Battleships: Scharnhorst, Gneisenau in Brest?

Jawgap

Wibbs wrote: »

Great post JG, but I'd haggle with ya on a couple of points :eek:

Of the three fighters(spit/Hurri/Emil) the ME had the highest wing loading, even with flaps, which reduced the gap, but not quite enough. You can't argue with physics on that score. IIRC 30 odd pounds per square inch for the Emil compared to 20 odd pounds per square inch of the other two. Wartime tests on both sides tended to agree on this point, though both sides noted the superior handling qualities of the ME at low speeds. Throw in as you pointed out the ME having a tendency to snap out of control with zero warning at the edge. The Spit being about the most easygoing and stable of any wartime fighter in an actual stall, barely drops a wing and like you say with plenty of warning beforehand(never mind a juddering stick, if you decided to be a real badass at higher speeds it would actually pop some rivets telling you to cop the hell on Ted ), meant the other two had the obvious if slight advantage in turning circle. I recall watching a youtube vid of an interview with a stuka pilot(them pesky things again:)) who noted that he was slightly less worried(though pretty fubared either way) if engaged by a spit, because he could hope to outturn him, whereas a hurricane who dropped his flaps could get a firing angle on him.


Certainly not in level flight. The 262 could hit 550 odd MPH. The fastest piston engined fighter ever(toss up between sea fury/mustang) barely scrapes 500. Again physics tends to screw with you regarding propeller speed and shockwaves forming on same at those kind of speeds. Maybe the Spit had the better climb rate? I dunno TBH. It was certainly more forgiving at slow speeds compared to the 262 and the pilot was far less worried his engine would go kaput on him.

Yep plus fighting over home ground made a huge diff. More fuel, more time, quicker resupply and if UK pilot crash lands or successfully bails out, he's back in the fray the next day, even the same day with some nutters. German guy does similar and he's packed off to Scotland or Canada for the remainder. Throw in utterly daft tactics ordered by above(stick close to the bombers) which crippled a fighters advantage and the eyeswiveling daft lack of the ability for fighters and bombers to talk to each other(on diff frequencies*) and it was a recipe for disaster. IMH it was as much a surprise that the Luftwaffe kept the pressure on as long as they did.


*that was bad enough, but the fact that the German radios were pretty crap by comparison and Luftwaffe pilots were still using wing waggling and hand signals even at that stage says it all.

Haggle away - these thread would be very short and uninteresting if we all agreed!

If I recall (I can't find the data at the moment) the Me109 could out-turn the Hurricane, but if you tried it the slats would pop with quite a load bang - and given when this happens you are most likely in a dogfight the natural reaction is to reverse the turn if you think you are hit and flying into trouble.

The early variants of the Me109 were certainly better at low speed, but the Gustav version was supposed to have been something of a pig at low speed to the point where Allied pilots reckoned they could provoke them into crashing by forcing them into turning moves at low speed and low altitude.

I think early 109s didn't even have radios - pilots communicated by hand signals and wing waggles - and the poor communication contributed to the disastrous start to Eagle Day when some formations of bombers didn't get the message scrubbing the missions and some fighters did - one fighter leader realised what was happening and chased after the bombers, swooping and diving in front of the formation leader to try and get him to turn around, he just thought the guy was being a plonker and showing off!

On the fraught subject of the outcome of the Battle of Britain, I did my masters dissertation on that - I analysed a whole range of factors from fighter types, bomber types, strategy, tactics, RDF (radar), the Dowding System of Control, 100 Octane fuel, logistics, the Civil Repair Organisation etc to come up with a conclusion.

Everyone will have their own view, but the conclusion I arrived at was that the outcome (whether you see it as a draw, a British / German loss, or a British / German victory) was that Keith Park, on balance, was the critical factor - a lesser commander with the same resources could have pissed it all away in two to three days.

The tactics he promoted and his dispositions flew in the face of conventional logic at the time and on the face of it, didn't seem to be working, but he stuck with it and - thankfully - history proved him right. The 15th September (Battle of Britain Day) showed him at his best - he realised just about everything was in his favour and threw everything up, but not in a massed formation but in timed 'penny packets' which stripped the fighters away and then hammered the bombers.

