Illusionism

mzungu · 02-07-2016 11:56pm #1

Saul Smilansky* suggests the idea of free will as we know it, is an illusion. He speaks of the inner struggle this has caused him, mainly because his duty as a philosopher is to attempt to reveal the truth, but what happens when the **'truth' and the 'good' do not go hand in hand.

Essentially, he believes that if more people were aware that free will is an illusion, then it would be used to excuse bad actions, and this would be bad for society.

If we take this quote from **The Atlantic:

Smilansky advocates a view he calls illusionism—the belief that free will is indeed an illusion, but one that society must defend. The idea of determinism, and the facts supporting it, must be kept confined within the ivory tower. Only the initiated, behind those walls, should dare to, as he put it to me, “look the dark truth in the face.” Smilansky says he realizes that there is something drastic, even terrible, about this idea—but if the choice is between the true and the good, then for the sake of society, the true must go.

Sam Harris in Free Will (2012) also views the idea of humans having full autonomy as false. However he feels we should embrace the idea of determinism, as when we do we will accept that 'human behavior arises from neurophysiology'. Essentially, the more we discover about the neurophysiological dynamics of things like psychopathy, the more chance we have of successfully treating it.

**The Atlantic:

According to Harris, we should acknowledge that even the worst criminals—murderous psychopaths, for example—are in a sense unlucky. “They didn’t pick their genes. They didn’t pick their parents. They didn’t make their brains, yet their brains are the source of their intentions and actions.” In a deep sense, their crimes are not their fault. Recognizing this, we can dispassionately consider how to manage offenders in order to rehabilitate them, protect society, and reduce future offending. Harris thinks that, in time, “it might be possible to cure something like psychopathy,” but only if we accept that the brain, and not some airy-fairy free will, is the source of the deviancy.

Accepting this would also free us from hatred. Holding people responsible for their actions might sound like a keystone of civilized life, but we pay a high price for it: Blaming people makes us angry and vengeful, and that clouds our judgment.

“Compare the response to Hurricane Katrina,” Harris suggested, with “the response to the 9/11 act of terrorism.” For many Americans, the men who hijacked those planes are the embodiment of criminals who freely choose to do evil. But if we give up our notion of free will, then their behavior must be viewed like any other natural phenomenon—and this, Harris believes, would make us much more rational in our response.

Although the scale of the two catastrophes was similar, the reactions were wildly different. Nobody was striving to exact revenge on tropical storms or declare a War on Weather, so responses to Katrina could simply focus on rebuilding and preventing future disasters. The response to 9/11, Harris argues, was clouded by outrage and the desire for vengeance, and has led to the unnecessary loss of countless more lives. Harris is not saying that we shouldn’t have reacted at all to 9/11, only that a coolheaded response would have looked very different and likely been much less wasteful. “Hatred is toxic,” he told me, “and can destabilize individual lives and whole societies. Losing belief in free will undercuts the rationale for ever hating anyone.”

Both Harris and Smilansky want us to consider that thought is still important and critical in the decision making process. There is no fatalism in either of their thought, only determinism. The two often get mixed in with one another. Nevertheless, they both believe in determinism while at the same time holding the view that we are not all on a journey towards a predestined fate. Yet, both take opposing viewpoints on how we should deal with it. Smilansky believes society needs to be protected from the idea, whilst Harris suggests that in the long run it could make society safer.

*Smilansky, Saul (2000). Free Will and Illusion. Oxford University Press.

** http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/

Speedwell · 03-07-2016 12:29am

I've always approached this as, sure, we may be determined, on one level, by the laws of physics, on another level by our biochemistry, on yet another level by our circumstances (for example, I happen to not be in Buenos Aires at the moment so I'm not sitting down to a steak and Malbec dinner in my favorite restaurant no matter how much I might "choose" to). There's not anything about us that isn't a product of what atoms are where at what time. But we're so constructed that it makes sense to act as though we have free will under limitations we hardly even think about. I know it's a layman's "whatever works" approach, but the important thing is that it does work on what we might call the human scale.

Black Swan · 03-07-2016 10:07am

mzungu wrote: »

Saul Smilansky* suggests the idea of free will as we know it, is an illusion...

BF Skinner in Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971) suggested that "free will" was myth. Rather, humans were products of their heredity and environment, with a heavy emphasis on schedules of reinforcement in the latter case, especially those behaviours having been operant conditioned.

mzungu wrote: »

Both Harris and Smilansky want us to consider that thought is still important and critical in the decision making process. There is no fatalism in either of their thought, only determinism.

The Skinnerian behaviourist perspective was deterministic to the extent that it suggested heredity and environment explained and predicted most, if not all the variance in human behaviour, with some random variation accounting for a measure of such behaviour, the latter which, if not reinforced would eventually be subject to extinction.

