Faith necessarily irrational and unjustified?

antiskeptic

oscarBravo wrote: »

I'll confess that I'm at a loss as to what the argument actually is, but when I take a step back and realise that I'm arguing with someone who rejects empiricism in order to rationalise a belief in something that's functionally indistinguishable from a figment of his imagination, I realise that banging my head against a wall would be a marginally more productive use of my time.

Which goes to show you aren't paying attention at all. Either to me, or the word "Empiricism" (which refers to a one of any number of philosophies available to the non-believer)

antiskeptic

SW wrote: »

I wasn't joking. That's pretty much what you just did.

Where's that at then - in the quote you quoted?? I know non sequitur is an overworked web-retort but feck me if yours couldn't be added as a prime example to a wiki page.

kylith

antiskeptic wrote: »

Objective morality merely points to something immovable and unchanging (a.k.a. God) as a reference point. His values don't change.

Except that they very obviously do. It used to be ok to own slaves and now it isn't. It used to be accepted that the correct way of getting you daughter married was to sell her, now it isn't. It used to be right and proper that the punishment for various crimes was death, and now it isn't. So either God's moral values have changed in line with subjective human values (in which case you think he'd update the bible to outline his new laws), or you're wrong about morality coming from your God.

Penny 4 Thoughts

antiskeptic wrote: »

You need to find the rational or logical error in what I say in order to prevent my points standing.

Well I think we have already found that. The logical error is that there is a difference in you being incapable of delusion and you knowing you are not deluded. From here you seem to be confusing the two. You have been focusing on God's ability to make it so you cannot be deluded, when you should have been focusing on how you justify knowledge that this happened, not whether it could or not. Even if you are not deluded and are incapable of being deluded that is not the same as a rational argument to justify saying you are not deluded. Asserting that because of God's action you are incapable of not being deluded does not remove the need to establish that you aren't deluded logically

You have focused solely on God's abilities. Her ability to make a part of you that cannot be deluded. Her ability to create the rules of logic themselves. Her ability to appear to you in a way that could not be a delusion etc.

I'm not disputing any what you have said in those aspects. But if you look at the original question "would you not also have to accept that belief based on such an event would be both rational and justified."

The question at hand is not whether your beliefs are true, but rather the question at hand is can you can rationally justify your acceptance of those beliefs as true.

That is the logical error you are making.

Penny 4 Thoughts

Hi Antiskeptic,

I don't want you to feel I ignored the time you went to do this post, even if a lot of the details in it are now irrelevant given what I said in my older post, so I will go through and point out the issues.

antiskeptic wrote: »

..in an environment where that particular problem:

a) exists

b) is something you're aware of.

If neither of a) nor b) were the case then 'value' wouldn't exist for you. Value would be thrown to one side like a internal combustion engine without fuel.

(NB: both a) and b) being the design of God and included as sub-components in the empirical system of evaluation)

Neither the non-existence of the problem (the possibility of delusion in this regard), nor the absence of awareness (realization that you can be deluded) are relevant, as I will explain below.

antiskeptic wrote: »

I'm not sure how you arrive at that conclusion:

You've heard of the dodo surely: he had no reason to suppose a problem and got "whacked" for his trouble. Similarly, if God doesn't install trouble in the system (e.g. possibility of delusion) then you've no reason to suppose trouble. I mean, why would you suppose trouble unless God a) designed it in b) raised the notion of trouble in your consciousness

"Objects at rest.." and all that..

The thing though is that the possibility of delusion is not removed entirely from existence. We know people are deluded all the time.

You have not removed delusion as a possibility, you have merely said that in this specific context delusion is impossible and thus you require no justification for your beliefs in this regard because you cannot be deluded in this specific context. That is not the same thing as saying delusion is impossible in all circumstances.

Thus, to be rational, you would at the very least need a logical argument as to how you know you are operating in this realm in the first place and not merely deluded about that.

