Basis of morality

Scofflaw

I was thinking about this the other day, as a result of a thread on the Christianity forum. Insofar as I have a basis for a formal moral system, it goes something like this:

1. everything is real (assumption)

2. therefore, other people/organisms are real

3. there is no [EDIT]a priori[/EDIT] valid basis for determining superiority (assumption, but testable)

4. therefore, all organisms are equal

5. if all organisms are equal, it is incorrect to privilege the desires of one organism over another purely on the basis of which organism has them

6. it is likewise incorrect to treat organisms other than oneself as less real than oneself

7. it is therefore incorrect to treat other organisms as objects for the gratification of one's own desires without reference to theirs, with the incorrectness increasing in proportion to the extent you negate their desires

8. in cases where only some desires can be satisfied, one should aim for a solution that maximises the satisfaction of desire, while minimising the negation of desire (utilitarianism, in other words).

Some obvious corollaries:

1. the desires of all living organisms can be regarded as flowing from their continued life - therefore, killing another organism negates all their desires, and is the most incorrect action.

2. there are extenuating circumstances, such as not realising the other had desires that needed to be taken into account on any given occasion

3. and from the above, it should be clear that any action requiring the use of force against others necessarily entails incorrect action

4. it can be assumed that organisms will desire what is best for themselves - to make the best possible decisions (assumption)

5. it is possible for the organism's desires to become deranged through mental illness, parasitic activity and diseases - in these cases, one should operate as far as possible on the basis of the most probable non-deranged desires, or the best possible decisions for that organism

6. it is possible that an organism, through ignorance of facts, may come to decisions that are less optimal than decisions. If you withhold information that might alter their decision, you are ignoring their desire to make the best decisions

7. anything that tends to promote the objectificaiton of others is likely to lead to incorrect actions

[EDIT]
Corollaries arising from discussion:

1. organisms that are dependent on another organism for continued existence are enfeebled in their rights with respect to that other organism in proportion to the degree of their dependence.
[/EDIT]

Thoughts? Comments? Where are the gaping holes that I have failed to see?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Fallen Seraph

Hmmm. I think that your statement number 5 is relatively trivial without further justification. You say it's incorrect to give preference to the desires of one organism over another; to this I must respond: so what? Indeed it is incorrect; but
a) it's not necessarily morally incorrect, just flat out wrong and baseless.
b)it assumes that desire is some form of moral currency, which would need to shown and, I feel, is quite questionable.

Your corollary number 4 is also much closer to a proposition than a corollary and I also don't think it's particularly correct. It's fairly trivial to see that what someone desires isn't necessarily what's best for them. I might want a huge fry-up for breakfast every morning, but it's probably not the best for my health in the long run.

And to take up a quibble with your desire as moral currency; emotion is a prerequisite for desire (I feel) that it's unreasonable to assume that lower lifeforms have emotions, so your generalisation to "organisms" is invalid. Going a little further it's still very debatable with higher lifeforms; just because a bird is real doesn't mean that emotions to a bird are anything similar to the emotions we feel. I think that's doing a bit of projecting from humans onto animals.


Also I think that utilitarianism, as a philosophy, is a very nice guide to day to day living; but not exactly rigorous in a moral sense under extreme circumstances.

Zillah

I have problems with step 3 and 4. This sort of stuff is really delicate to discuss so I'm just going to see if I can build up what I'm getting at:


You state "there is no valid basis for determining superiority". Please define superiority in this context? Superiority, by definition requires a scale. I am superior in strength to that individual, that individual is superior in speed to myself. Isolated it means nothing. In this context you seem to be using it as some sort of measurement of existence worthiness, in which case could we not conflate points 3 and 4 into the arbitrary assertion "All organisms have an equal right to exist"?

In which case your argument is no more valid than an argument founded upon the equally arbitrary assertion "Humans have a greater right to exist than all other known life".

Scofflaw

Fallen Seraph wrote:

Hmmm. I think that your statement number 5 is relatively trivial without further justification. You say it's incorrect to give preference to the desires of one organism over another; to this I must respond: so what? Indeed it is incorrect; but
a) it's not necessarily morally incorrect, just flat out wrong and baseless.
b)it assumes that desire is some form of moral currency, which would need to shown and, I feel, is quite questionable.

OK.

a) I'm missing an input, which is that I want a system of morality with some sort of logical basis. I don't expect the system to logically defensible ex nihilo, because nothing is.

b) does it? I'd probably need more explanation of 'moral currency'. Vectors would be a closer analogy, I think.

Fallen Seraph wrote:

Your corollary number 4 is also much closer to a proposition than a corollary and I also don't think it's particularly correct. It's fairly trivial to see that what someone desires isn't necessarily what's best for them. I might want a huge fry-up for breakfast every morning, but it's probably not the best for my health in the long run.

I haven't stated what 'best possible decisions' are. If you consider a fry-up is the 'best possible decision', that's your call. If I know that they're bad for you, and you don't, I would be delinquent if I did not supply that information, but that is the extent of my correct action - unless you are not in your right mind.

You'll note I have suggested that we consider the "best long-term interests" only where we cannot know the desires of the individuals concerned. Where we do know those desires, we should operate on the basis of those, whether they are in the individuals' best interests or not.

Therefore corollary 4 (which is, as you say, really an assumption) is only activated where individuals lack the ability to make decisions for themselves.

Fallen Seraph wrote:

And to take up a quibble with your desire as moral currency; emotion is a prerequisite for desire (I feel) that it's unreasonable to assume that lower lifeforms have emotions, so your generalisation to "organisms" is invalid. Going a little further it's still very debatable with higher lifeforms; just because a bird is real doesn't mean that emotions to a bird are anything similar to the emotions we feel. I think that's doing a bit of projecting from humans onto animals.

Well, you've taken a very specific, and very human, meaning of desire. If there is another word (urge? drive?) that covers everything from phototropism to the human desire for glory, I can't think of it. However, this is not a projection, but a lexical deficiency.

Fallen Seraph wrote:

Also I think that utilitarianism, as a philosophy, is a very nice guide to day to day living; but not exactly rigorous in a moral sense under extreme circumstances.

Indeed, but then so is my eyesight, and hearing, reflexes, and a whole bunch of other things. I haven't therefore discarded them.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Scofflaw

Zillah wrote:

I have problems with step 3 and 4. This sort of stuff is really delicate to discuss so I'm just going to see if I can build up what I'm getting at:

You state "there is no valid basis for determining superiority". Please define superiority in this context? Superiority, by definition requires a scale. I am superior in strength to that individual, that individual is superior in speed to myself. Isolated it means nothing.

