Irish troops battle at Jadotville, Congo. Heroes?

TrishGal · 13-11-2013 3:03pm

I know that this is an old post but I only came across this today. My father RIP was Sgt P.J. Gallagher and he was one of the men who got injured on the way back from the Lufira bridge with Force Kane. I am interested to find out if there is anyone out there who remembers him. He was in his fifties when he was out there, considerably older than the majority and he was with the Medical Corp. He never spoke about the Congo and he died when I was 16 (1981) so I've no one to ask?

Thanks,

Hedgemeister · 13-11-2013 4:08pm

TrishGal wrote: »

I know that this is an old post but I only came across this today. My father RIP was Sgt P.J. Gallagher and he was one of the men who got injured on the way back from the Lufira bridge with Force Kane. I am interested to find out if there is anyone out there who remembers him. He was in his fifties when he was out there, considerably older than the majority and he was with the Medical Corp. He never spoke about the Congo and he died when I was 16 (1981) so I've no one to ask?

Thanks,

Try The Curragh History Forum, there's a lot of information there about the Congo / Overseas Service etc, and I'm sure somebody on that site will assist you with the info you seek.

Hedgemeister · 13-11-2013 4:40pm

Somebody mentioned 'bulls wool' uniforms, and soldiers sent to the Congo wearing them. It's true of course, and they (myself included) were also dispatched to the Cypriot summers and Lebanon (in the early days) wearing the same 'bulls wool.'

Somebody else said 'Officers were issued with Gustav sub-machineguns.' That was true, but so were all NCO's and some Ptes, ie, members of the machine gun & Mortar Sections, APC crews (pistols & Gustavs) and all M.T. drivers carried Gustav LMGs.
In Niemba, some fault lay with the Baluba tribesmen being allowed to approach too near the Patrol, combined with the lack of stopping power at close range of the copper-jacketed 9mm ammunition used by the Irish; hence the old story "they were so drunk/drugged they kept coming at us, though they were riddled with bullets."

Why is it always assumed that the Irish soldier is poorly trained' when a subject such as this arises?

Badly equipped, yes, but poorly trained, no. Only fully trained soldiers are allowed volunteer for overseas service, and to get ones ass on the 'plane, there's months of extra training and revision involved.
If people bother to visit the above Curragh website they can see for themselves that the Baluba were far from being armed with 'just clubs'.
The Irish action in Katanga was not the set of the movie ZULU.

No questions in the Irish Media of why we left the remains of Tpr. Pat Mullins, a Limerickman killed in action when his APC was attacked by Mercenaries in the Congo in 1961.
Or, while I'm on the subject, why we left the remains of Pte. Kevin Joyce from Galway, killed in action in Lebanon in 1981, in the Lebanese dust.
Ireland is getting a bad name for herself Internationally for abandoning it's dead soldiers remains, and with good cause. This sends out a message to the wrong people that the Irish people don't give a rat's ass about their troops, something which I've privately suspected to be true.
No other participating country in either the Congo or Lebanon left dead soldiers behind, except dear Mother Ireland.
Why is this, and why is there no public questioning of it?

pedroeibar1 · 15-11-2013 12:23am

Hedgemeister wrote: »

Somebody mentioned 'bulls wool' uniforms, and soldiers sent to the Congo wearing them. It's true of course, and they (myself included) were also dispatched to the Cypriot summers and Lebanon (in the early days) wearing the same 'bulls wool.'

Somebody else said 'Officers were issued with Gustav sub-machineguns.' That was true, but so were all NCO's and some Ptes, ie, members of the machine gun & Mortar Sections, APC crews (pistols & Gustavs) and all M.T. drivers carried Gustav LMGs.
In Niemba, some fault lay with the Baluba tribesmen being allowed to approach too near the Patrol, combined with the lack of stopping power at close range of the copper-jacketed 9mm ammunition used by the Irish; hence the old story "they were so drunk/drugged they kept coming at us, though they were riddled with bullets."

Why is it always assumed that the Irish soldier is poorly trained' when a subject such as this arises?

Badly equipped, yes, but poorly trained, no. Only fully trained soldiers are allowed volunteer for overseas service, and to get ones ass on the 'plane, there's months of extra training and revision involved.
If people bother to visit the above Curragh website they can see for themselves that the Baluba were far from being armed with 'just clubs'.
The Irish action in Katanga was not the set of the movie ZULU.

