Most significant battle of WWII.

OS119

Jawgap wrote: »

In one sense - Thank God Hitler interfered to the degree he did....

i think its probably fair to say that in terms of unconditional surrender in 1945, Hitler was one of the Allies top 5 assets.

it was Hitler who created a chaoticly Byzantine command structure within the Armed Forces (and the wider 'defence' establishment), Hitler who forbade the placing of the economy on a total war footing as happened in the UK, USA and USSR, Hitler who ensured that the Luftwaffes strike capability was concentrated in Tactical Airpower and utterly lacking in Strategic Bombers, and Hitler who, once he was at war with the largest Empire the world had ever seen, a dictatorship of 200m people on his doorstep, and the most industrialised, and most productive country in world, decided that the best course of action was to take resources away from his fighting capabilties, and start killing people who posed no threat to him.

his idiocy even sabotaged the German Nuclear Weapons Programme.

are we sure he wasn't working for MI6?

jonniebgood1

Jawgap wrote: »

finally, the other factor in the decision to halt the spearheads was political - Hitler thought if they went 'easy' on the BEF the Brits might be more amenable to doing a deal!

I have heard this before also but is there evidence of this, i.e. did he say it. Or is it hearsay?
Alot is made of how Hitler respected Britain but how much substance is in that and how much of it is the British view of the war.

OS119

jonniebgood1 wrote: »

...Alot is made of how Hitler respected Britain but how much substance is in that and how much of it is the British view of the war.

i don't know if its provable, but its certainly inferable that regardless of whether he respected the UK or not (and personally, i rather hope he didn't..), the UK was a power he felt he would have to fight off/keep at bay/do a deal with rather than one that he wanted to fight and conquer.

the evidence is, for me, pretty overwhelming - he did make agreements and political overtures to the UK in the run-up to the war and during the 'phoney' war, and he never built the kind of Armed Force that would be required to defeat and conquer the UK. his Army, Navy and Air Force were built for large scale land-based operations with the approriate air and naval support. he never built the kind of fleet that would be required to defeat the RN - hold it off, yes, defeat it, no - he never built the amphibious/logistic support capability required to mount a sea-borne invasion on the UK, and he never built the strategic bomber fleet required to destroy the UK's capability to defend itself, and make war on him.

i think its not an unreasonable belief/reading of the facts that Hitler would happily have avoided war with the UK if he could - and that he could have 'lived with' a UK that mainted its sea-power and empire while he got on with laying waste to Eastern Europe. its therefore not unreasonable to believe that he made some attempt to bring that situation about.

quite how long that status quo would remain after a hypothetical Nazi victory over the Soviet Union is perhaps a matter of conjecture...

Jawgap

jonniebgood1 wrote: »

I have heard this before also but is there evidence of this, i.e. did he say it. Or is it hearsay?
Alot is made of how Hitler respected Britain but how much substance is in that and how much of it is the British view of the war.

I'd have to have a dig about but I think Andrew Roberts in Storm of War discusses it in some detail. The reality was that the decision to stop the panzers was a complicated one and it's probably a mistake to try and identify a single reason for it.

Hitler saw the Brits as Anglo Saxons, and, like the Nordics, not that far removed from the Aryan ideal - I think that in Mein Kampf he even discusses the utility of an alliance with the British. And after Dunkirk there were prospective offers of a truce - the notion being that the British could keep their empire, but the Germans could have a free hand in Europe. I think Halifax might have initiated contact with the Italians who were not rebuffed by Berlin when they passed on information about the development.

In the end it was the British, as in Chruchill, who dismissed the idea of a truce.

Quite probably they would have turned on Britain evenutally as their command of the sea and control of trade routes was seen by the Nazis as an impediment to their economic progress - no point in having lebensraum if you can't sell what you are producing!

jonniebgood1

I believe that in his Mein kampf book Hitler outlined how he saw that Britain should be an ally of Germany. Communist Russia was the hated enemy of the Nazi's. The situation then in September 1939 was bizarre- at war with Britain and a truce with the Soviet Union.

