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Enda Kenny lays wreath at WW1 site
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19-12-2013 10:29pm#1
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What debt do we owe to those who fought in WWI?I don't think it should be that big a deal for the head of government to and acknowledge the debt we owe to people who fought in WW1 and to those from here who fought in WW2
A conclusion that is based on two very flawed assumptions:As such there was very little that the democracies could do to deter Hitler from war. There was going to be war as long as Hitler remained in power.
1) That Germany was capable of waging war before 1939
2) That Hitler's will was absolute in Germany before 1939
Both are incorrect. Hitler himself admitted German weakness in 1936, accepting that "if the French had then marched into the Rhineland we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our legs, for the military resources at our disposal would have been wholly inadequate for even a moderate resistance". The advantage in men and materials that the Allied nations had at this point was so absolute that Germany could not seriously contemplate a European war. Hitler bluffed and no one called it.
Things were not much better two years later when Hitler had to face down opposition from within the military, including coup conspiracies during the Munich crisis. Would the German establishment have followed him into a two-front war of annihilation over the Sudetenland? No chance - at every step Hitler had to cajole/coerce the military and political elite into war; a task that the Allies made much easier than it should have been.
Time and again the failure of the Western nations to force a diplomatic confrontation when Germany was weak simply postponed the war until Germany was strong. It was Allied appeasement that allowed Hitler the time and minor triumphs needed to solidify his rule at home and build a military machine that could conquer Europe.
Which is the very charge that the anti-appeasers levelled against the Anglo-French political elite. Chamberlain wasn't playing for time (as his apologists now argue) but believed and asserted that a war could be averted through existing diplomatic structures and arrangements.He didn't just want to re-balance power in Germany’s favour - he wanted to sweep existing power structures away and replace it with a German-ruled Europe, eliminating France and Britain as European powers
Which is all very nice but completely glosses over the fact that British rearmament did not begin in earnest until 1937, with Chamberlain in particular resistant to raising the defence budget. Compare with Germany's progress in preparing for war:I think you'll find there was no blind eye being turned if you look at things like British defence planning and spending and the depth of Anglo-French co-operation and planning that went on through the early 1930s. In 1934 the British launched a scheme to expand the RAF to 41, then 52 squadrons , and the parliamentary debates make it clear that this was in response to the threat presented by Germany specifically.
The British around that time tried to negotiate an Air Pact with the Germans and when that failed and Hitler told them he was aiming for party with the French, the British decided to expand the RAF to over 120 squadrons.
The staff papers coming out of the RAF Staff College at Andover in this period also make it abundantly clear that the RAF, at least, were focused on Germany as the most likely adversary they'd have to face, and when the first RDF station went operational it was in Suffolk.
Those few RAF squadrons look very impressive now, no?
[Edit: And it's worth noting that the Chancellor from 1931-37, and ardent opponent to a swift rearmament, was of course Chamberlain. Instead of a general expansion of military capability in preparation for war, he simply shuffled funds around: the RAF got its planes because Chamberlain starved the army of funds]0 -
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A conclusion that is based on two very flawed assumptions:
1) That Germany was capable of waging war before 1939
2) That Hitler's will was absolute in Germany before 1939
Both are incorrect. Hitler himself admitted German weakness in 1936, accepting that "if the French had then marched into the Rhineland we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our legs, for the military resources at our disposal would have been wholly inadequate for even a moderate resistance". The advantage in men and materials that the Allied nations had at this point was so absolute that Germany could not seriously contemplate a European war. Hitler bluffed and no one called it.
Things were not much better two years later when Hitler had to face down opposition from within the military, including coup conspiracies during the Munich crisis. Would the German establishment have followed him into a two-front war of annihilation over the Sudetenland? No chance - at every step Hitler had to cajole/coerce the military and political elite into war; a task that the Allies made much easier than it should have been.
Time and again the failure of the Western nations to force a diplomatic confrontation when Germany was weak simply postponed the war until Germany was strong. It was Allied appeasement that allowed Hitler the time and minor triumphs needed to solidify his rule at home and build a military machine that could conquer Europe.
Which is the very charge that the anti-appeasers levelled against the Anglo-French political elite. Chamberlain wasn't playing for time (as his apologists now argue) but believed and asserted that a war could be averted through existing diplomatic structures and arrangements.
Which is all very nice but completely glosses over the fact that British rearmament did not begin in earnest until 1937, with Chamberlain in particular resistant to raising the defence budget. Compare with Germany's progress in preparing for war:
Those few RAF squadrons look very impressive now, no?
[Edit: And it's worth noting that the Chancellor from 1931-37, and ardent opponent to a swift rearmament, was of course Chamberlain. Instead of a general expansion of military capability in preparation for war, he simply shuffled funds around: the RAF got its planes because Chamberlain starved the army of funds]
The French weren't going to march anywhere, they were quite happy behind their Maginot Line and the essence of Anglo-French planning was a static defence - the point, however, seems to have been lost that the fact that Anglo-French planning was active and ongoing from about 1932 suggests that the suggested blind eye was not so extensive as was suggested.