No questions in the Irish Media of why we left the remains of Tpr. Pat Mullins, a Limerickman killed in action when his APC was attacked by Mercenaries in the Congo in 1961.
Or, while I'm on the subject, why we left the remains of Pte. Kevin Joyce from Galway, killed in action in Lebanon in 1981, in the Lebanese dust.
Ireland is getting a bad name for herself Internationally for abandoning it's dead soldiers remains, and with good cause. This sends out a message to the wrong people that the Irish people don't give a rat's ass about their troops, something which I've privately suspected to be true.
No other participating country in either the Congo or Lebanon left dead soldiers behind, except dear Mother Ireland.
Why is this, and why is there no public questioning of it?

It is so because the average civvie does not give a rats about the army, a stance generally mirrored by the politicians.
I was the one who mentioned the Gustav – I was a small boy at the time, and remember overhearing the stories of live firing practice, even the range at the back of the old Detention Barracks in Cork was used and the firing could be heard clearly at night.
Here’s a photo of the MPC Gustav team from 1954 (earlier I know) and I think the officer is Michael Gill, then a Comdt. I know the photo is from the Southern Command, and Gill, then a Lt. Col. if not a full Col. was stationed in Collins at the time of the Congo on the JAG staff.

Jawgap · 15-11-2013 11:07am

The current edition of the Journal of Military History has an article on UN air operations in the Congo during the UN Operations in the Congo mission

Walter Dorn, "The UN’s First 'Air Force': Peacekeepers in Combat, Congo 1960–64"

The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was created in July 1960 to help the Congolese government quell its mutinous army and reestablish order. After ONUC’s mandate was expanded in 1961 to stop the Katanga province’s secession, a shooting war developed, in which Katanga paralyzed UN operations with a single armed jet. An aerial “arms race” and open combat followed. In December 1962 ONUC implemented Operation Grand Slam: Swedish jets neutralized Katanga’s air force, and the UN’s coordinated air-ground manoeuvers forcibly ended the secession. This article uncovers the unprecedented use of air power in UN peacekeeping and evaluates it for twenty-first century lessons.

Hedgemeister · 15-11-2013 11:43am

Jawgap wrote: »

The current edition of the Journal of Military History has an article on UN air operations in the Congo during the UN Operations in the Congo mission

Walter Dorn, "The UN’s First 'Air Force': Peacekeepers in Combat, Congo 1960–64"

The Korean War was a UN 'operation'.
I'd say that was the first time airpower was used by UN Forces.

Hedgemeister · 15-11-2013 12:12pm

pedroeibar1 wrote: »

It is so because the average civvie does not give a rats about the army, a stance generally mirrored by the politicians.
I was the one who mentioned the Gustav – I was a small boy at the time, and remember overhearing the stories of live firing practice, even the range at the back of the old Detention Barracks in Cork was used and the firing could be heard clearly at night.
Here’s a photo of the MPC Gustav team from 1954 (earlier I know) and I think the officer is Michael Gill, then a Comdt. I know the photo is from the Southern Command, and Gill, then a Lt. Col. if not a full Col. was stationed in Collins at the time of the Congo on the JAG staff.

You're right Pedro, but I just wondered why that is so?
For a Nation that constantly bleat about the wrongs & disasters in faraway places (from the safety of our tiny island) we think so little of our own, fellow Irishmen that gave everything in the cause of Peace.
The location of the Lebanese murderer of two Irish soldiers is well known (NY USA) but is there any calls for his extradition?
Not bloody likely.
But, on the other hand, we became very agitated when four of our new citizens were embroiled in the goings on in Cairo recently!

The older I get, the more I realise 'Mother Ireland' is a joke.
(I suppose I'll be called a rascist now)

Jawgap · 15-11-2013 12:14pm

I think the main difference was that while the UN Forces in Korea made extensive use of airpower it was never under UN command - whereas in the Congo they had more control and command of the aircraft and weaponry within the defined limits set down by the contributing nations - for example, the British contributed bombs and rockets but stipulated they could only be directed towards aircraft on the ground at designated airfields.