William James (1884) in "What is An Emotion" (Mind, 9, pp 188-205) suggested that an arousing stimulus may trigger a sequence of behaviours that did not originate with thought. It's a beautiful day, you are walking in the forest, become lost, enter a clearing to get your bearings, and thereupon you encounter a huge bear approaching you. At first moment you are indecisive, stand still, and experience shortness of breath, and a rapidly beating heart. This "bear in woods" confrontation served as an arousing stimulus (i.e., physiological arousal linked to the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system). Suddenly you run, and after running you interpret your behavior (after-the-fact) as a wise response to a fearful situation. Where was the free will in this analogy?

mzungu · 03-07-2016 3:46pm

Black Swan wrote: »

BF Skinner in Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971) suggested that "free will" was myth. Rather, humans were products of their heredity and environment, with a heavy emphasis on schedules of reinforcement in the latter case, especially those behaviours having been operant conditioned.

The Skinnerian behaviourist perspective was deterministic to the extent that it suggested heredity and environment explained and predicted most, if not all the variance in human behaviour, with some random variation accounting for a measure of such behaviour, the latter which, if not reinforced would eventually be subject to extinction.

Sosa (in Catania 1988 p141) suggests that Karl Popper's critique of Hume's associationism is 'damaging' to Skinners behaviourism. Namely, if conclusions are being drawn based purely on repetition (for behaviourism), then we need to consider what exactly repetition actually means. Popper states it can never be 'perfect sameness; they can only be cases of similarity'. Essentially, Popper calls on us to consider it repetition from 'a certain point of view'.

So, in response to Hume, Popper asks questions of Skinner's thesis. There are always 'systems of expectations, anticipations, assumptions, or interests - before there can be any repetition'. As such, the point of view itself would not be caused by repetition.

**Chomsky offered an interesting viewpoint of Beyond Freedom and Dignity:

There is, of course, no doubt that behavior can be controlled, for example, by threat of violence or a pattern of deprivation and reward. This much is not at issue, and the conclusion is consistent with a belief in “autonomous man.” If a tyrant has the power to require certain acts, whether by threat of punishment or by allowing only those who perform these acts to escape from deprivation (e.g., by restricting employment to such people), his subjects may choose to obey — though some may have the dignity to refuse. They will understand the difference between this compulsion and the laws that govern falling bodies.

Of course, they are not free. Sanctions backed by force restrict freedom, as does differential reward. An increase in wages, in Marx’s phrase, “would be nothing more than a better remuneration of slaves, and would not restore, either to the worker or to the work, their human significance and worth.” But it would be absurd to conclude merely from the fact that freedom is limited, that “autonomous man” is an illusion, or to overlook the distinction between a person who chooses to conform, in the face of threat or force or deprivation, and a person who “chooses” to obey Newtonian principles as he falls from a high tower.

William James (1884) in "What is An Emotion" (Mind, 9, pp 188-205) suggested that an arousing stimulus may trigger a sequence of behaviours that did not originate with thought. It's a beautiful day, you are walking in the forest, become lost, enter a clearing to get your bearings, and thereupon you encounter a huge bear approaching you. At first moment you are indecisive, stand still, and experience shortness of breath, and a rapidly beating heart. This "bear in woods" confrontation served as an arousing stimulus (i.e., physiological arousal linked to the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system). Suddenly you run, and after running you interpret your behavior (after-the-fact) as a wise response to a fearful situation. Where was the free will in this analogy?

Barrett (2012) found in electrical stimulation testing that there was no one to one response between behaviour and emotion as 'stimulation of the same site produces different mental states across instances, depending on the prior state of the individual and also the immediate context'. She suggests that some form of processing must occur between our physiological responses and how we perceive the emotion. Barrett also asks us to consider that emotion is subjective, and our reactions to threats will differ depending on the individual.

*Catania, A. C. (1988). The selection of behavior: The operant behaviorism of BF Skinner: Comments and consequences. CUP Archive.
Chicago

**Chomsky (1971)https://chomsky.info/19711230/

*** Feldman Barrett, Lisa (2012). "Emotions are Real". American Psychological Association 12 (3): 413–429

mzungu · 03-07-2016 3:52pm

Speedwell wrote: »

I've always approached this as, sure, we may be determined, on one level, by the laws of physics, on another level by our biochemistry, on yet another level by our circumstances (for example, I happen to not be in Buenos Aires at the moment so I'm not sitting down to a steak and Malbec dinner in my favorite restaurant no matter how much I might "choose" to). There's not anything about us that isn't a product of what atoms are where at what time. But we're so constructed that it makes sense to act as though we have free will under limitations we hardly even think about. I know it's a layman's "whatever works" approach, but the important thing is that it does work on what we might call the human scale.

Exactly. Once fatalism is taken from the equation, we don't necessarily need to view everything as a predestined plan that will play out regardless....from that nice steak in Buenos Aires to a walk in the park on a Saturday afternoon.

From the two perspectives, I guess I would be siding more with Harris on this one, if this would enable us to better understand neuropsychology, then a case could be made for accepting there is some form of determinism there. Although, I do understand where Smilansky is coming from, I'm not sure protecting society from it would be a good move.

