night, but there's no reason to
think it would and all the evidence points to the fact it won't, so you may as well assume that you'll have to get up for work in the morning.

As for separating Christian Induction, that's quite easy. Christianity's supernatural claims (and most other supernatural claims) are unverifiable. It would be more akin to saying all swans turning black when no one is looking than making any inductive conclusion.

I agree that the problem of induction isn't a practical problem, but the fact that in practice we ignore the problem by paying lip service to it, doesn't actually mean it isn't a problem! I may be misunderstanding you when you talk about probabilities, are you just trying to explain to me how science works, or are you claiming that the probability of induction being true is affected by the past successes of induction? If it's the latter, then I think it's circular reasoning, since past successes are only relevant to future successes under the assumption of induction.

It's alright to treat induction as a type of axiom underlying science, but if this is all we're doing, we have to acknowledge that there are other axioms which are no less (or more) valid, in the same way as hyperbolic and elliptic geometry are valid forms of geometry.

Your criterion of verifiability doesn't seem to be a solution, since induction, as a principle, is no more testable than the claim that turn black when they aren't observed. Indeed, if we consider the following two cases

1) Induction

2) Induction, except the universe will cease to exist in 2050.

They are, until the year 2050, identical in what they say about the universe. If we are to choose right now, which to believe in, they have so far made identical predictions and they have the same amount of justification (none). The only obvious reason to choose 1 over 2 is that 1 is simpler than 2, but it is only induction which has taught us that simple explanations are more likely to be true than complicated ad-hoc ones, so it would be circular reasoning to choose 1 over 2 for this reason. Importantly, we have no way of assigning relative probabilities to the two events, without first assuming one of the two inductive models.

kylith

wylo wrote: »

But Im of the view, while people shouldnt assume God exists, it would be just as foolish, ignorant and unscientific to assume that 30 billion peoples behaviours is based on nothing more than ignorance and stupidity. And thats why the question should be addressed.

I must disagree on this point. For generations the population of the civilised world believed that disease was caused by 'miasma'; i.e. bad smells. We now know that disease is caused by microorganisms; therefore large numbers of people can be, and have been, wrong based on nothing more than ignorance.

This is also an example of the failure of inductive reasoning, if I understand the concept correctly (it's the first time I've heard of it by that name). The reasoning was: where there is disease there is a bad smell. Therefore disease must be caused by bad smells.

jjn2

jjn2 wrote: »

I agree that the problem of induction isn't a practical problem, but the fact that in practice we ignore the problem by paying lip service to it, doesn't actually mean it isn't a problem! I may be misunderstanding you when you talk about probabilities, are you just trying to explain to me how science works, or are you claiming that the probability of induction being true is affected by the past successes of induction? If it's the latter, then I think it's circular reasoning, since past successes are only relevant to future successes under the assumption of induction.

But what makes it a problem if there's no practical issue?
The universe has been consistent to certain laws for as long as we've been observing it. When we found new stuff we've found that it too has also followed laws.
So barring any new evidence, it's a as safe an assumption as it is to assume we are not brains in jars.

jjn2 wrote: »

It's alright to treat induction as a type of axiom underlying science, but if this is all we're doing, we have to acknowledge that there are other axioms which are no less (or more) valid, in the same way as hyperbolic and elliptic geometry are valid forms of geometry.

Well the various forms of geometry are internally consistent and independently verifiable and also have practical uses in making observable predictions about the universe.
Theology, or anything likewise based on claims we can never verify cannot do any of this stuff and are therefore indistinguishable form complete nonsense.

jjn2 wrote: »

Your criterion of verifiability doesn't seem to be a solution, since induction, as a principle, is no more testable than the claim that turn black when they aren't observed. Indeed, if we consider the following two cases

1) Induction

2) Induction, except the universe will cease to exist in 2050.

They are, until the year 2050, identical in what they say about the universe. If we are to choose right now, which to believe in, they have so far made identical predictions and they have the same amount of justification (none). The only obvious reason to choose 1 over 2 is that 1 is simpler than 2, but it is only induction which has taught us that simple explanations are more likely to be true than complicated ad-hoc ones, so it would be circular reasoning to choose 1 over 2 for this reason. Importantly, we have no way of assigning relative probabilities to the two events, without first assuming one of the two inductive models.

But that's the thing, it's a Freudian admission that induction has worked so far. If it did not, there would have been no way to make any scientific advances or even testable predictions.
But we can't exclude your second possibility either, just as we can't exclude the possibility that everything would suddenly turn to custard. We just believe that these things have a low probability of happening.

And even if induction was somehow magically turned on it's head for no reason, it's not exactly a problem as we have only really ever held that it is true conditionally based on past observations.

jjn2

King Mob wrote: »

But what makes it a problem if there's no practical issue?
The universe has been consistent to certain laws for as long as we've been observing it. When we found new stuff we've found that it too has also followed laws.
So barring any new evidence, it's a as safe an assumption as it is to assume we are not brains in jars.

You are correct, it is as safe an assumption as just about anything else, but the problem is that it isn't a safe assumption. We effectively take it on faith. The fact that we are psychologically comfortable doing this makes the problem of induction practically irrelevant in our day to day lives, but taking something on faith should at the very least be a problem to anyone who criticizes Christians for basing their beliefs on faith.

King Mob wrote: »

Well the various forms of geometry are internally consistent and independently verifiable and also have practical uses in making observable predictions about the universe.
Theology, or anything likewise based on claims we can never verify cannot do any of this stuff and are therefore indistinguishable form complete nonsense.

Mathematics isn't really verifiable, it consists (if you're a formalist) simply of collections of statements which are true based on different axiomatic systems. The fact that mathematics has verifiable applications is great for making mathematics useful, but there are probably very few if any mathematicians who would think that the truth of mathematics is in any way dependent on empirical observations.

Similarly, the principle of induction isn't independently verifiable. Without first assuming that inductive reasoning is sound, how would you propose to verify it?

