Michael Nugent and the Euthyphro Dilemma

antiskeptic

An offshoot from "Michael Nugent speaks for Atheism" from whence his most recent post on the topic


Michael wrote:

First let’s remember what the dilemma is: it is about defining the fundamental characteristic of moral goodness. The argument that something is good because it pleases a god creates the following dilemma:

Option one: Does the god have a reason for being pleased by goodness? If so, that reason is closer to the fundamental characteristic of goodness, and the god is merely observing that something is good rather than causing it to be good.

Option two: Does the god have no reason for being pleased by goodness? If so, then goodness is arbitrary from the perspective of the supposed god, and the answer tells us nothing about the fundamental characteristic of goodness.

You first argued that good is a label for “that which aligns with god’s will”, that his will stems from his character, and that his character is immutable.

I replied that all that this does is push the dilemma onto his immutable characteristics rather than onto his will, and I asked if there is any reason, or no reason, that your god happens to have the immutable characteristics that your god happens to have?

You replied that there is no reason required for God’s characteristics to be as they happen to be, that he might have had characteristics causing him to love selfishness but as it happens he doesn’t, and that he wants us to align ourselves with his will because it is the only way that he is able to share our company.

Well, if we apply that to the Euthyphro dilemma, then goodness is arbitrary, as it is based merely on the characteristics that your god happens to have, and these are characteristics for which there is no reason required and over which he has no control. Also, the only reason to do good is to facilitate the desire of this god to be able to share our company.

Fortunately for those of us with a different sense of morality, based on concepts like empathy and compassion and reciprocation, there is no evidence that such a god exists.



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antiskeptic

Originally Posted by Michael Nugent
First let’s remember what the dilemma is: it is about defining the fundamental characteristic of moral goodness. The argument that something is good because it pleases a god creates the following dilemma:

You first argued that good is a label for “that which aligns with god’s will”, that his will stems from his character, and that his character is immutable.
Correct


I replied that all that this does is push the dilemma onto his immutable characteristics rather than onto his will, and I asked if there is any reason, or no reason, that your god happens to have the immutable characteristics that your god happens to have?

You replied that there is no reason required for God’s characteristics to be as they happen to be, that he might have had characteristics causing him to love selfishness but as it happens he doesn’t, and that he wants us to align ourselves with his will because it is the only way that he is able to share our company.

Correct

Well, if we apply that to the Euthyphro dilemma, then goodness is arbitrary, as it is based merely on the characteristics that your god happens to have, and these are characteristics for which there is no reason required and over which he has no control.

Correct. As stated previously, the sense of arbitrary applicable isn't the sense which says what's good today could be bad tomorrow. That would indeed cause a dilemma.

I asked what the dilemma was with an arbitrary goodness which was fixed and immutable.

Also, the only reason to do good is to facilitate the desire of this god to be able to share our company.

I thought I did mention another reason? That it facilitates our expressing our hearts desire wrt God.


Why do good? Because I feel I ought.

Why do you feel you ought? Because God installed a sense of ought as part of a mechanism related to finding him (and post-having found him, to enable growth in the relationship). I'm subject to it's pressure "I ought, I ought not"

It's not an arbitrary, pulled-out-of-a-hat-on-a-whim kind of thing: when I do as I ought I am, in fact, expressing myself according to the image of the God after whom I was made. And when I am not, I am not. These responses feed into an algorithm (of sorts*) which ensures my hearts desire will obtain the option offered it.

Why did God go to this trouble on my behalf? So that I could enjoy God and he me, forever.

Why does God want that? Because God is love and the immutable nature of love is to desire to express itself to a beloved.

Why do you want that? I'm made in the image of God and so part of me is love too and the immutable nature of love... The other bit of me which isn't made in the image of God wants the opposite. I get to choose which it will be for all eternity.

-

Where's the dilemma in 'good' existing within a closed system and for an immutable reason?




* 'algorithm of sorts'. By this I mean that both our 'good' and 'bad' actions (and our own responses to those actions) feed into a mechanism which ultimately spits out our final answer to God. But it's not a simple weighing scales mechanism whereby enough "good" doing is get's us to heaven. Or insufficient "good" doing gets us to Hell. Our bad doing contributes just as significantly to our finally being saved (if that's what happens to us) as does our good doing.



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antiskeptic

I've included this post/response because it expands on the idea of a closed system bounded by God at all points.

http://www.boards.ie/vbulletin/showpost.php?p=75269461&postcount=254

Recidite wrote:

The reason it would be unsatisfactory is that "goodness" would be reduced to "correctness", as in trying to achieve a facsimile of the god's nature or his instructions. Goodness would have no intrinsic value of its own.

So we would be just like the Nazi concentration camp guards, following correct procedure at all times; there would be no separate consideration about whether the correct procedures were just.[/I]

This merely kicks the can up the road.

Like goodness, 'value' and 'satisfactory' and 'just' can be examined under the Euthyphro Dilemma setup. Is it valuable/satisfactory/just because God says so (in which case arbitrary). Or is it that God too must bow to a higher authority where 'good' is what's intrinsically good (where intrinsically excludes any reference to or connection with God).

My response here would be the same as it was for "good". And since that response appears to sidestep the Euthyphro Dilemma, so to would my response to "just/value/etc.


The only dilemma that I can see is one for the man who finds himself in a closed system the boundary of which is God. And in finding himself there he finds he is subject to God's plan for him - which kicks into touch whatever intellectual mastur...means a man might generate in the attempt to rid himself of God.

