Who Predicted This? Who Do We Blame?

later12

Sand wrote: »

Firstly, experience with Irish banking is not exactly something Id stick on my CV, given the success of Irish banks.

Secondly, even accepting your own views as to what Irish bankers thought, what Irish bankers think is a good and responsible risk management profile is probably cowboy country.

Agreed on the first point. On the second point, I agree partially. But on the second point I think there is some general misunderstanding of what risk management actually is in banking terms and how it relates to lending practice. This is largely a tangent deviating from the thread, so to put this issue to bed here goes.

For example, imagine that you are a banker and you meet me in a pub and I ask you what my chances of getting a loan, x. Imagine that you already know, from our business dealings, that my cashflow is x(y) where (y) is a significant multiplier, and you know that I can provide a guarantee by way of an acceptable risk asset worth many times the total aggregate loan. You also know of my exposures (based on a note of disclosure that I can produce) meaning that my exposure at default is minimal. Would you or would you not tell me, there and then, that I would qualify for a loan, without having to check it out with the risk manager? Of course, if you were a reasonable, intelligent individual (which I have no doubt you are), you would. I would, presumably, at some time thereafter, go into your bank and go through the motions as a matter of procedure. That is what happened in Anglo, too, as far as I know. I don't understand why so many people are shocked that senior figures were able to assure clients on lending facilities given the close nature of customer relations and given that everyone in Anglo knew one another at some level.

Secondly, assessing risk.

Risk analysis and risk management are a sort of catch-all term that people enjoy bashing about (and insist were ignored) without any reference to how risk is actually assessed in the extension of credit within a financial institution.

• Risk managers (and lenders themselves) use routine and procedural scoring tools to weigh the settlement risk of a credit facility. In extending credit for use as leverage in an investment interest, this assessment is ameliorated by way of the available financial data, and an assessment of the investor's company or the portfolio that he has put together.
• Risk has nothing to do with bank policy. The lender and the risk analysis team can only approve credit facilities within the remit of acceptable lending policy that the board and directors of the bank decide upon.
• In Anglo, it was decided that property was a very acceptable risk, and within that remit it was up to lenders and the risk analysis to approve or reject the applications based on their credit scoring - not based on wider bank policy or whether the bank was setting a dangerous policy in classing the property exposure as acceptable.

It is in the above light that I am calling BS on the accusation that lending standards were relaxed. You can quite easily fault lending policy into property, but without anything to back up a departure from routine lending standards in deciding on the creditworthiness of individual clients, I'm not sure how credible the suggestion ought to be.

This, like I said, is a bit of a tangent and I will be as glad to get off of it as I'm sure you would be. The point is a relatively minor one, but it is nevertheless important. The problem was not lending standards, it was policy at board level, and it was the lack of regulation in the market overall.

If you consider Anglo-Irish to be a well run bank, as an Irish citizen I would truly, truly, truly hate to see what you would consider to be a terribly run bank. Clowns like Lenihan might try to make me liable for their ****ing terrible lending practises.

Where did I ever say they were a well run bank? They were poorly run in many ways, but in many ways I still admire the bank. If AIB and BOI had not tried to encroach on the property investment industry so much as they did, Anglo would probably still be sailing in fair weather. I would suggest that it was not Anglo that brought down the banking industry itself.

Id like you to explain to me how Anglo Irish can be both a black hole and yet, a well run bank, and how you are not an apologist for FF.

Okay I've just explained my position on the first part, but an apologist for Fianna Fail? Come on... I would say I criticise them fairly, I just don't lose the head like some posters when it comes to criticising them. I think that FF have been disastrous for Ireland and for its economy over the past six or seven years in particular, in the long term I am more of an optimist. That's all.

McDave

jmayo wrote: »

First correction the true Celtic Tiger was up until 2001, subsequent to that we had a gigantic bubble.

Yes, the brief post-Dotbomb lull was actually the cue to manage the economy onto a more sustainable trajectory. But Ahern/McCreevy chose populism and hubris over restraint, and the economy rapidly started to lose touch with reality.

keithcan

McDave wrote: »

Yes, the brief post-Dotbomb lull was actually the cue to manage the economy onto a more sustainable trajectory. But Ahern/McCreevy chose populism and hubris over restraint, and the economy rapidly started to lose touch with reality.