The only reason the German bombers didn't get absolutely slaughtered on that day, even though casualties were quite high, was because they held their nerve and their discipline - one formation of Dorniers, stripped of its fighter cover, pressed its attack and then conducted an impressive fighting withdrawal across SE England.

Which brings into the picture the whole cannon -v- guns debate - is it better to make a few big holes in a plane, or lots of little holes. One Dornier in that formation suffered 200 hits from .303 guns and still made it home; that probably demonstrates the ruggedness of the Do17 and the lack of punch in the .303 - unless you could get in close and keep your guns on target for a full half second you probably weren't going to bring down your target in one pass.

Jawgap

Should also add - the assertion that the Spitfire MkXIX was faster than an Me262 came from Stephen Bungay's book - "The Most Dangerous Enemy" - but I checked and he doesn't quote figures. The MkXIX was in photo reconnaissance configuration, so even if it caught a 262, it couldn't do anything except take a holiday snap.

Wikipedia says a MkXIX attained 690 mph in a dive, but that might have been an instrumentation error.

Another point Bungay makes about the Spitfire is the way pilots who flew talk about it - their narratives are almost erotic!! The plane is nearly always described as a 'she' and in 'upper class' terms in the sense that they are generally referred to as 'ladies' etc.

Bob Doe, who flew both the Hurricane and the Spitfire during the Battle of Britain compared the two, describing the Hurricane as a 'brick-built ****house' and the Spitfire as 'sensitive.' He also thought the average pilot would be better off in a Hurricane, but a good pilot would be better in a Spitfire as both plane and pilot would get the most out of each other.

Wibbs

Capt'n Midnight wrote:

Of course the Russians have never let a minor obstacle like the laws of physics get in the way of over engineering a solution.

Tu-95 has propellers, and gets up to around Mach 0.87 ( 575 mph )
though at this speed the tips of the eight 5.8m counter rotating propellers are travelling past the speed of sound and it's a tad noisy. And not very radar stealthy either.

Aye CM, but its a turboprop which makes a big difference. Piston engined aircraft just don't have the grunt to overcome the approaching shockwaves.

I'm with you on Park JG. Fascinating chap.

Though I reckon the Germans could have never won the BoB regardless, or it would have been very very difficult to do. One simple reason being they couldn't cover the whole UK. Air superiority kinda presupposes you can put something in the air in the first place. At that stage of the war the aircraft weren't up to it. The UK being on "home ground" could simply have shifted production(as they started to do) and airfields north and west and attacked from there(and could cover more of the "air" doing so). An actual German invasion would have gone tits up IMH. The German army and airforce was entirely aimed at land engagements. They had pretty much zero sea assault technology or tactics. Actually the Luftwaffe before the BoB had a standing rule/order that no single engined plane could overfly large areas of water. They rescinded that for the BoB, added life rafts and jackets to planes with some hasty training thrown in.

The XIX v 262 bit is odd mind you. No way was the Spit faster in level flight, or in the climb. Maybe in the dive? But that's about it.

Capt'n Midnight

Jawgap wrote: »

Keith Park, on balance, was the critical factor - a lesser commander with the same resources could have pissed it all away in two to three days.

..
Which brings into the picture the whole cannon -v- guns debate - is it better to make a few big holes in a plane, or lots of little holes.

have to agree with both

Had they taken out the radar or continued to concentrate on the airfields then it might have been different. Would it have been different if the 109's had longer range ?


Can't find the link but IIRC the US ship reckoned it took 250,000 browning rounds to shoot down a Japanese aircraft

BostonB

It was death of a thousand paper cuts in fairness. Theres certainly merit in the argument Hitler never intended to invade, simply to fight the Uk to a treaty.

Jawgap

Capt'n Midnight wrote: »

have to agree with both

Had they taken out the radar or continued to concentrate on the airfields then it might have been different. Would it have been different if the 109's had longer range ?


