Anarcho-Capitalism and Terrorism

Kama

This came to mind from reading the now-defunct sock-puppet conspiracy thread thread on libertarian ideology and terrorism, and the ongoing anarcho-capitalist threads, which touched on some issues I'm quite keen on. I'd be grateful if anyone else is interested or contributes.


A note on terms: despite their differences, I'll be using the terms mafias, pirates, and terrorists pretty much interchangeably, as non-state competing actors. 'Terrorism' here is non-state use of violence to achieve ends, and no assumption is made of the legitimacy in any ethical or normative sense of their means or objectives. It may also be argued that I misrepresent anarcho-capitalism due to these groups use of violence; I would argue that they comprise an alternate view of legitimacy, and can easily construe their position as one of self-defence of their property.


'Terrorism and Anarcho-Capitalism'

It was weakly argued previously that 'libertarians are terrorists'. Disregarding any 'scare-quote' deconstructions of this supposed identity, I find this far less interesting than the reciprocal, that terrorists are increasingly anarcho-capitalist, or seem a model of anarcho-capitalist behaviour. Firstly, they are the most prominent example of non-state economic actors; estimates vary of the size of the black economy, but it's unquestionably large. Secondly, their behaviours seem most developed where state authority is weakest, and the market for violence and protection most contestable.

Relevant examples include mafias and the international economy of 'black globalization', changes in guerrilla behaviour as with the Nigerian Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, and piracy in Somalia. 'Go to Somalia' is frequently the reply to libertarians who desire a stateless utopia; I'd argue this is correct, and that the behaviour of Somali pirates is quite typically anarcho-capitalist. In the absence of a effective state, private militias defensively enforce their rights to their territorial waters through interdiction as customs or extortion, trading the proceeds to support further expansion and running costs. Outsourcing, franchise behaviours, use of information technology, and integration in a transnational economy are common behaviours, as in my other example.

These changes are seen as emergent from state and market reconstitution under globalization and liberalization, and a shift from an international regime of nation-states to what Bobbitt in Shield of Achilles termed 'market-states': 'Whereas the nation-state based its legitimacy on a promise to better the material well-being of the nation, the market-state promises to maximize the opportunity of each individual citizen.' Firstly, this shift of legitimation is in a anarcho-capitalist direction, eschewing collective responsibilities for the 'national good' for an individualist-meritocratic function. Secondly, the competitors to state power, the 'terrorists', change in behaviour and organization as a reflection of this shift. A transnationally globalized economy produces a transnationally globalized criminal economy in its own image, with declining commitment to national claims, loyalties, and provision in favour of increasing individual opportunity, and maximising market share and returns in the global economy.

A strong state, definitionally, possesses a monopoly of force. The historically-manifest success of states has hinged on their comparative advantage in warfare over previous forms of social organization, their superior ability to provide internal and external security to a territory (state-making and war-making in Tilly's terms), extract revenue, and legitimate 'protection racket' rents within that territory. Maximising return gave a strong incentive for states towards territorial expansion, with investing in centralized military structures providing a return, by acquiring territory, and was necessitated by the reverse need to provide external security. Efficient extraction entailed the elimination of internal competitors, which facilitated or enabled protection rackets. Tilly

A weak or failed state, here, is one where this monopoly is lost, or cannot be enforced. Without effective security provision, legitimation suffers, and revenue extraction becomes problematic, feeding back on the ability to provide security, or secure legitimation. A weakened state lacks the capability to enforce internal security, and can be out-competed by internal non-state competitors, aka terrorists. Key examples here include Mexico (where MS-13 can outgun the state), Somalia, and the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. It is worth noting that a state may not be 'weak' purely due to internal factors, and that the ability to provide or contest with competitors can be influenced by exogenous factors, such as technological shifts. Old-fashioned piracy declined with the movement from sail to coal, reducing the flexibility of the current technique; so too new forms of piracy can become more competitive with technological shifts.

'Terrorists' here are non-state actors, attempting to compete with the state for legitimacy, for territory, or extortion rights. The means and functions are seen here as homologous with those of state actors: pace Tilly, state-making is organized crime, the Emperor is a well-dressed pirate. Like states, terrorists or mafias are viewed as parasites or symbiotes, extracting rents and providing services. The goal of terrorists in nation-state conditions is often to produce a state, as in national liberation movements: the successful 'terrorist' becomes Father of the Nation with capture or establishment of the state as the primary locus of power.

In the era of nation-states and primarily national economies, this locus of power is the state, and the target for terrorist movements is state capture. But in conditions where the state is weak or failed, or when the state no longer enjoys this power over the local economy, state capture becomes less desirable or efficient, and the opportunities and freedom offered by the transnationally liberalized marketplace and transport infrastructure, especially in areas with a government-enforced illegal cartel, such as drugs or human trafficking, yield superior returns. 'Barriers to entry are raised, and the means to manage or reduce risk are not available to all. A monopoly rent results for the supplier' (Strange, 1996). The 'black economy' infrastructure that is required provides an advantage in any other illegal activities, such as human trafficking, and encourages an anarchic international marketplace or bazaar for criminal groups, to obtain commodities and expertise.

When territory becomes less important than market global share in producing wealth, and gaining territory less an issue for states, their competitors also shift to a more non-territorial approach, and as states lose or cede the ability or authority to provide domestic economic goods in favour of competing in a global marketplace, their shadows follow suit. Rather than provide 'national goods' for legitimation, they provide opportunity to their constituents, and rather than require political legitimation (much as the Chinese government) they supply economic advance, as in Somali piracy, providing opportunity at low entry cost with a potentially high return.

Terrorist movements, it is argued, change in behaviour to an increasingly anarcho-capitalist stance, in congruence with the shifts in political legitimation to opportunity-maximizing market-states, and economic transnational integration, and responding to shifts in the balance of warfare, to wars of movement and maneuver, and to the lowered capital intensivity of deploying effective force through asymmetric warfare, and a return to the 'commercial warfare' of piracy. This process mirrors the shifts in the 'orthodox' economy, the increases in privatization and 'deregulation', and the renaissance of private security, such as Blackwater and Sandline, who can be seen as analogous to chartered privateers to the terrorists 'pirates'.

Another example of this tendency is MEND in Nigeria. While the attempt to produce a nation-state was crushed in the Biafran War, and Ken Saro-Wiwa long dead as a demonstration of the efficacy of non-violent resistance, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta has emerged as an effective regional player.

It targets oil infrastructure for systems disruption of the regional economy, corporate hostage as a revenue-generating activity, and taking swarm attacks on targets using outsourced staff - Mend 'doesn’t even field its own guerillas. They hire their experts and fighters mostly from criminal gangs and tribal warrior cults to do their operations'. Robb It can be argued that MEND bears a strong similarity to the behaviour of some corporations: it provides a brand identity to its constituent businesses, while subcontracting out the production of violence. MEND doesn't seek to provide an effective territorial governance, but merely to make governance impossible for others, and gain the capability to extract rents at will. MEND's success here can be viewed as similar to that of Al Qaida: it provides planning, PR, and venture capital to subcontracted agents to achieve its ends. Its swarm tactics and organization are enabled by advances in information technology (email, mobile phones) and the ability to leverage the transnational criminal economy to gain effective competition in the internal arms race with Nigerian State forces and corporate private security, and to monetize or barter the proceeds acquired, such as hijacked oil, or more daringly to use their capacity for supply disruption as 'swing' for financial manipulation. It's worth noting here that perhaps the key factor in the failure of the Biafran Secession was their inability to access adequate military technology, and the provision of the same to the Nigerian government during the civil war by Britain and Russia.

Recently, as part of the 'ceasefire' agreement, MEND released a statement that seems a market-state reconfiguration of the 'Armalite and the Ballot Box', 'Operation Moses': 'an escalated campaign of attacks to maximize their bargaining power..."The two-pronged approach of combining dialogue and intensifying attacks throughout the course of negotiations will be the unique characteristics of Moses,” said MEND'. Disruption provides them a strong financial return, while amplifying their 'Voice'; a win-win for MEND. Lacking a held territorial base, deterritorialzing like global capital, the Nigerian state is unable to adequately erode MEND's support, or interdict their operatives, in a new variation on guerrilla war.