Yes, that's exactly right. One can assert greater speed, or better eyesight, but one cannot simply assert superiority - it is meaningless to do so.

Zillah wrote:

In this context you seem to be using it as some sort of measurement of existence worthiness, in which case could we not conflate points 3 and 4 into the arbitrary assertion "All organisms have an equal right to exist"?

Not really. That's a corollary, but I don't see how I'm using it as a 'measure of existence worthiness'. If anything, I could be said to be saying that you can't use 'superiority' to determine 'existence worthiness'.

Zillah wrote:

In which case your argument is no more valid than an argument founded upon the equally arbitrary assertion "Humans have a greater right to exist than all other known life".

I don't think so. An equal right to existence can be derived from the impossibility of determining an overall 'superiority', but an assertion of the greater right of any group of organisms is entirely unfounded.

cordially,
Scofflaw

JC 2K3

Morality is just collective security.

Your arguments are very nice, but they kind of assert that morality is some sort of inherent universal system of rules.

InFront

'1; Everything is real'? Not what I expected to read on an atheism forum.

Anyway, 3 and 4 are hugely shakey points. I mean one could argue there is no valid basis for determining something as basic as intelligence (in humans), however we do attempt it, results vary depending on your definition of intelligence.
Does that then mean that either all or no humans are intelligent?
If you choose to deny the theories that are put forward on apportioning hierarchy as valid altogether, then this "morality" gives as much gravity to washing your face with beauty products to kill bacteria, as (apologies for the image) decapitating an infant with a chainsaw.

As for corollaries 4 and 6: one says that an organism will be the best decider for his own fate based on his desire, but you then disqualify this by adding in that they must have 'the facts'. Well which is it, the desire or the facts?

Scofflaw

JC 2K3 wrote:

Morality is just collective security.

Your arguments are very nice, but they kind of assert that morality is some sort of inherent universal system of rules.

Not really. The system I suggest is just one system. I can universally apply it, but that doesn't mean other people will, or should. I gives me a basis for deciding whether something is right or wrong that is both formal (in the sense that it can be thought through) and consistent (in the sense that thinking it through shouldn't lead to clearly incorrect outcomes).

My question is really: to what unexpected, and clearly incorrect, outcomes, does the above system of morality give rise? Are there situations that cannot be judged using this system of morality?

cordially,
Scofflaw

InFront

How about a topical one: MRSA.

What gives us the right to kill Staph. aureus that may or may not be methicillin-resistant? Who is a danger to whom; are they a danger to us or is it us who are a danger to them? Who has the greater right to exist according to what is written above? Both, apparently.

7. it is therefore incorrect to treat other organisms as objects for the gratification of one's own desires without reference to theirs, with the incorrectness increasing in proportion to the extent you negate their desires

but more importantly, according to your post:

killing another organism negates all their desires, and is the most incorrect action.

Scofflaw

InFront wrote:

How about a topical one: MRSA.

What gives us the right to kill Staph. aureus that may or may not be methicillin-resistant? Who is a danger to whom; are they a danger to us or is it us who are a danger to them? Who has the greater right to exist according to what is written above? Both, apparently.

but more importantly, according to your post:

Good point - which forces me to extend the system. I would cite self-defence - they will do us harm if allowed to, we will do them harm to prevent it. Attacking another organism negates one's own moral rights.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Zillah

Scofflaw wrote:

Good point - which forces me to extend the system. I would cite self-defence - they will do us harm if allowed to, we will do them harm to prevent it. Attacking another organism negates one's own moral rights.

Now you've got a paradox.

1 - All organisms are equal.
2 - Attacking another organism negates one's own moral rights.
3 - Some organism's by their nature must attack other organisms.
4 - Therefore, some organisms have no moral rights.
5 - Therefore, all organisms are not equal.

robindch

> 5 - Therefore, all organisms are not equal.

Hmm... perhaps some organisms are more not equal than others?

I feel an implosion coming on.

Zillah

robindch wrote:

> 5 - Therefore, all organisms are not equal.

Hmm... perhaps some organisms are more not equal than others?

Animal Farm always made me sad.

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

3. there is no valid basis for determining superiority (assumption, but testable)

4. therefore, all organisms are equal

I think, much as has gone before, the problems start in that area of ‘no objective way of determining superiority’. I think you’ve already hit on that issue of guessing that, if it could be determined objectively, there would be some half assumption that ‘superior’ would be a quality that brings with it a right to advancement above others. But even that is questionable, IMHO.

We’re Homo Sapiens. We witness the arrival of the first Homo Superiors among our offspring, and recognise them as objectively superior according to a standard that (just for the purpose of argument) has general acceptance. We recognise that Homo Superior will simply take over the planet in one generation, turning us into chutney along the way. Have we a moral obligation not to drown them at birth? Does an inferior species have to go quietly into that dark night? In this scenario, Homo Superior may simply triumph, but that does not seem to be a moral choice unless we take it that justice is whatever is in the interest of the stronger.

To be honest, I suspect that the only sound basis for morality comes from one of those social contract type ideas, where we try to derive rights from a putative state of nature. As I understand it Hobbes (no, not the mod from the Islam forum) had that idea that a state of nature would be a place of perpetual warfare between people (widen that to organisms by all means) that could only be brought to an end by surrendering unquestionable authority to a central figure like a monarch, who then provided order.

Locke on the other hand felt that the state of nature would be grand most of the time, with people generally staying out of each other hair and not fighting over every little thing. However, conflicts would sometimes break out that required an impartial authority to rule on and hence we would contract among ourselves to create a central authority that drew its legitimacy from our consent. This does make morality a little arbitrary – it’s just whatever we decide it is. But I’m not confident any other sound base can be found – although I’m open to suggestion.

Scofflaw

Zillah wrote:

Now you've got a paradox.

1 - All organisms are equal.
2 - Attacking another organism negates one's own moral rights.
3 - Some organism's by their nature must attack other organisms.
4 - Therefore, some organisms have no moral rights.
5 - Therefore, all organisms are not equal.

Ha. Not so, my fine friend.