Saying God has put you into this realm is not enough, because you also need to justify the belief that God has put you into the realm before you no longer require justification for beliefs that stem from that.

antiskeptic wrote: »

It's only needed by projection. A projection of the empirical realm (designed by God with it's need to suppose delusion) onto all possible realms designed by God. But there is no requirement for God to design all possible realms of interaction with us such that they include the possibility of delusion.

The thing though is that God in her infinite wisdom designed some realms that include the possibility of delusion.

You need to rationally distinguish between being moved by God into a realm that precludes delusion, and merely being deluded about that movement. Once you have done that and are certain you are in a realm of non-delusion, fine believe everything that takes place.

All you have done by supposing the existence of this possible realm is simply shifted the problem one step to the side. I agree that all conclusions while in the realm of non-delusion can be taken as factual, but you start in the realm of possible delusion, so you need to justify your belief that you moved to the other realm.

I have said a few times now that it doesn't matter if you are actually in a state of being incapable of being deluded. You still need to justify believing in that state in the first place, even if you actually are in that state.

antiskeptic

Penny 4 Thoughts wrote: »

Neither the non-existence of the problem (the possibility of delusion in this regard), nor the absence of awareness (realization that you can be deluded) are relevant, as I will explain below.

Whilst appreciating your taking a point by point approach (and I would like to continue in that vein), unbeknownst to yourself you appear to have jumped track.

-

We were dealing with a conundrum presented you. It focused on your being subject to God's design for the evaluation method we call empiricism / empirical method. I had pointed out that all components of that system constitute God's design - including concern for possible delusion which he raises in you and having you refer to external sources as a way of offsetting that concern, etc.

My saying:

..in an environment where that particular problem:

a) exists

b) is something you're aware of.

If neither of a) nor b) were the case then 'value' wouldn't exist for you. Value would be thrown to one side like a internal combustion engine without fuel.

(NB: both a) and b) being the design of God and included as sub-components in the empirical system of evaluation)

..was a response to your attempt to 'evade' the conclusion that you are subject to the value God sets for each component. You argued:

Penny wrote:

The value is that it allows for the differentiation between delusion and reality.

..which, as I pointed out in the above response, only arises as a concern because God designed you to have a concern about delusion. If he didn't design you so then you would have no concern and that now-worthwhile component of the system would have no value to you.

-

Your post goes on in this switched-track vein so I'll hold up here for a moment to see can we get back onto the conundrum track. I appreciate too, the time you've spent writing it.

Assuming you now see yourself a subject to God's value-setting in the case of empirical method (with the value being the value of a sub-component or the value of the whole system of evaluation), we can move on to examine the consequences of the conundrum for you. This should resolve some of the other questions you've raised.

If you see a way out of the conundrum then by all means argue that point.

Penny 4 Thoughts

antiskeptic wrote: »

We were dealing with a conundrum presented you. It focused on your being subject to God's design for the evaluation method we call empiricism / empirical method. I had pointed out that all components of that system constitute God's design - including concern for possible delusion which he raises in you and having you refer to external sources as a way of offsetting that concern, etc.

And again Antiskeptic I've explained it isn't relevant. If I'm not concerned I'm going to get hit by a bus while walking out into the road that won't stop me being hit by a bus. It doesn't make walking out in the road and thinking I won't get hit a rational act. Concern about a logical problem is not connected to whether you are acting rationally or not in relation to your beliefs about the logical problem.

antiskeptic wrote: »

If he didn't design you so then you would have no concern and that now-worthwhile component of the system would have no value to you.

If God removed all value from acting rationally I would probably not care about acting rationally. But God making me not care about acting rationally is different than something becoming rational simply because I no longer care.

Your original question discussed whether one can be said to be acting rationally or not, not whether one would care that they are acting irrationally or whether acting rationally would no longer have any value to them.