That said, both Harris and Smilansky are in the minority viewpoint on the matter. As such, I would be wary of hitching the wagon to either one (neither would I hitch it to 'majority' viewpoints ). I would very much be the casual observer, as I find arguments on all sides to have merit. Interesting topic nonetheless.

Torakx · 03-07-2016 6:51pm

Great topic

I would be of the same mind as Sam Harris.
This way of thinking for me is my go to when it comes to forgiving assaults and other violations from other people on myself and others.
It helps me to accept others where I might have thought they "chose" to be an ass.
For example, I am quite annoyed in general at the political elite and their power games, which is ruining society for everyone else.
In the past, when I had not considered the issue of free will, I was all for punishing others for grievances.
Since then through Nietzsche's "will to power" and with consideration for lack of free will, I have turned much more towards viewing "bad people"(or whoever falls under that label at any time) as needing a path redirection at worst.
At best, accept them and outsmart them, while trying to help them genuinely. This seems the route to growth for ourselves.
To overcome challenges in our society in order to grow stronger.
For this to happen, we need to be honest with ourselves as a society.

There may be arguments for free will based on consciousness as some kind of force outside of physics.
The double slit experiment might be one way to counter that idea.
It shows that conscious observation is a form of measurement of data and is connected intrinsically to the universe/reality.
I presume, because consciousness is the result of electrical signals, running through neuron paths which are based on previous measurements(thoughts).

With cause and effect, combined with consciousness being a part of the universe and reality, it looks likely that there is no free will inside this universe/dimension.
Definitely many variables and time dependent interactions of data give the illusion of free will or randomness, but there is no reason I can see to consider we are outside of time and space or cause and effect.

I don't think that we are necessarily living preordained lives either.
No need to be fatalistic.
Just that it hasn't played itself out yet( a slight but crucial difference, an abyss of sorts), and that we are working within the limits of our functions. Those functions occurring through cause and effect.
All things considered, the potential for variance is huge.
Enough room there for positive philosophies to work.

There might be a danger with propaganda/media programming a fatalistic culture which may limit the variance in society with regards functions chosen.
Which is why I consider words(spells) to be magic.
A higher form of manipulating reality. But still part of reality of course

On forgiveness, there was a nice way of thinking I came across when reading about NLP(Neuro Linguistic Programming).
Everyone is doing the best they can, using the abilities, energy and tools they happen to have at their disposal, at any given time.
That's part of the philosophy of NLP and how it is possible to direct other peoples perspective.
It's understood that minds have functions connected to drives and emotions, which were inherent or experienced and can be manipulated or changed.

This means we can and probably should help those who are running destructive functions. Instead of punishing them for ignorantly having those functions.
Do you ban/punish alcohol use or help those people who become alcoholics?
How about drugs or crime, even murder?
It's all the same.

Positive reinforcement(progressive) works for animals because it rewards trying, which pushes into the future and ignores the past.
Change is in the future. Doing and done is too late.

Our society currently runs a negative reinforcement model(regressive), which reinforces adaptive behaviours, when encountering punishment.
Those adaptive behaviours are defensive and destructive in nature.
In fact even our laws and punishments are regressive in a future tense. Read any law and see, it's kind of funny to consider in a court case.

Thou shall not kill.
What if a defendant agrees with the law being invoked and said they agree and shall not kill in the future.
There is no law saying thou shall not have killed. On what day, time and place, shall thou not have killed? Or who?
Since killing is an act, it is always in the present. LOL

Black Swan · 10-07-2016 3:18pm

Indeed "free will" or free agency (depending upon how you define them) are interesting topics to discuss in our Philosophy forum. Rather than continue to play devil's advocate and staunchly hammer Smilansky's free will illusionism, or Skinner's behaviourist perspective that "free will is myth," which personally, I have mixed thoughts about, perhaps a few casual comments about probabilistic determinism may be a fun alternative to add to our discussion? This perspective is currently quite popular with governments, universities, marketing and advertising organisations.

Probabilistic determinism suggests that, given adequate access to data, appropriate measures, and effective modes of analysis there is an increased probability that many human behaviours can be explained and predicted. Those human behaviours that are nature based (e.g., physiology, genetics, etc.) tend to be more predictable and subject to explanation that those nurture or environmentally based, but the limitations in the latter may be due to the limitations of data access, measurements, and analytical modes, which, if improved may lead to better future predictions and explanations.

Probabilistic determinism is not said to account for all human behaviours, rather there may be some random behaviours that occur, but which may be estimated within the realms of probability and error (e.g., confidence levels, confidence intervals, systematic errors, etc.). Given these empirically based limitations, probabilistic determinism suggests that:

Proposition: As the probability of predicting human behaviour increases, the probability of free will decreases.