Claw Hammer · 19-11-2013 3:46pm

Hedgemeister wrote: »

Somebody mentioned 'bulls wool' uniforms, and soldiers sent to the Congo wearing them. It's true of course, and they (myself included) were also dispatched to the Cypriot summers and Lebanon (in the early days) wearing the same 'bulls wool.'

Somebody else said 'Officers were issued with Gustav sub-machineguns.' That was true, but so were all NCO's and some Ptes, ie, members of the machine gun & Mortar Sections, APC crews (pistols & Gustavs) and all M.T. drivers carried Gustav LMGs.
In Niemba, some fault lay with the Baluba tribesmen being allowed to approach too near the Patrol, combined with the lack of stopping power at close range of the copper-jacketed 9mm ammunition used by the Irish; hence the old story "they were so drunk/drugged they kept coming at us, though they were riddled with bullets."

Why is it always assumed that the Irish soldier is poorly trained' when a subject such as this arises?

Badly equipped, yes, but poorly trained, no. Only fully trained soldiers are allowed volunteer for overseas service, and to get ones ass on the 'plane, there's months of extra training and revision involved.
If people bother to visit the above Curragh website they can see for themselves that the Baluba were far from being armed with 'just clubs'.
The Irish action in Katanga was not the set of the movie ZULU.

No questions in the Irish Media of why we left the remains of Tpr. Pat Mullins, a Limerickman killed in action when his APC was attacked by Mercenaries in the Congo in 1961.
Or, while I'm on the subject, why we left the remains of Pte. Kevin Joyce from Galway, killed in action in Lebanon in 1981, in the Lebanese dust.
Ireland is getting a bad name for herself Internationally for abandoning it's dead soldiers remains, and with good cause. This sends out a message to the wrong people that the Irish people don't give a rat's ass about their troops, something which I've privately suspected to be true.
No other participating country in either the Congo or Lebanon left dead soldiers behind, except dear Mother Ireland.
Why is this, and why is there no public questioning of it?

The Bulls wool uniform was replaced in 1963. It continued in service by the FCA for some years after.

The government got a request on 17th July 1960 for troops to serve in the Congo. On 19th July 1960 the Defence Amendment Bill was introduced in the Dail. Hours after the Bill was signed into law by President deValera, the following week, two Globemaster aircraft arrived at Baldonnel. The first troops were airborne on the 27th of July, more followed on 31st July and the 33rd Battalion followed in the middle August. Training?

Wicklowrider · 19-11-2013 4:21pm

Claw Hammer wrote: »

The first troops were airborne on the 27th of July, more followed on 31st July and the 33rd Battalion followed in the middle August. Training?

Their very first mortar rounds took out the enemy artillery.
The ex French Foreign Legion Officer who boasted he would have Quinlan's head on a stick ,was captured by an Irish fighting patrol. And lucky that the Sgt Mjr talked Quinlan out of shooting him. From start to finish they mastered the battleground against a force that even the Gurkhas couldn't breakthrough. Seriously - you know the film Zulu? Well think about facing a force that outnumbers you like that film - except they are armed with everything from artillery to airpower. The Irish still inflicted something in the region of 10% enemy K.I.A while managing to bring every single one of their own home. Nothing at all lacking in their training imo.

Hedgemeister · 19-11-2013 6:15pm

Someone should have told our Quartermaster about bulls wool being replaced in 1963. I did my recruit trg in '67, (No. 5 Pln, Mac Donagh Barracks, Curragh Camp) in 'bulls wool,' and served in Cyprus in '68, and again in '69 (10th and 12 th Inf Gps wearing those issue hairy green shirts, the ones that replaced the equally hairy gray ones of Congo vintage. We had those up to the mid seventies, if I remember correctly.

Hedgemeister · 19-11-2013 6:55pm

Claw Hammer wrote: »

The Bulls wool uniform was replaced in 1963. It continued in service by the FCA for some years after.

The government got a request on 17th July 1960 for troops to serve in the Congo. On 19th July 1960 the Defence Amendment Bill was introduced in the Dail. Hours after the Bill was signed into law by President deValera, the following week, two Globemaster aircraft arrived at Baldonnel. The first troops were airborne on the 27th of July, more followed on 31st July and the 33rd Battalion followed in the middle August. Training?

