LOSING SMALL WARS-British military failure in Iraq & Afghanistan

timhorgan

LOSING SMALL WARS- British military failure in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Frank Ledwidge is an Irishman who has held senior British military intelligence posts in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan - This book is a serious wake-up call for the British military. it just goes to show how lucky we are with the "triple-lock" system.

Telegraph review- the reviewer has actually comletely missed the point about "boots on the ground".

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/bookreviews/8652343/Losing-Small-Wars-by-Frank-Ledwidge-review.html

I have just finished this book - the full title is indicative of the content

1) This book would not have been needed if Tony Blair and the British government had the decency and intelligence to listen to Field Marshall Lord Bramall who was against involvment in Iraq from the beginning and asked all the right questions " Of course we can get to Baghdad, but what are we going to do when we get there?" Letter to The Times.

2). Ledwidge tells of a certain very Senior Officer (but does not name) who went skiing in France just as a major op. was beginning. However, from the text and the context we can easily figure that one out.

3). Lovely little vignette on page 62 showing the British sense of humour
General David Richards, Commander of ISAF in southern Afghanistan at the time

"We were told the Canadians had asked to do Kandahar and that we would go to a place called Helmand. and I thought "Where's Helmand?".

This should be required reading for every British serviceman and woman this August. It is certainly the most hard-hitting. It is clear that the author has nothing but admiration for the courage, tenacity and professional of the British Army- all ranks, but with a few notable exceptions only those below one star. The tale he tells will make very uncomfortable reading for almost everyone with the rank of Brigadier upwards and all the politiicans involved. Very few civil servants or anyone at the MOD will enjoy reading it either.

Frank Ledwidge has "done the State some service". If only a quarter of what he outlines is true we should see a mass falling on swords. This book is up there with "Dead men Risen".

HellsAngel

timhorgan wrote: »

LOSING SMALL WARS- British military failure in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Frank Ledwidge is an Irishman who has held senior British military intelligence posts in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan - This book is a serious wake-up call for the British military. it just goes to show how lucky we are with the "triple-lock" system.

Telegraph review- the reviewer has actually comletely missed the point about "boots on the ground".

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/bookreviews/8652343/Losing-Small-Wars-by-Frank-Ledwidge-review.html

I have just finished this book - the full title is indicative of the content

1) This book would not have been needed if Tony Blair and the British government had the decency and intelligence to listen to Field Marshall Lord Bramall who was against involvment in Iraq from the beginning and asked all the right questions " Of course we can get to Baghdad, but what are we going to do when we get there?" Letter to The Times.

2). Ledwidge tells of a certain very Senior Officer (but does not name) who went skiing in France just as a major op. was beginning. However, from the text and the context we can easily figure that one out.

3). Lovely little vignette on page 62 showing the British sense of humour
General David Richards, Commander of ISAF in southern Afghanistan at the time

"We were told the Canadians had asked to do Kandahar and that we would go to a place called Helmand. and I thought "Where's Helmand?".

This should be required reading for every British serviceman and woman this August. It is certainly the most hard-hitting. It is clear that the author has nothing but admiration for the courage, tenacity and professional of the British Army- all ranks, but with a few notable exceptions only those below one star. The tale he tells will make very uncomfortable reading for almost everyone with the rank of Brigadier upwards and all the politiicans involved. Very few civil servants or anyone at the MOD will enjoy reading it either.

Frank Ledwidge has "done the State some service". If only a quarter of what he outlines is true we should see a mass falling on swords. This book is up there with "Dead men Risen".

I remember a few months ago this embarrassing wiki leak:

UK troops were 'not up' to the task of securing Afghanistan's troubled Helmand province and the local governor pleaded for US reinforcements.
The claims were made by US diplomats, which were released by WikiLeaks in a new batch of cables.

http://www.rte.ie/news/2010/1203/wikileaks.html

long journey

US blames Iran for recent deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan by arming local militias http://bit.ly/lawgdT

alanmcqueen

Ordered the book; thanks for the tip.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article6969921.ece

A lot of one stars and above to give out about it seems.

LondonIrish90

HellsAngel wrote: »

I remember a few months ago this embarrassing wiki leak:

UK troops were 'not up' to the task of securing Afghanistan's troubled Helmand province and the local governor pleaded for US reinforcements.
The claims were made by US diplomats, which were released by WikiLeaks in a new batch of cables.

http://www.rte.ie/news/2010/1203/wikileaks.html

I don't think its too embarrassing if the local Afghan commander doesn't believe the task is being carried out in the right manner. I dare say he isn't a leading brain when it comes to modern military tactics and strategy. I'd suggest British and Afghan commanders have vastly different ideas on how to approach a campaign such as this. Just look at the amout of deaths the ANP and ANA suffer. Would a casualty rate that high be considered even remotely acceptable to the British? Of course not.

He may be frustrated at progress in Helmand, however who is to say the Americans will bring what he desires?

Saying this, British soldiers are indeed involved in some of the most ferocious fighting they have seen in decades and men are spread thinly. However, throughout history the British have more often than not been outnumbered significantly in many campaigns from which they have emerged victorious. I would not however see this plea as a reflection in any way on the integrity, tenacity and professionalism of British troops on the ground.

constantg

LondonIrish90 wrote: »

I

Saying this, British soldiers are indeed involved in some of the most ferocious fighting they have seen in decades and men are spread thinly. However, throughout history the British have more often than not been outnumbered significantly in many campaigns from which they have emerged victorious. I would not however see this plea as a reflection in any way on the integrity, tenacity and professionalism of British troops on the ground.

I thought professionally cutting the fingers off your enemies went out with the French at Agincourt?

Also facing facts the truth on the ground is often far different than the truth in the papers.

I would say that the locals are probably right in calling for the British Army to go in instead of the Yanks. Say what you will about the Brits (and i generally don't invite many to my house for tea and crumpets) they USUALLY only shoot the guys with guns.

They USUALLY only drop 1,000 lbs bombs on definitive enemy positions.

They USUALLY don't lash off $1000000 worth of ammo and pyro when they hear a noise at night! They tend to identify their targets and light them up then :P

Batsy

constantg wrote: »

I

Say what you will about the Brits (and i generally don't invite many to my house for tea and crumpets)

Why? Is your house a mess?

cruasder777

HellsAngel wrote: »

I remember a few months ago this embarrassing wiki leak:

UK troops were 'not up' to the task of securing Afghanistan's troubled Helmand province and the local governor pleaded for US reinforcements.
The claims were made by US diplomats, which were released by WikiLeaks in a new batch of cables.

http://www.rte.ie/news/2010/1203/wikileaks.html

3,000 infantrymen in an area the size of wales, what were they supposed to do ?

