Russia - threadbanned users in OP

The Abrams thing was simply a necessary example - a piece in the puzzle - to understand the overall picture. Yes the tanks themselves are near meaningless inthe proposed number, but the way the US is choosing to procure and supply them is the relevant bit.

I have another example I forgot in my original post - the Gay(gray) Eagle drones that 17 bipartisan Senators in the US want provided. Actually Gay is a more appropriate name for any Ukraine specific version, because just like all the other examples, The US won't supply them from their inventories, they have to make them from scratch minus all the capabilities the US considers too secret to fall into Orc hands, despite the loss of an RQ-170 and Global Hawk to Iran and round 5 predators and Reapers in other places. What a BS excuse that is:

The GDLSBs might as well not be coming - the perfect definition of too little, too late:

So while so many people think the US is doing a lot and that it's enough and that they don't need planes or greater range weapons, I'm with all of the above people in those links in thinging that isn't the case and that they need it now. I wouldn't give them F-16s, though, It'd be F-15s.

As an absolute minimum, the US should be traiinig Ukrainians on F-15s, Gay Eagles, ATACAMS and so on, just in case the Orcs don't oblige with the idea of drawing this out for years thus providing the time and breathing space Biden's current strategy - if you can call it that - requires. Training is not escalatory, but it is excellent insurance.

Looks like President Joe might need to think this one over. $1 for drones like these!

a number of factors do get in the way, such as the mentioned outside costs that could run into millions.

MQ-9 Reaper and MQ-1C Gray Eagle, both of which are proven systems that have combat and surveillance capabilities, a 27-hour endurance, and can be armed with Hellfire missiles. Largely for surveillance by the sound of it.

My concern is now they still have enough to virtually destroy Ukraine unless some very serious military defeats happen to them in the near future .Unfortunately it's still a huge task to run the Russians out of Ukraine completely.

Russian is notorious for being stuck in a cycle this time is no different

Russia Falls Into Old Habits

Lauren Goodrich

Senior Eurasia Analyst, Stratfor

14 MIN READOct 25, 2016 | 08:02 GMT

A sailor in Sevastopol holds the Russian flag at a one-year anniversary celebration of the March 18, 2014, Russian takeover of Crimea. Russia and its leaders are acting more aggressively at home and abroad, in keeping with a centuries-old historic cycle.

(ALEXANDER AKSAKOV/Getty Images)

Nearly 10 years ago, Stratfor published a series on Russia's historical boom-and-bust cycle. At that time, Russia was clearly at the height of a boom, rebuilding itself into a stable and robust power. Today, the country is quickly descending into the next, less pleasant stage. The strategy that revitalized the country is becoming less effective, forcing Russia and its leaders to act more aggressively at home and abroad. Though still assertive, Russia is no longer acting from a position of strength. The country may maintain some semblance of strength for years to come, but its fragility will eventually become apparent, forcing it into the next phase of the cycle.

Geography's Role in Russian History

For nearly eight centuries, Russia has been trapped in a loose cycle: It rises from chaos, returns as a regional and sometimes even global power, grows aggressive as the system cracks, and then collapses before rising again. The cycle is less about political choice than it is about geographic constraints. Geographically speaking, Russia is operating from an inherently weak position. It is the largest country in the world, covering roughly 13 time zones (split now into four mega-zones). Yet 75 percent of the country is virtually uninhabitable frozen tundra that becomes marshland in the summer, making domestic trade extremely difficult. Maritime trade is also difficult for Russia, given that its only warm-water port, on the Black Sea, is blocked by rivals, including Turkey. Therefore, the country has struggled to develop economically.

Furthermore, Russia's heartland — which runs from St. Petersburg south through Moscow and into the Volga region — lies on a series of plains, making it vulnerable from all sides. This has forced Russia to seek to expand its borders and influence outward to create a buffer zone between its heartland and rival regional powers. As Catherine the Great famously put it: "I have no way to defend my borders except to extend them." The longest sustained example of this expansion occurred during the Soviet period, when the Russian heartland was shielded by Siberia, 14 other Soviet republics and seven Eastern Bloc countries.

Expanding Russian influence comes at an immense financial, military, political and social cost. During the Soviet period, Moscow had to centralize control over the entire Soviet space, subsidizing most of the Soviet states' economies while managing their diverse populations. Moreover, Soviet gross domestic product was half of U.S. GDP, even though the two countries had roughly the same population. By the last decade of the Soviet Union, Western intelligence sources estimated that half of Soviet industrial output went toward building up the military, causing vast shortages of industrial goods. Thus the dilemma: Russia must expand to survive, but that expansion is unsustainable and has historically led to its collapse.