King Mob wrote: »

But that's the thing, it's a Freudian admission that induction has worked so far. If it did not, there would have been no way to make any scientific advances or even testable predictions.
But we can't exclude your second possibility either, just as we can't exclude the possibility that everything would suddenly turn to custard. We just believe that these things have a low probability of happening.

And even if induction was somehow magically turned on it's head for no reason, it's not exactly a problem as we have only really ever held that it is true conditionally based on past observations.

The most basic point of the problem of induction, acknowledged by Hume, Popper and every other philosopher who's considered it, is that the claim that induction has worked so far is totally useless, when it comes to justifying induction.

You are welcome to accept induction as an article of faith, but if you do, you probably shouldn't feel too superior to people who accept other things on faith!

jjn2

jjn2 wrote: »

Mathematics isn't really verifiable, it consists (if you're a formalist) simply of collections of statements which are true based on different axiomatic systems. The fact that mathematics has verifiable applications is great for making mathematics useful, but there are probably very few if any mathematicians who would think that the truth of mathematics is in any way dependent on empirical observations.

You need to read what I wrote again. I said that it is internally consistent, which is true. And that mathematical facts can be verified independently. And I said that these things can be used to make verifiable, testable predictions about the observable universe.

jjn2 wrote: »

Similarly, the principle of induction isn't independently verifiable. Without first assuming that inductive reasoning is sound, how would you propose to verify it?

jjn2 wrote: »

You are correct, it is as safe an assumption as just about anything else, but the problem is that it isn't a safe assumption. We effectively take it on faith. The fact that we are psychologically comfortable doing this makes the problem of induction practically irrelevant in our day to day lives, but taking something on faith should at the very least be a problem to anyone who criticizes Christians for basing their beliefs on faith.

jjn2 wrote: »

The most basic point of the problem of induction, acknowledged by Hume, Popper and every other philosopher who's considered it, is that the claim that induction has worked so far is totally useless, when it comes to justifying induction.

You are welcome to accept induction as an article of faith, but if you do, you probably shouldn't feel too superior to people who accept other things on faith!

But it isn't assumed on faith, it's assumed because it has worked and produced tangible results that we can use to make verifiable predictions.
If induction doesn't work how is this possible?
If you are claiming that induction my someday stop working, then I've already covered this in that our assumption of induction is conditional and subject to change as the facts do.

People who claim a belief in God or many other supernatural things do assume it on faith because they do not have anything else at all to back up base their assumption on. And the odd time they make testable claims, they are always falsified.

jjn2

King Mob wrote: »

You need to read what I wrote again. I said that it is internally consistent, which is true. And that mathematical facts can be verified independently. And I said that these things can be used to make verifiable, testable predictions about the observable universe.

The truth of mathematics is totally independent of any empirical validation.

King Mob wrote: »

But it isn't assumed on faith, it's assumed because it has worked and produced tangible results that we can use to make verifiable predictions.
If induction doesn't work how is this possible?
If you are claiming that induction my someday stop working, then I've already covered this in that our assumption of induction is conditional and subject to change as the facts do.

People who claim a belief in God or many other supernatural things do assume it on faith because they do not have anything else at all to back up base their assumption on. And the odd time they make testable claims, they are always falsified.

You can claim that induction has worked well in the past (it has), you can make predictions using science, and you can test them, and the predictions can be verified, but none of this adds a shred of evidence to the claim that induction is justified. This is the central point of the problem of induction. If you think you have evidence for the reliability of induction, you should publish it, you would be famous! Unfortunately, the claim that induction is reliable, because of how well it has worked in the past, or that it becomes more likely to be true, because we can use it to make predictions which turn out to be accurate, is an example of circular reasoning.

jjn2

jjn2 wrote: »

The truth of mathematics is totally independent of any empirical validation.

I didn't say the truth of mathematics could be empirically verified. I said that some things in maths could be independently verified, such as certain proofs etc, and that some maths can be used to accuratly predict things we can observe, such as using maths to describe and predict the orbits of planets.

jjn2 wrote: »

You can claim that induction has worked well in the past (it has), you can make predictions using science, and you can test them, and the predictions can be verified, but none of this adds a shred of evidence to the claim that induction is justified. This is the central point of the problem of induction. If you think you have evidence for the reliability of induction, you should publish it, you would be famous! Unfortunately, the claim that induction is reliable, because of how well it has worked in the past, or that it becomes more likely to be true, because we can use it to make predictions which turn out to be accurate, is an example of circular reasoning.

But again, you haven't read what I have written. I said it was a justified assumption not a verified fact.
It is justified in that it works. If it does not work, then you must explain how we are able to many testable observations and predictions.
However if or when it is found to not work, then there would be no confidence in it as he assumption is made on the condition that it can be shown to work.

This is separate from the assumption made by faith as there is nothing to justify that assumption.

jjn2

King Mob wrote: »

But again, you haven't read what I have written. I said it was a justified assumption not a verified fact.
It is justified in that it works. If it does not work, then you must explain how we are able to many testable observations and predictions.
However if or when it is found to not work, then there would be no confidence in it as he assumption is made on the condition that it can be shown to work.

This is separate from the assumption made by faith as there is nothing to justify that assumption.

I have read what you've written, but you are misunderstanding the problem of induction. This isn't just my reading of the problem of induction, the most basic conclusion of the problem of induction is that what you have said in the above is wrong. The problem isn't that we can't conclusively prove that induction works, the problem is that there isn't a shred of non-circular justification for it. What you are doing above is using induction to justify induction.

What you are doing is the following: Induction has worked well in the past (science, predictions, verification etc.), so it's a fair assumption that it will also do so in the future. But this idea that it's a fair assumption that it will continue to work well is an application of inductive reasoning. Therefore your argument is circular, and provides no justification of induction.

