1916 Rising - The military perspective.

BoJack Horseman

Its something I admittedly know little about...

I'd like to seek opinions from my fellow armchair generals on the military aspects of the brief rebellion in Easter 1916... Not so much about the politics.

Questions I'd like to know more about are along the lines of:

How were the rebels organised, what were their formations?
What were the equipment/armaments used in the campaign?

The tactics used.... what was the logic?... was there merit to it?
(It seemed to me that occupying the GPO, a biscuit factory, a flour mill, a distillery, a hospital & sitting in the open in St Stephens Green was not the plan of military competence.... just awaiting the inevitable shootout seems pointless).

Why did the campaign not focus on areas that held more C&C/military/infrastructural merit?

Contributions from a military slant very welcome

riffmongous

BoJack Horseman wrote: »

The tactics used.... what was the logic?... was there merit to it?
(It seemed to me that occupying the GPO, a biscuit factory, a flour mill, a distillery, a hospital & sitting in the open in St Stephens Green was not the plan of military competence.... just awaiting the inevitable shootout seems pointless).

Why did the campaign not focus on areas that held more C&C/military/infrastructural merit?

I would guess the plan with the buildings was to form a ring around the inner city using these buildings, which you referred to a bit mockingly, but look up pictures of the buildings and they are all tall tough imposing buildings, well suited for commanding the surrounding streets which were needed by the British to move in reinforcements from the train station at Heuston and the port at Dun Laoighaire.



Look up the Battle of Mount Street to see how well this plan could work, 17 Volunteers against a full battalion of British and they caused around 240 casualties. However a lack of numbers meant that they couldn't secure the entire area and many of the other positions were simply bypassed, remember the Rising was originally planned for a much larger amount of troops, although the commands of the big positions do deserve some of the blame too for keeping too many troops in these buildings and not supporting the smaller outposts

BoJack Horseman

riffmongous wrote: »

I would guess the plan with the buildings was to form a ring around the inner city using these buildings, which you referred to a bit mockingly, but look up pictures of the buildings and they are all tall tough imposing buildings, well suited for commanding the surrounding streets which were needed by the British to move in reinforcements from the train station at Heuston and the port at Dun Laoighaire.

Thing is though..... none of that worked, because none of it had any chance of working! It was hopelessly incapable of the task.

If you want to conduct what is essentially area denial to the enemy, one must have the weaponry & wherewithal to do so....

Taking Heuston Station as an example:

The rebels, I assume would have keen intelligence on what men & material were in possession by the British forces.
While road interception would have been difficult, rail would have been very easy to eliminate and therefore would have greatly impeded reinforcement of train moved artillery into dublin.

No need to keep an eye on the train station if the tracks were simply damaged outside of Dublin in the first place.....
And besides, the buildings occupied would not have been able to impede a muster at Heuston anyway.... the distance is around 400m...
From what I can tell, the rebels lacked mortars & artillery, therefore their task was all but futile..

I did have a look at the buildings occupied & while some were large, others were not & would not have impeded enemy movement all that much, as proved to be so.... especially when you consider that the rebels seemed to lack any mortar weaponry (open to correction here).

This is not hindsight.... it would be very obvious right from the get-go that if the tactic was to impede reinforcement to the centre, then not thinking of damaging railways or even preventing naval incursion (which was possible) was just accelerating the inevitable defeat.... & a remarkable oversight by the commanders.

riffmongous

Infantry Mortars were still in their infancy back in 1916, if they were even in pproduction yet..

The strategic goal of the rebellion was not to keep the British forces outside the city though, but rather draw them in and hold them to allow the rest of the country to rise up.

Regarding artillery the rebels were counting on the British not using any in the city, it sounds naive now but urban combat was a new phenomenon in 1916 and well considering how well Dublin was supposedly regarded by the British.. The artillery was decisive in the end but with full turnout of volunteers preventing such easy access to the GPO and the capture of Trinity and Dublin Castle it would have been much tougher to get proper lines of fire on the GPO. Iirc British artillery fire was of a very poor standard at the start of the battle

riffmongous

I think one of the most serious rebel failings was how they were unable to communicate effectively between their different units, for example at Mount Street while 17 men held off a few battalions there was a hundred men nearby at the main position doing nothing.

Lots of the rebel positions never saw combat and never reacted to changing circumstances, having most of the top command cut off at the GPO was a huge problem. In the end though this was a good thing for the men and the city as it spared a lot of destruction.

