Does time exist?

Morbert

I am assuming the world line issue has been resolved.

Presentism is the idea that only the present moment exists; so regardless of the configuration of hypersurfaces, the Wheeler-DeWitt equation embodies a stark form of the idea that only the present moment exists.

No it doesn't. This is what I have been saying. It gives us all states the universe can be in. It says nothing about the evolution or "change" of the universe. The quote you used even says this:

"The Wheeler-DeWitt equation embodies a stark form of presentism: it simply tells us which states the universe can find itself in, and says nothing about any evolution through time."

I.e. The Hamiltonian is simply a constraint. It does not generate change. The "stark form of presentism" is presumably an allusion to the fact that a static universe exists.

I'm not entirely sure about the idea of a 3D hypersurface, but, if I understand correctly, I don't have too much trouble with the idea that the universe is an unchanging configuration space and that change is an illusion.

Still, it would represent presentism though.

EDIT: it is probably worth clarifying the point about change being an illusion; change still manifests in the physical world we experience, but the physical world we experience is illusory.

You understand that the configurations corresponding to your past and your future (and all possibilities of your past and future, permitted by the Wheeler DeWitt equation) are part of this unchanging configuration space, right?

ClimberC

But, but, but.... time is the fourth dimension!!

We can measure fluctuations in time, so how can we measure something that isnt there? If time didnt exist, we wouldnt be able to move. there is even a theory that time, as a dimension will cease to exist..........*twitch*

roosh

Morbert wrote: »

I am assuming the world line issue has been resolved.

No, it still remains an open question with limited scope for answer; it is therefore an underlying assumption of the theory.

Morbert wrote: »

No it doesn't. This is what I have been saying. It gives us all states the universe can be in. It says nothing about the evolution or "change" of the universe. The quote you used even says this:

"The Wheeler-DeWitt equation embodies a stark form of presentism: it simply tells us which states the universe can find itself in, and says nothing about any evolution through time."

I.e. The Hamiltonian is simply a constraint. It does not generate change. The "stark form of presentism" is presumably an allusion to the fact that a static universe exists.

I would presume the "stark form of presentism" refers to a stark form of presentism i.e. the idea that only the present moment exists.

Morbert wrote: »

You understand that the configurations corresponding to your past and your future (and all possibilities of your past and future, permitted by the Wheeler DeWitt equation) are part of this unchanging configuration space, right?

If you consider that the universe is starkly presentist, then all forms of your "past" and "future" exist within whatever form the universe takes, be that a "configuration space" or whatever; this is because there is essentially no difference between "the past" and "the present"; there is no point at which "the past" stops and the present begins; the same can be said of "the future".

So, what we label "the past" continues to exist, except that it's appearance has changed, such that we can say what we observed as "the past" no longer exists. The same is true of "the future"; what is in "the future" already exists, but not in the form that it will take "in the future".


If you take the baking process for example; you get the ingredients to bake a loaf of bread; you take the flour and make the dough, with water and eggs, or whatever. The flour, the eggs and the water don't cease to exist, they simply change form. But the intact egg, the jug of water and the loose flour, which represent the past states of the objects no longer exists.

What that dough will eventually become i.e. a loaf of bread, also already exists, just not in the form of bread; the heat in the oven already exists, even before it is turned on, just not in the same form; the oven exists, the filament in the oven exists and the electricity exists, all of which combine to give the effect we label heat.

So, "the past" and "the future" exist always, but only ever in the form of the present, or the stark present, whichever you want to call it.

Morbert

roosh wrote: »

No, it still remains an open question with limited scope for answer; it is therefore an underlying assumption of the theory.

I would presume the "stark form of presentism" refers to a stark form of presentism i.e. the idea that only the present moment exists.

If you consider that the universe is starkly presentist, then all forms of your "past" and "future" exist within whatever form the universe takes, be that a "configuration space" or whatever; this is because there is essentially no difference between "the past" and "the present"; there is no point at which "the past" stops and the present begins; the same can be said of "the future".

So, what we label "the past" continues to exist, except that it's appearance has changed, such that we can say what we observed as "the past" no longer exists. The same is true of "the future"; what is in "the future" already exists, but not in the form that it will take "in the future".


If you take the baking process for example; you get the ingredients to bake a loaf of bread; you take the flour and make the dough, with water and eggs, or whatever. The flour, the eggs and the water don't cease to exist, they simply change form. But the intact egg, the jug of water and the loose flour, which represent the past states of the objects no longer exists.

What that dough will eventually become i.e. a loaf of bread, also already exists, just not in the form of bread; the heat in the oven already exists, even before it is turned on, just not in the same form; the oven exists, the filament in the oven exists and the electricity exists, all of which combine to give the effect we label heat.

So, "the past" and "the future" exist always, but only ever in the form of the present, or the stark present, whichever you want to call it.