Lets stick with what you originally asked, otherwise we will be here all day.

antiskeptic

Penny 4 Thoughts wrote: »

And again Antiskeptic I've explained it isn't relevant. If I'm not concerned I'm going to get hit by a bus while walking out into the road that won't stop me being hit by a bus.

Indeed not!

It doesn't make walking out in the road and thinking I won't get hit a rational act.

Why wouldn't you be acting rationally? Acting rationally isn't diminished by your not being in possession of information you simply aren't equipped to be in possession of? Acting rationally would involve critical consideration of the information you have available/or can reasonably expect to have available to you - not of information you cannot be aware of nor have any reason to suppose you should be aware of it.

Concern about a logical problem is not connected to whether you are acting rationally or not in relation to your beliefs about the logical problem.

I'm not sure what you mean here, could you elaborate?

If God removed all value from acting rationally I would probably not care about acting rationally. But God making me not care about acting rationally is different than something becoming rational simply because I no longer care.

True.

Your original question discussed whether one can be said to be acting rationally or not, not whether one would care that they are acting irrationally or whether acting rationally would no longer have any value to them.

Lets stick with what you originally asked, otherwise we will be here all day.

Lets continue on with the conundrum instead of jumping tracks

Penny 4 Thoughts

antiskeptic wrote: »

Why wouldn't you be acting rationally?

I would not be acting rationally because I cannot rationally or logically justify the belief that I will not get hit by a bus. Despite this I believe that conclusion anyway.

I may not care. That doesn't though mean I suddenly start acting rationally. If that was the case the most ignorant teenager in the world would also be the most rational human being. I used to teach teenagers and I can assure you that isn't the case

antiskeptic wrote: »

Acting rationally isn't diminished by your not being in possession of information you simply aren't equipped to be in possession of?

It is if you are ignore that you are not able to justify the conclusion. I have concluded despite not being able to logically justify that conclusion, that I will not get hit by a bus. My conclusion is not logically sound, thus I am acting irrationally. The rational conclusion would be that I do not know if I will get hit by a bus or not.

How much I care about that is not relevant. How much I do not value the logical process is not relevant.

antiskeptic wrote: »

I'm not sure what you mean here, could you elaborate?

I can either logically justify by belief or I can't. How much I care that I cannot, or how much value I place in being able to or not, does not change that.

antiskeptic wrote: »

Lets continue on with the conundrum instead of jumping tracks

The conundrum doesn't exist though, Antiskeptic. Your premise is that God can make us not care about how rational our beliefs are and can make us place no value in empiricism.

Yes she can, but in doing so she does not make us act rationally, she merely makes us ignore that we are acting irrationally. And remember you asked can it be said that the belief is rationally justified.

antiskeptic

Things went off the rails a bit and I've tracked back to find out where that was. Mid post picks it up so perhaps read that first.

Penny 4 Thoughts wrote: »

Because I cannot rationally or logically justify the belief that I will not get hit by a bus, yet I believe that conclusion anyway. I may not care, but that doesn't mean I suddenly start acting rationally. If that was the case the most ignorant teenager in the world would also be the most rational human being. I used to teach teenagers and I can assure you that isn't the case

It is if you are ignore that you are not able to justify the conclusion. I have concluded despite not being able to logically justify that conclusion, that I will not get hit by a bus. My conclusion is not logically sound, thus I am acting irrationally. The rational conclusion would be that I do not know if I will get hit by a bus or not.

How much I care about that is not relevant. How much I do not value the logical process is not relevant.

You've not taken account of the basis given for your not being concerned about crossing the road. Your lack of concern arose out of a lack of information - say a lack of information about the existence of buses. If you are completely unaware that buses exist then you are not acting irrationally in crossing the road

You don't have to justify ignoring a danger which as far as you are concerned and based on the information you possess, doesn't exist

I can either logically justify by belief or I can't. How much I care that I cannot, or how much value I place in being able to or not, does not change that.