That would appear to include the Euthyphro Dilemma (so called)

MagicMarker

Cool story bro.

Zombrex

antiskeptic wrote: »

Why did God go to this trouble on my behalf? So that I could enjoy God and he me, forever.

Why does God want that? Because God is love and the immutable nature of love is to desire to express itself to a beloved.

You have just replaced "good" with "love", and thus not solved the dilemma.

Is love something that God carries out because he is good, and is thus a concept above him, or is love just what God randomly does and is thus arbitrary.

antiskeptic

Zombrex wrote: »

You have just replaced "good" with "love", and thus not solved the dilemma.

Is love something that God carries out because he is good, and is thus a concept above him, or is love just what God randomly does and is thus arbitrary.

It has already been concluded that good isn't arbitrary in the sense that todays good can be tomorrows bad. This because God is immutable.

It has also already been concluded that God is arbitrary in the sense that he just is the way he is and that if he happened to be a God who prized rather than hated selfishness, then selfishness would be good (according to our working definition of good = the flavour of God / God's will)

The question then posed was: what's the dilemma in an arbitrary good (or love) whose characteristics are immutable.

Knasher

I think the Euthyphro dilemma is only a dilemma if he believer wants to ascribe certain conflicting attributes to their god. For example many believers like to say that god is good or wise and that god is the source of morality, but if they believe there is no objective standard for good beyond god then that becomes a meaningless tautology, for similar reasons god cannot be said to be either wise or rational and god becomes definitively a tyrant (even if you believe him to be a well meaning one). Whereas if you have an objective standard of good then god is bounded by morals in accordance with that and then cannot be said to be the source of morality.

If you don't ascribe these conflicting attributes to god then I don't think there is much of a dilemma for you. I wouldn't exactly say you have solved the dilemma per say, because there are obviously christians who do ascribe these conflicting attributes and the dilemma still exists for them. But I don't see why we would be a particular interesting audience for this particular topic (such that it even needs its own thread) as the only part I think we would really have an opinion on is if there were inconsistencies in your personal theology, which doesn't seem to be the case in this particular topic. Surely a debate between christians with apposing views on this would be a more fruitful discussion (not that I'm trying to get rid of you, I just don't see where this topic can really go).

The only thing I would like to know though, is under your view of god as immutable, do you still hold to the belief that god has given you free will. Because those two would also seem to be in conflict. I know we talked about this briefly before but I don't think it was fully explored. If god is immutable and omniscient (though I would certainly agree that omniscience implies immutability) then it would seem god would already be aware of every action I will take during my life and my ultimate punishment. I don't see how free will can exist when there is only one viable action, because if there is more than one viable action and god doesn't know what I'll do then he is no longer omniscient. And if there is no free will then god ultimately created me so he could specifically punish me for all eternity, which is kinda a dick move.

I know a common out is that god has the ability to be omniscient but chooses not to be in order to preserve human free will. The problem with that is that he is then making decisions accounting for human actions and can no longer be described as immutable.

antiskeptic

Knasher wrote: »

I think the Euthyphro dilemma is only a dilemma if he believer wants to ascribe certain conflicting attributes to their god. For example many believers like to say that god is good or wise and that god is the source of morality, but if they believe there is no objective standard for good beyond god then that becomes a meaningless tautology, for similar reasons god cannot be said to be either wise or rational and god becomes definitively a tyrant (even if you believe him to be a well meaning one). Whereas if you have an objective standard of good then god is bounded by morals in accordance with that and then cannot be said to be the source of morality.

I agree with you in the main here. However, God can said to be the source of morality if we're limiting morality to describe something we find ourselves constrained and bound by - rather than something that exists without reference to anything else (such as God)

If you don't ascribe these conflicting attributes to god then I don't think there is much of a dilemma for you. I wouldn't exactly say you have solved the dilemma per say, because there are obviously christians who do ascribe these conflicting attributes and the dilemma still exists for them. But I don't see why we would be a particular interesting audience for this particular topic (such that it even needs its own thread) as the only part I think we would really have an opinion on is if there were inconsistencies in your personal theology, which doesn't seem to be the case in this particular topic. Surely a debate between christians with apposing views on this would be a more fruitful discussion (not that I'm trying to get rid of you, I just don't see where this topic can really go).

The dilemma is solved when you find that you are no longer impaled on either of its horns. I would agree that there are shades of understanding and opinion which render the dilemma a valid challenge to some but Michael's Irish Times piece didn't make any attempt to deal in such subtleties, opting instead to tar all with the same simplistic brush.

Only one need escape the dilemma in order to render is universal claim false.

The only thing I would like to know though, is under your view of god as immutable, do you still hold to the belief that god has given you free will. Because those two would also seem to be in conflict. I know we talked about this briefly before but I don't think it was fully explored. If god is immutable and omniscient (though I would certainly agree that omniscience implies immutability) then it would seem god would already be aware of every action I will take during my life and my ultimate punishment. I don't see how free will can exist when there is only one viable action, because if there is more than one viable action and god doesn't know what I'll do then he is no longer omniscient. And if there is no free will then god ultimately created me so he could specifically punish me for all eternity, which is kinda a dick move.

I know a common out is that god has the ability to be omniscient but chooses not to be in order to preserve human free will. The problem with that is that he is then making decisions accounting for human actions and can no longer be described as immutable.

Firstly, I don't pretend to suppose a person will be able to model God as he is given that he could be expected to exist in ways and dimensions that are completely impenetrable for us.