You are making increasingly confident statements about concepts you are unfamiliar with. This is a signature of crank thinking, and I would urge you, while you are still new to the subject, to steer away from it. For example, it is clear you do not understand what a configuration space is. It is also clear that you do not understand what people like Smolin, Barbour et al mean when they say time might not exist. It is clear that you do not understand the consequence of the Wheeler DeWitt equation. You are instead latching on to specific quotes, or phrases (I.e. "A stark form of presentism") without any deeper understanding of what they are saying.

In Lee Smolin's 7th lecture from the set you linked to in your OP, he shows that the parameter describing the foliation of 4-D spacetime into slices of 3-D "space" has nothing to do with the "change" of presentism, and is in fact in many ways arbitrary. It does not lead to any notion of the "true" present.

Similarly, the Wheeler-DeWitt equation does not produce a single present that exists. It is instead a constraint on the state space of the universe. It is a "stark form of presentism" because you have a set of all states without any time dimension. This is a form completely different to what you are arguing. You are arguing that the universe is only one state, rather than an atemporal set of states, and that this state "changes" and this "change" is where our concept of time comes from.

roosh

Morbert wrote: »

You are making increasingly confident statements about concepts you are unfamiliar with. This is a signature of crank thinking, and I would urge you, while you are still new to the subject, to steer away from it. For example, it is clear you do not understand what a configuration space is. It is also clear that you do not understand what people like Smolin, Barbour et al mean when they say time might not exist. It is clear that you do not understand the consequence of the Wheeler DeWitt equation. You are instead latching on to specific quotes, or phrases (I.e. "A stark form of presentism") without any deeper understanding of what they are saying.

In Lee Smolin's 7th lecture from the set you linked to in your OP, he shows that the parameter describing the foliation of 4-D spacetime into slices of 3-D "space" has nothing to do with the "change" of presentism, and is in fact in many ways arbitrary. It does not lead to any notion of the "true" present.

Similarly, the Wheeler-DeWitt equation does not produce a single present that exists. It is instead a constraint on the state space of the universe. It is a "stark form of presentism" because you have a set of all states without any time dimension. This is a form completely different to what you are arguing. You are arguing that the universe is only one state, rather than an atemporal set of states, and that this state "changes" and this "change" is where our concept of time comes from.

I never claimed to understand what a configuration space was, I simply offered an explanation as to how "the past" can continue to exist and how "the future" can already exist without violating a strong form of presentism.

I haven't claimed that Smolin or Barbour advocate the form of presentism that you think I'm advocating; I was simply highlighting the fact that the question of the nature of time is very much an open question.

As for the Wheeler DeWitt equation, you seem to be arguing that a "stark form of presentism" is something other than a stark form of the idea that only the present moment exists.

Again, the example given is an example of how all states of the universe can exist within a single, universal, present moment.

Any other form of the idea that the observed "past" state of the universe continues to exists, or that the yet to be observed "future" already exists, requires the assumption that the observed "past" state of the universe continues to exists, or that the yet to be observed "future" already exists.


In the absence of evidence, that doesn't require the assumption that a clock measures physical time (and even with it), I think it is fairly safe to say that there is no observer living or dead, and no will there be, who has ever experienced anything other than the present moment. That means that there can be no empirical evidence that supports the contention that observed "past" states continue to exist, or that yet-to-be observed "future" states already exist, without some underlying assumption about their existence.

Morbert

roosh wrote: »

I never claimed to understand what a configuration space was, I simply offered an explanation as to how "the past" can continue to exist and how "the future" can already exist without violating a strong form of presentism.

I haven't claimed that Smolin or Barbour advocate the form of presentism that you think I'm advocating; I was simply highlighting the fact that the question of the nature of time is very much an open question.

It is very much an open question. I am of the opinion that quantum physics is the deeper theory, and that what is physical is diffeomorphic-invariant. This means time is an open question, but it also means the "present" is also an open question. There is no reason to project our intuitive, neurologically induced framework of "past,present, and future" onto the universe a a whole.

As for the Wheeler DeWitt equation, you seem to be arguing that a "stark form of presentism" is something other than a stark form of the idea that only the present moment exists.

It is! In ordinary quantum mechanics, the Hamiltonian generates change. I.e. Our system is in a single quantum state, and that state "changes" according to the Schrodinger equation. But the Wheeler DeWitt equation is not analogous in this manner. It is a constraint, not an equation of change. Time, even as a parameter, disappears.

Again, the example given is an example of how all states of the universe can exist within a single, universal, present moment.

Any other form of the idea that the observed "past" state of the universe continues to exists, or that the yet to be observed "future" already exists, requires the assumption that the observed "past" state of the universe continues to exists, or that the yet to be observed "future" already exists.

The only difference is they are not labelled "past" or "future". They are instead part of an unchanging atemporal state space. It is not even correct to call the state space a moment.