The first troops that served in Lebanon had little (pre-Mission) training either. For instance, I was told on a Thursday afternoon that I was going, (1978) and I was in Lebanon the following Sunday night!Just enough time for drawing UN Kit, and for the Medics to make a pin-cushion out of our arms.
On my future trips we had at least 2 months training before travelling. While not essential, this extra training does no harm at all.

Those lads in the Congo may not have had that 'luxury,' but remember they were all well trained soldiers to begin with.
They still managed to do okay.

Jesus. · 04-08-2014 6:42pm

Just after finishing Declan Power's book and he made a great job of it. I got the sense though that he was going out of his way to exonerate A Company rather than looking purely at the facts in a cold, hard, calculated way. Still, it was a great piece of writing and an enjoyable read.

Being honest though, I'm not surprised Jadotville was looked upon as an embarrassment at the time, by both the Government and the Army - whatever about the people. This was the first time the Irish Army went into battle since the creation of the State and ultimately, despite the extenuating circumstances and all the other qualifications given, it was defeated by a bunch of Mercenary-led Africans.

There's no doubting the courage and fighting prowess of the men of A Company, particularly given the fact that most of them were mere lads that'd never heard a shot fired in anger before. But the CO, Cmdt Pat Quinlan, fu*ked up in the end and lost the battle. Anthony Mockler in his book "The new Mercenaries" put it like this:

- On 13 September United Nations Indian troops under Brigadier Raja seized control of key points in Elizabethville and throughout the state. Conor Crusie O'Brien announced unwisely: "Katanga's secession is ended". Next day the Katangese gendarmerie counter-attacked. Heavy fighting followed in Elisabethville and elsewhere. Three days later the Irish garrison at Jadotville surrendered to the Katangese. Admittedly they were surrounded and their water supply had been cut off. But their position, although unpleasant, was not desperate; if their morale had been high they could have fought their way out and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Katangese and the mercenaries. The least that can be said is that this surrender was hardly in the spirit of Irish history. -

I tend to agree with him. If Quinlan had of tried to meet up with Force Kane at Lufira bridge, I think they could have made their way out with the Company mainly intact. Sure it would have been difficult but far from impossible.

Thoughts?

jonniebgood1 · 04-08-2014 9:25pm

From what I have read of the incident Mocklers analysis seems harsh. Whether the mercenaries were native or not is irrelevent. In a situation like that it is numbers, familiarity with location, training and weapons that matter most. Does Mockler give any reason in favour of the Irish soldiers holding out for more, i.e. superior weapons, etc?

nuac · 05-08-2014 10:23am

Jesus. wrote: »

Just after finishing Declan Power's book and he made a great job of it. I got the sense though that he was going out of his way to exonerate A Company rather than looking purely at the facts in a cold, hard, calculated way. Still, it was a great piece of writing and an enjoyable read.

Being honest though, I'm not surprised Jadotville was looked upon as an embarrassment at the time, by both the Government and the Army - whatever about the people. This was the first time the Irish Army went into battle since the creation of the State and ultimately, despite the extenuating circumstances and all the other qualifications given, it was defeated by a bunch of Mercenary-led Africans.

There's no doubting the courage and fighting prowess of the men of A Company, particularly given the fact that most of them were mere lads that'd never heard a shot fired in anger before. But the CO, Cmdt Pat Quinlan, fu*ked up in the end and lost the battle. Anthony Mockler in his book "The new Mercenaries" put it like this:

- On 13 September United Nations Indian troops under Brigadier Raja seized control of key points in Elizabethville and throughout the state. Conor Crusie O'Brien announced unwisely: "Katanga's secession is ended". Next day the Katangese gendarmerie counter-attacked. Heavy fighting followed in Elisabethville and elsewhere. Three days later the Irish garrison at Jadotville surrendered to the Katangese. Admittedly they were surrounded and their water supply had been cut off. But their position, although unpleasant, was not desperate; if their morale had been high they could have fought their way out and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Katangese and the mercenaries. The least that can be said is that this surrender was hardly in the spirit of Irish history. -

I tend to agree with him. If Quinlan had of tried to meet up with Force Kane at Lufira bridge, I think they could have made their way out with the Company mainly intact. Sure it would have been difficult but far from impossible.