They were there for peace keeping, when things flared up 5 years ago they were under siege, some platoons in remote forward operating bases were under attack 24/7, cut off by road and supplied by air.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7146458.ece

They held on, but only just. The courage of 16 Air Assault Brigade’s defence of the “platoon houses” is now the stuff of military folklore.

But the first six months of the Helmand campaign were a disaster for a British mission beset from the start by poor planning and resourcing, weak intelligence, departmental infighting, charges of tactical recklessness, a dysfunctional command structure and an unforeseen Taleban resurgence.
Related Links



As British televisions broadcast the World Cup from Germany through the summer of 2006, 33 British servicemen were killed and about 100 more injured in the most intense period of fighting endured by British Forces in 50 years. While they were cut off in small bases, or platoon houses, there were extraordinary episodes of resistance and bravery. At Naw Zad, 40 Gurkhas held off 28 assaults in two weeksÍ at Sangin 100 paratroopers fought off 44 attacks in 25 daysÍ at Kajaki eight British soldiers and two dozen Afghans repelled 30 attacks in ten days.

HellsAngel

cruasder777 wrote: »

3,000 infantrymen in an area the size of wales, what were they supposed to do ?

They were there for peace keeping, when things flared up 5 years ago they were under siege, some platoons in remote forward operating bases were under attack 24/7, cut off by road and supplied by air.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7146458.ece

They held on, but only just. The courage of 16 Air Assault Brigade’s defence of the “platoon houses” is now the stuff of military folklore.

But the first six months of the Helmand campaign were a disaster for a British mission beset from the start by poor planning and resourcing, weak intelligence, departmental infighting, charges of tactical recklessness, a dysfunctional command structure and an unforeseen Taleban resurgence.
Related Links



As British televisions broadcast the World Cup from Germany through the summer of 2006, 33 British servicemen were killed and about 100 more injured in the most intense period of fighting endured by British Forces in 50 years. While they were cut off in small bases, or platoon houses, there were extraordinary episodes of resistance and bravery. At Naw Zad, 40 Gurkhas held off 28 assaults in two weeksÍ at Sangin 100 paratroopers fought off 44 attacks in 25 daysÍ at Kajaki eight British soldiers and two dozen Afghans repelled 30 attacks in ten days.

"They held on, but only just." Only with the help of good old Uncle Sam yet again.

cruasder777

HellsAngel wrote: »

"They held on, but only just." Only with the help of good old Uncle Sam yet again.

With American air support as well as RAF and other NATO air Forces. 25,000 US troops are now in the same area supported by 80 chinooks.

You sound as if you would have prefered they were wiped out.

16 Air Assaults bdes 2006 siege of Helmand is the stuff of legend. Maybe if other armies had shared their burden they would not have struggled so much, hey ?

You have to question this dumb Yank Generals take on the fact he seems to think they should have been out patrolling and winning the hearts and minds of locals in 2006 when they were under attack from thousands of insurgents, across Helmand in some cases with only a platoon or less supported by the Afghan army, cut off in remote FOBs.

In some FOBs they were so close to being over run they were told to destroy photographs and fix bayonets.

They were tested in a way most modern infantry are not nowadays and came up to scratch.

HellsAngel

cruasder777 wrote: »

With American air support as well as RAF and other NATO air Forces. 25,000 US troops are now in the same area supported by 80 chinooks.

You sound as if you would have prefered they were wiped out.

16 Air Assaults bdes 2006 siege of Helmand is the stuff of legend. Maybe if other armies had shared their burden they would not have struggled so much, hey ?

You have to question this dumb Yank Generals take on the fact he seems to think they should have been out patrolling and winning the hearts and minds of locals in 2006 when they were under attack from thousands of insurgents, across Helmand in some cases with only a platoon or less supported by the Afghan army, cut off in remote FOBs.

In some FOBs they were so close to being over run they were told to destroy photographs and fix bayonets.

They were tested in a way most modern infantry are not nowadays and came up to scratch.

"16 Air Assaults bdes 2006 siege of Helmand is the stuff of legend." According to who ?? Let me guess...... according to 16 Air Assault Bde that's who !!! The Americans are the real deal, the place would fall apart without them. American helicopter support , that's the cutting factor.

cruasder777

HellsAngel wrote: »

"16 Air Assaults bdes 2006 siege of Helmand is the stuff of legend." According to who ?? Let me guess...... according to 16 Air Assault Bde that's who !!! The Americans are the real deal, the place would fall apart without them. American helicopter support , that's the cutting factor.

It was the most intense fighting the Brits have experienced since Korea.

So your saying (as one example) a platoon of British infantry being cut off and holding out in 52 day siege (the longest the Brits have been involved with since WWII) in a remote FOB in Helmand before relief could get through not the stuff of military legend ?

No one is disputing the US militaries professionalism or logistical capabilty, the Brits get involved in such situations because they over stretch themselves, the fact they are sometimes under equipped and out numbered is what makes it more intresting.

Rorkes Drift, Helmand, Arnham, the Falklands to name a few. No one is disputing the Americans overwhelming firepower.

The history of the British army is one of Lions led by donkeys, nothing new there.

I dont dispute that the Brits sometimes get things wrong and f.....up, but your just trying to slag them them off where credit is due.