A Perpetual Cycle

Russia's cycle can be divided into roughly three parts: collapse, resurrection and fragility. It starts with a catalyst that causes governance to break down and disrupts the social order, leading to collapse. Historically, this has taken many shapes. In the 13th century, it was the Mongol invasion; in the 17th century, the Time of Troubles; in the 20th century, the Russian Revolution, fall of the Soviet Union and the 1998 financial crisis.

From collapse comes the next stage of Russia's cycle: resurrection. Typically the system that governed during the crisis is transformed into something new — usually with a strong personality at the fore. This figure tends to create a stable system in which Russia can consolidate itself and its borderlands. This figure also fosters a sense of national identity, helping Russians and peripheral populations unite under a common patriotism.

Examples include Ivan III, who threw off the Mongol yoke and united Russia; the first Romanov tsar, Mikhail I, who led Russia out of the civil wars of the 16th century; the "greats," Peter and Catherine, who transformed Russia into a global empire; Vladimir Lenin, who transformed Russia into the Soviet Union; and arguably, Vladimir Putin, who ushered in prosperity following the Soviet collapse.

None, however, has been able to overcome Russia's geographic challenge. All have fallen into the problematic pattern of trying to consolidate the heartland while expanding Russian influence, practically ensuring their own collapse. When the inevitable stress points begin to emerge — whether political, social, security or economic — Moscow tends to tighten its grip and to act more aggressively within and along its borders.

The leaders, who were once seen as the saviors of Russia, are either replaced with, or evolve into, more authoritarian (and often ruthless) leaders, who quash dissent and aggressively defend Russia's borders and borderlands. This is the age of fragility. Fragility leaders lack the stability their predecessors enjoyed and have less time to devote to consolidation and nation building, making them appear more erratic.

Brutal leaders often emerge from crumbling systems. The most famous fragility leader was the Soviet Union's Josef Stalin. Similarly, when droughts and famines followed Ivan III's and his successor's successful tenures, Ivan IV — aka "The Terrible" — severely restricted freedom of movement and lashed out in a series of wars against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, eventually leading to civil war after his death.

Throughout history, internal and external pressures first lead to political, economic, social and foreign policy stagnation before the cracks in the system force a complete transformation.

At times, such transformations are simply political, such as the transition from Stalin to Nikita Khrushchev; at others, the entire system collapses into chaos, such as the fall of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union. Then, the cycle begins anew.

Putin's Edition of the Cycle

The rise and endurance of Putin and his government fit within Russia's historical cycle. After the Soviet collapse, Russia lost direct control over its borderlands. The country devolved into chaos. Broken attempts to transition to a market economy through what was known as shock therapy only led to radical privatizations and the rise of oligarchs — which in turn resulted in a 40 percent decline in GDP and a deep financial crisis by 1998. The political landscape wasn't much better. The government was made up of dozens of parties with vastly different agendas all attempting to agree on a new political system. The security services and military were further degraded by President Boris Yeltsin. The Russian people struggled to find a new identity to unite them as the Soviet Union had. Rumblings of secession arose in many of Russia's regions, with a brutal war erupting between Moscow and its Northern Caucasus republics, particularly Chechnya.

A bureaucrat from St. Petersburg, Putin was appointed by Yeltsin to head the KGB's successor, the Federal Security Bureau, in 1998. The intelligence agency was charged with containing the chaos. Yeltsin assumed that Putin, a Moscow outsider, would not be able to challenge him. But Putin and his cadre of loyalists from St. Petersburg (many former KGB agents) took strong steps against the various problems facing Russia, and by the next year he was prime minister. Once in office, he continued to consolidate and rebuild the security services and military. He issued ultimatums to the Russian regions to support the government financially and politically and to cease talk of secession. Putin's efficiency began to convince many Moscow elites to support him, and he eventually supplanted Yeltsin as president.

At the time, Putin was seen as a great reformer, consolidating the country economically, politically and socially.

He cracked down on the oligarchs, seizing strategic assets for the state — such as the highly coveted energy sector. He streamlined the political process, bolstering a single party under his control with the opposition parties built into a system he could manipulate. He reined in the unruly Northern Caucasus, dividing the region's militant groups and creating a broadly loyal Chechen force to help end the Second Chechen War. Perhaps most important, he made a social pact with the Russian people to stabilize and boost the country.

