RAIB report on SPADs on IE network

MrMorooka

Thread title should be RAIU, not RAIB, whoops.

http://www.raiu.ie/download/pdf/summary_report_rs2016r001.pdf

Interesting reading. Really affirms that IE is pretty badly run in many ways, too much is left to relying on operational staff, lax procedures, a lack of technology to prevent accidents. Management seems really dysfunctional when it comes to managing drivers.

This variance in the treatment of operational staff, has led to
the perception of some drivers involved in these incidents that the drivers are [sic - words missing??]. The general
treatment of the drivers, post SPAD event, has also increased the perception as it has been found
by the RAIU that in some cases drivers are treated poorly, with the suggestion of further sanctions
and accusations of having SPADs on purpose. Actions taken against some drivers appeared
quite punitive.

Seems to be a word missing here...

In addition, in some instances drivers were
required to attend the Coroner’s Court and were questioned by the families of the deceased, the
drivers who experienced these scenarios found them to be very stressful and found that they had no
support from the company when required to attend these courts.

CAWS accounts for is available on 41.6%, while ATP is
available on 4.6 % of the IÉ network, which means that over half of the IÉ network is protected
through basic overrun protection, meaning that there is a strong reliance of the performance of
drivers in the prevention of SPAD events.

Basically, on most of the network, you are relying on the driver not to pass a red signal. If he does, there is no TPWS to automatically stop the train. There is no DRA to deal with start-on-red incidents.

Really, the railway seems not to be run in a particularly professional manner.

MrMorooka

However, reading further in, it does seem like DRA is being rolled out to the whole fleet and there is a TPWS-like system being implemented as well, so that is good.

The report also recommends that

IÉ-IM must introduce an adequate train protection systems on all of the IÉ network for the
protection of trains; this system should be robust and to an acceptable standard within
Europe; and have the appropriate ATP and speed supervision functionality

No idea if this is binding or not. Implementation is probably reliant on government investment, so that's not encouraging.

roundymac

http://www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/trains-nearly-collided-on-mallow-killarney-line-in-2013-392612.html
This part is frightening.

GM228

MrMorooka wrote: »

However, reading further in, it does seem like DRA is being rolled out to the whole fleet and there is a TPWS-like system being implemented as well, so that is good.

The report also recommends that


No idea if this is binding or not. Implementation is probably reliant on government investment, so that's not encouraging.

All trains are now fitted with DRA and a CAWS/ATP hybrid system is currently undergoing trials in a number of locations to be rolled out to the entire IE network by 2025 subject to government funding.

Fred Swanson

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GM228

Fred Swanson wrote: »

Are there no AWS horns on approaching yellow/red signals?

AWS is is only in use with NIR.

Fred Swanson

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GM228

Fred Swanson wrote: »

So there is no alarm that must be acknowledged when passing cautionary signals?

There is with the CAWS system.

Captain Chaos

Fred Swanson wrote: »

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Here is a video of CAWS in action on a 201 on a Mk3 pushpull from Connolly to Howth Junction, it becomes signal checked as it catches up on a DART service ahead. You can see the lights in the cab telling the driver the signal aspect ahead even though he cannot see them yet and the different alerts.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DuWT3l9THWY

Jamie2k9

GM228 wrote: »

All trains are now fitted with DRA and a CAWS/ATP hybrid system is currently undergoing trials in a number of locations to be rolled out to the entire IE network by 2025 subject to government funding.

Are they starting it in 2017? or did I read it wrong?, assume line by line and most pressing need if funding will be slow?

It's been tested for quiet some time already, going well?

Fred Swanson

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flyingsnail

Fred Swanson wrote: »

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No, CAWS only covers Dublin -Cork, Limerick - Limerick Junction, Portarlington - Athlone, Greystones - Maynooth and M3 Parkway and Connolly to the boarder.

Fred Swanson

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Jamie2k9

Fred Swanson wrote: »

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Not really hence why they only allow one train per section on mini CTC lines, warning is really only needed for lines with multiple trains running behind one another.

The number passed at danger is low when you consider the number of services operated over the period.

Fred Swanson

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Jamie2k9

Fred Swanson wrote: »

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Of course but if you look at the table most of them would of happened at 20-30mph at most so quiet easy to stop.

Would be different and more serious issue if it was a case of a train doing 100mph towards Heuston passed one and a train was stopped in a station etc however they have adequate systems in place for it.

GM228

Jamie2k9 wrote: »

Are they starting it in 2017? or did I read it wrong?, assume line by line and most pressing need if funding will be slow?

It's been tested for quiet some time already, going well?

No start date yet as the project is still only in the testing phase, national implementation is dependent on a successful business case and government funding.

Seanmk1

Jamie2k9 wrote: »

Of course but if you look at the table most of them would of happened at 20-30mph at most so quiet easy to stop.

Would be different and more serious issue if it was a case of a train doing 100mph towards Heuston passed one and a train was stopped in a station etc however they have adequate systems in place for it.

A 20-30mph SPAD can be a big problem. The Cherryville disaster happened at 32mph.

A two to three hundred ton train travelling at 20 mph represents a significant amount of kinetic energy.

Cherryville report here http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docsummary.php?docID=1355

goingnowhere

To be fair a modern train in a collision at 30 mph you would expect a zero or very low fatality rate.

Crash a train made out of wood and the results at any speed are scary

Cherryville was not a SPAD anyway, the rule book allowed the situation to occur and left the driver to make the call, he couldn't see the train in fog until too late.

Seanmk1

goingnowhere wrote: »

To be fair a modern train in a collision at 30 mph you would expect a zero or very low fatality rate.