Can't find the link but IIRC the US ship reckoned it took 250,000 browning rounds to shoot down a Japanese aircraft

The argument is that longer range, heavier bomb loads etc wouldn't have made a jot of difference. The Luftwaffe needed Fighter Command to come up in numbers and engage in wholesale air combat and be knocked down in large numbers - Galland estimated that the Luftwaffe needed to outscore the RAF by 5:1 in terms of fighter kills to achieve air superiority and have enough strength to protect the proposed invasion fleet. As long as Park and Dowding stuck with 'penny packets' and harassing attacks they would be difficult to conclusively defeat.

Even if the Luftwaffe had got their targeting right and kept up pounding away at 11 Group's airfields, Fighter Command could have just withdrawn northwards. The reason they stayed where they were had more to do with politics than military logic, but then the Luftwaffe helped them by shifting their attacks to London. But then that was just part of the problem, the way they shifted targeting (a bit like the Americans would do later in the War with daylight bombing) trying to find the key node whose destruction would lead to victory.

Again, they failed to appreciate the importance of the system - they needed to cut Park and his controllers off from the frontline squadrons, except the system was too resilient.

Incidentally, the Luftwaffe thought massed bombing from medium level was the way to go, but it was shown (although they could never have known) that their low level precision strikes, especially by the like of Erpro 210, were much more effective, but they had too few units skilled in that type of bombing and they saw it as too costly.

And in the continuing debate on guns -v- cannons, I'd go with 'Sailor' Malan - his preferred tactic was to take the bombers head on and shoot up the cockpit. He wasn't interested in knocking them down because he figured a crippled bomber limping back to base with the crew shot to pieces would have a much greater psychological impact than a downed bomber where a squadron could imagine their mates in captivity in jolly old England. Applying that logic it probably doesn't matter what you use!

Tabnabs

Just came across a long documentary about the Scharnhorst and thought it may be of interest in this thread.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nP0Wx_d1QO4

BlaasForRafa

Jawgap wrote: »

And in the continuing debate on guns -v- cannons, I'd go with 'Sailor' Malan - his preferred tactic was to take the bombers head on and shoot up the cockpit. He wasn't interested in knocking them down because he figured a crippled bomber limping back to base with the crew shot to pieces would have a much greater psychological impact than a downed bomber where a squadron could imagine their mates in captivity in jolly old England. Applying that logic it probably doesn't matter what you use!

Thats just one mans logic though, the germans did studies on what it took to shoot down their targets. They estimated that it would take hundreds of 13mm rounds to take down a B-17 or B-24, 20-30 20mm rounds or 4-5 30mm rounds. Against single engine planes 4-5 20mm rounds were enough to take one down. Erich Hartmann's doctrine of waiting till the enemy aircraft filled his windscreen certainly seemed to pay off for him.

As regards range, the Germans did have drop tanks for Bf109's in August 1940 although they weren't widely available and while some formation leaders were asking for them, there wasn't a big push to get them into widespread service. If the Jagdwaffe had been fully kitted out with drop tanks in the BoB then they would have been able to loiter over southern England for longer and would have been able to engage RAF fighters for a longer time. It would probably have made the BoB a closer run thing but there were too many other factors against the germans in any case.

Capt'n Midnight

When Iraq was firing scuds the Americans used the patriot missile against them.

The scud cost 1/3rd the price of the patriot.

Scud also broke up on re-entry so multiple targets

Patriot also tried to intercept targets below ground level !


Bottom line the US had to waste resources on patriot because it was theoretically possible to intercept it. During WWII the allies had to use lots of anti aircraft guns and radar and interceptors and barrage balloons against the flying bomb , but didn't have to deploy any against the rocket because there was no defence against it. So in many ways the cheaper flying bomb was more effective.

Jawgap

BlaasForRafa wrote: »

Thats just one mans logic though, the germans did studies on what it took to shoot down their targets. They estimated that it would take hundreds of 13mm rounds to take down a B-17 or B-24, 20-30 20mm rounds or 4-5 30mm rounds. Against single engine planes 4-5 20mm rounds were enough to take one down. Erich Hartmann's doctrine of waiting till the enemy aircraft filled his windscreen certainly seemed to pay off for him.

