Germanwings A320 Crash

Cianmcliam

Gaoth Laidir wrote: »

Wasn't the change in speed due to the switchover from Mach to IAS mode on passing through FL270?

I don't think so, the BEA report suggests the selected speed seems to have changed up to seven times before the aircraft passed 30,000ft (between point 5 and 6 on their timeline, pg. 13).

bkehoe

Cianmcliam wrote: »

I don't think so, the BEA report suggests the selected speed seems to have changed up to seven times before the aircraft passed 30,000ft (between point 5 and 6 on their timeline, pg. 13).

Probably because Mmo/Vmo increase as one descends so to achieve the highest descent rate one would increase the speed as the limits increase.

Cianmcliam

bkehoe wrote: »

Probably because Mmo/Vmo increase as one descends so to achieve the highest descent rate one would increase the speed as the limits increase.

That's what I would have assumed but would you ever need to adjust the selected speed seven times within 35 seconds? From what I understand though 'selected speed' is a target you set and the autopilot adjusts variables to reach that, not itself a variable that gets influence and changed by the autopilot as the aircraft descends, which is what was implied at the press conference. For that to happen you would need to be in 'managed' mode instead.

Steve

Cianmcliam wrote: »

That's what I would have assumed but would you ever need to adjust the selected speed seven times within 35 seconds? From what I understand though 'selected speed' is a target you set and the autopilot adjusts variables to reach that, not itself a variable that gets influence and changed by the autopilot as the aircraft descends, which is what was implied at the press conference. For that to happen you would need to be in 'managed' mode instead.

Doesn't the FMC manage decent speed as required?

I don't claim to know much about this bar PMDG 737 sims.

That said, from what I understand the FMC / AP manages attitude to maintain a target speed during the descent.

Cianmcliam

Steve wrote: »

Doesn't the FMC manage decent speed as required?

I don't claim to know much about this bar PMDG 737 sims.

That said, from what I understand the FMC / AP manages attitude to maintain a target speed during the descent.

I guess the descent rate would be controlled by the FMC, but according to the more detailed explanation regarding Indian Airlines 605:
Any of the four FCU knobs can be pulled to "pull" that segment of auto-flight control to the pilot ("selected" guidance) where the pilot can dial in the desired Speed, Heading/Track, Altitude, or Vertical Speed/Flight Path Angle and override the FMS managed guidance for that segment of auto-flight guidance. During "Selected" Guidance, the aircraft is guided to a "selected" target which is set by the pilot in the FCU. It is possible to fly in a mixed mode configuration, where, for example, lateral guidance of the pre-programmed flight plan route is being "managed" by the FMS but the speed and vertical guidance is “selected" by the pilot.

"Selected" guidance always overrides "managed" guidance. During the Indian Airlines Flight 605 accident sequence, the Speed mode was being "managed" by the FMS and the lateral heading mode (HDG) and the Altitude (ALT) and Vertical Speed (V/S) modes were "selected" by the aircrew.

http://lessonslearned.faa.gov/ll_main.cfm?TabID=1&LLID=71&LLTypeID=2

So, we would have to agree with the BEA that changes to the selected speed in selected mode have to be made by a conscious person using the dial.

Steve

Without access to the full data / facts I can't really say much more.

Cianmcliam

Very disappointed that AVHerald is now deleting comments that state simple facts about the claims in the article. Thanks to a helpful member here I was able to confirm that the manual does indeed prove the Selected Speed must be adjusted by a person piloting the plane and cannot jump around due to automatic processes. The case is therefore closed. Unfortunately most commenters on the article are still unaware how many inaccuracies and peculiarly sourced documents were presented at the press conference.

Austrian Simon

Cianmcliam wrote: »

Very disappointed that AVHerald is now deleting comments that state simple facts about the claims in the article. Thanks to a helpful member here I was able to confirm that the manual does indeed prove the Selected Speed must be adjusted by a person piloting the plane and cannot jump around due to automatic processes. The case is therefore closed. Unfortunately most commenters on the article are still unaware how many inaccuracies and peculiarly sourced documents were presented at the press conference.