KingBrian2

A major drawback was failing to cease Dublin Castle effectively the administration of military rule in Ireland. The 1916 rising starts out like a 19th century battlefield. Claiming the Castle would have boosted support and moral among the volunteers willing to come out and mobilise. The guerrilla warfare is what made it turn nasty. The street to street battles would have terrified the cities population having never experienced close quarter fighting before.

BoJack Horseman

riffmongous wrote: »

Infantry Mortars were still in their infancy back in 1916, if they were even in pproduction yet..

I had a look and infantry mortars had entered service the year before in 1915 after it was urgently required at the front in Europe.
I can't find anything regarding if garrisons had access to it though....

Iirc British artillery fire was of a very poor standard at the start of the battle

Yeah, it seemed to be terrible.....

Looking at pictures,.... the buildings along the quays were devastated by artillery.... I assume they could not get the elevation needed to hit the GPO & just blasted away through the obstructing buildings anyway...

BoJack Horseman

Why was the GPO designated as the HQ anyway?

I assume the building was a hub for telegraph/telephone communications?

KingBrian2

BoJack Horseman wrote: »

Why was the GPO designated as the HQ anyway?

I assume the building was a hub for telegraph/telephone communications?

Well basing it on the commanders words themselves the symbolic and central location made it an ideal target coupled with an escape route and the ability to link up communications with the other Rebel outposts. A flurry of activity marked the events of that week the GPO served as an exemplar site to store weaponry and personnel. It was certainly fortified.

Fleawuss

Pearse was no soldier. I think he realized they would be defeated but went ahead for the gamble that their deaths would inspire others. Militarily a disaster. Psychologically a success.
On another note you can't separate the military from the political. Tactically a failure, strategically...? There are lots of problems with 1916.

KingBrian2

Fleawuss wrote: »

Pearse was no soldier. I think he realized they would be defeated but went ahead for the gamble that their deaths would inspire others. Militarily a disaster. Psychologically a success.
On another note you can't separate the military from the political. Tactically a failure, strategically...? There are lots of problems with 1916.

The allies won the war, had to do it all over again in 1939 the military can only do so much.

BigDuffman

Idiocy, hence the term a "poets rebellion". Pearse was no not a general (he was in fact a man with great ambitions and a martyr complex) , nothing of what was done as part of Easter Sunday had any tactical or strategic merit. Bar the political rhetoric there was nothing gained bar slaughter. Heroes, yes, military greatness....not a hope. As was the common theme of the era, Lions lead by Lambs.

Considering the Irish experience with the Boers, I'm surprised there was no lessons learnt that got applied. Any military minded individuals could have had the country locked up tight in 4 days through a simple restriction of mobility.

Main Roads
Rail Roads
Dublin Barracks
The Curragh
Cork Barracks
The Ports

In that order or as simultaneously as possible in the middle of the night. Cordon and secure. Then read the proclamation from the GPO's steps, whilst holding the British Soldiers and officials hostage.

Fleawuss

BigDuffman wrote: »

Idiocy, hence the term a "poets rebellion". Pearse was no not a general (he was in fact a man with great ambitions and a martyr complex) , nothing of what was done as part of Easter Sunday had any tactical or strategic merit. Bar the political rhetoric there was nothing gained bar slaughter. Heroes, yes, military greatness....not a hope. As was the common theme of the era, Lions lead by Lambs.

Considering the Irish experience with the Boers, I'm surprised there was no lessons learnt that got applied. Any military minded individuals could have had the country locked up tight in 4 days through a simple restriction of mobility.

Main Roads
Rail Roads
Dublin Barracks
The Curragh
Cork Barracks
The Ports

In that order or as simultaneously as possible in the middle of the night. Cordon and secure. Then read the proclamation from the GPO's steps, whilst holding the British Soldiers and officials hostage.

Two minor things: it was Easter Monday and the line is "Lions led by donkeys". Pearse was no donkey. I think he understood the Irish psyche very well and the heroic defeat won more to his cause than a more protracted military campaign that would ultimately have failed. The executions are what won the day in the end. As someone once said, war is far too serious a business to be left to the soldiers.

BoJack Horseman

Fleawuss wrote: »

Pearse was no donkey. I think he understood the Irish psyche very well and the heroic defeat won more to his cause than a more protracted military campaign that would ultimately have failed..