You're right, but we the citizens (or enough of our number to make the vital difference) put Ahern and McCreevy and Cowan back in power on each occassion. Does it not come back to this all the time? we can vote them in or out, based on judging their policies and competence. And we judged FF to be the right people to direct our country's way forward.

feicim

later10 wrote: »

I would like to begin by saying that I am not an apologist for Fianna Fáil economic policy (or lack thereof) from about 2001 onwards, nor for property developers. Nor am I an apologist for Bertie Ahern. However, one thing he said during his recent interview struck me, when he said that nobody warned himk of the banking crisis.

I presume most people guffawed at this. But actually, I have a feeling he's correct. While one might have foreseen a slowdown in property and construction, indeed one ought to have foreseen such a thing, who predicted that it would be so extreme, so rapid and as such would lead to bank meltdown in the way that it did?

I know there have been many commentators like George Lee and David McWilliams and Morgan kelly who have been talking about the property boom, but largely they didn't see this as an issue for the banks. Morgan Kelly himself in 2007 suggested that banks were well capitalised to deal with the risks and suggested that the consumer effect of a property bust would be less than seen in the US.

And what about property developers? Unless you are on of these people who doesn't believe that homes should be sold for a profit, what exactly was so wrong about being a property developer? they were, and many still are businessmen. Largely, they didn't see the bust coming so quickly and so dramatically. They didn't ask for NAMA, nor for the bank bailouts. In fact I presume most of them are opposed to both NAMA and the bailout, just like other mortgage owners.

So my question is two-fold

1. Who predicted the mess in its current form (not just the property crash) and
2. Why are we so quick to demonise property developers?

This guy in 1998 seemed fairly sure about what was going to happen...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a37sRjkLtWw

If this guy was able to twig are we really to believe the government had no way of figuring it out??

McDave

keithcan wrote: »

You're right, but we the citizens (or enough of our number to make the vital difference) put Ahern and McCreevy and Cowan back in power on each occassion. Does it not come back to this all the time? we can vote them in or out, based on judging their policies and competence. And we judged FF to be the right people to direct our country's way forward.

It's true. Many citizens voted to continue the party (as in "fun" party). We can blame the voter for not taking a harder view of politicians bribing them with their own money. But neither did FF have it in them to do anything other than go along with the charade, and line their buddies' pockets. Not an ounce of leadership in them.

later12

feicim wrote: »

This guy in 1998 seemed fairly sure about what was going to happen...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a37sRjkLtWw

If this guy was able to twig are we really to believe the government had no way of figuring it out??

A couple of things. Firstly, this was 1998, there was no unsustainable housing bubble, the Irish economy was fundamentally sound. And I don't think a lot of his ''economics lesson'': Apart from the fact that pretty much every bank in existence uses fractional reserve lending, he didn't really 'twig' anything. He just described how banks can collapse, he could have been reading a paragraph straight from Pearson's Financial Economics. This information was always quite accessible, but I didn't see any particular reason in this video 9which after all is from 1998) as to how it could be said to have predicted the irish banking crisis - the guy hardly even mentions Irish banking policy at all.

he seems to have some beef with banks, that's fine, but I don't think he should be credited with really having predicted any of this apart from describing accurately enough how banks can fall in general terms.

Sand

@Later10

A couple of things. Firstly, this was 1998, there was no unsustainable housing bubble,

What, the warnings are too early now?

McDave

later10 wrote: »

A couple of things. Firstly, this was 1998, there was no unsustainable housing bubble, the Irish economy was fundamentally sound.

I'll hold up my hand and say that during the 1997 election campaign, particularly with the emphasis on tax cuts and the tone set by the Indo's payback headline, I smelled a needless and hasty return to fiscal indiscipline. I felt the country needed more of a steady hand than a Thatcher-style private spending manifesto. There was no bubble in 1998, but we lost the run of ourselves very quickly with poor decisions on infrastructure and an immediate kickstart of consumer spending and commodification of assets. I had a gut feeling that the election of Ahern was an action replay of the profligate Lynch years, and when he appointed the likes of, for instance, Ray Burke, that it was going to be business as usual for construction and other vested interests.

later12

Sand wrote: »

@Later10


What, the warnings are too early now?

Well what was he warning about? There is no accusation that the banks were lending irresponsibly nor engaged in unusual or unsafe funding policies in 1998.