The moral rules are suspended only in attack and defence, not generally, and only for the attacker and defender. A lion attacking a gazelle does not forfeit his rights in your direction, but only in respect of the gazelle whose rights he is abrogating.

I only have a paradox if I couple "nature" to "rights". I don't, so there is no paradox.

Nice try, though.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

I think, much as has gone before, the problems start in that area of ‘no objective way of determining superiority’. I think you’ve already hit on that issue of guessing that, if it could be determined objectively, there would be some half assumption that ‘superior’ would be a quality that brings with it a right to advancement above others. But even that is questionable, IMHO.

We’re Homo Sapiens. We witness the arrival of the first Homo Superiors among our offspring, and recognise them as objectively superior according to a standard that (just for the purpose of argument) has general acceptance. We recognise that Homo Superior will simply take over the planet in one generation, turning us into chutney along the way. Have we a moral obligation not to drown them at birth? Does an inferior species have to go quietly into that dark night? In this scenario, Homo Superior may simply triumph, but that does not seem to be a moral choice unless we take it that justice is whatever is in the interest of the stronger.

Again, assuming we know they're going to turn us into chutney, we have the right of self-defence. We can exercise this only if we know that's what they're going to do - even so, it would not be moral.

Schuhart wrote:

To be honest, I suspect that the only sound basis for morality comes from one of those social contract type ideas, where we try to derive rights from a putative state of nature. As I understand it Hobbes (no, not the mod from the Islam forum) had that idea that a state of nature would be a place of perpetual warfare between people (widen that to organisms by all means) that could only be brought to an end by surrendering unquestionable authority to a central figure like a monarch, who then provided order.

Locke on the other hand felt that the state of nature would be grand most of the time, with people generally staying out of each other hair and not fighting over every little thing. However, conflicts would sometimes break out that required an impartial authority to rule on and hence we would contract among ourselves to create a central authority that drew its legitimacy from our consent. This does make morality a little arbitrary – it’s just whatever we decide it is. But I’m not confident any other sound base can be found – although I’m open to suggestion.

I'm not sure those are moral systems - they appear to be legal systems. A legal system requires some form of enforcement, which a moral system does not.

How can personal morality be a social contract?

cordially,
Scofflaw

InFront

Scofflaw wrote:

Good point - which forces me to extend the system. I would cite self-defence - they will do us harm if allowed to, we will do them harm to prevent it. Attacking another organism negates one's own moral rights.

So anything that has the potential to harm us is fair game?

Most staph aureus (just as an example, there are lots of bacteria like this) are usually harmless. Take an innocent staph aurus hidden on the window ledge of an ICU unit. The room is sterilised using the new technology for sterilising hospitals. He has never hurt anyone, nobody has contracted MRSA from him, why does your morality entertain such an act against an innocent organism, apparently the equal of a human being?
Why not against all animals who are potentially threatening? Why not all humans who are potentially threatening?

Scofflaw

InFront wrote:

So anything that has the potential to harm us is fair game?

Not really. Anything that is definitely going to harm you is fair game. You don't get to kill a snake on the off-chance.

InFront wrote:

Most staph aureus (just as an example, there are lots of bacteria like this) are usually harmless. Take an innocent staph aurus hidden on the window ledge of an ICU unit. The room is sterilised using the new technology for sterilising hospitals. He has never hurt anyone, nobody has contracted MRSA from him, why does your morality entertain such an act against an innocent organism, apparently the equal of a human being?

Destroying them is immoral. There's a virtual certainty, statistically, that the staph will do harm in that setting, so the immorality is partially mitigated by the plea of self-defence - in that setting, the staph is rather more than potentially threatening.

Given the option to use a 'sterilising agent' that would only kill those bacteria that will almost certainly do harm, I would prefer to use it.

By the way, do bear in mind that a human is a multicellular organism when using the example of bacteria.

InFront wrote:

Why not against all animals who are potentially threatening? Why not all humans who are potentially threatening?

Because it would also be immoral, in proportion to the degree of threat and the likelihood of actual attack.

cordially,
Scofflaw

JC 2K3

We have a valid basis for determining superiority - those who are most like ourselves, ie. other humans, are superior to everything else.

Within the subset of being humans we believe that those with similar opinions to ourselves are superior, as one's personal opinions will undoubtably be the "best" opinions according to them. However, for the sake of our own security, it is probably better not to harm other humans as they are the ones most capable of causing us harm should they feel threatened by us.

Scofflaw

JC 2K3 wrote:

We have a valid basis for determining superiority - those who are most like ourselves, ie. other humans, are superior to everything else.

Within the subset of being humans we believe that those with similar opinions to ourselves are superior, as one's personal opinions will undoubtably be the "best" opinions according to them. However, for the sake of our own security, it is probably better not to harm other humans as they are the ones most capable of causing us harm should they feel threatened by us.

It's certainly a basis.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Zillah

Scofflaw wrote:

Nice try, though.

Oh I'm not done yet my cordial aquaintance.

Some organisms, by their very nature, must always attack another organism to survive. Lets use the HIV virus as an example. Now, while the HIV virus does not have its rights negated en masse due to its nature, it must, inescapably be attacking one other organism at any given moment. So, we have an organism who's rights are always subsurvient to at least one other organism. Its very existence has rendered it a second class lifeform, lacking all rights in regard to one other entity at all times.

Scofflaw

Zillah wrote:

Oh I'm not done yet my cordial aquaintance.

Some organisms, by their very nature, must always attack another organism to survive. Lets use the HIV virus as an example. Now, while the HIV virus does not have its rights negated en masse due to its nature, it must, inescapably be attacking one other organism at any given moment. So, we have an organism who's rights are always subsurvient to at least one other organism. Its very existence has rendered it a second class lifeform, lacking all rights in regard to one other entity at all times.

Nice. I accept that based on its lifestyle, the AIDS virus exists in a constant state of forfeited rights. Does it thereby forfeit all capability for rights? I would argue not - you would have no right to destroy a crystal of AIDS viruses if it were somewhere it could do no harm. So, although its lifestyle leaves it in a constant state of forfeited rights, that does not make it a "second-class" organism. It is an organism exactly equal to you, in a state of constantly suspended rights.

Note that this is exactly the same as legal status. You do not, by committing a criminal act, forfeit your intrinsic rights - they are abrogated or suspended as a result of your commission of a crime, but that does not magically make you a second-class citizen before the law.

cordially,
Scofflaw

InFront

Scofflaw wrote:

Not really. Anything that is definitely going to harm you is fair game. You don't get to kill a snake on the off-chance.