Just to do a very quick summary, Hume's argument was something like this. To justify the use of induction, we need to show that nature is uniform in some sense. This uniformity of nature is a matter of fact about the universe, which is not necessarily true, and can't therefore be justified deductively, so we must have to justify it inductively, but this is circular.

If you are interested, the below link has a quick discussion of the problem of induction, along with an explanation of why some of the commonly used arguments are wrong. The only argument that I know of which is generally considered to be somewhat valid is the pragmatic justification at the end.

http://ls.poly.edu/~jbain/philsci/philscilectures/08.Induction.pdf

One of the problems with the pragmatic justification is that it's pragmatic, so while it may motivate our use of induction, it can't actually justify its success. My point at the end of all of this is that the pragmatic justification can't differentiate in any way between an assumption of induction, and an assumption of induction with some exceptions. What would usually be used to get rid of those exceptions is Occam's razor, but the usefulness of Occam's razor is a consequence of our inductive reasoning, and therefore can't be used to differentiate betwen the two.

Penn

God doesn't exist in the same way that the sun will rise tomorrow.

Until it's proven that God exists, he doesn't (because there is not enough evidence to support that he does). Until it's proven that the sun won't rise tomorrow, it will (because we have more than enough evidence to support that it will).

jjn2

Penn wrote: »

God doesn't exist in the same way that the sun will rise tomorrow.

Until it's proven that God exists, he doesn't (because there is not enough evidence to support that he does). Until it's proven that the sun won't rise tomorrow, it will (because we have more than enough evidence to support that it will).

This is simply wrong, what you believe to be evidence is actually circular. If you read the rest of this thread, or the link in my last post, you will see why.

Penn

jjn2 wrote: »

This is simply wrong, what you believe to be evidence is actually circular. If you read the rest of this thread, or the link in my last post, you will see why.

Firstly, just because someone disagrees with you, don't assume they didn't read the thread or links. I know what your position is, I just disagree with it.

Secondly, it's not "what I believe to be evidence". Is induction circular? Yes. However, because we cannot see into the future, we cannot account for things that we do not know about. We can only use a) evidence from what has happened in the past and b) predictions about what will happen in the future (based on past and present conditions).

In both cases of God not being real and the sun rising tomorrow, it's the most logical explanation given the information we have. Does that mean that it's 100% right? No. Something we don't know about travelling at 100,000,000 light years per second could smash into the Sun and kill us all. But there is nothing to suggest that it will or that something like that exists, so we cannot assume that it is a factor in whether or not the sun will rise tomorrow. We can only work off the information we have. Are all swans white? Yes, because all swans noted have always been white. If a black swan came, then are all swans white? No, they are usually white, but there are some black ones.

People 600 years ago thought the sun revolved around the earth. Were they right? At the time, yes, because they were working off the information they had. That the sun came from the east, rose up into the sky, and set to the west. But were they actually right? No, because we now know that that is not the case.

It's not about what we perceive to be right or perceive to be valid evidence. It's about using all the information we currently have to make a judgement. Will the sun rise tomorrow? Based on the evidence we have, there is absolutely no reason to suppose that it won't. If it didn't rise tomorrow, then we would have new evidence to show that it doesn't always rise.

Same with God. There is no scientific evidence to support the idea that God exists. Does he exist? Probably not. In 600 years, will science have improved to the level that we would be able to prove God existed? Who knows. If it did though, and we were able to prove God existed, then obviously there would be scientific evidence to support the idea that God exists. But until that happens, there's no reason to suggest that he does.

Is using induction circular? Yes. But it is also the most valid way of determining facts. No one can say anything with 100% certainty (unless it's 99.9999...% and they're rounding up). We can only ever work with the information we have.

What would you suggest to be an alternative? How should we determine if the sun will rise tomorrow? I think the sun will rise tomorrow because I have seen no evidence to say that it won't. But I'm not 100% sure. 99.999999....%, but not 100%.

jjn2

Penn wrote: »

Firstly, just because someone disagrees with you, don't assume they didn't read the thread or links. I know what your position is, I just disagree with it.

Unfortunately there is no law forbidding you to disagree with me, but if you're going to disagree with the philosophical consensus regarding the problem of induction, you should probably provide some supporting arguments. To be fair, you've done that now.

Secondly, it's not "what I believe to be evidence". Is induction circular? Yes. However, because we cannot see into the future, we cannot account for things that we do not know about. We can only use a) evidence from what has happened in the past and b) predictions about what will happen in the future (based on past and present conditions).

In both cases of God not being real and the sun rising tomorrow, it's the most logical explanation given the information we have. Does that mean that it's 100% right? No. Something we don't know about travelling at 100,000,000 light years per second could smash into the Sun and kill us all. But there is nothing to suggest that it will or that something like that exists, so we cannot assume that it is a factor in whether or not the sun will rise tomorrow. We can only work off the information we have. Are all swans white? Yes, because all swans noted have always been white. If a black swan came, then are all swans white? No, they are usually white, but there are some black ones.

People 600 years ago thought the sun revolved around the earth. Were they right? At the time, yes, because they were working off the information they had. That the sun came from the east, rose up into the sky, and set to the west. But were they actually right? No, because we now know that that is not the case.

It's not about what we perceive to be right or perceive to be valid evidence. It's about using all the information we currently have to make a judgement. Will the sun rise tomorrow? Based on the evidence we have, there is absolutely no reason to suppose that it won't. If it didn't rise tomorrow, then we would have new evidence to show that it doesn't always rise.

Same with God. There is no scientific evidence to support the idea that God exists. Does he exist? Probably not. In 600 years, will science have improved to the level that we would be able to prove God existed? Who knows. If it did though, and we were able to prove God existed, then obviously there would be scientific evidence to support the idea that God exists. But until that happens, there's no reason to suggest that he does.

Is using induction circular? Yes. But it is also the most valid way of determining facts. No one can say anything with 100% certainty (unless it's 99.9999...% and they're rounding up). We can only ever work with the information we have.