To put it into context, that youtube video dates from around the time that NIB were facing a high court investigation into problems relating to tax disclosure and charging practices as well as some scandals in AIB relating to DIRT, trading and auditing. There was a ganeral air of mistrust, rightly so.

While he might realistically have made the case that banks ought not be trusted, he really didn't provide anything directly useful on the banking crisis as it has emerged, apart from a brief introductory few lines on how banks can face funding problems.

later12

McDave wrote: »

I'll hold up my hand and say that during the 1997 election campaign, particularly with the emphasis on tax cuts and the tone set by the Indo's payback headline, I smelled a needless and hasty return to fiscal indiscipline.

Indeed, arguments can be made that fiscal and regulatory discipline has been found wanting for many years prior to the turn of the century, I wouldn't really argue against that point. The point, really, however, is whether there was ever expressed specific concerns on irish banking and how resilient the domestic banks were to shocks in the system.

Sand

@Later10

Well what was he warning about?

That Bertie needed to keep a close eye on his banks?

That was afterall why we have banking regulations and banking regulators. Its to proactively stop dangerous trends *before* they go wrong.

McDave

later10 wrote: »

Indeed, arguments can be made that fiscal and regulatory discipline has been found wanting for many years prior to the turn of the century, I wouldn't really argue against that point. The point, really, however, is whether there was ever expressed specific concerns on irish banking and how resilient the domestic banks were to shocks in the system.

Again I can pinpoint the moment five years ago when I suspected the Irish banking system was in deep trouble. I was making a simple mortgage enquiry in an institution I considered to be prudent, only to be quite hastily offered terms which reflected what a handful of critical commentators were claiming to be irresponsible. I put this information together with my sense that Ireland had been front-loading public and private spending for years, and concluded I wasn't going to unnecessarily expose myself to a further substantial financial commitment.

I know what I'm saying is anecdotal. But if I as a non-specialist individual can draw these common sense conclusions based on personal experience, why couldn't the Irish, financial, economic or political structures sense anything was amiss? Yet we have a veritable web of players intent on passing the buck, when any one of them doing their job thoroughly might have been able to prepare the ground for a change in policy direction.

I honestly don't think any of this is rocket science. If anything, it suggests our systems were utterly ineffectual and our governance non-existent. And, even worse, I don't think anyone in a position of financial, economic or political responsibility can absolve themselves from the consequences of not even entertaining the most rudimentary of alternative scenarios and gathering the necessary data.

later12

Sand wrote: »

@Later10
That Bertie needed to keep a close eye on his banks?

We didn't own any banks at the time. I agree that regulation was severely lacking but this video has nothing to do with that, it doesn't mention regulation nor any political administration at all. He appears to have a problem with fractional reserve lending, and while that might wash with his colleagues over at One World Scam, it is something that the rest of the world is probably quite happy to get on with. Lets not blow this out of proportion or start seeing things that aren't there.

later12

McDave wrote: »

if I as a non-specialist individual can draw these common sense conclusions based on personal experience, why couldn't the Irish, financial, economic or political structures sense anything was amiss?

that's a valid question. My point isn't that it was particularly difficult to see; suggesting that an imminent financial disaster ought to have been common sense only emphasises the point that financial advice was severely lacking in quality both within the popular media and most likely in official circles as well.

I am simply warning that the same people who are now painted as having prediced all that happened, probably didn't. They may have predicted a property bust, but that doesn't necessarily mean a banking collapse - in fact, as has been mentioned, it rarely does.

I honestly don't think any of this is rocket science. If anything, it suggests our systems were utterly ineffectual and our governance non-existent. And, even worse, I don't think anyone in a position of financial, economic or political responsibility can absolve themselves from the consequences of not even entertaining the most rudimentary of alternative scenarios and gathering the necessary data.

I am actually in agreement with that.

McDave

later10 wrote: »

I am simply warning that the same people who are now painted as having prediced all that happened, probably didn't. They may have predicted a property bust, but that doesn't necessarily mean a banking collapse - in fact, as has been mentioned, it rarely does.

On this point, I'm racking my brains trying to remember who were the earliest canaries in the coalmine. DMcW was one in the early to mid "00s", both in his NewsTalk breakfast show and on TV3's Agenda. There was also the Maynooth academic Jim O'Leary who worked for Davy's up till 2001 (according to: http://www.businessworld.ie/livenews.htm?a=2667154;s=rollingnews.htm) and who was quite a sober analyist by private sector standards. He has to be the earliest non-believer, if you will. Almost everyone else in the early noughties was pretty much a "Celtic Tiger" cheerleader. Neither were predicting bank collapses in that time. But both expressed fears about overheating, if not bubbles.

