Basis of morality

Schuhart wrote:

But if you've agreed that mice are just too stupid to exercise some rights and hence are excluded from them, too stupid to take on moral obligations and too stupid to be able to exercise their rights directly, surely the argument that mice and humans are similar in the context of morality is shown to be false?

I'm not trying to assert similarity.

Schuhart wrote:

Hence, its not that I'm assuming superiority. Its just that the flaws of your assertion of equality come to light when we actually try applying it.

You're not attempting to apply equality - you're attempting to apply similarity.

Schuhart wrote:

Hence, it can no longer be maintained that equality must be used in the absence of anything to suggest dissimilarity relevant to the moral context, as dissimilarity is both demonstrated and agreed between us. Hence, the boot moves to the other foot and you need to identify a quality of similarity not readily apparent at present.

I'm not trying to assert similarity.

Schuhart wrote:

What is this quality of similarity that, say, a mouse has that brings them within the scope of human determined morality? I simply don't see it.

I'm not trying to assert similarity.

Schuhart, all you have shown is that mice and men are dissimilar. You now need to argue your way from there to showing that mice and men should be unequal. You have asserted that assumed dissimilarity in moral capabilities is a basis for inequality, but you haven't shown it.

Should human beings with dissimilar moral capabilities be treated differently by the law? If so, why? If not, why not?

somewhat repetitively,
Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

I’m not sure that captures the situation. We’ve both accepted that difference in capability makes certain rights and probably all obligations irrelevant, hence equality in the sense of, well, equality simply doesn’t exist in the moral sphere. In particular, wiping the slate clean of any moral obligations without seeing any equality implications seems rather inexplicable. A dependency relationship can be interpreted in any number of ways, but equality doesn't strike me as one of them without some justification being provided.

What you’re left with is an argument that humans should be benevolent towards other creatures possibly on a similar basis to incapacitated humans, but that’s not equality.

I know you may be feeling a frustration from repetition, but to be honest at my end I do see a flaw in what you've proposed and I don't see your responses addressing it.

I can see that. Interestingly, from my end, all I can see is an assertion of a flaw, not the proof.

Remember that I am only asserting a scheme that I can apply. It is of no interest to me whether the mouse can apply it, or even another human being of different moral capability. This is my moral scheme.

I accept that mice and men are dissimilar, I accept that they are presumably dissimilar in moral capability, I accept that identical rights and obligations do not apply.

However, all that tells me is that I would need to consider what rights and obligations are appropriate for mice as opposed to men. It doesn't tell me that mice have no rights, and appears to provide no basis for such a judgement.

So, to repeat my question - should human beings with dissimilar moral capabilities be considered unequal before the law? If so, why? If not, why not?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

I know we may well end up circling again, but this is the very point that causes me a problem. You seem to assume 'appropriate' means the same as 'equal' in this context, whereas I see it as highlighting difference as 'appropriate' will mean different things depending on the context.

No, I'm saying that because there is no valid basis for inequality, there is no basis for assuming any organism has no rights if any other organism does. However, because every organism is dissimilar, identical rights are inappropriate.

In the absence of knowing what rights a mouse would choose, all we can do is note what the mouse prefers to avoid - death, pain, starvation/privation - and assert that those are the minimal rights we can ascribe to a mouse.

Schuhart wrote:

If 'appropriate' is being used in a context which is effectively 'you'll be as equal as I mean you to be', then it hardly seems worth the candle. I might deem it equal and appropriate to use animals for painful but useful experiments on grounds that, if the animals had the moral capability that I can exercise on their behalf, they would want to contribute to scientific advancement.

In principle, the same situation may apply to incapacitated humans. Appropriate treatment, but not equal treatment as equal treatment is simply not feasible.

You are, I think, using 'equal' and 'similar' interchangeably.

