Is it right to be skeptical?

Peregrinus · 24-05-2019 2:26am

smacl wrote: »

I just wondering why qualify the word evidence with the word empirical? I would have thought evidence was by its nature empirical and that qualifying it thusly implied the existence of non-empirical evidence.

In the sense of "grounds for believing that a proposition is true or valid", evidence doesn't have to be emprical. There's no empirical evidence, for example, that a woman has the right to choose, or that the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides, so if you use the term "evidence" for the things which lead us to accept propositions like these, that must be non-empirical evidence.

Of course, some people wouldn't use the term "evidence" in that context. They'd make a distinction between empirically-observable facts and information, for which they use the word "evidence", and other grounds for belief - axioms, theses, inferences, deductions, etc - for which they wouldn't use that term. But all this really tells us is that they define the term "evidence" in a way that is limited to empirically observable phenomena. Which, you know, fine; it's a perfectly defensible definition. But definitions are subjective; they don't create a reality that didn't exist before.

Not to put words in Antiskeptic's mouth, but I think the thrust of his position is this: people who demand [empirically-observable] evidence for any claim are implicitly stating that a no claim should be accepted as true without such evidence. But that is itself a claim for which there is no [empirically-observable] evidence.

antiskeptic · 24-05-2019 7:57am

A platinum post there Perigrinus. It saves smacl the potential embarrassment of standing in a court one day, refusing, not only to swear on the bible, but refuse too, to give evidence on the basis that his witnessing the crime wasn't empirically demonstrable. ☺

smacl · 24-05-2019 8:26am

Peregrinus wrote: »

In the sense of "grounds for believing that a proposition is true or valid", evidence doesn't have to be emprical. There's no empirical evidence, for example, that a woman has the right to choose, or that the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides, so if you use the term "evidence" for the things which lead us to accept propositions like these, that must be non-empirical evidence.

Of course, some people wouldn't use the term "evidence" in that context. They'd make a distinction between empirically-observable facts and information, for which they use the word "evidence", and other grounds for belief - axioms, theses, inferences, deductions, etc - for which they wouldn't use that term. But all this really tells us is that they define the term "evidence" in a way that is limited to empirically observable phenomena. Which, you know, fine; it's a perfectly defensible definition. But definitions are subjective; they don't create a reality that didn't exist before.

Not to put words in Antiskeptic's mouth, but I think the thrust of his position is this: people who demand [empirically-observable] evidence for any claim are implicitly stating that a no claim should be accepted as true without such evidence. But that is itself a claim for which there is no [empirically-observable] evidence.

Let's consider your two examples here. There's no evidence, regardless of empiricism, that a woman has the right to choose. It is a right that has been accorded through consensus via democratic process that exists in some jurisdictions and not in others. With respect to Pythagoras, while it deals in the abstract of planar geometry, we can readily collect evidence via measured real world observations that this theorem holds true. We actually do collect this evidence billions of times per second through use of systems such as GPS which rely on calculation of distance between points which ends up using Pythagoras, i.e. distance is the square root of the sum of the squares of the coordinate differences on each axis. This is evidence and is also empirical.

My point remains that evidence is empirical. It is based on observation rather than conjecture, speculation, consensus, opinion or belief. It might be very weak evidence, such as limited, non-repeatable or testable observations, observations that might come second hand from an unreliable source or have been otherwise contaminated. It could be very strong evidence where observations are repeatable by anyone and can be blind tested to remove bias. Strength of evidence suggests probability of something being objectively true. Lack of evidence on the other hand leaves that thing as a subjective belief or opinion until shown to be otherwise.

Of course we can accept a claim as being true without being furnished with supporting evidence and in do so in good faith. This is an act of trust and a subjective decision. We all have trusted sources for information, for example when children receive information from parents and teachers.

smacl · 24-05-2019 8:40am

antiskeptic wrote: »

A platinum post there Perigrinus. It saves smacl the potential embarrassment of standing in a court one day, refusing, not only to swear on the bible, but refuse too, to give evidence on the basis that his witnessing the crime wasn't empirically demonstrable. ☺

I've worked as expert witness in the past, not had to swear on the bible, and presented evidence that led to prosecution. All the evidence presented was based on observation and by definition empirical. Perhaps you could give me example of a piece of evidence that would be acceptable in a court of law that is not empirical. Just in case you've forgotten, let's remind ourselves of what the word actually means

Merriam-Webster wrote:

Definition of empirical
1 : originating in or based on observation or experience
empirical data
2 : relying on experience or observation alone often without due regard for system and theory
an empirical basis for the theory
3 : capable of being verified or disproved by observation or experiment
empirical laws
4 : of or relating to empiricism

Peregrinus · 24-05-2019 8:46am

antiskeptic wrote: »

A platinum post there Perigrinus. It saves smacl the potential embarrassment of standing in a court one day, refusing, not only to swear on the bible, but refuse too, to give evidence on the basis that his witnessing the crime wasn't empirically demonstrable. ☺

His observation of the crime is itself empirical evidence of the crime.