You are plain wrong here.

At this time I am not going to comment any further. Maybe you exercise patience instead of raising false claims.

I repeat: I'd wish you would show the same effort and dedication to review the BEA final report and the claims in there as well as trying to prove the family wrong. You'd have a lot to discover indeed.

Just one question for you: what highly important is missing in the entire BEA report?

Cianmcliam

Austrian Simon wrote: »

You are plain wrong here.

At this time I am not going to comment any further. Maybe you exercise patience instead of raising false claims.

I repeat: I'd wish you would show the same effort and dedication to review the BEA final report and the claims in there as well as trying to prove our coverage wrong. You'd have a lot to discover indeed.

Just one question for you: what highly important is missing in the entire BEA report?

I'm happy to hear any alternative explanations, whether I'm wrong or not, at least let the comment remain on the article so others can correct me or check themselves.

One thing we have to agree on is that the manual does indeed confirm once 'Selected Mode' is set at 9 h 33 min 12, any subsequent changes to the target speed (not indicated speed or true speed) cannot be overridden by automatic processes. It is a target after all, not a measurement. It is written clearly in the Thales manual, pg. 11-12 of the FMGS section.

I have been testing the claims in the BEA report, that is the only reason I asked for the medical form from April 2009. It could have proven the article correct on that detail, and going by the later documents that seemed quite likely.

What data is missing? Well it would be nice to see the graphs and explanations of the decoding documents for the FDR. That may show why DES and OPDES were shown as active, or why the FDR is unable to distinguish between them (OPDES with mixed mode speed selection perhaps?). However, the BFU also reviewed and endorsed the BEA conclusions.

Austrian Simon

Cianmcliam wrote: »

I'm happy to hear any alternative explanations, whether I'm wrong or not, at least let the comment remain on the article so others can correct me or check themselves.

One thing we have to agree on is that the manual does indeed confirm once 'Selected Mode' is set at 9 h 33 min 12, any subsequent changes to the target speed (not indicated speed or true speed) cannot be overridden by automatic processes. It is a target after all, not a measurement. It is written clearly in the Thales manual, pg. 11-12 of the FMGS section.

I have been testing the claims in the BEA report, that is the only reason I asked for the medical form from April 2009. It could have proven the article correct on that detail, and going by the later documents that seemed quite likely.

What data is missing? Well it would be nice to see the graphs and explanations of the decoding documents for the FDR. That may show why DES and OPDES were shown as active, or why the FDR is unable to distinguish between them (OPDES with mixed mode speed selection perhaps?). However, the BFU also reviewed and endorsed the BEA conclusions.

When does the selected speed get updated from another source than the rotary knob? Did you review this in the AOM - yes, it does get updated automatically indeed (I recommend you start to look at what happens on autopilot mode changes)!

Also explain, what the autopilot does with both descent and open descent modes active - perhaps this provides further answers? Do you find any answer in the AOM at all?

Do you know how software works internally?

How does a mode change in the pitch channel affect other modes, in particular in the thrust/speed channel?

Do you perhaps start to see the relevance of this mode conflict? So, still no reason to have this investigated?

And once again, please show the same dedication and effort to verify the BEA final report that you showed so far to prove me wrong. There are very very very very important details missing in the final report (but I needed a very long time too to recognize what is missing).

I have some sympathy with your position. After all, I too did not have any doubts and any questions about the BEA final report from Mar 13th 2016, when it was released and I covered it, until Mar 24th 2017, when the family presented new facts that were entirely unknown in the public but are verified fact.

For me the decisive points were:

The entire medical history (except the depressive episode in 2008/2009) and thus the entire motive of the first officer to commit suicide was blown to pieces. Germany's States Attorney final decision puts all of this to rest. There was no mental disorder and no psychotic event.