Is this known for certain?
ie: Is there any biography or confirmation on his part that the rather inept planning & execution was all part of a cunning plan?

riffmongous

BoJack Horseman wrote: »

I had a look and infantry mortars had entered service the year before in 1915 after it was urgently required at the front in Europe.
I can't find anything regarding if garrisons had access to it though....



Yeah, it seemed to be terrible.....

Looking at pictures,.... the buildings along the quays were devastated by artillery.... I assume they could not get the elevation needed to hit the GPO & just blasted away through the obstructing buildings anyway...

I don't think the British forces used mortars during the fighting either, only 18-pdr guns sent from Athlone, and of course the Helga. Ironically the awful accuracy or random shooting worked out pretty well as some of the shots onto Sackville Street ended up starting the fire that drove the rebels out of the GPO

Fleawuss

BoJack Horseman wrote: »

Is this known for certain?
ie: Is there any biography or confirmation on his part that the rather inept planning & execution was all part of a cunning plan?

It's called Blood Sacrifice. It's why he did it at Easter. Death and Resurrection. Google it.

BoJack Horseman

Fleawuss wrote: »

Google it.

So your saying he thought he was Christ or something?

The question still stands.... Can the poor planning & execution be explained away with "blood sacrifice"?

Was it made clear to those participating that the leadership had no intention of engineering anything close to a victory condition & just wanted them all to be slaughtered?
If that's what your saying it would seem incredibly callous on the part of the leadership to do that to their men.

riffmongous

Is it really true that Pearse was the sole man responsible for the Rising going ahead though? They were a council of 7 and Clarke and Connolly were also both strongly committed to revolution, Connolly indeed had threatened before to rebel without the Volunteers help.

KingBrian2

Well the revolutionaries had various reasons for taking part Connolly himself was a socialist while the Republicans, Nationalists & Parnellites all had differing objectives they hoped to achieve.

riffmongous

KingBrian2 wrote: »

Well the revolutionaries had various reasons for taking part Connolly himself was a socialist while the Republicans, Nationalists & Parnellites all had differing objectives they hoped to achieve.

Well the rebellion had been planned since the start of the year but I am wondering what the command structure was that gave the final order to go ahead with the rebellion after the Aud was captured and Mac Neill cancelled the orders for the volunteers easter maneuvers, which is when the Rising lost it's faint chance of success and truly became symbolic

KingBrian2

riffmongous wrote: »

Well the rebellion had been planned since the start of the year but I am wondering what the command structure was that gave the final order to go ahead with the rebellion after the Aud was captured and Mac Neill cancelled the orders for the volunteers easter maneuvers, which is when the Rising lost it's faint chance of success and truly became symbolic

They were still trying to convince Neill to go ahead that seemed to go nowhere. Neill and others were giving out the orders to stand down all the while the IRB Council were firmly committed to the fight. They had the personnel, logistics & guns brought in to distribute to the Volunteers. The notorious shooting of Volunteers by the British and subsequent Bachelor's Walk peaceful march had occurred by this stage.

josephryan1989

The rebels were primarily armed with hundreds of "Howth" rifles or Mauser 1871 single shot bolt action rifles smuggled into the country from Germany in 1914. These were long heavy weapons that fired a 11mm round loaded with black powder and a soft lead projectile. They had a heavy recoil which would could injure the shooter, the barrel was prone to overheating and burning the hand holding it and they could quickly get clogged with dirt and jam. When fired they spurted flame and smoke which would give their position away to the enemy. There advantage was the penetrating power of the round that could cut through the bodies of bunched infantrymen making an assault on rebel positions.
The rebels who could not get Howth rifles, were armed with a mix of various weapons from stolen or purchased British army .303 Lee-Enfields, a range of more modern Mauser bolt action repeating rifles such as the Gewehr 98, single shot breech loading Martini-Henry rifles, sporting hunting rifles and shotguns.
Sidearms were a range of automatic pistols and revolvers.
The German Mauser C96 pistol called "Peter the Painter" (because it was used by Peter Piaktow, a Latvian gang member involved in the infamous Siege of Sidney Street in East London) was used by several rebels in pitched close range gun battles with British troops.
Hand grenades and improvised hand grenades and petrol bombs (Sean Lemass, a future Taoiseach, was praised later for his alleged accuracy with petrol bombs) were also used.