The above construct will hopefully address that: the lack of concern stems from a lack of knowledge.


Now that I read back I see where this went off the rails a bit. You replied to my response to God able to adjust our concern levels applying concern to crossing the road:

If I'm not concerned I'm going to get hit by a bus while walking out into the road that won't stop me being hit by a bus. It doesn't make walking out in the road and thinking I won't get hit a rational act.

The thinking "I won't get hit" bit is your addition. Of course mere lack of concern isn't cause to suppose you won't be hit. But removal of concern alone doesn't make walking across the road irrational. I can still think I'll be hit by a bus but be unconcerned about it.

The conundrum doesn't exist Antiskeptic. Your premise is that God can make us not care about how rational our beliefs are and can make us place no value in empiricism.

Yes she can, but in doing so she does not make us act rationally, and you asked can it be said that the belief is rationally justified.

Having identified where things went off the rails a bit, we can continue.

MrPudding

antiskeptic wrote: »

Things went off the rails a bit and I've tracked back to find out where that was. Mid post picks it up so perhaps read that first.




You've not taken account of the basis given for your not being concerned about crossing the road. Your lack of concern arose out of a lack of information - say a lack of information about the existence of buses. If you are completely unaware that buses exist then you are not acting irrationally in crossing the road

You don't have to justify ignoring a danger which as far as you are concerned and based on the information you possess, doesn't exist





The above construct will hopefully address that: the lack of concern stems from a lack of knowledge.


Now that I read back I see where this went off the rails a bit. You replied to my response to God able to adjust our concern levels applying concern to crossing the road:




The thinking "I won't get hit" bit is your addition. Of course mere lack of concern isn't cause to suppose you won't be hit. But removal of concern alone doesn't make walking across the road irrational. I can still think I'll be hit by a bus but be unconcerned about it.






Having identified where things went off the rails a bit, we can continue.

What is the actual point in your conundrum? By that I mean, what is the point in answering it?

MrP

antiskeptic

MrPudding wrote: »

What is the actual point in your conundrum? By that I mean, what is the point in answering it?

MrP

If a person realizes that they are totally reliant on God to demonstrate God's existence not only in his turning up but for designing the mechanism of evaluation (e.g. empirical method and the nature of our interaction with it) then they would realise that any method God utilises to reveal himself is as good as God decides it be.

In other words, there being no way to independently (from God) way to arrive at the conclusion "God exists" places us all in his hands. If he decides we're to know he exists then we know it by his act - not by way of any method.


Which would mean the answer to the thread titles question is a negative.

Penny 4 Thoughts

antiskeptic wrote: »

You've not taken account of the basis given for your not being concerned about crossing the road. Your lack of concern arose out of a lack of information - say a lack of information about the existence of buses. If you are completely unaware that buses exist then you are not acting irrationally in crossing the road

True but then I am aware of buses because it is in my conclusion "I will not get hit by a bus". I couldn't make that conclusion in the first place if I was not aware of what a bus was, or that it might hit me. If I was not aware of the existence or danger of buses I wouldn't have made that conclusion at all.

Thus the conclusion "I will not get hit by a bus" is irrational.

You are aware of delusion. You are aware of God. You have concluded that you are not deluded, but rather that it is God who appeared to you.

How do you rationally justify that belief. You seem to merely be saying you don't care, but then saying that is because God has made you ignorant of delusion. But she hasn't, since we are discussing it here

antiskeptic wrote: »

The above construct will hopefully address that: the lack of concern stems from a lack of knowledge.

You do not lack the knowledge of delusion. If you did you could not conclude you weren't deluded.

antiskeptic wrote: »

Having identified where things went off the rails a bit, we can continue.

Ok, but do you except that you have not been made ignorant of delusion by God?

gaynorvader

antiskeptic wrote: »

If a person realizes that they are totally reliant on God to demonstrate God's existence...