Okay. But if you do kill a snake, though it poses no danger, this is just as morally wrong as killing one's child, for example?

Scofflaw wrote:

There's a virtual certainty, statistically, that the staph will do harm in that setting

Not at all. An estimated 30% of the population walk around with SA on their faces and hands, it lives much more frequently inside people, and it can be impossible to completely remove it from one’s person. By no means has a SA a certainty or virtual certainty of being life threatening.

By the way, do bear in mind that a human is a multicellular organism when using the example of bacteria.

Can you explain the difference you think there is in having more cells than another? I thought all organisms were equal (points 3&4), or is it now size dependent? Furthermore, I presume this theory is exclusively pro-life?

Zillah

Scofflaw wrote:

Note that this is exactly the same as legal status. You do not, by committing a criminal act, forfeit your intrinsic rights - they are abrogated or suspended as a result of your commission of a crime, but that does not magically make you a second-class citizen before the law.

The comparison to myself comitting a crime and having my rights suspended is not a very good one. The virus, by its very existence must be constantly comitting this "crime". While in theory you could have an isolated sample of the HIV* virus that is not in this state of perpetually suspended rights, its an utterly meaningless technicality; you are denying it the right to breed, expand and do pretty much anything but exist in torpor. So again, by its very nature, it is perpetually having its rights revoked, whether they be the right to exist, or the right to reproduce.

There is no circumstance in which this organism has access to all the rights you intend on giving all organisms. Your caveat of "attacking another organism is grounds for suspension of rights" may aswell be "possessing eyes is grounds for suspension of rights" (in regards to say, mammals); both are a fundamental element of the organism's existence. While I appreciate the need for the caveat, it is at odds with your assertion that all organisms are equal: That need is based on the notion that we are putting humans on a higher moral priority than the virus.

*(and it is HIV, not AIDS. AIDS is a condition that can result from the HIV virus)


To elaborate:

There are three rights at risk here -
1 - The virus' right to exist.
2 - The human beings right to exist.
3 - The virus' right to be free and reproduce.

All three of these are fundamental aspects of the organism. You must choose one of these rights to be perpetually denied, thereby demoting that organism to second class in moral terms. We choose, inevitably, that the virus lose its right to exist or to be free and reproduce. This is because we are making the human and the virus not equal.

Now while you may say that the virus' right to reproduce is merely being suspended, it is a suspension of rights that occurs in every circumstance, every time. In which case you're just renaming "second class".

Scofflaw

Zillah wrote:

The comparison to myself comitting a crime and having my rights suspended is not a very good one. The virus, by its very existence must be constantly comitting this "crime". While in theory you could have an isolated sample of the HIV* virus that is not in this state of perpetually suspended rights, its an utterly meaningless technicality; you are denying it the right to breed, expand and do pretty much anything but exist in torpor. So again, by its very nature, it is perpetually having its rights revoked, whether they be the right to exist, or the right to reproduce.

No, by its actions its rights are constantly opposed by our right of self-defence.

Zillah wrote:

There is no circumstance in which this organism has access to all the rights you intend on giving all organisms. Your caveat of "attacking another organism is grounds for suspension of rights" may aswell be "possessing eyes is grounds for suspension of rights" (in regards to say, mammals); both are a fundamental element of the organism's existence. While I appreciate the need for the caveat, it is at odds with your assertion that all organisms are equal: That need is based on the notion that we are putting humans on a higher moral priority than the virus.

*(and it is HIV, not AIDS. AIDS is a condition that can result from the HIV virus)


To elaborate:

There are three rights at risk here -
1 - The virus' right to exist.
2 - The human beings right to exist.
3 - The virus' right to be free and reproduce.

All three of these are fundamental aspects of the organism. You must choose one of these rights to be perpetually denied, thereby demoting that organism to second class in moral terms. We choose, inevitably, that the virus lose its right to exist or to be free and reproduce. This is because we are making the human and the virus not equal.

None of those rights are being denied. There is an additional right, which is our right to self-defence:

1 - The virus' right to exist.
2 - The human beings' right to exist.
3 - The virus' right to be free and reproduce.
4 - The human beings' right to try and prevent that.

It's a morally neutral situation - the HIV virus is not "evil" simply because it will kill you by existing and reproducing in you, and human beings are not "evil" for trying to prevent it doing so.

Zillah wrote:

Now while you may say that the virus' right to reproduce is merely being suspended, it is a suspension of rights that occurs in every circumstance, every time. In which case you're just renaming "second class".

That someone always has to travel in second class doesn't make them second-class.

You cannot forfeit your rights due to your nature unless someone decides that certain natures should forfeit their rights. You strongly wish to do so (as far as I can see), and I do not.

However, how will you define your 'second-class organisms'. Is it the species? What if a species of pathogen evolves very slightly to be harmless, while not undergoing sufficient change to render it a new species? If the harmless variant is 'not second-class', while the harmful one is, then all you've done is redefine 'action' as 'nature'.

The stronger point is that the HIV virus may not be able to exist without us as hosts - a dependent organism as well as an obligate pathogen. Its very existence, then depends not only on doing harm, but also depends on us. I have considered that dependency does lead to a situation of 'enfeebled' rights, which is a 'second class' of organisms. However, that flows out of this system of morality - a consequence of it. I have therefore amended statement 3.

We would be within our rights of self-defence to eradicate any obligate human pathogen - not because they have no rights, but because we have the right of self-defence. From a human perspective, of course, it is straightforwardly a morally good thing to eliminate a pathogen. From a universal perspective, on the other hand, such an eradication is morally neutral - killing one organism for the sake of another.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Scofflaw

InFront wrote:

Okay. But if you do kill a snake, though it poses no danger, this is just as morally wrong as killing one's child, for example?

Yes, that is the case. All that I can see that prevents it being the case is our bias towards humanity, and perhaps the strong likelihood that such an action is evidence of deragement. 'Duty of care' I don't see any way yet of getting to. [EDIT]Indeed, considering a totally dependent child, it may well be less moral to kill the snake.[/EDIT]

InFront wrote:

Not at all. An estimated 30% of the population walk around with SA on their faces and hands, it lives much more frequently inside people, and it can be impossible to completely remove it from one’s person. By no means has a SA a certainty or virtual certainty of being life threatening.