Liam Byrne

later10 wrote: »

We didn't own any banks at the time.

You know well what Sand meant.

later10 wrote: »

Lets not blow this out of proportion or start seeing things that aren't there.

Sounds like something Bertie said when people warned him.

London Irish

I think this is what the OP is looking for.

From Feb 2000, by William Slattery (former Deputy Head of Banking Supervision in the Central Bank of Ireland): http://www.financedublin.com/article.php?i=3558

Two quotes, but really worth reading in it's entirety:

Indeed, the construction industry is currently running to full capacity and there appears to be a general expectation that this level of activity will continue through 2000 and beyond. The size of the tax concessions in the recent budget seems likely to fuel significant activity in 2000. A continuation of 1999 years growth into this year would bring aggregate credit to about 140% of GNP. It is beyond the scope of this article to undertake a full international analysis of the levels of aggregate credit but the systemic crises which occurred in Asia last year took place when aggregate credit in those countries appears to have been of the order of 150% of GNP. Further, peak credit growth in the Scandinavian economies when their banking systems went through systemic crises about ten years ago, was around 35%, not much more than our current levels. So, previous experiences point to the severe dangers that we face. An article in the December 22 edition of Standard and Poor's Credit Week mentioned Ireland as one of seven countries with a financial system vulnerable to a credit bust.

Banks' lending policies must, in these circumstances be conservative and take account of the overall macro-economic environment, as well as the position of individual books. My own personal view is, however, a minority one in that, from a macro-economic perspective, too much is expected of individual banks in an environment when monetary conditions are out of control.

dan_d

Amazing really, that it went on another 8 years before the crumbling started.

later12

London Irish wrote: »

I think this is what the OP is looking for.

From Feb 2000, by William Slattery (former Deputy Head of Banking Supervision in the Central Bank of Ireland): http://www.financedublin.com/article.php?i=3558

Two quotes, but really worth reading in it's entirety:

Yes, well found; I have never seen that article, it is the first piece on the current crisis that I think can be fairly described as 'prophetic'. After fourteen pages of this thread, it cuts quite a lonely presence. Its singularity, in itself, is telling.

Given that Wm Slattery was, at the time, a senior figure in the Irish Central Bank, it also puts paid to suggestions that people were afraid of confronting the orthodoxy or of making life difficult for certain individuals in government.

Although as you pointed out it was published in Finance, apparently it also went over the head of every opposition politician, analyst, commentator, and economist contributing to public economic discourse: all of whom maintained a deafening silence on the issue of the doomed interconnectedness of the banking and property industry, and the unacceptable liabilities of the former pre-bust.

K-9

London Irish wrote: »

I think this is what the OP is looking for.

From Feb 2000, by William Slattery (former Deputy Head of Banking Supervision in the Central Bank of Ireland): http://www.financedublin.com/article.php?i=3558

Two quotes, but really worth reading in it's entirety:

Wasn't the only one either, the Central Bank Governor was warning us too,
Irish Central Bank declared its impotence before launch of the euro; Why Spain's biggest banks survived huge housing boom

Central bank governor Maurice O'Connell, told the Oireachtas Committee on Finance and the Public Service in early 1997: "There seems to be a perception that the Central Bank can exercise some legal authority in restricting credit. It has no such authority. Any restriction would be inconsistent with European Union practice. Besides, it would be unworkable as demand would probably be met by overseas lenders."
He said the Bank had warned financial institutions repeatedly of the dangers inherent in high rates of credit growth and any relaxation of lending standards.
In the following years, as Finance Minister Charlie McCreevy stoked the property boom with income and capital tax cuts coupled with a massive expansion of property tax incentives, the annual reports of the Central Bank chronicled the letters that were sent by the governor to the financial institutions, pleading for prudence.
In April 1999, the governor had issued a letter stating that an analysis of practices had shown that some lenders had no evidence as to how borrowers came by the balance of their money. The governor criticised what he called, the particularly disturbing practice of allowing large amounts of the borrowers after tax income to go towards paying off a mortgage.
The 1999 annual report notes: "Institutions were...advised that it remains vitally important for them to take a medium term perspective and to reckon with the potential consequences of rising interest rates and a return to lower rates of growth in the economy. All institutions gave assurances that there would be no slackening in prudential lending standards."