In the absence of evidence, that doesn't require the assumption that a clock measures physical time (and even with it), I think it is fairly safe to say that there is no observer living or dead, and no will there be, who has ever experienced anything other than the present moment. That means that there can be no empirical evidence that supports the contention that observed "past" states continue to exist, or that yet-to-be observed "future" states already exist, without some underlying assumption about their existence.

And there is no observer, living or dead, who has shown that their present moment is the same throughout the universe. All we can do is observe co-incidents and inter-relationships/connections between things.

oB1

"Tempus Fugit" Time was an invention in a sense - well not really, but in any early stages of "life" as we know it - it was used as a form of measurement of how quickly an " earth day " from sunrise to sunset and back again.

In my opinion time is merely a convention of thought and conversation. If time actually existed, it could be measured and quantified by something that cannot be suspended. So what is "time?" Time is relativity

Someone says "yesterday," and you think of time passing. However, yesterday isn't a distance away from "now" that can be measured in an absolute that we known as "time." Now is really simply here, and yesterday is the Earth spinning. There is no one measure of time that is not dependent upon motion or decay. There is only relativity -- the amount this moves in relation to some standard of movement, such as a clock movement. For example, "one hour" means what? It means 1/24th of a day, or 1/24th of the earth's revolution from this position of the earth in relation to the sun as compared to a previous or subsequent revolution. If all the movement and radioactive decay in the universe were to suddenly stop, including the rotation of electrons, the atomic activity of stars, the revolution of moons and planets, the beating of hearts, and the breathing of breaths.... If all this movement were to suddenly stop, where would time be? In a motionless universe, would there be such a thing as time? And how do we know for certain that the entire universe didn't instantly freeze two moments ago, then sleep motionlessly for an eternity, and then instantly thaw to find us exactly here, thinking that only a second has passed? We cannot know. We have no clocks that are not merely measures of relative motion.

If the measurement of " time " didn't exist or ceased to exist - we would have know way of telling each other when to meet, or when something happened - think of it as an equation to add numbers... if nobody knew how to count - well you know what would happen there....

roosh

Morbert wrote: »

It is very much an open question. I am of the opinion that quantum physics is the deeper theory, and that what is physical is diffeomorphic-invariant. This means time is an open question, but it also means the "present" is also an open question. There is no reason to project our intuitive, neurologically induced framework of "past,present, and future" onto the universe a a whole.

Knowing as little as I do, I would still be inclined to agree with you, that QM is the deeper theory. I would also agree, to an extent, that "the present" is an open question, but I think it can be separated into two aspects; how the present manifests at the macro-level i.e. how we perceive the present; and the absolute nature of reality.

I would say that, how we perceive the physical world, at the macro-level is not necessarily what the nature of reality "looks like", but I think we can still deduce that there is a universal present moment, because that is all that can be deduced from empirical experience without recourse to an assumption about past and future states continuing to exist - in a form other than the present moment.

Morbert wrote: »

It is! In ordinary quantum mechanics, the Hamiltonian generates change. I.e. Our system is in a single quantum state, and that state "changes" according to the Schrodinger equation. But the Wheeler DeWitt equation is not analogous in this manner. It is a constraint, not an equation of change. Time, even as a parameter, disappears.

Our system can exist as a single quantum state, where past and future exist eternally, all within the parameter of a single, universal present moment; because what constituted the past state of the system continues to exist, but has changed its form to that of the present; and the present will change to a state which we now call "the future", but what constitutes that "future" state exists in the present moment, just in a different form.

Morbert wrote: »

The only difference is they are not labelled "past" or "future". They are instead part of an unchanging atemporal state space. It is not even correct to call the state space a moment.

Apologies, I don't fully follow this point.

Morbert wrote: »

And there is no observer, living or dead, who has shown that their present moment is the same throughout the universe. All we can do is observe co-incidents and inter-relationships/connections between things.

This is true, but for the alternative to be true that observer, and every other observer, has to assume that "the past" continues to exist and that "the future" already exists, contrary to their empirical experience.

Morbert

roosh wrote: »

Our system can exist as a single quantum state, where past and future exist eternally, all within the parameter of a single, universal present moment; because what constituted the past state of the system continues to exist, but has changed its form to that of the present; and the present will change to a state which we now call "the future", but what constitutes that "future" state exists in the present moment, just in a different form.

