[Constitutional Convention][6][18 May / 8 June 2013] Review Electoral System

RangeR

Greetings. My name is Keith Burke. I'm from Kildare. I was chosen to be one of the 66 citizens of Ireland to represent the wider citizen base in the Constitutional Convention. Some broad information can be found here. It looks mostly accurate

I'm not an expert in law, the constitution or politics. I want to educate myself in the various proposals to better allow myself discuss it on the day. I also want to hear what the wider citizen base think about the proposals.

The Convention are meeting on May 18th/19th and 8th/9th June 2013 to discuss the 6th issue put to us.

Reform the electoral system

I've read through the Irish Constitution [PDF]. There are many, may, many pages relating to the Electoral System, The Government, The Dáil etc. I won't list them individually but they are Articles 15 through 3, depending on where you draw the line.

However, this discussion might be slightly different. We could discuss to change what's in the Good Book --OR-- we could scrap everything and start with a clean slate. We discussed, briefly and loosely on how to proceed. It went a little like this...

Advisory Panel

• Michael Gallagher - TCD
• Michael Marsh - TCD

Weekend 1
1. Why is this on the agenda?
2. What alternatives are there?
3. If we keep what we have, how would we change it?

At end of week 1
Vote on which alternative system to examine in detail in weekend 2
Draw up a preliminary list of potential changes to existing process

Weekend 2
Flesh out the detail.
Maybe investigate Direct Democracy.

It should be said, that this is a VERY lose description of what and how we might discuss.

Request : This thread is not to discuss the Convention itself, please only discuss the pro's and con's of the thread topic.
NOTE : Neither myself nor Sorcha are available for weekend 2, 8 June 2013. We have a wedding to attend for a very close friend. I DID ask them to change the date of the wedding but they were not obliging So, we will be attending May but not June. I do not know, nor probably ever know, who our substitutes will be.

I welcome your comments. Discuss.

View

Well without going into the topic in detail at the moment, one obvious point is that we have European elections next year and - unlike in the case of local and general elections - there is no constitutional provisions or requirement in BnahE concerning them, hence we are free to use a different electoral system for them (it must be one of the dozen or so proportional voting systems though under EU law).

Indeed it may well be a good idea to use a different system since, as the EP votes on a "party line" basis, what matters in it is the balance of MEPs from each (EU level) "political party/viewpoint" not whether Pat or Joe - both from the same party here - would be "better" for fixing the local potholes.

Cookie_Monster

I'd be in favour of removing the PR system altogether to a simple one person one vote system, not the 10+ votes you could have under the current one.
Idealy GE's could be done as a list system, and candidates picked after by the party, would start to help to cut down on localism on the national stage.

P_1

I'd be in favour of a list system, similar to what they have in Germany with the exception of the rules they have regarding minimum vote percentage in a bid to eliminate the parish pump from irish politics

sparkling sea

This is a complex one, I would be in favour of changing our PR-STV, its holding us back and keeping national politics at way too local a level.

We need our politicans to act for the whole nation and not just their own counties, so how do we bring this about - its tricky. The system we have now just isnt working though.

StillWaters

This is probably the most complex item on the Convention's Agenda. I would be in favour of reform myself. I think the focus on localism that results from the PR system and multi seat constituents is not healthy, and can lead to weak TDs and weak coalitions.

PRAF

I think a fairly radical change is required. Our system has many drawbacks (too parochial, parish pump driven, poor quality of TDs, etc.) and the results have been catastrophic for the country.

However, where do you start with the types of reforms that are required. In summary, I think we need:
- A smaller Dail. Something in around 100 TDs seems fine to me, although I am not pushed on the exact number. The principle should be that the smaller the number, the more the TD would need to appear to a broader number of voters in order to get elected. It could be one measure to help remove parish pump politics
- Some element of a list system. Perhaps 50% of the TDs to come from a list system. Again, this could be another measure to help remove parish pump politics. It would help to ensure that talented people, with strong views on national issues, have a good chance of being elected

Other ideas may not fit neatly into the discussion but are highly interrelated. For example, ending the 'whip system' in the Dail, enhancing the role of the President, improving local politics (including mayors of large citites), etc.

Sierra Oscar

I would favor the introduction of a mixed system, consisting of list system alongside our current system. Give people the opportunity to have an input into politics without having to go through the parish pump.

Should be aimed towards those who perhaps only want to serve for one or two terms.

PopePalpatine

I can see one problem with a smaller Dáil, that being that it is easier for power to be concentrated in the hands of the ruling government.