What would you suggest to be an alternative? How should we determine if the sun will rise tomorrow? I think the sun will rise tomorrow because I have seen no evidence to say that it won't. But I'm not 100% sure. 99.999999....%, but not 100%.

I am not saying that induction is circular (inductive reasoning itself isn't circular), what I am saying is that your justification of induction is circular. You would probably not be impressed if I attempted to prove God's existence using the testimony of the bible either. Everything you have said about the sun and about swans assumes induction. You say we can use (a) and (b), but they give you no information, unless you first assume some principle of induction.

I really don't understand how we can be having a discussion about whether our use of induction is justified, only for you to simply state as fact that induction is the most valid way of determining facts. This is meant to be your conclusion, not your justification.

I have explained some alternatives, if you consider the principle of induction, except for example with the additional assumption that God exists, or that the universe will be destroyed in 2050. There is no reason to choose them over normal induction, but there is also no reason to choose induction over them.

Finally, I am sure you are familiar with the problem of justifying your belief that the sun will rise tomorrow, with the fact that there is no evidence to the contrary.

Penn

jjn2 wrote: »

Finally, I am sure you are familiar with the problem of justifying your belief that the sun will rise tomorrow, with the fact that there is no evidence to the contrary.

But it isn't even a case of justifying whether or not the sun will rise tomorrow because there's no evidence to the contrary. There is evidence to support the claim that it will rise. By the laws of nature which we currently know of, even if we disregard the fact that the sun rises every morning, there is still evidence that it will rise tomorrow. Not only that, but the sun is always "risen/active" for about half the planet at any given time, so it isn't even a case of "Will the sun rise tomorrow?", it's "Is the sun still there?"

Fine, lets say justification of induction is circular. So what?

Your point (correct me if I'm wrong) is that because we assume induction to be correct, but we are using induction to form that belief, that we have some type of faith with regards to induction, and this is somehow comparable to people who believe in God and their faith.

Degree matters, as does the definition of the word "faith". Trusting evidence based science (based on induction or not) is not the same as taking something as true despite there being no sufficient evidence for it.

jjn2

Penn wrote: »

But it isn't even a case of justifying whether or not the sun will rise tomorrow because there's no evidence to the contrary. There is evidence to support the claim that it will rise. By the laws of nature which we currently know of, even if we disregard the fact that the sun rises every morning, there is still evidence that it will rise tomorrow. Not only that, but the sun is always "risen/active" for about half the planet at any given time, so it isn't even a case of "Will the sun rise tomorrow?", it's "Is the sun still there?"

All our laws of nature and science are obtained through inductive reasoning. If you therefore take away inductive reasoning, there is zero evidence for the sun rising tomorrow. You are right of course, that we are only using shorthand when talking about the sun rising.

Fine, lets say justification of induction is circular. So what?

Your point (correct me if I'm wrong) is that because we assume induction to be correct, but we are using induction to form that belief, that we have some type of faith with regards to induction, and this is somehow comparable to people who believe in God and their faith.

Degree matters, as does the definition of the word "faith". Trusting evidence based science (based on induction or not) is not the same as taking something as true despite there being no sufficient evidence for it.

An inductive justification of induction is no justification at all, this is the primary problem.

I don't fully understand how you've summed up my point, but that might be because I've been unclear. Inductive reasoning is at the heart of the way we live our lives, and is essential to any knowledge we have about the world, in particular all scientific knowledge. Evidence based science has no justification, and no evidence, if you take away the inductive principles underlying it. You are confusing the issue by talking about science, because you have to justify induction, before you can even begin to justify science.

Since we can't justify induction, we are taking it on faith. There isn't any evidence for it, let alone sufficient evidence. I then gave a slightly modified principle of induction, whereby certain specific beliefs (for example Christan beliefs) are included alongside a general principle of induction, and said that we have no reason to choose normal induction over this modified induction.

Penn

jjn2 wrote: »

Since we can't justify induction, we are taking it on faith. There isn't any evidence for it, let alone sufficient evidence. I then gave a slightly modified principle of induction, whereby certain specific beliefs (for example Christan beliefs) are included alongside a general principle of induction, and said that we have no reason to choose normal induction over this modified induction.

But we do, because again, degree matters.

Take speeding for example. Speeding is illegal. If you go 81km/h in an 80km/h zone, you are speeding. If you go 120km/h in an 80km/h zone, you are speeding. One is worse than the other.

We do have reason to choose normal induction over modified induction. You say that once you take the inductive reasoning behind it out, it has no justification. But the same can be said for anything. If you take the Bible out of Catholicism, there's no evidence for it. You're arguing about the methodology of determining results, rather than the results. We use induction to show that the sun will rise tomorrow, and we use induction as proof that induction works. And yet, for every day this has been done so far, the sun has risen.

Your argument is a philosophical one, and is correct, but it doesn't mean that the claims that the sun will rise tomorrow are any less valid. There is a reason to choose normal induction over modified induction.... It works. Yes, I'm using induction as justification for using induction to prove induction.... But there is more of a justification for doing that than there is for modified induction.

Degree matters.

sbsquarepants

jjn2 wrote: »

All our laws of nature and science are obtained through inductive reasoning. If you therefore take away inductive reasoning, there is zero evidence for the sun rising tomorrow. You are right of course, that we are only using shorthand when talking about the sun rising.

As they say on those financial adds, past performance is no guarantee of future performance:D

I think you're making a kind of non point to be honest. Science may well be based on induction, but as for it being a problem? I just don't see it. Science doesn't really claim to be truth, just a best known version of the "rules" of reality- always open to change in the face of evidence.
The sun has risen every day since men were around to notice it, yes there may be no "proof" that it will rise tomorrow, but that is hardly the same thing as saying there is no real reason to believe it will. I can predict it will rise tomorrow and be as close to certain as it's possible to be that it will - insofar as i can't be "certain" that it even exists. I can only really be certain that i exist, in some form or other (i think, therefore i am) - everything else is just probabilities and perceptions. But all probabilities are not created equal, the existance of a deity seems less likely to me than the existance of the sun, induction or not. I can see a "reason" to believe in the sun, on all to rare occasions i can even feel that reason on my face as i stroll about. Not so much of that with the deity.

jjn2

Penn wrote: »

But we do, because again, degree matters.