Siege of Musa Qala

By this time the Pathfinders had spent six weeks in the field, and they were beginning to show signs of exhaustion, while their equipment was becoming worn by constant use in difficult conditions. They were due to be relieved by the Danish Reconnaissance squadron, a 140-strong force equipped with MOWAG Eagle armoured vehicles. The Danish forces, accompanied by some British signals specialists, left Camp Bastion on July 21. As they approached Musa Qala from the West, the Pathfinders observed groups of Taliban regrouping to ambush them, and directed a Harrier GR7 against the insurgents, killing several.[21] The Taliban had blocked the road with barrels, and attacked the Danish column from three sides with machine guns and RPGs. The column halted when one Eagle was destroyed by a mine and its three crewmen were wounded, and, after having directed an airstrike from a B-1 bomber against Taliban positions, it withdrew into the desert, much to the dismay of the Pathfinders.[3] The garrison had now run out of food and water, and were reduced to drinking goats milk, while their ammunition was also running low, and they had no more batteries for their night vision devices. The Taliban chose December 24 to launch their largest attack against the district centre, in the form of a concerted assault by 300 militants against every side of the base. The attack opened with an RPG strike that destroyed one of the sangars, causing a Danish soldier to fall outside the compound. Private Mark Wilson of the Pathfinders used an old bedstead to climb the compound wall and help the injured Dane to safety under enemy fire, for which he was later awarded the Military Cross.[22] Air support took 90 minutes to arrive, during which the base was subjected to continuous fire, which would have been even heavier, if the Danish column hadn't intercepted Taliban reinforcements coming from Now Zad. On July 26, after coalition aircraft dropped six 1000-pound bombs on known Taliban positions, the relief force finally broke in to Musa Qala. There were no casualties, except for a Pathfinder sergeant who was accidentally shot by an ANP guard.[22]


http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1531204/Troops-come-home-with-tales-of-heroism.html

The first troops to return from a summer of intense fighting in Afghanistan came home last night after some of the toughest battles the Army has seen in 50 years. The simple count of ammunition expended, 450,000 rounds of small arms fire, 4,300 artillery rounds and 1,000 grenades thrown – told its own story of the enormous gun battles.

A senior commander, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said: "We went there to carry out reconstruction and we ended up fighting a war."

For the past four months the 3,500 troops of the Helmand Task Force, based around 3 Bn the Parachute Regiment, have been fighting with an intensity not seen since the Korean War. They lost 16 dead and 43 wounded.

For the first time in decades, artillery fired their guns over open sights, military policemen were turned into streetwise infantry fighters and Chinook pilots watched as rockets and bullets came within inches of downing their aircraft.



Some soldiers talked of frontline fighting akin to the First World War, others nonchalantly accepted "becoming accustomed" to incoming fire.

"If anybody tells me that the youth of today cannot hack it then that is complete bloody nonsense – they showed courage in spades out there and done us all proud," the senior commander said.

"These guys have faced an intensity of combat we have not faced for generations. It's been quite hairy but the guys pulled through."

A unit of the Para's elite Pathfinder platoon who had gone to the town of Musa Qala for a six-day operation ended up spending 52 days in the town, in combat for 26 of them.

The tactic of pushing out into Taliban-held towns in northern Helmand using platoon houses of 50 to 100 men to protect the areas had worked because it acted as a "breakwater" that kept the enemy away from more central areas.

Some patrols in the town of Sangin left their base knowing that there was a 90 per cent chance of contact with the enemy.

"It takes a special kind of courage for anybody to go out day after day to know what they are up against particularly when they have seen their friends killed on previous operations," the officer said. "RAF have also given us some of bravest flying I have ever seen or heard of.

"But I think more could have been done to prepare the public for the type of mission we were about to undertake."

The initial role of the Royal Military Police, carrying out routine investigation duties, changed into one of fighting pitched battles, standing shoulder to shoulder with Paras they would more normally have been separating in bar-room brawls.

With the severe lack of infantrymen, the RMPs were among several units called to fight. For the first time, the soldiers were asked to use heavy machine guns, mortars and grenades to fight off waves of Taliban attacks.


For the first time in almost 50 years the Royal Artillery fired over "open sights". In a tactic redolent of the Napoleonic era, the gunners of I Battery 7 Royal Horse fired their 105mm shells from close range at a Taliban machine gun nest during one engagement. Overall the battery of six light guns fired an extraordinary 4,300 rounds of mostly high explosive ordnance.

As desperate battles raged around the platoon houses with wave after wave of Taliban attacks, the infantry called in the bombardments with the artillery at times landing them "target close" – about 100 yards away from friendly positions.

Major Gary Wilkinson, 37, the battery commander, had to give up a troop of 30 men to become infantry. After one two-week operation, in which the unit had fired 10,000 rifle rounds, they had 20 hours to ready their cannons and return to duty as gunners.

HellsAngel

cruasder777 wrote: »

So your saying (as one example) a platoon of British infantry being cut off and holding out in 52 day siege (the longest the Brits have been involved with since WWII) in a remote FOB in Helmand before relief could get through not the stuff of regimental legend ?

No one is disputing the US militaries professionalism or logistical capabilty, the Brits get involved in such situations because they over stretch themselves, the fact they are sometimes under equipped and out numbered is what makes it more intresting.

Rorkes Drift, Helmand, Arnham, the Falklands to name a few. No one is disputing the Americans overwhelming firepower.

The history of the British army is one of Lions led by donkeys, nothing new there.

I dont dispute that the Brits sometimes get things wrong and f.....up, but your just trying to slag them them off where credit is due.

Well at least you can admit the US militaries professionalism and logistical capabilty, their the real deal no doubt about it. But since your into history and " stuff of legends ". I'll tell you what stuff of legends is and give you some perspective -

Siege of Leningrad 8 September 1941 – 27 January 1944

Battle of Monte Cassino 17 January 1944 – 18 May 1944

Iwo Jima 19 February – 26 March 1945

Battle of Dien Bien Phu March 13 – May 7, 1954

As for lions led by donkeys, some lions at Dunkirk, Norway, Crete, Singapore, Gallipoli, Balaclava, Castlebar, Yorktown, Fontenoy etc not to mention a certain place called Afghanistan in 1842 Naturally in these battles against Britain, it's not because the opposition could just possibly have been better soldiers than the ' lions ' now could it !!!!

cruasder777

HellsAngel wrote: »

Well at least you can admit the US militaries professionalism and logistical capabilty, their the real deal no doubt about it. But since your into history and " stuff of legends ". I'll tell you what stuff of legends is and give you some perspective -

Siege of Leningrad 8 September 1941 – 27 January 1944

Battle of Monte Cassino 17 January 1944 – 18 May 1944

Iwo Jima 19 February – 26 March 1945

Battle of Dien Bien Phu March 13 – May 7, 1954

As for lions led by donkeys, some lions at Dunkirk, Norway, Crete, Singapore, Gallipoli, Balaclava, Castlebar, Yorktown, Fontenoy etc not to mention a certain place called Afghanistan in 1842 Naturally in these battles against Britain, it's not because the opposition could just possibly have been better soldiers than the ' lions ' now could it !!!!

Yes mate easy to slag off from your arm chair, I wonder how you would have shaped up at any of those places.