The standard British rifle was of course the ten round box magazine Lee Enfield bolt action rifle. In trained hands this weapon was excellent for sniping at long range and when a section or platoon were firing together rapidly they could lay down a devastating curtain of fire. The smaller .303 round meant that soldiers could carry much more ammo than the rebels.
However since many of the men were boys in their teens and early twenties with no battle experience and minimal training with their rifles, their accuracy was rubbish and in firefights they might waste hundreds of rounds and not hit anything or fail to suppress the fire of a handful of rebels who could keep their cool and pick them off at leisure from concealed positions.

In the opening phases of the battle the soldiers were marched into battle or made frontal charges creating needless casualties. Later they adopted the tactic of burrowing through the walls and ceilings of buildings and using rear gardens rather than moving up exposed streets. Boilers were mounted on trucks and turned into improvised armoured personnel carriers. They moved up to rebel held buildings hosing them down before skirmisher leaped out and assaulted them.
To suppress rebel positions the British used belt fed water cooled .303 Vickers machine guns that could continously hose down buildings, barricades and streets to allow infantry to move up and close in with grenades and rifle fire to clear strongpoints.
Rebel snipers and British snipers dueled with each other across the rooftops.
The Helga was used to shell Liberty Hall point blank with its forward mounted gun but the city centre itself was actually shelled from the cricket grounds of Trinity College and from Phibsborough. The buildings on lower O'Connell Street bore the brunt of the bombardment and were reduces to gutted ruins and rubble.
The cordons on the bridges of the Royal and Grand canals prevented a rebel break out and when British troops infiltrated the city centre they isolated the rebel strongpoints from eachother until they reached O'Connell Street and cut off the GPO from outlying rebel positions.
The leaders could only reach Moore Street because O'Connell Street was being swept by machine gun fire from across O'Connell Street and was no man's land for anyone trying to cross. The leaders were ultimately bottled up in Moore Street when British fire prevented them from escaping bringing about the final surrender.

With limited firepower and ammo and men, the rebels had better rifle training and maximized their knowledge of city and gave a better account of themselves. Their most obvious failures were not capturing Dublin Castle which was guarded by only a handful of troops and police, Trinity College which became the position for the British artillery and a rallying point for British troops coming up from Kingstown and overlooking the Shelbourne Hotel which allowed the British to dominate Stephen's Green and forced the rebels to hold out in the Royal College of Surgeons. By simply holding out in fixed positions and neglecting to use small parties to hold the bridges on the canals the rebels made life easier for the British advance into the centre.

The British blundered badly in the opening battles and their inexperience with urban fighting prolonged the fight and led to higher casaulties. However in the battle their men learned fast and improvized well but a collapse of discipline among some of the men led to atrocities which were seized upon by Republican propagandists subsequently.

BigDuffman

Fleawuss wrote: »

Two minor things: it was Easter Monday and the line is "Lions led by donkeys". Pearse was no donkey. I think he understood the Irish psyche very well and the heroic defeat won more to his cause than a more protracted military campaign that would ultimately have failed. The executions are what won the day in the end. As someone once said, war is far too serious a business to be left to the soldiers.

Apologies, typo, you are of course correct regarding the day.

If we're being pedantic, Lions for lambs is quite a popular military phrase. Gaining inspiration from Alexander the great and popularized by a Robert Redford film.

Pearse in my opinion was completely ill-equipped to lead any military action. As for understanding an Irish psyche, the majority of the Irish masses had no interest in a campaign against the british and most certainly not protracted campaign. Instilling patriotism through a misguided ideal of martyrdom and bloody rhetoric is idiocy. Attempting to meet the might of the British empire in a static take over in one day with no support, comms or logistics is idiotic. The executions obviously had a galvanising effect. If that was the objective then why not save lives and offer up a token high profile action by a few willing martyrs to make a point, not lead a host of men willing to fight to defeat through poor planning and strategy.

josephryan1989

BigDuffman wrote: »

Apologies, typo, you are of course correct regarding the day.

If we're being pedantic, Lions for lambs is quite a popular military phrase. Gaining inspiration from Alexander the great and popularized by a Robert Redford film.