Indeed - and we don't require people to swab their hands and faces except in certain settings where SA will almost certainly be harmful.

InFront wrote:

Can you explain the difference you think there is in having more cells than another? I thought all organisms were equal (points 3&4), or is it now size dependent? Furthermore, I presume this theory is exclusively pro-life?

Not strictly size-dependent, but cell-dependent. You are composed of roughly 100 trillion cells, all of which will die if you die. You also contain roughly 10 times that many bacteria, most of whom will also die if you die. AN SA bacterium conists of one cell - as do most other pathogens. An infection sufficient to kill you will consist of far fewer pathogen cells than it kills, so by utilitarian rules, it comes off worse.

InFront wrote:

Furthermore, I presume this theory is exclusively pro-life?

Again, this runs me into the question of dependency. I think dependency does enfeeble rights, as a consequence of the moral system as I have stated it. I don't have much of a problem with that, and certainly prefer to accept it as a necessary conclusion than place an arbitrary restriction to the effect that dependency does not reduce rights. I have added it to the corollaries.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Zombrex

Scofflaw wrote:

I was thinking about this the other day, as a result of a thread on the Christianity forum. Insofar as I have a basis for a formal moral system, it goes something like this:

1. everything is real (assumption)

2. therefore, other people/organisms are real

3. there is no [EDIT]a priori[/EDIT] valid basis for determining superiority (assumption, but testable)

4. therefore, all organisms are equal

Why organisms?

Is the assertion that life has value over non-life an axiom?

InFront

Scofflaw wrote:

Indeed - and we don't require people to swab their hands and faces except in certain settings where SA will almost certainly be harmful.

I am interested as to why you make a distinction between 'us' and 'them'. Isn't it in the visitor's interest to protect both the Staph aureus and the human patient? In that case, isn't it immoral to even visit the hospital, since you know you will be subjecting innocents to needless compromise?
And remember, even an infection with MRSA does not guarantee a death under any circumstances. Most people get sick and recover. Is that worth killing the Staph aureus for?

1. organisms that are dependent on another organism for continued existence are enfeebled in their rights with respect to that other organism in proportion to the degree of their dependence.

Would infanticide be okay, under what circumstances? How about famine victims who spread disease and continue the cycle of poverty through pregnancy?

Scofflaw

Wicknight wrote:

Why organisms?

Is the assertion that life has value over non-life an axiom?

Not really - it's more the assumption that non-life has no 'intentions/desires/urges'.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Scofflaw

InFront wrote:

I am interested as to why you make a distinction between 'us' and 'them'. Isn't it in the visitor's interest to protect both the Staph aureus and the human patient? In that case, isn't it immoral to even visit the hospital, since you know you will be subjecting innocents to needless compromise?

Yes.

InFront wrote:

And remember, even an infection with MRSA does not guarantee a death under any circumstances. Most people get sick and recover. Is that worth killing the Staph aureus for?

Again, when you talk about a human being getting sick, you are usually talking about quite a lot of cell death.

InFront wrote:

Would infanticide be okay, under what circumstances? How about famine victims who spread disease and continue the cycle of poverty through pregnancy?

It's hard to think, off-hand, of an uncontrived circumstance in which infanticide is necessary, which would be the circumstance in which it is also acceptable. The famine victim question is so complex it would require a lot of analysis...

cordially,
Scofflaw

InFront

Well lets combine both then. Take a country like Angola which is no stranger to famine, overpopulation, HIV and various other disease outbreaks like cholera. I think it has the highest child mortality rate in the world, at about 18%. HIV is at about 4%. Knowing the serious effect the weakest kids in that society are having on humanitarian relief, what is the moral problem posed by killing HIV children at birth? Or imposing abortion? Or imposed sterilisation upon those with HIV/ AIDS? They are a direct danger to the health of others, just like MRSA, and completely dependent upon other organisms.

JC 2K3

Wicknight wrote:

Why organisms?

Is the assertion that life has value over non-life an axiom?

The assertion that "value" exists is an axiom.

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

we have the right of self-defence.

I think the self defence angle is being well explored. The only thing I'd throw in is how self defence is a moral judgement as it is simply my self interest. Presumably, unless I'm absolutely browned off at existence, I'm going to engage in self defence. I wonder if morality is only revealed when it causes someone to do something that cannot be traced back to their own self interest. Otherwise it all seems to come back to justice being the interest of the stronger.

Scofflaw wrote:

I'm not sure those are moral systems - they appear to be legal systems. A legal system requires some form of enforcement, which a moral system does not.

How can personal morality be a social contract?

Certainly I came across those ideas in the context of discussion about the theoretical basis for political authority. I just wonder if there's any other basis for morality than what we collectively deem it to be, and (while I'm not dogmatic at all about this - I'm still exploring the topic and happy to take it where it comes) I would wonder if morality has a meaning outside of a social setting.

I know we hardly want to get lost in academic woolliness. But does morality mean anything more than doing right by other people? (with a possible extention to other life forms, although they are hardly equal partners in the transaction).

Zombrex

JC 2K3 wrote:

The assertion that "value" exists is an axiom.

Well value doesn't exist beyond the value we grant something.

Zombrex

Scofflaw wrote:

Not really - it's more the assumption that non-life has no 'intentions/desires/urges'.

cordially,
Scofflaw

does all life have "intentions/desires/urges"?

Scofflaw

InFront wrote:

Well lets combine both then. Take a country like Angola which is no stranger to famine, overpopulation, HIV and various other disease outbreaks like cholera. I think it has the highest child mortality rate in the world, at about 18%. HIV is at about 4%. Knowing the serious effect the weakest kids in that society are having on humanitarian relief, what is the moral problem posed by killing HIV children at birth? Or imposing abortion? Or imposed sterilisation upon those with HIV/ AIDS? They are a direct danger to the health of others, just like MRSA, and completely dependent upon other organisms.

Interesting. I think the essential questions are "is the desired result better than what will otherwise happen, and is there another way to achieve the desired result without killing?".

There are almost certainly routes around the problems caused by weakened children that do not require killing them. However, if there are not, then it is morally acceptable to kill those children, or impose abortion - sterilisation would be the least bad option, in the absence of a cure for HIV/AIDS.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Scofflaw

Wicknight wrote:

does all life have "intentions/desires/urges"?