Good luck also helped. Global energy prices began to rise sharply in 2004 and natural gas demand in Europe rose dramatically — just as Russia got its energy production back up following the Soviet collapse. Flush with cash, Russian GDP rose tenfold between 2000 and 2009. Russians' standard of living increased fourfold, and real disposable income rose 160 percent. Unemployment and the poverty rate were reduced by half. But with more income came more military spending: Under Putin, spending on the military increased nearly fivefold.

For most of Putin's leadership, the Russian economy and its financial position have been relatively stable. This enabled Moscow to focus on its borderlands — and specifically to push back against what it perceived as persistent foreign encroachment following the Soviet collapse. NATO and the European Union had expanded into some of the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet states, either offering them membership or association agreements. But with the United States preoccupied with the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Moscow was able to gain traction against what it perceived as expanding foreign influence on its borders.

Russia made its own security alliances to counter NATO with the creation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in 2002. Moscow also used its energy resources to manipulate alliances on its borders. It used a series of energy cutoffs to Europe to ensure that Ukraine and Georgia would not be admitted into NATO. Then, Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, and NATO did not intervene. In 2010, Moscow pressured Ukraine to elect a more Russia-friendly leader. From 2010 to 2015, Russia expanded its economic union with Kazakhstan and Belarus to include Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.

The West painted Putin as a thug and Russia as an aggressor, but the Russian people praised the man who helped their country return to being a regional, and even global, power. Putin fulfilled his social contract with the Russian public, and in return, the people loved him.

Signs of Weakness Presage the Next Phase

Despite Putin's popularity, his rule is beginning to show signs of weakness, and threats to Russia's stability and external influence are increasing. The cycle, it seems, has not been broken. In 2014, Russia experienced a series of blows to its power. First, the Russian-friendly government in Ukraine was overturned in another uprising, leading to a staunchly pro-Western government in Kiev. Moscow attempted to incite the country against what it deemed a Western-backed coup, but its attempts only revealed the limits of Russian power. Now, Russia has only limited influence in a sliver of eastern Ukraine held by Russian-backed rebels.

Russian actions in eastern Ukraine united the European Union and the United States to exact a series of economic sanctions on the country and on several of its citizens. Meanwhile, oil prices crashed, falling from triple-digit prices per barrel in mid-2014 to the low $40s per barrel today. The combination of low oil prices and conflict with the West caused foreign investment into Russia to plummet by 50 percent in 2014. By 2015, foreign investment fell to nearly zero. The Russian ruble fell by 40 percent in 2014 and remained volatile the following year, and capital flew from the country, $160 billion in 2014 and another $85 billion in 2015.

The Russian people are bearing the brunt of the economic pain. With the decline in the currency, 25 percent of Russians have had their salaries cut, and 15 percent have lost their jobs altogether. The average monthly wage has dropped to below $450 a month, less than in China, Romania and Serbia. On average, Russians have spent half their incomes on food this year. And more than half of Russians believe that their economic position will only worsen in the years to come.

The current recession in Russia differs from the 2008-2009 economic crisis, which was part and parcel of the global financial crisis. Moreover, this recession is coupled with foreign policy shortcomings in Ukraine and in its standoff with the West. Russia is now seen as isolated on the international stage. The Kremlin has sporadically rallied national support over the past two years with its annexation of Crimea and with its intervention in Syria against the wishes of the West, but such acts have only momentarily increased patriotism.

Instead, the economic and foreign crises are starting to burden Putin's government, forcing the Russian leader to become increasingly authoritarian, according to the cycle. Even Ivan the Terrible started out popular, carrying on his grandfather's push to transform Russia from a medieval regional state to a far-reaching empire. It was not until famines and failed wars began to threaten Russia that Ivan IV became the brutal leader he is now remembered as. Putin could meet the same fate. He faces similar dilemmas, and will soon have to make tough decisions on how to maintain power and stability and protect Russia's borders.

As cash flows diminish, the political, security and business elite that make up the current Russian government are grasping for assets and power. Previously, Putin has been able to manage such power-grabs, but over the past two years the elite have pushed back, leading to the fall of some of the most powerful men in the country. Increasingly concerned that those fallen leaders will band against him, Putin is surrounding himself with loyalists who have no power of their own. Progressively uncertain of the loyalty of the Russian military and security services, the Russian leader has also created his own personal military, the National Guard, made up of 400,000 troops directly accountable to him.

Putin has been able to rule Russia with an iron grip for 16 years because of his government's popularity, but this, too, is slipping.