The fruits of the British re-armament were not seen until 1937, that is true - but the really interesting thing is the way both countries re-armed.
The Air Ministry was very clear when it was given a mandate to expand the RAF in 1935 that there would be no rush - essentially they didn't want the service flooded with airframes that would be obsolete in 5 years and overwhelmed with inexperienced air and ground crews. They set up the Volunteer Reserve and a whole host of other programmes to boost the manpower pool without it swamping the service.
They also ploughed a lot of their spending into an aggressive R&D programme which produced RDF, the cantilever monoplane, etc. In 1935/36 the Air Ministry was the largest spender on R&D in the UK - spending twice the amount ICI did for instance in the same year. In contrast to Germany, the R&D effort was much more coherent, organised and focused. Yes, it produced plenty of 'dogs' but it also led to the introduction of some some superlative aircraft.
There was also significant spending on aerodromes and infra-structure, especially to put in concrete runways, proper crew quarters, hangars and maintenance facilities and dispersal pens. Money was spent on improving communications and making them more robust.........not as glamorous as a 5,000 plane air force, but ultimately more important.
Also in 1935 "The Reorientation Scheme" was put into effect which saw a band of air defences begin to be established down the east coast of the country - I'm assuming that given the radii of action on the documents mentions Germany specifically (and the Low Countries) - this is who the Air Ministry were most concerned about.
Finally, they thought - a lot - about how to fight an air war as an independent air force, not just - to use VonRichtofen's great phrase - as 'the army's whore.'
German defence spending as a proportion of GDP is interesting, especially as their economy was reckoned to be about 30% larger than the UK's but if GDP is a robust arbiter of warfighting ability how come in 1941, when the combined GDP of the Axis (Germany, Italy, Austria, Japan) along with France and the other occupied countries dwarfed the UK (by about a factor of 3), the Axis did not defeat the Allies?
Likewise, in 1943, when Allied GDP exceeded Axis GDP by a factor of 2.3, there was still 2 years of the War to run.
GDP is interesting, but it's crude. No use in having a huge defence budget if you spend it on the wrong things at the wrong time and in the wrong way.
The 'few' RAF squadrons were judged at the time to be sufficient - the idea being to match the Luftwaffe. The pre-requisites put in place, however, proved more important in the long run.0 -
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The French weren't going to march anywhere without British support. And, far from girding themselves for a later war, it was quite clear throughout the 1930s that Britain had absolutely no appetite for any sort of confrontation with Germany. Which is not to absolve the appeasers in Paris of any blame but British diplomats were continually undermining those in the French government who wanted a firm line taken.The French weren't going to march anywhere, they were quite happy behind their Maginot Line and the essence of Anglo-French planning was a static defence - the point, however, seems to have been lost that the fact that Anglo-French planning was active and ongoing from about 1932 suggests that the suggested blind eye was not so extensive as was suggested
In the case of the Rhineland, the German army could have been scattered and Hitler deposed years before Poland, at relatively little cost. Yet the appeasers failed to see the opportunity, failed to see the danger that Hitler posed and ultimately failed to save the world another world war
Correction: British rearmament proper did not begin until 1937. The RAF, which had benefited from earlier funding commitments, was expanding in 1937 but the other branches had barely started to modernise. The result is that when war arrived in 1939 Britain was still playing catch-up; the UK could commit a piddling ten divisions to the Continent in 1940The fruits of the British re-armament were not seen until 1937, that is true - but the really interesting thing is the way both countries re-armed
Unlike Germany? I don't think that anyone's ever suggested that the Luftwaffe was full of sub-standard planes, poorly trained pilots and insufficient infrastructureThe Air Ministry was very clear when it was given a mandate to expand the RAF in 1935 that there would be no rush - essentially they didn't want the service flooded with airframes that would be obsolete in 5 years and overwhelmed with inexperienced air and ground crews. They set up the Volunteer Reserve and a whole host of other programmes to boost the manpower pool without it swamping the service.
They also ploughed a lot of their spending into an aggressive R&D programme which produced RDF, the cantilever monoplane, etc. In 1935/36 the Air Ministry was the largest spender on R&D in the UK - spending twice the amount ICI did for instance in the same year. In contrast to Germany, the R&D effort was much more coherent, organised and focused. Yes, it produced plenty of 'dogs' but it also led to the introduction of some some superlative aircraft.
There was also significant spending on aerodromes and infra-structure, especially to put in concrete runways, proper crew quarters, hangars and maintenance facilities and dispersal pens. Money was spent on improving communications and making them more robust.........not as glamorous as a 5,000 plane air force, but ultimately more important
Because the UK fought alone for just over a year and was effectively the focus of Germany's ire for less than six months. Over a longer period there is no doubt that, yes, the superior Axis production would have crushed the UK. Luckily for London it was soon joined by the two largest industrial powers in the world and it was the immense resources of the USA and USSR that ultimately won the warGerman defence spending as a proportion of GDP is interesting, especially as their economy was reckoned to be about 30% larger than the UK's but if GDP is a robust arbiter of warfighting ability how come in 1941, when the combined GDP of the Axis (Germany, Italy, Austria, Japan) along with France and the other occupied countries dwarfed the UK (by about a factor of 3), the Axis did not defeat the Allies?