Thoughts?

And how many soldiers have you commanded in action yourself?

Jesus. · 05-08-2014 11:27am

jonniebgood1 wrote: »

From what I have read of the incident Mocklers analysis seems harsh. Whether the mercenaries were native or not is irrelevent. In a situation like that it is numbers, familiarity with location, training and weapons that matter most. Does Mockler give any reason in favour of the Irish soldiers holding out for more, i.e. superior weapons, etc?

On the one hand it does appear harsh. A Company wasn't an appropriately-sized unit for that operation, nor was it sufficiently armed. However, in most military situations, forces will claim they're inadequately supported and under-manned. Its part and parcel of warfare.

You're right that the Katangans were a formidable force themselves, if not exactly a match for a Western Army contingent.

I don't know what reasons Mockler gives tbh. His was a book about the wider conflict and he only touches on Jadotville but I presume he feels that they were capable of making it to the bridge and linking up with the relief force.

The thing about it is, Quinlan acquitted himself very well up to the end, in particular the decision to dig in at the start. Also the positioning of his troops and armored cars meant that the Katangans couldn't get up close. Its a pity then that his final agreement to a ceasefire brought about a surrender. The moment he agreed to a ceasefire the game was up as the Katangans just, inch by inch, reneged on it and eventually forced him into surrender. There were other officers who were going to make a break for it contrary to Quinlan's orders so obviously some of them also felt it could be done.

One other thing about Cmdt Quinlan is his assertion that his duty was to bring all his men home safely and that he didn't want men killed in a conflict that they had no stake in. Obviously a CO has a duty toward his men's safety but your number one objective is to carry out orders to maximum efficiency, even if it means taking casualties. I'm not convinced this was done.

If the Gurkha's had've been in that position I'm confident they would have attempted a break out. Perhaps its harsh to compare an untested Irish unit to crack troops like that but if you're measuring the capability of your armed forces, you've got to see how they'd stack up against quality units from other nations. The Gurkha's took home dead from a couple of operations they went on with Irish soldiers which suggests they were brave but perhaps also a bit reckless.

The Irish soldiers fought very well in that campaign, particularly at the Tunnel and Jadotville itself but at the end of the day, the result at the latter was seen as a premature capitulation of a Western Military unit to a force of loosely-aligned African militia, not least by the Army itself which was embarrassed by the defeat.

nuac · 05-08-2014 4:14pm

nuac wrote: »

And how many soldiers have you commanded in action yourself?

Question repeated.

Jesus

Do you have combat experience at at least company level, or are you just an armchair general?

I.e. a breakout to the bridge would hardly have been a dead cert in the complete absence of air cover, and with some 'planes available to the other side.

I doubt if a breakout to the bridge would have stood up as a TEWT

I think Quinlan and his men did the best he could with what they had.

Azwaldo55 · 10-08-2014 3:09pm

Great news!

Rising Irish star Jamie Dornan is to act as Commandant Quinlan in a movie that is supposed to be filmed in Ireland and South Africa.

http://www.irishtimes.com/life-and-style/people/film-siege-of-jadotville-to-reveal-heroism-of-irish-troops-1.1891868

Let's hope the movie is a classic like Zulu or The Wild Geese or Dark of The Sun with a stirring soundtrack like this:

If they could get some other Irish actors like Liam Cunningham perhaps to the play the real life growling hard as nails sergeant who was Quinlan's right hand man, Chris O'Dowd as a fictional wise cracking hard drinking joker who provides comic relief and Aidan Gillen as a typical old sweat who has little time for a wide eyed but frightened pious youngster played by Jack Gleeson (if someone could please kidnap him and force him to come out of retirement) who says the rosary and wants to go home to Mammy but becomes a man during the fighting at Jadotville.

Maybe Wesley Snipes could act as the evil Moise Tshombe with Thomas Kretschmann as an ice cold ruthless ex-Nazi war criminal who is now working in the Congo as a mercenary offering his services to ruthless mining companies and told to CAPTURE JADOTVILLE!

Jesus. · 10-08-2014 5:49pm

Hopefully so Azwaldo but I'll believe it when I see it. They were supposed to be doing one years ago and Jim Sheridan was giving interviews about having his cast assembled with shooting to begin imminently but it never happened.