His testimony in court that he witnessed the crime is itself empirical evidence of the fact that he witnessed the crime.

[Don't confuse "empirical evidence" with "absolute, incontrovertible proof".]

realdanbreen · 24-05-2019 8:50am

Macdarack wrote: »

If you were skeptical you wouldn't have written 'I'm a Christian'

Explain please.
And while you're at it explain why Jesus only arrived on earth 2000 odd years ago to spread the word when there were humans on earth for hundreds of thousands of years before that?

Peregrinus · 24-05-2019 9:19am

smacl wrote: »

Let's consider your two examples here. There's no evidence, regardless of empiricism, that a woman has the right to choose. It is a right that has been accorded through consensus via democratic process that exists in some jurisdictions and not in others . . .

God forbid that we should allow this thread to be derailed into a dicussion of the rights and wrongs of abortion. We know how that will end. But I do want to pick up one point here.

If, by "right to choose:", we mean a right to choose that is established by law, then of course that can be empirically evidenced; we can just read the relevant laws which establish the right.

But if we live in a country where the law does not allow women to exercise choice in regard to abortion, and a zealous campaigner wishes to criticise the law on the basis that it fails to respect women's right to choose, he's asserting that there is a right to choose which exists independently of the law, which precedes the law and which, indeed, can be invoked to determine what laws we should enact. And a right in that sense cannot be empirically evidenced, because it's not an empirical phenomemon; it's a moral or ethical proposition.

OK. But anyone who accepts this (or any other) moral or ethical proposition, asserts it to be true, calls for it to be respected, etc, etc, is clearly accepting a proposition which is not, and cannot be, empirically evidenced. Such a person cannot, with consistency, simultaneously claim that propositions should not be accepted unless empirically evidenced. At most, they could assert that some propositions ought not to be accepted without empirical evidence, and I think the onus would be on them to identify the class of propositions concerned, and to explain convincingly why they require empirical evidence when others do not.

Which is not necessarily an impossible task, but it does have to be attempted. And it is noteworthy that the proposition "there exists a class of proposition which requires empirical evidence" is a proposition which, itself, may not require empirical evidence, or at any rate isn't generally supported by offering empirical evidence.

smacl wrote: »

. . . With respect to Pythagoras, while it deals in the abstract of planar geometry, we can readily collect evidence via measured real world observations that this theorem holds true. We actually do collect this evidence billions of times per second through use of systems such as GPS which rely on calculation of distance between points which ends up using Pythagoras, i.e. distance is the square root of the sum of the squares of the coordinate differences on each axis. This is evidence and is also empirical.

The theorem is approximately true for real-world objects which approximate to a Pythagorean right-angled triangle. But this is no help; actual Pythagorean right-angled triangles have no material existence and cannot be empirically observed. Nobody attempst to prove Pythagoras by taking approximate measurements and arguing that what can be empirically observed to be approximately true must be ideally absolutely true. Every junior cert maths student (who is not headed for failure in the exam and a row with the Da) can offer you a proof of Pythogoras; no empirical observations are involved.

Which comes back to the point just made, and leads to a refinement; there exists a class (or classes) of propositions which do not require empirical evidence and whose truth or validity is better demonstrated in other ways. Which refutes any assumption or assertion about the pre-eminence or superiority of emperical evidence as a method of advancing knowledge generally. At best, this can be true only for certain classes of knowledge.

smacl wrote: »

My point remains that evidence is empirical. It is based on observation rather than conjecture, speculation, consensus, opinion or belief. It might be very weak evidence, such as limited, non-repeatable or testable observations, observations that might come second hand from an unreliable source or have been otherwise contaminated. It could be very strong evidence where observations are repeatable by anyone and can be blind tested to remove bias. Strength of evidence suggests probability of something being objectively true. Lack of evidence on the other hand leaves that thing as a subjective belief or opinion until shown to be otherwise.