Take speeding for example. Speeding is illegal. If you go 81km/h in an 80km/h zone, you are speeding. If you go 120km/h in an 80km/h zone, you are speeding. One is worse than the other.

We do have reason to choose normal induction over modified induction. You say that once you take the inductive reasoning behind it out, it has no justification. But the same can be said for anything. If you take the Bible out of Catholicism, there's no evidence for it. You're arguing about the methodology of determining results, rather than the results. We use induction to show that the sun will rise tomorrow, and we use induction as proof that induction works. And yet, for every day this has been done so far, the sun has risen.

Your argument is a philosophical one, and is correct, but it doesn't mean that the claims that the sun will rise tomorrow are any less valid. There is a reason to choose normal induction over modified induction.... It works. Yes, I'm using induction as justification for using induction to prove induction.... But there is more of a justification for doing that than there is for modified induction.

Degree matters.

Degrees matter, but there is no difference in this case. Firstly, there is a pragmatic argument for counter induction, secondly, the exact same pragmatic argument used to justify induction (it works) applies to a modified inductive assumption with the modification that the universe will be destroyed in 2050 (it works, at least so far).

You claim that there is more of a justification for induction than some form of modified induction, what is this justification that applies only to induction?

jjn2

sbsquarepants wrote: »

As they say on those financial adds, past performance is no guarabtee of future performance:D

I think you're making a kind of non point to be honest. Science may well be based on induction, but as for it being a problem? I just don't see it. Science doesn't really claim to be truth, just a best known version of the "rules" of reality- always open to change in the face of evidence.
The sun has risen every day since men were around to notice it, yes there may be no "proof" that it will rise tomorrow, but that is hardly the same thing as saying there is no real reason to believe it will. I can predict it will rise tomorrow and be as close to certain as it's possible to be that it will - insofar as i can't be "certain" that it even exists. I can only really be certain that i exist, in some form or other (i think, therefore i am) - everything else is just probabilities and perceptions. But all probabilities are not created equal, the existance of a deity seems less likely to me than the existance of the sun, induction or not. I can see a "reason" to believe in the sun, on all to rare occasions i can even feel that reason on my face as i stroll about. Not so much of that with the deity.

I tried to fit that in to one of my posts, but couldn't make it seem natural:D. I won't waste your time by just repeating my arguments, but if you read the link I provided, the problem of induction isn't that we can't be certain about our inductive reasoning, but that we have no reason whatsoever to trust in it.

Penn

jjn2 wrote: »

Degrees matter, but there is no difference in this case. Firstly, there is a pragmatic argument for counter induction, secondly, the exact same pragmatic argument used to justify induction (it works) applies to a modified inductive assumption with the modification that the universe will be destroyed in 2050 (it works, at least so far).

You claim that there is more of a justification for induction than some form of modified induction, what is this justification that applies only to induction?

Past history, logic, evidence... Yes, we use induction to make these things evidence, but at least there is something there to do this with rather than a claim that the universe will be destroyed in 2050.

Your claim that the world will end in 2050 is not based on past history, is not logical (unless you can somehow see into the future), and has no evidence behind it.

Again, your argument is a philosophical one, in how we decide what to believe, rather than what is actually the truth. But the difference between people using circular reasoning with regards induction and science, and a person's belief in a god or gods, is the fact that we can determine to the best of our abilities whether the science is the truth or not. We can experiment, we can actually try to figure out what is the truth, to the furthest extent that we possibly can. But with religion, it already claims to be the truth and that no experimentation is necessary.

We're only human, and yes, we use science to prove science. We use induction to justify induction. But at least that is aiming towards something.

sbsquarepants

jjn2 wrote: »

I tried to fit that in to one of my posts, but couldn't make it seem natural:D. I won't waste your time by just repeating my arguments, but if you read the link I provided, the problem of induction isn't that we can't be certain about our inductive reasoning, but that we have no reason whatsoever to trust in it.

But that's just not true.
The reason we have to trust in it is that it has worked so far. We are pattern spotting, habbit forming creatures, we try something new if it doesn't work we keep trying till we find something that does, then we tend to stick with that and it becomes natural to us. We are predisposed to seeking out and recognising patterns. Induction has worked well for us so far - surely that's reason enough to trust it now?

Barr125

jjn2 wrote: »

I tried to fit that in to one of my posts, but couldn't make it seem natural:D. I won't waste your time by just repeating my arguments, but if you read the link I provided, the problem of induction isn't that we can't be certain about our inductive reasoning, but that we have no reason whatsoever to trust in it.

If we have no reason to trust inductive reasoning, then you would have to take that into account in EVERY decision you make during the course of life, scientific or not, and you would have to account for every possible outcome.

Example: I'm about to eat my Cornflakes. Up until now, my Cornflakes haven't poisoned me and there have been an infinitesimal amount of people have been poisoned by them. But if I have no reason to trust my inductive reasoning, then my Cornflakes could very well poison me and I don't have breakfast.

Imagine having to apply that kind of skewed reasoning to every decision of the day. Whether you realize it or not, you apply inductive reasoning unconsciously to every situation you deal with.

jjn2

Penn wrote: »

Past history, logic, evidence... Yes, we use induction to make these things evidence, but at least there is something there to do this with rather than a claim that the universe will be destroyed in 2050.

Your claim that the world will end in 2050 is not based on past history, is not logical (unless you can somehow see into the future), and has no evidence behind it.

Again, your argument is a philosophical one, in how we decide what to believe, rather than what is actually the truth. But the difference between people using circular reasoning with regards induction and science, and a person's belief in a god or gods, is the fact that we can determine to the best of our abilities whether the science is the truth or not. We can experiment, we can actually try to figure out what is the truth, to the furthest extent that we possibly can. But with religion, it already claims to be the truth and that no experimentation is necessary.