It would make a good flick though.

Speaking of films regarding Irish soldiers, did you ever see "One Man's Hero" with Tom Berringer? Its about the San Patricio battalion of Mexico. I've only seen clips and I've been told its rubbish. Can't get it on Youtube.

pablomakaveli · 10-08-2014 11:26pm

If they had their water supply cut off it's understandabl why they surrendered. Lugging a load of military kit and weapons around will have you in a sweat. Doing it in combat even more so.

I don't think many forces could have operated in the same conditions without water.

Jesus. · 11-08-2014 12:04am

pablomakaveli wrote: »

If they had their water supply cut off it's understandabl why they surrendered. Lugging a load of military kit and weapons around will have you in a sweat. Doing it in combat even more so. I don't think many forces could have operated in the same conditions without water.

Not really. They could have attempted a break out when their water rations were almost out but not completely used up.

I don't think there's any doubt that casualties would have been sustained, especially with that Fouga tearing about the place but I don't agree with the line that it was "impossible" or "suicide". Those desperate scenarios would apply to breaking out with no ammo left or trying to hold their positions indefinitely with ammunition practically gone.

The Indo article above also goes overboard with the one-sided narrative, practically quoting Power line for line while adding in imaginative metaphors to enhance the story. That kind of poetic licence is all well and good in many circumstances but to an historian, amateur or otherwise, it would make for uncomfortable reading. The casualty rate for instance seems very much on the high side considering the only estimates we have are from an Irish civilian engineer called Kearney who counted coffins of white soldiers being carried past and then made a guesstimate as to how many Gends might have been killed in proportion because they apparently didn't warrant a coffin. The figures for the amounts of attacking troops coming in waves also seems extremely excessive for the action that took place.

Seeing as we don't have an account from the other side, the truth is probably some way off from what we're presented with here.

Azwaldo55 · 11-08-2014 10:50am

Jesus. wrote: »

Hopefully so Azwaldo but I'll believe it when I see it. They were supposed to be doing one years ago and Jim Sheridan was giving interviews about having his cast assembled with shooting to begin imminently but it never happened.

It would make a good flick though.

Speaking of films regarding Irish soldiers, did you ever see "One Man's Hero" with Tom Berringer? Its about the San Patricio battalion of Mexico. I've only seen clips and I've been told its rubbish. Can't get it on Youtube.

It is a very well acted low budget production. Tom Berenger was excellent. I saw it a few years ago on TG4.

Jesus. · 11-08-2014 2:02pm

Jesus. · 11-08-2014 2:03pm

I'd like to see it alright Azwaldo. I don't pay much heed to "film critics" tbh!

This video is a bit corny but along with the clips of the film, I think its a catchy little ditty!

nuac · 11-08-2014 2:32pm

Jesus

Regarding your posts about options the Irish soldiers could have taken in Katanga, could you please outline your own combat command experience.

It is easy to be an armchair general. Quinlan and his troops had to deal with the cards they were dealt.

pablomakaveli · 11-08-2014 4:03pm

Jesus. wrote: »

Not really. They could have attempted a break out when their water rations were almost out but not completely used up.

I don't think there's any doubt that casualties would have been sustained, especially with that Fouga tearing about the place but I don't agree with the line that it was "impossible" or "suicide". Those desperate scenarios would apply to breaking out with no ammo left or trying to hold their positions indefinitely with ammunition practically gone.

The Indo article above also goes overboard with the one-sided narrative, practically quoting Power line for line while adding in imaginative metaphors to enhance the story. That kind of poetic licence is all well and good in many circumstances but to an historian, amateur or otherwise, it would make for uncomfortable reading. The casualty rate for instance seems very much on the high side considering the only estimates we have are from an Irish civilian engineer called Kearney who counted coffins of white soldiers being carried past and then made a guesstimate as to how many Gends might have been killed in proportion because they apparently didn't warrant a coffin. The figures for the amounts of attacking troops coming in waves also seems extremely excessive for the action that took place.

Seeing as we don't have an account from the other side, the truth is probably some way off from what we're presented with here.

