Russia-Ukraine War (continuing)

I'm going to have to slightly disagree with you there, at least with regards to Ukraine being the best way to defend NATO. It is certainly important to arm Ukraine and help them succeed in taking back their country. However, I can't shake the feeling that Russia is going to test NATO directly regardless, and that test is going to happen in the Baltic states.

Why do I believe this? Well, Russia is absolutely paranoid about being encircled and not having unimpeded access to the world's oceans or, failing that, at least have a completely unimpeded marine approach to its major ports. All of Russia's current deep-water ports, Murmansk and Severodvinsk on the Atlantic as well as Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk on the Pacific, are icebound for at least part of the year, whilst the other two sea areas they can use to access the open oceans lead through choke points controlled by competitors/hostile powers. That would be the Baltic, where they have to pass through either the Kattegat and deal with Denmark and Sweden, or through the Kiel Canal, which is German, and the Black Sea, with the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, which are controlled by Turkey. This desire far predates Vladimir Putin's reign and dates back to the days of the tsars.

In the Baltic, Russia, in the shape of the USSR, used to enjoy relatively unimpeded access all the way to the Danish Straits and the Kattegat. The Baltic States were under their control, Kaliningrad was, and still is, a major naval base, and both East Germany and Poland had been brought to heel. However, following the fall of the Iron Curtain, Moscow lost a lot of that control. Germany reunified, Poland couldn't turn away from Russia fast enough and the Baltic states broke away as well. More importantly, they lost the land corridor to Kaliningrad, one of the major fleet bases on the Baltic and the only one that isn't hemmed in by a long an narrow gulf. Even if we leave Putin's longing to restore glory to the Empire/USSR out, this is a major strategic weakness that is extremely hard to swallow for Moscow. That's especially the case these days, given that the 2022 invasion of Ukraine has effectively turned the Baltic into a NATO lake.

So why the Baltics? Well, they're effectively exposed, at the extreme end of NATO, and relatively weak militarily. At the same time, Russia has a number of advantages in the shape of very short supply lines from one of its major industrial and population centres in the shape of St. Petersburg, as well as its bases in Kaliningrad. More importantly though, they have a partner in Belarus. Lukashenko's regime has, despite being Putin's puppet, been strangely absent from the fight in Ukraine. It has acted as a base for Russian forces but from what I can see, it hasn't sent any of its own forces into the fight, certainly not in large numbers. Now, this could mean that the Belarusian armed forces are in even rougher shape than Russia's, but I believe it is prudent to assume that the armed forces of Belarus are in at least somewhat of a fighting shape.

Accordingly, my suspicion is that Russia is going to call in a few dozen "favours" from Lukashenko to get him to commit his forces to a push westwards through Lithuania and the Suwalki Corridor towards Kaliningrad to isolate the Baltic states and re-establish an overland supply route with Kaliningrad. That would leave Russia with enough "space" to deal with Latvia and Estonia at its leisure by sending down forces from St. Petersburg. and I suspect that Putin is going to make this move sooner rather than later, because he knows that the longer he waits, the stronger NATO's position in the Baltic States is going to become. Germany recently stood up its 45th Panzer Brigade at the Rudninkai training range in Lithuania, right in the middle of the Suwalki Corridor, and the Bundeswehr expects the unit, the Bundeswehr's only permanently forward-based formation to be fully operational by 2027. I expect Putin to make a move in that direction sometime before that happens, so likely within the next 12-18 months.

Also, even if the US decides to stay out of a Baltic invasion, the neighbouring countries will absolutely get involved. Sweden, Finland and Norway all know they are at risk if solidarity is not shown. Even if that risk is low. The Poles absolutely detest the Russians and for very good reason; they will not be kept out. If Sweden, Norway and Finland commit, Denmark will also commit. I can't imagine the Dutch after MH17 not going to the defense of a NATO partner against Russia. Russia is despised by too many countries to have a reasonable chance of achieving anything in the Baltics.

The bridge in question, certainly the one shown in the article, seems to be the one between Sovetsk in Kaliningrad Oblast and Panemunes in Lithuania. I have my doubts that the bridges in Druskininkai got a similar treatment, given that they are completely within Lithuanian territory and connect different parts of that town.

For what it's worth, there are several spots further west where the tributaries of the Neman could potentially be forded, but I have my doubts that these would be used, as the roads leading there are just too small.

In general though, I get what you're saying. It wasn't just Switzerland, by the way. Back in Germany, numerous bridges in the area known as the Fulda Gap and in the Kinzig valley were designed to take atomic demolition munitions, essentially nuclear land mines. I only moved into that area ten years after the Iron Curtain came down, but you'd be surprised how many relics of these deployment plans were still present even in the 2000s and early 2010s.

The big problem both in the Suwalki corridor and the Fulda Gap is how quickly the defending forces could react. An attacker will have the initiative in any attack, especially a surprise attack. I have significant doubts about the Belarusian armed forces ability to pull off the type of lightning attack that would be needed, but then again, it would probably take any armoured spearhead less than an hour from their training area to make it into the town and the bridges. That would probably not even be enough to alert the Lithuanian command staff.

Just on your last paragraph, not sure if that's aimed at the scenario I outlined earlier but in case it was, I certainly drew that up as the death ride of not just Lukashenko, but Putin. In my eyes, such a move would be akin to the Ardennes offensive of late 1944 and early 1945. A desperate last gamble to wrangle some sort of victory, or at least a defiant last stand from an otherwise ignominious situation. Russia is throwing its last available assets into the meat grinder in Ukraine, and whilst it is capable of still limited gains in the field and still has some working logistics, it is becoming more and more clear that it is pretty much a spent force. Belarus might be in a better material state, but it lacks the deep reserves that Russia started the war with. As far as I'm concerned, an attack on the Suwalki corridor would signal the beginning of the end for the regimes in both countries.