{...}

...they would realise that they were making a logical fallacy called circular reasoning.

oscarBravo

antiskeptic wrote: »

If a person realizes that they are totally reliant on God to demonstrate God's existence not only in his turning up but for designing the mechanism of evaluation (e.g. empirical method and the nature of our interaction with it) then they would realise that any method God utilises to reveal himself is as good as God decides it be.

In other words, there being no way to independently (from God) way to arrive at the conclusion "God exists" places us all in his hands. If he decides we're to know he exists then we know it by his act - not by way of any method.

I'm afraid your argument is indistinguishable from the logical fallacy of "begging the question" from what I can see.

Penny 4 Thoughts

antiskeptic wrote: »

If a person realizes that they are totally reliant on God to demonstrate God's existence not only in his turning up but for designing the mechanism of evaluation (e.g. empirical method and the nature of our interaction with it) then they would realise that any method God utilises to reveal himself is as good as God decides it be.

In other words, there being no way to independently (from God) way to arrive at the conclusion "God exists" places us all in his hands. If he decides we're to know he exists then we know it by his act - not by way of any method.


Which would mean the answer to the thread titles question is a negative.

Unless you are proposing that God is altering reason and logic "on the fly" none of that is relevant though. We have discussed that God could change the nature of logic if she wanted. But we have also agreed that that isn't what you are proposing.

We are are stuck, so to speak, with rationality and logic being as they are. If you want to say they are that way because God decided to make them that way, that is fine, I won't argue with that.

You have asked is a belief rational. It is rational if it follows reason and logic. Reason and logic might come from God, but they are as they are and we have agreed they are not changing. Thus a belief is rational if it follows reason and logic.

pauldla

If I may, as a coda to the above, belief without proof is called faith.

Biscuit, anyone?

swampgas

antiskeptic wrote: »

If a person realizes that they are totally reliant on God to demonstrate God's existence not only in his turning up but for designing the mechanism of evaluation (e.g. empirical method and the nature of our interaction with it) then they would realise that any method God utilises to reveal himself is as good as God decides it be.

In other words, there being no way to independently (from God) way to arrive at the conclusion "God exists" places us all in his hands. If he decides we're to know he exists then we know it by his act - not by way of any method.

If by "realize" you mean "comes to a logical conclusion based on evidence" then you still have the same problem. It is not logical to assume that the only explanation for a religious experience is that God exists and that you are totally reliant on God to demonstrate his existence. It is an assumption that flies in the face of the available evidence on how people think.

antiskeptic

Penny 4 Thoughts wrote: »

True but then I am aware of buses because it is in my conclusion "I will not get hit by a bus". I couldn't make that conclusion in the first place if I was not aware of what a bus was, or that it might hit me. If I was not aware of the existence or danger of buses I wouldn't have made that conclusion at all.

Thus the conclusion "I will not get hit by a bus" is irrational.

I, of course agree. You can't be aware of a danger and without reason suppose you not exposed to it. Lack of concern doesn't rationalise that.


But we're not looking at your construct, we're looking at a construct in which a lack of concern doesn't impinge on rationality. "I know buses exist, I know they run you down, but I don't care that I'm run down and I'm not expecting not to be run down" ... is rational.


-

Although I want you to stick to the conundrum - which is something you answer and not me, I'll answer this by way of illumination.

You are aware of delusion.

Because God has made that a concern for me in the empirical realm

You are aware of God.

Indeed

You have concluded that you are not deluded, but rather that it is God who appeared to you.

Indeed

How do you rationally justify that belief. You seem to merely be saying you don't care, but then saying that is because God has made you ignorant of delusion.

Not ignorant. Just not concerned. And not concerned because he didn't make delusion a concern in the means chosen to reveal himself. If he had then I'd have that concern and would have to find a means to address it - just like I do with the empirical realm.

Connecting back to the conundrum: you need to find a way to circumvent God being the one to design the means of revelation. If he removes a concern or other bit of information then so be it. It doesn't necessarily render actions you take on that lesser amount of information, irrational.