Approval ratings for the government have fallen from 66 to 26 percent, and Putin's personal approval rating has fallen from 88 percent to 74 percent over the past two years. In recent parliamentary elections in September, voter turnout was the lowest in post-Soviet history, revealing the lack of faith in the process and government. In those elections, Putin was able to massage the results enough to give his party, United Russia, a supermajority so he could push through the tough and unpopular legislation necessary to hold power. Under the increasingly authoritarian leader, the government passed a series of draconian laws to suppress the Russian people should dissent become instability.

These domestic challenges come as pressures on the country's borders continue to mount. Russia's intervention in Ukraine has vacillated between a frozen and low-intensity conflict. The West maintains sanctions on Russia and is even discussing expanding those sanctions because of Moscow's intervention in Syria. NATO continues to build up its position along Russia's periphery, and Moscow's attempt to gain leverage in its talks with the West via Ukraine and Syria has fallen relatively flat in recent months. Russia could ramp up hostilities in the various theaters under negotiation with the West, but this risks isolating and over-extending Russia even more — similar to what happened in the period between Leonid Brezhnev and Mikhail Gorbachev.

This is not to say Russia is on the brink of collapse, only that the country is entering the next phase of its historical cycle, in which the state is highly vulnerable yet increasingly aggressive. Putin will therefore be acting from a position of survival instead of strength. Russia could muddle along in its compromised position for some time, but eventually the cycle must progress, and the next phase of transformation will begin.

Meanwhile strikes against Russian bases in Mariupol and metiplol have occurred,

Looks like someone didn't get the memo...

Ireland has allocated €3 billion for UA refugees, but it's not remotely the burden you think it is or the cost the government wants everyone to believe it is, to deflect from paltry €7 million in aid Ireland has provided Ukraine.

A very large slice of that amount will be an absolute fudge of claiming the salaries of public sector workers involved in providing the aid, and a fair chunk of that flies straight back to the government as income tax paid by those workers and vat levied on their spending. You would think a large chunk of the money will be for accommodation, where again a large percentage will be returned to the state as taxes. Of the relatively small amount actually ending in the hands of the refugees, a good slice of that goes straight back to the government as VAT when they spend.

What is touted as a burden is in reality largely made up of pre existing public sector costs and taxes and the whole thing is basically a large economic stimulus that will benefit a myriad of Irish businesses.

Then of course 'allocated' may not actually result in expenditure. With 70K refugees by end of last year, that would be over €48K, spent on every one of them. I have my doubts, given they only spent €350m on accommodation for refugees in 2022.

So while you grind your teeth over concerns about the cost of refugees in Ireland, spare a bloody thought for impoverished Moldova with a population of only 4m and where just over 100,000 Ukrainian refugees actually settled there, a country with a GDP only 3% that of Ireland's.

In 2022, Ireland had the largest budget surplus in the EU (well we would with our low taxes/s) and that was €5.2b by the 3rd quarter, so even if the refugee allocation of €3b was actually spent, it's more than easily affordable.

Let them threaten to attack a European country.

Didnt I hear Lavrov threaten to take back Alaska or some other mad shyte recently. Words are cheap, especially so when the worlds watching you get taken apart by Ukraine.

February is going to be an absolute bloodbath. Genuinely think we have seen nothing like what is to come.

Russia is going to throw absolutely everything they have at this and may use restricted weaponry.

But, Russia has burned through its best and most elite forces, VDV, tank groups, etc. So, Ukraine has a very good chance at repelling this, but its going to come , hoping I'm wrong at a huge civilian and military cost.

If they go ahead with such a suicidal offensive it will bring the end of the war much closer. Untrained demoralised soldiers with poor equipment against a motivated, western supplied well trained army. Would be a massacre.

And some of those officers killed by their own men / side if reports are to be believed...

Russians are the complete opposite of conscientious objectors in this war and in their own political environment. Slaves in other words.

The problem there is throw enough orcs at a wall repeatedly and cracks and breaks eventually appear ,

Unfortunately modern firearms don't to so well in sustained fire fights as seen from Iraq to Afghanistan,

Looks like ukraine are getting the nod to join the EU ,

This is going to trigger a few people

An article on Zelensky's ratings within Ukraine shortly before the war and the reasons for it:

You're the one trying to rewrite history (why?).

As said previously, I think Zelensky has got his act together since and should be applauded for it

Let's check back in 6 months and see where we are. I predict, sadly, many more dead and war no closer to being over, just as I did 6 months ago. Neither side can win in any outright sense, and neither can afford to lose (Ukraine for genuine, existential reasons, Putin because his vile regime would collapse).

The only hope is Putin's downfall from within Russia. Would love it to happen, but would be surprised