Certainly a running theme through the accounts of pilots from all sides was the need to get in close. I think Sorley's original calculations for the Spitfire and Hurricane suggested the guns be harmonised to 400 yds, but it wasn't long before pilots had their armourers change that to 250yds and even 100yds.

BlaasForRafa wrote: »

As regards range, the Germans did have drop tanks for Bf109's in August 1940 although they weren't widely available and while some formation leaders were asking for them, there wasn't a big push to get them into widespread service. If the Jagdwaffe had been fully kitted out with drop tanks in the BoB then they would have been able to loiter over southern England for longer and would have been able to engage RAF fighters for a longer time. It would probably have made the BoB a closer run thing but there were too many other factors against the germans in any case.

The Germans did indeed have rudimentary drop tanks, but in the event of combat the first thing they would have done was drop them. Park in his instructions to controllers and squadron leaders was quite clear that bombers were the targets and that fighter formations should be harried, rather than engaged in full combat (often ignored, it has to be admitted).

He knew of the Germans fuel limitations and his logic was simply to get them up to full throttle, force them to burn their fuel and retreat. The Germans could have loitered longer with drop tanks, but the RAF would have just fed in a few more squadrons to chase them around the sky.

Maybe if they'd used the tanks to allow fighters to escort bombers in from a different direction it would have added some pressure - especially if they'd gone more after 12 Group or 10 Group, it might have stretched Fighter Command a bit more, but piling more into the SE of England, 'helped' Fighter Command more than it hurt them.

Capt'n Midnight wrote: »

When Iraq was firing scuds the Americans used the patriot missile against them.

The scud cost 1/3rd the price of the patriot.

Scud also broke up on re-entry so multiple targets

Patriot also tried to intercept targets below ground level !


Bottom line the US had to waste resources on patriot because it was theoretically possible to intercept it. During WWII the allies had to use lots of anti aircraft guns and radar and interceptors and barrage balloons against the flying bomb , but didn't have to deploy any against the rocket because there was no defence against it. So in many ways the cheaper flying bomb was more effective.

I'd question whether the V2 was militarily effective? True there was no defence against them, but considering what they hit (and didn't hit) and the effort and resources required to produce them, you'd have wonder if they represented the best use of dwindling material and labour.

Capt'n Midnight

Jawgap wrote: »

I'd question whether the V2 was militarily effective? True there was no defence against them, but considering what they hit (and didn't hit) and the effort and resources required to produce them, you'd have wonder if they represented the best use of dwindling material and labour.

No it wasn't.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V-2#Assessment

There was no need to divert resources into defending against it (as opposed to targeting launch sites) so didn't tie up the military.

For the cost of a fighter aircraft you could get one tonne of explosives somewhere near a large city (the same as a V1 which was 4% of the cost) but no control over where it landed. Double agents were used to give false reports which the Germans believed and so the guidance mechanism was changed.

Also most people don't realise that London wasn't the main target. More V2's were launched at Antwerp than everywhere else put together.

Huge white elephant.

Even if all 3,000 odd V2's hit a city you are only talking of the bomb load of one of the early 'thousand bomber' raids - which used medium bombers.

The Hamburg raid was 9,000 tons, no way they could produce enough V2's.

And the strange thing is the Germans who had lived through worse bombing expected the V2 to accomplish what had not been accomplished against them.

Stovepipe

With regard to drop tanks, both sides had basic external tanks (Spanish civil war HE51s and HS123s had fixed external tanks)but both sides had failed to get a usable drop tank that achieved the functions of cheapness in manufacture, ease of use for pilots and an ability not to leak. I read somewhere that the Germans had problems getting the fuel feed to work and had relegated the task to a non-priority until the advent of Barbarossa.
regards
Stovepipe

BlaasForRafa

Just to get somewhat back on to topic I found this today, it has an interesting bit about the bombing of the Scharnhorst while it was at La Pallice after having being initially repaired at Brest in 1941 http://asisbiz.com/Il2/Operation-Donnerkeil/pages/German-Ship-Prinz-Eugen-Moored-alongside-repair-vessel-Huscaran-01.html

The trip to La Pallice was not a success. The port had been chosen for the shoals offshore, which provided a measure of protection and reduced the number of escorts needed. On the other hand, it was disastrously lacking in antiaircraft defences. Scharnhorst behaved perfectly. She worked up to 30 knots with no difficulties and she carried out gunnery trials satisfactorily.