The conflicting modes on the autopilot, while the reaction of the real A320 autopilot is unknown (but has not been investigated), changed the whole scenario immediately. This mode conflict is not mentioned in the BEA final report but has serious consequences (and no, that's not what I meant with my question about what is missing in the BEA report).

I pull out again, I probably said too much already - and I need to focus on the still ongoing research into this entire saga, which still takes a lot of time (and I have no idea at this time how long this research might take). I shall follow the evidence where ever it takes me (and when ever it emerges, perhaps after becoming a pest to authorities ).

Cianmcliam

Simon, I've spent quite some time reading the Thales and Airbus manuals and I can't find anything that would back up a claim that the autopilot will adjust the Selected Speed once the dial is pulled to disengage Managed Speed. That is also borne out in the comments I quoted above from a totally different investigating agency on a different incident: "Selected" guidance always overrides "managed" guidance.

The way it works, according to the manual as I understand it, is that DES and OPDES cannot be engaged at the same time. In DES mode the autopilot must be navigating to known points fixed in the flight plan. The print out of the FDR you have may not be the same as the official one produced by the BEA and examined also by the BFU. Given the problems with other documents in their files, this would not surprise me.

Since Lubitz set the target altitude to 100ft and we know the aircraft was indeed descending to that target (not navigating according to a flight plan), we know for a fact, regardless of what the FDR print out says, the aircraft was in OPDES. Bear in mind too that the FDR did not record any changes to the autopilot mode once OPDES is selected, all the speed changes are after this point and cannot therefore be due to changes in autopilot mode.

In both modes autothrust in engaged and although it tries to maintain idle thrust to save fuel, it may adjust thrust if the vertical speed cannot maintain the correct vertical profile using pitch commands alone. I think this is where you are mixing the two concepts, thrust applied by the autopilot may indeed occur but it in no way changes the Selected Speed. Again, it is a target and a command, not a measurement or variable.

I don't know why the FDR print out you have indicates DES and OPDES were both engaged, it may be that the data was extracted using the decoding document incorrectly or that the FDR is unable to distinguish between the two modes to begin with. But since, in the real world, the aircraft did descend to a selected altitude and was not navigating to an airport or go-around point, DES mode could not have been engaged and the FDR print out is a red herring.

Austrian Simon

Cianmcliam wrote: »

Simon, I've spent quite some time reading the Thales and Airbus manuals and I can't find anything that would back up a claim that the autopilot will adjust the Selected Speed once the dial is pulled to disengage Managed Speed. ...

But since, in the real world, the aircraft did descend to a selected altitude and was not navigating to an airport or go-around point, DES mode could not have been engaged and the FDR print out is a red herring.

Let's make it easy first: aircraft is airborne and flying, autopilots and flight directors are off. What is being announciated (modes and targets)? Now you engage autopilot or flight director. What happens? What modes are being announciated? What targets (speed, altitude, vertical speed) are being announciated by the automation?

Interesting that you mention the FDR may be a red herring. You are almost there arriving at the same conclusions that I have stated ever since I engaged in this discussion and in the released coverage ... We do not know what results this conflict of autopilot modes on the FDR could produce, hence this cnflict definitely needs further investigation to explain whether this is just a FDR recording issue (and if so, what other data may have been similiarly affected) or whether there was a real autopilot malfunction. That's what I have always been saying - good to see you arrive at the same conclusion now.

smurfjed

Would either of you care to comment on the usage of Zopiclone , Mirtazapine, Escitalopram , Dominal f, Zolpidem, Lorazepam as well as the "Referral for psychiatric hospital treatment due to a possible psychosis". Not to mention the number of sick days in a one month period.

In my world, each and everyone of these medicines fall into a reportable category not only in the annual medical BUT AS SOON as i took them. In each case I would be immediately grounded pending review.

smurfjed

autopilots and flight directors are off. What is being announciated (modes and targets)?

Once you turn on the AP/FD the MODES displayed would depend on what was selected, although its not as simple as a Boeing, due to FBW, "I believe" that MODES will change depending on the applicable LAW.