And we're back to definitions. If we want to define "evidence" as meaning always 'empirically-observable phenomena", as I said before, fine; I can live with that. That's generally how I use the word myself. But . . .

smacl wrote: »

Of course we can accept a claim as being true without being furnished with supporting evidence and in do so in good faith. This is an act of trust and a subjective decision. We all have trusted sources for information, for example when children receive information from parents and teachers.

. . . there's more to it that that. There are lots of non-evidential reasons for accepting the truth of a proposition beside "Mummy told me so" and, as for instance with Pythagoras, sometimes those reasons can be more compelling than any evidence could be. It all depends on the class of proposition.

I tentatively suggest as follows:

1. For propositions about material, physical objects, evidence (in the "empirical evidence" sense) is likely to provide a more compelling basis for accept their truth (or rejecting it) than anything else.

2. Philosophical materialists (in the sense of "those who believe that nothing is real except matter and its movements and modifications") will tend to believe, or default to the belief, that only propositions about material objects can be true (or at least that they can be truer than any other kind of proposition) and therefore ultimate truth can be established by, and only by, evidence.

3. We live in a culture steeped in materialism (in the sense just outlined, but also in other senses) and therefore we tend to absorb this assumption of the pre-eminence of evidence as a route to knowledge.

4. There is some tension between this assumption and our commitment to moral/ethicals propositions, or our reliance on ideal propositions that prove to have useful real-world applications (like Pythagoras). We mostly contrive not to notice this tension by not thinking too hard about it.

5. We probably should think a bit more about it.

realdanbreen · 24-05-2019 9:47am

Peregrinus wrote: »

God forbid that we should allow this thread to be derailed into a dicussion of the rights and wrongs of abortion. We know how that will end. But I do want to pick up one point here.

If, by "right to choose:", we mean a right to choose that is established by law, then of course that can be empirically evidenced; we can just read the relevant laws which establish the right.

But if we live in a country where the law does not allow women to exercise choice in regard to abortion, and a zealous campaigner wishes to criticise the law on the basis that it fails to respect women's right to choose, he's asserting that there is a right to choose which exists independently of the law, which precedes the law and which, indeed, can be invoked to determine what laws we should enact. And a right in that sense cannot be empirically evidenced, because it's not an empirical phenomemon; it's a moral or ethical proposition.

OK. But anyone who accepts this (or any other) moral or ethical proposition, asserts it to be true, calls for it to be respected, etc, etc, is clearly accepting a proposition which is not, and cannot be, empirically evidenced. Such a person cannot, with consistency, simultaneously claim that propositions should not be accepted unless empirically evidenced. At most, they could assert that some propositions ought not to be accepted without empirical evidence, and I think the onus would be on them to identify the class of propositions concerned, and to explain convincingly why they require empirical evidence when others do not.

Which is not necessarily an impossible task, but it does have to be attempted. And it is noteworthy that the proposition "there exists a class of proposition which requires empirical evidence" is a proposition which, itself, may not require empirical evidence, or at any rate isn't generally supported by offering empirical evidence.

The theorem is approximately true for real-world objects which approximate to a Pythagorean right-angled triangle. But this is no help; actual Pythagorean right-angled triangles have no material existence and cannot be empirically observed. Nobody attempst to prove Pythagoras by taking approximate measurements and arguing that what can be empirically observed to be approximately true must be ideally absolutely true. Every junior cert maths student (who is not headed for failure in the exam and a row with the Da) can offer you a proof of Pythogoras; no empirical observations are involved.

Which comes back to the point just made, and leads to a refinement; there exists a class (or classes) of propositions which do not require empirical evidence and whose truth or validity is better demonstrated in other ways. Which refutes any assumption or assertion about the pre-eminence or superiority of emperical evidence as a method of advancing knowledge generally. At best, this can be true only for certain classes of knowledge.

And we're back to definitions. If we want to define "evidence" as meaning always 'empirically-observable phenomena", as I said before, fine; I can live with that. That's generally how I use the word myself. But . . .

. . . there's more to it that that. There are lots of non-evidential reasons for accepting the truth of a proposition beside "Mummy told me so" and, as for instance with Pythagoras, sometimes those reasons can be more compelling than any evidence could be. It all depends on the class of proposition.