Schuhart wrote:

I don't know if it helps, but I have a similar feeling to one I had on the topic of what gender equality means in the context of Islam (or, at least, Islam as seen by persons who post here). Similarly, the view being advanced on the other side was difference didn't mean inequality. If a woman is obliged to submit to her husband that is actually equal for a woman. Now, my own feeling is that a better description of the situation was that, in fact, that interpretation of Islam is really arguing for gender inequality, but with mutual respect.

Clearly, the assertion that the woman is subordinate to her husband is a statement of inequality. For a start, it suggests that the basic rights of the woman are subordinate to the basic rights of the man - that killing your wife to prevent infringement of your honour is a morally acceptable outcome, for example.

Schuhart wrote:

I think that kind of thinking applies here. You are not really arguing for species equality, because its essentially meaningless. What you are arguing for is a sort of one way respect.

Well, given that from the beginning I have said that this is my moral system, which I apply to the rest of the universe, the one-wayness would seem to be the case. However, equality in basic rights is far from meaningless.

I am arguing that all species are equal from my point of view, based on the assertions given. All are equally entitled to rights, but in most cases we can only ascribe rights based on presumption. All the rights I have suggested during the discussion are 'passive' rights - the 'right not be xxxxx', because I don't feel we can ascribe others.

So, let's be clear what I am stating: your 'right to life', which is probably the most basic right we can universally ascribe, is not superior to the 'right to life' of a mouse.

Let's take it from there - how does dissimilarity impact the statement above?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

Because the right to life only has meaning within human society, in which mice don't participate in any real sense.

OK - that doesn't make any sense to me whatsoever. Having a right to life means that if I kill you, that is immoral, yes?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

Assuming you have no justification.

Agreed. We'll leave justification out for the moment.

So, having a right to life means that if I kill you without justification, that is immoral, yes?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

Yes, that sound fine.

So, is it more immoral to kill a man, or a mouse?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

I haven’t said that a morality that does not use the basis I have chosen is incorrect. I’ve said I cannot see any other basis – that is a considerable difference.

Indeed. Considerably worse, unfortunately.

However, it does have the advantage, from my point of view, of resolving my exasperation. If you cannot accept the idea of a moral system based on personal invention rather than social contract, then there is little point in arguing the finer details of a moral system based on personal invention!

Schuhart wrote:

Rather a distortion of the situation, don’t you think?

Not at all. A morality based on social contract will find it immensely difficult to move away from accepted social norms - if slavery is an accepted social norm, how does a socially agreed morality overturn that acceptance?

Schuhart wrote:

As I understand it, the social contract approach is based on us moving from a notional state of nature into society. It’s not that I personally lived in a state of perpetual war, and then submitted to an absolute monarch ala Thomas Hobbes. It just that's how he would form an argument suggesting that submitting to an absolute monarch is what all right-thinking folk should do. Ditto for Locke’s more reasonable and tranquil state of nature, as a basis for his argument for why we might still find it useful to set down some kind of common agreement.

That is, once again, a basis for law, not morality. Law, obviously, cannot be based on personal whim (since it ceases to be law in so doing). Law, however, is not morality.

Schuhart wrote:

Hence, your objection is utterly meaningless. Once we identify moral capability in slaves, women, and any other excluded folk they are in – because we recognise the division is artificial.

Not at all. We can give them reduced rights on the basis that they have a reduced moral capacity - exactly as we do with children. How easy is it to argue that, say, women, have a reduced moral capacity? It's enormously easy, if that's what one wishes to believe - because the problem with using moral capacity as a measure is that it isn't one. There is no way of measuring moral capacity that can be universally agreed - it is, if anything, more of a social convention than anything else.

This is what I mean when I say that there is no valid method for determining superiority in moral terms - morality is not quantified.

Imagine, again, a society of theists who allow only reduced rights to atheists. What is their justification? That rejection of God is both evidence of, and leads to, moral incapacity. How do you prove your way out of that? Prove moral capacity in atheists? How exactly, when we're dealing with people who don't want to believe that? You've seen the difficulty we have persuading Creationists of well-established science, but your system would require us to persuade them that something unmeasurable is possessed in full measure by people whose lack of belief 'proves' the diametric opposite.