Austrian Simon

smurfjed wrote: »

Would either of you care to comment on the usage of Zopiclone , Mirtazapine, Escitalopram , Dominal f, Zolpidem, Lorazepam as well as the "Referral for psychiatric hospital treatment due to a possible psychosis". Not to mention the number of sick days in a one month period.

In my world, each and everyone of these medicines fall into a reportable category not only in the annual medical BUT AS SOON as i took them. In each case I would be immediately grounded pending review.

This has been fully clarified by the states attorney of Dusseldorf. He was not under influence of any medication, drugs, alcohol or other such substances. We are running in circles!

smurfjed

1.13.2 Results of post-mortem toxicological examinations
Toxicological examinations of the co-pilot’s human tissue found at the accident
site were conducted by the French judicial authorities. The presence of citalopram
and mirtazapine, which are two antidepressant medications, as well as of zopiclone,
which is a sleeping-aid medication was detected.

So how can one say that he wasn't under the influence of any drugs?

Cianmcliam

smurfjed wrote: »

Would either of you care to comment on the usage of Zopiclone , Mirtazapine, Escitalopram , Dominal f, Zolpidem, Lorazepam as well as the "Referral for psychiatric hospital treatment due to a possible psychosis". Not to mention the number of sick days in a one month period.

In my world, each and everyone of these medicines fall into a reportable category not only in the annual medical BUT AS SOON as i took them. In each case I would be immediately grounded pending review.

His Class 1 medical cert had a waiver that rendered it invalid if there was a relapse into depression and he should have reported taking the anti-depressants as soon as he started but didn't. If he had he wouldn't have been flying. His insurance would have covered the repayment of the loan for his training with around €20,000 extra left if he was unable to work, if he was unfit to fly he lost his future income. He confirmed this in an email in December 2014. His waiver prevented him from getting income protection insurance.

This raises the problem with the Dusseldorf States Attorney report, they had to decide if any of his doctors or company doctors could be held liable for him being able to fly that day. That would require proof beyond reasonable doubt that they diagnosed him with a serious psychological illness and suicidal thoughts.

If Lubitz had told them that his depression could be managed with medication without a formal diagnosis, allowing him to keep his job and purpose in life, then that is the most likely explanation for the States Attorney's odd decision on this. Either that or Lubitz was masking his symptoms enough to prevent a full diagnosis while still obtaining meds that showed the true picture.

Toxicology performed on his remains prove he was taking anti-depressants. Almost all anti-depressants are 99% gone from the system after 4-6 days, except Prozac, which he was not taking. Hair can retain proof of taking these medications further into the past but you need a big sample and the hair has to be reasonably long to go more than a couple of months. Lubitz had receeding hair that he kept short.

Austrian Simon

Cianmcliam wrote: »

His Class 1 medical cert had a waiver that rendered it invalid if there was a relapse into depression and he should have reported taking the anti-depressants as soon as he started but didn't. If he had he wouldn't have been flying. His insurance would have covered the repayment of the loan for his training with around €20,000 extra left if he was unable to work, if he was unfit to fly he lost his future income. He confirmed this in an email in December 2014. His waiver prevented him from getting income protection insurance.

This raises the problem with the Dusseldorf States Attorney report, they had to decide if any of his doctors or company doctors could be held liable for him being able to fly that day. That would require proof beyond reasonable doubt that they diagnosed him with a serious psychological illness and suicidal thoughts.

If Lubitz had told them that his depression could be managed with medication without a formal diagnosis, allowing him to keep his job and purpose in life, then that is the most likely explanation for the States Attorney's odd decision on this. Either that or Lubitz was masking his symptoms enough to prevent a full diagnosis while still obtaining meds that showed the true picture.

Toxicology performed on his remains prove he was taking anti-depressants. Almost all anti-depressants are 99% gone from the system after 4-6 days, except Prozac, which he was not taking. Hair can retain proof of taking these medications further into the past but you need a big sample and the hair has to be reasonably long to go more than a couple of months. Lubitz had receeding hair that he kept short.