MEND are now a participant in the anarcho-capitalist, liberalized economy of 'Black Globalization', an anarchic, rhizomatic, transnationally globalized economic structure. The centrality of financial liberalization in this process appears key: while it is illegal to trade directly in the black economy, it is highly profitable and provides large sums of liquidity, and without the 'cleaning' of the proceeds back into the orthodox economy it is difficult to see how the world-economy could continue. De facto, money laundering is legal, and s a necessity for both parties; it is unsurprising that the key tax havens or offshore centers are positioned on the crossroads of the narcotics trade: the Bahamas, Hong Kong, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. The implications for the international political system of can be viewed as an impotent incapacity, or more sinisterly as complicit capture of institutions, as hypothesized in 'conspiracy theory'. As an Emperor has 'bought' enough legitimacy, and can deploy enough force, so too the profits of 'Black Globalization' can provide terrorists and mafias with a competitive advantage against 'uncorrupted' actors, both in their access to funds, ability to buy complicity or collusion, and their paramilitary coercive advantages within states.

This trajectory problematizes the initial state/non-state division with which I began. This potential symbiosis, of criminal terrorist profiteers, leveraging transnational finance, provides imo an 'existential threat' to a liberal-democratic world system. Without some form of global governance, but with a global economy, the likely telos appears institutional capture and manipulation of the world-system by transnational criminal congeries and associations in their own interests; with their emergence as a global player, and their competitive advantages due to the anarchic global environment, they possess significant power to exert, and lack an effective check on that power.

Akrasia

I think it is very interesting to compare the behaviour of the pro capitalist militias and the somali pirates (which I agree share many properties of what an 'anarcho capitalist' society would look like) with the behaviour of the left Anarchist movements like the EZLN (Zapatistas)



I know which version of a revolution I would prefer to experience.

Ostrom

Do you see this as positive?

Is there a sustainable model for social order emerging from this - is it an alternative configuration of state-market - or just fragmentary adaptations to circumstance?

This interests me most: "When territory becomes less important than market global share in producing wealth, and gaining territory less an issue for states, their competitors also shift to a more non-territorial approach, and as states lose or cede the ability or authority to provide domestic economic goods in favour of competing in a global marketplace, their shadows follow suit".

Thinking long-term, the only means through which this could self-sustain is through protectionism - reverting to agrarian / protected industrial development? As someone who is not well read in the area, the only example I can think of close to such a model is the EZLN mentioned above.


@ Kama - what would be good reading for an insulated individual like myself who wants to explore the above?

Kama

Thanks for the response. I'll admit I'm waiting to see what happens when DF arrives :eek:

@ Akrasia - We can similarly look, as with the EZLN, at thier ability to leverage communication technology to broadcast their struggle. The Zap's have successfully become a global brand, with SubCommandante Marcos as their Henry Okah, and what might otherwise be another indigenous uprising for peasant land rights becomes a global focus for the opposition to neoliberalism. They're a fascinating organization, and yes, Chiapas with Zapatista Autonomous Communities looks like a much better place to live than Northern Mexico, under the de facto rule of MS-13.

There's an intransigent problem for study in this area (mafias etc) because it's 'black'; we can't conduct effective interviews or surveys, it's heuristically problematic for obvious reasons involving guns, and the general tendency of most people to value their bodily integrity On the other approach, if you bring up the effects of transnational drug flows on the corruption of political processes worldwide in academic debate, you do tend to get called a 'conspiracy theorist'. But these hot money flows must be reintegrated, and the proceeds can buy a lot of legitimacy or collusion, so I regard it as a unacknowledged and urgent problem, and one lacking in much sustained public attention; instead we get 'moral panics' on drug use, and ineffective punitive and carceral approaches at huge cost, and interdiction which can, at best, increase price. Which makes more sense as 'conspiracy theory' than as policy, which accounts for it's credibility to many.

@ Efla, the post intent is descriptive-analytic, on the whole I wasn't trying to push any subjective-evaluative buttons. To answer, I don't really see it as positive; states are retrenching in a lot of areas that matter, like social provision, largely due to fiscal constraints, and have ceded authority, either directly or indirectly, in others to the global market economy. I think this has real and dangerous effects on the legitimacy of states. To quote Strange again, 'democracy is as apt to decline out of boredom and frustration as of the violent overthrow of constitutional government'. Much heretofore 'political' control has been transferred to 'markets', the scope of autonomy appears reduced. The economy is globalized, and while the polis or agora is not, the 'raiders' are. I think this a real and pressing problem, and widespread state failure as quite possible, and with strong positive feedback, much as with the banking crisis. Mexico's collapse, for the current example, constitutes an existential threat to the US, in a way that Iran can never be.

If organized crime was integrated in terms of its actions, centralized and coherent...well then I'd venture to say we're f*cked; this is the general 'conspiracy theory' message: 'gangsters rule the world, all the rest is a sham, take the red pill'. My operating assumption here is that they aren't, that it's a properly anarchic environment, with any guerrilla 'aristocrat' having a legion of sociopaths well-willing to knock him off, and with incredibly low levels of trust increasing transaction costs.

As to possible scenarios emergent if we accept this account, there are several, with protectionist blocs being one of them for any sufficiently large to be viable economic unit, such as the EU. If any of the above was of interest, I can only recommend strongly reading the sources, as I can truly claim credit for none of the post. They are:

Bobbit, The Shield of Achilles if you have a lot of spare time, and an interest in the links in and co-evolution of warfare, states and constitutional orders. It's quite extended in scope, on the rise and evolution of what we call the State. His prognosis (as I read it) is a strengthening of the market-state constitutional order, and the war on terrorism as an existential necessity, though I admit to not having read Terror and Consent yet, the synopsis is here

If you have less time, either procuring the book 'Brave New War' by John Robb, or visiting his blog. I've found his analysis and coverage invaluable, and his style as exemplary. His optimist prognosis is a more localized, resilient, tech-booster communities in response to supply disruptions and state weakening; he'd recommend you to look at Rob Hopkins and the Transition Towns movement.

And in international political economy broadly, I recommend highly Susan Strange, who managed to write for the Economist without being a 20-something male from Magdalen College wrote seminal work on the market-authority nexus. While she died, I think her vision has been more than validated; her essay on mafias in The Retreat of the State was the initial inspiration.

Offalycool

Bit drunk now, but this is a well fleshed out argument, well done.

I think one substantial factor in the lawlessness in deprived countries goes back to international relations, it is the international acceptance of a self proclaimed regime to govern and profit from a people and a countries’ natural resources via international law. If I break into a house and take up residence, and sell all the furniture, any sales should technically not be recognise by law. I would be selling stolen property and any buyer would not have a legitimate claim on the goods. However, in international law if I take over a country by force, and sell anything I can, any buyer is entitled to the goods: it is legitimately recognise by international law. I can understand there is such a thing as a legitimate overthrow of an unaccountable regime, but it is a bit much to accept any government, regardless of public support. This clearly does not promote democracy in the world, whatever the slogan proclaims.

The global ‘governance’ of international law clearly is not concerned with the legitimacy of democracy, or indeed see it as a viable threat. Nevertheless, I do not find this surprising as I believe in the west there are multiple levels of governance. One level is accountable, the nuts and bolts of politics. The other is not accountable and exercises influence (force) outside legal legitimacy via capital. As with actors in the political level, this level is basically concerned with its interests. However, this unaccountable level strives to overpower competitors in a game without rules, and hence has no qualms about democratic legitimacy. This is the level that exercises international influence as capital in truth recognises no borders. A democratic state must to an extent account for the legal infrastructure within its borders; it is ultimately accountable to its citizens. On the other hand, international capitalism is at the fore of international relations, specifically trade, and as a result has tremendous influence in international law. Here there is really no accountability, only force. I believe this is the dimension of modern ‘legitimate’ organisation that is most akin to ‘terrorism’ as it is understood traditionally.

Kama

Offalycool wrote: »

Bit drunk now, but this is a well fleshed out argument, well done.

Like Drunken-style kungfu, there's a lot to be said for the Half-Hammered School of Political Theory

However, in international law if I take over a country by force, and sell anything I can, any buyer is entitled to the goods: it is legitimately recognise by international law.

Ish. The state system doesn't look *quite* that anarchic. States need a degree of external recognition to do that, or a lot of structural power in the world system (eg. the US in Iraq), but it's hardly costless even then. GW was kinda right when he said 'international law? I'd better speak to my lawyer' though; what institutions we have are toothless, such as the ICC.

Nevertheless, I do not find this surprising as I believe in the west there are multiple levels of governance. One level is accountable, the nuts and bolts of politics. The other is not accountable and exercises influence (force) outside legal legitimacy via capital.

Yup. A lot of Strange's thesis quite early on was that authority, autonomy and power had moved outside the state, and that political economy hadn't caught up. With autonomy moved 'outside', with the effect that politics within states was becoming more formal and less meaningful; even if it remained properly accountable, the scope was increasingly denuded.