However, I'd favour a "list system" for electing 50% of our TDs, with PR being used for the other 50%.

I'd also favour reforming the Seanad, using a list system to elect all of them, but Seanad elections would be held at the same time as local/EU elections so failed TDs can't get a seat there.

antoobrien

There should be some interesting discussions with the politicians if you suggest some of these:

Dail
Representation:
Change the representation levels to be equivalent to in seat per 50,000, which will reduce the seats to about 100
or
Insert a cap on the number of seats stating that they should be spread evenly across the country based on population, with the constituency boundaries to be reviewed every 10 years using a combination census & electoral roll figures

Changes to the voting system - First past the post
There are two ways I can see this operating:
Single seat constituencies (the KISS principle)
or
Multi seat - max one vote per seat with no transfers. In a 3 seater a valid vote will have up to 3 boxes marked x.

Seanad:
Direct elections instead of local authority votes & government appointed
Elections should be similar to the US senate with 1 seat per county

And on a less serious note (unless somebody wants to seriously suggest it):
E voting - is totally secure and has no need tor those paper backup systems.;)

RangeR

The KISS principle - For others

KISS is an acronym for "Keep it simple, stupid" as a design principle noted by the U.S. Navy in 1960.[1][2] The KISS principle states that most systems work best if they are kept simple rather than made complex; therefore simplicity should be a key goal in design and unnecessary complexity should be avoided. The phrase has been associated with aircraft engineer Kelly Johnson (1910–1990).[3] The term "KISS principle" was in popular use by 1970.[4] Variations on the phrase include "keep it stupid simple", "keep it short and simple", "keep it simple sir", "keep it super simple", "keep it simple or be stupid", "keep it simple and stupid", "keep it simple and straightforward", "Keep it simple student", "keep it simple,silly", "keep it simple and sincere" or "keep it simple and secular."

PRAF

Agree with you on the 100 seats thing.

antoobrien wrote: »

Changes to the voting system - First past the post
There are two ways I can see this operating:
Single seat constituencies (the KISS principle)
or
Multi seat - max one vote per seat with no transfers. In a 3 seater a valid vote will have up to 3 boxes marked x.

I'd be a little concernabout about first past the post. The dangers is that with 100 single seat constituencies, you may get a lot of single issue TDs (save my hospital, no to the big incinerator, don't close my garda station, etc.). Another danger is that you have a less representative democracy. One of the (few) good things about the current system is that the percentage of TDs by party is reasonably closely aligned with the party preferences you get with opinion polls. With first past the post, if you have a dominant party who are well organised and well supported nationally (e.g. FF or FG) they may have 25-30% support each but could end up with 40% of the seats each.

The disadvantages are probably less so with your multiseat constituencies idea. They would also be less so with some form of list system.

antoobrien wrote: »

Seanad:
Direct elections instead of local authority votes & government appointed
Elections should be similar to the US senate with 1 seat per county

And on a less serious note (unless somebody wants to seriously suggest it):
E voting - is totally secure and has no need tor those paper backup systems.;)

If we are to retain the Seanad, I think your suggestion of direct elections is the best way to do so. I agree with county by county representation. However, I'd also consider getting some form of representation from Northern Ireland and from the diaspora if there was a practical way of doing it. We'd be adding an international dimension to the 'upper house' which could be worthwhile

Agree 100% with e-voting by the way. There is no such thing as a 100% secure system. However, what people often don't realise is that the current system is much, much, much less secure than a well designed e-voting system would be.

antoobrien

PRAF wrote: »

Agree 100% with e-voting by the way. There is no such thing as a 100% secure system. However, what people often don't realise is that the current system is much, much, much less secure than a well designed e-voting system would be.

I think you've misunderstood me, I'm horrified at the thought of an e-voting system. Besides the fact that they are far too easy to break, they're very hard to make transparent and there is more potential for data privacy issues (i.e. find out who's voting for <insert muppet of choice>) than with the pen & paper approach.

PRAF wrote: »

I'd be a little concernabout about first past the post. The dangers is that with 100 single seat constituencies, you may get a lot of single issue TDs (save my hospital, no to the big incinerator, don't close my garda station, etc.).

I'm not particularly worried about that, those kind of candidates rarely top the polls - which would be required under first past.

Think about it for a second - what would it effect how the parties choose candidates? There'd be no 2-4 candidate stuff like there was with FG in Galway West, so there'd be no vote splits. Given the locations of the candidates, I'd be willing to bet FPTP would return the same TDs in Galway.