Another obvious limitation regarding probabilistic determinism should be noted. It requires lots of data in order to reliably implement its empirical modes of analysis and estimate variances, confidence and interval levels, and other forms of error, and the closer it comes to population-sized data sets or sample sizes that approach 1,200 the better its probability estimates. Consequently by its nature and methods, probabilistic determinism becomes highly problematic when attempting to predict individual, case study human behaviour.

Yet another practical limitation of probabilistic determinism today is when the researcher is attempting to identify all the necessary conditions that will be sufficient to predict human behaviour. There is currently a heavy reliance on theories to guide empirical research, and the limitations of theory adds to the limitations of today's probabilistic determinism. Furthermore, occasionally because of these limitations, especially when inductively analyzing secondary data sets, which may include what has been called big data, spurious correlations can be found as statistically significant.

For example, it has been frequently reported in the news media overtime that marijuana use has been significantly associated with later hard drug use. Well, I can establish a stronger and statistically significant correlation between prior milk drinking and later hard drug use, but it appears nonsensical at face validity. Some spurious associations are not so obvious as the silly milk > hard drugs correlation, and a healthy dose of skepticism should always be used when reviewing any study, be it conducted at Trinity University in Dublin, or conducted by the publisher of the Red Tops at market checkouts.

That is not to say that all statistics should be tossed out because some statistics are spurious. One of the necessary conditions that is to be satisfied when attempting to estimate behaviour quantitatively is correlation. So don't fall for the all too often broad sweeping cliché generalisation: "Lies, damned lies, and statistics." Then again, to foster a healthy skepticism I would recommend that you read Darrell Huff's old (1954) small paperback of 142 pages How to Lie with Statistics, which should be freely available in your public or university libraries.

mzungu · 12-07-2016 11:38pm

Black Swan wrote: »

Indeed "free will" or free agency (depending upon how you define them) are interesting topics to discuss in our Philosophy forum. Rather than continue to play devil's advocate and staunchly hammer Smilansky's free will illusionism, or Skinner's behaviourist perspective that "free will is myth," which personally, I have mixed thoughts about, perhaps a few casual comments about probabilistic determinism may be a fun alternative to add to our discussion? This perspective is currently quite popular with governments, universities, marketing and advertising organisations.

Probabilistic determinism suggests that, given adequate access to data, appropriate measures, and effective modes of analysis there is an increased probability that many human behaviours can be explained and predicted. Those human behaviours that are nature based (e.g., physiology, genetics, etc.) tend to be more predictable and subject to explanation that those nurture or environmentally based, but the limitations in the latter may be due to the limitations of data access, measurements, and analytical modes, which, if improved may lead to better future predictions and explanations.

Probabilistic determinism is not said to account for all human behaviours, rather there may be some random behaviours that occur, but which may be estimated within the realms of probability and error (e.g., confidence levels, confidence intervals, systematic errors, etc.). Given these empirically based limitations, probabilistic determinism suggests that:

Proposition: As the probability of predicting human behaviour increases, the probability of free will decreases.

Another obvious limitation regarding probabilistic determinism should be noted. It requires lots of data in order to reliably implement its empirical modes of analysis and estimate variances, confidence and interval levels, and other forms of error, and the closer it comes to population-sized data sets or sample sizes that approach 1,200 the better its probability estimates. Consequently by its nature and methods, probabilistic determinism becomes highly problematic when attempting to predict individual, case study human behaviour.

In the case of probabilistic determinism in human behaviour, the old adage in weather forecasting may apply there. It states the further you are from an present time making a forecast, the less likely it is that an it will be accurate. Could we say the same for probabilistic determinism in human actions? This may mean that everything would need to be measured right at that moment in time in order for there to be a successful outcome.

There might be a case for nature and nurture based measurements. Eg: Person is afraid of thunder and lightening. This is determined by other factors happening in the world, this sets off a series of reactions within the person. All of them deterministic. This might be something that could be measured from a good distance of time away from the event itself. Would I be right to assume that this mode of thought would see nothing in the world as being truly random, it would only appear random to us because we do not yet have the tools to measure and understand it?

For probabilistic determinism, I assume that for everything run successfully, then it would encompass pretty much all the scientific disciplines, that would only be to predict something as everyday as 'John leaves the house and instead of walking to work he takes the bus instead'. I wonder is there technology coming down the line that could handle all that information for everything a person does throughout the course of a day, month, year etc. Fascinating to think of the potential ramifications there...Goodbye National Lottery!!

On a smaller scale, take the advertising industry. As most of their methods target the emotions predicting a response to consume. That could be viewed as behaviour prediction on a smaller scale. Is it deterministic? That would be a bit to far. Having said that, I am fairly sure when the next IPhone is released there will be queues around the block!!

Yet another practical limitation of probabilistic determinism today is when the researcher is attempting to identify all the necessary conditions that will be sufficient to predict human behaviour. There is currently a heavy reliance on theories to guide empirical research, and the limitations of theory adds to the limitations of today's probabilistic determinism. Furthermore, occasionally because of these limitations, especially when inductively analyzing secondary data sets, which may include what has been called big data, spurious correlations can be found as statistically significant.