Crash a train made out of wood and the results at any speed are scary

Cherryville was not a SPAD anyway, the rule book allowed the situation to occur and left the driver to make the call, he couldn't see the train in fog until too late.

I'm fairly sure that the rulebook didn't allow for 30mph speeds, and if it did it needed to be rewritten.

I wouldn't like to be on a modern train for a 30mph collision

MrMorooka

Seanmk1 wrote: »

I'm fairly sure that the rulebook didn't allow for 30mph speeds, and if it did it needed to be rewritten.

The rulebook at the time didn't specify a speed, just said to proceed cautiously and be ready to stop. See appendix 7 of the linked report.

Captain Chaos

For everyone saying the train was only going about 30mph, assume the other train was too. That's a head on collision with a combined impact speed of 60mph. If you happen to be standing at the time you are fecked.

Losty Dublin

Fred Swanson wrote: »

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CAWS is intended to be an in cab signal system and not a dedicated protection system. Whenever a signal downgrades from green to either a red or orange aspect an phone in the train cab phone rings. In the driver doesn't pick up the receiver in time the train brake will apply automatically and won't be released until CTC hear back from the driver. While it doesn't eliminate SPAD's it will help to prevent one if a driver doesn't react in time to his alarm.

Losty Dublin

goingnowhere wrote: »

Cherryville was not a SPAD anyway, the rule book allowed the situation to occur and left the driver to make the call, he couldn't see the train in fog until too late.

Correct, it wasn't a SPAD. Don't forget that the tail lamp had gone out and seriously curtailed visibility of the unprotected broken down train on the night in question.

Sam Russell

Why do trains not use GPS reporting of their position back to a central office? It would alert the signal man to danger if trains are approaching each other closer than is safe.

Every smart phone has GPS.

Heisenberg1

Sam Russell wrote: »

Why do trains not use GPS reporting of their position back to a central office? It would alert the signal man to danger if trains are approaching each other closer than is safe.

Every smart phone has GPS.

There would be no benefit to have GPS tracking. Each train occupies a signal block section when that block is ocuppied no other train can be given a signal until that section is clear, this spaces out the trains safely. One train one section one time. If a train SPADs the siganller will get an alarm about it.

Heisenberg1

Losty Dublin wrote: »

CAWS is intended to be an in cab signal system and not a dedicated protection system. Whenever a signal downgrades from green to either a red or orange aspect an phone in the train cab phone rings. In the driver doesn't pick up the receiver in time the train brake will apply automatically and won't be released until CTC hear back from the driver. While it doesn't eliminate SPAD's it will help to prevent one if a driver doesn't react in time to his alarm.

When the driver recieves a downgrade from green to yellow an audible alarm will sound, this acts as a reminder to the driver of the signal aspect. The brakes do not apply. The driver must stop and confirm why there was a downgrade but the train will still have full power. If you look at ATP for incidence
with this method of train protection there should not be a SPADs on the Dart network but there is.

12Phase

Is there any reason why IE isn't really following European developments and harmonisation on signalling?

CAWS etc all seem "home brew"

Jamie2k9

Heisenberg1 wrote: »

When the driver recieves a downgrade from green to yellow an audible alarm will sound, this acts as a reminder to the driver of the signal aspect. The brakes do not apply. The driver must stop and confirm why there was a downgrade but the train will still have full power. If you look at ATP for incidence
with this method of train protection there should not be a SPADs on the Dart network but there is.

I was lead to believe what Losty Dublin said happens with the brakes, they have 5 seconds to respond or brakes apply and the same applies to emergency equipment activated or alarms on trains. They have to press a switch to acknowledge the change.

Drivers do not just stop is there is a downgrade from Green to Orange, they slow down in event next signal after Orange is Red but not stop, if that was the case trains would be stopping for no reason in the middle or nowhere.

Heisenberg1

Jamie2k9 wrote: »

I was lead to believe what Losty Dublin said happens with the brakes, they have 5 seconds to respond or brakes apply and the same applies to emergency equipment activated or alarms on trains. They have to press a switch to acknowledge the change.

Drivers do not just stop is there is a downgrade from Green to Orange, they slow down in event next signal after Orange is Red but not stop, if that was the case trains would be stopping for no reason in the middle or nowhere.

I should of been more clear if a driver recieves a downgrade from green to red he must stop his train and confirm the state of the signal. I always unsderstood the 5 second rule too relate to the acknowledging the deadman?

Just checked it on wiki losty is correct the brake will apply if the downgrade is not acknowledged within 7 seconds.

Heisenberg1

12Phase wrote: »

Is there any reason why IE isn't really following European developments and harmonisation on signalling?

CAWS etc all seem "home brew"

I would imagine it comes down too cost look what PTC is costing in the US or ERTMS is costing in the UK.

Losty Dublin

12Phase wrote: »

Is there any reason why IE isn't really following European developments and harmonisation on signalling?

CAWS etc all seem "home brew"

Cost, time and hassle. To introduce new system signalling systems and practices means refitting the entire signal system of Irish Rail and NIR with new signal control centres and comms systems. As well, the withdrawing every loco, carriage and driving van trailer (DVT) to ensure that they are retro fitted and compatible as well and the time involved in training up train drivers, guards, gatekeeper, station staff, signal cabin operatives, track laying crews and electrical teams etc and you can see that it's a costly exercise all told.

As Ireland's network works grand as it and isn't connected to mainland Europe it's not going to offer any gains as such. Some level of sameness will probably come in over time but you are talking decades here