Where they do well, they'll continue to do well. If anything I'd say FTPT would be rejected because of the possibility that it will militate against the smaller parties/candidates.

The other suggestion - pick 5, would probably have changed the personnel in if not the party representation - FHE would have beaten Kyne.

oscarBravo

PRAF wrote: »

...the current system is much, much, much less secure than a well designed e-voting system would be.

I don't think you could possibly be more wrong.

PRAF

oscarBravo wrote: »

I don't think you could possibly be more wrong.

There is no such thing as 100 percent security. Doesn't exist. Evoting has some drawbacks, but they could easily be overcome. We currently rely on paper and pencil. Of course it is totally impossible to erase an X on a piece of paper isn't it. Totally impossible to lose a ballot box. Impossible to burn paper ballots. Inconceivable that two people could collude to do any of this.

The current system is more vulnerable from a security perspective

oscarBravo

PRAF wrote: »

Of course it is totally impossible to erase an X on a piece of paper isn't it.

Without anyone noticing?

Totally impossible to lose a ballot box.

Without anyone noticing?

Impossible to burn paper ballots.

Without anyone noticing?

Inconceivable that two people could collude to do any of this.

Without anyone else noticing?

The current system is more vulnerable from a security perspective

Only if you dismiss the drawbacks of electronic voting with handwaving like "easily overcome", which they are not.

Try this for size: it is impossible - impossible - to guarantee that the version of software you're using to cast your vote is the version that has been tested to your satisfaction.

PRAF

oscarBravo wrote: »

Without anyone noticing? Without anyone noticing? Without anyone noticing? Without anyone else noticing? Only if you dismiss the drawbacks of electronic voting with handwaving like "easily overcome", which they are not.

Try this for size: it is impossible - impossible - to guarantee that the version of software you're using to cast your vote is the version that has been tested to your satisfaction.

Some food for thought for you:
- The current system is not 100% secure! Every form of paper ballot system that has ever been devised can and has been manipulated. I have mentioned a few possibilities but there are many more (ballot-box stuffing, substitution of ballots, vote tampering, etc) which would be very difficult to detect. In complex systems where people, processes, and technology interact it is very often the people element that fails first
- Integrity of results Computers are quite simply more accurate than humans. Even the simplest forms of voting systems can be difficult for humans to process correctly. In the Irish system, where they system is reasonably complex (with transferable voting), everyone knows that the results are not 100% accurate and so there can be numerous recounts with varying results each time
- Benefits of technology Perhaps one of the biggest failing of the current voting system is that you have to be present in your constituency on the day of the vote. For many people (those on holidays, overseas on business, sick in hospital, etc) they are simply unable to vote. Many more would like to but real life gets in the way and they decide to prioritise other activities. An IT based voting system would make it much easier for people to vote and IMO would therefore enhance our democracy

Let me be clear on this. I am not suggesting that eVoting is 100% secure. Far from it. I have acknowledge that no system can ever be 100% secure. We could do a lot to increase eVoting security (e.g. voter verified paper trails, open source code which is fully transparent for those who care to inspect it, etc.). However, you will never get to 100% security.

I do wonder though if the benefits of eVoting outweigh the cons. For me, they do although I accept I am perhaps in the minority on that. The shame of it is that opponents of eVoting will rarely if ever accept that the current system has any flaws.

Apologies OP - we've gone way off topic here!!

oscarBravo

PRAF wrote: »

- The current system is not 100% secure! Every form of paper ballot system that has ever been devised can and has been manipulated. I have mentioned a few possibilities but there are many more (ballot-box stuffing, substitution of ballots, vote tampering, etc) which would be very difficult to detect. In complex systems where people, processes, and technology interact it is very often the people element that fails first

The current system has safeguards in place to address the risks you've described. You've talked about erasing pencil marks, but haven't explained how you do so with people watching. You've talked about ballot stuffing, but haven't explained how to do so and explain the discrepancy with the electoral register. You've talked about ballot boxes going missing, but haven't explained how it's possible to do so without someone noticing that, well, there are some ballot boxes missing.

Electronic voting would introduce an entirely new set of attack vectors to a system that's actually a lot more secure than you're giving it credit for, and those attack vectors are completely opaque to the vast majority of people who would be asked to trust the system.

- Integrity of results Computers are quite simply more accurate than humans. Even the simplest forms of voting systems can be difficult for humans to process correctly. In the Irish system, where they system is reasonably complex (with transferable voting), everyone knows that the results are not 100% accurate and so there can be numerous recounts with varying results each time

That's a problem for an electronic counting system to resolve, not a voting system. I'm open to the idea of a computerised approach to counting our existing paper ballot, once the paper ballots remain the authorative record of the electorate's wishes.