One model I use is based on the notion that God doesn't occupy the time dimension - it is a view that is biblically supported and one that is acceptable to many theologians.

In that case, God is observing now what you are doing tomorrow. If you have difficulty with that statement then note the difficulty is rendered only by the introduction of time units. But because time units aren't restraining to God, the thing that would make my observing now what you are doing tomorrow a nonsense, doesn't apply to God.

Thus can free will be preserved. God observing now what you are doing tomorrow doesn't mean you aren't free to be doing something else tomorrow. If you do decide to do something different tomorrow (than you are now planning to) then that is what God see's now.

I know a common out is that god has the ability to be omniscient but chooses not to be in order to preserve human free will. The problem with that is that he is then making decisions accounting for human actions and can no longer be described as immutable

I'm not sure what you mean here. What does "making decisions accounting for human actions" mean?

When God says "I will remember their sins no more" I don't think that they magically disappear. I think that, similar to his forgiving us by taking on the due penalty himself, he has a way of dealing with things in such a way that permits them to be filed away in a basement like ancient accounts where they have no power or effect

The knowledge hasn't been destroyed. It's just be rendered eternally irrelevant.

Zombrex

antiskeptic wrote: »

It has also already been concluded that God is arbitrary in the sense that he just is the way he is and that if he happened to be a God who prized rather than hated selfishness, then selfishness would be good (according to our working definition of good = the flavour of God / God's will)

The question then posed was: what's the dilemma in an arbitrary good (or love) whose characteristics are immutable.

The dilemma is that what is good becomes random and meaningless, devote of reason and thus devoid of justice and purpose.

Or to put it another way, all the nice notions objective morality is supposed to give us evaporate. How immutable it is is largely irrelevant.

antiskeptic

Zombrex wrote: »

The dilemma is that what is good becomes random and meaningless, devote of reason and thus devoid of justice and purpose.

In the discussion with Michael we've arrived at a point where 'good' is seen as either:

1) a word to describe the flavour of Gods character

2) a componant in the moral sense that we've been equiped with - with morality being a derived product of the fact that we've created in God's image and so share something of his characteristic.

There are reasons and meanings inherent in the second use of the word - which refer back ultimately to God's plan wrt to us. But I'll assume you're referring to the first sense of good since the second is derivative and so, less important.


God's flavour is:

Random?

Random: having no definite aim or purpose; not sent or guided in a particular direction; made, done, occurring, etc., ...

God has aims and purposes. He is character is fixed but that doesn't mean he can't make choices or plan or desire within the bounds of that character. He is as he is, but we can't say he could just as easily have been another way since we know nothing of what can and can't be at that level.

Meaningless?

Define meaningful (in terms that can't be brought under the umbrella of God) then perhaps we can find out whether God is lacking in meaning.


Devoid of a reason?

I don't see a dilemma in the fact that God is self-contained and need not reference an external reason for being the way he is. A reason is an upstream causation of what happens downstream. When you reach the head of the stream there are no more reasons - nor need there be. You're at the source. The ultimate source needn't necessarily require a reason.


Devoid of Justice?

Justice is like good, it's a term used of the flavour of God. When we ask whether something is just as we are saying is " does it reflect the character of God".


Purpose.

God has purpose in his actions and again I don't see the dilemma in a self-contained God who doesn't require an upstream reason to have those purposes.



The problem with an all-encompassing God is that you are forced to explain one aspect of him in terms of another aspect of him and in trying to reject one aspect of him using other aspects of him you end up with nonsense.

Or to put it another way, all the nice notions objective morality is supposed to give us evaporate. How immutable it is is largely irrelevant.

What nice notions are you talking of? All objective morality claims is that there is a common and immoveable reference point to which all are subject.

And that the flavour of that reference point will be agreed by all to be the fullest version of what we collectively (and somewhat inconsistantly) behold as good.

That some folk don't see that now is neither here nor there.

Zombrex

antiskeptic wrote: »

God has aims and purposes. He is character is fixed but that doesn't mean he can't make choices or plan or desire within the bounds of that character. He is as he is, but we can't say he could just as easily have been another way since we know nothing of what can and can't be at that level.

Er, which brings us back to Euthyphro's dilemma. Does God do good because it is good or is it good because God does it.

God makes choices, are these choices good, in which case God is following a notion that is beyond him, or are they simply meaningless and arbitrary.

antiskeptic wrote: »

Meaningless?

Define meaningful (in terms that can't be brought under the umbrella of God) then perhaps we can find out whether God is lacking in meaning.

Meaningful as in they serve some goal or purpose.

Think about it for a minute. Is God attempting to achieve goodness through his choices and actions? If so then goodness is something beyond God.

If God isn't attempting to achieve anything then his actions have no meaning, they are arbitrary.

antiskeptic wrote: »

You're at the source. The ultimate source needn't necessarily require a reason.

Which makes it meaningless and arbitrary. God is not attempting to be good or do good since those terms have no meaning to God. God is just arbitrarily doing things.

The point you are missing is that as soon as you apply reason to what God is doing (God does X because it is good to do X and God wants to do good) you have introduced a concept beyond God.

Hence the dilemma.

antiskeptic wrote: »

Justice is like good, it's a term used of the flavour of God. When we ask whether something is just as we are saying is " does it reflect the character of God".

Well no it is more than that. It is an action carried out to maintain a sense of fairness and balance.

antiskeptic wrote: »

God has purpose in his actions and again I don't see the dilemma in a self-contained God who doesn't require an upstream reason to have those purposes.