I would say so, yes.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

I think the self defence angle is being well explored. The only thing I'd throw in is how self defence is a moral judgement as it is simply my self interest. Presumably, unless I'm absolutely browned off at existence, I'm going to engage in self defence. I wonder if morality is only revealed when it causes someone to do something that cannot be traced back to their own self interest. Otherwise it all seems to come back to justice being the interest of the stronger.

Hmm. If one insists on treating all organisms as having equal rights, it seems hard to say that this is simply the operation of the 'interests of the stronger'.

Schuhart wrote:

Certainly I came across those ideas in the context of discussion about the theoretical basis for political authority. I just wonder if there's any other basis for morality than what we collectively deem it to be, and (while I'm not dogmatic at all about this - I'm still exploring the topic and happy to take it where it comes) I would wonder if morality has a meaning outside of a social setting.

Again, that is to assume that morality applies only to humans. If you do so, then you cannot answer the question "is it immoral/evil to torture an animal to death for fun?".

Schuhart wrote:

I know we hardly want to get lost in academic woolliness. But does morality mean anything more than doing right by other people? (with a possible extention to other life forms, although they are hardly equal partners in the transaction).

For a given value of "other people".

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

Hmm. If one insists on treating all organisms as having equal rights, it seems hard to say that this is simply the operation of the 'interests of the stronger'.

Is self defence meaningful for a weaker creature? If it’s a choice between me and my tape worm, and I decide on grounds of self defence to expel it, does its right to self defence enter the equation at all? I suppose what it amounts to is I don’t see how the assertion of equal rights for all organisms converts into something meaningful.

Another thought coming to mind is just that morality seems to imply choice. Assume we have discovered what morality is for a moment. I can follow it and be good or ignore it and be bad. My tape worm presumably just hangs about in my body soaking up whatever it can without any consciousness of whether this is good or not. So in what sense is it a moral being?

Scofflaw wrote:

Again, that is to assume that morality applies only to humans. If you do so, then you cannot answer the question "is it immoral/evil to torture an animal to death for fun?"

But I suppose what’s on my mind is that morality does largely (and possibly only) apply to humans. In what sense can we answer the question if it’s immoral/evil for a well fed domestic cat to torture an animal to death for fun. What is a moral cat, and how is that morality expressed?

Now, I suppose we can see morality in its application to humans might also involve choices that involve animals and even inanimate objects. Is it moral/evil for me to take more out of the resources of the world around me than I strictly need? But I’d take it that the ultimate reason for asking such questions is the impact on people around me.

Hence, maybe I shouldn’t torture animals for fun because it gives me a mindset that treats people with similar brutality. On the other hand, if torturing animals is therapeutic and spiritually refreshing, and empowers me to spend the rest of my time as a beacon of wholesome goodness to all around me, then presumably I should drown those kittens, and take my time over it.

Scofflaw wrote:

For a given value of "other people".

I don’t understand the point here.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

Is self defence meaningful for a weaker creature? If it’s a choice between me and my tape worm, and I decide on grounds of self defence to expel it, does its right to self defence enter the equation at all? I suppose what it amounts to is I don’t see how the assertion of equal rights for all organisms converts into something meaningful.

You're still thinking in terms of the enforcement of justice! If you choose to beat a mouse to death, you are being immoral. If the mouse defends itself, it is not being immoral. That it will be totally ineffective at doing so is not morally relevant to the question of self-defence.

How does the assertion of equal rights convert into something meaningful for the mouse? The answer would be if the immorality of your actions prevented you either directly or indirectly from committing them - and as far as I know, that's all any system of morality can do.

Schuhart wrote:

Another thought coming to mind is just that morality seems to imply choice. Assume we have discovered what morality is for a moment. I can follow it and be good or ignore it and be bad. My tape worm presumably just hangs about in my body soaking up whatever it can without any consciousness of whether this is good or not. So in what sense is it a moral being?But I suppose what’s on my mind is that morality does largely (and possibly only) apply to humans. In what sense can we answer the question if it’s immoral/evil for a well fed domestic cat to torture an animal to death for fun. What is a moral cat, and how is that morality expressed?

Good question, and I don't know how morality would appear to a cat. I am only seeking, after all, a formal system of morality that is useful to me. I can only act towards the cat as seems best to me, because I don't know how the cat views things.

(By the way, anyone who is not a cat-lover will answer the question for you.)

Schuhart wrote:

Now, I suppose we can see morality in its application to humans might also involve choices that involve animals and even inanimate objects. Is it moral/evil for me to take more out of the resources of the world around me than I strictly need? But I’d take it that the ultimate reason for asking such questions is the impact on people around me.

Well, I'd prefer 'organisms present and future' to 'people'.

Schuhart wrote:

Hence, maybe I shouldn’t torture animals for fun because it gives me a mindset that treats people with similar brutality.

Well, that's a first step. I would assert that you shouldn't torture animals for fun because you have no right to do so, and they have the right for you not to do so.

Schuhart wrote:

On the other hand, if torturing animals is therapeutic and spiritually refreshing, and empowers me to spend the rest of my time as a beacon of wholesome goodness to all around me, then presumably I should drown those kittens, and take my time over it.

Depends, I suppose, on whether you do more good than harm that way, from a strictly utilitarian perspective. It's hard to see how the same argument doesn't apply to torturing children if that's what turns you into Mother Teresa, though.

Schuhart wrote:

I don’t understand the point here.

You insist on viewing morality as applying only to humans, because only humans can apply it. Rather like saying that art only applies to artists, because only artists can apply it.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

If the mouse defends itself, it is not being immoral.

But I suppose what’s on my mind is morality is probably irrelevant to its considerations of its actions (if we’re willing to take a commonsense approach to the mouse’s reasoning powers). You are right to point out that we need to distinguish between what is moral and what is enforceable. But it seems to me that morality becomes something we bestow on mice, not something they partake in themselves. That seems to me to suggest there is an inequality between what morality means for me and what it means for a mouse.

I feel this consideration is present when you say

Scofflaw wrote:

I am only seeking, after all, a formal system of morality that is useful to me.

That seems to make morality a human thing, i.e. the function of morality is to guide individual human actions, including those in relation to other creatures.

Scofflaw wrote:

I would assert that you shouldn't torture animals for fun because you have no right to do so, and they have the right for you not to do so.

I suppose I’d query what the basis of that right is. If torturing the animal is good for me, and not harmful to any other human, what is the animal basing a right on?