I tentatively suggest as follows:

1. For propositions about material, physical objects, evidence (in the "empirical evidence" sense) is likely to provide a more compelling basis for accept their truth (or rejecting it) than anything else.

2. Philosophical materialists (in the sense of "those who believe that nothing is real except matter and its movements and modifications") will tend to believe, or default to the belief, that only propositions about material objects can be true (or at least that they can be truer than any other kind of proposition) and therefore ultimate truth can be established by, and only by, evidence.

3. We live in a culture steeped in materialism (in the sense just outlined, but also in other senses) and therefore we tend to absorb this assumption of the pre-eminence of evidence as a route to knowledge.

4. There is some tension between this assumption and our commitment to moral/ethicals propositions, or our reliance on ideal propositions that prove to have useful real-world applications (like Pythagoras). We mostly contrive not to notice this tension by not thinking too hard about it.

5. We probably should think a bit more about it.

A foot long post!

smacl · 24-05-2019 10:20am

Peregrinus wrote: »

We probably should think a bit more about it.

Yes indeed. Bit pushed for time now but will respond in more detail later on once I get a chance.

Effects · 24-05-2019 10:37am

realdanbreen wrote: »

And while you're at it explain why Jesus only arrived on earth 2000 odd years ago to spread the word when there were humans on earth for hundreds of thousands of years before that?

He had to wait long enough for humans to evolve to a level where they could understand and accept him. It's not that difficult to understand.

realdanbreen · 24-05-2019 11:17am

Effects wrote: »

realdanbreen wrote: »

And while you're at it explain why Jesus only arrived on earth 2000 odd years ago to spread the word when there were humans on earth for hundreds of thousands of years before that?

He had to wait long enough for humans to evolve to a level where they could understand and accept him. It's not that difficult to understand.

Oh right, so I guess the philosopher Socrates would have been too dumb to figure out what Jesus was talking about. And I guess Cleopatra was just some dumb broad from Egypt!

victor8600 · 24-05-2019 11:54am

martinedwards wrote: »

...I'm a Christian.

I absolutely believe in the Life, death and resurrection of Jesus.

There is Jesus and his teachings and then there are churches. Christian religions had to incorporate pagan customs and beliefs to gain acceptance in the populace. Did Jesus teach to wear a cross or to worship statues of Holy Mary? Very unlikely.

All the extra stuff in Christianity, like holy relics and the ancient festivals re-purposed for religious needs, are just there to attract people. Churches are really tourist visitor centres "enhancing the experience" of divine, just like the Cliffs of Moher Visitor Centre. Those are places to get postcards, "unique" rocks made in China, get something to eat and to watch a movie about the place as if you cannot see the cliffs with your own eyes.

antiskeptic · 26-05-2019 6:43pm

realdanbreen wrote: »

A foot long post!

Beats your inch wide one. If that not empirically demonstrable.

antiskeptic · 26-05-2019 7:17pm

Peregrinus wrote: »

His observation of the crime is itself empirical evidence of the crime.

Even if he's making up a story about his observing the crime?

His testimony in court that he witnessed the crime is itself empirical evidence of the fact that he witnessed the crime.

Even if he's making up a story about his observing the crime? I would have thought the jury would be more involved in a faith exercise.

Peregrinus · 27-05-2019 3:09am

antiskeptic wrote: »

Even if he's making up a story about his observing the crime?

We have to distinguish between

(a) what he saw; and

(b) what he says he saw.

So let's say: I murder you; Smacl is present on the occasion and sees all.

OK. Smacl's observation is empirical evidence of the murder - evidence that wouldn't exist if smacl hadn't been there. It's empirical because it's something smacl observed himself. But it's only empirical for Smacl; it's his observation.

Skip forward a few months. I am on trial. Smacle gives evidence, saying, "I say Peregrinus murder antiskeptic".

This is empirical evidence for the jury because they observed smacl say it. It's empirical evidnence that smacl witnessed the murder. But it's not direct empirical evidenced of the murder itself, because the jury didn't observe the murder. At best it's indirect; that smacl witnessed a murder can only be true if, in fact, there was a murder.

This is where we have to distinguish between empirical evidence and irrefutable evidence. As you point out, smacl could be lying. Or he could be delusional. Or he could be mistaken. So his testimony is empirical evidence (becuse the jury has observed it), but it's not conclusive proof. So the jury may be reluctant to convict without corroborating evidence - your corpse, with the stab wounds; a knife, with my fingerprints; another witness, whose account corroborates smacl's; that kind of thing. Each of these is empirical evidence; none of them are conclusive on their own but, taken together, they may convince the jury beyond reasonable doubt that I murdered you.