This is the level that exercises international influence as capital in truth recognises no borders. A democratic state must to an extent account for the legal infrastructure within its borders; it is ultimately accountable to its citizens. On the other hand, international capitalism is at the fore of international relations, specifically trade, and as a result has tremendous influence in international law.

This is the main thrust of the alter-mondialiste argument; that we have a form of global governance, but one that exceeds and can subordinate the predominantly-national democratic structures. Rather than a nation-state managing a national economy, we have a global economy managing it's constituent market-states. I'm not 'all-in' on this as a bet, I think one of the strongest effects of Washington Consensus, TINA etc, was to convince people that the scope of state action was narrowed that much, which becomes quite the self-fulfilling prophecy. States are strongly constrained, I'd argue, but have more leeway in how to steer the national-economic ship of state than the 'hard' convergence of 'Golden Straightjackets' made out.

Here there is really no accountability, only force. I believe this is the dimension of modern ‘legitimate’ organisation that is most akin to ‘terrorism’ as it is understood traditionally.

I'm not quite as convinced. I expected the first argument on these lines to be 'what about state terrorism, rather than the 'terrorism' of the global market. I usually try and avoid the word entirely, because I don't usually find it used with much fixed meaning, more as an expression of strong dislike. The broader the meaning of a term becomes, the less useful it is in pinpointing any specific phenomenon, and in this post anyway, I'm trying to use it in a fairly specific way, so the more broadstroke 'terrorism' are off the table. You can make a fair case that corporations etc are 'non-state actors seeking to contest the state', but here anyway I was trying to focus on quite different features: 'how terrorism evolves in an anarchic capitalist environment' rather than 'capitalism is anarchic and terroristic'. The first seems to me less identity-ridden and value-laden, and potentially discussable without the thread descending into violence and discursive 'terrorism'.

That being said, my concern with the post, in the conclusion anyway, was of the (to my mind quite plausible) scenario, that through appropriation and monopoly drug profits, mafia-like groups could leverage their positions to one of dominance in the global governance system. The global environment we have is quite close to 'one dollar one vote', and mafias have a lot of dollars. It's been done often enough on the national level, where we have state-mafia syntheses such as the FSB-Mafia expropriation that came with Russian liberalization.

Ostrom

Kama wrote: »

This trajectory problematizes the initial state/non-state division with which I began. This potential symbiosis, of criminal terrorist profiteers, leveraging transnational finance, provides imo an 'existential threat' to a liberal-democratic world system. Without some form of global governance, but with a global economy, the likely telos appears institutional capture and manipulation of the world-system by transnational criminal congeries and associations in their own interests; with their emergence as a global player, and their competitive advantages due to the anarchic global environment, they possess significant power to exert, and lack an effective check on that power.

Reminds me of a comment by Harvey, on Hegel:

'...despite an excess of wealth, civil society is not rich enough, i.e. its own resources are insufficient to check excessive poverty and the creation of a penurious rabble' (Hegel)

It seems the many forms of what seem to be construed here as 'anarcho capitalism' could be separated into those arising from immiseration and acting coherently toward an alternative market configuration, and those exploiting through other historical forms of accumulation (the example of organised crime). Given the variety of historical circumstance, I cant see this existing as anything more then fragmentary.

I'm ignorant empirically on the examples you have given though, I'll have to read more.

Permabear

This post has been deleted.

Offalycool

Kama wrote: »

Like Drunken-style kungfu, there's a lot to be said for the Half-Hammered School of Political Theory

:cool:

Ish. The state system doesn't look *quite* that anarchic. States need a degree of external recognition to do that, or a lot of structural power in the world system (eg. the US in Iraq), but it's hardly costless even then. GW was kinda right when he said 'international law? I'd better speak to my lawyer' though; what institutions we have are toothless, such as the ICC.

Not always. Internal hostility can result in coup d'état, overthrowing a legitimately supported administration. This can be directly and indirectly supported by domestic and foreign entities. The new administration is accepted, and for the most part encouraged by the international market and law. In so far as the latest invasion of Iraq is concerned, the argument still stands. The cost is weighed against the projected rewards.

I'm not quite as convinced. I expected the first argument on these lines to be 'what about state terrorism, rather than the 'terrorism' of the global market. I usually try and avoid the word entirely, because I don't usually find it used with much fixed meaning, more as an expression of strong dislike. The broader the meaning of a term becomes, the less useful it is in pinpointing any specific phenomenon, and in this post anyway, I'm trying to use it in a fairly specific way, so the more broadstroke 'terrorism' are off the table. You can make a fair case that corporations etc are 'non-state actors seeking to contest the state', but here anyway I was trying to focus on quite different features: 'how terrorism evolves in an anarchic capitalist environment' rather than 'capitalism is anarchic and terroristic'. The first seems to me less identity-ridden and value-laden, and potentially discussable without the thread descending into violence and discursive 'terrorism'.

I draw a comparison between international capitalism and terrorism because essentially uncompromising force is involved. Capitalism within the state is restrained in the interest of stability; it is subordinated to democratically legitimised law. Beyond the regulatory power of the state, capitalism is essentially anarchistic (and terrifying).

That being said, my concern with the post, in the conclusion anyway, was of the (to my mind quite plausible) scenario, that through appropriation and monopoly drug profits, mafia-like groups could leverage their positions to one of dominance in the global governance system. The global environment we have is quite close to 'one dollar one vote', and mafias have a lot of dollars. It's been done often enough on the national level, where we have state-mafia syntheses such as the FSB-Mafia expropriation that came with Russian liberalization.

The top dogs of capital are essentially the mafia; they have just been around long enough to legitimise 'business', become insulated from the tiresome chore of political engagement, and have picked up enough etiquette to pass off as law abiding members of society (which essentially they are as they violate no domestic law, and as Bush says “International law?“) Nevertheless, it is much more peaceful and profitable to encourage some level of self determination for the masses in developed nations. I doubt it will make much of a difference to our comfortable western lives which mob rules the roost. Its quite a different story for citizens in much of our resource laden underdeveloped suppliers.

Kama

Welcome back DF...I threw my back out, so I share some of your pain, or somesuch solidaristic nonsense

If one sees anarcho-capitalism as a logical extension of classical liberalism (as I do) and sees genuine liberals as law-abiding and peaceful individuals (as I do), it quickly becomes clear that anarcho-capitalists and terrorists are about as far apart as they could be.

Well this is a definitional question; if we define anarcho-capitalists as necessarily pacifistic, then it follows that this cannot be a duck. But I don't see a necessary reason for this to be, and this is not my definition here. I'm not arguing that these are classical liberals, or that classical liberalism is a terrorist movement (though the thread weakly arguing that was the jumping point), more that (appropriately enough for libertarianism) there is no monopoly on anarcho-capitalism by the classical liberal, or other anarchocapitalist positions you describe, which can be viewed as a subset within anarcho-capitalism, broad-church. I'm not using it as an analogy, but descriptively; these movements are anarchic, and behave in a late-capitalist manner that is functional in and emergent from the financial and legal ecology of the world-economy; the logic of the marketplace comes to be (mis?)used, imitated, or engaged in, by violent movements who are integrated in a global marketplace. An example would be Bin Laden's comment on 911 in terms of its return on investment, the venture capital approach to terrorist action; another is Henry Okah the 'guerrilla entrepreneur' alleged to mastermind MEND.

Suffice to say I didn't intend this as a critique of classical liberalism of libertarian philosophy, though I do believe it raises some problems for it. to say 'would not, however, support terrorism' begs the question...why not? Besides the definitional closure of 'if they do, they aren't', I don't see the necessity; as I said, I can see the Somali pirates as quite legitimately defending their territory against incursions, pollution etc, as a private militia enforcing their territorial waters, in the absence of a adequate Leviathan. Similarly, MEND can be seen as 'defending their property' against the injustice of the Nigerian State. In both cases, we can view, in libertarian style, their violence as retaliatory, their property rights as unrecognized, and their response within this context as justified. One mans terrorist is another mans defender of his natural rights...


@ offalycool - tend to agree with the thrust of your points, but have a query or two. If capitalism in the international sphere is essentially anarchistic, can it be thought of as a truly deterritorialized and coherent actor that can 'weigh costs and benefits, or do we have an anarchic relation between different actors in more zero-sum mercantilist manner ? Fr'instance, Chinese capitalist interests may differ substantially from American. Is capital truly global and footloose, or more bloc-like between rival and competing interest groups?

Capitalism within the state is restrained in the interest of stability; it is subordinated to democratically legitimised law. Beyond the regulatory power of the state, capitalism is essentially anarchistic (and terrifying).