For example, it has been frequently reported in the news media overtime that marijuana use has been significantly associated with later hard drug use. Well, I can establish a stronger and statistically significant correlation between prior milk drinking and later hard drug use, but it appears nonsensical at face validity. Some spurious associations are not so obvious as the silly milk > hard drugs correlation, and a healthy dose of skepticism should always be used when reviewing any study, be it conducted at Trinity University in Dublin, or conducted by the publisher of the Red Tops at market checkouts.

That would be a concern. In dealing with data that could predict human behaviour, there would need to safeguards to prevent ideologies from interpreting it in a harmful way.

That is not to say that all statistics should be tossed out because some statistics are spurious. One of the necessary conditions that is to be satisfied when attempting to estimate behaviour quantitatively is correlation. So don't fall for the all too often broad sweeping cliché generalisation: "Lies, damned lies, and statistics." Then again, to foster a healthy skepticism I would recommend that you read Darrell Huff's old (1954) small paperback of 142 pages How to Lie with Statistics, which should be freely available in your public or university libraries.

Thank you for the recommendation. Found a PDF of it on Google!

Black Swan · 13-07-2016 7:39pm

mzungu wrote: »

In the case of probabilistic determinism in human behaviour, the old adage in weather forecasting may apply there. It states the further you are from an present time making a forecast, the less likely it is that an it will be accurate. Could we say the same for probabilistic determinism in human actions? This may mean that everything would need to be measured right at that moment in time in order for there to be a successful outcome.

OK, I'll continue to take the probabilistic determinism side for discussion sake beginning with your comparative weather forecasting analogy. Weather forecasting has been significantly improving overtime, although when a population outlier event occurs like today's Pacific El Niño Grande, where the predictive models have few past data/documented Grande events, the statistical algorithms were terribly invalid and unreliable. The same problem occurs when a volcano suddenly erupts spewing ash into the global atmosphere, trashing predictive models lacking data and capacities for outlier events; i.e., which today are treated as random events, but in the future with better Grande and volcanic predictions, may be factored into meteorology models. Today's geometrically advancing hardware and software technologies would be thunk magic 200 years ago, and tomorrow's advances science fiction today, and perhaps deviltry centuries before, with would-be probabilistic determinism meteorologists burned at the stake, stoned, drowned, or torn apart by pre-scientific superstitious mobs.

Certainly today's meteorology has a long way to go before it no longer suffers from negative and cliché weather forecasting comments (some well deserved), but with improved technologies and modes of measurement and analysis predictions may more reliably meet the needs of its audience. As for predicting several weeks or months in advance, there does not appear to be the requisite major financial incentives to attempt such long range predictions, and given that research follows money, it's doubtful (if long range predictions were possible) that ill-funded researches would find such a complex, reliable, and valid model in the near future (although that may change in the mid-to-far future).

mzungu wrote: »

There might be a case for nature and nurture based measurements. Eg: Person is afraid of thunder and lightening. This is determined by other factors happening in the world, this sets off a series of reactions within the person. All of them deterministic. This might be something that could be measured from a good distance of time away from the event itself. Would I be right to assume that this mode of thought would see nothing in the world as being truly random, it would only appear random to us because we do not yet have the tools to measure and understand it?

Complex and comprehensive probabilistic determinism conceptual frameworks, measurements, and modes of analysis would need to include both nature, nurture, and other environmental conditions to improve their descriptions, explanations, and predictions of human behaviour ranging from short, medium, and long range time intervals. Unfortunately and practically speaking today, there appears to be lots of RFPs and funding for short-term predictions of human behavior, and relatively short-term cross-sectional and cross-lag designs continue to be the norm accordingly. Whereas long-term longitudinal studies remain quite expensive, and consequently occur infrequently. Corporate sources of funding now want quick results for the quarterly or annual report to boards of directors, stock holders, and speculative short-term equity analysts that affect stock prices, while government sources want quick results to report to special interest lobbies, voting constituents, and to compete with political opponents; i.e., speed pays grants today.

mzungu wrote: »

For probabilistic determinism, I assume that for everything run successfully, then it would encompass pretty much all the scientific disciplines...

Across-discipline conceptual frameworks occur frequently today, especially in PhD level researchers, were one discipline researcher borrows concepts from another discipline through the process of deconceptualisation.

mzungu wrote: »

On a smaller scale, take the advertising industry. As most of their methods target the emotions predicting a response to consume. That could be viewed as behaviour prediction on a smaller scale. Is it deterministic? That would be a bit to far. Having said that, I am fairly sure when the next IPhone is released there will be queues around the block!!