I would never slag off those on the losing end of major military battles, leave it to armchair warriors like you.

constantg

Batsy wrote: »

Why? Is your house a mess?

No, but the door frame does show signs from where the RIC and the British Army units in South Tipp in 1920 broke it in one Sunday morning and tore it apart searching for weapons.


Silly boys, sure weren't they hidden up in the haybarn like!

Fratton Fred

cruasder777 wrote: »

Yes mate easy to slag off from your arm chair, I wonder how you would have shaped up at any of those places.

I would never slag off those on the losing end of major military battles, leave it to armchair warriors like you.

I think the appropriate advice is to not feed the troll.

Patsy the Hells Angel prefers fighting battles from a bar stool than in the flesh.

HellsAngel

Fratton Fred wrote: »

I think the appropriate advice is to not feed the troll.

Patsy the Hells Angel prefers fighting battles from a bar stool than in the flesh.

Now 3,2,1 before Fred's friend getz comes along with "hes badd tyyping and speling " to back him up !!!!

( As for fighting from a barstool, well you should drop into the Self Defense or Mixed Martial Arts forum from time to time. I don't say I have all the answers but anyone with experience would see that HA knows his sparring and rolling . I wouldn't consider myself a Chuck Liddell or Rampage Jackson, been a black belt in Tae Kwon Do, a blue belt in Brailian Jiu Jitsu and having boxed in my early teens, I spend a lot less time on a bar stoool around here than many others )

constantg

ANY chance at all we could stick to the thread?

I mean looking at Afghanistan it is worth noting that noone has ever succeeded in suppressing the tribes and conquering the area effectively. Like didn't Alexander the Great leave it be?

Also look at the Russians; THIS was their Vietnam! It's part of the Yanks second Vietnam (with Iraq).


Counter-Mobility is a HUGE issue over there. The guys were (and are) being bottled up in compounds, like an earlier poster referred to in detail (the siege; apologies, can't remember who you are offhand). The 21st century army is being beated by 19th century tactics!

All of the fancy trucks and patrolling vehicles are sticking to roads and as we all know predictability breeds complacency. They get hit up because there are a limited number of ways in and out.

Air supply is the only realistic option, but there aren't enough heli assets, so drops of resupply etc have to be scripted. Travel times for the attack assets (up to 90 mins for UK Apache from Kandahar and sometimes 2 hrs for a fast mover from the Indian Ocean via a carrier) means that there just aren't enough seriously hard hitting assets in theatre to strike back.

ROE (Rules of Engagement) mean that the soldiers are under HORRIFIC pressure to make sure they're lighting up the right guys. Verbal Warnings, Warning shots, paranoid Accuracy in fire (needing to avoid civillian casualties at all costs) are all things rarely seen in a CONVENTIONAL war! On the modern (theoretical) battlefield, doctrine suggests that noncoms (civillians) still present are in mortal danger and need to be encouraged to leave, so that combattants can have a greater degree of flexibility. At the moment NATO and ISAF are being hamstrung in the manner in which they can approach operations against an emeny who is hiding amongst the populace and using them as cover. Thus NATO/ISAF are unable to begin 'unrestricted' warfare against their enemy.

At the moment both sides are engaged in counter-insurgency cat-and-mouse, with little to show for it. The Taliban are still alive (which is the main goal of the insurgent in practical terms) after a decade of combat and the allied nations have invested a disproportionate amount of cash and lives into an ever changing mission. Added to this there's this concept of 'nation building'. You can't nation build where there's an active warzone.

HellsAngel

constantg wrote: »

ANY chance at all we could stick to the thread?

I mean looking at Afghanistan it is worth noting that noone has ever succeeded in suppressing the tribes and conquering the area effectively. Like didn't Alexander the Great leave it be?

Also look at the Russians; THIS was their Vietnam! It's part of the Yanks second Vietnam (with Iraq).


Counter-Mobility is a HUGE issue over there. The guys were (and are) being bottled up in compounds, like an earlier poster referred to in detail (the siege; apologies, can't remember who you are offhand). The 21st century army is being beated by 19th century tactics!

All of the fancy trucks and patrolling vehicles are sticking to roads and as we all know predictability breeds complacency. They get hit up because there are a limited number of ways in and out.

Air supply is the only realistic option, but there aren't enough heli assets, so drops of resupply etc have to be scripted. Travel times for the attack assets (up to 90 mins for UK Apache from Kandahar and sometimes 2 hrs for a fast mover from the Indian Ocean via a carrier) means that there just aren't enough seriously hard hitting assets in theatre to strike back.

ROE (Rules of Engagement) mean that the soldiers are under HORRIFIC pressure to make sure they're lighting up the right guys. Verbal Warnings, Warning shots, paranoid Accuracy in fire (needing to avoid civillian casualties at all costs) are all things rarely seen in a CONVENTIONAL war! On the modern (theoretical) battlefield, doctrine suggests that noncoms (civillians) still present are in mortal danger and need to be encouraged to leave, so that combattants can have a greater degree of flexibility. At the moment NATO and ISAF are being hamstrung in the manner in which they can approach operations against an emeny who is hiding amongst the populace and using them as cover. Thus NATO/ISAF are unable to begin 'unrestricted' warfare against their enemy.

At the moment both sides are engaged in counter-insurgency cat-and-mouse, with little to show for it. The Taliban are still alive (which is the main goal of the insurgent in practical terms) after a decade of combat and the allied nations have invested a disproportionate amount of cash and lives into an ever changing mission. Added to this there's this concept of 'nation building'. You can't nation build where there's an active warzone.

I believe their's a saying that an Afghan is only happy when he's fighting.

cruasder777

constantg wrote: »

ANY chance at all we could stick to the thread?

I mean looking at Afghanistan it is worth noting that noone has ever succeeded in suppressing the tribes and conquering the area effectively. Like didn't Alexander the Great leave it be?

Also look at the Russians; THIS was their Vietnam! It's part of the Yanks second Vietnam (with Iraq).


Counter-Mobility is a HUGE issue over there. The guys were (and are) being bottled up in compounds, like an earlier poster referred to in detail (the siege; apologies, can't remember who you are offhand). The 21st century army is being beated by 19th century tactics!

All of the fancy trucks and patrolling vehicles are sticking to roads and as we all know predictability breeds complacency. They get hit up because there are a limited number of ways in and out.