This was the conclusion of Strange in the early 90s, and many others since; the argument of Robb is that this anarchic environment is vulnerable to violent competitors who can leverage the platform of the global infrastructure with ease, that there is an ecological niche for violent predators which has been filled. There's a question, though, of to what extent, other than by the exercise of the power to cede control state or state-bloc power is diminished. I suspect state autonomy to be significantly under-rated, and bloc autonomy as comparatively high.

The top dogs of capital are essentially the mafia; they have just been around long enough to legitimise 'business', become insulated from the tiresome chore of political engagement, and have picked up enough etiquette to pass off as law abiding members of society...Nevertheless, it is much more peaceful and profitable to encourage some level of self determination for the masses in developed nations. I doubt it will make much of a difference to our comfortable western lives which mob rules the roost. Its quite a different story for citizens in much of our resource laden underdeveloped suppliers.

In a sense, we return to Tilly (and DF's) conception of the State as a protection racket, and to 'Pirates and Emperors'; for raiders or mafias, a excellent site of investment is in legitimacy; bandits who settle in the village declare themselves Kings, and their progeny become well-bred aristocrats. Cocaine mafia dons live in the Hamptons, and go to the opera, forceful appropriation buys the clothes of legitimacy, or slowly wears into them. Something close to this happens on the Texan border: small towns are effectively legally owned by Mexican gang-leaders, who prefer it on that side of the border, for the relative safety and peace and quiet. Once enough money is laundered in, there's a strong incentive (as with Stringer Bell in The Wire) to 'go legit', or at least keep an arms length, to 'become the Bank'.

Out of interest, does anyone find the concept of 'mafia capture' as outlined implausible? Is this a scenario possible, and if not what features of our international socio-economic organization mitigate or check such trends?

efla wrote:

It seems the many forms of what seem to be construed here as 'anarcho capitalism' could be separated into those arising from immiseration and acting coherently toward an alternative market configuration, and those exploiting through other historical forms of accumulation (the example of organised crime). Given the variety of historical circumstance, I cant see this existing as anything more then fragmentary.

Could you expand on this point, and distinction? I feel, perhaps, that I may be creating a muddle with the designation 'anarcho-capitalist' here; my contention is that their behaviour configures against, and is homologous to, current capitalist practices; nation-states produce national forms of terrorism, an integrated world economy of market-states produces an internationally integrated form of terrorism whose success or failure is determined by their competition in global markets, both illegal and legal.

On the immiseration, many is the mafia that began on such grounds - one supposed origin (disputed) of the Sicilian Mafia was in organization for peasant land rights. Equally, mafias and terrorists form 'alternate market configurations', aka the black market, engage in trade and barter behaviours. It is worth noting that, as with gang behaviour in many countries, they provide a form of opportunity for economic advancement with low entry costs, that can absorb the substantial underemployed labour force; the return on kidnapping in Mexico or Nigeria, is far, far above what can be obtained in the legitimate economy, providing what is seen as the only practical route of escape from poverty, and the return from 'raiding' as in the Somali example, is a significant boon to the local economy in terms of capital inflows. It's a competitive business, albeit an 'illegitimate' one.

They thrive in conditions of weakened or failing states, where force monopoly tends to greater contestability, and I would hence designate them as a brand of anarchism, though not one usually represented in boards political theory forums, as they actively subvert the state. Their methods have also been called 'open source insurgency' (Robb) or more broadly' Fourth Generation Warfare' (Lind). They are typically stateless, and not (as previously) attempting state capture, instead maximizing revenue through direct participation and predation of market flows, rather than parasitising the same through appropriating the means of state power.

Again, this is somewhat of an adaptation of Tilly's thesis on State-Making, in an era where states are no longer the primary form of, or actor in, international organization. To follow offallycools tangent, where once the bandit would become king, demand tribute, and conquer his rivals, now the entreprenurial mafia-terrorist has an investment fund, eliminates competitors, and demands interest. Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose?

Apologies if these terms seem insufficient, or their meaning too full already; are there any suggestions on how better to describe any of the features I'm delineating? Or feel free to tell me if my 'map' is forcing or misrepresenting the territory. Comments or critique, as always, appreciated.

nesf

Hmm, Kama I believe you may be confusing a wish to enact change in the social order (which is a general wish shared by everything from centrists to terrorists) with minimalism of the State which is a very specific form of this. I think you can argue that some terrorist groups share some beliefs with some forms of pacifistic libertarianism but the differences between them are almost more important. Also looking at the paths they wish to take to enact this change separates terrorists from pretty much everyone else. There's a marked difference between someone wanting to enact an "alternative market configuration" at the barrel of a gun and someone wanting to do it through the ballot box.

Permabear

This post has been deleted.

Offalycool

Kama wrote: »

If capitalism in the international sphere is essentially anarchistic, can it be thought of as a truly deterritorialized and coherent actor that can 'weigh costs and benefits, or do we have an anarchic relation between different actors in more zero-sum mercantilist manner ? Fr'instance, Chinese capitalist interests may differ substantially from American. Is capital truly global and footloose, or more bloc-like between rival and competing interest groups?

It’s a good question. I think the unifying power of the modern state is platform for action in the global market. If you want to over through a regime in a third world country (perhaps because of their insistence in undercutting your business, or trading with your enemies) there are a number of ways of going about it. You can intervene militarily, you can support an internal struggle, you can get your allies to impose economic sanctions etc. Capital provides the means for all the options above. Traditionally, if I was a patriot I may use ‘my’ state to influence other states for the benefit of my beloved country. On the other hand, if I interact in a transnational market with interests throughout the world, I may not pledge allegiance to any particular block-like entity, or state. I may also use rogue element within other states for my interests, even at the expense of the welfare of my birthplace. I think this is where capital distinguishes itself from the tribalism of “block-like” entities.

It would be tempting to blame the structure of the state, the ideally public machinery that may be harnessed for private interest at the expense of those it was designed to protect. I don’t think this is very pragmatic though, rather, it is better, I believe, to live within a democratic state structure with the political freedom to meet in public spaces and determine the issues of common concern, and tackle appropriately.

Out of interest, does anyone find the concept of 'mafia capture' as outlined implausible? Is this a scenario possible, and if not what features of our international socio-economic organization mitigate or check such trends.

For the record, I think it is plausible. I also think it is the status quo.

turgon

Offalycool wrote: »

Bit drunk now

donegalfella wrote: »

This post has been deleted.

Kama wrote: »

I threw my back out

Perhaps its a message from some higher diety that he/she is getting sick of these communist/libertarian threads

EDIT: Very good opening post Kama.

DF: In your anarcho-capitalist world, what would prevent such militias as in Somalia forming and exercising influence over the populace? I would see the necessity of a state to keep law and order.

silverharp

turgon wrote: »

DF: In your anarcho-capitalist world, what would prevent such militias as in Somalia forming and exercising influence over the populace? I would see the necessity of a state to keep law and order.

without trying to second guess DF , the model could be that all land and even the seas would be the private property of some entity. if for example the Irish sea consortium was having issues with pirates, their own security would deal with the problem in an effort to keep the custom of passing traffic. If the society is "civil" to begin with I'd assume that any attempt at racketeering would be dealt with by private security companies paid for by the businesses or residents of a particular area. As the security companies would possibly be public companies I would see no reason why they would desend into mafia style operations themselves.

turgon

Ok, suppose this situation. I have small area of land next to a huge superfarm owned by a consortium of farmers. Im getting annoying as I occupy a ford that would be beneficial to them. So they forcibly take a strip of my land by acting like a militia and give themselves access to said ford.

So I take it to court. Presumably I get compensation as well as my land back, and some of the superfarmers who were involved might go to prison. But who enforces this? Supposing they refuse to comply and give me my land and money and I go back to court to get them off my land, and then they snub the court. How does the court force them to go to to court? Do I have to pay for a militia to force them there? And supposing they go bankrupt. Am I to shoulder the cost of my militia?

silverharp

turgon wrote: »

Ok, suppose this situation. I have small area of land next to a huge superfarm owned by a consortium of farmers. Im getting annoying as I occupy a ford that would be beneficial to them. So they forcibly take a strip of my land by acting like a militia and give themselves access to said ford.

So I take it to court. Presumably I get compensation as well as my land back, and some of the superfarmers who were involved might go to prison. But who enforces this? Supposing they refuse to comply and give me my land and money and I go back to court to get them off my land, and then they snub the court. How does the court force them to go to to court? Do I have to pay for a militia to force them there? And supposing they go bankrupt. Am I to shoulder the cost of my militia?

one approach would be insurance , you as the farmer would take out insurance covering amongst other things land disputes. it would be up to the insurance company to work out what kind of courts/arbitration to use. If the dispute was a genuine one where both parties thought they were right then their insurance companies would organise their side. If the other side were not abiding a particular judgment then your insurance company would settle your side and would go after the other side to reclaim costs.