OS119

jonniebgood1 wrote: »

I believe that in his Mein kampf book Hitler outlined how he saw that Britain should be an ally of Germany. Communist Russia was the hated enemy of the Nazi's. The situation then in September 1939 was bizarre- at war with Britain and a truce with the Soviet Union.

in a way, this is the problem with dealing with Nazi Germany - it was in essence loonspudery. its very difficult to tell what was unhinged delusional nutjobbery, and what was cold, logical political manouvering to attain the goals of the afforementioned lunacy.

was Hitler sufficiently off his mind that he genuinely believed that he could persuade/force the UK to accept a partnership with Germany as the dominant European power and the UK as the 'overseas' power - in a context where UK foreign policy since the Plantaganets had been to avoid having one over-arching European power - or was he just trying to buy time until a Greater Germany that controlled all the natural (and human) resources of mainland Europe west of Moscow could defeat the UK and its Empire?

Fratton Fred

Whilst not the most important, I always think the battle for Crete is often overlooked.

Whilst a thumping defeat for the British and commonwealth forces, it gave the Nazis enough of a kick in the gonads to rethink the use if airborne troops. A reaction which was opposite to the allies who developed their own parachute regiments. It also resulted in the creation of the RAG Regiment.

dubhthach

Fratton Fred wrote: »

Whilst not the most important, I always think the battle for Crete is often overlooked.

Whilst a thumping defeat for the British and commonwealth forces, it gave the Nazis enough of a kick in the gonads to rethink the use if airborne troops. A reaction which was opposite to the allies who developed their own parachute regiments. It also resulted in the creation of the RAG Regiment.

One could argue though that it served as a template for what ended up happening at Arnhem. The German's as you mentioned never deployed a mass airborne attack (on scale of Crete -- there were parachute drops during the Bulge of course) again due to massive casualties the Fallschirmjäger suffered during the descent. Result though was they ended up been used as crack ground troops -- Monte Casino for example.

Kilkenny14

Crete is a good example of how one battle in WW2 had important tactical and strategic consequences in a campaign.

The Battle of Crete was crucial in convincing the Germans not to use a pure airborne attack again, as it convinced them not to attack Malta this way in 1941/1942. If they had done so and succeeded, it would taken much longer to have defeated Rommel and the Afrika Corps

Jawgap

Problem was that the Balkan Campaign was even more of a side show than North Africa and Italy.

It was a strategically inconsequential campaign that the Germans got dragged into by the Italian failure in the region, in the same way they got dragged into Africa by Mussolini's failure there.

The 'best' you could say is that the Germans failed to learn from their victory about the effectiveness of their command philosophy (Auftragstaktik) and the effectiveness of airborne forces. They failed to appreciate how well both had actually performed in very difficult circumstances.

The Allies learned a lot more from the defeat - for example that a well handled destroyer or cruiser could survive in a serious threat from the air, in Western waters anyway - even if the the threat was unhampered by defensive air cover, the defensive AA equipment was inadequate, the ship was overloaded or the crew were stressed beyond reason. When you look at the losses the RN suffered in the battle they look and are significant, but the actual nature of them is more revealing.

For example it took 108 hits from the air to sink the cruiser Naiad, and not only that in one 10 minute period she dodged 36 near misses. It took 13 hours of attack for the Luftwaffe to score a single hit on HMS Fiji, and then they only sunk her because they got a lucky hit in the boiler room with that one strike.

It's also worth noting that the ships the Luftwaffe managed to sink were detached (Fiji was sent to rescue Greyhound, which itself had been detached to attack a fishing boat!). The RN learned that if ships stuck together and worked together they could hold off fairly intense air attacks.

The Allies also learned that airborne forces had to jump with their heavy equipment and when they set up their own airborne formations they made sure their heavy weapons went out the door with them when they dropped.

Crete was tactically important, but other than the resources it tied up on both sides, it and the Balkan Campaign in general were of no real importance in influencing the outcome of the War.

dubhthach

There's also some probability that the Balkans campaign (invasion of Yugoslavia, Battle of Greece) delayed Barbarossa by several weeks. Given how close the Germans got to Moscow before Zhukov drove them back it's an interesting question to ponder if Barbarrossa has started in late May as oppose to June 22nd what would have happened.