Schuhart wrote:

For this to be relevant to animals, we’d have to see that division as artificial too. So, as I said, you are rather left making the argument that a mouse and a black have the same capacity for moral reasoning.

Sigh. No, what I'm saying is that we can't measure it, and therefore cannot reliably establish the difference. If you believe that we can measure it, as opposed to simply ascribing it capriciously, please show me how - I'm all ears (well, eyes)!

That we can't measure moral capacity in any reliable and repeatable way makes it a very shaky basis on which to determine inclusion in a moral system - and leaves with no way of determining the difference in moral capacity between a mouse and a man but our own feelings and prejudices. That leaves you unable to persuade a white racist that a black person has the same moral capacity as a white person, or persuade a male chauvinist that women have the same moral capacity as men, because you can't measure it.

I know you will say that the difference in moral capacity between a mouse and a man is 'obvious', but history is littered with such claims - and the racist, and the chauvinist, and the theist, all claim the differences they 'see' are 'obvious'.

Schuhart wrote:

It depends what you mean by ‘moral system’. If the term as you use it means a collection of statements based on individual whim, then certainly you have a moral system. If you expect the moral system to make sense to others then, as far as I can see, you don’t have one yet.

Clearly it doesn't make sense to you, anyway - but perhaps that's because you don't accept personal thought as a basis for moral systems (for reasons that remain somewhat obscure).

Schuhart wrote:

(I’ve a feeling that what you are doing is trying to broaden the definition of ‘moral system’ until it ceases to have meaning – a common technique you’ll have noticed yourself in many religious discussions here. It’s not dissimilar to the process you’ve commented on yourself where the definition of ‘God’ will be made elastic to overcome whatever immediate argument is being used to suggest the concept makes little sense, and afterwards snap back into shape as the deity who delivered this or that holy book.)

Hmm. I've a feeling you're trying to narrow it to the point where only your conception of it can be right...

Personal systems of morality, based entirely on the whim of the person, are perfectly acceptable as moral systems, unless one believes, as you appear to, that they can't be.

Morality is a system for determining what's 'good', and what's 'evil', yes? There are then, to my mind, several general ways of basing such a system:

1. divine fiat (universal) - a book, or priesthood, tells you what God says is right
2. social contract (society) - a common morality is worked out between all persons in society
3. personal whim (individual) - a person works out a morality based on what they feel is wrong or right

The advantage of the first is that it is universal - you need never change your moral stance, since what God says is bad is bad. Unfortunately, it ties the importance of the moral system to it being the eternal truth, while the survival of the religion is actually tied to the social acceptance of that morality. Interpretation will therefore need to change while appearing to remain the same, as we have seen.

The advantage of the second is that it is automatically socially acceptable - and acceptance by society is the final arbiter of any moral system. The disadvantage is that it contains no mechanism for change, if it is the only system in pace - custom dictates morality, morality dictates custom.

The advantage of the third is that it is whimsical - that is, you can use any basis that seems right to you personally, and work logically or capriciously as you see fit. The disadvantage is that it may well create friction between the individual and their society or religion - but that is also the advantage, because this is the source of change in the social morality.

Take a man like Wilberforce the abolitionist, for example. Why did he decide slavery was immoral? Was it the then-current social morality? Clearly not, since that accepted slavery. Was it the Biblical morality? Clearly not, since as we know the Bible condones slavery, and many slave-owners justified their ownership Biblically.

We therefore have a puzzle, in your view - neither of the 'public' sources of morality explain Wilberforce's conviction that slavery was wrong. It therefore comes down to 'personal whim' - a whimsical morality that with some support and a great deal of persistence was imposed on society.