Air supply is the only realistic option, but there aren't enough heli assets, so drops of resupply etc have to be scripted. Travel times for the attack assets (up to 90 mins for UK Apache from Kandahar and sometimes 2 hrs for a fast mover from the Indian Ocean via a carrier) means that there just aren't enough seriously hard hitting assets in theatre to strike back.

ROE (Rules of Engagement) mean that the soldiers are under HORRIFIC pressure to make sure they're lighting up the right guys. Verbal Warnings, Warning shots, paranoid Accuracy in fire (needing to avoid civillian casualties at all costs) are all things rarely seen in a CONVENTIONAL war! On the modern (theoretical) battlefield, doctrine suggests that noncoms (civillians) still present are in mortal danger and need to be encouraged to leave, so that combattants can have a greater degree of flexibility. At the moment NATO and ISAF are being hamstrung in the manner in which they can approach operations against an emeny who is hiding amongst the populace and using them as cover. Thus NATO/ISAF are unable to begin 'unrestricted' warfare against their enemy.

At the moment both sides are engaged in counter-insurgency cat-and-mouse, with little to show for it. The Taliban are still alive (which is the main goal of the insurgent in practical terms) after a decade of combat and the allied nations have invested a disproportionate amount of cash and lives into an ever changing mission. Added to this there's this concept of 'nation building'. You can't nation build where there's an active warzone.

Numbers is the biggest issue, even now with 25,000 US troops in Helmand, its a fraction of whats needed.

The Russians had 500,000 troops in Afghanistan.

constantg

cruasder777 wrote: »

Numbers is the biggest issue, even now with 25,000 US troops in Helmand, its a fraction of whats needed.

The Russians had 500,000 troops in Afghanistan.

Surely the ROE needs to be looked at then though? Like facing facts the Yanks had thousands in Vietnam, but were fighting a huge enemy.

Here they're fighting a few thousand (at most) and yet it's developing a type of asymetric warfare where IEDs (NOT a novel invention despite what FOX news would have you think) and decent Iranian sniper scopes are destroying modern armies!

Like it doesn't bode well for future security against a resurgent Russia, a nuclear Iran or an increasingly technologically armed, nuclear Red China, if the pride of NATO can't knock off a few thousand bearded lads who believe anything more than a yurt is an offence against 'God'......

timhorgan

I went to a meeting in the House of Commons this week where a very distinguished British diplomat and Russian expert spoke about Afghanistan and the book he had written. Rodric Braithwaites book (Guardian review of book below) takes a very sympathetic view of both the Russian and Afghan peoples and the book is well worth reading over these winter evenings for anyone who has an interest in the tragedy at present unfolding in Afghanistan.

This week he spoke of an Estonian sergeant at present serving with ISAF who had also served in Afghanistan as a young man with the Soviet forces. The Estonian described how the Soviets had far more helicopters, shorter supply routes and far more native speakers due to the adjoining Soviet 'stans at that time. Yet they still had to withdraw.

Probably the most important lesson for Ireland is to appreciate how important the "triple-lock" is in regard to sending troops abroad . We should be wary of making even the slightest amendment to this process. It has served us well so far. (I know that there is a small Irish contingent in Kabul but I have no doubt that their experience there will only re-inforce the need for the maintenance of the "triple-lock") if only to prevent young Irish lives to be sacrificed on the whim of idiotic foreign politicians or nutcase generals.


http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/20/afgantsy-russians-afghanistan-rodric-braithwaite-review

Border-Rat

I've just started reading this book. Already its reminding me of Bandit Country by Harnden, i.e. British troops refusing to leave their barracks etc. Its a good read so far, it confirms the over-rated nature of British troops.

timhorgan

constantg;]ANY chance at all we could stick to the thread?

Counter-Mobility is a HUGE issue over there. The guys were (and are) being bottled up in compounds, like an earlier poster referred to in detail (the siege; apologies, can't remember who you are offhand). The 21st century army is being beated by 19th century tactics!

All of the fancy trucks and patrolling vehicles are sticking to roads and as we all know predictability breeds complacency. They get hit up because there are a limited number of ways in and out.

Air supply is the only realistic option, but there aren't enough heli assets, so drops of resupply etc have to be scripted. Travel times for the attack assets (up to 90 mins for UK Apache from Kandahar and sometimes 2 hrs for a fast mover from the Indian Ocean via a carrier) means that there just aren't enough seriously hard hitting assets in theatre to strike back.

constantg:

Your summary above is about as succint and precise as it can get in describing how the war is being lost in Afghanistan. You make excellent points. The forward bases are very much like the old US cavalry forts in Indian territory. Even worse, it appears that most contacts - usually initiated by the Taliban- occur within a kilometer of the bases. The British Army in particular is floundering in Helmand.

Take one example- the British Warthog- a 2-pod unit where the Commander is separated from his troops and the only visibility from the troop-carrying pod is via a tv- what kind of situational awareness is that? Then when a contact is initiated the troops are weighed down with so much armour that they can barely make it to the nearest ditch. Top that with the costly and almost totally useless Bowman comms. system. ( In one contact the troop commander could not raise his base just 500m away).

And there is an ongoing cover-up on casualties- the actual casualty rate for units returning this year is 25% (ie. killed or seriously wounded).

cruasder777

Border-Rat wrote: »

I've just started reading this book. Already its reminding me of Bandit Country by Harnden, i.e. British troops refusing to leave their barracks etc. Its a good read so far, it confirms the over-rated nature of British troops.

What British troops refused to leave their baracks ?

Regiment ? Tour date ? Barracks ?

Or are you just posting lies.

cruasder777

timhorgan wrote: »

constantg:

Your summary above is about as succint and precise as it can get in describing how the war is being lost in Afghanistan. You make excellent points. The forward bases are very much like the old US cavalry forts in Indian territory. Even worse, it appears that most contacts - usually initiated by the Taliban- occur within a kilometer of the bases. The British Army in particular is floundering in Helmand.

Take one example- the British Warthog- a 2-pod unit where the Commander is separated from his troops and the only visibility from the troop-carrying pod is via a tv- what kind of situational awareness is that? Then when a contact is initiated the troops are weighed down with so much armour that they can barely make it to the nearest ditch. Top that with the costly and almost totally useless Bowman comms. system. ( In one contact the troop commander could not raise his base just 500m away).