Akrasia

silverharp wrote: »

one approach would be insurance , you as the farmer would take out insurance covering amongst other things land disputes. it would be up to the insurance company to work out what kind of courts/arbitration to use. If the dispute was a genuine one where both parties thought they were right then their insurance companies would organise their side. If the other side were not abiding a particular judgment then your insurance company would settle your side and would go after the other side to reclaim costs.

None of these systems would work in an asymmetrical dispute between a wealthy landowner and a poor landowner.

The wealthy consortium would have an insurance policy that covers indefinite legal expenses, access to the best lawyers, relationships and contacts within the courts etc. The poor landowner might have an insurance policy, but it would be inferior, the poor landowner may not be able to cover the huge costs of litigation, his insurance company might be shoddy, or corrupt, or if it was a part of the same company that his opponent also had insurance with, would have a conflict of interest in protecting its larger client...

The libertarian solution boild down to, essentially, might is right. If you own the land, you're right, if you can afford to defend them in the private courts.

If you're right, but can't defend your rights, then you will lose, and there will be nobody to back you up

Kama

Perhaps it's force of habit, or perhaps my choice of initial terms or thread title gave the wrong impression, but I'm not attempting to rebut or refute the arguments of classical liberalism, right-libertarianism, pacificist anarchocapitalism etc. Not that I don't think there are some interesting issues here for them (I think there are) but that wasn't the direction I intended; not that I can tell a thread where to go. Anyway, I'll represent my argument, hopefully with more clarity.

The core of what I'm intrigued by, and seeking to address, is:

Changes in the political economy of the state-system, form nation states towards market-states; from competition for territory to competition for global market share, from national economies managed by states to transnational economies which 'manage' states, and from legitimation by service or goods provision for the nation to legitimation by maximizing opportunity for the individual. This is the first, more state-centric, argument, and originates with Bobbitt.

Secondly, evolutionarily emergent from this, the corresponding change in the behavior practices of non-state actors. International relations tends to be state-centric, which tends to elide the effects of non-state institutions; firms and standard NGO's come here, but the specific trend I wish to emphasize is the 'black' non-state actors (terrorists, mafias, pirates, guerrillas), which I'm lumping together as 'terrorists'; while there are numerous differences, they all function within a 'black' capitalist market-economy, which is stricto sensu anarchic, as they are not governed by States. Robb's term for them is 'global guerrillas'; if terrorist is too bad a word, or brings up too many associations, I'll use that instead.

It is argued that there appears to be a homology or correspondence between between the form of the state, and the form of the oppositional non-state forces: in a nation-state system or context, violent oppositional groups contest the state, and seek to capture the state, legitimating their struggle by national ideology, while with the transition to a market-state context, violent oppositional groups participate directly in the globally integrated economy as market actors, with less national orientation, and more providing financial opportunity for their participants.

I'm taking the structure of Tilly, in State-Making as Organized Crime, and asking whether this changes, or is updated by, the current context of a globally integrated marketplace, where the return on investment from capturing a slice of the global pie is greater than capturing a slice of the national territory. Factors include: changes in the world economy (integration, financial liberalization, information technology, and the monopoly profits from the global black market), changes in the balance of force in war: lighter, smaller, cheaper, more available, tilting the balance of power further towards individuals, and the Goliath Effect of there being what Barnett calls a US 'Leviathan Force' that makes asymmetric warfare the 'only game in town'). These conditions make 'conventional' guerrilla war less viable, and state capture Pyrrhic, with a consequence that 'warfare', or violent competition, becomes more of a entrepreneurial business: venture terrorism, attacks calculated by return on investment, and outsourcing attacks to subcontractors, encouraging state failure, weakening, or hollowing, an an-archic form or direction. State capture carries less advantage than market-capture, and carries more of a cost.

Finally, I'm 'queering' the state/non-state distinction, by asking what the political effects of this are. If 'terrorist' activity on the above lines is a successful (violent) business, and accumulates capital, this gives them power (as the ability to influence outcomes), and imho has dangerous possible trajectories, such as institutional capture. National mafias have frequently attempted or effected national institutional capture, and hence I deem it possible that international mafias could attempt the same. Crudely, all that cocaine and heroin money has to re-enter the economy somewhere (typically assumed to be tax havens at the crossroads of the drug trade), and hence must own portions of the 'white' economy, either as property or as political influence. I've asked if anyone considers this 'Beyond the Pale of Possibility'.

/restatement

nesf wrote:

Kama I believe you may be confusing a wish to enact change in the social order (which is a general wish shared by everything from centrists to terrorists) with minimalism of the State which is a very specific form of this.

One of the things I find interesting about these movements is that rather than political demands for changes in the social order, economics takes the front seat. Somali pirates don't seek to create a state-form, they want money, and will trade the booty on the global bazaar; MEND don't seek to form a 'New Biafra' in the Niger Delta, they seek to maximize their oil revenue by violent appropriation, extort Shell etc with hostage kidnappings, and make the Niger Delta ungovernable or anarchic with respect to the Nigerian central government or the corporate non-state actors. There are political justifications, but thee economics seem to come first; which appears to me anarchocapitalist.

I think you can argue that some terrorist groups share some beliefs with some forms of pacifistic libertarianism but the differences between them are almost more important. Also looking at the paths they wish to take to enact this change separates terrorists from pretty much everyone else. There's a marked difference between someone wanting to enact an "alternative market configuration" at the barrel of a gun and someone wanting to do it through the ballot box.

I'd agree, there's a huge difference on a violent/non-violent axis for a political movement; in this country it was 'the armalite and the ballot box'. We can distinguish violent and non-violent forms of practically any political ideology by their position on this axis, the 'physical force' question. So in this way I regard it as quite theoretically coherent to assume a violent manifestation of anarchocapitalism; Manson was a violent hippy, Aum Shinryuku were violent Buddhists, Root Force are violent Greens, and so on, and transnational global institutions in the world economy have a violent 'black' sibling, in the mafia/pirate/terrorist institutions. I'm far less concerned with their ideological underpinnings or expressions, than their behaviour and technique; I don't think they sit and read Rothbard, but they do re-enact capitalist behaviors, form a globally integrated market, and seek to weaken states to enhance their own freedoms, and maximize their returns. Similarly to Tilly's account, and the libertarian view of states as parasites which extort revenue from their territory, I argue that these groups extort revenue without capturing the state, as they can 'deal direct' in the global economy. As offaly says:

Offalcool wrote:

if I interact in a transnational market with interests throughout the world, I may not pledge allegiance to any particular block-like entity, or state....I think this is where capital distinguishes itself from the tribalism of “block-like” entities.

As a globalization diminishes national ties with non-states such as firms, so too with non-state criminal or terrorist institutions. The marketplace logics are (so we are told) universal, so it is unsurprising to see the 'terrorists' conform; how else could they behave?

For the record, I think it is plausible. I also think it is the status quo.

I'm kinda seduced by this logic as well. Violent interests seized power, and called themselves legitimate...force+time=custom, power creates law to justify its gains. The first way I heard this was a general systems theory scenario: 2 groups, farmers and raiders. Farmers farm, accumulate a food surplus, raiders ride in and steal the surplus. Over time, the raiders become 'lazy', don't want to have to go to the bother, and sit down in the village square and declare themselves 'King'. Interesting part is, by doing this, straight parasitism moves towards symbiosis: the villagers pay extortion rent or tribute, and the raiders need to maintain their tribute-stream and provide a form of security. I like it, because I like the idea that parasitism can, and does, move in the direction of symbiosis, and this goes from the cellular level to social systems.

Similarly, and this is only half a joke, how do you deal with 'raiders' in a state? Well, you could annihilate them, but it's more elegant and cheaper to give them salaries, call them the army or police, and tell them to chase other people. The de-arming of the police force in our national history wasn't entirely unlike this.

Applying this to the scenario I've outlined, mafia-terrorism would be 'domesticated' by either employing them (as with the Mafia in post-war Italy), or them wearing clean white suits, and having enough invested in the global market-commons that it becomes worthwhile for them to retain its security against non-state violent competitors. Again, I suspect an element of this in the status quo, but it's a 'dark' topic so epistemically intractable.

silverharp wrote:

If the society is "civil" to begin with I'd assume that any attempt at racketeering would be dealt with by private security companies paid for by the businesses or residents of a particular area. As the security companies would possibly be public companies I would see no reason why they would desend into mafia style operations themselves.