Max Weber in Economy and Society (1922) suggested that the march of rationalisation (and its associated advancing technologies, measurements, and predictions) would continue, unstoppable so long as the human race continued. Weber was addressing not only physical events like weather prediction that affected humans, but also human behaviour prediction, especially when he suggested that humans may increasingly find themselves in an "iron cage" of structured and rationalised society where free agency (or free will) gradually diminished as the efficiency and effectiveness of rationalisation marched on. Prediction was especially encouraged by capitalistic ROI and its associated reduction of risk when making future economic investments (e.g., consumer purchases of goods and services), and the more predictive the human behavior model, the lower the risk, and the higher the ROI.

mzungu wrote: »

That would be a concern. In dealing with data that could predict human behaviour, there would need to safeguards to prevent ideologies from interpreting it in a harmful way.

Software cookies are used in tracking consumer behaviour today, then targeting those consumers with advertising. Does such tracking, and advertising rely on predicting future consumer purchasing behaviour, or are advertisers wasting their money? If they are not wasting their money and a measure of consumer behaviour is predicted, then to what extent do such predictions of the purchase of products and services erode the notion of free agency or free will? Such applications by ideological lobbies, or worse highly biased governments or movements present a scary specter, if human prediction models continue to be rationalised as suggested by Max Weber.

Black Swan · 13-07-2016 8:10pm

Black Swan wrote: »

Across-discipline conceptual frameworks occur frequently today, especially in PhD level researchers, were one discipline researcher borrows concepts from another discipline through the process of deconceptualisation.

Oops! Someone was talking in my ear when posting this, and I made a mistake. "Deconceptualisation" was in error. What I meant was "Decontextualisation," whereupon one researcher borrows from one or more discipline's context when constructing their conceptual framework in their discipline's context.

mzungu · 14-07-2016 11:11pm

Black Swan wrote: »

OK, I'll continue to take the probabilistic determinism side for discussion sake beginning with your comparative weather forecasting analogy. Weather forecasting has been significantly improving overtime, although when a population outlier event occurs like today's Pacific El Niño Grande, where the predictive models have few past data/documented Grande events, the statistical algorithms were terribly invalid and unreliable. The same problem occurs when a volcano suddenly erupts spewing ash into the global atmosphere, trashing predictive models lacking data and capacities for outlier events; i.e., which today are treated as random events, but in the future with better Grande and volcanic predictions, may be factored into meteorology models. Today's geometrically advancing hardware and software technologies would be thunk magic 200 years ago, and tomorrow's advances science fiction today, and perhaps deviltry centuries before, with would-be probabilistic determinism meteorologists burned at the stake, stoned, drowned, or torn apart by pre-scientific superstitious mobs.

Certainly today's meteorology has a long way to go before it no longer suffers from negative and cliché weather forecasting comments (some well deserved), but with improved technologies and modes of measurement and analysis predictions may more reliably meet the needs of its audience. As for predicting several weeks or months in advance, there does not appear to be the requisite major financial incentives to attempt such long range predictions, and given that research follows money, it's doubtful (if long range predictions were possible) that ill-funded researches would find such a complex, reliable, and valid model in the near future (although that may change in the mid-to-far future).

Complex and comprehensive probabilistic determinism conceptual frameworks, measurements, and modes of analysis would need to include both nature, nurture, and other environmental conditions to improve their descriptions, explanations, and predictions of human behaviour ranging from short, medium, and long range time intervals. Unfortunately and practically speaking today, there appears to be lots of RFPs and funding for short-term predictions of human behavior, and relatively short-term cross-sectional and cross-lag designs continue to be the norm accordingly. Whereas long-term longitudinal studies remain quite expensive, and consequently occur infrequently. Corporate sources of funding now want quick results for the quarterly or annual report to boards of directors, stock holders, and speculative short-term equity analysts that affect stock prices, while government sources want quick results to report to special interest lobbies, voting constituents, and to compete with political opponents; i.e., speed pays grants today.

A short article about that here: https://sciencenode.org/feature/weather-forecasts-2030.php
It's few years old, but the general idea is pretty much as you described above. Newer technology leads more information allowing for more accurate graphic models.
Also, this one about crowd sourcing:

Other bourgeoning climate observation techniques are more scrappy, like the smartphone app pressureNET that's crowdsourcing the data-collection process. The Android app automatically collects atmospheric pressure measurements using barometers in the smartphones. It sends the data from thousands of phones to scientists, who incorporate it into climate models.

Link:http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/the-future-of-weather-forecasts-cloudy-with-a-chance-of-accuracy
The general consensus does appear to be that it is only funding that has held things back. Until such time as it becomes a money spinner (unlikely) or we accidentally get a breakthrough other tech related projects (stranger things have happened). Either way, we may have to wait a while though!

Max Weber in Economy and Society (1922) suggested that the march of rationalisation (and its associated advancing technologies, measurements, and predictions) would continue, unstoppable so long as the human race continued. Weber was addressing not only physical events like weather prediction that affected humans, but also human behaviour prediction, especially when he suggested that humans may increasingly find themselves in an "iron cage" of structured and rationalised society where free agency (or free will) gradually diminished as the efficiency and effectiveness of rationalisation marched on. Prediction was especially encouraged by capitalistic ROI and its associated reduction of risk when making future economic investments (e.g., consumer purchases of goods and services), and the more predictive the human behavior model, the lower the risk, and the higher the ROI.