Pearse in my opinion was completely ill-equipped to lead any military action. As for understanding an Irish psyche, the majority of the Irish masses had no interest in a campaign against the british and most certainly not protracted campaign. Instilling patriotism through a misguided ideal of martyrdom and bloody rhetoric is idiocy. Attempting to meet the might of the British empire in a static take over in one day with no support, comms or logistics is idiotic. The executions obviously had a galvanising effect. If that was the objective then why not save lives and offer up a token high profile action by a few willing martyrs to make a point, not lead a host of men willing to fight to defeat through poor planning and strategy.

A handful of rebels should have ran into the GPO and read the Proclamation and surrendered to the first peeler who came along? There would have been no credibility to their cause. Their opponents 100 years would have good cause to call them a bunch of cranks.

Instead a modest army took over the city centre for a week and fought a gallant fight and the leaders took their punishment like men.
The point was to demonstrate to the world the desire for an Irish Republic. They were proven right when middle Ireland rowed in behind them.
-
Yeats epitomized middle Ireland who was forced to acknowledge this reality when he wrote Easter 1916 where one by one rethought his view of the leaders he had dismissed previously.

BigDuffman

josephryan1989 wrote: »

Instead a modest army took over the city centre for a week and fought a gallant fight and the leaders took their punishment like men.
The point was to demonstrate to the world the desire for an Irish Republic. They were proven right when middle Ireland rowed in behind them.
-
Yeats epitomized middle Ireland who was forced to acknowledge this reality when he wrote Easter 1916 where one by one rethought his view of the leaders he had dismissed previously.

I don't disagree with the sentiment or ultimate result. What I have a problem with is the people seem to refuse to see the rising for what it ultimately was, a military disaster and cluster that could have been avoided with proper strategy and execution. As with a lot of ill fated military gambits, the execution and resultant failure can ultimately be more important than the actual operation. As is the case here.

Before the more republican types get fired up, obviously I will be celebrating 1916 and have the utmost respect for the heroes that died. But the actual military operation in my humble opinion was fundamentally flawed. Digging in on a flat plane, in a cultivated park, surrounded by high buildings and a superior enemy is the definition of bad planning and vision.

josephryan1989

BigDuffman wrote: »

I don't disagree with the sentiment or ultimate result. What I have a problem with is the people seem to refuse to see the rising for what it ultimately was, a military disaster and cluster that could have been avoided with proper strategy and execution. As with a lot of ill fated military gambits, the execution and resultant failure can ultimately be more important than the actual operation. As is the case here.

Before the more republican types get fired up, obviously I will be celebrating 1916 and have the utmost respect for the heroes that died. But the actual military operation in my humble opinion was fundamentally flawed. Digging in on a flat plane, in a cultivated park, surrounded by high buildings and a superior enemy is the definition of bad planning and vision.

The Rising was launched knowing full well it would end in defeat. It was a deliberate sacrifice. When the leaders signed the Proclamation they knew they had signed their lives away.

The Irish Volunteers might have been more competently led and ghastly naive military decisions were made but the result was never in any doubt when those rebels went into battle. They were going to lose but they hoped the rest of Ireland and generations yet unborn would fight on for their dream.

Supposing the Aud had landed and arms and ammo were distributed to thousands of men? Supposing more of the country had risen and the fighting in Dublin continued for days longer? The British would have sent more troops and artillery and still defeated the rebellion. Victory in traditional terms was never the aim.

riffmongous

BigDuffman wrote: »

I don't disagree with the sentiment or ultimate result. What I have a problem with is the people seem to refuse to see the rising for what it ultimately was, a military disaster and cluster that could have been avoided with proper strategy and execution. As with a lot of ill fated military gambits, the execution and resultant failure can ultimately be more important than the actual operation. As is the case here.

Before the more republican types get fired up, obviously I will be celebrating 1916 and have the utmost respect for the heroes that died. But the actual military operation in my humble opinion was fundamentally flawed. Digging in on a flat plane, in a cultivated park, surrounded by high buildings and a superior enemy is the definition of bad planning and vision.

The man responsible for that tactical disaster Michael Mallin was actually probably one of the most experienced men, as he had fought in the British Army for years beforehand, this was the age of the frontal charge across no mans land and a lack of tactical and strategic ability was to be seen on both sides

KingBrian2

BigDuffman wrote: »

I don't disagree with the sentiment or ultimate result. What I have a problem with is the people seem to refuse to see the rising for what it ultimately was, a military disaster and cluster that could have been avoided with proper strategy and execution. As with a lot of ill fated military gambits, the execution and resultant failure can ultimately be more important than the actual operation. As is the case here.