Non-empirical evidence might be a juror reasoning that, in the circumstances outlines at the trial, I had a strong motive for killing you. I didn't testify or ever confess, and nobody else (obviously) can give evidence about my state of mind, so the juror's conclusions about my motivation are necessarily non-empirical; they don't arise out of anything he observed, but out of his reasoning and his own beliefs about how people's minds work.

antiskeptic · 28-05-2019 11:12pm

Peregrinus wrote: »

We have to distinguish between

(a) what he saw; and

(b) what he says he saw.

So let's say: I murder you; Smacl is present on the occasion and sees all.

OK. Smacl's observation is empirical evidence of the murder - evidence that wouldn't exist if smacl hadn't been there. It's empirical because it's something smacl observed himself. But it's only empirical for Smacl; it's his observation.

Skip forward a few months. I am on trial. Smacle gives evidence, saying, "I say Peregrinus murder antiskeptic".

This is empirical evidence for the jury because they observed smacl say it. It's empirical evidnence that smacl witnessed the murder. But it's not direct empirical evidenced of the murder itself, because the jury didn't observe the murder. At best it's indirect; that smacl witnessed a murder can only be true if, in fact, there was a murder.

This is where we have to distinguish between empirical evidence and irrefutable evidence. As you point out, smacl could be lying. Or he could be delusional. Or he could be mistaken. So his testimony is empirical evidence (becuse the jury has observed it), but it's not conclusive proof. So the jury may be reluctant to convict without corroborating evidence - your corpse, with the stab wounds; a knife, with my fingerprints; another witness, whose account corroborates smacl's; that kind of thing. Each of these is empirical evidence; none of them are conclusive on their own but, taken together, they may convince the jury beyond reasonable doubt that I murdered you.

Non-empirical evidence might be a juror reasoning that, in the circumstances outlines at the trial, I had a strong motive for killing you. I didn't testify or ever confess, and nobody else (obviously) can give evidence about my state of mind, so the juror's conclusions about my motivation are necessarily non-empirical; they don't arise out of anything he observed, but out of his reasoning and his own beliefs about how people's minds work.

Understood. Thanks.

I've been around empricists too long. They keep on screaming for empirical evidence, which, it turns out, I've been giving them in telling them all along that God exists!

Peregrinus · 29-05-2019 2:08am

antiskeptic wrote: »

Understood. Thanks.

I've been around empricists too long. They keep on screaming for empirical evidence, which, it turns out, I've been giving them in telling them all along that God exists!

That's empirical evidence of your belief in God's existence; not empirical evidence that he exists. What they really mean is, is your belief in God's existence grounded in empirical evidence?

Going back to the murder trial, smacl believes I murdered you because of what he himself observed empirically. The jury might not attach so much weight to his evidence if it was grounded not in what he saw, but in his conviction that I am a violent and wicked person.

Is your belief in God also the result of some emprical observation that you made? That, I think, is what your interlocutors are asking.

I think your interlocutors are guilty of a category error. If, in fact, God exists, what empirical evidence would there be of that, that is not found? And if there's no clear answer to that question (and I suspect there isn't) then "God exists" looks to me like it's in the category of claims that are not susceptible of investigation by scrutinising empirical evidence.

smacl · 29-05-2019 8:40am

Just coming back to this now, apologies for the delay;

Peregrinus wrote: »

The theorem is approximately true for real-world objects which approximate to a Pythagorean right-angled triangle. But this is no help; actual Pythagorean right-angled triangles have no material existence and cannot be empirically observed. Nobody attempst to prove Pythagoras by taking approximate measurements and arguing that what can be empirically observed to be approximately true must be ideally absolutely true. Every junior cert maths student (who is not headed for failure in the exam and a row with the Da) can offer you a proof of Pythogoras; no empirical observations are involved.

I suspect this issue here is that mathematics, in this case geometry of the plane, is a pure abstract. The plane is a closed system and a construct of our imagination, as are points, lines, and triangles that might lie on that plane. We can and do synthesize data in this system which we treat as observations and use to demonstrate Pythagoras, but we typically need something a bit more robust for proof. For a bit of fun, here are 122 proofs to Pythagoras some of which do rely heavily on (synthetic) observation rather than mathematics (e.g. proof by tesselation). While one might consider this empirical, it is empiricism within the closed abstract system under consideration. Planar and spatial geometry are useful ways of describing real world objects and their relationships, which in turn can become the basis of empirical observation, but they're no more than an efficient alternative to the English words we use to describe the same thing.