An attempted breakout could have been an absolute disaster as well. Leaving a fortified position to strike out into enemy territory exposing yourself to attack isn't necessarily good idea.

Jesus. · 11-08-2014 4:10pm

pablomakaveli wrote: »

An attempted breakout could have been an absolute disaster as well.

Possibly

pablomakaveli wrote: »

Leaving a fortified position to strike out into enemy territory exposing yourself to attack isn't necessarily good idea.

Agreed

Kevhog1988 · 11-08-2014 4:22pm

Both my grandfather and his brother served in the congo. (36th Battalion)
They were very poorly equipped initially. Grandfather passed away but his brother told me that whilst they were en route they refuelled in a airport which was also used by the British Army. The guys in the British army raided there stores and gave the irish guys as much as they could.

jonniebgood1 · 11-08-2014 9:54pm

nuac wrote: »

Originally Posted by Jesus. View Post

Just after finishing Declan Power's book and he made a great job of it. I got the sense though that he was going out of his way to exonerate A Company rather than looking purely at the facts in a cold, hard, calculated way. Still, it was a great piece of writing and an enjoyable read.

Being honest though, I'm not surprised Jadotville was looked upon as an embarrassment at the time, by both the Government and the Army - whatever about the people. This was the first time the Irish Army went into battle since the creation of the State and ultimately, despite the extenuating circumstances and all the other qualifications given, it was defeated by a bunch of Mercenary-led Africans.

There's no doubting the courage and fighting prowess of the men of A Company, particularly given the fact that most of them were mere lads that'd never heard a shot fired in anger before. But the CO, Cmdt Pat Quinlan, fu*ked up in the end and lost the battle. Anthony Mockler in his book "The new Mercenaries" put it like this:

- On 13 September United Nations Indian troops under Brigadier Raja seized control of key points in Elizabethville and throughout the state. Conor Crusie O'Brien announced unwisely: "Katanga's secession is ended". Next day the Katangese gendarmerie counter-attacked. Heavy fighting followed in Elisabethville and elsewhere. Three days later the Irish garrison at Jadotville surrendered to the Katangese. Admittedly they were surrounded and their water supply had been cut off. But their position, although unpleasant, was not desperate; if their morale had been high they could have fought their way out and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Katangese and the mercenaries. The least that can be said is that this surrender was hardly in the spirit of Irish history. -

I tend to agree with him. If Quinlan had of tried to meet up with Force Kane at Lufira bridge, I think they could have made their way out with the Company mainly intact. Sure it would have been difficult but far from impossible.

Thoughts?

And how many soldiers have you commanded in action yourself?

It would do no harm to address the simple question asked on several questions by nuac. The question is fair IMO. You can feel free to justify your view, whether you have a military background or not does not make your view irrelevant or otherwise. Rather it puts it in context which is relevant here.

Jesus. · 11-08-2014 10:26pm

I disagree Jonnie. I purposely didn't respond to his initial reply because I considered it to be beyond stupid (no offence Nuac). After making an honest construct of some paragraphs and stating the case for my argument, a silly one-liner which states that only those who've led troops into battle (not even the rank and file fighting soldier gets a chance here!) are capable or worthy of having an opinion about an historical event, is just pure idiocy. I'm sorry but I can't put it in milder terms than that.

For one thing it would discount most of the sources we've all gotten our knowledge from about past wars and conflicts, as historians and journalists are more often than not just academics and civilians who've never fired a shot in anger (Declan Power notwithstanding). I would also wonder why he chose me to ask of my military credentials as opposed to anyone else on the thread. You've just asked me too (although in a qualified and dignified manner which is why I've replied) but have you asked anyone else commenting or is it just those who suggest that the CO could possibly have handled things differently toward the end of that engagement? Remember, it was the Irish army itself - not civilians - who were none to happy about Jadotville in the immediate aftermath and subsequent years. Perhaps they were too harsh on their comrades but if Nuac is suggesting military service is a prerequisite for having any knowledge on this subject, then how does he respond to criticism from within the Army itself for saying what I've simply said?

In answer to your question, I've never led troops into battle. Have you? How many people on this thread have? Is their opinion any less because they haven't? Are others perhaps letting emotion get in the way of detached analysis?

I don't know

Irish troops battle at Jadotville, Congo. Heroes?

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