Jawgap

Pretty much the same outcome - except the Red Army might have had a slightly longer drive to Berlin:)

Farmer Pudsey

dubhthach wrote: »

There's also some probability that the Balkans campaign (invasion of Yugoslavia, Battle of Greece) delayed Barbarossa by several weeks. Given how close the Germans got to Moscow before Zhukov drove them back it's an interesting question to ponder if Barbarrossa has started in late May as oppose to June 22nd what would have happened.

It all goes back to 'if' Great Britian had remained in WW11 if operation Barbarrossa had started May15 as opposed to June 22nd. If Great britian had been completely defeated before Operation Barbarroossa then Germany could have concentrated all there armed forces on Russia. One third of germany's forces were always in action against the Western allies. If Russia had to fightagainst the complete German armed forces and had not recieved the aid it did from the USA it might well have been defeated. we all might not be swearing allegence to the Greater German state now.

snafuk35

Unquestionably Dunkirk.
If Germany had not allowed the bulk of the regular British Army to escape, Britain would probably have been forced to capitulate.
Britain of course became an island fortress and later giant base for the bombing of German cities, for naval forces and airpower protecting the Atlanitc convoys routes and for the jumping off point for the invasion of North Africa and Europe.
With Britain still in the war and later America to join with Britain precious divisions were posted to defend the coasts from Norway to the Bay of Biscay and to protect the Mediterranean. There was less manpower available to hold back the Soviets after the failure of Barbarossa.

Jawgap

snafuk35 wrote: »

Unquestionably Dunkirk.
If Germany had not allowed the bulk of the regular British Army to escape, Britain would probably have been forced to capitulate.
Britain of course became an island fortress and later giant base for the bombing of German cities, for naval forces and airpower protecting the Atlanitc convoys routes and for the jumping off point for the invasion of North Africa and Europe.
With Britain still in the war and later America to join with Britain precious divisions were posted to defend the coasts from Norway to the Bay of Biscay and to protect the Mediterranean. There was less manpower available to hold back the Soviets after the failure of Barbarossa.

They still had a powerful Navy and Air Force at their disposal. Britain's defence policy during the 1930s shifted in 1934 when the RAF took on the role of defenders of the homeland from the RN (the Inskip Doctrine). And specifically within the RAF, Fighter Command was tasked with protecting 'the base.'

The defence establishment actually planned for being expelled from the Continent (thought not leaving all the heavy kit behind) whereupon Fighter Command would defend Britain while the army built up its strength.

In the interim, Bomber Command and the RN would engage the enemy wherever and whenever it could.

It would be a stretch to say Dunkirk was anticipated, but the idea that the army would be excluded from mainland Europe and would have to force a landing at some point was one eventuality that was actively addressed. Given that, I wouldn't say Dunkirk was quite the disaster it's sometimes made out to be.

Delancey

Any discussion of Dunkirk must include the address made to the House of Commons by Winston Churchill on the subject where he said : '' We must take care not to assign to this deliverance the attributes of a victory '' - how eloquent.

OS119

Delancey wrote: »

Any discussion of Dunkirk must include the address made to the House of Commons by Winston Churchill on the subject where he said : '' We must take care not to assign to this deliverance the attributes of a victory '' - how eloquent.

indeed - as Jawgap says, even if the BEF had been anihalated at Dunkirk, the UK still had the capability in the RAF and RN to keep the Germans on their side of the Channel. Dunkirk was a god-send in terms of morale and eventually being able to re-build the Army - but it wasn't the Army who were going to keep the Germans away, it was the RAF and RN.

Farmer Pudsey

OS119 wrote: »

indeed - as Jawgap says, even if the BEF had been anihalated at Dunkirk, the UK still had the capability in the RAF and RN to keep the Germans on their side of the Channel. Dunkirk was a god-send in terms of morale and eventually being able to re-build the Army - but it wasn't the Army who were going to keep the Germans away, it was the RAF and RN.

I tend to disagree if the BEF had been destroyed at Dunkirk Britian would have had no professional army for the battle of Norway,Greece and North Africa. Also if they had beem destroyed would Hitler have continued with the Battle of Britian as it Britian had no defence. My own opinion is that Britian staying in the war was the crucial act of WW11 it peovided the USA a gigantic airfore carrier in the Europe that would not have been there.