Incorrect.

The hair test proved that he was taken the medication that the general practitioner had prescribed after her suspect diagnosis, when she interpreted the eye sight problems as hallucinations and therefore (incorrectly) assumed psychosomatic issues and initiated a therapy in this direction (which was unsuccessful and was terminated). All specialist doctors had not found any indications of mental issues whatsoever.

Please read the stuff correctly and do not repeat the old disproven allegations by the states attorneys in their initial press conferences over and over again - the states attorney of Dusseldorf said so in the press conferences indeed, but cleared all this up as total hoax in his final decision to terminate all investigations.

Austrian Simon

smurfjed wrote: »

So how can one say that he wasn't under the influence of any drugs?

Post mortem hairtest and blood test.

We are definitely running in circles. It's all written and quoted.

smurfjed

Regardless of the private doctors, there is an onus of responsibility for a pilot to report any decrease in his medical status. Our responsibility is even covered in our company manual as follows:



We are not even allowed take Viagra without permission.

Cianmcliam, your explanation is extremely different to Austrian_Simon, thank you.

smurfjed

Final Report
Accident on 24 March 2015
at Prads-Haute-Bléone (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence, France)
to the Airbus A320-211

Page 33 states:

1.13.2 Results of post-mortem toxicological examinations
Toxicological examinations of the co-pilot’s human tissue found at the accident
site were conducted by the French judicial authorities. The presence of citalopram
and mirtazapine, which are two antidepressant medications, as well as of zopiclone,
which is a sleeping-aid medication was detected.

So which Post mortem hairtest and blood test. are you talking about?

Austrian Simon

smurfjed wrote: »

Final Report
Accident on 24 March 2015
at Prads-Haute-Bléone (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence, France)
to the Airbus A320-211

Page 33 states:

1.13.2 Results of post-mortem toxicological examinations
Toxicological examinations of the co-pilot’s human tissue found at the accident
site were conducted by the French judicial authorities. The presence of citalopram
and mirtazapine, which are two antidepressant medications, as well as of zopiclone,
which is a sleeping-aid medication was detected.

So which Post mortem hairtest and blood test. are you talking about?

The final results by the states attorney of Dusseldorf. The post mortem hairtest is described in my story, the related quotes are there too.

I am not going to repeat this all over again and again.

The BEA final report was released long before that (on Mar 13th 2016) and is based on disproven evidence, in particular to those health history details.

Quote of the relevant paragraph out of my coverage (which is backed by the evidence from the states attorney files):

Dusseldorf found out, that in December 2014 the first officer noticed a problem with his eyesight, his eyesight seemed discoloured (as like looking through sunglasses) and when looking into bright light sources he saw them blurred. He was concerned about his eyesight (and his medical, however, he was insured against loss of medical and would not have lost any income). Having a doctor in his family, the first officer was used to seek not only one opinion, but second opinions from multiple doctors if necessary. None of the eye doctors he visited found any organic or psychological problem that could have explained the problem with the eyes (however, none of the doctors was specialist for nerves or optic nerve and the optic nerve thus was never checked). His general practitioner took over an erroneous note into her files that he possibly had been in hospital care for depression but mistyped that information making the information appear as if it was for certain. The information was false however. The general practitioner decided, as there were no organic or psychological reasons for the eyesight problems to treat him for psychic problems on suspicion. The first officer was prescribed relevant medication. She wrote him sick as a precaution. Post mortem hair tests and the forensic toxicology confirmed that he had been taking the prescribed medication in the past, but also confirmed he was not under their influence at the time of the accident.

Nonoperational

It would be very unusual to prescribe citalopram and mitazepine together without a diagnosis of major depressive disorder. Mirtazepine is usually an add on to an SSRI that would be commenced some time after the SSRI not being effective. I know this is speculation but it is worth mentioning. Of course maybe the SSRI wasn't effective because there was no depression, but that's not the way I would lean based on the drug history.