Before the more republican types get fired up, obviously I will be celebrating 1916 and have the utmost respect for the heroes that died. But the actual military operation in my humble opinion was fundamentally flawed. Digging in on a flat plane, in a cultivated park, surrounded by high buildings and a superior enemy is the definition of bad planning and vision.

The result was that the revolutionaries were able to hold out against a formidable foe for an entire week. They also launched a daring offensive against the seat of British rule in Ireland comparable to famous resistance movements that took place across the continent in Europe. The Warsaw Uprising, Stauffenber's famous assassination attempt of Hitler.

4512

A guerrilla war was what was needed from the very start but support for republicanism was really only widespread after 1916. Frongoch also acted as a breeding ground for Independence.
No offense to the lads and lassies that fought, but some of the places occupied, eg Stephens Green, were a complete tactical disaster.

BigDuffman

KingBrian2 wrote: »

The result was that the revolutionaries were able to hold out against a formidable foe for an entire week. They also launched a daring offensive against the seat of British rule in Ireland comparable to famous resistance movements that took place across the continent in Europe. The Warsaw Uprising, Stauffenber's famous assassination attempt of Hitler.

A lot of people failing to see the point. No one denies any of it was daring and courageous. The point is as the OP asked, was a military perspective on 1916. A military perspective is a clinical view. The reality is that it was very badly planned and executed. It's not an argument if they were brave for taking a stand against British rule. It's examining the tactical merit of the operation. A commander upon reviewing a historical engagement does not say "oh how brave they were" he will look at what went wrong and envisage how he might improve upon the situation from a military perspective.

IrishTrajan

BoJack Horseman wrote: »

(It seemed to me that occupying the GPO, a biscuit factory, a flour mill, a distillery, a hospital & sitting in the open in St Stephens Green was not the plan of military competence.... just awaiting the inevitable shootout seems pointless).

Well, they only needed to really hold out for a week to declare independence under international law at the time, no? 1200 men marching out to fight against 17,000 is pretty ballsy, but it was inevitable defeat would come. Maybe if the rest of the Volunteers had risen at the same time (effectively ironing out the difference in numbers), but I don't think the Brits would've let the Irish hold it for very long - and public opinion was very much against the Rising at the start, so it wouldn't even have enjoyed local support.

There was a few risings outside the city as well, up near Donabate was one, I think.

josephryan1989

IrishTrajan wrote: »

Well, they only needed to really hold out for a week to declare independence under international law at the time, no? 1200 men marching out to fight against 17,000 is pretty ballsy, but it was inevitable defeat would come. Maybe if the rest of the Volunteers had risen at the same time (effectively ironing out the difference in numbers), but I don't think the Brits would've let the Irish hold it for very long - and public opinion was very much against the Rising at the start, so it wouldn't even have enjoyed local support.

There was a few risings outside the city as well, up near Donabate was one, I think.

Thomas Ashe and Richard Mulcahy led men from across Fingal who captured Donabate Lusk Rush Skerries Balbriggan and Garristown before they ambushed a ten car convoy of 57 RIC from the direction of Slane killing 11 and forcing the rest to surrender at Ashbourne.

I believe in Wexford the rebels took control of a large area while Galway rebels were dispersed by naval fire. In Cork Terence McSwinney have surrendered hundreds of armed men when the bishops acted as intermediaries.

byhookorbycrook

BoJack Horseman wrote: »

While road interception would have been difficult, rail would have been very easy to eliminate and therefore would have greatly impeded reinforcement of train moved artillery into dublin.

No need to keep an eye on the train station if the tracks were simply damaged outside of Dublin in the first place.....
And besides, the buildings occupied would not have been able to impede a muster at Heuston anyway.... the distance is around 400m...
From what I can tell, the rebels lacked mortars & artillery, therefore their task was all but futile..

... then not thinking of damaging railways or even preventing naval incursion (which was possible) was just accelerating the inevitable defeat.... & a remarkable oversight by the commanders.

"He told us that the duties assigned to our Company were the demolition in our area of the railway lines from Waterford to Dublin with the object of holding up and delaying the advance of enemy troops that might be sent to Dublin that way from Britain via Rosslare or Waterford."
http://www.1916remembrancegardenraheen.com/page2.html