My main initial problem with this is the assumption of a full 'civil' society to begin with, in the absence of an 'Leviathan'; it seems very 'assume a can opener'. But we'll assume on, for arguments sake. So...

Are there returns from mafia-type operations, or 'cheating', superior to 'honesty', in classic PD style? If so, then there is a strong motivational incentive. DynCorp had problems like this, with drug-running Air America style, child prostitution in former Yugoslavia, and so on. If there is low transparency, and a return, then I would assume a degree of mafia-style behaviour. And the mafia has famously good lawyers.

In line with my earlier argument, I view most of the private security companies of the day as fitting quite well with the 'piracy' view; Blackwater/Xi, Sandline, or especially Executive Outcomes, are pirates with letters of marque, aka privateers, and groups like MEND as the symmetrical and homologous response to these 'legitimate' non-state actors; Blackwater has supposedly moved on to 'consultancy' rather than service provision (privatized School of the Americas?). Mercenaries are nothing new, and one of my own objections to all of the argument is...well, this is nothing new. Bandits, guerrillas etc have always sought to expropriate surplus, and the violent mechanism we call states either/or arose from them/defended against them.

The reason this is here, rather than trying the military forum, is that I think there are important political questions, about the role of states, their functions or cession of function, their foundation as a vehicle for war and the effects on this from changes in the nature of war, and political legitimacy in a post-political environment. Political theory tends to focus on the state, its formal contestation through democratic process, and our use of or antipathy towards it. What I'm angling for here, and the reason I think this is related to the libertarian debates here, is that these groups or behaviors profit by the weakness of states, and are actors in global political economy, albeit under-theorized ones. Much as the changes in the global economy have definite and possibly determining effects for the state system, so do do the changes in violent non-state opposition. As the regulation of the global economy is a central issue, so too the problem and effects of global 'raiders', mafias or terrorists; a congery of globalized capitalist organizations of non-state violent actors, in the absence of a global sovereign body with a force-oligopoly.

So apologies if that's all over the place, too many interlinked issues, if there's a specific issue someone wants to tie me down on go for it...

silverharp

Kama wrote: »

Are there returns from mafia-type operations, or 'cheating', superior to 'honesty', in classic PD style? If so, then there is a strong motivational incentive. DynCorp had problems like this, with drug-running Air America style, child prostitution in former Yugoslavia, and so on. If there is low transparency, and a return, then I would assume a degree of mafia-style behaviour. And the mafia has famously good lawyers

I dont know anything about these companies but I am not sure what conclusions you could draw from their actions. A gov. contracting a company to get involved with drugs policy is not a relevant scanario from a Libertarian perspective. It will always be possible to assemble groups of individuals to carry out nefarious schemes, however it is unlikely that I could ring up Group 4 and ask them to rob a bank for me? The law of big numbers would pervail.

Kama wrote: »

The reason this is here, rather than trying the military forum, is that I think there are important political questions, about the role of states, their functions or cession of function, their foundation as a vehicle for war and the effects on this from changes in the nature of war, and political legitimacy in a post-political environment. Political theory tends to focus on the state, its formal contestation through democratic process, and our use of or antipathy towards it. What I'm angling for here, and the reason I think this is related to the libertarian debates here, is that these groups or behaviors profit by the weakness of states, and are actors in global political economy, albeit under-theorized ones. Much as the changes in the global economy have definite and possibly determining effects for the state system, so do do the changes in violent non-state opposition. As the regulation of the global economy is a central issue, so too the problem and effects of global 'raiders', mafias or terrorists; a congery of globalized capitalist organizations of non-state violent actors, in the absence of a global sovereign body with a force-oligopoly.

From a Libertarian perspective , the simple proposition is that if you grant a monopoly of law /policing/military to the state you end up with a lower quality service at a higher cost. How many police/judges should there be and what should they do under a statist approach will be sub optimal. When it comes to external matters a monopoly in force will lead to many more unnecessary conflicts. Wars over idiology or for short term political gain will occur because the costs can be externalised via taxes , borrowing or simply money printing. I guess there will always be some unstable parts of the globe but I would argue that the current state setup actually encourages the export of this instability. It took policies like prohibition to allow the mafia to develop. Today the prohibition on drugs fuels many of non state violent actors today.

Permabear

This post has been deleted.

Kama

Silverharp wrote:

I dont know anything about these companies but I am not sure what conclusions you could draw from their actions. A gov. contracting a company to get involved with drugs policy is not a relevant scanario from a Libertarian perspective.

The problem here is, that we inhabit a world-system which contains states, and any evidence I might marshall will be 'contaminated' by this statist taint, so no empirical example can be sufficient or convincing; this would be one of my key complaints btw in arguing with non-statist libertarians or any ideological hue, theoretical or ideological arguments about how things will necessarily be in the absence of state sovereignty. I find this determinism unsubstantiated; the theory doesn't adequately generate supporting empirical facts.

I do think the actions of private military contractors are relevant when discussing privatized security, so DynCorp, Sandline, Blackwater, Executive Outcomes are (to my mind) quite justified exemplars, and their history and behaviors relevant evidence. Closer to home, the actions of IRMS come to mind. Whatever the demerits of state force-monopoly are (there are many), they do not automatically assure the merits of private force-monopoly; for starters, as with the non-statist groups here, there is no democratic check on their actions.

donegalfella wrote:

You can't suggest, however, that all non-state-sanctioned economic actors can be labeled "guerrillas" or "terrorists." Everyone from the 15-year-old babysitter working for pocket-money to the window-washer getting paid "under the table" is engaging in unrecorded, unregulated, unsanctioned economic activity -- and yet these people are not pirates, guerrillas, or mafia. They are simply ordinary people who have no problems operating "under the radar" of statism.[/donegalfella]

I don't think I suggested that, or if i did it's my fault for lack of clarity; babysitters aren't generally terrorists, nor is an informal economy necessarily piracy, I apologize if I gave that impression. The groups I designated are violent groups without state sanction: mafias, pirates, and terrorists, competitors in the market for violent force and racketeering with the state. Please note I'm not assuming state legitimacy on a moral level, and I'm equivalently non-committed about the legitimacy of the 'Black' competitors, in an attempt at (relativistic) objectivity.

I'd agree that much economic action takes place in the informal economy, without state sanction or supervision, but I'd also note that the existence of this economy provides an economic ecology that can be parasitized by 'raiders', racketeers etc, who replace the same state functions, enumerated by Tilly. There's a niche, and in the non-statist economy, this can and often is filled by non-statist violent force actors.

I find the most convincing argument for any form of anarchism to be 'it's what people do anyway', but (as with the rise of the State, pace Tilly) there is a strong incentive to milk the 'farmers' for 'tribute'. Once a surplus is accumulated, as with DF's libertarian yeoman householder, there's a opportunity for those who can focus force to deprive him of it and add it to their own. The anarchocapitalist solution is for private security provision; I consider 'legitimized' gangsterism as a more likely trajectory.

Secondly, it is often statism that encourages movements such as the Mafia.

Again, while this can be true, I find it less convincing; the 'hard form' reduces to the 'if we didn't have law there wouldn't be crime'; true, but deprived of meaning; early Leftist social constructionist accounts in criminology tended to emphasise this, but I find it begs questions. I have given examples of Mafia-like groups who are thriving in low-statist conditions, and who endeavor to weaken states further, parasitizing economic action in their areas of influence, directly competing by violent appropriation with statist protectors/expropriators or their 'legitimate' allies such as private security. I don't find the culturalist logic that convincing, I'll stick with bourgeois-rationalist assumptions for the time being ;D

I'd agree on the much of the thrust of the argument (illegality of drugs, prostitution etc is a direct subsidy to organized crime), but find the assumption that they would just 'go away' in a non-statist environment utopian and unsupported by evidence. I'd argue that the problem I'm gnawing on would be hugely mitigated in a statist regime which stopped granting these subsidies of monopoly profits, and that the continuing of prohibitions on those same libertarian freedoms you argue for here is either implicit or explicit sanction to organized crime, while simultaneously beating a 'moral panic' law-and-order drum, a symbiosis of 'frenemies'. I'm quite in agreement with social-libertarian ideologies on this.

donegalfella wrote:

Libertarian or anarcho-capitalist systems, properly understood as self-regulating, market-oriented orders with minimal to zero state interventionism ...can feasibly take place only in cultures already accustomed to and shaped by the traditions of Enlightenment liberalism.