Would Britian have been able to perserve in 1940 if the army had benn destroyed?????

jonniebgood1

Farmer Pudsey wrote: »

I tend to disagree if the BEF had been destroyed at Dunkirk Britian would have had no professional army for the battle of Norway,Greece and North Africa.

The Norwegian campaign was almost over when Dunkirk happened.

jonniebgood1

OS119 wrote: »

even if the BEF had been anihalated at Dunkirk, the UK still had the capability in the RAF and RN to keep the Germans on their side of the Channel. Dunkirk was a god-send in terms of morale and eventually being able to re-build the Army - but it wasn't the Army who were going to keep the Germans away, it was the RAF and RN.

Also overlooked in terms of importance IMO is the attack on French ships by the Royal Navy in Algerian waters that followed Dunkirk.

Jawgap

Farmer Pudsey wrote: »

I tend to disagree if the BEF had been destroyed at Dunkirk Britian would have had no professional army for the battle of Norway,Greece and North Africa. Also if they had beem destroyed would Hitler have continued with the Battle of Britian as it Britian had no defence. My own opinion is that Britian staying in the war was the crucial act of WW11 it peovided the USA a gigantic airfore carrier in the Europe that would not have been there.

Would Britian have been able to perserve in 1940 if the army had benn destroyed?????

Yes, the BEF was not the entire army.

Here is the order of battle for the BEF - compare it to the order of battle for the British Army in 1939

Dunkirk was a disaster, but they still had plenty in reserve, before you even get to the support they would have got from the 'Dominions.'

@delancey is right about the attitude of the Government, they knew they had a lucky escape and regarded it as such.

and for all his faults (which are indeed many) Churchill recognised fighting on was the only realistic option - he summed up Dunkirk for what it was, but my own favourite was the speech he made in cabinet, which again summarised the strategic position very well and ended with some great rhetoric....

"......if we tried to make peace now, we should get better terms than if we fought it out. The Germans would demand our – that would be called disarmament – our naval bases, and much else. We should become a slave state, though a British Government which would be Hitler’s puppet would be set up – under Mosley or some such person. And where should we be at the end of all that? On the other side we have immense reserves and advantages. And I am convinced that every one of you would rise up and tear me down from my place if I were for one moment to contemplate parley or surrender. If this long island story of ours is to end at last, let it end only when each one of us lies choking in his own blood upon the ground.

Kilkenny14

Farmer Pudsey wrote: »

I tend to disagree if the BEF had been destroyed at Dunkirk Britian would have had no professional army for the battle of Norway,Greece and North Africa. Also if they had beem destroyed would Hitler have continued with the Battle of Britian as it Britian had no defence. My own opinion is that Britian staying in the war was the crucial act of WW11 it peovided the USA a gigantic airfore carrier in the Europe that would not have been there.

Would Britian have been able to perserve in 1940 if the army had benn destroyed?????

I agree with your point - if the BEF were destroyed that would also have meant that officers like Brooke, Montgomery, and Alexander would have been lost to the Allied war effort.

dave2pvd

I've got one: the air raids on Japan.

Perhaps this is not considered a battle?

Japan's war machine was crippled before the Nagasaki and Hiroshima bombings. The turning point was the B-29. Once the Allies had this long range bomber, Japan's isolation was no more.

In many ways, the air raids / B-29 arrival was the beginning of the end for the Empire.

Reekwind

dave2pvd wrote: »

In many ways, the air raids / B-29 arrival was the beginning of the end for the Empire.

Devil's advocate: Japan went into the war with a barely industrialised economic base that was in no position to compete with the industrial powerhouse that was the US. For example, in 1943 alone the US produced more aircraft than Japan did from 1939-45. So while the air raids may have hindered Japanese production, can this really be said to have had much bearing on the course or outcome of the war?

Delancey

More important than the B 29 raids was the submarine campaign of the US Navy - the methodical destruction of its merchant fleet was a colossal loss that Japan as a maritime nation could not afford.
Losses of tankers reached a point that the Japanese Navy had to base itself in the Dutch East Indies because tankers en route to the japanese home islands could not make it past the gauntlet of US subs.
The war in the Pacific is often described as a war of aircraft carriers - I think it inaccurate to say that , rather it was a war of carriers and submarines.