- Benefits of technology Perhaps one of the biggest failing of the current voting system is that you have to be present in your constituency on the day of the vote. For many people (those on holidays, overseas on business, sick in hospital, etc) they are simply unable to vote. Many more would like to but real life gets in the way and they decide to prioritise other activities. An IT based voting system would make it much easier for people to vote and IMO would therefore enhance our democracy

Making it possible for people to vote without having to be physically present at a polling station is the single biggest threat I can imagine to the integrity of our voting system. As impossible as it is to secure an electronic voting system in a polling booth (and the expert consensus is that it is, indeed, impossible), it's just crazy to imagine that a distributed system (using, presumably, public communications networks and individuals' computers or smartphones) could possibly be secured in any meaningful way.

Let me be clear on this. I am not suggesting that eVoting is 100% secure. Far from it. I have acknowledge that no system can ever be 100% secure. We could do a lot to increase eVoting security (e.g. voter verified paper trails, open source code which is fully transparent for those who care to inspect it, etc.). However, you will never get to 100% security.

My argument isn't that the current system is perfectly secure; it's that there are a very limited number of attack vectors, and all of them could be addressed with relatively little effort if it were deemed worthwhile. Electronic voting, on the other hand, can't possibly ever be completely secure - I reiterate the point that it is simply impossibly to know for a fact that the software you're using to cast your vote is the same software that you trust, even supposing you have the technical nous to usefully evaluate such software.

I do wonder though if the benefits of eVoting outweigh the cons. For me, they do although I accept I am perhaps in the minority on that. The shame of it is that opponents of eVoting will rarely if ever accept that the current system has any flaws.

The flaws in the current system are well understood, and generally well managed. The flaws in a putative electronic voting system can't even be completely understood, never mind fully managed.

antoobrien

PRAF wrote: »

Some food for thought for you:
- The current system is not 100% secure! Every form of paper ballot system that has ever been devised can and has been manipulated. I have mentioned a few possibilities but there are many more (ballot-box stuffing, substitution of ballots, vote tampering, etc) which would be very difficult to detect. In complex systems where people, processes, and technology interact it is very often the people element that fails first
- Integrity of results Computers are quite simply more accurate than humans. Even the simplest forms of voting systems can be difficult for humans to process correctly. In the Irish system, where they system is reasonably complex (with transferable voting), everyone knows that the results are not 100% accurate and so there can be numerous recounts with varying results each time

There isn't an evoting machine on the planet that can't be tampered with using fairly basic techniques to do the above.

PRAF wrote: »

- Benefits of technology Perhaps one of the biggest failing of the current voting system is that you have to be present in your constituency on the day of the vote. For many people (those on holidays, overseas on business, sick in hospital, etc) they are simply unable to vote.

This is a good thing as far as I can see. If the vote is important to people they will make an effort to be "at home" (the sick excepted) and available to vote. There will always be people who don't turn up for any event - elections are no different

PRAF wrote: »

Let me be clear on this. I am not suggesting that eVoting is 100% secure. Far from it. I have acknowledge that no system can ever be 100% secure. We could do a lot to increase eVoting security (e.g. voter verified paper trails, open source code which is fully transparent for those who care to inspect it, etc.).

How easy would to be to rig an election where the only thing you have to do is a string substitution to change the results? How hard would it be to change 100,000 votes? It took about 45 minutes to return a result in the election that Mary O'Rourke lost her seat in the first trial of evoting. That's more than enough time to re-write 100,000 records and substitute false audit trails.

And verification would only be any use if the voting modules hadn't been affected and overwritten before they get to the count center.

RangeR

PRAF wrote: »

Apologies OP - we've gone way off topic here!!

No apology needed. The inviolability* of our voting system is core to our electoral system so therefore falls into the remit of reforming such a system.


* I'm getting to hear and use that word in every CCVEN meeting Before CCVEN, I never knew what it meant, or that it even existed.

Definition of inviolability wrote:

1. Secure from violation or profanation: an inviolable reliquary deep beneath the altar.
2. Impregnable to assault or trespass; invincible: fortifications that made the frontier inviolable.

RangeR

antoobrien wrote: »

How easy would to be to rig an election where the only thing you have to do is a string substitution to change the results? How hard would it be to change 100,000 votes?