Intriguing. There's very little scope for 'true' libertarianism then, if this culturalist-institutionalist account holds. The bastions of classic liberalism are polluted by the state-socialist trends, while those areas which have not developed state-socialist institutions are 'culturally unsuited', leaving an ideology without sufficient adherents or cultural elective affinity, and an ecologic problem of the strain being unsuited to other climes. Evolutionarily, that would tend to suggest the 'meme' to be either in a dead-end, or at best an extended period of dormancy, a highly pessimistic outlook.

As for your criticism that economics "takes the front seat" to politics—the two are so deeply intertwined that the distinction between them is meaningless. Most basically, the very existence of a state creates the presumption of economic interventionism. Without the authority to tax, to expropriate wealth, to take over sectors of the economy, the state is nothing. It can only exist by sucking resources from the private sector.

I'd agree on the first count: politics divorced from the economy is a formal exercise denuded of relevance, but I'd also argue (contra the general libertarian account) that the reciprocal also holds: that economics divorced from politics, as in the depoliticized liberal argument, becomes blind to its foundation. Hence, as with classic liberalism, political economy. My attempt in this thread was to trace the outlines of a political economy of mafias, piracy, and terrorism, rather than to attempt to discredit anarcho-capitalism, libertarianism, Austrian economics etc; it's interesting to me that the response has primarily been to the latter. For the purposes of this thread, I am impartial as to the legitimacy of either the state or non-state actors, and view them as quite homologous; an Emperor IS a successful Pirate, a State IS a successful Raider, the Father of a Nation IS a successful Terrorist, etc. I'm arguing there to be an ecological niche for violent expropriators, which can be filled by either Statist raiders or by non-statist raiders, and (I think this interesting) the balance of power seems (to me) to be shifting away from statist forces, and towards small groups.

On the second, I argue that markets and political systems are and have been in a form of symbiosis, which accounts for their presence and (ideologically unsatisfying) success, compared to either non-market states or non-statist markets. The state is 'nothing' without markets, and markets are 'nowhere' without the state, to respond crudely. The nearest I can see to a functioning non-statist market is precisely the transnational black market, which is also enabled/parasitized/symbiotic with a resource-extracting racket, organized crime, mafias and terrorist organizations, providing the same extractive and protective functions to those parts of the black economy under its aegis, fully analogous to Tilly's account. Other theorists have (and this shows the state-centrism to me) termed them 'virtual states' or 'quasi-states'; I'm unsure how helpful that nomenclature is.

silverharp

Kama wrote: »

The problem here is, that we inhabit a world-system which contains states, and any evidence I might marshall will be 'contaminated' by this statist taint, so no empirical example can be sufficient or convincing; this would be one of my key complaints btw in arguing with non-statist libertarians or any ideological hue, theoretical or ideological arguments about how things will necessarily be in the absence of state sovereignty. I find this determinism unsubstantiated; the theory doesn't adequately generate supporting empirical facts.

I do think the actions of private military contractors are relevant when discussing privatized security, so DynCorp, Sandline, Blackwater, Executive Outcomes are (to my mind) quite justified exemplars, and their history and behaviors relevant evidence. Closer to home, the actions of IRMS come to mind. Whatever the demerits of state force-monopoly are (there are many), they do not automatically assure the merits of private force-monopoly; for starters, as with the non-statist groups here, there is no democratic check on their actions.

You used the term "private force-monopoly" , the point is there wouldnt be. There would be competing suppliers. Everyone by deciding to purchase a particular service would be "voting" on a regular basis. By definition property owners are very interested in what goes on around them, look what happens around D4 if the council tries to build an incinerator which in reality may or may not have some theoretical problems. How much more magnified would the reaction of people be if some malign force was trying to take hold. In a modern economy property oweners tend to have insurance. These companies are defensive in nature ie they want to minimise payments, so your House insurance company will say yep, here is your quote, by the way it is dependant on the fact that you have signed up to an approved list of security companies. Oh and there will be a 10% discount if you have approved weapons training (thats for Joycey:D)

Permabear

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silverharp

donegalfella wrote: »

This post has been deleted.

Dont give up. you might enjoy the piece I've attached from a Market Historian by the name of Bob Hoye he mostly deals with market issues but has an interesting historical perspective. If he is right the public will come to their senses and reject intervention style economics

http://www.institutionaladvisors.com/pdf/080718-Commodities_and_Politics.pdf

Permabear

This post has been deleted.

Kama

silverharp wrote:

You used the term "private force-monopoly" , the point is there wouldnt be. There would be competing suppliers.

There already are competing suppliers; fr'instance, in this country, at a minimum, we have statist, state-sanctioned private (Group4, IRMS, etc), non-state competitors (shading through various paramilitary down to gangs). Now it's not an orderly competition on the free-market anarchist assumptions, it doesn't satisfy that way, but it does exist. It's still a 'done thing' that when people fail to achieve goals through the legitimate system, they can and have turned to the other systems. A perfected monopoly of force seems asymptotic to me, what I'm highly intrigued by is when barriers to entry lower; 'Small is Beautiful' seems the trend in warfare currently. If states weaken, fail, or hollow out, we see rises (and this seems quite appropriately anarchocapitalist) in private provision of violence; I part ways on the assumption that this will be a orderly and 'peaceful' affair towards some stable equilibrium, or that there are not externality costs from unaccountable providers. To my mind, bandits, mafias etc have a comparative advantage in the market for force, and I feel I've justified this position with examples of competing non-state groups.

As should be clear, this has precisely no theoretical relevance to minarchism, strong Nozick-style rights-enforcing systems, but I think it does in conditions where the result of said systems are assumed, can-opener style, to exist. in the absence of a state provider.

donegalfella wrote:

I understand—although my presumption is that in a non-statist economy, where activities traditionally associated with organized crime, such as the narcotics trade, prostitution, smuggling, gambling, and so on, are managed legally through the market, racketeers would have less incentive to exist in the first place. The "street value" of narcotics is so high mostly due to the risks involved in producing and distributing prohibited substances -- and the huge profits involved attract racketeers.

I agree on this analysis, I regard the current status quo as a government-enforced cartel for the criminals, but I'd note that the presumption is just that. IF there was a world as you describe, then the world would be 'Just So'. I can't prove that wrong, you can't prove that right, and either of us saying we can is talking out our hole, aka non-falsifiable. 'The theory says it should' < something empirical.

I know it may be irritating that my definition of anarchy here is not the strict anarchocapitalist one; I view the international drug trade as anarchic, similar to the conception of the state-system as anarchic; without a ruler, without law. It's self-organizing, autopoetic, and anything goes that you can get away with; while a state force-monopoly can bring at least the semblance of order and regularity, instead competition can include 'war' or violent action.

I'm unfamiliar with Tilly—so can I ask what this "niche" is? In what way could raiders or racketeers act as parasites on the informal economies of babysitting or window-washing?

I highly recommend Tilly, it's quite in lines with much of what I think your views are on state expropriation, there's a link in the first post to 'State-Making as Organized Crime', I think you'll like it.

Firstly, I think you're trying to belittle slightly with the baby-sitting, the informal economy is way larger, and in contexts of reduced state capacity or spread, necessarily larger again. But ok, I'm quite a fan of the extreme micro.

In the informal economy, you necessarily have lessened ability for formal-legal redress, so it's harder to punish 'cheaters'; if I am that classic American worker, the intersection squeegee-guy, I occupy a quite precarious position to begin with: I provide a service which anyone feels quite happy not paying for. Any surplus I accumulate is quite easily appropriated by local 'enforcement' - anyone with more muscle than a probably-homeless man. I wash windows, and a herd of window-washer 'sheep' provides an ecological niche for a bully-appropriating 'wolf'. Similar 'shake-downs' happen in school, or on the street: I was briefly accosted last night, by two gentlemen who had a clear force-advantage over me. If they had wished to relieve me of any of my valuables they could, including my baby-sitting money. As it happened, they didn't but the capability was there; not looking like you have squat may well have worked to my advantage. If I wanted redress for such an event, then realistically my best bet would be to befriend a larger, stronger pack of burly lads from East Wall, who would either settle the account violently, or by negotiation with the implicit threat of possible violence. As in the schoolyard, bullies abound, and their deterrent is the possibility of force.

The State extracts a protective racket rent, aka tax, and in return prevents (broadly speaking) competitors from extracting on its turf. In the absence of the State, there is more competition for this position, because of the possible returns. Nature abhors a vacuum?
A query: is the term 'niche' a problem? Realize might be using it too much, but thinking of complex economic systems as ecologies I find quite helpful. I'm currently reading 'The Corner' by David Simon, and he uses this to account for the ecology that forms in the informal drug economy; sufficient 'corner-boys' selling crack provides a context in which 'stick-up boys' who specialize in violent appropriation can exist; a niche is created that becomes filled.