And there is an ongoing cover-up on casualties- the actual casualty rate for units returning this year is 25% (ie. killed or seriously wounded).

Your post is a total fabrication, troop casualty rates are not 25 % this yr, there have been far fewer deaths and injuries this yr.

The commander sits up front with warthog like with all APCs and is seperated from his troops like with all APCs,but in communication, what are you on about ? What visibilty do troops have in any APC ?

You were proven wrong on another thread about the warthog, it has a great safety record with IEDs, 11 hits and only two serious injuries, this has already been pointed out to you.

We are now with Bowman BCIP 5 Tim keep up, the problems you talk of were on previous models and have been corrected.


Yet you persist with BS and lies.

Border-Rat

cruasder777 wrote: »

What British troops refused to leave their baracks ?

Regiment ? Tour date ? Barracks ?

Or are you just posting lies.

Sorry to interrupt fantasy, but;

Towards the end of the year (1993), members of a Royale Scot Platoon were disciplined for remaining in their base while on vehicle checkpoint duty because they had opted to falsify car registration details in preference to venturing outside.

- - Bandit Country, Toby Harnden, p.401

This is from a different book in a different theatre, obviously. But the author of this book makes similar allegations.

Are you a former and/or current employee of the British military?

cruasder777

Border-Rat wrote: »

Sorry to interrupt fantasy, but;



- - Bandit Country, Toby Harnden, p.401

This is from a different book in a different theatre, obviously. But the author of this book makes similar allegations.

Are you a former and/or current employee of the British military?

Mind your own business.

By 93 the conflict was all but over. Soldiers on guard duty being too lazy to log proper vehicle details, is hardly the same of what the
author is attepting to claim sounds to me like they kept a senior officer waiting while playing cards or something and got busted for it, checks were made and it was found they falsified vehicle details.

The British army was losing around 3 soldiers yr, to attempt to claim soldiers feared going out due to such an attrition rate is bs.

alex18

cruasder777 wrote: »

Your post is a total fabrication, troop casualty rates are not 25 % this yr, there have been far fewer deaths and injuries this yr.

Actually, 25% is pretty average. The last battalion I have wounded figures for were on the 2009-2010 tour. Out of 620 all ranks, 120 were evacuated through injury or death. You may notice that this is roughly 20%

When you add in the casualties that were not evacuated, but were still injured or otherwise incapacitated then the figures rise.

cruasder777 wrote: »

The commander sits up front with warthog like with all APCs and is seperated from his troops like with all APCs

You've obviously never been in a Bulldog, Mastiff, Wolfhound etc etc

cruasder777 wrote: »

but in communication, what are you on about ?

He is saying that the separation between a commander and the troops in a Warthog is greater than in other types of APV/AIFV

cruasder777 wrote: »

What visibilty do troops have in any APC ?

Rather depends on the model, but usually not a lot.

cruasder777 wrote: »

We are now with Bowman BCIP 5 Tim keep up, the problems you talk of were on previous models and have been corrected.

Have you ever used a Bowman? The army is lucky more people don't kill themselves just at the powerpoint stage!

Border-Rat

cruasder777 wrote: »

By 93 the conflict was all but over. Soldiers on guard duty being to lazy to log proper vehicle details due to laziness or playing cards etc not the same as what you claim.

Sorry to interrupt your fantasy again, but the context the author gave was they were in fear of the South Armagh Sniper.

The British army was losing around 3 soldiers yr, to attempt to claim soldiers feared going out due to such an attrition rate is bs.

Attacks in South Armagh, statistically were increasing in the 1990's. For example, by 1994 helicopters were ordered to travel in pairs because of the increase in anti-air attacks. This was not the case before 1990. These are the findings of a respected author in a well-researched book.

Its interesting that in the book of the OP, the author speaks about an ego so huge within the British military, that it just mentally blocks out its own shortcomings and that so determined are they in the belief of their own superiority, it actually becomes a fault.

cruasder777

You obviosly havent Alex, if you had you would know Commanders sit up front in Bulldog not in visible contact with their troops, same with Mastiff 3, Wolfhound is just a varient of mastiff.

They are certainly not in visible contact with troops without having to get up and move into physical contact with them, which does not happen because commanders are harnessed in, all modern British APCs have SDU camera systems, rear, front, back etc with IR illuminastors like with warhog, communication is via headsets. Mastiff 3 has a partition.

So Tims warthog claims of commanders not being able to communicate with troops because they are not visible are nonsense.


Tim referred to deaths and serious casualties, repeat this yr they are down. No where nr 25%.



Bowman BCIP 5 does not have the same problems, have you ever used it ?

cruasder777

Border-Rat wrote: »

Sorry to interrupt your fantasy again, but the context the author gave was they were in fear of the South Armagh Sniper.

Attacks in South Armagh, statistically were increasing in the 1990's. For example, by 1994 helicopters were ordered to travel in pairs because of the increase in anti-air attacks. This was not the case before 1990. These are the findings of a respected author in a well-researched book.

Its interesting that in the book of the OP, the author speaks about an ego so huge within the British military, that it just mentally blocks out its own shortcomings and that so determined are they in the belief of their own superiority, it actually becomes a fault.

Helos paired up to stop ground to air attacks on them, they first started doing this in the early 90s. It was a clever strategy, it meant the PIRA had a good chance of being caught.

The fact you claim in the 90s attacks were up shows you are the one living in a fantesy world, yr on yr the death toll of soldiers deaths went down.

Border-Rat

cruasder777 wrote: »

Helos paired up to stop ground to air attacks on them, they first started doing this in the early 90s. It was a clever strategy, it meant the PIRA had a good chance of being caught.

It was to stop lone helicopters being shot down.

The fact you claim in the 90s attacks were up shows you are the one living in a fantesy world, yr on yr the death toll of soldiers deaths went down.

Attacks were decreasing in most of the 06 Counties, but increasing in South Armagh. But you forget, my point had nothing to do with statistics, the point was when the pressure was on - it was proven that Brits did not leave their barracks.

I'm sure I'll find more out about the overrated nature of the worlds self-declared finest armed forces as I read on through this great book. My suspicions of them being over-rated were confirmed years ago when I read real intel on how their faired against the regular Shi'ite army in Iraq in 2003. Hint: It was not flattering.

alex18

cruasder777 wrote: »

You obviosly havent Alex, if you had you would know Commanders sit up front in Bulldog not in visible contact with their troops, same with Mastiff 3, Wolfhound is just a varient of mastiff.