One would assume that you have unrestricted raw access to the source data.

The fundamental need for any electronic voting system is to it's security setup. It should be proven that it's secure. Gov cannot just say "It's secure". Security by Obfuscation is not security.

• The source code should be open to public peer review.
• Data should be secured and all access logged. There should be NO raw data access allowed by any person or service.
• Votes should be PK signed and encrypted at point of vote, so it can't be tampered with.
• To allow for paper trail, use an OCR method similar to the Lotto slips. Voter marks their card, inserts it into puter, then puts their voting slip in the ballot box. paper trail can be used for recounts or verification.
• I'm sure I've missed something but the crux of it is that the security methods must be made public. The Gov techs should engage with the public and fix any issues found.

antoobrien

RangeR wrote: »

One would assume that you have unrestricted raw access to the source data.

The fundamental need for any electronic voting system is to it's security setup. It should be proven that it's secure. Gov cannot just say "It's secure". Security by Obfuscation is not security.

• The source code should be open to public peer review.
• Data should be secured and all access logged. There should be NO raw data access allowed by any person or service.
• Votes should be PK signed and encrypted at point of vote, so it can't be tampered with.
• To allow for paper trail, use an OCR method similar to the Lotto slips. Voter marks their card, inserts it into puter, then puts their voting slip in the ballot box. paper trail can be used for recounts or verification.
• I'm sure I've missed something but the crux of it is that the security methods must be made public. The Gov techs should engage with the public and fix any issues found.

Sorry RangeR but that's more than a bit naive, especially as most of the security reviews I have read above have been "black box" tests (i.e. no access to source or designs). Combine that with the fact that PK systems are regularly broken due to weak keys and configuration issues, I'm not at all convinced that eVoting is realistic.

The only option I see as being practical is the "lotto slips" suggestion, which is ecounting rather than evoting as you can bet that the audit trail will be invoked all over the place (recounts for all!). For that we can just buy some US systems as they use punch card style systems.

RangeR

antoobrien wrote: »

Sorry RangeR but that's more than a bit naive, especially as most of the security reviews I have read above have been "black box" tests (i.e. no access to source or designs). Combine that with the fact that PK systems are regularly broken due to weak keys and configuration issues, I'm not at all convinced that eVoting is realistic.

The only option I see as being practical is the "lotto slips" suggestion, which is ecounting rather than evoting as you can bet that the audit trail will be invoked all over the place (recounts for all!). For that we can just buy some US systems as they use punch card style systems.

I don't think it naive. It's idealistic, granted. Gov must be able to prove the security and integrity of any eVoting system.

Do I see this happening... not so much.

I have nothing against black box testing, however, I see no reason in NOT making the source code available. Peer review of the code can easily can identify potential security concerns.

Having the system open for public review [and I don't mean totalitarian public review but maybe the heads of colleges / Security experts etc or some other manageable method] would identify weak PK/config instantly.

oscarBravo

RangeR wrote: »

The fundamental need for any electronic voting system is to it's security setup. It should be proven that it's secure. Gov cannot just say "It's secure". Security by Obfuscation is not security.

At the risk of being repetitive, it can't be proven to be secure, because it's impossible to be certain that the software running on the voting machine is the same software that has been tested.

• The source code should be open to public peer review.

See above.

• Data should be secured and all access logged. There should be NO raw data access allowed by any person or service.

If I'm hacking the voting machine, I'm sure as hell going to hack the access log.

• Votes should be PK signed and encrypted at point of vote, so it can't be tampered with.

No problem - just sign and encrypt the vote after it's been tampered with.

• To allow for paper trail, use an OCR method similar to the Lotto slips. Voter marks their card, inserts it into puter, then puts their voting slip in the ballot box. paper trail can be used for recounts or verification.

What happens when the paper count disagrees with the electronic count? What happens in the voting booth if the scanner claims to have read something different from what's marked on the ballot?

Electronic voting is a hard, hard problem to solve. You can't trust a machine to record your vote, which brings you back to scanning paper votes, which only works if the paper votes are the authoritative electoral record, in which case it's not electronic voting, but electronic counting, and it still presents a range of difficult problems to solve.

antoobrien

RangeR wrote: »

I don't think it naive. It's idealistic, granted. Gov must be able to prove the security and integrity of any eVoting system.

Do I see this happening... not so much.

I have nothing against black box testing, however, I see no reason in NOT making the source code available. Peer review of the code can easily can identify potential security concerns.