Ok, but do you except that you have not been made ignorant of delusion by God?

I am not ignorant of delusion. That concern still operates for me in the empirical realm because that's how that system was designed.

antiskeptic

swampgas wrote: »

If by "realize" you mean "comes to a conclusion based on logical and reasoned thinking"

I've re-written to reflect what I mean. It's a realization that anyone can come to without being a believer and without having any encounter with any god.

If God is to demonstrate himself then the means by which he does so is irrelevant - you are reliant on him at all points of that demonstration.

A connected conclusion is that direct, personal revelation might well be a better and more valid way for God to evidence himself. Better and more valid than empirical means that is. It merely depends on what validity God assigns each method.

gaynorvader

antiskeptic wrote: »

{...}
Not ignorant. Just not concerned. And not concerned because he didn't make delusion a concern in the means chosen to reveal himself. If he had then I'd have that concern and would have to find a means to address it - just like I do with the empirical realm.
{...}
I am not ignorant of delusion. That concern still operates for me in the empirical realm because that's how that system was designed.

Circular reasoning again. "I'm not deluded because God said I wasn't. I know God saying I'm not deluded happened because I'm not deluded."

This is a logical fallacy.

Penny 4 Thoughts

antiskeptic wrote: »

I, of course agree. You can't be aware of a danger and without reason suppose you not exposed to it. Lack of concern doesn't rationalise that.


But we're not looking at your construct, we're looking at a construct in which a lack of concern doesn't impinge on rationality. "I know buses exist, I know they run you down, but I don't care that I'm run down" ... is rational.

It is neither rational nor irrational since there is no statement there. "I don't care that I'm run down" isn't a statement about buses. "I am not concerned about buses because I cannot be run down" would be.

How concerned you are is not relevant to how rational the concluding statement/belief is. You are either making a justified statement or you are not.

If you had said I am not concerned if God is real or not, then you might have a point about the relevance of concern, in the same way that saying you are not concerned if a bus hits you is not a statement that a bus will or won't hit you and thus does not need rational justification.

But as we see below you do make statements that require justification to be considered rational...

antiskeptic wrote: »

And not concerned because he didn't make delusion a concern in the means chosen to reveal himself.

As it stands that statement is rationally unjustified. That doesn't mean it isn't true. It could be true. But you have not demonstrated rationally that it is true.

You need to logically justify your belief in that statement, otherwise you are relying on circular reasoning.

You seem to be saying that you don't have to because you are no longer concerned about delusion because delusion is not a possiblity. But that is getting ahead of yourself, in the same way that saying "I am not concerned about a bus hitting me because it is not possible a bus will hit me" requires that first "...it is not possible a bus will hit me" is rationally justified.

antiskeptic wrote: »

Connecting back to the conundrum: you need to find a way to circumvent God being the one to design the means of revelation. If he removes a concern or other bit of information then so be it. It doesn't necessarily render actions you take on that lesser amount of information, irrational.

That is only true if God removes all possibility of being deluded in all realms. She hasn't, thus your statement above is unjustified, ie you have not shown that you are not deluded about your belief that you have been raised to a higher tier where delusion itself has been removed from the equation and thus you no longer need be concerned about it.

Your lack of concern for delusion can only take place after you have established, logically, that this move has taken place and delusion is no longer possible. While you are trying to establish that delusion is no longer relevant delusion itself is still in play as a possible explanation because you are still in tier 1 with the rest of us. You thus require a rational argument to justify the statement that a new tier has been introduce and delusion removed from the equation.

swampgas

antiskeptic wrote: »

I've re-written to reflect what I mean. It's a realization that anyone can come to without being a believer and without having any encounter with any god.

If God is to demonstrate himself then the means by which he does so is irrelevant - you are reliant on him at all points of that demonstration.