That is not what a configuration state is. What you are saying is "The ball was here, now it's there, but the ball always exists". A timeless, static universe says "The ball is here" and "The ball is there" both exist. They are both different "configurations" that exist in an all-encompassing space of configurations. Ontologically speaking, it gets rather messy because a quantum state is not just a configuration, but rather a function over all configurations called a "wave function". But what is important is that, in the traditional, non-relativistic, Schrodinger formalism of quantum mechanics, the universe is a single quantum state that changes. That change is described by a mathematical object called the Hamiltonian operator. This is the presentism you are talking about. Time is just a parameter of change, and all that exists is the single quantum state. In quantum cosmology, the Hamiltonian no longer describes change. Instead, it is a constraint on all configurations. Change disappears as well. All states (that are allowed) exist.

roosh

Morbert wrote: »

That is not what a configuration state is. What you are saying is "The ball was here, now it's there, but the ball always exists". A timeless, static universe says "The ball is here" and "The ball is there" both exist. They are both different "configurations" that exist in an all-encompassing space of configurations. Ontologically speaking, it gets rather messy because a quantum state is not just a configuration, but rather a function over all configurations called a "wave function". But what is important is that, in the traditional, non-relativistic, Schrodinger formalism of quantum mechanics, the universe is a single quantum state that changes. That change is described by a mathematical object called the Hamiltonian operator. This is the presentism you are talking about. Time is just a parameter of change, and all that exists is the single quantum state. In quantum cosmology, the Hamiltonian no longer describes change. Instead, it is a constraint on all configurations. Change disappears as well. All states (that are allowed) exist.

To try and be more precise about what I am saying; I am saying that the nature of reality manifested, on the macro level, as "the ball was there"; this manifestation changed to "the ball is here". There is no evidence to suggest that the manifestation of "the ball there" continues to exist, and there is no evidence to suggest that the manifestation, "the ball is already over there" (the future), already exists.

To speak about a "ball" at the quantum level is, I'm sure you'll agree, pretty imprecise. I would be more inclined to say that, the nature of reality, which manifested as "the ball was there" continues to exist - in whatever form it does - and the nature of reality, which will give rise to the "future" manifestation of "the ball is over there, exists now.

Where the nature of reality is monistic in nature, and could be potentially be classified as a "wave function".

Morbert

roosh wrote: »

To try and be more precise about what I am saying; I am saying that the nature of reality manifested, on the macro level, as "the ball was there"; this manifestation changed to "the ball is here". There is no evidence to suggest that the manifestation of "the ball there" continues to exist, and there is no evidence to suggest that the manifestation, "the ball is already over there" (the future), already exists.

To speak about a "ball" at the quantum level is, I'm sure you'll agree, pretty imprecise. I would be more inclined to say that, the nature of reality, which manifested as "the ball was there" continues to exist - in whatever form it does - and the nature of reality, which will give rise to the "future" manifestation of "the ball is over there, exists now.

Where the nature of reality is monistic in nature, and could be potentially be classified as a "wave function".

This is where we get back to relativity of simultaneity. There is evidence that the notion of a single "true" present does not exist, unless we assume there are unknown mysterious dynamics at work (which we also have no evidence for).

roosh

Morbert wrote: »

This is where we get back to relativity of simultaneity. There is evidence that the notion of a single "true" present does not exist, unless we assume there are unknown mysterious dynamics at work (which we also have no evidence for).

And this is where we get back to the question of how a clock measures physical time.


The evidence that the notion of a single "true" present does not exist is reliant on the assumption that a clock measures physical time; that there is no empirical observation of "past" and "future" points to an underlying assumption of their eternal existence.


Ultimately I think it might come back to a question on the constancy of the one-way speed of light, which is an untestable assumption in relativity i.e. the conclusion has to be assumed.

The "mysterious dynamics at work" seems to pertain to experiments on the constancy of the speed of light primarily, given that time dilation and length contraction aren't actually observed in muon experiments.

I'm just wondering, if light in a vacuum had an absolute wave length, would this account for any lack of a fringe shift, or more accurately, a negligible fringe shift, in interferometery experiments?

That question might be better suited to the physics section though.

Morbert

roosh wrote: »

And this is where we get back to the question of how a clock measures physical time.


The evidence that the notion of a single "true" present does not exist is reliant on the assumption that a clock measures physical time; that there is no empirical observation of "past" and "future" points to an underlying assumption of their eternal existence.


Ultimately I think it might come back to a question on the constancy of the one-way speed of light, which is an untestable assumption in relativity i.e. the conclusion has to be assumed.

The "mysterious dynamics at work" seems to pertain to experiments on the constancy of the speed of light primarily, given that time dilation and length contraction aren't actually observed in muon experiments.

I'm just wondering, if light in a vacuum had an absolute wave length, would this account for any lack of a fringe shift, or more accurately, a negligible fringe shift, in interferometery experiments?

That question might be better suited to the physics section though.

The mysterious dynamics pertain to explanations of the constancy of the two-way speed of light. It is not only an untestable assumption, but a large collection of unparsimonious, untestable assumptions that happen to produce Einstein's relativity. Even at my most generous, I will say that, at the very least, the notion of relativity you adopt has no fewer assumptions than the spacetime notion of relativity.

roosh

Morbert wrote: »

The mysterious dynamics pertain to explanations of the constancy of the two-way speed of light. It is not only an untestable assumption, but a large collection of unparsimonious, untestable assumptions that happen to produce Einstein's relativity. Even at my most generous, I will say that, at the very least, the notion of relativity you adopt has no fewer assumptions than the spacetime notion of relativity.