I think the consumerist ideology has a lot to answer for, but it is in a way a bit ironic that our need to consume is what has effectively messed up the weather patterns. I do think Weber was on to something there. Money will always be invested in areas where there is a high chance of making more money. Things like weather forecasting (and more life and death matters like vaccines for some diseases). If malaria was prevalent in the developed world I am fairly sure a vaccine would have been discovered long before now.

Software cookies are used in tracking consumer behaviour today, then targeting those consumers with advertising. Does such tracking, and advertising rely on predicting future consumer purchasing behaviour, or are advertisers wasting their money? If they are not wasting their money and a measure of consumer behaviour is predicted, then to what extent do such predictions of the purchase of products and services erode the notion of free agency or free will? Such applications by ideological lobbies, or worse highly biased governments or movements present a scary specter, if human prediction models continue to be rationalised as suggested by Max Weber.

Definitely not a waste of money, the reason you can be full sure they work is because all companies fall over themselves to get consumer information. I read in an article the other day that people on IPad and Andriod tablets browsing for holidays had differently priced packages displayed when they searched for them. Guess which ones were more expensive! Yep, thats right. Ipad owners had more expensive packages advertised to them. The idea being that Ipad could afford the expensive ones and Android users would not be as well off. So Android users had more budget packages aimed at them. You can be sure it was not just one holiday company doing it either. Consumer data allows people to be put in boxes more easily , so they can be targeted at them more effectively.

What I find most disconcerting is the way Facebook seems to be the new outlet for news for a lot of people. Alongside that, this culture today of full disclosure of all private things online, it is basically giving advertisers a soft target.

As for your question about this eroding free will, that is an interesting one. To an extent, I think it does. Some examples would be advertising targeted at kids. Things like the 'nag factor' explained here: https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/08/110815121519.htm . I find that to be a very serious disregard for the minds of the young. This could certainly be viewed as an erosion of free will, which is of course reinforced by the culture that surrounds it.

Black Swan · 17-07-2016 12:03am

"Sign, sign, everywhere a sign
Blockin' out the scenery, breakin' my mind
Do this, don't do that, can't you read the sign?"
(Five Man Electrical Band, 1971)

This oldies but goodies song brought to mind roadway signs, but more, how driving a car once learned and practiced through extensive experiential repetition exhibits automaticity, or what has been labeled procedural knowledge. Once having mastered driving, we no longer have to exhibit conscious control of our driving-a-car actions, we just do it without conscious thought, while at the same time we chat with someone in the companion seat, dial the radio or flip CD songs or listen to recorded novels, check-out the cute lad or lass as we drive by, and negotiate traffic, stops, and turns traveling to a familiar distination thoughtlessly. While such procedural knowledge was normally useful, freeing-up conscious thought to do other things while driving, it makes me wonder to what extent the more things were proceduralised, the greater the erosion of free agency or free will? Certainly, the first decision to drive may fall within the free agency or free will domain (if either of these things exist), but what about when procedural automaticity prevails?

Procedural knowledge has become a very powerful source that unconsciously regulates behaviour, such procedures becoming very difficult to consciously unlearn. For example, if you have been proceduralised to drive on a particular side of the road in a car designed for that side of the road driving, and all of a sudden you find yourself in a country where everything was opposite, mistakes generally happen until you adapt. The different side of the road analogy was a more obvious example, where there may be many more subtle things which regulate behaviour that were not so obvious; that, once subject to automaticity become unconsciously controlling, and very difficult to unlearn, or in some cases acknowledge that they even exist.

Richard E Clark (2009) in Cognitive and Neuroscience Research on Learning and Instruction: Recent insights about the impact of non-conscious knowledge on problem solving, higher order thinking skills and interactive cyber-learning environments, The International Conference on Education Research, concluded that: "Evidence... suggests that we believe we control our own learning by conscious choice when in fact nearly all mental operations are highly automated, including learning and problem solving." If most learning and problem solving were automated and not subject to conscious control, what implications does this have for free agency or free will?

mzungu · 17-07-2016 11:43pm

Black Swan wrote: »

"Sign, sign, everywhere a sign
Blockin' out the scenery, breakin' my mind
Do this, don't do that, can't you read the sign?"
(Five Man Electrical Band, 1971)

This oldies but goodies song brought to mind roadway signs, but more, how driving a car once learned and practiced through extensive experiential repetition exhibits automaticity, or what has been labeled procedural knowledge. Once having mastered driving, we no longer have to exhibit conscious control of our driving-a-car actions, we just do it without conscious thought, while at the same time we chat with someone in the companion seat, dial the radio or flip CD songs or listen to recorded novels, check-out the cute lad or lass as we drive by, and negotiate traffic, stops, and turns traveling to a familiar distination thoughtlessly. While such procedural knowledge was normally useful, freeing-up conscious thought to do other things while driving, it makes me wonder to what extent the more things were proceduralised, the greater the erosion of free agency or free will? Certainly, the first decision to drive may fall within the free agency or free will domain (if either of these things exist), but what about when procedural automaticity prevails?