Ethics and philosophy and are also abstract constructs. Like mathematics they're highly useful and may form the basis of description and action, but as abstracts they're not subject to observation.

To someone who is not religious, such as myself, religion is also an abstract construct. I acknowledge that there are claims of observations such as miracles that can be considered as empirical observation, but the veracity of this data is not testable.

Going back to the murder trial, smacl believes I murdered you because of what he himself observed empirically. The jury might not attach so much weight to his evidence if it was grounded not in what he saw, but in his conviction that I am a violent and wicked person.

This is a key point in my opinion and corresponds quite closely to religious belief. Faith rests largely on the testimony of others, particularly that provided by parents and teachers to children. It can be viewed as a chain of trust passing through the generations. Unfortunately, I think the jury may be prejudiced P. and I reckon you'll be found guilty for all the wrong reasons. Apparently orange is the new black

Peregrinus · 29-05-2019 9:50am

smacl wrote: »

. . . mathematics . . . is a pure abstract. . .

Yup. And to the materialist (in the sense already discussed) this means it’s not real, or not important, or not meaningful, or none of these things. Hold onto that thought.

smacl wrote: »

I acknowledge that there are claims of observations such as miracles that can be considered as empirical observation, but the veracity of this data is not testable.

(Forgive me for taking this one out of the sequence you put it in; I just want to get it out of the way.)

Even if putative miraculous events are testable - and sometimes they are - you can never prove by empirical evidence that they are miraculous. I can establish by empirical evidence that you have been cured of cancer, say, and I can possibly also exclude by empirical evidence all the known possible causes of such a cure. But this doesn’t mean that your cure is miraculous or supernatural or whatever; just that I can’t explain it. And, as we know, lots of things in the past could not be explained and were attributed to miracle/supernatural causes/divine intervention which nowadays we can readily account for with empirically-established naturalistic explanations.

Your inexplicable cure doesn’t have to be miraculous; it could just be inexplicable because we don’t understand enough about cancer. Which is why I don’t think inexplicable events count as emprical evidence for the supernatural.

smacl wrote: »

Ethics and philosophy and are also abstract constructs. Like mathematics they're highly useful and may form the basis of description and action, but as abstracts they're not subject to observation.

To someone who is not religious, such as myself, religion is also an abstract construct.

And not just to someone who is not religious such as yourself.

Imagine a very simplistic, literalist understanding of God in which God actually is a very old man with a long white beard who lives in the physical heavens above us. Such a God is in principle susceptible of empirical observation.

Right. Most of us understand that that concept of God, even for fairly literalist believers, is in reality a figurative one. A few oddballs aside, Christians never, at any time, believed that God was an actual physical old man in the actual physical heavens. So the failure to observe God with telescopes, from aeroplanes or through the use of beard-seeking technology tells us precisely zero about the existence of God, one way or the other.

So, let me offer you a different metaphor for God. Think of God as an author, who writes the book in which we are characters. Without the author, there would be no book and no characters. The author, therefore, is the explanation - the fully sufficient explanation - for the existence of the book and the characters. But to the characters in the book, the author is not capable of empirical observation, because he’s not a character in the book. The characters in the book might speculate about the existence of the author, and they might observe that their own existence, and the existence of everything they empirically observe, is accounted for by hypothesising the author. But how are they to know if the hypothesis is correct?

They are not to know it, one way or the other, by empirical observation because, by definition, they author they have hypothesised is not someone who could be empirically observed within the book. If they look for empirical evidence of the author, they are making the category error that I pointed to earlier).

OK. It’s much easier to say how they are not to evaluate the author-hypothesis than it is to say how they are to evaluate it. But this isn’t a problem unique to the author-hypothesis. It applies to lots of things including, as I have pointed out, mathematics, ethics, and other fields of enquiry whose utility, validity, meaningfulness, etc. is not in doubt.

One possible, and I think quite reasonable, position for a character to take is to say “I don’t care whether the author hypothesis is correct or not. If it is correct, that explains my existence. If it’s not correct, I have no ready explanation for my existence but, frankly, that doesn’t bother me. I get by just fine without one” . As I say, that’s reasonable, but it’s not in any sense a refutation or critique of the author-hypothesis; just a lack of interest in it.