But this is the thing. You say God has purpose but this requires a concept beyond God. So one might say God's purpose is to be just. Thus justice exists above God. One might say God's purpose is to be good. Thus goodness exists above God.

If nothing exists above God then God has no notion of purpose. God just arbitrarily does what he does with no meaning or sense of purpose.

antiskeptic wrote: »

The problem with an all-encompassing God is that you are forced to explain one aspect of him in terms of another aspect of him and in trying to reject one aspect of him using other aspects of him you end up with nonsense.

Well yes, but that is in fact exactly what you are doing. You define God as having purpose, but don't realize that purpose does not exist without a goal and what ever that goal is (to be good, to be just, to be happy, to love) requires concepts beyond the entity fulfilling that purpose.

antiskeptic wrote: »

What nice notions are you talking of? All objective morality claims is that there is a common and immoveable reference point to which all are subject.

Yes, which become meaningless because of Euthyphro's dilemma.

It would be like saying it is good to walk on the right side of the street.
Why?
Well that is because God wants it that way.
Why?
Well he just does. There is no reason to it.
So it is meaningless, without purpose, simply arbitrary?
Yes.
So it doesn't actually matter if I walk on the left side of the street?
Not really, you will annoy God but God won't know why it annoys him.

antiskeptic

Zombrex wrote: »

Er, which brings us back to Euthyphro's dilemma. Does God do good because it is good or is it good because God does it.

I know you've picked this up late so perhaps the thing to do is go back to the start of the conversation between MN and myself to see how we've arrived that the point we've arrived at.

The brief answer to your question?

The word 'good' is being used as a non-descriptive term to encompass 'the flavour of God's character' (from whence his actions). When we use the term 'good' in this sense, then his actions are per definition 'good'

It doesn't matter whether we are talking of God A who happens to be selfless or of God B who is selfish, they would both be good if we use the word 'good' in this way regarding them.

I've to go now but it seems you need to enter the discussion earlier than mid-stream. See if the above helps with the leap in..

Roger Hassenforder

antiskeptic wrote: »

When the word 'good' is used as a non-descriptive term for nature of God's character (from whence his actions) then his actions are per definition 'good'.

It doesn't matter whether we are talking of God A who happens to be selfless or of God B who is selfish, they would both be good under this usage of good..

another leap in from stage left:
In fairness, how can an adjective used be non-descriptively to describe an attribute of something? a god could be 'good', but it doesnt mean its actions are therefore exclusively good. it could be good but impotent, good but non existant etc...

antiskeptic

Roger Hassenforder wrote: »

another leap in from stage left:
In fairness, how can an adjective used be non-descriptively to describe an attribute of something?

When it's not used as an adjective in the first instance? When it's not attempting to describe something.

It's use as an adjective comes later. In our world. A world set up by and derived from God. A world which is God-equipped with a notion called "morality" for purpose that God has regarding mankind. In that circumstance 'is it good' is another way of saying "does it have a flavour like Gods character?"

You too would need to go back to the earlier conversation with MN in the other thread. It's been dealt with there.

Roger Hassenforder

eh?

something snapped in the back of my head just now.
to coin a phrase from Dragons den, I'm out!

Zombrex

antiskeptic wrote: »

I know you've picked this up late so perhaps the thing to do is go back to the start of the conversation between MN and myself to see how we've arrived that the point we've arrived at.

The brief answer to your question?

The word 'good' is being used as a non-descriptive term to encompass 'the flavour of God's character' (from whence his actions). When we use the term 'good' in this sense, then his actions are per definition 'good'

It doesn't matter whether we are talking of God A who happens to be selfless or of God B who is selfish, they would both be good if we use the word 'good' in this way regarding them.

I've to go now but it seems you need to enter the discussion earlier than mid-stream. See if the above helps with the leap in..

Well I'm not sure what discussion you were having with MN, but I was discussing Euthyphro's dilemma and explaining, since you asked , what the actual dilemma is.

You seem to not understand where the dilemma is and I think it is because you have not through through the actual consequences of what is being said in Euthyphro's dilemma. "Good" being defined as what God does is not really the point, the issue is the meaning of what God does, whether we call it "good", "bad" or "hair dryer"

antiskeptic

Zombrex wrote: »

Well I'm not sure what discussion you were having with MN, but I was discussing Euthyphro's dilemma and explaining, since you asked , what the actual dilemma is.

Then we were talking past each other. I was asking what the dilemma was with the current state of affairs - a state of affairs that has progressed beyond the ED as I've seen it classically stated (and as stated by MN)

You seem to not understand where the dilemma is and I think it is because you have not through through the actual consequences of what is being said in Euthyphro's dilemma. "Good" being defined as what God does is not really the point, the issue is the meaning of what God does, whether we call it "good", "bad" or "hair dryer"

Perhaps you could help me understand the dilemma by telling me what definition of good is being used when the word is bandied about in the classic presentation of the dilemma. Here's Michael up top. He refers to the word alot.

---

Miguel Nugenti wrote:

First let’s remember what the dilemma is: it is about defining the fundamental characteristic of moral goodness. The argument that something is good because it pleases a god creates the following dilemma:

In the conversation with MN, we've already gotten to the point of re-stating the above statement using an particular definition of 'good'. Something is 'good' because it mimics God's characteristics (where 'good' is a non-descriptive word for God's characteristics). There is clearly no dilemma in that.

MN wrote:

Option one: Does the god have a reason for being pleased by goodness? If so, that reason is closer to the fundamental characteristic of goodness, and the god is merely observing that something is good rather than causing it to be good.