We're only human, and yes, we use science to prove science. We use induction to justify induction. But at least that is aiming towards something.

You say there's evidence, but you haven't provided any. A circular justification of induction is as useful as a circular justification for the existence of God. Since the value of experimentation and science comes from our assumption of inductive validity, it can't help us in trying to understand if our inductive assumption is actually any good. You have presented evidence for induction, but it has all been circular, I have presented no evidence for the universe ending in 2050, so we are in the same boat.

sbsquarepants wrote: »

But that's just not true.
The reason we have to trust in it is that it has worked so far. We are pattern spotting, habbit forming creatures, we try something new if it doesn't work we keep trying till we find something that does, then we tend to stick with that and it becomes natural to us. We are predisposed to seeking out and recognising patterns. Induction has worked well for us so far - surely that's reason enough to trust it now?

The fact that it is in our nature (a claim which relies on inductive reasoning, but I don't actually disagree with it), is no more relevant than the fact that some people believe we are predisposed to believing in the supernatural, when it comes to actually justifying those beliefs. The fact that induction has worked well for us so far, is only relevant under the assumption of induction, and is therefore an example of circular reasoning.

jjn2

Barr125 wrote: »

If we have no reason to trust inductive reasoning, then you would have to take that into account in EVERY decision you make during the course of life, scientific or not, and you would have to account for every possible outcome.

Example: I'm about to eat my Cornflakes. Up until now, my Cornflakes haven't poisoned me and there have been an infinitesimal amount of people have been poisoned by them. But if I have no reason to trust my inductive reasoning, then my Cornflakes could very well poison me and I don't have breakfast.

Imagine having to apply that kind of skewed reasoning to every decision of the day. Whether you realize it or not, you apply inductive reasoning unconsciously to every situation you deal with.

I am not denying the validity of inductive reasoning or science (I think they are both valid, and extremely important), my claim is that our choosing to trust in induction is effectively a matter of faith, in the same way as choosing to believe in God is a matter of faith.

pts

jjn2 wrote: »

I tried to fit that in to one of my posts, but couldn't make it seem natural:D. I won't waste your time by just repeating my arguments, but if you read the link I provided, the problem of induction isn't that we can't be certain about our inductive reasoning, but that we have no reason whatsoever to trust in it.

Very few things can be verified to be objectively true. It is more common to define an axiom/position of faith/assumption as a starting point, then we can argue about how reasonable that assumption is. For example how do we prove that we are not a brain in a vat? We can't, but we tend to live our lives based on the assumption that we are not.

Instead of arguing about if the principle of induction can be objectively proven since it probably can't. Lets look at your last statement, "...but that we have no reason whatsoever to trust in it.". Given the assumption that a model with predictive power is better than one without predictive power then inductive reasoning gives us a good reason to trust it.
You could argue that this assumption is unreasonable, but it is still one that you live your life by.

BTW have you seen this video? I think you might find it interesting.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g9x_oa--KAc

jjn2

jjn2 wrote: »

I have read what you've written, but you are misunderstanding the problem of induction. This isn't just my reading of the problem of induction, the most basic conclusion of the problem of induction is that what you have said in the above is wrong. The problem isn't that we can't conclusively prove that induction works, the problem is that there isn't a shred of non-circular justification for it. What you are doing above is using induction to justify induction.

What you are doing is the following: Induction has worked well in the past (science, predictions, verification etc.), so it's a fair assumption that it will also do so in the future. But this idea that it's a fair assumption that it will continue to work well is an application of inductive reasoning. Therefore your argument is circular, and provides no justification of induction.

Just to do a very quick summary, Hume's argument was something like this. To justify the use of induction, we need to show that nature is uniform in some sense. This uniformity of nature is a matter of fact about the universe, which is not necessarily true, and can't therefore be justified deductively, so we must have to justify it inductively, but this is circular.

If you are interested, the below link has a quick discussion of the problem of induction, along with an explanation of why some of the commonly used arguments are wrong. The only argument that I know of which is generally considered to be somewhat valid is the pragmatic justification at the end.

http://ls.poly.edu/~jbain/philsci/philscilectures/08.Induction.pdf

One of the problems with the pragmatic justification is that it's pragmatic, so while it may motivate our use of induction, it can't actually justify its success. My point at the end of all of this is that the pragmatic justification can't differentiate in any way between an assumption of induction, and an assumption of induction with some exceptions. What would usually be used to get rid of those exceptions is Occam's razor, but the usefulness of Occam's razor is a consequence of our inductive reasoning, and therefore can't be used to differentiate betwen the two.

But again, the assumption we make that induction work in the future is conditional.
We make this assumption because induction has worked so far, which you've agreed is true, there's no reason to think that it will randomly change and there is no better way of discovering stuff about the universe.

However, the assumption that God exists is not based on anything that is verifiable or is distinguishable from delusion.

We are able to make testable predictions about stuff, which is due to the fact that induction works.
Any assumptions or claims about God are not able to translate to any testable predictions or anything verifiable.

The "problem" you have with induction is really just a non-issue that arises from the language we use rather than the actual logic.

sbsquarepants

jjn2 wrote: »

The fact that it is in our nature (a claim which relies on inductive reasoning, but I don't actually disagree with it), is no more relevant than the fact that some people believe we are predisposed to believing in the supernatural, when it comes to actually justifying those beliefs. The fact that induction has worked well for us so far, is only relevant under the assumption of induction, and is therefore an example of circular reasoning.