Scofflaw wrote:

It's hard to see how the same argument doesn't apply to torturing children if that's what turns you into Mother Teresa, though.

I’d agree, but I think that threshold is already past. You know the kind of moral quandary that people like to pose – you can kill a tyrant, but only by planting a bomb that will also kill his largely blameless wife. Assume we agree the greater good is served by proceeding to kill them both. Then we just get into that George Bernard Shaw type of discussion about the exact price – the best time to plant the bomb is when the tyrant is visiting his wife and their newborn child in a maternity hospital. You’re going to take a few dozen totally innocent newborn children along too. And while he might be a tyrant, he’s not the worse tyrant who ever lived yadda yadda yadda. In principle, there is no difference between that quandary and someone torturing children because it turns them into Mother Teresa – it just the matter of what precise moral benefits justify what precise moral costs.

Scofflaw wrote:

You insist on viewing morality as applying only to humans, because only humans can apply it. Rather like saying that art only applies to artists, because only artists can apply it.

I’m not confident that analogy holds. Art applies to people able to engage with it at some level, even if only as a spectator and even if someone’s engagement is to feel art is a complete waste of time. Are mice even spectators to morality? If you lay poison to get a mouse out of your house, or drug him so that you can move him peacefully to a new home or just decide he has an equal right to share your roof I’m not sure the mouse is any the wiser. Its not that they think morality is a waste of time, either. They simply have no engagement with it (assuming, as above, we’re willing to accept a commonsense view of the intellectual life of mice).

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

But I suppose what’s on my mind is morality is probably irrelevant to its considerations of its actions (if we’re willing to take a commonsense approach to the mouse’s reasoning powers). You are right to point out that we need to distinguish between what is moral and what is enforceable. But it seems to me that morality becomes something we bestow on mice, not something they partake in themselves. That seems to me to suggest there is an inequality between what morality means for me and what it means for a mouse.

The mouses' morality is irrelevant to the morality of your actions.

Schuhart wrote:

I feel this consideration is present when you say. That seems to make morality a human thing, i.e. the function of morality is to guide individual human actions, including those in relation to other creatures.

That's correct.

Schuhart wrote:

I suppose I’d query what the basis of that right is. If torturing the animal is good for me, and not harmful to any other human, what is the animal basing a right on?

In which system of morality? In mine, its right is based on its equality to you. The morality of the animal does not enter the picture.

Schuhart wrote:

I’d agree, but I think that threshold is already past. You know the kind of moral quandary that people like to pose – you can kill a tyrant, but only by planting a bomb that will also kill his largely blameless wife. Assume we agree the greater good is served by proceeding to kill them both. Then we just get into that George Bernard Shaw type of discussion about the exact price – the best time to plant the bomb is when the tyrant is visiting his wife and their newborn child in a maternity hospital. You’re going to take a few dozen totally innocent newborn children along too. And while he might be a tyrant, he’s not the worse tyrant who ever lived yadda yadda yadda. In principle, there is no difference between that quandary and someone torturing children because it turns them into Mother Teresa – it just the matter of what precise moral benefits justify what precise moral costs.

Sure.

Schuhart wrote:

I’m not confident that analogy holds. Art applies to people able to engage with it at some level, even if only as a spectator and even if someone’s engagement is to feel art is a complete waste of time.

OK, let's consider architecture. A person can use architecture without ever 'engaging with it' - stairs go up, wall is here, archi-what?

Schuhart wrote:

Are mice even spectators to morality? If you lay poison to get a mouse out of your house, or drug him so that you can move him peacefully to a new home or just decide he has an equal right to share your roof I’m not sure the mouse is any the wiser. Its not that they think morality is a waste of time, either. They simply have no engagement with it (assuming, as above, we’re willing to accept a commonsense view of the intellectual life of mice).

So, your morality has made no difference to the mouse? Surely not! Depending on your morality, and whether you choose to act morally, it is either dead, moved, or unaffected.

You seem to insist on a reciprocal, or contractual, element in morality - do you have a justification for it? Surely, as you said yourself, we can best judge morality when it does not coincide with personal interests - and a 'reciprocal morality' by its very nature would seem always to coincide with self-interest.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

I think we seem to agree that morality is essentially a human thing (I’m not trying to distort anything you’re saying here – I’m just trying to identify what needs investigation and what can be left behind).The question, as I see it, seems to be whether morality is something that has some kind of objective basis or whether it is simply a human affectation or arbitrary human construct.

Scofflaw wrote:

The mouses' morality is irrelevant to the morality of your actions.

Scofflaw wrote:

In mine, its right is based on its equality to you. The morality of the animal does not enter the picture.

Indeed, but presumably the mouses' ‘morality’, such as it is, is a different kettle of fish to mine. I’m a morality giver, and it’s a morality taker. That suggests that, in the specific context of morality, we are not equal.

That doesn’t necessarily mean I can do what I like with the mouse - in principle a human lacking mental capacity might be said to be in the same boat. But deeming the mouse to have equal rights seems to require explanation. The situation seems more to me that we are deeming lesser creatures to be worthy of protection, not saying that they are equal in any meaningful sense.

I know we can speed past the discussion that might be had about how mice and humans are not equal in the sense of being uniform, just as humans are not equal in the sense of being uniform. But how is this equality manifested that you see bringing in its train moral rights (but presumably not obligations)?

Scofflaw wrote:

OK, let's consider architecture. A person can use architecture without ever 'engaging with it' - stairs go up, wall is here, archi-what?

I’d suggest the person in that situation is using civil engineering, not architecture. Their engagement with architecture is deeming it to be worthless, as with the earlier art example. That's not the same as saying art/architecture is simply utterly beyond them. One the other hand, morality is presumably to mice as time travel is to humans.

Scofflaw wrote:

So, your morality has made no difference to the mouse?

Clearly it makes a difference to the mouse, but its just a morality taker without any knowledge of why its life has been impacted for better or worse by my choices. Its not equal to me in moral terms.

Scofflaw wrote:

Surely, as you said yourself, we can best judge morality when it does not coincide with personal interests - and a 'reciprocal morality' by its very nature would seem always to coincide with self-interest.

I’m not so much saying that morality must be reciprocal, so much as I don’t see a solid basis for it other than whatever we arbitrarily decide it to be. We might well arbitrarily decide that no reciprocation is necessary.