Re-stated using the definition of good used above. "Does God have a reason to be pleased that created beings mimic him". The asnwer is "Yes (in the ultimate sense, when folk mimic him completely) - it means his desire to have relationship with us is made possible"

Option two: Does the god have no reason for being pleased by goodness? If so, then goodness is arbitrary from the perspective of the supposed god, and the answer tells us nothing about the fundamental characteristic of goodness.

This is a bit garbled. Classically stated, the dilemma here supposedly arises from the fact that God references nothing outside himself when it comes to goodness. Which makes goodness arbitrary. However, the dilemma specifically point to a use of the word 'aribitrary' which focuses on changeablity - that what's morally good today might not be the case tomorrow. That's a problem resolved by God's immutability. Since what's morally good is something which is derived from his characteristics and since his characteristics don't change, there is no problem with changeable morality. Where then the dilemma?

---

But perhaps you've a different definition of what the word 'good' is supposed to mean. And could tell me why I need utilise it as opposed to the one I chose to use above.

Zombrex

antiskeptic wrote: »

Re-stated. Does God have a reason to be pleased that created beings mimic him. Yes (in the ultimate sense) - it means his desire to have relationship with us is made possible

Yes but why does God have a desire to have a relationship with us and why would that please him.

The simplest way to avoid this dilemma is clear-headedness.

If I recall correctly, Socrates asked Euthyphro did the gods approve of something because it was good, or was something good because the gods approved of it.

A reasonable person would say that Socrates (in Plato's narrative) was referring to the likes of Zeus, Poseidon, Hera, Apollo and so on. Given the context, he was unlikely to have been referring to anyone else.

These were all made-up characters. They didn't exist, except in fable, so the answer doesn't matter. The dilemma only exists for as long as one is prepared to allow the existence of the characters.

Accordingly, the clear-headed way to resolve this "dilemma" is not to kid yourself that these characters exist.

Just because a question makes grammatical sense does not mean it makes logical sense. And just because a question can be asked does not mean that it merits answering.

As someone somewhere asked once: Why are unicorns hollow?

antiskeptic

Zombrex wrote: »

Yes but why does God have a desire to have a relationship with us and why would that please him.

I could follow the track down some of the ways. God loves us and love desires to express and gains pleasure from expressing..

But we can cut to the chase (not least because I can only track back so far in search of reasons for the reasons)

The suggestion is that in God, the linear track back for a reason for the reason for the reason ...leads you into something you can't understand finally (because you'd have to be God to fully understand God). The linear lines become curved and you find yourself tracking in circles.

The question is: where is the dilemma in that?

Logical Fallacy

antiskeptic wrote: »

The suggestion is that in God, the linear track back for a reason for the reason for the reason ...leads you into something you can't understand finally (because you'd have to be God to fully understand God). The linear lines become curved and you find yourself tracking in circles.

So if you cannot understand God, by your own admission, why the certainty that God loves us?

This makes no real sense, love is a human thing, a by product of assorted hormones. God, were he to exist, is non-corporal ergo no hormones.

In short, why consistently try and mash a deity shaped peg into a human shaped hole?

antiskeptic

Logical Fallacy wrote: »

So if you cannot understand God, by your own admission, why the certainty that God loves us?

I mentioned being able to go only so far. The closest person to me can understand aspects of me. But I understand me the most (or I should do) I have access all areas.

This makes no real sense, love is a human thing, a by product of assorted hormones. God, were he to exist, is non-corporal ergo no hormones.

God, if he exists enabled us to experience love in physical form utilising hormones. In spiritual form he can enable us to experience love in spiritual 'hormones'

You're confusing the item with the means whereby the item is conveyed.

In short, why consistently try and mash a deity shaped peg into a human shaped hole?

Because it deals with objections like yours. And a man devoid of objections to God is a man closer to God than a man with a barrowful of them (the thinking goes)

Zombrex

antiskeptic wrote: »

I could follow the track down some of the ways. God loves us and love desires to express and gains pleasure from expressing..

And again we are back to the dilemma. What determines that love desires to express and gain pleasure from expressing.

antiskeptic wrote: »

The suggestion is that in God, the linear track back for a reason for the reason for the reason ...leads you into something you can't understand finally (because you'd have to be God to fully understand God). The linear lines become curved and you find yourself tracking in circles.

The question is: where is the dilemma in that?

Where is always was, God is just arbitrarily and does what he does with no meaning or sense of purpose. All other conclusions lead back to Euthyphro dilemma.

Logical Fallacy

antiskeptic wrote: »

You're confusing the item with the means whereby the item is conveyed.

No i'm not, you are making an assumption that an emotion can be felt without the required biology to feel it.

That is quite a strong assumption to make.

Second only to assuming that there would be any kind of emotional common ground between a human and a deity. It would be akin to comparing a single cell organism to a human.

There is no point of reference.

antiskeptic

Logical Fallacy wrote: »

No i'm not, you are making an assumption that an emotion can be felt without the required biology to feel it.

That is quite a strong assumption to make.`

God of the bible feeling emotions without requiring biology opens the door to others doing the same.

I'm not sure how you get to supposing a God couldn't feel emotions due to a lack of hormones - this would require a level of knowledge that is beyond you.

Second only to assuming that there would be any kind of emotional common ground between a human and a deity. It would be akin to comparing a single cell organism to a human.

There is no point of reference.