They are certainly not in visible contact with troops without having to get up and move into physical contact with them, which does not happen because commanders are harnessed in, all modern British APCs have SDU camera systems, rear, front, back etc with IR illuminastors like with warhog, communication is via headsets. Mastiff 3 has a partition.

I've worked in them you berk. In most of them, like Mastiff, the commander sits right infront of the troops. Just look on google or youtube and you find plenty of videos like this:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2_xNAYNdLh4

Granted, that video is a Mastiff 2, but the Mastiff 3 basically has new cameras, different seats and special harnesses.

cruasder777 wrote: »

So Tims warthog claims of commanders not being able to communicate with troops because they are not visible are nonsense.

The difference with the Warthog is that the commander and driver are in one cab while the troops are in another.

Communication isn't just about shouting down a radio.

cruasder777 wrote: »

Tim referred to deaths and serious casualties, repeat this yr they are down. No where nr 25%

Considering that this year hasn't ended yet, I wouldn't draw many conclusions.

However, so far this year we have been averaging about 80 UK personnel being admitted to field hospitals every month for various reasons. Last year the average figure was 105 per month.

Saying that, I would maintain that infantry casualties remain at 20-25% per tour.

cruasder777 wrote: »

Bowman BCIP 5 does not have the same problems, have you ever used it ?

Yes, I have used it.

Border-Rat wrote: »

My suspicions of them being over-rated were confirmed years ago when I read real intel on how their faired against the regular Shi'ite army in Iraq in 2003. Hint: It was not flattering.

For every 1 British death during the invasion (March-May), 30 Iraqis were killed and 400-500 captured.

Yeh, terrible performance right there.

cruasder777

Mastiff 3 has a partion at the front with a gap, the commander is not in view, fact.

timhorgan

Border-Rat;Sorry to interrupt fantasy, but;

- - Bandit Country, Toby Harnden, p.401

This is from a different book in a different theatre, obviously. But the author of this book makes similar allegations.

Are you a former and/or current employee of the British military?

BR: Toby Harnden in his excellent book Dead Men Risen also describes officers in Helmand having problems getting troops to follow orders and to advance to contact. I have the book but unfortunately not the time to find the exact reference at present but the Toby Harnden website (below) on the first page does refer to "cowardice|" amongst some of the Welsh Guardsmen.


http://www.tobyharnden.com/reviews/

Excerpt

So too, in their way, are the moments when fear and, on occasion, cowardice seep through the Guardsmen’s defences…Dead Men Risen is a serious work, far removed from the blood-and-thrills of the Bravo Two Zero school of military literary campaigning. Such books may grip but they do not engage. Harnden’s does both.

goldie fish

timhorgan wrote: »

BR: Toby Harnden in his excellent book Dead Men Risen also describes officers in Helmand having problems getting troops to follow orders and to advance to contact. I have the book but unfortunately not the time to find the exact reference at present but the Toby Harnden website (below) on the first page does refer to "cowardice|" amongst some of the Welsh Guardsmen.


http://www.tobyharnden.com/reviews/

Excerpt

Actually timmmmmmeeeeeee, that quote is not by toby, but a review of the book by Alex Massie.
The quote in full:

…Toby Harnden’s Dead Men Risen (the first edition of which was pulped by the MoD, as the author described in The Spectator on 12 March) is a boots-on-the-ground account of the Welsh Guards’ experiences in Helmand Province in 2009. It made me think of Dr Johnson’s quip: ‘Every man thinks meanly of himself for not having been a soldier’. He was right, but Harnden’s fine book also made me thankful I never joined the army.
Still stung by the loss of 32 Guardsmen aboard HMS Galahad during the Falklands War, the Welsh felt they had been offered a chance to prove themselves anew in Helmand province. Instead, they would lose their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Rupert Thorneloe, who became the most senior officer to have died in the field since the Falklands. Thorneloe, leading from the front and by example, was killed by an IED on 1 July 2009.
Such are the wages of leadership. Harnden’s is an account of a regiment at war; there is heroism aplenty, and great camaraderie, but also much squalor and horror. Scenes depicting the repatriation of dead soldiers and their funerals back home are desperately moving. So too, in their way, are the moments when fear and, on occasion, cowardice seep through the Guardsmen’s defences.

Stop taking quotes out of context, you boring little man.

timhorgan

cruasder777 wrote: »

Bowman BCIP 5 does not have the same problems, have you ever used it ?

UK Special Forces rejected Bowman and all units including SAS do not use Bowman. I am sure you know that already.

xflyer

So some soldiers were reluctant to fight and risk their lives. Well, shock horror. Pick up any account of war in any period and you'll find the same. Does this mean the British army as a whole are overrated. No it doesn't. Read any study of men in battle and you instances of this. Unit morale varies for all sorts of reasons.


This war can't be won by troops on the ground. So discussing the failures or otherwise of the prosecution of the war, while all very interesting does rather miss the point. No amount of troops thrown at the problem will get rid of the Taliban. Like the IRA they can neither be completely defeated nor can they win. Like NI the only way to resolve it is by civil and political means.

cruasder777

timhorgan wrote: »

UK Special Forces rejected Bowman and all units including SAS do not use Bowman. I am sure you know that already.

UK SOF units use a much more expensive comms system which relies on military satellites for on the ground units to also be in direct communication with the UK. Its classified.

Bowman when it came out was first generation digital comms system, there were claims it was rolled out to soon, that was 7 yrs ago, since then those problems have been resolved.

The operational needs of SOF units are different then standard infantry.

timhorgan

cruasder : UK SOF units use a much more expensive comms system which relies on military satellites for on the ground units to also be in direct communication with the UK. Its classified.

Its classified: Really?- Made by Fujitsu, cost just under £1billion, Project name was J* and is compatible with Bowman but more importantly with US comms. I could tell you a lot more!.

Bowman when it came out was first generation digital comms system, there were claims it was rolled out to soon, that was 7 yrs ago, since then those problems have been resolved.

Not so, just about 2 years ago a young officer was killed because he moved out into the open to raise comms with his base just 500m away.

Read Dead Men Risen and note that even then you are not getting the full story because the MOD had the first print run pulped and the subsequent book censored. But the book does describe Welsh Guardsmen refusing to advance to contact because their comms were not working.

timhorgan

alex18; The difference with the Warthog is that the commander and driver are in one cab while the troops are in another.