That said, I suppose a standard problem is trying to separate morality out from self interest. I’m mindful of how Mario Puzo’s Godfather is described as always offering his ‘friendship’ first, in situations where he seemed to have no selfish interest, just to develop a comprehensive network of people who owed him favours that might be called in as the need arose. I suppose what we can say is that there’s no reason why a moral act cannot also be good for us personally. But, indeed, we only really ‘see’ morality as a separate phenomenon when it cannot be explained by self interest.

Tar.Aldarion

As once was said(by me?), all life is equally precious, or equally worthless.
Ok, I don't have time to read the thread, but the first page was excellent!

Zillah

Scofflaw wrote:

That someone always has to travel in second class doesn't make them second-class.

If your moral system demands that they, by their nature, much always travel in second class, then I would very much say that thats makes them second class in your system.

Scofflaw

Zillah wrote:

If your moral system demands that they, by their nature, much always travel in second class, then I would very much say that thats makes them second class in your system.

Evidently you would. However, I think you'd need to do more than assert the equivalence.

First - have you ever travelled first-class on a plane? Train? If you haven't, do you think that makes you second-class - in the sense of having a second-class nature, or being a second-class person?

Second - the rights of an organism that attacks to live are not removed. They are opposed by a right of self-defence.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Zillah

Scofflaw wrote:

First - have you ever travelled first-class on a plane? Train? If you haven't, do you think that makes you second-class - in the sense of having a second-class nature, or being a second-class person?

Not a valid comparison. For it to be a valid comparison I would have to have a fundamental aspect of my being make it so that I would always be forced to travel second class, and never ever under any circumstances have the possibility of ever travelling first class, by dictate.

Second - the rights of an organism that attacks to live are not removed. They are opposed by a right of self-defence.

But they are perpetually suspended which is functionally identical to not having them.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

I think we seem to agree that morality is essentially a human thing (I’m not trying to distort anything you’re saying here – I’m just trying to identify what needs investigation and what can be left behind).The question, as I see it, seems to be whether morality is something that has some kind of objective basis or whether it is simply a human affectation or arbitrary human construct.

I wouldn't even be certain that it can be generalised to 'human'. The majority of people seem to live by whatever system was imposed on them when they were small.

Schuhart wrote:

Indeed, but presumably the mouses' ‘morality’, such as it is, is a different kettle of fish to mine. I’m a morality giver, and it’s a morality taker. That suggests that, in the specific context of morality, we are not equal.

Hmm. You've stepped from 'different' to 'non-existent' rather casually there. There isn't really a 'give' or 'take' here - you mean that the mouse (or other human, come to that) benefits from your morality, whether they themselves are moral or not? Isn't that rather the point?

Schuhart wrote:

That doesn’t necessarily mean I can do what I like with the mouse - in principle a human lacking mental capacity might be said to be in the same boat. But deeming the mouse to have equal rights seems to require explanation. The situation seems more to me that we are deeming lesser creatures to be worthy of protection, not saying that they are equal in any meaningful sense.

I know we can speed past the discussion that might be had about how mice and humans are not equal in the sense of being uniform, just as humans are not equal in the sense of being uniform. But how is this equality manifested that you see bringing in its train moral rights (but presumably not obligations)?

No, I am saying that there is no meaningful a priori sense in which they are inferior. If they are not inferior, then they must have rights equal to yours, because there is no reason that they should have less - so, if you are moral, then you must allow others all the rights you claim yourself.

Now, if you claim no rights whatsoever, then you need allow none to others - is that your claim?

Schuhart wrote:

I’d suggest the person in that situation is using civil engineering, not architecture. Their engagement with architecture is deeming it to be worthless, as with the earlier art example. That's not the same as saying art/architecture is simply utterly beyond them.

Then apply the argument to civil engineering, if you prefer. I think you'll find that there are people whom architecture is utterly beyond. There are undoubtedly people who are entirely incapable of scientific thought.

Schuhart wrote:

One the other hand, morality is presumably to mice as time travel is to humans. Clearly it makes a difference to the mouse, but its just a morality taker without any knowledge of why its life has been impacted for better or worse by my choices. Its not equal to me in moral terms.I’m not so much saying that morality must be reciprocal, so much as I don’t see a solid basis for it other than whatever we arbitrarily decide it to be. We might well arbitrarily decide that no reciprocation is necessary.

If you meet a human being who is immoral, or less moral than yourself, the same is true. You will make moral choices, he will not. Are you superior to that person? In such a way that he should have less rights than you? Are you entitled to act immorally towards those who are themselves immoral?

Schuhart wrote:

That said, I suppose a standard problem is trying to separate morality out from self interest. I’m mindful of how Mario Puzo’s Godfather is described as always offering his ‘friendship’ first, in situations where he seemed to have no selfish interest, just to develop a comprehensive network of people who owed him favours that might be called in as the need arose. I suppose what we can say is that there’s no reason why a moral act cannot also be good for us personally. But, indeed, we only really ‘see’ morality as a separate phenomenon when it cannot be explained by self interest.

Indeed.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Scofflaw

Zillah wrote:

Not a valid comparison. For it to be a valid comparison I would have to have a fundamental aspect of my being make it so that I would always be forced to travel second class, and never ever under any circumstances have the possibility of ever travelling first class, by dictate.

Hmm. Yes - the problem arises, however, because the HIV virus is an obligate pathogen on us. I have (a couple of posts back) allowed that those whose existence is entirely dependent on another has enfeebled rights, particularly where that dependence requires doing harm.

Zillah wrote:

But they are perpetually suspended which is functionally identical to not having them.

Functionally, yes. However, de facto is not de juro.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Zillah

Scofflaw wrote:

Hmm. Yes - the problem arises, however, because the HIV virus is an obligate pathogen on us. I have (a couple of posts back) allowed that those whose existence is entirely dependent on another has enfeebled rights, particularly where that dependence requires doing harm.

Right...so some creatures have enfeebled rights. Thats not equal.

Scofflaw

Zillah wrote:

Right...so some creatures have enfeebled rights. Thats not equal.

Well, their inequality arises from a system that states there is no a priori way of determining inequality.

That the system produces inequality is not unacceptable - nor does it demonstrate any incoherence (because it is not an a priori determination). Indeed, in the cases you have chosen that demonstrate this, it would be far more ridiculous if the system continued to insist on exact equality. That the system is then capable of determining them unequal is rather pleasing.

cordially,
Scofflaw