I disagree. Spotting a pattern and making a prediction of future events based on that pattern is not circular reasoning. It doesn't really matter what caused the original prediction to be made, the pattern is either there or it isn't. Early in human history people spotted the predictability of the seasons, their reasons for why they occured were largely off the wall - but the pattern itself held true. Spring follows winter follows autumn follows summer whether virgins are thrown into volcanoes or not:D
Why it happens has been refined over the years, that it happens stays fixed. To say we have no reason to expect it to keep happening this way is plainly untrue. The reason is history and experience, we've all experienced the sequence. We have records of it being like this for centuries, millenia even. It "could" all change tomorrow but odds are it wont.

Climate change eh - great example to pick!!:D

jjn2

pts wrote: »

Very few things can be verified to be objectively true. It is more common to define an axiom/position of faith/assumption as a starting point, then we can argue about how reasonable that assumption is. For example how do we prove that we are not a brain in a vat? We can't, but we tend to live our lives based on the assumption that we are not.

Instead of arguing about if the principle of induction can be objectively proven since it probably can't. Lets look at your last statement, "...but that we have no reason whatsoever to trust in it.". Given the assumption that a model with predictive power is better than one without predictive power then inductive reasoning gives us a good reason to trust it.
You could argue that this assumption is unreasonable, but it is still one that you live your life by.

I will watch the video later today. I have two problems with what you have said. Firstly, how do we assess how reasonable our axioms are? If we for example are considering different axioms of mathematics, it might be that we choose to use the axioms of hyperbolic geometry, when dealing with problems for which these axioms seem empirically reasonable. In the case of our assumption that we should use inductive reasoning, any way we might choose to verify the soundness of our choice quickly falls into the problem of being circular, because really, without inductive reasoning, we know basically nothing about the universe.

Secondly, regarding the criterion of predictive power. We should first note that prior to actually assuming inductive reasoning to be valid, we don't have reason to believe in any predictive power of induction. More importantly, any form inductive reasoning, modified to allow unpredictable exceptional events (miracles, for example) is indistinguishable from normal inductive reasoning in terms of predictive power. This is actually the discussion I was hoping to have, because my thinking is that whereas we would normally use Occam's razor, or some principle of parsimony, to choose induction over a modified form of induction, those principles have no value prior to our assumption of induction, and therefore don't differentiate between normal induction and a modified form of induction.

King Mob wrote: »

But again, the assumption we make that induction work in the future is conditional.
We make this assumption because induction has worked so far, which you've agreed is true, there's not reason to think that it will randomly change for no reason and there is no better way of discovering stuff about the universe.

However, the assumption that God exists is not based on anything that is verifiable or is distinguishable from delusion.

We are able to make testable predictions about stuff, which is due to the fact that induction works.
Any assumptions or claims about God are not able to translate to any testable predictions or anything verifiable.

The "problem" you have with induction is really just a non-issue that arises from the language we use rather than the actual logic.

This isn't my "problem" of induction, while I would be interested in hearing if anyone believes that the problem of induction has been solved, I really do think that it's a matter of basic philosophical knowledge that there is a problem, and that the naive solution to the problem, that it's worked so far, is entirely circular and valueless.

sbsquarepants wrote: »

I disagree. Spotting a pattern and making a prediction of future events based on that pattern is not circular reasoning. It doesn't really matter what caused the original prediction to be made, the pattern is either there or it isn't. Early in human history people spotted the predictability of the seasons, their reasons for why they occured were largely off the wall - but the pattern itself held true. Spring follows winter follows autumn follows summer whether virgins are thrown into volcanoes or not
Why it happens has been refined over the years, that it happens stays fixed. To say we have no reason to expect it to keep happening this way is plainly untrue. The reason is history and experience, we've all experienced the sequence. We have records of it being like this for centuries, millenia even. It "could" all change tomorrow but odds are it wont.

Climate change eh - great example to pick!!

There's no circular reasoning involved in saying that there is a pattern, you can also make a prediction, and you're safe, but the (implied) claim that this prediction is likely to come true is going to be based on the fact that past predictions based on past identified patterns have come true. But the only way that past performance is relevant to the future, is under an assumption of uniformity of nature or inductive validity.

jjn2

jjn2 wrote: »

This isn't my "problem" of induction, while I would be interested in hearing if anyone believes that the problem of induction has been solved, I really do think that it's a matter of basic philosophical knowledge that there is a problem, and that the naive solution to the problem, that it's worked so far, is entirely circular and valueless.

1. It's not actually a problem, either practically or philosophically. Assuming that it works is justified in that is has worked and it is working. Assuming that it will work in the future is conditional (and falsifiable). It is only a problem if you assert as 100% fact that it always work, which we are not doing.

2. Assumption that it works is different from the assumption that God exists or similar is because it allows us to make predictions and has made several successful predictions. A belief in god has never and can never produce successful testable predictions. Further faith in God is not conditional, it will not and does not change in the face of facts (or lack of facts).

Therefore the assumption that induction works is not taken on faith and is not comparable to the assumption that God exists.

Knasher

jjn2 wrote: »

Secondly, regarding the criterion of predictive power. We should first note that prior to actually assuming inductive reasoning to be valid, we don't have reason to believe in any predictive power of induction. More importantly, any form inductive reasoning, modified to allow unpredictable exceptional events (miracles, for example) is indistinguishable from normal inductive reasoning in terms of predictive power. This is actually the discussion I was hoping to have, because my thinking is that whereas we would normally use Occam's razor, or some principle of parsimony, to choose induction over a modified form of induction, those principles have no value prior to our assumption of induction, and therefore don't differentiate between normal induction and a modified form of induction.

A modified form of induction that allows unpredictable exceptional events would mean that no conclusions could be drawn from any experiment or observation because it would be impossible to distinguish between a "miracle" event and a natural occurrence. The only reason we have for making the assumption that we live in an universe where inductive reasoning is valid, is because between counter-induction (which does provide predictions but the predictions prove counter-induction is invalid) and non-induction, the only one which provides useful data is induction. Of course that also means that we can never actually prove induction, because any proof would indeed be circular (although we could disprove induction by contradiction), it is the only form that provides usable data, so for that reason alone it is the only valid choice.

jjn2

King Mob wrote: »

1. It's not actually a problem, either practically or philosophically. Assuming that it works is justified in that is has worked and it is working. Assuming that it will work in the future is conditional (and falsifiable). It is only a problem if you assert as 100% fact that it always work, which we are not doing.