Another position might be “I find the author-hypothesis implausible because it doesn’t stack up for me. Even if the author did exist on some other plane not observable by us, why would he bother to write a book? What would be the point?”. That is a critique of the author-hypothesis, but not an especially compelling one; my inability to understand why anyone would write a book probably tells you more about me than it does about the author-hypothesis.

Maybe we should turn the question around; why would anyone accept the author-hypothesis? Or, why do people in fact accept it? People may accept it because they find it a more satisfactory or more coherent answer to the question of existence (or some other question) than anything else that presents itself to them. I don’t think it’s enough to say, though, that they accept it because Mummy and Daddy told them to; we’re all quite capable of evaluating and rejecting (or accepting) other stuff that Mummy and Daddy tell us, and indeed doing this is a normal part of human maturing. While it might be comforting to atheists to believe that they are more mature than theists in this regard, the very fact that it is comforting to them should lead us to be sceptical of the notion. Plus, there is no (ahem) empirical evidence for it.

smacl · 29-05-2019 11:07am

Peregrinus wrote: »

Maybe we should turn the question around; why would anyone accept the author-hypothesis? Or, why do people in fact accept it? People may accept it because they find it a more satisfactory or more coherent answer to the question of existence (or some other question) than anything else that presents itself to them. I don’t think it’s enough to say, though, that they accept it because Mummy and Daddy told them to; we’re all quite capable of evaluating and rejecting (or accepting) other stuff that Mummy and Daddy tell us, and indeed doing this is a normal part of human maturing. While it might be comforting to atheists to believe that they are more mature than theists in this regard, the very fact that it is comforting to them should lead us to be sceptical of the notion. Plus, there is no (ahem) empirical evidence for it.

My personal opinion, having been raised an atheist, is there is some serious confirmation bias involved here, notably around the subject of death and mortality. If, as a young child, you're given the impression that your subjective existence can be extended indefinitely through adherence to religious belief, and you sincerely fear a death that involves ceasing to exist in any subjective sense, you will really want your religious beliefs to be true. This bias is reinforced, particularly for those leading a very hard life, by suggesting that the next life will be considerably superior to this one. I would imagine that becoming an atheist for someone who was previously a theist would be a tough move. For those leading a miserable life, tougher still. I'm with Marx on this one "Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people" When religion is introduced at a young age, or at a low ebb, I would imagine that it could be difficult to deal with critically.

Effects · 31-05-2019 10:38am

realdanbreen wrote: »

Oh right, so I guess the philosopher Socrates would have been too dumb to figure out what Jesus was talking about.

Where's your proof that Socrates even existed?

Clearly you don't understand evolution. What good would Jesus have been if he existed in the time of Neanderthal man?

pauldla · 03-06-2019 1:21am

Effects wrote: »

He had to wait long enough for humans to evolve to a level where they could understand and accept him. It's not that difficult to understand.

Best comment on this thread so far...

ChrisJ84 · 06-06-2019 4:33pm

Peregrinus wrote: »

Yup. And to the materialist (in the sense already discussed) this means it’s not real, or not important, or not meaningful, or none of these things. Hold onto that thought.

Yuval Noah Harari picks up on that theme in his book, Sapiens. He basically says that our biology is material reality, and everything else is an imagined reality (religion, nation states, culture, public limited companies, economics etc. etc.) that may be useful or even valuable, but is ultimately a construct we use to make sense of the world and our experiences in it.

Obviously, as a Christian I disagree with many of his conclusions but it's still a really stimulating read that approaches these questions from a purely materialistic perspective.

hinault · 09-06-2019 3:58pm

Atlantic Dawn wrote: »

The star positions over Bethlehem at Christmas for the birth of Jesus could never have happened, the bible is a joke of a book if it can't get basic real facts correct.

False.

The scientific and cosmological evidence today confirms the narrative written two thousand years ago about a cosmological event.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kO7Dz0uOMjM

pauldla · 10-06-2019 2:18am

hinault wrote: »

False.

The scientific and cosmological evidence today confirms the narrative written two thousand years ago about a cosmological event.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kO7Dz0uOMjM

I think the best that can be said is 'maybe'. Not the 'never happened' as our co-poster puts it, but not solid scientific or astronomical evidence either (I suggest you meant 'astronomical' rather than 'cosmological'?).

Is it right to be skeptical?

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