Having the system open for public review [and I don't mean totalitarian public review but maybe the heads of colleges / Security experts etc or some other manageable method] would identify weak PK/config instantly.

naive - very. The experts would have to have a good understanding of the systems to understand the configurations they are looking at, which is by no means guaranteed as many experts do not tend have a broad expertise but rather very selective areas. Hiring these people to review the systems every time we have an election would a lot of money.

As for heads of colleges, they could have been away from the industry for years. It's amazing what a few months away from coding does to ones skills, so I shudder to think what the result of unleashing bureaucrats onto these systems would be, especially if they have no experience of the systems in question.

RangeR

antoobrien wrote: »

naive - very. The experts would have to have a good understanding of the systems to understand the configurations they are looking at, which is by no means guaranteed as many experts do not tend have a broad expertise but rather very selective areas. Hiring these people to review the systems every time we have an election would a lot of money.

Why do you want "jack of all trades"? I don't see your problem. It's very difficult to be an expert any everything. Get five experts in area 1, 5 more in area 2 and so on.

I wouldn't let the money aspect muddy the waters. Regardless of what we hear in the news these days, there is actually plenty of money to go around.

They wouldn't be reviewing at every election. It would be a constant thing.
Let's think outside the box for a second. Let's just say that Gov.ie made the source code public. Thousand upon thousands of AN Other's could try and break it. then report their findings. Now these AN Other's may or may not be experts. Who cares? they report back and other AN Others attempt to verify.

Anyway, we're getting into specifics. I don't want to go there as we will never agree. Think Macro, not Micro.

antoobrien wrote: »

As for heads of colleges, they could have been away from the industry for years. It's amazing what a few months away from coding does to ones skills, so I shudder to think what the result of unleashing bureaucrats onto these systems would be, especially if they have no experience of the systems in question.

I agree that colleges are heavy on theory and not so much on practical.

I believe you are missing the point. How is all of this naive? I understand that you don't believe in eVoting. Is there ANY aspect of eVoting that you would agree with? Don't want to go around in circles here. What I have outlined works VERY well in the Open Source community and has done for years.

Anyway, my suggestions are just that. They are meant to be indicative, not specific. Leave the exact requirements to the experts. Let's just say "security oversight is required" rather than tying the conversation down to specifics that nobody will agree to.

antoobrien

RangeR wrote: »

I believe you are missing the point. How is all of this naive? I understand that you don't believe in eVoting. Is there ANY aspect of eVoting that you would agree with?

In short I work in enterprise software, so I have a very good understanding of what is required to get systems out the door.

The fact that there are so many more potential points of failure & attack vectors for evoting makes me very leery of the prospect of anything more than an automated vote counting system.

oscarBravo

RangeR wrote: »

Let's think outside the box for a second. Let's just say that Gov.ie made the source code public. Thousand upon thousands of AN Other's could try and break it. then report their findings.

None of which is remotely useful if the software running on the voting machines on election day isn't the software that has been thoroughly tested.

Anyway, we're getting into specifics. I don't want to go there as we will never agree. Think Macro, not Micro.

[...]

Let's just say "security oversight is required" rather than tying the conversation down to specifics that nobody will agree to.

That's a dangerous approach to take. It's based on the premise that the security of an electronic voting system is just a detail that can definitely be solved. I'm rejecting that premise out of hand.

Duffy the Vampire Slayer

PopePalpatine wrote: »

I can see one problem with a smaller Dáil, that being that it is easier for power to be concentrated in the hands of the ruling government.

However, I'd favour a "list system" for electing 50% of our TDs, with PR being used for the other 50%.

I'd also favour reforming the Seanad, using a list system to elect all of them, but Seanad elections would be held at the same time as local/EU elections so failed TDs can't get a seat there.

I would agree with this entirely. A Seanad elected at a different time than the Dail (And with an increase in its powers) could aid democracy and give the Irish people more chance to express their views. People may argue that it could stall the political process and block laws from being passed quickly but I think that many of our recent problems come from power being too centralized in the cabinet and laws being passed quickly without any debate.

The Dagda

Please, please, please bring in term limits for the Dail. Career politicians are a curse.

It may encourage actual qualified people to serve the country; if it was possible to get to a position of responsibility in a reasonable amount of time, without having to spend years compromising oneself, as seems to be the case now.

hmmm

One aspect of the current electoral system that is unfair is the ability for certain public sector workers to return to their guaranteed jobs if their political career doesn't work out. Signs on we are incredibly over-represented by teachers in the Dail. I'm not sure how this can be corrected, but it is a massive advantage to people with those careers.