The trouble came on 24 July, when she was lying at anchor. It had taken the RAF a commendably short time to locate her. At noon that day several squadrons of Handley Page Halifaxes bombed from altitudes of 3.000 to 3.700 meters (10-12,000 feet). Five bombs hit the starboard side simultaneously in a nearly straight line parallel to the centerline. Two bombs were of the 227 kg (500 lb) high-explosive type, the others were 454 kg (1000 lb) semi-armor-piercing type bombs.

Bomb damage. One of the 227 kg (500 lb) bombs hit abeam of the conning tower, just forward of the starboard 150 mm twin turret. It passed through the upper and middle decks before exploding on the armor deck, which remained intact. The first platform deck was torn, with significant bulging in the explosion area. The side-armor plating was deflected outboard about 200 mm, and a small hole was torn in it. Rivets that joined the armored torpedo bulkhead to the main deck were loosened enough to cause leakage.

Ammunition for the 150 mm guns, stowed about 3 meters from the center of the explosion, was not affected. Splinter damage was insignificant.

A 454 kg bomb hit the port side between the 100 mm and the 150 mm guns, 3,5 meters from the deck edge, and penetrated the upper deck, lower armor deck, and first platform before being deflected downward along the torpedo bulkhead and out through the double bottom without exploding. The bottom plating was holed and local flooding occurred. The wing tanks had their restraining walls holed by splinters. Number 4 generator room was flooded, several electrical installations were put out of action, and cables, damaged by splinters or flooding, disrupted operations in the battle, command, and fire-control stations, including those for the forward antiaircraft battery and turret Anton.

A second 454 kg (1000 lb) bomb hit midway between the 150 mm and 105 mm guns, 2,6 meters from the deck edge; it, too, penetrated all decks and platforms before passing through the side shell below the armor belt without exploding. Five spaces on the starboard side over a length of 10 meters were flooded. Some lights were extinguished, water leaked into the magazines for the 150 mm single mounts, and the living spaces were damaged by splinters.

The third 454 kg (1000 lb) bomb hit slightly abaft the after turret, 3 meters from the deck edge, tore through the upper deck, passed through the side plating, and buried itself in the sea bed, unexploded; it was later recovered. The shell plating was severely damaged, and 10 watertight spaces, including the starboard shaft alley, were flooded. Flooding also occurred in the magazines for turret Caesar, and the ammunition hoist was put out of service.

The other 227 kg (500 lb) bomb fell forward of the after turret, to starboard, 3 meters from the deck edge; it penetrated two decks and exploded on the main armor deck, where it made a small hole. Several frames were holed by splinters, and the connection at the top of the torpedo bulkhead was damaged. The penetrated decks bulged from the explosion and were holed by splinters. Some flooding occurred in the outboard spaces. Heating, potable, and plumbing piping under the battery and middle decks was damaged. The ammunition hoists for the 37 mm guns were put out of action, although the ammunition was not affected.

The ship took an 8 degree list to starboard, as most of the void tanks used for counterflooding were flooded. Damage would have been more extensive if all three 454 kg (1000 lb) bombs had not been duds. Trim by the stern increased 3 meters due to 1.520 to 3.050 metric tons of water taken on board. The forward and after turrets were temporarily out of action, and half the antiaircraft battery was out. Several small fires broke out but were extinguished. Two men were killed and 15 others were injured.

Four months were spent in repairing the damage.

It looks like all the bombs may have came from one aircraft which was an incredible bit of bad luck for the Germans and good luck for the British. Almost as if to balance out the luck, the three heaviest bombs turned out to be duds and didn't explode. Still, all the damage caused by bombs holing the deck and some exploding internally took 4 months to repair, if all the bombs had gone off it would have been far worse.