Genuinely asking; did you mean to type the emboldened bit; or am I just picking it up wrong? Did you mean to say Lorentz's relativity; because it sounds like you are saying that Einsteins relativity is based on a large collection of untestable assumptions - I'll just put it down to a freudian slip

The thing is, I think that Lorentzian relativity can be stripped of certain assumptions; I don't think it requires the assumption that an absolute reference frame exists, it simply has to allow for that possibility; which is not an assumption at all, and not contradicted by any evidence.

Of course, it can assume that an absolute reference frame doesn't actually exist, that all objects are absolutely in motion; not with respect to an absolute reference frame, but in the sense of absolute motion we've been discussing. A further assumption about the existence of time can be dropped, which would tally with the idea that an absolute frame of reference doesn't necessarily exist, and hence no "universal time".

I also suspect that defining a rest frame for units of measurement would also help to remove other assumptions.


It just strikes me that the assumptions of the spacetime notion of relativity are fundamentally untestable, and circular in nature.

Morbert

roosh wrote: »

Genuinely asking; did you mean to type the emboldened bit; or am I just picking it up wrong? Did you mean to say Lorentz's relativity; because it sounds like you are saying that Einsteins relativity is based on a large collection of untestable assumptions - I'll just put it down to a freudian slip

The thing is, I think that Lorentzian relativity can be stripped of certain assumptions; I don't think it requires the assumption that an absolute reference frame exists, it simply has to allow for that possibility; which is not an assumption at all, and not contradicted by any evidence.

Of course, it can assume that an absolute reference frame doesn't actually exist, that all objects are absolutely in motion; not with respect to an absolute reference frame, but in the sense of absolute motion we've been discussing. A further assumption about the existence of time can be dropped, which would tally with the idea that an absolute frame of reference doesn't necessarily exist, and hence no "universal time".

I also suspect that defining a rest frame for units of measurement would also help to remove other assumptions.

I mean the untestable postulate of Lorentz's relativity, that there is an "absolute" rest, requires a wide range of untestable assumptions about the dynamics of things to be able to reproduce the predictions of Einstein's relativity.

It just strikes me that the assumptions of the spacetime notion of relativity are fundamentally untestable, and circular in nature.

As are assumptions of the Lorentzian notion of relativity.

roosh

Morbert wrote: »

I mean the untestable postulate of Lorentz's relativity, that there is an "absolute" rest, requires a wide range of untestable assumptions about the dynamics of things to be able to reproduce the predictions of Einstein's relativity.

I don't think Lorentzian relativity requires an absolute rest frame to actually exist though; it simply has to allow for the possibility that one could exist, something that is more compatible with the experimental evidence than the assumption that absolute rest cannot exist.

Of course, if you suggest that Einsteinian relativity allows for the possibility that absolute rest could exist, then we can use this possibility to see what deductions we can make. One such deduction is the subject of the thread in the phyiscs forum.

It also seems however, that Einsteinian relativity requires its own untestable assumptions, which amount to circular reasoning.

Morbert wrote: »

As are assumptions of the Lorentzian notion of relativity.

OK, so you would agree that Einsteinian relativity is based on untestable assumptions and circular reasoning?

Donnielighto

C14 in the moon and in earth. Check levels later.... Time is relative.

roosh

Donnielighto wrote: »

C14 in the moon and in earth. Check levels later.... Time is relative.

That depends on what you mean by "time".

Morbert

roosh wrote: »

I don't think Lorentzian relativity requires an absolute rest frame to actually exist though; it simply has to allow for the possibility that one could exist, something that is more compatible with the experimental evidence than the assumption that absolute rest cannot exist.

Of course, if you suggest that Einsteinian relativity allows for the possibility that absolute rest could exist, then we can use this possibility to see what deductions we can make. One such deduction is the subject of the thread in the phyiscs forum.

It also seems however, that Einsteinian relativity requires its own untestable assumptions, which amount to circular reasoning.

Lorentzian relativity posits an absolute rest insofar as it posits that time dilation and length contraction are dynamical effects, and someone who is not undergoing length contraction or time dilation is "at absolute rest".

OK, so you would agree that Einsteinian relativity is based on untestable assumptions and circular reasoning?

Circular reasoning: No.

Untestable assumptions: Only insofar as the kinematics of relativity don't falsify some underlying dynamical explanation. I.e. It is an untestable assumption that these dynamical explanations don't exist, just as it is an untestable assumption that they do exist, or that an invisible teapot orbits Pluto.

roosh

Morbert wrote: »

Lorentzian relativity posits an absolute rest insofar as it posits that time dilation and length contraction are dynamical effects, and someone who is not undergoing length contraction or time dilation is "at absolute rest".