And if the human is made in the image and likeness of God (that is to say, that which differentiates humans from animals is the divine life they possess)?

antiskeptic

Zombrex wrote: »

And again we are back to the dilemma. What determines that love desires to express and gain pleasure from expressing.

Nothing need determine it. It can be the intrinsic nature of love. Or to put it the right way around: a certain bundle of attributes ("realities behind the label" as Michale puts it in his post below / "flavours" as I put it) have the label 'love' attached to them.

Where is always was, God is just arbitrarily and does what he does with no meaning or sense of purpose. All other conclusions lead back to Euthyphro dilemma.

You haven't defined meaning in order to say his not having to refer to something outside himself renders what he does meaningless. Could you deal with this? Ditto 'purpose'.


If God is self-contained and infinite then you can track "backwards" within him to find purpose and meaning and reason forever without end. Your error, I think, is in the attempt to get to the end of God as if he operated linearly like we do (x happens because of y and y because of z. Can't go any further than z then you've arrived at arbitariness and meaningless and reasonless).

Whilst you can't arrive at the end of a non-linear infinite 'system' like God, you can conclude that the totality of possible meaning, purpose and reason is contained within God. Where's the dilemma in that?

Michael Nugent

Zombrex wrote: »

Well I'm not sure what discussion you were having with MN, but I was discussing Euthyphro's dilemma and explaining, since you asked , what the actual dilemma is.

We were teasing out the implications for the Euthyphro dilemma of Antiskeptic’s theory of his god and his supposedly immutable characteristics.

I was doing this with two caveats: that the supposed immutability of his god’s will could be challenged based on reading the bible, and that his god’s supposed existence could be challenged on various grounds, but I wanted to see where we would end up if we granted him those suppositions for the purposes of the discussion.

I’ll come back to it here when I get a chance now that it has been extracted from the other thread.

Zombrex wrote: »

You seem to not understand where the dilemma is and I think it is because you have not through through the actual consequences of what is being said in Euthyphro's dilemma. "Good" being defined as what God does is not really the point, the issue is the meaning of what God does, whether we call it "good", "bad" or "hair dryer"

As a quick observation, I broadly agree with this.

I think Antiskeptic's position is largely built on redefining labels, rather than addressing the reality behind the labels. So we have taken the labels that we typically associate with morality (right, wrong, good, bad, justice, injustice etc) and applied those labels to the supposed will of this supposed god.

However, the realities behind these labels - independently of the supposed god's will - still exist, although we now have no label for them in this discussion.

antiskeptic

Michael Nugent wrote: »

I think Antiskeptic's position is largely built on redefining labels, rather than addressing the reality behind the labels. So we have taken the labels that we typically associate with morality (right, wrong, good, bad, justice, injustice etc) and applied those labels to the supposed will of this supposed god.

However, the realities behind these labels - independently of the supposed god's will - still exist, although we now have no label for them in this discussion.

I'm not so much redefining labels as attaching what they represent to God as their source (rather than to an atheists God-knows-what-source ). The realities* behind the various sub-labels associated with the overarching label 'good' are being seen as constituting the very character (and, as downstream consequence, the will) of God. The labels themselves are of course, merely ways of referring to those realities for the purpose of discussion. The labels would be only labels were we talking of the atheist concept of good too.

As you say, the discussion isn't about whether or not the bible supports Gods character as actually consisting of the realities we normally associate with labels like love, mercy, patience. We're assuming this for the sake of having a God-character with which to deal with the Euthyphro Dilemma.

-

Because morality (which consists of realities bearing the labels such as those you refer to above) is something derived from the character of God and to which we are subject by means of our very constitution, we can answer the ED questions by referring back up the chain to the source of our moral sense.

Hence:

Q: Is x morally good?
A: "Is it morally good" is just another way of asking "Does is mimic with and align with God's character?" If it does so, then per definition, it is morally good

Q: Why is it morally good?
A Because it aligns with God's character - per definition

Q: Is it morally good just because it aligns with God's character?
A: Per definition, yes.

Q: Is God morally good
A: That's a nonsense question. Does Gods character align with God's character???



-

Finally. Contrary to your final assertion, my argument holds that it's the realities behind the labels that constitute the character of God. They naturally don't exist independently of God's character.

What is required now of you is the attachment of a dilemma to this position.


-


* you use the term 'realities' behind the label. This would appear to be trying to express the same idea for which I use the word 'flavour'. 'Flavour' is an all-encompassing term for the experiential aspect of God's character. For example, the lable 'love' has sub-componants such as 'self-sacrifice' and 'patience' and 'mercy'. Patience, mercy and self-sacrifice can further sub-divideded by descriptive terms. What matters most however, isn't how God's character is described but how it is experienced. The word "flavour" attempts to capture the notion of Gods character as something primarily experienced. As does, I guess, the word "realities"?

Again, no assumption is made that God is actually love (as commonly described and experienced). The word 'flavour' can apply to a God who is love and a God who is opposite. They'd both have a character and that character would have an experiential flavour. In so far as my argument works, it does so equally well for both kinds of Gods.

Michael Nugent

Michael Nugent wrote: »

We were teasing out the implications for the Euthyphro dilemma of Antiskeptic’s theory of his god and his supposedly immutable characteristics.

Why?

antiskeptic

Deleted User wrote: »

Why?

Because Michaels a 'militant' atheist whose set out to undermine peoples faith in figments of their imagination. He employed the Euthyphro Dilemma in an Irish Times piece recently to that very end.

It's one thing to suppose there is a dilemma - quite another to support that.

