How important was Tom Barry in the IWOI?

Jawgap wrote: »

I think sometimes it is a mistake to assume that because a commander excels at handling a small or medium sized unit that they will be effective handling larger units, and - most importantly - waging a campaign to achieve a strategic outcome.

No doubt, Barry could lead, organise and fight and inflict damage far out of proportion to the size of his resources, but that doesn't mean he could win. Him and his men, would be almost impossible to defeat, but that isn't the same as being capable of winning.

History is littered with great commanders who could fight but couldn't campaign (for various reasons) - the classic example is probably Lee, who could make war, as opposed to Grant, a much less gifted general, who could campaign.

The other factor that is sometimes overlooked is the role of the emergent RAF. If, as seems likely, they would have been given a freer hand in any resumed war, Barry and the other commanders would have found it a different operational environment, but no doubt they would have adapted.

That is a fair point, but it should be bourn in mind that the West Cork IRA was a much larger unit than the 100 or so men under Barry's direct command and while largely unarmed, they were handled quite effectivly by the Brigade leadership in the larger war against the British beyond the activities of the Column.

The question of how the IRA would have faired had they been able to import arms in large numbers, and how leaders like Barry would have coped with being in command of larger units is one that will never be answered, but it should also be rememberd that IRA did not just plan to make units in the active areas bigger, had an arms landing been successfuly staged, plans were in place for much of the landed arms to be distributed to other parts of the country.
Had the IRA managed to land several thousand rifles, it was not a case of creating a sincle large force in the active areas of Munster under Barry or anyone else, but of extending the war into previously inactive areas to force the British to streach their resources over larger parts of the country and thus relieve the active areas in Munster.
While Barry could have expected to recieve some arms and ammunition in the event of a successful arms landing, it would have been an increase to a force of several hundred rather than a force of several thousand, the trade off being that it would also have seen a reduction of opposing enemy forces in the Cork area as the British whould have had to counter increased IRA activity over more of the country and could no longer focus on swamping Cork with troops.

It should be noted that even if this did happen, it would still not bring the IRA anywhere near to parity with the British Forces in Ireland, but it would have allowed for an expansion of the war which the British government simply could not have continued with, it was not a similar case to the North in the 70's where the British could allow the conflict to drag on for decades, the whole of Ireland was united in opposition to the British Governments actions and there was large and mounting public opposition in Britian its self, the British government had from the outset been promising a swift and decisive victory to the British Public, as that promise was shown to be hollow and stories of the atrocities commited in Ireland filtered through to the British public, opinion was turning against the government, the government in power was becoming very unpopular because of the War and the opposition was highly critical of their conduct with regard to Ireland, had the war continued it is in my opinion certain that the British Government would have faced a crisis and it is more likely that they would have lost power rather then being allowed to impliment the measures needed to increase dramatically the troop presence in Ireland.