But that's not really the purpose of that graph. It illustrates the degree to which Britain was unprepared for war in 1939. That is, it gives lie to the notion that the appeasers were playing for time; it demonstrates intent. You cannot ready a nation for war without increasing the defence budget; you cannot modernise your armed forces without spending money. The reality is that Britain was doing neither until 1937, when it suddenly woke up to the reality of a looming war and started to invest in its military capacity
This was not a matter of hindsight: a certain Winston Churchill had been calling for such an increase for years
"Sufficient" is a good word. The bare minimum that Chamberlain gave to the military to modernise was to be spent on the arm most concerned with protecting England. Even then the Chancellor was uninterested in 'Continental adventures'. The Battle of France might have been very different if Britain had actually contributed more than a petty ten divisions (compared to 114 French and 135 German)The 'few' RAF squadrons were judged at the time to be sufficient - the idea being to match the Luftwaffe. The pre-requisites put in place, however, proved more important in the long run.0 -
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The French weren't going to march anywhere without British support. And, far from girding themselves for a later war, it was quite clear throughout the 1930s that Britain had absolutely no appetite for any sort of confrontation with Germany. Which is not to absolve the appeasers in Paris of any blame but British diplomats were continually undermining those in the French government who wanted a firm line taken.
The French weren't going to march anywhere, full stop
>.
And Britain had no interest in War as AP1300 makes it plain. Even as late as 1940 the edition issued in that year stated categorically"War is the last resort of national policy undertaken as a result of a threat to the Empire's security or in fulfillment of a covenant to which it is a party."
But just because they (the British) didn't want it, didn't mean they weren't going to prepare for it in a way that met the policy objectives of the government and at least some of the objectives dictated by military prudence.
As early as 1931, Sir George Milne, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, reported to the Committee of Imperial Defence that "nothing was clearer' in the contemporary scene than the 'gradual emergence of a revisionist bloc of powers consisting of the ex-enemy states and Italy."
Likewise, the planning and reports of the Chiefs of Staff Subcommittee of the CID are pretty clear in 1936 that they anticipate war with Germany in 1939 and perhaps as early as 1938.
Even before that the Hankey Committee also known as the Defence Requirements Committee (members included the three Chiefs of Staff), concluded in 1933 that the 'ultimate potential enemy' was Germany.
They acknowledged there was no evidence that Germany contemplated an attack on Britain or the Empire, but thought that she intended to pursue her aims without recourse to her neighbours.
So to say a blind eye was being turned is quite incorrect - but it fits nicely with Churchill's version of events.
Correction: British rearmament proper did not begin until 1937. The RAF, which had benefited from earlier funding commitments, was expanding in 1937 but the other branches had barely started to modernise. The result is that when war arrived in 1939 Britain was still playing catch-up; the UK could commit a piddling ten divisions to the Continent in 1940
Yes, that was completely in accordance with their defence thinking - first build up Fighter Command to parry the initial air attacks and 'protect the base' (the UK); then the Royal Navy and Bomber Command to blockade the Continent and weaken the enemy; then the Army to be ready to go back on the offensive.
The UK as the foremost naval power for over 100 years never had a strong army and traditionally when it fought on the Continent it did so with the aid of one of the major countries (France or Germany) usually to neutralise the one it wasn't fighting with - that was always their approach as far back as Marlborough.
Germany, as a continental power squeezed between Russia and France naturally prioritised its army and air force (as an adjunct to the land forces) - in the same way it prioritised east-west railways.
Both countries re-armed according to their strategic views.Unlike Germany? I don't think that anyone's ever suggested that the Luftwaffe was full of sub-standard planes, poorly trained pilots and insufficient infrastructure
Not full of substandard planes, but they had a large number of aircraft types that were effectively obsolescent by 1941 - the Stuka for example - and a lot of others that were nearing the end of their potential - the Bf109, the He111 etc.
Charles Portal discusses it at length in his memoirs (The Central Blue).Because the UK fought alone for just over a year and was effectively the focus of Germany's ire for less than six months. Over a longer period there is no doubt that, yes, the superior Axis production would have crushed the UK. Luckily for London it was soon joined by the two largest industrial powers in the world and it was the immense resources of the USA and USSR that ultimately won the war
But that's not really the purpose of that graph. It illustrates the degree to which Britain was unprepared for war in 1939. That is, it gives lie to the notion that the appeasers were playing for time; it demonstrates intent. You cannot ready a nation for war without increasing the defence budget; you cannot modernise your armed forces without spending money. The reality is that Britain was doing neither until 1937, when it suddenly woke up to the reality of a looming war and started to invest in its military capacity
This was not a matter of hindsight: a certain Winston Churchill had been calling for such an increase for years
Chamberlain, for all his flaws, was not playing for time - he, like a lot of people, didn't want war for the reasons I've already stated. Unfortunately he didn't know what we know now - that Hitler was unappeasable.
And if you read the Mass Observation reports from the time you'll see that Churchill when he took over was not universally popular.0 -
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