A connected conclusion is that direct, personal revelation might well be a better and more valid way for God to evidence himself. Better and more valid than empirical means that is. It merely depends on what validity God assigns each method.

Your realization is simply that if God exists then maybe you are reliant on God to provide evidence of his existence. It's still a huge "if" though.

The bit you seem to be skating around is that there is no conclusive evidence to show that God exists in the first place, so your conclusion is unsupported.

kylith

Even if we accept that we have to rely of God to prove his own existence it begs the question of why he has yet to do so. I was prayed and was open to god proving his existence for the first 12 years of my life, and he didn't do so. I'm still open to him revealing himself even though I have long since ceased praying and he still hasn't done so.

Face it, refusing to prove your existence while simultaneously condemning people to suffer for eternity for the sin of not believing in you is so dickish a move that even if he appeared in front of me right now I'd be more likely to spit on him than fall on my knees.

Penny 4 Thoughts

We are probably getting to the end where this discussion can go. If it is not too presumptuous I might summarize so far. The argument as far as I can tell from Antiskeptic is as follows

1 - We are all susceptible to delusion, and require things like empiricism to tell the difference.
2 - In some people God chooses to awaken their spirit.
3 - After such an awakening they are not susceptible to delusion in regards to communication between them and God.
4 - As such they have no more concern as to if they are deluded or not since it is not an option.
5 - As such they have no need for empiricism, since empiricism attempts to solve a problem that doesn't exist in the realm

The problem is of course that everything after #1 could itself be a delusion. If you choose to believe it isn't, that it is real, then this requires justification for it to be considered a rational conclusion. To take the justification from 2,3,4 or 5 is circular reasoning, and thus irrational. This is independent to whether 2,3,4 or 5 are actually true or not, the point holds even if all statements are true.

Antiskeptic, is that a fair summary of your arguments, and do you accept the rebuttals?

Brian Shanahan

pauldla wrote: »

If I may, as a coda to the above, belief without proof is called faith.

Biscuit, anyone?

To be honest belief in any matter only exists when there is insufficient evidence to take it as given. That is why its belief.

Faith is simply belief in specific contexts, mainly religious and inter-personal.

robindch

Penny 4 Thoughts wrote: »

3 - After such an awakening they are not susceptible to delusion in regards to communication between them and God.

Good summary. Popette - of whom much anon - believes that her beliefs are similarly incapable of error, though they're very different from antiskeptic's.

I would be interested in hearing antiskeptic explain away this slightly fatal counterexample.

MrPudding

robindch wrote: »

Good summary. Popette - of whom much anon - believes that her beliefs are similarly incapable of error, though they're very different from antiskeptic's.

I would be interested in hearing antiskeptic explain away this slightly fatal counterexample.

Meh. I ready asked him that. Apparently it is not relevant to the pointless conundrum.

MrP

robindch

MrPudding wrote: »

Apparently it is not relevant to the pointless conundrum.

Reminds me of a line, perhaps mangled by time and a failing memory, in one of the Platonic-style dialogs in Hofstadter's incomparable Godel, Escher, Bach in which I think Lewis Carroll's turtle announces that not only has he discovered a most wonderful proof to Fermat's Last Theorem, but a counterexample too, both of which, sadly, were too long to explain, even in a marginal footnote.

robindch

Penny 4 Thoughts wrote: »

1 - We are all susceptible to delusion, and require things like empiricism to tell the difference.
2 - In some people God chooses to awaken their spirit.
3 - After such an awakening they are not susceptible to delusion in regards to communication between them and God.
4 - As such they have no more concern as to if they are deluded or not since it is not an option.
5 - As such they have no need for empiricism, since empiricism attempts to solve a problem that doesn't exist in the realm

Bearing (3) in mind, antiskeptic's observation from Monday is interesting:

antiskeptic wrote: »

And in that lack of specifics, the possibility of making the visions and apparitions fit after the fact?