Michael needs to sustain the dilemma or the IT letter wilts.

That's why.

CerebralCortex

antiskeptic wrote: »

Because Michaels a 'militant' atheist whose set out to undermine peoples faith in figments of their imagination. He employed the Euthyphro Dilemma in an Irish Times piece recently to that very end.

It's one thing to suppose there is a dilemma - quite another to support that.

Michael needs to sustain the dilemma or the IT letter wilts.

That's why.

Is it him trying to undermine people or is he just interested in the truth?

Somehow I'm reminded of this

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uwOq8zB-ido

antiskeptic

CerebralCortex wrote: »

Is it him trying to undermine people or is he just interested in the truth?

It doesn't really matter. He has to support the contention whichever viewpoint you happen to hold.

Logical Fallacy

antiskeptic wrote: »

God of the bible feeling emotions without requiring biology opens the door to others doing the same.

I'm not sure how you get to supposing a God couldn't feel emotions due to a lack of hormones - this would require a level of knowledge that is beyond you.

Once again you are missing the point. I'll slow things down a little.

"Love" as humans understand it is the by-product of hormones and biology. Removes those mechanism and what do you have?

I'm not saying anything about God, if something exists that is so powerful it can actually create complex systems and life then i wouldn't hazard to understand what it may or may not be able to feel...but I am not talking about a deity, i am talking about our totality of understanding of the importance of biology in a humans perception of the emotional spectrum.

As a final point...it's best not to overstretch yourself, you are talking about a level of knowledge that is beyond me, that i haven't even made any mention of but your entire argument is based on the fact that you are making assumptions based on knowledge which is beyond you.

I'll happily have a polite conversation once you are realistic about what you believe and why, but when you fire out lines that have no relevance to what i posted but have a lot of relevance to what you believe i reserve the right to have a chuckle about it.

And if the human is made in the image and likeness of God (that is to say, that which differentiates humans from animals is the divine life they possess)?

The image and likeness of...once again this says nothing about mechanics. God, were it to exists, would be non-corporal in a traditional sense...I imagine the mashing of that likeness into a physical form involves a lot of limitations and shortcuts...once again i think there is no real safe assumption that the emotional spectrum and experience of a human would tally with that of a deity if it were to exist.

antiskeptic

antiskeptic wrote: »

Because Michaels a 'militant' atheist whose set out to undermine peoples faith in figments of their imagination. He employed the Euthyphro Dilemma in an Irish Times piece recently to that very end.

It's one thing to suppose there is a dilemma - quite another to support that.

Michael needs to sustain the dilemma or the IT letter wilts.

That's why.

I wasn't asking you, I was asking him.

Why? Because the discussion seems to me like a waste of bandwidth.

antiskeptic

Deleted User wrote: »

I wasn't asking you, I was asking him.

Why? Because the discussion seems to me like a waste of bandwidth.

I would agree those kinds of discussions exist. Over and out

antiskeptic

Logical Fallacy wrote: »

Once again you are missing the point. I'll slow things down a little.

*thumbs up*

"Love" as humans understand it is the by-product of hormones and biology. Removes those mechanism and what do you have?

Love needn't be just the by-product of hormones and biology. In a created realm of humanity, hormones and biology would be (important) elements in a total human mechanism which loves. That total mechanism would involve a thing called a spirit which sits at the head of the table of a person (so to speak)

Without hormones in a human you'd have a mechanism minus essential bits - such that it couldn't function properly. Sure.

But in order to support your contention that God can't experience love (because he hasn't got hormones) you'd have to know that only hormones and biology can account for love. That there is no other way for it to be achieved.

This I doubt you can know.

I'm not saying anything about God, if something exists that is so powerful it can actually create complex systems and life then i wouldn't hazard to understand what it may or may not be able to feel...

Not even if it communicated how it feels to you?

but I am not talking about a deity, i am talking about our totality of understanding of the importance of biology in a humans perception of the emotional spectrum.

And you don't see that something (such as love) might be enabled in different ways depending on the makeup of the love enabled creature. In other words, that a spiritual being might be enable to love using a different mechanism to the one a physical being utilises.

Are you excluding the possibility of spiritual (rather than phyical) hormones?

As a final point...it's best not to overstretch yourself, you are talking about a level of knowledge that is beyond me, that i haven't even made any mention of but your entire argument is based on the fact that you are making assumptions based on knowledge which is beyond you.

I'm not sure how you conclude that must be. If a person knew God personally then they would know something of his person and so could perhaps comment.

I'll happily have a polite conversation once you are realistic about what you believe and why, but when you fire out lines that have no relevance to what i posted but have a lot of relevance to what you believe i reserve the right to have a chuckle about it.

So far, what I see on your side is a large assumption about the contraints God is forced to operated under he enables created beings to experience love. That's a bit of a leap, to my mind. Quite ... Luddite in fact.

The image and likeness of...once again this says nothing about mechanics. God, were it to exists, would be non-corporal in a traditional sense...I imagine the mashing of that likeness into a physical form involves a lot of limitations and shortcuts...once again i think there is no real safe assumption that the emotional spectrum and experience of a human would tally with that of a deity if it were to exist.

The likeness of God isn't in the physical - the physical on it's own is mere animal. The divine element of man need not be at all mashed (although the bibles take is that it is misshapen at birth) and might well be able to be brought to understand God. If the core of man is derived from the substance of the character of God then it's not at all far fetched to suppose intimate union possible.

It's fairly standard biblical fayre that - man coming to know and experience the mind of God. You might not believe that but it's not quite as out of order to mention it as you make out.