Personal morality is the basis of all morality, and the agent of change in social and religious morality - the leaven in the bread, if you like.

more cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

You are spot on. I see the racist, chauvinist, and theocrat as obviously wrong and don’t feel that their error opens the door to extending moral rights to mice or, for that matter, interesting fossils. What you are suggesting is that if someone makes a mistake, we have to make one as well.

Nope. I'm saying that we have no way of distinguishing, except "feelings". You "feel" the theocrat is wrong, but can you prove it?

Schuhart wrote:

I think you’re confusing ‘whim’ with ‘thought’. ‘Whim’ is the PFJ deciding to fight for Stan’s right to have babies. ‘Thought’ is Socrates refusing to accept that he had corrupted the youth of Athens.

Again - how do you objectively distinguish them? Clearly you feel that one is ridiculous, and one is not, but "Schuhart thinks it's silly" is not a great basis for morality either - although, now I come to think of it, it's frequently the basis for religious systems as delivered by a Prophet...

cordially,
Scofflaw

I have this feeling that you're really not answering my questions. I'm equally sure that's not deliberate, so one or the other of us currently has a firm grasp on the wrong end of the stick.

Schuhart wrote:

You know yourself that proof, in the final analysis, really just amounts to deciding that something is very improbable. So, yes, as we know there are arguments that suggest very strongly that a person would be wrong in believing that this or that God had handed us a book. It really just hinges on how ludicrous we’re willing to let things get.

That's a yes, then - you can't measure it, and you're simply hoping I'll agree.

Schuhart wrote:

If we want, we can remove your first assumption in the OP and just operate on the basis that none of this is real and I’m imagining it all.

Well, yes - that's the nature of an assumption. Buddhists would tend to agree with you, rather than me - and I don't claim that Buddhists are therefore immoral, so clearly it's possible to build an effective moral system on that basis as well.

Have you been operating on the assumption that I think the system I propose is a universal system? That it is right? That it is the only and exclusive system of morality? Absolutely not so.

Schuhart wrote:

(In which case, I’m imagining that you are wrong. And very, very smelly.)

Actually, I'm not at most fragrant right this instant, although 'smelly' is stretching it a bit.

Schuhart wrote:

In fairness, it’s not only down to me saying it’s silly. I just see a big leap between ‘equal’ and ‘appropriate’, and not filling that gap makes me feel what you are saying is whim. Pulling out George Bernard Shaw again, once we say ‘appropriate’ it becomes a matter of how low can you go.

And intellectual capacity isn’t the only thing that creates that gap. Is it rational to see a big need for me not to step on a spider, if his mate is just going to eat him? Say we accept animal life to be more perilous than ours, do we equally accept one of those perils to be medical research by humans? I just feel the contention that animals be given moral equality in the absence of any argument to the contrary runs out of steam fairly quickly, because there are actually reasonable arguments that need answering.

The principle needs justification. It’s simply not self-evident.

I seem to have keep repeating this - the basis for equality is purely and simply that there is no good basis for inequality.

When I say a good basis, I mean an objective, measurable, repeatable basis. Your judgements of moral capacity are subjective, as are mine, so neither are trustworthy.

In the absence of a good basis, we can treat them either (a) arbitrarily unequally, or (b) arbitrarily equally. Unequally seems immediately more "sensible", but we rapidly run into the problem of deciding exactly where on a scale everything comes. You can lump ('all humans equally capable'), or split('some humans more capable than others'), but every single judgement you make is arbitrary and discriminatory, even if you pretend to have some method of measurement (phrenology, maybe?).

You "know", and I "know", that there are differences, that organisms are not equal - but we cannot determine by how much, because we are just operating on our "feelings", subjectively, with no objective system of measurement. We can go nowhere from the decision that things are unequal that does not involve arbitrary decisions.

Until you can provide a repeatable, objective system of determining moral capacity (or any other measure you wish to use to determine inequality), you're simply exercising your prejudices.

cordially,
Scofflaw