Communication isn't just about shouting down a radio.

Alex18: You are obviously speaking from first-hand experience which is refreshing. The problem of course is is that it is always preferable for the commander to be in direct contact with his men in the vehicle. With Warthog the commander usually sits in the front passenger seat which is said to have very poor visibility. Further it is the commander who has to operate the heavy machinegun located on the front pod. This is hardly an ideal situation where the commander can be tied down with this task rather than directing the firefight. The other problem with t Warthog is the difficulty in reversing which makes it almost useless in narrow urban scenarios. The only other option would be for the commander to sit in the rear pod but this has severe drawbacks as well.
But thanks for the interesting and positive contributions.

cruasder777

timhorgan wrote: »

Its classified: Really?- Made by Fujitsu, cost just under £1billion, Project name was J* and is compatible with Bowman but more importantly with US comms. I could tell you a lot more!.





Not so, just about 2 years ago a young officer was killed because he moved out into the open to raise comms with his base just 500m away.

Read Dead Men Risen and note that even then you are not getting the full story because the MOD had the first print run pulped and the subsequent book censored. But the book does describe Welsh Guardsmen refusing to advance to contact because their comms were not working.

Wow Tim your an expert, you know it was made by Fujitsu because that was in the public domain.

Of course its classified and of course its compatible with Bowman :rolleyes:, once again your claims are false. UK SOF forces need for operational purposes a system which can also communicate with the UK.


I dont rely on sensationalist books Tim :rolleyes:

cruasder777

timhorgan wrote: »

Alex18: You are obviously speaking from first-hand experience which is refreshing. The problem of course is is that it is always preferable for the commander to be in direct contact with his men in the vehicle. With Warthog the commander usually sits in the front passenger seat which is said to have very poor visibility. Further it is the commander who has to operate the heavy machinegun located on the front pod. This is hardly an ideal situation where the commander can be tied down with this task rather than directing the firefight. The other problem with t Warthog is the difficulty in reversing which makes it almost useless in narrow urban scenarios. The only other option would be for the commander to sit in the rear pod but this has severe drawbacks as well.
But thanks for the interesting and positive contributions.

Commanders are always in the front Tim and if you knew anything you would know communication is via headsets.

Commanders do not operate the HMG Lol, there are up to 4 crew inc the commander in the front, not 2.


The reason only 2 men have been injured in 11 IED atacks on warthog is because the men are not in the front vehicle when its hit.

Warthog is not just an urban vehicle, rather an all terrain one, which can go to places other APCs cant, cause of its design.

Owryan

All this bowman good/****e arguing is giving me a strange sense of deja vu.

I m sure timhorgan was spouting the same anti brit crap on another site till people became sick n tired of his crap so now he is here doing the same thing lol.

Unless you ve actually used it or been in a warthog thingymibob then no matter what you say timmy will just try n outshout you. And when he is.proven to be a gross exaggerator he ll just off and start another arguement

BlaasForRafa

Border-Rat wrote: »

Sorry to interrupt fantasy, but;



- - Bandit Country, Toby Harnden, p.401

This is from a different book in a different theatre, obviously. But the author of this book makes similar allegations.

Are you a former and/or current employee of the British military?

And are you a Sinn Fein/IRA supporter? Because you continually show anti British army bias. You can't go accusing someone of bias if you yoursel are clearly showing bias.

alex18

cruasder777 wrote: »

Mastiff 3 has a partion at the front with a gap, the commander is not in view, fact.

Oh sorry. Only their legs, shoulders and feet are in view IF they decide to sit in the front right seat.

They are completely invisible, unless of course they shift 1cm to the left.

cruasder777 wrote: »

Commanders do not operate the HMG Lol, there are up to 4 crew inc the commander in the front, not 2

Have you ever even been in one?

cruasder777

alex18 wrote: »

Oh sorry. Only their legs, shoulders and feet are in view IF they decide to sit in the front right seat.

They are completely invisible, unless of course they shift 1cm to the left.


Have you ever even been in one?

Yes, you obviously havent.

Theres a partion in the mastiff 3 it has a small gap, about a foot wide, the commander is not in view.

Hes also harnessed in, to make out he has visibilty to communicate with his troops is bollox, communication is via headsets.


The warthog can fit 4 in the front, not 2 as Tim claims, it usually has 3.

Am I wrong ?

alex18

cruasder777 wrote: »

Theres a partion in the mastiff 3 it has a small gap, about a foot wide, the commander is not in view.

In your original post you said:

cruasder777 wrote: »

The commander sits up front with warthog like with all APCs and is seperated from his troops

By separated I would believe you to mean that there is a physical separation, like in a Warthog.

You yourself have just admitted that this isn't the case.

cruasder777 wrote: »

Hes also harnessed in, to make out he has visibilty to communicate with his troops is bollox, communication is via headsets.

Communication is generally by shouting at each other, headsets or no in my experience.

cruasder777 wrote: »

The warthog can fit 4 in the front, not 2 as Tim claims, it usually has 3.

Am I wrong ?

Yes. Warthogs can fit upto 6 in the front, although 3 is the norm. Vikings fit 4 in the front, although I think they are being phased out of service.

cruasder777

alex18 wrote: »

In your original post you said:

By separated I would believe you to mean that there is a physical separation, like in a Warthog.

You yourself have just admitted that this isn't the case.


Communication is generally by shouting at each other, headsets or no in my experience.


Yes. Warthogs can fit upto 6 in the front, although 3 is the norm. Vikings fit 4 in the front, although I think they are being phased out of service.

Now I know you have never been in any of these vehicles in your life.

Manic Moran

The difference with the Warthog is that the commander and driver are in one cab while the troops are in another.

Communication isn't just about shouting down a radio.

True, but the important stuff uses a mike. We use intercom systems on the HMMWV even though everyone's within arm's reach of each other. On the larger vehicles, we're all strapped in nice and tight in case of explosion, so the ability to have a friendly conversation without the aid of an intercom system, especially when the vehicle is moving, is all but impossible unless you want to resort to yelling at the top of your voice which has its own issues with trasmission of information. And in the Bradley, I can only 'see' my passengers if I drop down the turret basket and open the hatch, stopping the turret (which must be forward) or if the troops get out and walk into my field of vision. Otherwise... intercom systems.

I'm sorry, but I don't see the VC being separated from the passengers as being a particularly huge deficiency.

NTM