Indeed, but it doesn't assume that anything is actually at absolute rest, and hence, doesn't assume that there exists an absolute reference frame; unless we assume that mathematical reference frames have physical existence.

Lorentzian relativity simply allows for the possibility that an object could be at absolute rest, something which can be deduced from the evidence; what we can't deduce, however, is that absolute rest doesn't exist at all; because, afterall, the earth might be at absolute rest - we just can't tell if it is or not.

If we conclude that absolute rest might not exist, then we are only free to conclude that everything must absolutely be in motion; we can't conclude that absolute rest doesn't exist, because, afterall we could be at absolute rest.

Morbert wrote: »

Circular reasoning: No.

Untestable assumptions: Only insofar as the kinematics of relativity don't falsify some underlying dynamical explanation. I.e. It is an untestable assumption that these dynamical explanations don't exist, just as it is an untestable assumption that they do exist, or that an invisible teapot orbits Pluto.

I think RoS might be based on circular reasoning, because it explicitly (or implicitly perhaps) assumes the constancy of the one-way speed of light, which, of course, is circular reasoning; and something which is a cornerstone of Einsteinian relativity.

I don't think we have any reason to deduce that a teapot orbits pluto, but I think we can deduce the possibility that an object could be at absolute rest, as well as the non-existence of time, which would make time dilation, at least, dynamical.

I also wonder if an absolute wave-length of light would account for the absence of fringe shifts in interferometry experiments; but that is for a different thread.

EnderValentine

Time is a relative term as proposed by Einstein. The average human mind has the effective capability to theoretically slow time enough in a subconscious ability that an event occurs much more slowly or rapidly based on the overall appeal of the event. Take for instance when you were a child and the clock for school seemed to run slower the more you looked forward to something and the opposite is also true. While Einstein's theory of relativity does not address this particular occurrence, one has the mental capability to understand that the cognitive functioning of the brain is relative to time and so as a parallel to this theory yes time does exist.

roosh

EnderValentine wrote: »

Time is a relative term as proposed by Einstein. The average human mind has the effective capability to theoretically slow time enough in a subconscious ability that an event occurs much more slowly or rapidly based on the overall appeal of the event. Take for instance when you were a child and the clock for school seemed to run slower the more you looked forward to something and the opposite is also true. While Einstein's theory of relativity does not address this particular occurrence, one has the mental capability to understand that the cognitive functioning of the brain is relative to time and so as a parallel to this theory yes time does exist.

As you mention, Einsteinian relativity doesn't make any reference to such a perception of time; but I would agree that "time" is relative in that sense.

That is, our experience of the present moment can vary such that processes we don't enjoy can seem to take longer than processes we enjoy; but at no point do we experience any part of the process outside of the present moment.

Morbert

roosh wrote: »

Indeed, but it doesn't assume that anything is actually at absolute rest, and hence, doesn't assume that there exists an absolute reference frame; unless we assume that mathematical reference frames have physical existence.

Lorentzian relativity simply allows for the possibility that an object could be at absolute rest, something which can be deduced from the evidence; what we can't deduce, however, is that absolute rest doesn't exist at all; because, afterall, the earth might be at absolute rest - we just can't tell if it is or not.

If we conclude that absolute rest might not exist, then we are only free to conclude that everything must absolutely be in motion; we can't conclude that absolute rest doesn't exist, because, afterall we could be at absolute rest.

If we conclude that absolute rest might not exist, then intrinsic motion might not exist either. It is perfectly consistent.

I think RoS might be based on circular reasoning, because it explicitly (or implicitly perhaps) assumes the constancy of the one-way speed of light, which, of course, is circular reasoning; and something which is a cornerstone of Einsteinian relativity.

I don't think we have any reason to deduce that a teapot orbits pluto, but I think we can deduce the possibility that an object could be at absolute rest, as well as the non-existence of time, which would make time dilation, at least, dynamical.

I also wonder if an absolute wave-length of light would account for the absence of fringe shifts in interferometry experiments; but that is for a different thread.

RoS is based on the kinematical formulation of Einstein's relativity. The constancy of the speed of light comes from Maxwell's equations. No circular reasoning is present, unless we try and use RoS to prove the kinematical formulation of Einstein's relativity.

Masteroid

The only time is 'now'. 'Now' is the current configuration of the universe and change occurs through deterministic processes. Only 'now' is the energy of the universe useful and usable.

In line with the second law of thermodynamics, all deterministic processes dissipate energy. That dissipated energy is related to the amount of change that has taken place and, in its current state, can effect change further.

Interaction --> Energy Dissipation --> Change. Change can only occur by this means. Which implies that only what happens now can have any deterministic consequences. Energy and matter which do not interact cannot effect outcomes, only that which does interact can.