2. Assumption that it works is different from the assumption that God exists or similar is because it allows us to make predictions and has made several successful predictions. A belief in god has never and can never produce successful testable predictions. Further faith in God is not conditional, it will not and does not change in the face of facts (or lack of facts).

Therefore the assumption that induction works is not taken on faith and is not comparable to the assumption that God exists.

Do you realize that you're contradicting every philosopher who's ever written about the problem of induction? As soon as you say anything about the probability of your predictions coming true, you run into difficulties. The standard understanding of the problem of induction, as discussed in this thread, and on the link in my reply to you on page 2, is that we can't just not know for certain that our predictions are good, but that we have no way at all of assessing their probability of being correct.

A modified form of induction that allows unpredictable exceptional events would mean that no conclusions could be drawn from any experiment or observation because it would be impossible to distinguish between a "miracle" event and a natural occurrence. The only reason we have for making the assumption that we live in an universe where inductive reasoning in valid, is because between counter-induction (which does provide predictions but the predictions prove counter-induction is invalid) and non-induction, the only one which provides useful data is induction. Of course that also means that we can never actually prove induction, because any proof would indeed be circular (although we could disprove induction by contradiction), it is the only form that provides usable data, so for that reason alone it is the only valid choice.

It wouldn't be impossible to distinguish between a miracle event and a natural occurence. Most Christians who are also scientists will do their work happily without expecting or considering that a miracle will occur, even though they might believe that these are technically possible. When you see that inductive reasoning is the only form of reasoning which provides useful data, you are not justifying induction, you are vindicating it. This would really be sufficient, but I don't see how this vindication doesn't apply equally well to an assumption of induction holding, except on the few occasions where miracles might occur.

jjn2

jjn2 wrote: »

Do you realize that you're contradicting every philosopher who's ever written about the problem of induction? As soon as you say anything about the probability of your predictions coming true, you run into difficulties. The standard understanding of the problem of induction, as discussed in this thread, and on the link in my reply to you on page 2, is that we can't just not know for certain that our predictions are good, but that we have no way at all of assessing their probability of being correct.

No you've misunderstood me again.

You've already agreed that induction has worked in the past, because it has been used to make successful testable predictions.
We can test induction in the present by making a testable prediction.
The problem only exists if it is asserted as absolute fact that this will be always the case for the future based on that previous information.
However we do not do this, instead we just make a conditional assumption. And we find out if induction continues to work as we continue to make testable predictions.

jjn2 wrote: »

It wouldn't be impossible to distinguish between a miracle event and a natural occurence. Most Christians who are also scientists will do their work happily without expecting or considering that a miracle will occur, even though they might believe that these are technically possible. When you see that inductive reasoning is the only form of reasoning which provides useful data, you are not justifying induction, you are vindicating it. This would really be sufficient, but I don't see how this vindication doesn't apply equally well to an assumption of induction holding, except on the few occasions where miracles might occur.

No miracles or any supernatural events have ever once been shown to occur either via prediction or after the fact.

Penn

jjn2 wrote: »

You say there's evidence, but you haven't provided any. A circular justification of induction is as useful as a circular justification for the existence of God. Since the value of experimentation and science comes from our assumption of inductive validity, it can't help us in trying to understand if our inductive assumption is actually any good. You have presented evidence for induction, but it has all been circular, I have presented no evidence for the universe ending in 2050, so we are in the same boat.

It's not the same boat though. Again, degree matters. There are 8billion people on this planet. There are 500billion people on this planet. Both those statements are wrong, but one is more wrong than the other.

A circular justification of induction is not the same as a circular justification for the existence of God because of scientific skepticism and common sense, which is all we can possibly have. There is no way around the circular justification of induction for science, because it is as far as we can possibly go. But it does not make science and religion equal.

What would you suggest otherwise? How could we determine facts? Should we all begin to prepare in case the sun doesn't rise tomorrow?

We are not all-knowing. We are not omnipotent. We can only do the best with what we currently have. But I'm sorry, whether or not using circular reasoning of induction or circular reasoning for religion both use circular reasoning, one is still more wrong than the other.

jjn2

King Mob wrote: »

No you've misunderstood me again.

You've already agreed that induction has worked in the past, because it has been used to make successful testable predictions.
We can test induction in the present by making a testable prediction.
The problem only exists if it is asserted as absolute fact that this will be always the case for the future based on that previous information.
However we do not do this, instead we just make a conditional assumption. And we find out if induction continues to work as we continue to make testable predictions.

No miracles or any supernatural events have ever once been shown to occur either via prediction or after the fact.

The claim that inductive reasoning is absolutely reliable is trivially false, but the problem I'm talking about isn't that we can't be absolutely certain of it. The problem is that there is absolutely justification at all for why you should have even the slightest bit of faith in your predictions.

Penn wrote: »

It's not the same boat though. Again, degree matters. There are 8billion people on this planet. There are 500billion people on this planet. Both those statements are wrong, but one is more wrong than the other.

A circular justification of induction is not the same as a circular justification for the existence of God because of scientific skepticism and common sense, which is all we can possibly have. There is no way around the circular justification of induction for science, because it is as far as we can possibly go. But it does not make science and religion equal.

What would you suggest otherwise? How could we determine facts? Should we all begin to prepare in case the sun doesn't rise tomorrow?

We are not all-knowing. We are not omnipotent. We can only do the best with what we currently have. But I'm sorry, whether or not using circular reasoning of induction or circular reasoning for religion both use circular reasoning, one is still more wrong than the other.

You are entitled to your opinion, but if you can't justify it, that's all it is. Scientific skepticism and common sense depend on inductive reasoning, and therefore don't help your case.