The property mania had set in as far back as 1999 and IIRC, probably about 1995. People were borrowing deposits from Credit Unions and other banks which would be what he was referring to.


Next step was relying on a percentage of after tax income as an affordability barometer, say 40% of after tax income. Then "rent a room" earnings and finally 100% or more mortgages.


Make no mistake about it though, this was going on from as far back as 15 years ago and nobody cried stop.

Ash.J.Williams

Cant's remember what thread i saw this in.....but it's compuslory viewing

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cxtkjZFfuZI

Anyone who believed in the economy, in hindsight looks like they were on mind control drugs, or total delusion!

Solair

I find it very worrying that Ireland's political system seems to have been incapable of reforming itself and the public administrative systems that it supposedly manages.

To me this is what Fianna Fail's track record looks like:

1) Decades of social oppression and absolute deference to the Catholic Church.
2) Banning of contraceptives until the 1980s.
3) Ignored systemic abuse of children in care / schools for decades and effectively participated in its cover-up because it couldn't say boo to the church.
4) Socially backwards view points pushed at all times, even passing blasphemy legislation in 2010!!
No divorce until the 1990s!, had to be sued in the ECHR to decriminalise homosexuality, ultra-right-wing attitudes to abortion.
5) Constantly undermining any efforts at improving transparency i.e. rolling back on the Freedom of Information Act etc when they got back into office in 1997..
6) Refusal to modernise, rationalise or take responsibility for health and education which remain largely in the control of religious institutions and now private companies too!
7) Planning laws that are entirely setup to funnel money into party supporters' i.e. petty landlords, small time developers, big time developers and more corruption than you could shake a stick at.
8) Infrastructural problems (linked to planning) e.g. poor public transport, bad non-primary roads, and more significantly, dysfunctional broadband. Cork City left without water for 2 weeks, Galway drinking its own sewage, Dublin left dry due to a bit of ice!
9) Economic collapses and failure to stably thrive due to incompetence and corruption.
10) Inability to deal with social disadvantage / create a balanced society e.g. 2-tier health, 2 tier education. The only opening up of this that ever happened was under Labour+FG who opened up the 3rd level system to all. Yet, FF are already rolling back on this

Why would *anyone* in their right mind even associate with a party like this?

They are about as right wing as you could possibly get in so many ways, they're incompetent, they're corrupt, they're self-serving, they've an unbelievably bad track record, yet they keep getting back into power.

Sorry for going OT slightly, but all of the above is symptomatic of exactly why we have this banking crisis on our hands today.

If people cannot see that, then really I just feel sorry for them and would hold out no hope for this country at all.

later12

K-9 wrote: »

Make no mistake about it though, this was going on from as far back as 15 years ago and nobody cried stop.

No it wasn't. Banks only started leading the property boom in the early 2000s, before that any increase in prices was led by a healthy improving economy more generally.

London Irish has provided a very good link to where this was predicted; it is the only really useful link that has been provided in this entire thread.
People producing stuff from 1997 or thereabouts when there was no justifiable indication that a banking collapse would occur and when banks were not particularly active in leading the market demand are pretty irrelevant.

K-9

later10 wrote: »

No it wasn't. Banks only started leading the property boom in the early 2000s, before that any increase in prices was led by a healthy improving economy more generally.

London Irish has provided a very good link to where this was predicted; it is the only really useful link that has been provided in this entire thread.
People producing stuff from 1997 or thereabouts when there was no justifiable indication that a banking collapse would occur and when banks were not particularly active in leading the market demand are pretty irrelevant.

I've provided links to comments from the Irish Central Bank Governor on the problems of lack of regulation and checks.

They are relevant, don't know why you want to dismiss them.

ilovesleep

It just goes to show that FF ignored these warnings for their own power and gain.

later12

K-9 wrote: »

I've provided links to comments from the Irish Central Bank Governor on the problems of lack of regulation and checks.

They are relevant, don't know why you want to dismiss them.

Maurice O'Connell was not talking about a lack of regulation, he was talking about standard practice in Europe of not restricting credit, which in itself is a perfectly reasonable position. lack of regulation simply was not a problem in early 1997 and that is widely acknowledged. Similarly, banks were not in any danger in 1997, nor were they heavily involved with the property boom back then - that happened in the early 2000s and again, that is widely acknowledged.