The whole universe is but a moment in perpetual change and 'time' is a notional line that represents nothing more than the direction of that change.

In other words, the only reality is now.

roosh

Masteroid wrote: »

The only time is 'now'. 'Now' is the current configuration of the universe and change occurs through deterministic processes. Only 'now' is the energy of the universe useful and usable.

In line with the second law of thermodynamics, all deterministic processes dissipate energy. That dissipated energy is related to the amount of change that has taken place and, in its current state, can effect change further.

Interaction --> Energy Dissipation --> Change. Change can only occur by this means. Which implies that only what happens now can have any deterministic consequences. Energy and matter which do not interact cannot effect outcomes, only that which does interact can.

The whole universe is but a moment in perpetual change and 'time' is a notional line that represents nothing more than the direction of that change.

In other words, the only reality is now.

Although I'm not as knowledgeable on some of the more technical aspects of your post, I think I am in full agreement.

roosh

Morbert wrote: »

If we conclude that absolute rest might not exist, then intrinsic motion might not exist either. It is perfectly consistent.

Absolute rest pertains to the intrinsic motion of an object, it isn't necessarily a case of it existing or not; so when we conclude that "absolute rest might not exist" we can conclude that nothing might be at absolute rest. From that we cannot conclude that intrinsic motion might not exist.

Galileo's insight was that we can't distinguish a state of absolute rest from a state of inertial motion; both implying intrinsic motion, because the motion wasn't qualified as being relative to anything - as Galileo's observer was in a closed ship. That we cannot determine one form the other doesn't mean we can conclude neither exists, or that neither might exist; we can conclude that one or the other exists, we just can't determine, by co-moving experiment, which state we are in.

Morbert wrote: »

RoS is based on the kinematical formulation of Einstein's relativity. The constancy of the speed of light comes from Maxwell's equations. No circular reasoning is present, unless we try and use RoS to prove the kinematical formulation of Einstein's relativity.

From Maxwell's occasions we can infer the constancy of the measured speed of light. If I measure the speed of light to be 300,000km/s, and you measure it to be 300,000km/s, but my instruments are contracted compared to yours, it means that my measurement of 300,000km/s is not the same as your measurement, and so the actual speed of light, as represented by those measurements would be different.

Morbert

roosh wrote: »

Absolute rest pertains to the intrinsic motion of an object, it isn't necessarily a case of it existing or not; so when we conclude that "absolute rest might not exist" we can conclude that nothing might be at absolute rest. From that we cannot conclude that intrinsic motion might not exist.

No, we can conclude that the notion itself is not a logical necessity.

Galileo's insight was that we can't distinguish a state of absolute rest from a state of inertial motion; both implying intrinsic motion, because the motion wasn't qualified as being relative to anything - as Galileo's observer was in a closed ship. That we cannot determine one form the other doesn't mean we can conclude neither exists, or that neither might exist; we can conclude that one or the other exists, we just can't determine, by co-moving experiment, which state we are in.

Intrinsic motion is in no way implied. In fact, physical indistinguishability is the very thing which allows us to reject intrinsic motion as a logical necessity.

From Maxwell's occasions we can infer the constancy of the measured speed of light. If I measure the speed of light to be 300,000km/s, and you measure it to be 300,000km/s, but my instruments are contracted compared to yours, it means that my measurement of 300,000km/s is not the same as your measurement, and so the actual speed of light, as represented by those measurements would be different.

Again, you are losing track of your own line of reasoning. What you have done above is simply restated the postulate of Lorentzian relativity, instead of arguing, as you were doing before, that Einstein's relativity is circular reasoning.

roosh

Morbert wrote: »

No, we can conclude that the notion itself is not a logical necessity.

Where intrinsic motion is required to account for relative velocity, then it is a logical necessity.

Morbert wrote: »

Intrinsic motion is in no way implied. In fact, physical indistinguishability is the very thing which allows us to reject intrinsic motion as a logical necessity.

Intrinsic motion is implied; Galileo's observer on the ship could not distinguish absolute motion from absolute inertial motion - although he could determine accelerated motion. In both cases intrinsic motion is implied, because the conclusion isn't that Galileo's observer cannot distinguish his state of rest relative to X from his state of motion relative to X. I think the point Galileo was probably trying to make, pertained more to his belief that the Earth actually orbited the Sun, and not the other way around.

The physical indistinguishability doesn't enable us to reject it as a logical necessity, it simply allows us to declare that we cannot distinguish one from the other; the implication is still that it is one or the other. Indeed, the logical necessity of absolute motion to account for relative motion, is what enables us to deduce that it is a logical necessity.

Morbert wrote: »

Again, you are losing track of your own line of reasoning. What you have done above is simply restated the postulate of Lorentzian relativity, instead of arguing, as you were doing before, that Einstein's relativity is circular reasoning.