CerebralCortex

antiskeptic wrote: »

*thumbs up*



Love isn't just the by-product of hormones and biology. In the created realm of humanity, hormones and biology are (important) elements in a total human mechanism which loves. That total mechanism involves a thing called a spirit which sits at the head of the table of a person (so to speak)

Without hormones in a human you'd have a mechanism minus essential bits - such that it couldn't function properly. Sure.

But in order to support your contention that God can't experience love (because he hasn't got hormones) you'd have to know that only hormones and biology can account for love.

Which I doubt you can do.

But the evidence points in that direction, far more in fact than the idea of a spirit or a soul I'm afraid. To suggest the opposite is tantamount to insanity.

antiskeptic

CerebralCortex wrote: »

But the evidence points in that direction, far more in fact than the idea of a spirit or a soul I'm afraid. To suggest the opposite is tantamount to insanity.

It doesn't matter where the evidence points.

What matters is what actually is the case. IF it is the case that God of the bible exists THEN a lack of hormones isn't an obstacle to love since love isn't sourced in biology, it's sourced in the character of God -and in the divine element of those created in him image. Our spirits in other words.

Logical Fallacy is committing a logical fallacy since he's supposing the "evidence pointing" to equate to inerrant fact.

Sarky

antiskeptic wrote: »

It doesn't matter where the evidence points.

I this part of what you said so very much.

antiskeptic

Sarky wrote: »

I this part of what you said so very much.

When you jump in midstream and don't seem to be following the line of discussion then anything can happen I suppose.

CerebralCortex

antiskeptic wrote: »

When you jump in midstream and don't seem to be following the line of discussion then anything can happen I suppose.

Come on! He got ya. Admit it. The evidence has little bearing on your beliefs.

antiskeptic

CerebralCortex wrote: »

Come on! He got ya. Admit it. The evidence has little bearing on your beliefs.

Your task isn't to be a canary in Sarky's quotemine. Your task is to reply to the complete post posted you - bearing in mind the context in which it was posted

Can you do that CC? Can you do it?

Zombrex

antiskeptic wrote: »

Nothing need determine it. It can be the intrinsic nature of love.

Which means love exists independently to God and thus God is not the source of love.

This is one part of the dilemma.

antiskeptic wrote: »

If God is self-contained and infinite then you can track "backwards" within him to find purpose and meaning and reason forever without end. Your error, I think, is in the attempt to get to the end of God as if he operated linearly like we do (x happens because of y and y because of z. Can't go any further than z then you've arrived at arbitariness and meaningless and reasonless).

Whilst you can't arrive at the end of a non-linear infinite 'system' like God, you can conclude that the totality of possible meaning, purpose and reason is contained within God. Where's the dilemma in that?

The linearity of it is not relevant. God being infinite does not change anything I've said, and if you think it does I think you are missing the point some what.

You seem to have settled on the idea above that love exists independently to God (as a force of nature so to speak) and that God follows love because it is good and he wants to feel love.

This creates the situation where properties of God are defined independently to God, thus creating a problem for the notion that God is the source of all.

Would that be correct?

antiskeptic

Zombrex wrote: »

Which means love exists independently to God and thus God is not the source of love.

?

'Love' is just a label being used to tag an attribute of God. You can use the label 'zog' in it's place if you like. Changing the label doesn't alter the flavour of the attribute.

The assertion is that nothing need determine that attribute of God we call 'zog' having the flavour it does. God being ever-existing means nothing determines him or his attributes.

I don't see how you get from that assertion to the idea that this attribute of God can exist independently of God.


Night II

Galvasean

antiskeptic wrote: »

It doesn't matter where the evidence points.

The fundamental difference between theist and atheist.

What matters is what actually is the case.

And how do we decide what actually is the case? By looking to where the evidence points. Or, if you prefer, wherever the heck you like apparently!

antiskeptic

delete

antiskeptic

Galvasean wrote: »

And how do we decide what actually is the case?

What you decide is the case and what is the case needn't be the same thing.

If you'd taken the time to track back in the discussion rather than hopping in midstream you'd see the context of 'evidence' was physical/empirical.

Suppose you die and are faced with God who is not physical, would you say you've got evidence to enable you to decide differenty.

Or would you keep beating that "the only evidence is empirical evidence" drum?


-


The relevant post involved an IF statement indicating the discussion was about what is possible. If you'd taken that time to follow that particular rabbit down the that hole, you wouldn't be digging this particular one.

CerebralCortex

antiskeptic wrote: »

What you decide is the case and what is the case needn't be the same thing.

If you'd taken the time to track back in the discussion rather than hopping in midstream you'd see the context of 'evidence' was physical/empirical.

Suppose you die and are faced with God who is not physical, would you say you've got evidence to enable you to decide differenty.

Or would you keep beating that "the only evidence is empirical evidence" drum?

Ah, ya. What do you suggest? We rely on intuitions?

MrPudding

CerebralCortex wrote: »

Ah, ya. What do you suggest? We rely on intuitions?

Duh. You need to use your blood pumping organ. Do you not know anything?

MrP

CerebralCortex

MrPudding wrote: »

Duh. You need to use your blood pumping organ. Do you not know anything?

MrP

No my cardiac cortex was damaged, hence the name.

MrPudding

CerebralCortex wrote: »

No my cardiac cortex was damaged, hence the name.

Ah. That explains why you don't beleive in gods then. If you have a damaged heart then how can you expect to see?

MrP