I agree, alas. We are now much further from the possibility of "true" libertarianism than we were 150 or 200 years ago, largely due to the vast expansion of the welfare-warfare state since the late 19th century.

I'll stop and dwell on this a little. There seems an irony in your culturalist turn; it seems quite (in Hayek's terms) constructivist. Libertarianism would require social engineering to produce the appropriate social and cultural identities and tendencies to support a libertarian-anarchist society, which would paradoxicallly require organized large-scale change to produce these preconditions. The assumption that the state 'interferes' and 'deforms' universal and natural human capitalist drives seems far more seductive, for all that it relies on the 'Just So Story' of what should happen in the absence of a state.

It also makes the philosophy seem quite nostalgic, rather than concentrating on a future; if only we lived back in England, in 1850, costume-drama style. I'm not culturalist, I don't think that England in this period had a cultural endowment of respect for property, but a sufficiently-strong state which enforced property rights. I'm more than slightly institutionalist in terms of causation here.

I don't particularly see that myself. Non-statist "terrorists," "pirates," or whatever you wish to call them, mostly arise in response to the tyranny of the majority.

I see no reason for an anarchocapitalist (in your terms) society not to have pirates, and I can see the (in my terms) anarchocapitalist Somali pirates as defending their property rights to their oceanic territory in the absence of a state or coast guard. They regard their 'natural rights' to their 'natural territory' as being coercively imposed on, by a tyrannous global majority, and respond reciprocally with force to enforce those rights. Similarly, MEND regard their 'natural rights' to the natural resources of their region as being unjustly appropriated by statist and corporate forces, and respond with force against this unjust appropriation. In the absence of an Accepted (or adequately enforced) Order, these are competing natural rights property claims, and their resolution is violent.

I'd need more proof that you have given here to be convinced that the balance of power is shifting away from the state.

Sure. My argument is that (especially in 'terrorism' or asymmetric warfare) there is a technological trend that makes it easier for small actors to deliver violent force. There is a developed technological infrastructure which can either deliver attacks (as in 911) or be the subject of attacks (systems disruption), which enables force magnification by small groups. Statist attempts to counter this are colossal behemoths such as the TSA, which are stunningly uneconomical (the math on dollars spent to lives possibly saved is insane), while the argument of the terrorist forces are increasingly economical - Bin Laden declared that the object of the attack was to 'bleed America into bankruptcy', which I might add he seems to have done quite effectively.

I don't expect you to be convinced; it's been a movement in International Political Economy for decades, in Social Policy it's state welfare retrenchment, in Sociology they called it 'globalization' - along with everything else since 1990-odd. it's still a debate in military theory between statists and anti-statists, although its made its mark in Red-Team wargaming, showing US fleet vulnerability to cheap missile-boat swarm tactics; Schumacheer's 'Small is Beautiful' applied to warfare. Military emphasis has been on state-to-state stand-up fights, but those don't seem to happen as much anymore, instead we have groups like the insurgency in Iraq; lots of decentralized autonomous actors sharing knowledge and equipment, without central guidance or control.
Which fits my 'anarchist' definition; freely associating autopoetic individuals, forming associations to achieve ends.

The reality is than most people are law-abiding, whether they agree with the law or not.

Again, I'm not a culturalist; I don't think people have an innate, principled lawfulness, but that they comply with laws which have the backing of force. I would expect compliance to be lower in its absence. I don't like this, it's not how I'd want things to be, but it seems realistic.

If all the taxes and regulations were lifted, he would hardly become a criminal racketeer. So you are making a huge error if you assume that because the current black market is associated with organized crime, a non-statist economy would effectively be one huge crime-ridden racket!

Think you're over-enthusiastically missing my points. My argument is not that 'if there is no law everyone is a criminal', which seems as simplistically naive as 'if there was no law there would be no crime'. My argument has been that if there is a developed economy which accumulates a surplus, then there is a gap in the market for violent predation of the same, from the babysitter and squeegee-boy through the stick-up boy, to the more meso-level of predominantly-national non-statists such as Mexican gangs, Somali Pirates and MEND, to their association in the macro-global mafia-criminal complex and the international black market. Yes, many 'farmers' would grow 'sheep' in a 'law-abiding' manner, as not everyone has the capacity, temperament, or aptitude for violent appropriation. But once there is a sufficient population of 'farmers' who have grown enough 'sheep', or enough squeegee-boys with change in their pockets, there will emerge 'raiders' to the 'farmers', a 'wolf' to the 'sheep', a stick-up boy to the crack dealer, a pirate to the Horn of Somalia, and a mafia to the global economy (whether 'statist' or no).

For the purposes of this thread, I'm comparatively uninterested in arguments or rhetorics about the legitimacy or otherwise of statism or non-statism, we do that to death regularly enough, or how people would behave in a world other than this one. I'm intensely interested in what people consider the effects of mafias etc on the global economy are, their evolution and behavior, and the implications for politics. I'm as much curious if anyone finds this conversation relevant, and if no, why?

Kama

This may be of interest, it's a Privatization Scenario for 2025 in the US. It's a little dated now, but still of interest.

Kama

And here is an interview with the Somali pirates...if no one wants to read it, these are my highlights:

'What was your job before you start this one or what forced you to become a pirate?

Every government in the world is off our coasts. What is left for us? Nine years ago everyone in this town was stable and earn[ed] enough income from fishing. Now there is nothing. We have no way to make a living. We had to defend ourselves. We became watchmen of our coasts and took up our duty to protect the country. Don’t call us pirates. We are protectors.

Does the length of a hijacking change the ransom that pirates are willing to accept?

Yes. Armed men are expensive as are the laborers, accountants, cooks and khat suppliers on land. During long negotiations our men get tired and we need to rotate them out three times a week. Add to that the risk from navies attacking us and we can be convinced to lower our demands.

Under what conditions would you kill the hostages?

Hostages — especially Westerners — are our only assets, so we try our best to avoid killing them. It only comes to that if they refuse to contact the ship’s owners or agencies. Or if they attack us and we need to defend ourselves.

What are the key factors to making a successful attack on a ship?

The key to our success is that we are willing to die, and the crews are not.

How are the pirates organized? (Are there pirate leaders, financiers, and specialists?)

The financiers are the most important since they organize and plan the big shot operations and are able to pay running cost. Financiers always need to forge deals with traders, land cruiser owners, translators, business people to keep the supplies flowing during operations and manage the logistics. There is a long supply chain involved in every hijacking.

I'd note the firmly and self-cognizantly economic logic; piracy as a entrepreneurial business involved in private enforcement of coastal waters.

More here, including a game...

silverharp

donegalfella wrote: »

This post has been deleted.

The way I see it the welfare state will be forced to rollback , it wont be long before people figure out that any benefits people expected to get wont be there. People will either be angry that they have paid into a system that will not deliver for them and yonger people will have nothing to lose.
Personally I dont see Libertarian states developing in any broad way but would see the size of gov. reducing so that they start heading in the direction of being 10% of the economy compared to the 30%+ that we see today.

Kama wrote: »

I'm intensely interested in what people consider the effects of mafias etc on the global economy are, their evolution and behavior, and the implications for politics. I'm as much curious if anyone finds this conversation relevant, and if no, why?

The way I see the global economy is that there will always be areas of high capital concentration and vice versa. We live in a very productive era where with the right mix of capital and talent, virtuous circles are created. The modern economy needs economic zones as small as Switzerland or as large as western Europe in general. At the same time other parts of the world are increasingly vunerable. Take countries like Zimbabwe, the options for it seem to be being some form of failed state, civil war or in the event of a complete breakdown the emergence of mafia like groupings that live in a paracitical way off the host population. A big factor would seem to come down to the wealth of the people. A poor population with little economic surplus can easily be controlled with a small amount of capital, several thousand AK's and some beer and you can control the area of a small state.
What effect on the global economy? I dont know, but capital will seek the safer areas and flee the unstable ones. As you mentioned the asymmetry in force means that a billion dollar oil project can be put at risk by a small number of armed locals.

Kama

silverharp wrote:

The way I see it the welfare state will be forced to rollback , it wont be long before people figure out that any benefits people expected to get wont be there. People will either be angry that they have paid into a system that will not deliver for them and yonger people will have nothing to lose.

Agree rollback will and is happening, disagree that it's a Good Thing; I'm a 2 cheers for the market economy kinda guy.

Following from your statement, that you need less capital to run a racket in poorer countries, doesn't it follow that with a larger amount of capital you could run a racket in richer ones?

As you mentioned the asymmetry in force means that a billion dollar oil project can be put at risk by a small number of armed locals.

Just enforcing their property rights, I'm afraid...