As mentioned, only the constancy of the measurement can be deduced from Maxwell's equations.

Where one observer measures the speed of light to be 300,000km/s and another, relatively moving observer measures the speed of light to be 300,000km/s, but the instruments of one observer are contracted, such that one observers clock ticks slower than the others, and their metre stick is shorter; the conclusion we would reach is that the actual speed of light, as represented by those measurements, does not remain constant.


So, Einsteinian relativity should conclude as Lorentzian relativity does.

Morbert

roosh wrote: »

Where intrinsic motion is required to account for relative velocity, then it is a logical necessity.

Intrinsic motion is implied; Galileo's observer on the ship could not distinguish absolute motion from absolute inertial motion - although he could determine accelerated motion. In both cases intrinsic motion is implied, because the conclusion isn't that Galileo's observer cannot distinguish his state of rest relative to X from his state of motion relative to X. I think the point Galileo was probably trying to make, pertained more to his belief that the Earth actually orbited the Sun, and not the other way around.

The physical indistinguishability doesn't enable us to reject it as a logical necessity, it simply allows us to declare that we cannot distinguish one from the other; the implication is still that it is one or the other. Indeed, the logical necessity of absolute motion to account for relative motion, is what enables us to deduce that it is a logical necessity.

Since you cannot establish it as a logical necessity without the cases being distinguishable, we can indeed reject intrinsic motion.

As mentioned, only the constancy of the measurement can be deduced from Maxwell's equations.

Where one observer measures the speed of light to be 300,000km/s and another, relatively moving observer measures the speed of light to be 300,000km/s, but the instruments of one observer are contracted, such that one observers clock ticks slower than the others, and their metre stick is shorter; the conclusion we would reach is that the actual speed of light, as represented by those measurements, does not remain constant.

So, Einsteinian relativity should conclude as Lorentzian relativity does.

This, again, has nothing to do with circular reasoning.

Regarding Lorentz v Einstein: You are just repeating yourself, perhaps unintentionally. You need to be able to recognise that we have been over this countless times before. If I am at my most charitable, I say that the assumptions of dynamical length contraction are at least as big an assumption as the kinematics of Einstein.

Under Lorentzian relativity, you have to assume that all material, whether it is a bar of steel or a bar of smoke, contract by exactly the same amount, and all processes are slowed by exactly the same amount, an amount that happens to make the speed of light constant. In Einstein's relativity, you don't have to assume all these accidental dynamics. You simply have to suppose that the relations between events exhibits hyperbolic geometry.

roosh

Morbert wrote: »

Since you cannot establish it as a logical necessity without the cases being distinguishable, we can indeed reject intrinsic motion.

That we cannot establish it as a logical necessity does not mean we are free to reject it, because, of course, we can deduce that it might actually exist; we just cannot tell one inertial state from another. We can, however, distinguish between them logically. Of course though, the physically indistinguishable nature of motion only extends to inertial motion; we can, apparently, distinguish accelerated motion from non-accelerated motion.

Morbert wrote: »

This, again, has nothing to do with circular reasoning.

We mightn't need to go any further though; from Maxwell's equations we can only deduce that the measurement of c remains invariant, not necessarily the actual speed of light as represented by those measurements.

Where length contraction and time dilation are involved, two measurements of 300,000km/s mean that only the measured speed of light remains invariant, not the actual speed.

This is contrary to Einsteinian relativity.

Morbert wrote: »

Regarding Lorentz v Einstein: You are just repeating yourself, perhaps unintentionally. You need to be able to recognise that we have been over this countless times before. If I am at my most charitable, I say that the assumptions of dynamical length contraction are at least as big an assumption as the kinematics of Einstein.

Under Lorentzian relativity, you have to assume that all material, whether it is a bar of steel or a bar of smoke, contract by exactly the same amount, and all processes are slowed by exactly the same amount, an amount that happens to make the speed of light constant. In Einstein's relativity, you don't have to assume all these accidental dynamics. You simply have to suppose that the relations between events exhibits hyperbolic geometry.

I'm not sure about the idea of a "bar of smoke", but it might be more accurate to say that atoms have to contract by different amounts, and all processes are slowed by different amounts, depending on their intrinsic motion; assuming there is not other, simpler explanation for the lack of a fringe shift in interferometry experiments.

With Einsteinian relativity we only need to assume that time is physical; that a clock measures time; that past and future exist; that the actual speed of light remains constant; that the one-way speed of light is the same in all directions, regardless of the motion relative to the source; that mathematical reference frames have physical existence; that static world-lines can somehow give rise to relative motion; that we exist as worldlines; that a clock can tick both faster and slower than another clock; and that nothing is actually capable of movement.

Or, to put it another way, that the relation between events exhibits hyperbolic geometry, which can contract and dilate, without affecting the dynamics of the phyiscal objects that are contracted.