What you posted just isn't relevant to the original post.

K-9

later10 wrote: »

Maurice O'Connell was not talking about a lack of regulation, he was talking about standard practice in Europe of not restricting credit, which in itself is a perfectly reasonable position. lack of regulation simply was not a problem in early 1997 and that is widely acknowledged. Similarly, banks were not in any danger in 1997, nor were they heavily involved with the property boom back then - that happened in the early 2000s and again, that is widely acknowledged.

What you posted just isn't relevant to the original post.

Yes it is relevant, the Central Bank was warning banks about lax lending guidelines in 1999. Instead of heeding the warning they completely ignored it, further warnings were issued on 100% mortgages etc.

If you fail to see why that is linked to the collapse of the banks, I think it's more a reluctance to want to see people issuing warning signs.

Edit, it's like the bankers claiming we didn't have sub prime debt here in 07/08. Yes we did, probably about 50% of it was, due to lax lending standards.

later12

K-9 wrote: »

Yes it is relevant, the Central Bank was warning banks about lax lending guidelines in 1999. Instead of heeding the warning they completely ignored it, further warnings were issued on 100% mortgages etc.

But warnings like that have been made throughout history, by that standard you could say the current crisis was predicted in 1880. Everyone knows about this sort of recommendation, the question is who predicted the current banking crisis.

Edit, it's like the bankers claiming we didn't have sub prime debt here in 07/08. Yes we did, probably about 50% of it was, due to lax lending standards.

Sub prime lending was not a problem in Ireland, unless you change the meaning of subprime. Mortgages are assessed in the Irish banks on a point scoring basis which incorporates credit worthiness and background checks. Obviously, it wasn't enough but it doesn't mean that mortgages were sub prime. Also, where are you getting the 50% figure?

K-9

later10 wrote: »

But warnings like that have been made throughout history, by that standard you could say the current crisis was predicted in 1880. Everyone knows about this sort of recommendation, the question is who predicted the current banking crisis.
Sub prime lending was not a problem in Ireland, unless you change the meaning of subprime. Mortgages are assessed in the Irish banks on a point scoring basis which incorporates credit worthiness and background checks. Obviously, it wasn't enough but it doesn't mean that mortgages were sub prime. Also, where are you getting the 50% figure?

I don't know why you are arguing this tbh. The Central Bank was pointing to lax lending standards as regards credit worthiness as far back as 1999, nothing was done about it, even when things got worse.

You are right, our "sub prime" problem is worse. Anglo has had write downs of over 40% and by the looks of it, more to come.
The average write down by NAMA on loans transferred to it by all institutions, are around 50%.

Anyway, I don't really see why it matters who predicted it. Probably McWilliams to some extent and Morgan Kelly afterwards, though that was later in the day.

later12

K-9 wrote: »

I don't know why you are arguing this tbh. The Central Bank was pointing to lax lending standards as regards credit worthiness as far back as 1999, nothing was done about it, even when things got worse.

First of all can I say how remarkable it is that people have sought to pat the CBI and their prudential analysis on the back in this thread, given that their appendix and their former staff members in the FR, when it was created, are so lambasted.

Nevertheless, a warning is not a prediction; central banks have been warning about private indebtedness for decades and do so in every country in the world to this day. They are typically, by nature, cautious entities who tend to dislike inflation, debt and anything that resembles a faltering equilibrium. However, they didn't predict the banking crisis as an entity themselves, and any suggestion to the contrary deserves to be dismissed.

You are right, our "sub prime" problem is worse. Anglo has had write downs of over 40% and by the looks of it, more to come.
The average write down by NAMA on loans transferred to it by all institutions, are around 50%.

The prevalence of sub prime debtors in a system is not measured by subsequent debt write downs or value revisioning, what connection are you trying to make? And where are you getting the 50% figure, or is it something that meandered lazily into your head?

Anyway, I don't really see why it matters who predicted it

. But that's what this thread is about, there are lots of other threads on this site to which you might also be interested in contributing on that basis. Nobody is asking you if it matters, and if you think it doesn't matter that's perfectly fine by me.

Personally I think it matters because none of the pop economists who are currently leading the herd, donkey like, managed to predict the current situation themselves and in my opinion, should be credited with far less 'prophetic' success than has been the case.