Nisbett & Wilson (1977) assert that we are conscious of the content of our minds (things like beliefs and attitudes), but largely unaware of the fundamentals behind the processes that bring about those contents: "We have no direct access to higher-order mental processes such as those involved in evaluation, judgment, problem solving, and the initiation of behavior."

Kihlstrom (2008) warns us about automaticity, on the basis of its methodological foundations. One reason he gives is as follows:

there does not seem to be a single pool of attentional resources. Nor does even extensive practice with a task render its performance effortless. There is even some data that suggests that attentional capacity is not limited -- at least, that its limits are very wide indeed. As noted earlier, alternative theories of automaticity have been proposed, particularly based on memory rather than attention memory. These revisionist theories preserve the legitimacy of the concept of automaticity, but tend to undercut the various features by which automatic processes are recognized. So, for example, in Anderson's (1992) proceduralization view, automatic processes are engaged only when an appropriate cue is presented in the context of a particular goal state; and in Logan's (2002) instance-based theory, automatic processes are only evoked if the subject has the appropriate mental set. Nor, once evoked, do processes proceed to conclusion in a ballistic fashion.

For a different take, John Searle (2001) has argued that our experience of free will is locked in a battle with scientific dogma surrounding determinism. He feels it may also be the case that choosing between the two is an incorrect way to frame such a debate. In light of this, do we disregard one or the other? Searle thinks not. Instead we need to examine if our ideals of free will (however we choose to define it) can coexist as part of the material makeup of our consciousness.

Procedural knowledge has become a very powerful source that unconsciously regulates behaviour, such procedures becoming very difficult to consciously unlearn. For example, if you have been proceduralised to drive on a particular side of the road in a car designed for that side of the road driving, and all of a sudden you find yourself in a country where everything was opposite, mistakes generally happen until you adapt. The different side of the road analogy was a more obvious example, where there may be many more subtle things which regulate behaviour that were not so obvious; that, once subject to automaticity become unconsciously controlling, and very difficult to unlearn, or in some cases acknowledge that they even exist.

Richard E Clark (2009) in Cognitive and Neuroscience Research on Learning and Instruction: Recent insights about the impact of non-conscious knowledge on problem solving, higher order thinking skills and interactive cyber-learning environments, The International Conference on Education Research, concluded that: "Evidence... suggests that we believe we control our own learning by conscious choice when in fact nearly all mental operations are highly automated, including learning and problem solving." If most learning and problem solving were automated and not subject to conscious control, what implications does this have for free agency or free will?

Öhman & Mineka (2001) suggest automaticity had an evolutionary purpose and that it operates without our conscious input. The paragraph is as follows:

Automaticity. Evolution may long ago have designed mechanisms to identify stimuli related to recurrent survival threats after a minimum of neural computations and to immediately give them priority (e.g., in terms of efficient attention capture). Because of their origin in animals with primitive brains, behavioral modules that have a deep evolutionary origin typically are not under voluntary control but are directly elicited by stimuli. Thus, the behavior is likely to be elicited whether we want it or not and whether the stimulus has been represented in consciousness. Evolutionarily fear-relevant stimuli, therefore, show characteristics of preconscious automaticity (i.e., they may trigger responses in the absence of any conscious awareness of the stimulus event; Bargh, 1989, p.11). Automaticity in itself may suggest an evolutionary origin, but it is also clear that automaticity of mental function can be achieved through extensive training (e.g., Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), even though such automaticity may reflect postconscious rather than preconscious automaticity in Bargh's (1989) terminology. However, rather than pitting evolutionarily derived automaticity
against learned automaticity, it is important to realize that evolution frequently uses extensive experience as a means of shaping neural architecture (e.g., Elman et al., 1996)

If we can consider automaticity as being controlled (to an extent) by postconsciousness, then it may suggest a free can still be a part of the equation. Which ties in with Searle's (2001) view mentioned a few paragraphs above. Although Nisbett & Wilson's (1977) point stands as much today as it did back then. Given how little we understand of the brain, it impedes our understanding of things like automaticity, and how it is brought about by the materials of our consciousness.

Kihlstrom, J.F. (2008). The automaticity juggernaut. In J. Baer, J.C. Kaufman, & R.F. Baumeister (Eds.), Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will (pp. 155-180). New York: Oxford University Press.

Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, D. S. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84, 231-253.

Öhman, A., & Mineka, S. (2001). Fears, phobias, and preparedness: toward an evolved module of fear and fear learning. Psychological review, 108(3), 483.

Searle, J. R. (2001). Rationality in action. Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press.